Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security Hardening en Us
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security Hardening en Us
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security Hardening en Us
Security hardening
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Abstract
Learn the processes and practices for securing Red Hat Enterprise Linux servers and workstations
against local and remote intrusion, exploitation, and malicious activity. By using these approaches
and tools, you can create a more secure computing environment for the data center, workplace, and
home.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
. . . . . . . . . .OPEN
MAKING . . . . . . SOURCE
. . . . . . . . . .MORE
. . . . . . .INCLUSIVE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . FEEDBACK
PROVIDING . . . . . . . . . . . . ON
. . . .RED
. . . . .HAT
. . . . .DOCUMENTATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 1.. .SECURING
. . . . . . . . . . . .RHEL
. . . . . .DURING
. . . . . . . . .INSTALLATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1. BIOS AND UEFI SECURITY 8
1.1.1. BIOS passwords 8
1.1.2. Non-BIOS-based systems security 8
1.2. DISK PARTITIONING 8
1.3. RESTRICTING NETWORK CONNECTIVITY DURING THE INSTALLATION PROCESS 9
1.4. INSTALLING THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF PACKAGES REQUIRED 9
1.5. POST-INSTALLATION PROCEDURES 10
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 2.
. . INSTALLING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .THE
. . . . .SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . .IN
. . .FIPS
. . . . .MODE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11. . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1. FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS 140 AND FIPS MODE 11
2.2. INSTALLING THE SYSTEM WITH FIPS MODE ENABLED 12
2.3. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 13
. . . . . . . . . . . 3.
CHAPTER . . USING
. . . . . . . .SYSTEM-WIDE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CRYPTOGRAPHIC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .POLICIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
..............
3.1. SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES 14
Tool for managing the cryptographic policies 15
Strong cryptographic defaults by removing insecure cipher suites and protocols 15
Cipher suites and protocols disabled in all policy levels 15
Cipher suites and protocols enabled in the cryptographic policies 16
3.2. SWITCHING THE SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY TO MODE COMPATIBLE WITH EARLIER
RELEASES 17
3.3. SETTING UP SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES IN THE WEB CONSOLE 18
3.4. SWITCHING THE SYSTEM TO FIPS MODE 20
3.5. ENABLING FIPS MODE IN A CONTAINER 21
3.6. LIST OF RHEL APPLICATIONS USING CRYPTOGRAPHY THAT IS NOT COMPLIANT WITH FIPS 140-2 21
3.7. EXCLUDING AN APPLICATION FROM FOLLOWING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTO POLICIES 22
3.7.1. Examples of opting out of system-wide crypto policies 22
3.8. CUSTOMIZING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES WITH SUBPOLICIES 23
3.9. DISABLING SHA-1 BY CUSTOMIZING A SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY 25
3.10. CREATING AND SETTING A CUSTOM SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY 26
3.11. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 27
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 4.
. . .SETTING
.........A
. . CUSTOM
. . . . . . . . . . CRYPTOGRAPHIC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .POLICY
. . . . . . . . BY
. . . .USING
. . . . . . .THE
. . . . .RHEL
. . . . . .SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . ROLE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
..............
4.1. SETTING A CUSTOM CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY BY USING THE CRYPTO_POLICIES RHEL SYSTEM ROLE
28
. . . . . . . . . . . 5.
CHAPTER . . CONFIGURING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPLICATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TO
. . . USE
. . . . . CRYPTOGRAPHIC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HARDWARE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . THROUGH
. . . . . . . . . . . .PKCS
. . . . . .#11
..................
31
5.1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE SUPPORT THROUGH PKCS #11 31
5.2. USING SSH KEYS STORED ON A SMART CARD 31
5.3. CONFIGURING APPLICATIONS FOR AUTHENTICATION WITH CERTIFICATES ON SMART CARDS 33
5.4. USING HSMS PROTECTING PRIVATE KEYS IN APACHE 33
5.5. USING HSMS PROTECTING PRIVATE KEYS IN NGINX 34
5.6. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 34
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 6.
. . .CONTROLLING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ACCESS
. . . . . . . . . TO
. . . .SMART
. . . . . . . .CARDS
. . . . . . . .BY
. . .USING
. . . . . . . POLKIT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
..............
6.1. SMART-CARD ACCESS CONTROL THROUGH POLKIT 35
6.2. TROUBLESHOOTING PROBLEMS RELATED TO PC/SC AND POLKIT 35
6.3. DISPLAYING MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT POLKIT AUTHORIZATION TO PC/SC 37
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 7.
. . SCANNING
. . . . . . . . . . . . THE
. . . . . SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . .FOR
. . . . .CONFIGURATION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMPLIANCE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AND
. . . . . .VULNERABILITIES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
..............
7.1. CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE TOOLS IN RHEL 39
7.2. VULNERABILITY SCANNING 40
7.2.1. Red Hat Security Advisories OVAL feed 40
7.2.2. Scanning the system for vulnerabilities 41
7.2.3. Scanning remote systems for vulnerabilities 42
7.3. CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE SCANNING 42
7.3.1. Configuration compliance in RHEL 42
7.3.2. Possible results of an OpenSCAP scan 43
7.3.3. Viewing profiles for configuration compliance 44
7.3.4. Assessing configuration compliance with a specific baseline 45
7.4. REMEDIATING THE SYSTEM TO ALIGN WITH A SPECIFIC BASELINE 45
7.5. REMEDIATING THE SYSTEM TO ALIGN WITH A SPECIFIC BASELINE USING AN SSG ANSIBLE
PLAYBOOK 46
7.6. CREATING A REMEDIATION ANSIBLE PLAYBOOK TO ALIGN THE SYSTEM WITH A SPECIFIC BASELINE
48
7.7. CREATING A REMEDIATION BASH SCRIPT FOR A LATER APPLICATION 49
7.8. SCANNING THE SYSTEM WITH A CUSTOMIZED PROFILE USING SCAP WORKBENCH 49
7.8.1. Using SCAP Workbench to scan and remediate the system 49
7.8.2. Customizing a security profile with SCAP Workbench 51
7.8.3. Additional resources 53
7.9. DEPLOYING SYSTEMS THAT ARE COMPLIANT WITH A SECURITY PROFILE IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN
INSTALLATION 53
7.9.1. Profiles not compatible with Server with GUI 53
7.9.2. Deploying baseline-compliant RHEL systems using the graphical installation 54
7.9.3. Deploying baseline-compliant RHEL systems using Kickstart 55
7.10. SCANNING CONTAINER AND CONTAINER IMAGES FOR VULNERABILITIES 56
7.11. ASSESSING SECURITY COMPLIANCE OF A CONTAINER OR A CONTAINER IMAGE WITH A SPECIFIC
BASELINE 57
7.12. SCAP SECURITY GUIDE PROFILES SUPPORTED IN RHEL 8 58
7.13. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 70
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 8.
. . .CHECKING
. . . . . . . . . . . INTEGRITY
. . . . . . . . . . . . WITH
. . . . . . AIDE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
..............
8.1. INSTALLING AIDE 72
8.2. PERFORMING INTEGRITY CHECKS WITH AIDE 72
8.3. UPDATING AN AIDE DATABASE 73
8.4. FILE-INTEGRITY TOOLS: AIDE AND IMA 73
8.5. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 74
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 9.
. . .ENHANCING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . SECURITY
. . . . . . . . . . . WITH
. . . . . . THE
. . . . . KERNEL
. . . . . . . . . INTEGRITY
. . . . . . . . . . . . SUBSYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
..............
