605 Phil.

357

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170532, April 24, 2009

THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF MARINDUQUE, PETITIONER, VS.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARCOPPER MINING
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Provincial Assessor of the Province of Marinduque (petitioner) assails by Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court the May 30, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which declared the Siltation Dam and Decant System of Marcopper Mining
Corporation (respondent) exempt from real property tax; and the September 29, 2005 CA
Resolution[2] which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner issued against respondent an Assessment Notice,[3] dated March 28, 1994, for real
property taxes due on the latter's real properties, including its Siltation Dam and Decant System
(subject property) at Barangay Lamese, Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. The subject property is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 05-35697 dated November 17, 1993, and has a market value of
Php36,360,996.19.[4]

Respondent paid the tax demanded,[5] but appealed the assessment before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA) on the ground that the subject property is exempt from real
property taxation under Section 234(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160[6] or the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides:

Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The following are exempted from
payment of the real property tax:

xxx

(e) Machinery and equipment used for pollution control and environmental
protection.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Attached to its appeal is an Affidavit issued by its Chief Mining Engineer Ricardo Esquieres, Jr.
(Esquieres), stating that the subject property was constructed to comply with the condition
imposed by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) that respondent
prevent run-offs and silt materials from contaminating the Mogpog and Boac Rivers; and
describing the subject property as a specialized combination of essential impervious earth
materials with a special provision for a spillway and a diversion canal. Esquieres explains that
the subject property is intended for the purpose of pollution control, sediment control, domestic
and agricultural water supply and flood control.[7]

Respondent also submitted a May 24, 1994 Certification issued by DENR Regional Technical
Director Carlos J. Magno that the subject property is a "Siltation

Dam structure intended primarily for pollution control of silted materials x x x."[8]

In a Decision[9] dated November 10, 1995, the LBAA dismissed respondent's appeal for having
been filed out of time. It further held that the subject property is taxable as an improvement on
the principal real property, citing the ruling of the Court in Benguet Corporation v. Central
Board of Assessment Appeals[10] that a tailings dam is a permanent improvement not exempt
from real property taxation.

Respondent appealed[11] to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) which, in a

Decision[12] dated December 21, 1998, held that respondent's appeal with the LBAA is timely,
but the same lacked legal basis because the subject property was neither a machinery nor an
equipment but a permanent improvement, and therefore not tax exempt under Sec. 234(e) of
R.A. No. 7160. Citing the definition of machinery under Sec. 199 of R.A. No. 7160, viz.:

Sec. 199. Definition of Terms. - When used in this Title, the term:

xxxx

(o) Machinery embraces machines, equipment, mechanical contrivances,

instruments, appliances or apparatus which may or may not be attached, permanently
or temporarily, to the real property. It includes the physical facilities for production,
the installations and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-
powered or self-propelled, and those not permanently attached to the real property
which are actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular
industry, business or activity and which by their very nature and purpose are
designed for, or necessary to its manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial,
industrial or agricultural purposes."

the CBAA held that to be considered a "machinery," the subject property must either be a
physical facility for production; or a service facility; or one that is actually, directly and
exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular industry, business, or activity; and which by
its very nature and purpose is designed for, or necessary to a manufacturing, mining, logging,
commercial, industrial or agricultural purpose. The subject property does not produce anything
nor operate as auxiliary to a production process; thus, it is neither a physical facility for
production nor a service facility. It is not even necessary to the mining activity of respondent,
because its purpose is merely to contain silt and sediments.[13]

Moreover, the CBAA noted that based on an ocular inspection it conducted, the subject property
had not been actually used for pollution control, for it had been out of operation since 1993.[14]

Respondent filed a Petition/Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[15] but the CBAA denied the
same in its July 27, 2000 Resolution.[16]

Respondent appealed[17] to the CA on the sole issue of whether the subject property was tax
exempt under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160.[18]

