78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

*
G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO,

RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA
MAGLUCOTCATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG,
LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO
MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA
MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO,
respondents.

Courts; Jurisdiction; Appeals; The jurisdiction of this Court in

cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.—This Court
recognizes that “the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the
latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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VOL. 329, MARCH 28, 2000 79

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.” This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and
(10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that
of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For these
reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine
whether indeed there was partition.
Courts; Civil Law; Property; Partition; The first phase of a
partition and lor accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e.,
not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property.—The first
phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e.,
not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a coownership does not exist, or partition
is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in
order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed
upon. In either case—i.e., either the action is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed—the order is a final one,
and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The second phase commences when
it appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition“
directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners.—The second phase commences when it appears
that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition“ directed
by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court
after the parties have

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80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for

the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just
share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such
an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The present rule on the question of
finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition
is that it is final and appealable.—The present rule on the
question of finality and appealability of a decision or order
decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. The order of
partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No.
1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof.
Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been
appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has
become final and executory and cannot now be disturbed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The true test to ascertain whether
or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final.—The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to
what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done
on the merits of the case. An order for partition is final and not
interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights
of the parties upon the issue submitted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the present rule, the
proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the
court are not binding upon the parties.—Under the present rule,
the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by
the court are not binding upon the parties. However, this rule
does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized
the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose
of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In
this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court
order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of Lot
No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this
case was filed, clearly,

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the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is
not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners
may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are
estopped from raising this question by their own acts of
ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision
plan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Parties to a partition
proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question
title to portion allotted to another party.—Parties to a partition
proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to
question title to portion allotted to another party. A person cannot
claim both under and against the same instrument. In other
words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions,
and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in
part. They must accept all or none. Parties who had received the
property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently
attacking its validity or any part of it. Here, respondents, by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already
occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This
occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now
be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other
coowners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in
accordance with the sketch plan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In technical estoppel, the
party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead
his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the
action and acted as he would otherwise not have done.—In
technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have
acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have
placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not
have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is
tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the
part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by
acceptance of benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that
he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate
it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability,
chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own.

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82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Ratification;

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts
and gives sanction to some unauthorized act of defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on
him.—Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on
him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts
to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and
becomes the authorized act of the party so making the
ratification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One who possesses as a mere
holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes
to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.—The
payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere
lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639
D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to
be that of lessees of petitioners, it goes without saying that the
latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an
owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was
commenced.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration; The purpose of
registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a
given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-
registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not
relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder.—We are
not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect
the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be
ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing
such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their
obligations thereunder. As originally conceived, registration is
merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is
never necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. Requirements for the recording of the instruments are
designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to
act with the presumption that recorded instruments exist and are
genuine.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In cases involving oral partition
under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
owner-

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

ship, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, equity

will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.—On general
principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts
of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely
or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or
agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will
in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been
consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set
off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the
rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated
in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the
parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or
otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.
Same; Lawyers; Code of Professional Conduct; A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or
behavior before the courts.—Any court when it renders a decision
does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart
from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the
courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate
therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and
unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his
appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the
elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the
courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and
admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the
CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leo B. Diocos for petitioners.
Nilo L. Ruperto for respondents.

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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision,

dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the
Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in
an action for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot
No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend
that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they
are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot
No. 1639-D, which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639
until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other
hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-
owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a
unique situation where there is an order for partition but
there is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was
submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its
approval or that a decree or order was registered in the
Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery
of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that they
are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally
part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original
Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of
Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis,
Roberto Maglucot, 1
Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on
16 August 1927. On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of
the registered owners and respondents’ predecessor-in-2
interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639.
Consequently, on 13 May 3
1952, then CFI of Negros
Oriental issued an order directing the parties to subdivide
said lot into six portions as follows:
________________

1 Exhibit “J,” Records, p. 89.

2 Exhibits “A-4,” “A-4-a” to “A-4-c” and “B,” Records, pp. 48-50.
3 Exhibit “A,” id., pp. 45-47.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

a) Hermogenes Olis — lot 1639-A

b) Pascual Olis — lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot — lot 1639-C
d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot — lot l639-D
e) Anselmo Lara — lot l639-E
4
f) Tomas Maglucot — lot 1639-F.

Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of

Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and
Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject
lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals
therefor. Said respondents built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of
P100.00 per annum to Mrs: Ruperta Salma, who
represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said
respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership
over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a
quo.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax
declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual
Olis (purported
5
owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B,
respectively) as indubitable proof that there was a
subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas
Maglucot, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, took active
part in the partition as6 it was he, in fact, who commenced
the action for partition. The court a quo cited Article 1431
of the Civil Code which states that “[t]hrough estoppel an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.” Applying said
provision of law, it held that while there was no court order
showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence
could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as
his successors-in-interest, to deny the existence of an
approved partition against the other co-owners who claim
that

________________

4 Rollo, p. 24.
 5 Exhibits “K” and “L,” Records, pp. 90-91.
6 RTC Decision, 13 December 1994, p. 10; Rollo, p. 42.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

7
there was one.
8
Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax
declarations over the houses of respondents, expressly
stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto
Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission9
by them of the
ownership of the subject lot by the latter.
The dispositive portion of the lower court’s decision
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment

is hereby rendered in favor, of the plaintiffs against the
defendants ordering the latter:

1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the

premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to
Plaintiffs;
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of
P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees;
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from
1993 for actual damages representing the amount of
unpaid rentals up to the time they actually vacate the
premises in question;
10
4. To pay the costs.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The

appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax
declarations relied upon
11
by petitioners are not conclusive
evidence of partition. The CA likewise found that the
prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
was not followed. It thus declared that there was no
partition of Lot No. 1639. Petitioners filed this petition for
review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the
following reversible errors:

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;

________________

7 Ibid.
8 Exhibits “G” to “I,” Records, pp. 87-88.
9 See note 5 at 9, Rollo, p. 41.
10 Id., pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 44-45.
11 CA Decision, pp. 6-7, Rollo, pp. 28-29.

87
 VOL. 329, MARCH 28, 2000 87
Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

II

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF

PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE
DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-
D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;

III

IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR

PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF
WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE
OUTCOME OF THE CASE;

IV

IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR

JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES;
THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE
CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW
WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE
AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION
HAPPENED DURING
12
THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually

partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners
and that majority of them participated in the actual
execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners
accepted their designated shares in 1946 as13 averred by
Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. Petitioners
opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a
court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639.
In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and
the heirs14 of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the
partition. Petitioners further contend that respondents
admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective
houses that they are “constructed on the land of

________________

12 Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 8.
13 Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 6; Rollo, p. 61.
14 Ibid.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

15
Roberto Maglucot.” Simply put, petitioners vigorously
assert that respondents are estopped from claiming to be
co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual
agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and
respondents’ acquiescence because they themselves
exclusively exercised ownership16 over Lot No. 1639-A
beginning 1952 up to the present.
For their part, respondents posit three points in support
of their position. First, they emphasize that petitioners
failed to show that the interested parties were apprised or
notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch17
and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same.
Second, they point to the fact that petitioners18 were unable
to show any court approval of any partition. Third, they
maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date,
OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title,
containing no19
annotation of any encumbrance or partition
whatsoever.
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the
parties and the evidence on record, we find that the
petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in
this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that “the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the
latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both

________________

15 Id., p. 10; Rollo, p. 65.

16 Id., p. 12; Rollo, p. 67.
17 Memorandum for Respondents, p. 2; Rollo, p. 79.
18 Ibid.
19 Id., pp. 3, 6; Rollo, pp. 81, 83.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence 20
of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.” This
case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the
findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the
RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based and are premised on
absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on
record to determine whether indeed there was partition.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised
of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines
whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether
partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the
sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the 21
commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is
taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end
with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or
partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter
case, the

_______________

20 Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351 (1998); Medina vs.
Asistio, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224 (1990).
21 See Sections 2 and 6, Rule 69, Rules of Court. See also HERRERA,
COMMENTS ON THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS
AMENDED, 768-770 (1997).

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90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition

among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In
either case—i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed—the order is a final one, 22
and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. The
second phase commences when it appears that “the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition” directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity
to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the
rents and profits of the real estate in 23question. Such an
order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
The present rule on the question of finality and
appealability of a decision or 23aorder decreeing partition is
that it is final and appealable. The order of partition is a
final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639
by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof.
Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not
having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to
the case, it has become final and executory and cannot now
be disturbed.
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does
not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when
there is something

_______________

22 Municipality of Biñan vs. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989).

23 Ibid.
23a See Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 295 (1976) reiterated in
Valdez vs. Bagaso, 82 SCRA 22 (1978); Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA
476 (1979); Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 616 (1984); Fabrica vs.
Court of Appeals, 146 SCRA 250 (1986).