9.1. THE KERNEL INTEGRITY SUBSYSTEM 75
9.2. TRUSTED AND ENCRYPTED KEYS 76
9.3. WORKING WITH TRUSTED KEYS 76
9.4. WORKING WITH ENCRYPTED KEYS 78
9.5. ENABLING IMA AND EVM 79
9.6. COLLECTING FILE HASHES WITH INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE 82
. . . . . . . . . . . 10.
CHAPTER . . . ENCRYPTING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BLOCK
. . . . . . . .DEVICES
. . . . . . . . . .USING
. . . . . . .LUKS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84
..............
10.1. LUKS DISK ENCRYPTION 84
10.2. LUKS VERSIONS IN RHEL 85
10.3. OPTIONS FOR DATA PROTECTION DURING LUKS2 RE-ENCRYPTION 86
10.4. ENCRYPTING EXISTING DATA ON A BLOCK DEVICE USING LUKS2 87
2
Table of Contents
10.5. ENCRYPTING EXISTING DATA ON A BLOCK DEVICE USING LUKS2 WITH A DETACHED HEADER 89
10.6. ENCRYPTING A BLANK BLOCK DEVICE USING LUKS2 91
10.7. CREATING A LUKS2 ENCRYPTED VOLUME BY USING THE STORAGE RHEL SYSTEM ROLE 92
. . . . . . . . . . . 12.
CHAPTER . . . AUDITING
. . . . . . . . . . . THE
. . . . .SYSTEM
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
..............
12.1. LINUX AUDIT 121
12.2. AUDIT SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 122
12.3. CONFIGURING AUDITD FOR A SECURE ENVIRONMENT 123
12.4. STARTING AND CONTROLLING AUDITD 124
12.5. UNDERSTANDING AUDIT LOG FILES 125
12.6. USING AUDITCTL FOR DEFINING AND EXECUTING AUDIT RULES 129
12.7. DEFINING PERSISTENT AUDIT RULES 130
12.8. PRE-CONFIGURED AUDIT RULES FILES FOR COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS 130
12.9. USING AUGENRULES TO DEFINE PERSISTENT RULES 131
12.10. DISABLING AUGENRULES 132
12.11. SETTING UP AUDIT TO MONITOR SOFTWARE UPDATES 133
12.12. MONITORING USER LOGIN TIMES WITH AUDIT 134
12.13. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 136
.CHAPTER
. . . . . . . . . . 13.
. . . BLOCKING
. . . . . . . . . . . . AND
. . . . . ALLOWING
. . . . . . . . . . . . .APPLICATIONS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BY
. . . USING
. . . . . . . .FAPOLICYD
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
...............
13.1. INTRODUCTION TO FAPOLICYD 137
13.2. DEPLOYING FAPOLICYD 138
13.3. MARKING FILES AS TRUSTED USING AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF TRUST 139
13.4. ADDING CUSTOM ALLOW AND DENY RULES FOR FAPOLICYD 140
13.5. ENABLING FAPOLICYD INTEGRITY CHECKS 143
3
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
. . . . . . . . . . . 14.
CHAPTER . . . PROTECTING
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SYSTEMS
. . . . . . . . . . .AGAINST
. . . . . . . . . .INTRUSIVE
. . . . . . . . . . . .USB
. . . . DEVICES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
...............
14.1. USBGUARD 148
14.2. INSTALLING USBGUARD 148
14.3. BLOCKING AND AUTHORIZING A USB DEVICE BY USING CLI 149
14.4. PERMANENTLY BLOCKING AND AUTHORIZING A USB DEVICE 150
14.5. CREATING A CUSTOM POLICY FOR USB DEVICES 151
14.6. CREATING A STRUCTURED CUSTOM POLICY FOR USB DEVICES 152
14.7. AUTHORIZING USERS AND GROUPS TO USE THE USBGUARD IPC INTERFACE 154
14.8. LOGGING USBGUARD AUTHORIZATION EVENTS TO THE LINUX AUDIT LOG 155
14.9. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES 155
4
Table of Contents
5
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
6
PROVIDING FEEDBACK ON RED HAT DOCUMENTATION
4. Enter your suggestion for improvement in the Description field. Include links to the relevant
parts of the documentation.
7
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
For example, if a machine is used in a trade show and contains no sensitive information, then it may not
be critical to prevent such attacks. However, if an employee’s laptop with private, unencrypted SSH keys
for the corporate network is left unattended at that same trade show, it could lead to a major security
breach with ramifications for the entire company.
If the workstation is located in a place where only authorized or trusted people have access, however,
then securing the BIOS or the boot loader may not be necessary.
The two primary reasons for password protecting the BIOS of a computer are [1]:
Because the methods for setting a BIOS password vary between computer manufacturers, consult the
computer’s manual for specific instructions.
If you forget the BIOS password, it can either be reset with jumpers on the motherboard or by
disconnecting the CMOS battery. For this reason, it is good practice to lock the computer case if
possible. However, consult the manual for the computer or motherboard before attempting to
disconnect the CMOS battery.
For instructions on password protecting BIOS-like programs, see the manufacturer’s instructions.
The recommended practices for disk partitioning differ for installations on bare-metal machines and for
8
CHAPTER 1. SECURING RHEL DURING INSTALLATION
The recommended practices for disk partitioning differ for installations on bare-metal machines and for
virtualized or cloud environments that support adjusting virtual disk hardware and file systems
containing already-installed operating systems.
To ensure separation and protection of data on bare-metal installations, create separate partitions for
the /boot, /, /home, /tmp, and /var/tmp/ directories:
/boot
This partition is the first partition that is read by the system during boot up. The boot loader and
kernel images that are used to boot your system into Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 are stored in this
partition. This partition should not be encrypted. If this partition is included in / and that partition is
encrypted or otherwise becomes unavailable then your system is not able to boot.
/home
When user data (/home) is stored in / instead of in a separate partition, the partition can fill up
causing the operating system to become unstable. Also, when upgrading your system to the next
version of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 it is a lot easier when you can keep your data in the /home
partition as it is not be overwritten during installation. If the root partition (/) becomes corrupt your
data could be lost forever. By using a separate partition there is slightly more protection against data
loss. You can also target this partition for frequent backups.
/tmp and /var/tmp/
Both the /tmp and /var/tmp/ directories are used to store data that does not need to be stored for a
long period of time. However, if a lot of data floods one of these directories it can consume all of your
storage space. If this happens and these directories are stored within / then your system could
become unstable and crash. For this reason, moving these directories into their own partitions is a
good idea.
For virtual machines or cloud instances, the separate /boot, /home, /tmp, and /var/tmp partitions are
optional because you can increase the virtual disk size and the / partition if it begins to fill up. Set up
monitoring to regularly check the / partition usage so that it does not fill up before you increase the
virtual disk size accordingly.
NOTE
During the installation process, you have an option to encrypt partitions. You must supply
a passphrase. This passphrase serves as a key to unlock the bulk encryption key, which is
used to secure the partition’s data.
When installing a potentially vulnerable operating system, always limit exposure only to the closest
necessary network zone. The safest choice is the “no network” zone, which means to leave your machine
disconnected during the installation process. In some cases, a LAN or intranet connection is sufficient
while the Internet connection is the riskiest. To follow the best security practices, choose the closest
zone with your repository while installing Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 from a network.
9
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
It is best practice to install only the packages you will use because each piece of software on your
computer could possibly contain a vulnerability. If you are installing from the DVD media, take the
opportunity to select exactly what packages you want to install during the installation. If you find you
need another package, you can always add it to the system later.
# yum update
Even though the firewall service, firewalld, is automatically enabled with the installation of
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, it might be explicitly disabled, for example, in the Kickstart
configuration. In such a case, re-enable the firewall.