The CA reversed the LBAA and CBAA in its Decision dated May 30, 2005 herein assailed, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS CONSIDERED, the instant petition for

review is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, dated December 21, 1998 and July 27, 2000,
respectively are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner's siltation dam and
decant system being exempt from real property tax as it is hereby determined, the
Municipal Treasurer of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, is hereby directed to refund the tax
payments made by petitioner under protest, or in lieu thereof, to credit said payments
in favor of petitioner for any taxes it will be required to pay in the future.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The CA held that the concept of machinery under Section 199 of R.A. No. 7160 is broad enough
to include a "machinery, instrument, apparatus or device consisting of parts which, functioning
together, allows a person to perform a task more efficiently," such as the subject property. Not
only does it function as a machinery, but it is also actually and directly used for the mining
business of petitioner. The CA noted that it was constructed in compliance with a DENR
requirement; thus, it "is part and parcel of [respondent's] mining operations to protect the
environment within which it operates xxx [i]t is a device used for cleaning up after production,
in order to clean the water which must necessarily flow into the Mogpog and Boac Rivers."[20]

Thus, the CA held that the subject property was exempt from real property taxation under
Section 91 of R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,[21] viz.:

Sec. 91. Incentives for Pollution Control Devices. - Pollution control devices
acquired, constructed or installed by contractors shall not be considered as
improvements on the land or building where they are placed, and shall not be
subject to real property and other taxes or assessments: Provided, however, That
payment of mine wastes and tailings fees is not exempted. (Emphasis supplied)

It qualifies as a pollution control device defined under DENR Administrative Order No. 95-23
as an "infrastructure, machinery, equipment, and/or improvement used for impounding, treating
or neutralizing, precipitating, filtering, conveying and cleansing mine industrial waste and
tailing, as well as eliminating and reducing hazardous effects of solid particles, chemicals,
liquids or other harmful by-products and gases emitted from any facility utilized in mining
operations for their disposal."[22] The definition "extends to all kinds of pollution control
devices acquired, constructed, or installed on the land or buildings of the mining corporation."
[23]

Finally, the CA ruled that, contrary to the view of the CBAA, the non-operational state of the
subject property "does not remove it from the purview of the clear provisions of R.A. No. 7160
x x x and R.A. No. 7942 x x x [i]n the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the
siltation dam and decant system was inutile to achieve its purpose prior to being damaged, and
continued to be so x x x."[24]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[25] but the CA denied it in a Resolution[26] dated
September 29, 2005.

Hence, the present petition, raising two main issues:

I. The propriety of the present action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court:

i. Whether or not there is available to Petitioner, the remedy of appeal or

other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law;

ii. Whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy;

iii. Whether or not, if available to the Petitioner, the remedy of appeal or

other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
were lost through the fault of the Petitioner.

II. Whether or not the Respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the Decision and
its subsequent Resolution, exempting the siltation dam and decant system of
Respondent Marcopper from the real property tax imposed by the Provincial
Government of Marinduque.

i. Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it whimsically,
arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded by treating as though non-
existent, the established and undisputed fact that the Siltation Dam
Decant System of Respondent Marcopper was damaged and has not been
in operation since 1993 up to, at the very least, the ocular inspection
conducted by the CBAA in November 1996, if not up to the present, given
the failure of Respondent Marcopper to claim otherwise;

ii. Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it whimsically,
arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded, by treating as though non-
existent, the established and undisputed fact that Respondent Marcopper
does not have a certificate of tax exemption from the DENR under the
provisions of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 so as to entitle it to
 exemption from the realty tax imposed by the local government of
Marinduque.