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

24
more to be done on the merits of the case. An order for
partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence,
appealable because it 25
decides the rights of the parties upon
the issue submitted.
However, this Court notes that the order of partition 26
was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,
which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was
controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners
not having 27
been confirmed by the trial court are not
binding. In this case, both the order of partition and the
unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory.
Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the
interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they
have assented
28
thereto, they cannot thereafter question the
decree, especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense
29
has been incurred in the execution of
the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied
their respective lots in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to
the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to
question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from30 the order in the
action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. In that case, the
order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties
“to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court
for its approval.” Here, the order appointed two
commissioners and directed them merely to approve the
sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the
parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the
commissioners without being confirmed by the court are
not binding upon

_______________

24 Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

25 Id., p. 9; See also Valdez vs. Bagaso, supra; Fabrica, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.
26 G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942.
27 RULES OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 2, par. 1 and Sec. 6.
28 Godwin v. Banks, 43 A. 863, 89 Md. 679.
29 Corbett vs. Fleming, 119 N.Y.S. 543, 134 App. Div. 544.
30 74 SCRA 118 (1976).

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92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

31
the parties. However, this rule does not apply in case
where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court
approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In
this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made
pursuant to a court order for partition by actually
occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and
continue to do so until the present until this case was filed,
clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met.
This statement is not to be taken to mean that
confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with
but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising
this question by their own acts of ratification of the
supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946
there was a prior
32
oral agreement to tentatively partition
Lot No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the original
33
co-
owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was
only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639
was filed because two of the co-owners, namely
Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have
said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title.
Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this
case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-
interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch plan. Such
_____________

31 Notably, the provision applied by the Cadastral Court in its Order of

Partition in 1952 was Section 22 of the Cadastral Act. (The Cadastral
Court was actually referring to Section 19 of the law.) A perusal of this
provision would show that the appointed commissioners are empowered to
make partition such part and proportion of the lands as the court shall
order. Significantly, in contrast to the procedure under the Rules of Court,
there is no requirement of confirmation of the report of the commissioners
by the Cadastral Court. It is not, however, necessary to make any
declaration on this matter since whatever rule may have been applicable,
the defendants are now estopped from raising this question.
32 Exhibit B for petitioners, Rollo, p. 51.
33 Exhibit A-4; Rollo, p. 49.

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VOL. 329, MARCH 28, 2000 93

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty

(40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI
took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral
partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that
said court was aware that the parties therein actually took
possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said
court ordered the partition and appointed two (2)
commissioners to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision
plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the
parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No.
1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were
aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which
would be considered by the commissioners for approval.
There is no showing that respondents by themselves or
through’ their predecessors-in-interest raised any
objections. On the contrary, the records show that the
parties continued their possession of the specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though
not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to
him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty,34
will not
be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows
that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding
partition when he has received and held a portion of the
subdivided land especially in this case where respondents
have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long
time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take
under partition, and who took possession of the portion
allotted to them, are estopped
35
to question title to portion
allotted to another party. A person cannot 36
claim both
under and against the same instrument. In other words,
they accepted the
______________

34 Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass., et al. v.

Stevenson, et al., 150 N.E. 726 citing Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition,
p. 710, Section 535.
35 Jeffries vs. Hignite, et al., 206 Ky. 50, 266 S.W. 901.
36 Christen, et al. vs. Christen, et al., 184 Ky. 822, 213 S.W. 189.

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94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot

accept the decree in part,37 and repudiate it in part. They
must accept all or none. Parties who had received the
property assigned to them are precluded 38
from subsequently
attacking its validity or any part of it. Here, respondents,
by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-
interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the
sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action
was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the
possession and ownership of the other coowners who took
exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with
the sketch plan.
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must
knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and
the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and
acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some
authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to
estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the
adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by
acceptance of benefits, which arises when a party, knowing
that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free
to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge, and while under
no disability,
39
chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as
his own. Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized
act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction
would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice,
knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what
was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes 40
the authorized
act of the party so making the ratification.
The records show that respondents were paying rent for
the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the
belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639

______________

37 Clarke, et al. vs. Charles, et al., 55 Neb 202, May 19, 1898.
38 Torres vs. Encarnacion, 89 Phil. 678 (1951).
39 Hampshire County Trust Co. of North Hampton, Mass., et al. v.
Stevenson, et al., 150 N.E. 726.
40 Ibid.
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VOL. 329, MARCH 28, 2000 95

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to

counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated
testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the
amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to
Ruperta Salma were for the payment of real property
taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that
the parties would be unaware of the difference in their
treatment of their transactions for so long a time.
Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a
tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been
made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for
specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that
respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence
on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This
they did not do for a period spanning more than four
decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they
are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents
over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the
concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes41
to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.
Since the possession of respondents were found to be that
of lessees of petitioners, it goes without saying that the
latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept
of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action
was commenced.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances 42
sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after
a long possession
43
in severalty, a deed of partition may be
presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds,
possession and occupation of land, improvements made
thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60
years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual
partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the
probate court, which had been

______________

41 A.M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON

THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 245 (Vol. II, 1995).
42 Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.
43 Hepburn & Dundas vs. Auld, 9 US 262, 3 L Ed. 96.