To start firewalld enter the following commands as root:
To enhance security, disable services you do not need. For example, if no printers are installed
on your computer, disable the cups service by using the following command:
[1] Because system BIOSes differ between manufacturers, some may not support password protection of either
type, while others may support one type but not the other.
10
CHAPTER 2. INSTALLING THE SYSTEM IN FIPS MODE
To ensure that your RHEL system generates and uses all cryptographic keys only with FIPS-approved
algorithms, you must switch RHEL to FIPS mode.
You can enable FIPS mode by using one of the following methods:
If you aim for FIPS compliance, start the installation in FIPS mode. This avoids cryptographic key
material regeneration and reevaluation of the compliance of the resulting system associated with
converting already deployed systems.
To operate a FIPS-compliant system, create all cryptographic key material in FIPS mode. Furthermore,
the cryptographic key material must never leave the FIPS environment unless it is securely wrapped and
never unwrapped in non-FIPS environments.
Switching the system to FIPS mode by using the fips-mode-setup tool does not guarantee compliance
with the FIPS 140 standard. Re-generating all cryptographic keys after setting the system to FIPS mode
may not be possible. For example, in the case of an existing IdM realm with users' cryptographic keys you
cannot re-generate all the keys. If you cannot start the installation in FIPS mode, always enable FIPS
mode as the first step after the installation, before you make any post-installation configuration steps or
install any workloads.
The fips-mode-setup tool also uses the FIPS system-wide cryptographic policy internally. But on top of
what the update-crypto-policies --set FIPS command does, fips-mode-setup ensures the installation
of the FIPS dracut module by using the fips-finish-install tool, it also adds the fips=1 boot option to the
kernel command line and regenerates the initial RAM disk.
Furthermore, enforcement of restrictions required in FIPS mode depends on the contents of the
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled file. If the file contains 1, RHEL core cryptographic components switch
to mode, in which they use only FIPS-approved implementations of cryptographic algorithms. If
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled contains 0, the cryptographic components do not enable their FIPS
mode.
The FIPS system-wide cryptographic policy helps to configure higher-level restrictions. Therefore,
communication protocols supporting cryptographic agility do not announce ciphers that the system
refuses when selected. For example, the ChaCha20 algorithm is not FIPS-approved, and the FIPS
cryptographic policy ensures that TLS servers and clients do not announce the
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLS cipher suite, because any attempt
to use such a cipher fails.
11
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
If you operate RHEL in FIPS mode and use an application providing its own FIPS-mode-related
configuration options, ignore these options and the corresponding application guidance. The system
running in FIPS mode and the system-wide cryptographic policies enforce only FIPS-compliant
cryptography. For example, the Node.js configuration option --enable-fips is ignored if the system runs
in FIPS mode. If you use the --enable-fips option on a system not running in FIPS mode, you do not
meet the FIPS-140 compliance requirements.
NOTE
Even though the RHEL 8.6 (and newer) kernel in FIPS mode is designed to be compliant
with FIPS 140-3, it is not yet certified by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The latest
certified kernel module is the updated RHEL 8.5 kernel after the RHSA-2021:4356
advisory update. That certification applies to the FIPS 140-2 standard. You cannot
choose whether a cryptographic module conforms to FIPS 140-2 or 140-3. The FIPS 140-
2 and FIPS 140-3 section in the Compliance Activities and Government Standards
Knowledgebase article provides an overview of the validation status of cryptographic
modules for selected RHEL minor releases.
Additional resources
FIPS 140-2 and FIPS 140-3 section in the Compliance Activities and Government Standards
Knowledgebase article.
IMPORTANT
Only enabling FIPS mode during the RHEL installation ensures that the system generates
all keys with FIPS-approved algorithms and continuous monitoring tests in place.
Procedure
1. Add the fips=1 option to the kernel command line during the system installation.
2. During the software selection stage, do not install any third-party software.
Verification
$ fips-mode-setup --check
FIPS mode is enabled.
12
CHAPTER 2. INSTALLING THE SYSTEM IN FIPS MODE
Additional resources
Editing boot options section in the Performing an advanced RHEL installation document
List of RHEL 8 applications using cryptography that is not compliant with FIPS 140-2
13
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
DEFAULT
The default system-wide cryptographic policy level offers secure settings for current threat models.
It allows the TLS 1.2 and 1.3 protocols, as well as the IKEv2 and SSH2 protocols. The RSA keys and
Diffie-Hellman parameters are accepted if they are at least 2048 bits long.
LEGACY
Ensures maximum compatibility with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 and earlier; it is less secure due to an
increased attack surface. In addition to the DEFAULT level algorithms and protocols, it includes
support for the TLS 1.0 and 1.1 protocols. The algorithms DSA, 3DES, and RC4 are allowed, while RSA
keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters are accepted if they are at least 1023 bits long.
FUTURE
A stricter forward-looking security level intended for testing a possible future policy. This policy does
not allow the use of SHA-1 in signature algorithms. It allows the TLS 1.2 and 1.3 protocols, as well as
the IKEv2 and SSH2 protocols. The RSA keys and Diffie-Hellman parameters are accepted if they are
at least 3072 bits long. If your system communicates on the public internet, you might face
interoperability problems.
FIPS
Conforms with the FIPS 140 requirements. The fips-mode-setup tool, which switches the RHEL
system into FIPS mode, uses this policy internally. Switching to the FIPS policy does not guarantee
compliance with the FIPS 140 standard. You also must re-generate all cryptographic keys after you
set the system to FIPS mode. This is not possible in many scenarios.
RHEL also provides the FIPS:OSPP system-wide subpolicy, which contains further restrictions for
cryptographic algorithms required by the Common Criteria (CC) certification. The system becomes
less interoperable after you set this subpolicy. For example, you cannot use RSA and DH keys
shorter than 3072 bits, additional SSH algorithms, and several TLS groups. Setting FIPS:OSPP also
prevents connecting to Red Hat Content Delivery Network (CDN) structure. Furthermore, you
cannot integrate Active Directory (AD) into the IdM deployments that use FIPS:OSPP,
communication between RHEL hosts using FIPS:OSPP and AD domains might not work, or some AD
accounts might not be able to authenticate.
Note that your system is not CC-compliant after you set the FIPS:OSPP cryptographic subpolicy.
The only correct way to make your RHEL system compliant with the CC standard is through the
installation of the cc-config package. See the Common Criteria section in the Compliance Activities
and Government Standards Knowledgebase article for a list of certified RHEL versions, validation
reports, and links to CC guides.
Red Hat continuously adjusts all policy levels so that all libraries provide secure defaults, except when
14
CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
Red Hat continuously adjusts all policy levels so that all libraries provide secure defaults, except when
using the LEGACY policy. Even though the LEGACY profile does not provide secure defaults, it does
not include any algorithms that are easily exploitable. As such, the set of enabled algorithms or
acceptable key sizes in any provided policy may change during the lifetime of Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
Such changes reflect new security standards and new security research. If you must ensure
interoperability with a specific system for the whole lifetime of Red Hat Enterprise Linux, you should
opt-out from the system-wide cryptographic policies for components that interact with that system or
re-enable specific algorithms using custom cryptographic policies.
IMPORTANT
Because a cryptographic key used by a certificate on the Customer Portal API does not
meet the requirements by the FUTURE system-wide cryptographic policy, the redhat-
support-tool utility does not work with this policy level at the moment.
To work around this problem, use the DEFAULT cryptographic policy while connecting to
the Customer Portal API.