iii. Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, inspite of the non-
operation during the relevant years of the Siltation Dam and Decant
System, the lack of certificate of tax exemption therefor and the clear and
unambiguous provisions of the Local Government Code and the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, it declared the aforesaid real property as
a machinery and equipment or a pollution control device that is exempt
from realty tax.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner posits that the CA committed not only a reversible error in holding that the subject
property is tax exempt under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160, but also a grave abuse of discretion
in discarding key factual findings of both the LBAA and the CBAA regarding the nature of the
subject property -- which factual findings respondent did not even controvert. Petitioner points
out that the CBAA found that the subject property had not been used for pollution control
because it had been out of operation since 1993;[28] and respondent admitted this in its Petition
for Review before the CA where it categorically stated that "[w]hat is not denied, however,
which even the barangay resolutions state was that the siltation dam was damaged in 1993 when
a typhoon hit Marinduque. This naturally affected the environment in the area for which reason
Marcopper specifically wanted to repair the dam."[29] Yet, petitioner argues, the CA completely
ignored such undisputed fact by holding that there is "absence of clear and convincing evidence
that the siltation dam and decant system was inutile to achieve its purpose prior to being
damaged, and continued to be so x x x."[30]

Petitioner further cites the finding of the CBAA that respondent did not obtain from the DENR a
certification of the tax exempt classification of the subject properties. This CBAA finding was
not controverted by respondent in its pleadings before the CA; yet, said court completely
glossed over this matter and declared the subject properties tax exempt.[31]

On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioner's mode of appeal from the CA Decision
should have been a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
within fifteen (15) days from October 13, 2005, the day petitioner received notice of the CA
Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. That petitioner filed instead a Petition for
Certiorari on December 12, 2005 -- the 60th day from receipt of the CA Resolution -- indicates
that it resorted to a special civil action for certiorari as a substitute for the appeal it had lost;[32]
worse, petitioner raised factual issues which the Court cannot resolve for it is no trier of facts.
[33]

The petition has merit.

On the proper mode of appeal

Previously, under Section 36 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464 or the Real Property Tax
Code, the proper mode of appeal from a decision rendered by the CBAA was by special civil
action for certiorari filed directly with the Court.[34] However, with the passage of R.A. No.
7902,[35] granting the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of boards and
commissions, the Court issued Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95[36] which provides
under paragraphs 1[37] and 5[38] that appeal from a decision of the CBAA shall be by Petition
for Review with the CA. Thus, from the final judgment of the CA, appeal to the Court on
questions of law is by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[39]
The availability of such remedy bars recourse to a special civil action for certiorari even if one
of the grounds invoked is grave abuse of discretion.[40]

Indeed, petitioner erred in its mode of appeal by Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.[41]
Nonetheless, in its Resolution[42] of July 5, 2006, the Court gave due course to the petition for it
involves not only the power of taxation of a local government unit but also its stewardship of the
environment. The higher interest of public welfare dictates that the Court suspend its rules pro
hac vice in order to resolve the merits of the petition.[43]

On whether the subject property is exempt from real property taxation

It should be borne in mind that the protest and appeals filed by respondents before the LBAA,
CBAA, and CA refer to the Assessment Notice dated March 28, 1994 and effective January 1,
1995.[44] No other assessment notice is under question.

The disputed assessment notice having taken effect on January 1, 1995, its validity is
determined by the provisions of Title II (Real Property Taxation) of R.A. No. 7160, effective
January 1, 1992. R.A. No. 7942 has no bearing on the matter, for this law came into effect only
on April 14, 1995. Hence, reference to R.A. No. 7942 by the CA and the respondent are all out
of place.

Title II of R.A. No. 7160 governs the administration, appraisal, assessment, levy and collection
of real property tax. Section 234 thereof grants exemption from real property taxation based on
ownership, character or usage. As the Court explained in Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Marcos,[45] to wit:

Section 234 of the LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property
taxes and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical
persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except as
provided therein.

xxxx

These exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and use of the property.
Thus:

(a) Ownership Exemptions. Exemptions from real property taxes on the basis of
ownership are real properties owned by: (i) the Republic, (ii) a province, (iii) a city,
(iv) a municipality, (v) a barangay, and (vi) registered cooperatives.
 (b) Character Exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of their
character are: (i) charitable institutions, (ii) houses and temples of prayer like
churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and (iii) non-profit
or religious cemeteries.