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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot
 44
lost and were not recorded. And where a tract of land held
in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the
lots has long been known and called by the name of one of
the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any
subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be
inferred that there has been a partition 45
and that such lot
was set off to him whose name it bears.
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in
the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639
and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly
indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this
argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of
the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that
the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition.
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of
registration is to notify and protect the interests of
strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant
thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing
such transaction does not relieve46
the parties thereto of
their obligations thereunder. As originally conceived,
registration is merely a species of notice. The act of
registering a document is never necessary
47
in order to give
it legal effect as between the parties. Requirements for the
recording of the instruments are designed to prevent frauds
and to permit and require the public to act with the
presumption
48
that recorded instruments exist and are
genuine.
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in
1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative,
the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of
said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties
took

_______________

44 Hunt vs. Rabitoay, 125 Mich. 137, 84 NW 59.

45 Jackson ex dem. Williams vs. Miller, (NY) 6 Wend. 228.
46 Casica vs. Villaseca, G.R. No. L-9590, April 30, 1957, 101 Phil. 1205.
47 PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 9 (1994
Revised Ed., 1997 Reprint).
48 See 26 C.J. 313.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action

for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners
refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original
title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the
cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been
any change in the possession of the parties. The only
significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of
partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot
No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the
oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were
the bases for the finding of actual partition among the
parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in
1952 having been discussed separately, we now deal with
oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was
initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions
of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and
the continuation of such possession for a very long period
indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral
partition. The validity of an oral partition
49
is already well-
settled. In Vda. de Espina vs. Abaya, we declared 50
that an
oral partition is
51
valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, reiterated
in Tan vs. Lim this Court has ruled, thus:

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of

frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has
been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to
partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper
cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated
by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the
parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number
of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.

______________

49 196 SCRA 313 (1991).

50 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1947).
51 296 SCRA 455 (1998).

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98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition

may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert
the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity
will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
 A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part
performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary,
to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of
frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact
between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to
by the parties.

Two more points have constrained this Court to rule

against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda
MaglucotAlejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the
share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations
contain statements that the houses of respondents were
built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot
who testified that after respondents were informed that
petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to
Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo
and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness
52
and
offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Aida
Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer
because 53they also intend to use the lot for a residential
purpose. This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted
by respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding
of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been

_____________

52 T.S.N., p. 5, August 18, 1994.

53 Ibid.

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Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

established by the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners.

Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a
co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly
admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not
coowners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration
No. 04-55754 in the names of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda
Maglucot, Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 55
in the names of
Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot, Tax Declaration No.
04-59356 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni
Posida showing that the houses of the above-mentioned 57
persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot
constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the
same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto
Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless
their veracity is directly attacked, the
58
contents therein are
presumed to be true and accurate. The lone testimony of
Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to
appear as owner of the land in their respective declarations
because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is
uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are
entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly
Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas
Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the sketch 59
plan of said lot showing the
partition into six portions.
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized
by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review on
certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners
made reference to the researcher of the CA First, he
alluded to the lack

_______________

54 Exhibit “G,” Records, p. 87.

55 Exhibit “H,” Id., p. 88.
56 Exhibit “I,” Id., p. 89.
57 Exhibits “G-l,” “H-l” and “1-1,” Id., pp. 87-88.
58 RULES OF COURT, RULE 131, SEC. 3 (m), (q), (y) and (ff).
59 Exhibits “B” and “B-1,” Rollo, p. 5.

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100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

of scrutiny of the
60
records and lack of study of the law “by
the researcher. Second, he cited the researcher of the CA
as having
61
“sweepingly stated without reference to the
record” that “[w]e have scanned the records on hand and
found no evidence of any partition.” Finally, counsel for
petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that “this will
only show that
62
there was no proper study of the case by the
researcher.”
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm
of the justice system and as an institution apart from the
persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the
courts and not the persons or personnel that may
participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly
improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate
the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should
be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession
regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper
language in its pleadings and admonished for his improper
references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, 63
or
menacing language or behavior before the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Pardo and
YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment set aside. That of the trial

court reinstated.

Note.—A party, having performed affirmative acts upon

which another person based his subsequent actions, cannot

_______________

60 Rollo, p. 9.
61 Id., p. 10.
62 Id., p. 16.
63 Rule 11.03, Code of Professional Responsibility.

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People vs. Cula

thereafter refute his acts or renege on the effects of the

same, to the prejudice of the latter. (Pureza vs. Court of
Appeals, 290 SCRA 110 [1998])

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