NOTE
The specific algorithms and ciphers described as allowed in the policy levels are available
only if an application supports them.
$ update-crypto-policies --show
DEFAULT
# update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE
Setting system policy to FUTURE
To ensure that the change of the cryptographic policy is applied, restart the system.
15
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
The following cipher suites and protocols are disabled in all cryptographic policies. They can be enabled
only by an explicit configuration of individual applications.
Camellia
ARIA
SEED
IDEA
AES-CCM8
IKEv1 no no no no
3DES yes no no no
RC4 yes no no no
DSA yes no no no
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CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
[a] You can use only Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 and RFC 3526.
[b] CBC ciphers are disabled for TLS. In a non-TLS scenario, AES-128-CBC is disabled but AES-256-CBC is
enabled. To disable also AES-256-CBC, apply a custom subpolicy.
Additional resources
WARNING
Switching to the LEGACY policy level results in a less secure system and
applications.
Procedure
1. To switch the system-wide cryptographic policy to the LEGACY level, enter the following
command as root:
Additional resources
For the list of available cryptographic policy levels, see the update-crypto-policies(8) man
page.
For defining custom cryptographic policies, see the Custom Policies section in the update-
17
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
For defining custom cryptographic policies, see the Custom Policies section in the update-
crypto-policies(8) man page and the Crypto Policy Definition Format section in the crypto-
policies(7) man page.
DEFAULT:SHA1
The DEFAULT policy with the SHA-1 algorithm enabled.
LEGACY:AD-SUPPORT
The LEGACY policy with less secure settings that improve interoperability for Active Directory
services.
FIPS:OSPP
The FIPS policy with further restrictions required by the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation standard.
WARNING
Note that your system is not CC-compliant after you set the FIPS:OSPP
cryptographic subpolicy. The only correct way to make your RHEL system compliant
with the CC standard is through the installation of the cc-config package. See the
Common Criteria section in the Compliance Activities and Government Standards
Knowledgebase article for a list of certified RHEL versions, validation reports, and
links to CC guides hosted at the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
website.
Prerequisites
The RHEL 8 web console has been installed. For details, see Installing and enabling the web
console.
You have root privileges or permissions to enter administrative commands with sudo.
Procedure
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CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
1. Log in to the web console. For more information, see Logging in to the web console .
2. In the Configuration card of the Overview page, click your current policy value next to Crypto
policy.
3. In the Change crypto policy dialog window, click on the policy you want to start using on your
system.
Verification
After the restart, log back in to web console, and check that the Crypto policy value
corresponds to the one you selected. Alternatively, you can enter the update-crypto-policies --
show command to display the current system-wide cryptographic policy in your terminal.
19
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Switching the system to FIPS mode by using the FIPS system-wide cryptographic policy does not
guarantee compliance with the FIPS 140 standard. Re-generating all cryptographic keys after setting
the system to FIPS mode may not be possible. For example, in the case of an existing IdM realm with
users' cryptographic keys you cannot re-generate all the keys.
The fips-mode-setup tool uses the FIPS policy internally. But on top of what the update-crypto-
policies command with the --set FIPS option does, fips-mode-setup ensures the installation of the
FIPS dracut module by using the fips-finish-install tool, it also adds the fips=1 boot option to the kernel
command line and regenerates the initial RAM disk.
IMPORTANT
Only enabling FIPS mode during the RHEL installation ensures that the system
generates all keys with FIPS-approved algorithms and continuous monitoring tests in
place.
Procedure
# fips-mode-setup --enable
Kernel initramdisks are being regenerated. This might take some time.
Setting system policy to FIPS
Note: System-wide crypto policies are applied on application start-up.
It is recommended to restart the system for the change of policies
to fully take place.
FIPS mode will be enabled.
Please reboot the system for the setting to take effect.
# reboot
Verification
After the restart, you can check the current state of FIPS mode:
# fips-mode-setup --check
FIPS mode is enabled.
Additional resources
List of RHEL applications using cryptography that is not compliant with FIPS 140-2
20
CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules on the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) web site.
NOTE
The fips-mode-setup command does not work correctly in containers, and it cannot be
used to enable or check FIPS mode in this scenario.
Prerequisites
Procedure
On hosts running RHEL 8.1 and 8.2: Set the FIPS cryptographic policy level in the container
using the following command, and ignore the advice to use the fips-mode-setup command:
On hosts running RHEL 8.4 and later: On systems with FIPS mode enabled, the podman utility
automatically enables FIPS mode on supported containers.
Additional resources
See the RHEL core cryptographic components article for an overview of the core cryptographic
components, the information on how are they selected, how are they integrated into the operating
system, how do they support hardware security modules and smart cards, and how do cryptographic
certifications apply to them.
In addition to the following table, in some RHEL 8 Z-stream releases (for example, 8.1.1), the Firefox
browser packages have been updated, and they contain a separate copy of the NSS cryptography
library. This way, Red Hat wants to avoid the disruption of rebasing such a low-level component in a
patch release. As a result, these Firefox packages do not use a FIPS 140-2-validated module.
List of RHEL 8 applications that use cryptography not compliant with FIPS 140-2
21
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
FreeRADIUS
The RADIUS protocol uses MD5.
Ghostscript
Custom cryptography implementation (MD5, RC4, SHA-2, AES) to encrypt and decrypt documents.
iPXE
Cryptographic stack for TLS is compiled in, however, it is unused.
Libica
Software fallbacks for various algorithms such as RSA and ECDH through CPACF instructions.
Ovmf (UEFI firmware), Edk2, shim
Full cryptographic stack (an embedded copy of the OpenSSL library).
Perl
HMAC, HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224,…
Pidgin
Implements DES and RC4.
QAT Engine
Mixed hardware and software implementation of cryptographic primitives (RSA, EC, DH, AES,…).
Samba [2]
Implements AES, DES, and RC4.
Valgrind
AES, hashes [3]
Additional resources
FIPS 140-2 and FIPS 140-3 section in the Compliance Activities and Government Standards
Knowledgebase article
You can also remove a symlink related to your application from the /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends
directory and replace it with your customized cryptographic settings. This configuration prevents the
use of system-wide cryptographic policies for applications that use the excluded back end.
Furthermore, this modification is not supported by Red Hat.
wget
To customize cryptographic settings used by the wget network downloader, use --secure-protocol and
--ciphers options. For example:
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CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
See the HTTPS (SSL/TLS) Options section of the wget(1) man page for more information.
curl
To specify ciphers used by the curl tool, use the --ciphers option and provide a colon-separated list of
ciphers as a value. For example:
Firefox
Even though you cannot opt out of system-wide cryptographic policies in the Firefox web browser, you
can further restrict supported ciphers and TLS versions in Firefox’s Configuration Editor. Type
about:config in the address bar and change the value of the security.tls.version.min option as
required. Setting security.tls.version.min to 1 allows TLS 1.0 as the minimum required,
security.tls.version.min 2 enables TLS 1.1, and so on.
OpenSSH
To opt out of the system-wide cryptographic policies for your OpenSSH server, uncomment the line
with the CRYPTO_POLICY= variable in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd file. After this change, values that you
specify in the Ciphers, MACs, KexAlgoritms, and GSSAPIKexAlgorithms sections in the
/etc/ssh/sshd_config file are not overridden.
To opt out of system-wide cryptographic policies for your OpenSSH client, perform one of the following
tasks:
For a given user, override the global ssh_config with a user-specific configuration in the
~/.ssh/config file.
For the entire system, specify the cryptographic policy in a drop-in configuration file located in
the /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ directory, with a two-digit number prefix smaller than 5, so that it
lexicographically precedes the 05-redhat.conf file, and with a .conf suffix, for example, 04-
crypto-policy-override.conf.