(c) Usage exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the basis of the
actual, direct and exclusive use to which they are devoted are: (i) all lands,
buildings and improvements which are actually directly and exclusively used for
religious, charitable or educational purposes; (ii) all machineries and equipment
actually, directly and exclusively used by local water districts or by government-
owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and transmission of electric power; and (iii) all machinery and
equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection.

To help provide a healthy environment in the midst of the modernization of the

country, all machinery and equipment for pollution control and environmental
protection may not be taxed by local governments. (Emphasis supplied)

As held in Mactan, the exemption granted under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160 to "[m]achinery
and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection" is based on usage. The
term usage means direct, immediate and actual application of the property itself to the
exempting purpose.[46] Section 199 of R.A. No. 7160 defines actual use as "the purpose for
which the property is principally or predominantly utilized by the person in possession thereof."
It contemplates concrete, as distinguished from mere potential, use. Thus, a claim for exemption
under Sec. 234(e) of R.A. No. 7160 should be supported by evidence that the property sought to
be exempt is actually, directly and exclusively used for pollution control and environmental
protection.[47]

The records yield no allegation or evidence by respondent that the subject property was actually,
directly and exclusively used for pollution control and environmental protection during the
period covered by the assessment notice under protest. Rather, the finding of the CBAA that
said property "apparently out of commission and not apt to its function as would control
pollution and protect the environment"[48] stands undisputed; such finding is even admitted by
respondent when, to repeat, in its Petition for Review before the CA, it categorically stated that
"[w]hat is not denied, however, which even the barangay resolutions state was that the siltation
dam was damaged in 1993 when a typhoon hit Marinduque. This naturally affected the
environment in the area for which reason Marcopper specifically wanted to repair the dam."[49]

Moreover, Sec. 206 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for exemption from real property
taxation, viz.:

Sec. 206. Proof of Exemption of Real Property from Taxation. - Every person by or
for whom real property is declared, who shall claim tax exemption for such
property under this Title shall file with the provincial, city or municipal assessor
within thirty (30) days from the date of the declaration of real property sufficient
documentary evidence in support of such claim including corporate charters, title
of ownership, articles of incorporation, bylaws, contracts, affidavits, certifications
 and mortgage deeds, and similar documents. If the required evidence is not
submitted within the period herein prescribed, the property shall be listed as taxable
in the assessment roll. However, if the property shall be proven to be tax exempt, the
same shall be dropped from the assessment roll. (Emphasis supplied)

The burden is upon the taxpayer to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that his claim for
exemption has legal and factual basis.[50]

As aptly pointed out by petitioner, there is no allegation nor evidence in respondent's pleadings
that it had complied with the procedural requirement under Sec. 206. There is nothing in the
records that would indicate that, within 30 days from its filing of Tax Declaration No. 05-35697
on November 17, 1993,[51] respondent filed with the provincial assessor an application for
exemption or any documentary evidence of the exempt status of the subject property.

What respondent submitted along with its appeal before the LBAA are Affidavit of Esquieres,
[52] the project design of the subject property,[53] as well as a Certification[54] dated May 24,
1994 issued by Carlos J. Magno, Regional Technical Director of DENR Regional Office No. IV.

But far from proving that the subject property is tax exempt, the documents classify the subject
property as anything but machinery or equipment.