Libreswan
See the Configuring IPsec connections that opt out of the system-wide crypto policies in the Securing
networks document for detailed information.
Additional resources
You can either apply custom subpolicies on top of an existing system-wide cryptographic policy or
define such a policy from scratch.
23
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
The concept of scoped policies allows enabling different sets of algorithms for different back ends. You
can limit each configuration directive to specific protocols, libraries, or services.
Furthermore, directives can use asterisks for specifying multiple values using wildcards.
The /etc/crypto-policies/state/CURRENT.pol file lists all settings in the currently applied system-wide
cryptographic policy after wildcard expansion. To make your cryptographic policy more strict, consider
using values listed in the /usr/share/crypto-policies/policies/FUTURE.pol file.
NOTE
Customization of system-wide cryptographic policies is available from RHEL 8.2. You can
use the concept of scoped policies and the option of using wildcards in RHEL 8.5 and
newer.
Procedure
# cd /etc/crypto-policies/policies/modules/
# touch MYCRYPTO-1.pmod
# touch SCOPES-AND-WILDCARDS.pmod
IMPORTANT
3. Open the policy modules in a text editor of your choice and insert options that modify the
system-wide cryptographic policy, for example:
# vi MYCRYPTO-1.pmod
min_rsa_size = 3072
hash = SHA2-384 SHA2-512 SHA3-384 SHA3-512
# vi SCOPES-AND-WILDCARDS.pmod
# Disable CHACHA20-POLY1305 for the TLS protocol (OpenSSL, GnuTLS, NSS, and
OpenJDK)
cipher@TLS = -CHACHA20-POLY1305
# Allow using the FFDHE-1024 group with the SSH protocol (libssh and OpenSSH)
group@SSH = FFDHE-1024+
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CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
# Disable all CBC mode ciphers for the SSH protocol (libssh and OpenSSH)
cipher@SSH = -*-CBC
5. Apply your policy adjustments to the DEFAULT system-wide cryptographic policy level:
6. To make your cryptographic settings effective for already running services and applications,
restart the system:
# reboot
Verification
Additional resources
How to customize crypto policies in RHEL 8.2 Red Hat blog article
IMPORTANT
The NO-SHA1 policy module disables the SHA-1 hash function only in signatures and not
elsewhere. In particular, the NO-SHA1 module still allows the use of SHA-1 with hash-
based message authentication codes (HMAC). This is because HMAC security properties
do not rely on the collision resistance of the corresponding hash function, and therefore
the recent attacks on SHA-1 have a significantly lower impact on the use of SHA-1 for
HMAC.
If your scenario requires disabling a specific key exchange (KEX) algorithm combination, for example,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, but you still want to use both the relevant KEX and the algorithm
25
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
in other combinations, see Steps to disable the diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 algorithm in SSH for
instructions on opting out of system-wide crypto-policies for SSH and configuring SSH directly.
NOTE
The module for disabling SHA-1 is available from RHEL 8.3. Customization of system-
wide cryptographic policies is available from RHEL 8.2.
Procedure
1. Apply your policy adjustments to the DEFAULT system-wide cryptographic policy level:
2. To make your cryptographic settings effective for already running services and applications,
restart the system:
# reboot
Additional resources
NOTE
Procedure
# cd /etc/crypto-policies/policies/
# touch MYPOLICY.pol
# cp /usr/share/crypto-policies/policies/DEFAULT.pol /etc/crypto-
policies/policies/MYPOLICY.pol
2. Edit the file with your custom cryptographic policy in a text editor of your choice to fit your
requirements, for example:
26
CHAPTER 3. USING SYSTEM-WIDE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES
# vi /etc/crypto-policies/policies/MYPOLICY.pol
4. To make your cryptographic settings effective for already running services and applications,
restart the system:
# reboot
Additional resources
Custom Policies section in the update-crypto-policies(8) man page and the Crypto Policy
Definition Format section in the crypto-policies(7) man page
27
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
You can use the crypto_policies system role to configure a large number of managed nodes
consistently from a single control node.
Prerequisites
You have prepared the control node and the managed nodes
You are logged in to the control node as a user who can run playbooks on the managed nodes.
The account you use to connect to the managed nodes has sudo permissions on them.
Procedure
1. Create a playbook file, for example ~/playbook.yml, with the following content:
---
- name: Configure crypto policies
hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
tasks:
- name: Configure crypto policies
ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: rhel-system-roles.crypto_policies
vars:
- crypto_policies_policy: FUTURE
- crypto_policies_reboot_ok: true
You can replace the FUTURE value with your preferred crypto policy, for example: DEFAULT,
LEGACY, and FIPS:OSPP.
The crypto_policies_reboot_ok: true setting causes the system to reboot after the system
role changes the cryptographic policy.
Note that this command only validates the syntax and does not protect against a wrong but valid
configuration.
$ ansible-playbook ~/playbook.yml
28
CHAPTER 4. SETTING A CUSTOM CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY BY USING THE RHEL SYSTEM ROLE
WARNING
Note that your system is not CC-compliant after you set the FIPS:OSPP
cryptographic subpolicy. The only correct way to make your RHEL system compliant
with the CC standard is through the installation of the cc-config package. See the
Common Criteria section in the Compliance Activities and Government Standards
Knowledgebase article for a list of certified RHEL versions, validation reports, and
links to CC guides hosted at the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)
website.
Verification
1. On the control node, create another playbook named, for example, verify_playbook.yml:
---
- name: Verification
hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
tasks:
- name: Verify active crypto policy
ansible.builtin.include_role:
name: rhel-system-roles.crypto_policies
- debug:
var: crypto_policies_active
$ ansible-playbook ~/verify_playbook.yml
TASK [debug] **************************
ok: [host] => {
"crypto_policies_active": "FUTURE"
}
The crypto_policies_active variable shows the policy active on the managed node.
Additional resources
29
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.crypto_policies/README.md file
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/crypto_policies/ directory
30
CHAPTER 5. CONFIGURING APPLICATIONS TO USE CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE THROUGH PKCS #11
PKCS #11 introduces the cryptographic token, an object that presents each hardware or software device
to applications in a unified manner. Therefore, applications view devices such as smart cards, which are
typically used by persons, and hardware security modules, which are typically used by computers, as
PKCS #11 cryptographic tokens.
A PKCS #11 token can store various object types including a certificate; a data object; and a public,
private, or secret key. These objects are uniquely identifiable through the PKCS #11 Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI) scheme.
A PKCS #11 URI is a standard way to identify a specific object in a PKCS #11 module according to the
object attributes. This enables you to configure all libraries and applications with the same configuration
string in the form of a URI.
RHEL provides the OpenSC PKCS #11 driver for smart cards by default. However, hardware tokens and
HSMs can have their own PKCS #11 modules that do not have their counterpart in the system. You can
register such PKCS #11 modules with the p11-kit tool, which acts as a wrapper over the registered smart-
card drivers in the system.
To make your own PKCS #11 module work on the system, add a new text file to the
/etc/pkcs11/modules/ directory
You can add your own PKCS #11 module into the system by creating a new text file in the
/etc/pkcs11/modules/ directory. For example, the OpenSC configuration file in p11-kit looks as follows:
$ cat /usr/share/p11-kit/modules/opensc.module
module: opensc-pkcs11.so
Additional resources
31
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Prerequisites
On the client side, the opensc package is installed and the pcscd service is running.
Procedure
1. List all keys provided by the OpenSC PKCS #11 module including their PKCS #11 URIs and save
the output to the keys.pub file:
2. To enable authentication using a smart card on a remote server (example.com), transfer the
public key to the remote server. Use the ssh-copy-id command with keys.pub created in the
previous step:
3. To connect to example.com using the ECDSA key from the output of the ssh-keygen -D
command in step 1, you can use just a subset of the URI, which uniquely references your key, for
example:
4. You can use the same URI string in the ~/.ssh/config file to make the configuration permanent:
$ cat ~/.ssh/config
IdentityFile "pkcs11:id=%01?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opensc-pkcs11.so"
$ ssh example.com
Enter PIN for 'SSH key':
[example.com] $
Because OpenSSH uses the p11-kit-proxy wrapper and the OpenSC PKCS #11 module is
registered to PKCS#11 Kit, you can simplify the previous commands:
If you skip the id= part of a PKCS #11 URI, OpenSSH loads all keys that are available in the proxy module.
This can reduce the amount of typing required:
32
CHAPTER 5. CONFIGURING APPLICATIONS TO USE CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE THROUGH PKCS #11
Additional resources
The Firefox web browser automatically loads the p11-kit-proxy PKCS #11 module. This means
that every supported smart card in the system is automatically detected. For using TLS client
authentication, no additional setup is required and keys and certificates from a smart card are
automatically used when a server requests them.
If your application uses the GnuTLS or NSS library, it already supports PKCS #11 URIs. Also,
applications that rely on the OpenSSL library can access cryptographic hardware modules,
including smart cards, through the pkcs11 engine provided provided by the openssl-pkcs11
package.
Applications that require working with private keys on smart cards and that do not use NSS,
GnuTLS, nor OpenSSL can use the p11-kit API directly to work with cryptographic hardware
modules, including smart cards, rather than using the PKCS #11 API of specific PKCS #11
modules.
With the the wget network downloader, you can specify PKCS #11 URIs instead of paths to
locally stored private keys and certificates. This might simplify creation of scripts for tasks that
require safely stored private keys and certificates. For example:
You can also specify PKCS #11 URI when using the curl tool:
Additional resources
For secure communication in the form of the HTTPS protocol, the Apache HTTP server (httpd) uses
the OpenSSL library. OpenSSL does not support PKCS #11 natively. To use HSMs, you have to install the
openssl-pkcs11 package, which provides access to PKCS #11 modules through the engine interface.
33
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
You can use a PKCS #11 URI instead of a regular file name to specify a server key and a certificate in the
/etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf configuration file, for example:
SSLCertificateFile "pkcs11:id=%01;token=softhsm;type=cert"
SSLCertificateKeyFile "pkcs11:id=%01;token=softhsm;type=private?pin-value=111111"
Install the httpd-manual package to obtain complete documentation for the Apache HTTP Server,
including TLS configuration. The directives available in the /etc/httpd/conf.d/ssl.conf configuration file
are described in detail in the /usr/share/httpd/manual/mod/mod_ssl.html file.
Because Nginx also uses the OpenSSL for cryptographic operations, support for PKCS #11 must go
through the openssl-pkcs11 engine. Nginx currently supports only loading private keys from an HSM,
and a certificate must be provided separately as a regular file. Modify the ssl_certificate and
ssl_certificate_key options in the server section of the /etc/nginx/nginx.conf configuration file:
ssl_certificate /path/to/cert.pem
ssl_certificate_key "engine:pkcs11:pkcs11:token=softhsm;id=%01;type=private?pin-value=111111";
Note that the engine:pkcs11: prefix is needed for the PKCS #11 URI in the Nginx configuration file.
This is because the other pkcs11 prefix refers to the engine name.
34
CHAPTER 6. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO SMART CARDS BY USING POLKIT
System administrators can configure polkit to fit specific scenarios, such as smart-card access for non-
privileged or non-local users or services.
Because access-control mechanisms built into smart cards, such as PINs, PIN pads, and biometrics, do
not cover all possible threats, RHEL uses the polkit framework for more robust access control. The
polkit authorization manager can grant access to privileged operations. In addition to granting access to
disks, you can use polkit also to specify policies for securing smart cards. For example, you can define
which users can perform which operations with a smart card.
After installing the pcsc-lite package and starting the pcscd daemon, the system enforces policies
defined in the /usr/share/polkit-1/actions/ directory. The default system-wide policy is in the
/usr/share/polkit-1/actions/org.debian.pcsc-lite.policy file. Polkit policy files use the XML format and
the syntax is described in the polkit(8) man page.
The polkitd service monitors the /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/ and /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/ directories for
any changes in rule files stored in these directories. The files contain authorization rules in JavaScript
format. System administrators can add custom rule files in both directories, and polkitd reads them in
lexical order based on their file name. If two files have the same names, then the file in /etc/polkit-
1/rules.d/ is read first.
Additional resources
Note that the system can install the pcsc-lite package as a dependency when you install other packages
related to smart cards such as opensc.
If your scenario does not require any interaction with smart cards and you want to prevent displaying
authorization requests for the PC/SC daemon, you can remove the pcsc-lite package. Keeping the
minimum of necessary packages is a good security practice anyway.
35
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
If you use smart cards, start troubleshooting by checking the rules in the system-provided policy file at
/usr/share/polkit-1/actions/org.debian.pcsc-lite.policy. You can add your custom rule files to the
policy in the /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/ directory, for example, 03-allow-pcscd.rules. Note that the rule files
use the JavaScript syntax, the policy file is in the XML format.
To understand what authorization requests the system displays, check the Journal log, for example:
The previous log entry means that the user is not authorized to perform an action by the policy. You can
solve this denial by adding a corresponding rule to /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/.
You can search also for log entries related to the polkitd unit, for example:
$ journalctl -u polkit
...
polkitd[NNN]: Error compiling script /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-debug-pcscd.rules
...
polkitd[NNN]: Operator of unix-session:c2 FAILED to authenticate to gain authorization for action
org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_pcsc for unix-process:4800:14441 [/usr/libexec/gsd-smartcard] (owned
by unix-user:group)
...
In the previous output, the first entry means that the rule file contains some syntax error. The second
entry means that the user failed to gain the access to pcscd.
You can also list all applications that use the PC/SC protocol by a short script. Create an executable file,
for example, pcsc-apps.sh, and insert the following code:
#!/bin/bash
cd /proc
for p in [0-9]*
do
if grep libpcsclite.so.1.0.0 $p/maps &> /dev/null
then
echo -n "process: "
cat $p/cmdline
echo " ($p)"
fi
done
# ./pcsc-apps.sh
process: /usr/libexec/gsd-smartcard (3048)
enable-sync --auto-ssl-client-auth --enable-crashpad (4828)
...
Additional resources
36
CHAPTER 6. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO SMART CARDS BY USING POLKIT
Prerequisites
Procedure
# touch /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-test.rules
# vi /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-test.rules
polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
if (action.id == "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_pcsc" ||
action.id == "org.debian.pcsc-lite.access_card") {
polkit.log("action=" + action);
polkit.log("subject=" + subject);
}
});
Verification
1. Make an authorization request for pcscd. For example, open the Firefox web browser or use the
pkcs11-tool -L command provided by the opensc package.
37
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Additional resources
38
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
Compliance policies can vary substantially across organizations and even across different systems within
the same organization. Differences among these policies are based on the purpose of each system and
its importance for the organization. Custom software settings and deployment characteristics also raise
a need for custom policy checklists.
SCAP Workbench
The scap-workbench graphical utility is designed to perform configuration and vulnerability scans
on a single local or remote system. You can also use it to generate security reports based on these
scans and evaluations.