The DENR Certification classifies the subject property as a "structure intended primarily for
pollution control of silted materials in order to protect the environmental degredation of
Maguila-guila, Mangamu-Mogpog River system from getting turbid."[55] That the subject
property is a structure is further underscored by the project design which describes the subject
property as a "zoned earth siltation dam"[56] composed of a clay core consisting of clayey
materials or impervious fill, a random fill made up of heavily to intensely fractured metarock,
and filters comprised of course tailings, river sand deposits and course filter gravels.[57]

It is described in greater detail by respondent's Chief Mining Engineer Ricardo Esquieres, Jr. in
an October 11, 1994 Affidavit[58] attached to respondent's appeal[59] before the LBAA, thus:

7. The siltation dam and decant system was constructed sometime in August 1992. It
is not only a specialized combination of essential impervious earth materials which
provide adequate strength and detention of turbid streamwater. It also has special
provisions like spillway and diversion canal which also promote its integrity by
providing a safe outlet of the impounded streamwater. Basically, the zoned-earth
dam is composed of a clay core, random fill and filter drains.

1. Clay core - impervious central portion of the dam to be inclined

with a width to heat ratio greater than 1.0 and designed to be thick -
thick enough to reduce seepage.

2. Random fill - relatively more permeable than the clay core and of
greater strength. Placed at the upstream face of the dam (to serve as
armor or ballast against slope stablity).
 3. Filters - designed to ensure that the dam structure is always in its
full drained state, thus, relieving any pore pressure that may
develop behind the dam.[60]

Therefore, by design, composition and function, the subject property is a structure adhered to
the soil, and has neither a mechanical contrivance, instrument, tool, implement, appliances,
apparatus, nor paraphernalia that produces a mechanical effect or performs a mechanical work
of any kind.[61] It meets none of the following features of a machinery as described in Section
199(o) of R.A. No. 7160:

(o) "Machinery" embraces machines, equipment, mechanical contrivances,

instruments, appliances or apparatus which may or may not be attached, permanently
or temporarily, to the real property. It includes the physical facilities for production,
the installations and appurtenant service facilities, those which are mobile, self-
powered or self-propelled and those not permanently attached to the real property
which are actually, directly, and exclusively used to meet the needs of the particular
industry, business or activity and which by their very nature and purpose are
designed for, or necessary to its manufacturing, mining, logging, commercial,
industrial or agricultural purposes.

That a structure such as the subject property does not qualify as a machinery or equipment used
for pollution control as contemplated under R.A. No. 7160 is evident from the adoption of an
expanded definition of pollution control device in R.A. No. 7942. Under Section 3 (am) thereof,
a pollution control device now also refers to "infrastructure" or "improvement," and not just to
machinery or equipment. This new concept, however, cannot benefit respondent, for the
assessment notice under review pertains to real property tax assessed prior to the amendment of
Sec. 234 (e) of R.A. No. 7160 by Sec. 91 in relation to Sec. 3 (am) of R.A. No. 7942. It is
settled that tax laws are prospective in application, unless expressly provided to apply
retroactively.[62] R.A. No. 7942 does not provide for the retroactive application of its
provisions.

In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring irrefutable evidence that the
subject property is not a machinery used for pollution control, but a structure adhering to the soil
and intended for pollution control, but has not been actually applied for that purpose during the
period under assessment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 30, 2005 and Resolution
dated September 29, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Assessment Notice dated
March 28, 1994 is declared VALID under the then applicable Republic Act No. 7160.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Peralta, JJ., concur.

[1]Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo
V. Cosico and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok; rollo, p. 44.

[2] Id. at 61.

[3] CA rollo, p. 53.

[4] Exhibit "C-2," id. at 54.

[5] Id. at 56.

[6] Id. at 83.

[7] Id. at 45-46.

[8] CA rollo, p. 81.

[9] Rollo, p. 63.

[10] G.R. No. 106041, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 271.

[11] CA rollo, p. 118.

[12] Rollo, p. 73.

[13] Rollo, pp. 81-82.

[14] Id. at 81.

[15] CA rollo, p. 46.

[16] Rollo, p. 84.

[17] CA rollo, p. 9.

[18] Id. at 7.

[19] Rollo, p. 59.

[20] Rollo, pp. 55-56.