OpenSCAP
The OpenSCAP library, with the accompanying oscap command-line utility, is designed to perform
configuration and vulnerability scans on a local system, to validate configuration compliance content,
and to generate reports and guides based on these scans and evaluations.
IMPORTANT
To perform automated compliance audits on multiple systems remotely, you can use the OpenSCAP
solution for Red Hat Satellite.
Additional resources
Red Hat Security Demos: Creating Customized Security Policy Content to Automate Security
39
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Red Hat Security Demos: Creating Customized Security Policy Content to Automate Security
Compliance
Red Hat Security Demos: Defend Yourself with RHEL Security Technologies
SCAP specifications create an ecosystem where the format of security content is well-known and
standardized although the implementation of the scanner or policy editor is not mandated. This enables
organizations to build their security policy (SCAP content) once, no matter how many security vendors
they employ.
The Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) is the essential and oldest component of SCAP.
Unlike other tools and custom scripts, OVAL describes a required state of resources in a declarative
manner. OVAL code is never executed directly but using an OVAL interpreter tool called scanner. The
declarative nature of OVAL ensures that the state of the assessed system is not accidentally modified.
Like all other SCAP components, OVAL is based on XML. The SCAP standard defines several document
formats. Each of them includes a different kind of information and serves a different purpose.
Red Hat Product Security helps customers evaluate and manage risk by tracking and investigating all
security issues affecting Red Hat customers. It provides timely and concise patches and security
advisories on the Red Hat Customer Portal. Red Hat creates and supports OVAL patch definitions,
providing machine-readable versions of our security advisories.
Because of differences between platforms, versions, and other factors, Red Hat Product Security
qualitative severity ratings of vulnerabilities do not directly align with the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) baseline ratings provided by third parties. Therefore, we recommend that you use the
RHSA OVAL definitions instead of those provided by third parties.
The RHSA OVAL definitions are available individually and as a complete package, and are updated within
an hour of a new security advisory being made available on the Red Hat Customer Portal.
Each OVAL patch definition maps one-to-one to a Red Hat Security Advisory (RHSA). Because an
RHSA can contain fixes for multiple vulnerabilities, each vulnerability is listed separately by its Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) name and has a link to its entry in our public bug database.
The RHSA OVAL definitions are designed to check for vulnerable versions of RPM packages installed on
a system. It is possible to extend these definitions to include further checks, for example, to find out if
the packages are being used in a vulnerable configuration. These definitions are designed to cover
software and updates shipped by Red Hat. Additional definitions are required to detect the patch status
of third-party software.
NOTE
40
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
NOTE
The Red Hat Insights for Red Hat Enterprise Linux compliance service helps IT security
and compliance administrators to assess, monitor, and report on the security policy
compliance of Red Hat Enterprise Linux systems. You can also create and manage your
SCAP security policies entirely within the compliance service UI.
Additional resources
Prerequisites
Procedure
2. Scan the system for vulnerabilities and save results to the vulnerability.html file:
Verification
Additional resources
41
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Prerequisites
The openscap-utils and bzip2 packages are installed on the system you use for scanning.
Procedure
2. Scan a remote system with the machine1 host name, SSH running on port 22, and the joesec
user name for vulnerabilities and save results to the remote-vulnerability.html file:
Additional resources
oscap-ssh(8)
Red Hat recommends you follow the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) content provided
in the SCAP Security Guide package because it is in line with Red Hat best practices for affected
components.
The SCAP Security Guide package provides content which conforms to the SCAP 1.2 and SCAP 1.3
standards. The openscap scanner utility is compatible with both SCAP 1.2 and SCAP 1.3 content
provided in the SCAP Security Guide package.
IMPORTANT
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
IMPORTANT
The SCAP Security Guide suite provides profiles for several platforms in a form of data stream
documents. A data stream is a file that contains definitions, benchmarks, profiles, and individual rules.
Each rule specifies the applicability and requirements for compliance. RHEL provides several profiles for
compliance with security policies. In addition to the industry standard, Red Hat data streams also contain
information for remediation of failed rules.
Data stream
├── xccdf
| ├── benchmark
| ├── profile
| | ├──rule reference
| | └──variable
| ├── rule
| ├── human readable data
| ├── oval reference
├── oval ├── ocil reference
├── ocil ├── cpe reference
└── cpe └── remediation
A profile is a set of rules based on a security policy, such as OSPP, PCI-DSS, and Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). This enables you to audit the system in an automated way
for compliance with security standards.
You can modify (tailor) a profile to customize certain rules, for example, password length. For more
information about profile tailoring, see Customizing a security profile with SCAP Workbench .
Pass
The scan did not find any conflicts with this rule.
Fail
The scan found a conflict with this rule.
Not checked
OpenSCAP does not perform an automatic evaluation of this rule. Check whether your system
conforms to this rule manually.
Not applicable
This rule does not apply to the current configuration.
Not selected
This rule is not part of the profile. OpenSCAP does not evaluate this rule and does not display these
rules in the results.
43
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Error
The scan encountered an error. For additional information, you can enter the oscap command with
the --verbose DEVEL option. Consider opening a bug report.
Unknown
The scan encountered an unexpected situation. For additional information, you can enter the oscap
command with the `--verbose DEVEL option. Consider opening a bug report.
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. List all available files with security compliance profiles provided by the SCAP Security Guide
project:
$ ls /usr/share/xml/scap/ssg/content/
ssg-firefox-cpe-dictionary.xml ssg-rhel6-ocil.xml
ssg-firefox-cpe-oval.xml ssg-rhel6-oval.xml
...
ssg-rhel6-ds-1.2.xml ssg-rhel8-oval.xml
ssg-rhel8-ds.xml ssg-rhel8-xccdf.xml
...
2. Display detailed information about a selected data stream using the oscap info subcommand.
XML files containing data streams are indicated by the -ds string in their names. In the Profiles
section, you can find a list of available profiles and their IDs:
3. Select a profile from the data stream file and display additional details about the selected
profile. To do so, use oscap info with the --profile option followed by the last section of the ID
displayed in the output of the previous command. For example, the ID of the HIPPA profile is:
xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_hipaa, and the value for the --profile option is hipaa:
44
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
Description: The HIPAA Security Rule establishes U.S. national standards to protect
individuals’ electronic personal health information that is created, received, used, or
maintained by a covered entity.
...
Additional resources
Prerequisites
You know the ID of the profile within the baseline with which the system should comply. To find
the ID, see Viewing Profiles for Configuration Compliance.
Procedure
1. Evaluate the compliance of the system with the selected profile and save the scan results in the
report.html HTML file, for example:
2. Optional: Scan a remote system with the machine1 host name, SSH running on port 22, and the
joesec user name for compliance and save results to the remote-report.html file:
Additional resources
45
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) profile, but you can remediate to align with any
other profile provided by the SCAP Security Guide. For the details on listing the available profiles, see
the Viewing profiles for configuration compliance section.
WARNING
If not used carefully, running the system evaluation with the Remediate option
enabled might render the system non-functional. Red Hat does not provide any
automated method to revert changes made by security-hardening remediations.
Remediations are supported on RHEL systems in the default configuration. If your
system has been altered after the installation, running remediation might not make
it compliant with the required security profile.
Prerequisites
Procedure
Verification
1. Evaluate compliance of the system with the HIPAA profile, and save scan results in the
hipaa_report.html file:
Additional resources
Complementing the DISA benchmark using the SSG content Knowledgebase article
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
WARNING
If not used carefully, running the system evaluation with the Remediate option
enabled might render the system non-functional. Red Hat does not provide any
automated method to revert changes made by security-hardening remediations.