[21] Id. at 57.

[22] Id. at 57-58.

[23] Id. at 58.

[24] Id.

[25] CA rollo, p. 318.

[26] Rollo, p. 61.

[27] Petitioner's Memorandum, rollo, pp. 503-504.

[28] Petition, id. at 14.

[29] Petition for Review in CA-G.R. No. 60672, CA rollo, p. 21.

[30] CA Decision, rollo, p. 58.

[31] Petition, rollo, p. 16-17.

[32] Memorandum for Respondent, id. at 560-563.

[33] Id. at 564.

[34]Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. L-50466, May 3, 1982,
114 SCRA 296, 300. See also Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
supra, note 10 at 279 and Sesbreño v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No. 106588,
March 24, 1997, 270 SCRA 360, 369.

[35] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; approved February 23, 1995.

[36]
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgments or Final Orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-judicial Agencies; effective June 1, 1995.

[37]1. Scope. - These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are
the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunication
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

[38]5. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven
(7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for
the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

[39] Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 368, 375-376.

[40]
Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11,
2004, 436 SCRA 123, 137.

[41] See Talento v. Escalada, G.R. No. 180884, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 491, 498.

[42] Rollo, p. 492.

[43] People v. Zulueta,, 89 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1951). See Hydro Resources Contractors Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85714, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA 309, 315. In Sanchez v.
Court of Appeals (345 Phil. 155, 179 [1997]), the Court noted that in "Remedial Law
Compendium", Volume One, p. 708, (1997), Justice Florenz D. Regalado enumerated the
following exceptions.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy
(Salvadades v. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in
a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB v.
Escolin, G.R. Nos. L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued
either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar v. Tan, G.R. No. L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf.
Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985); (3) for certain special
consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose v. Zulueta, G.R. No. 16598, May 31,
1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People v. Abalos,
G.R. No. L-29039, Nov. 28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case
will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. v. Campos, G.R. No. L-38280, Mar.
21, 1975)."

[44] Sec. 221 of R.A. No. 7160, which provides;

Sec. 221. Date of Effectivity of Assessment or Reassessment. - All assessments or reassessments

made after the first (1st) day of January of any year shall take effect on the first (1st) day of
January of the succeeding year: Provided, however, That the reassessment of real property due
to its partial or total destruction, or to a major change in its actual use, or to any great and
sudden inflation or deflation of real property values, or to the gross illegality of the assessment
when made or to any other abnormal cause, shall be made within ninety (90) days from the date
any such cause or causes occurred, and shall take effect at the beginning of the quarter next
following the reassessment (Previously Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 464 (PD 464) or
the Real Property Tax Code.) See Province of Nueva Ecija v. Imperial Mining Co., Inc., G.R.
No. L-59463, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 632.

[45] G.R. No. 120082, September 11, 1996, 261 SCRA 667.

[46]Lung Center of the Philippines v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 , 433 SCRA
119, 137.

[47]See Senator Aquilino Pimentel, The Local Government Code Revisited, Manila (2007), p.
444. See also Light Rail Transit Authority v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals, G.R. No.
127316, October 12, 2000, 342 SCRA 692.

[48] Rollo, p. 81.

[49] Petition for Review in CA-G.R. No. 60672, CA rollo, p. 21.

[50]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel Corporation, G.R. No.

147295, February 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 93, 103.

[51] CA rollo, p. 55.

[52] Id. at 63-68.

[53] Id. at 72-80.

[54] Id. at 81.

[55] Id.

[56] Id. at 72.

[57] Id. at 77-78.

[58] Id. at 63.

[59] Id. at 61.

[60] Id. at 65.

[61] See Central Azucarera de La Carlota v. Coscolluela, 44 Phil. 527 (1923).

[62] Pansacola v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 159991, November 16, 2006,
507 SCRA 81, 92-93; Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 120721, February
23, 2005, 452 SCRA 162, 173.