Remediations are supported on RHEL systems in the default configuration. If your
system has been altered after the installation, running remediation might not make
it compliant with the required security profile.
Prerequisites
The ansible-core package is installed. See the Ansible Installation Guide for more information.
NOTE
In RHEL 8.6 and later, Ansible Engine is replaced by the ansible-core package, which
contains only built-in modules. Note that many Ansible remediations use modules from
the community and Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) collections, which are
not included in the built-in modules. In this case, you can use Bash remediations as a
substitute to Ansible remediations. The Red Hat Connector in RHEL 8 includes the
necessary Ansible modules to enable the remediation playbooks to function with Ansible
Core.
Procedure
Verification
1. Evaluate compliance of the system with the HIPAA profile, and save scan results in the
hipaa_report.html file:
Additional resources
Ansible Documentation
NOTE
In RHEL 8.6, Ansible Engine is replaced by the ansible-core package, which contains only
built-in modules. Note that many Ansible remediations use modules from the community
and Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) collections, which are not included in
the built-in modules. In this case, you can use Bash remediations as a substitute for
Ansible remediations. The Red Hat Connector in RHEL 8.6 includes the necessary
Ansible modules to enable the remediation playbooks to function with Ansible Core.
Prerequisites
Procedure
2. Find the value of the result ID in the file with the results:
4. Review the generated file, which contains the Ansible remediations for rules that failed during
the scan performed in step 1. After reviewing this generated file, you can apply it by using the
ansible-playbook <hipaa-remediations.yml> command.
Verification
In a text editor of your choice, review that the generated <hipaa-remediations.yml> file
contains rules that failed in the scan performed in step 1.
Additional resources
Ansible Documentation
48
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. Use the oscap command to scan the system and to save the results to an XML file. In the
following example, oscap evaluates the system against the hipaa profile:
2. Find the value of the result ID in the file with the results:
4. The <hipaa-remediations.sh> file contains remediations for rules that failed during the scan
performed in step 1. After reviewing this generated file, you can apply it with the ./<hipaa-
remediations.sh> command when you are in the same directory as this file.
Verification
In a text editor of your choice, review that the <hipaa-remediations.sh> file contains rules that
failed in the scan performed in step 1.
Additional resources
49
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
To evaluate your system against the selected security policy, use the following procedure.
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. To run SCAP Workbench from the GNOME Classic desktop environment, press the Super
key to enter the Activities Overview, type scap-workbench, and then press Enter.
Alternatively, use:
$ scap-workbench &
Open Other Content in the File menu, and search the respective XCCDF, SCAP RPM, or
data stream file.
3. You can allow automatic correction of the system configuration by selecting the Remediate
check box. With this option enabled, SCAP Workbench attempts to change the system
configuration in accordance with the security rules applied by the policy. This process should fix
the related checks that fail during the system scan.
WARNING
If not used carefully, running the system evaluation with the Remediate
option enabled might render the system non-functional. Red Hat does not
provide any automated method to revert changes made by security-
hardening remediations. Remediations are supported on RHEL systems in
the default configuration. If your system has been altered after the
installation, running remediation might not make it compliant with the
required security profile.
4. Scan your system with the selected profile by clicking the Scan button.
50
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
5. To store the scan results in form of an XCCDF, ARF, or HTML file, click the Save Results
combo box. Choose the HTML Report option to generate the scan report in human-readable
format. The XCCDF and ARF (data stream) formats are suitable for further automatic
processing. You can repeatedly choose all three options.
6. To export results-based remediations to a file, use the Generate remediation role pop-up
menu.
The following procedure demonstrates the use of SCAP Workbench for customizing (tailoring) a
profile. You can also save the tailored profile for use with the oscap command-line utility.
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. Run SCAP Workbench, and select the profile to customize by using either Open content from
SCAP Security Guide or Open Other Content in the File menu.
2. To adjust the selected security profile according to your needs, click the Customize button.
This opens the new Customization window that enables you to modify the currently selected
51
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
This opens the new Customization window that enables you to modify the currently selected
profile without changing the original data stream file. Choose a new profile ID.
3. Find a rule to modify using either the tree structure with rules organized into logical groups or
the Search field.
4. Include or exclude rules using check boxes in the tree structure, or modify values in rules where
applicable.
Save a customization file separately by using Save Customization Only in the File menu.
Save all security content at once by Save All in the File menu.
If you select the Into a directory option, SCAP Workbench saves both the data stream file
and the customization file to the specified location. You can use this as a backup solution.
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
By selecting the As RPM option, you can instruct SCAP Workbench to create an RPM
package containing the data stream file and the customization file. This is useful for
distributing the security content to systems that cannot be scanned remotely, and for
delivering the content for further processing.
NOTE
Because SCAP Workbench does not support results-based remediations for tailored
profiles, use the exported remediations with the oscap command-line utility.
53
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
DISA STIG for Red Hat xccdf_org.ssgprojec Packages xorg-x11- To install a RHEL system
Enterprise Linux 8 t.content_profile_sti server-Xorg , xorg- as a Server with GUI
g x11-server-common, aligned with DISA STIG
xorg-x11-server- in RHEL version 8.4 and
utils , and xorg-x11- later, you can use the
server-Xwayland are DISA STIG with GUI
part of the Server with profile.
GUI package set, but the
policy requires their
removal.
WARNING
Certain security profiles provided as part of the SCAP Security Guide are not
compatible with the extended package set included in the Server with GUI base
environment. For additional details, see Profiles not compatible with a GUI server .
54
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
Prerequisites
You have booted into the graphical installation program. Note that the OSCAP Anaconda
Add-on does not support interactive text-only installation.
Procedure
1. From the Installation Summary window, click Software Selection. The Software Selection
window opens.
2. From the Base Environment pane, select the Server environment. You can select only one
base environment.
3. Click Done to apply the setting and return to the Installation Summary window.
4. Because OSPP has strict partitioning requirements that must be met, create separate partitions
for /boot, /home, /var, /tmp, /var/log, /var/tmp, and /var/log/audit.
6. To enable security policies on the system, toggle the Apply security policy switch to ON.
7. Select Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems from the profile pane.
9. Confirm the changes in the Changes that were done or need to be done pane that is
displayed at the bottom of the window. Complete any remaining manual changes.
NOTE
Verification
To check the current status of the system after installation is complete, reboot the system and
start a new scan:
Additional resources
55
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Prerequisites
Procedure
2. Update the partitioning scheme to fit your configuration requirements. For OSPP compliance,
the separate partitions for /boot, /home, /var, /tmp, /var/log, /var/tmp, and /var/log/audit must
be preserved, and you can only change the size of the partitions.
IMPORTANT
Verification
1. To check the current status of the system after installation is complete, reboot the system and
start a new scan:
Additional resources
NOTE
The oscap-podman command is available from RHEL 8.2. For RHEL 8.1 and 8.0, use the
workaround described in the Using OpenSCAP for scanning containers in RHEL 8
Knowledgebase article.
Prerequisites
Procedure
56
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
# podman images
REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE
registry.access.redhat.com/ubi8/ubi latest 096cae65a207 7 weeks ago 239 MB
3. Scan the container or the container image for vulnerabilities and save results to the
vulnerability.html file:
Note that the oscap-podman command requires root privileges, and the ID of a container is the
first argument.
Verification
Additional resources
For more information, see the oscap-podman(8) and oscap(8) man pages.
NOTE
The oscap-podman command is available from RHEL 8.2. For RHEL 8.1 and 8.0, use the
workaround described in the Using OpenSCAP for scanning containers in RHEL 8
Knowledgebase article.
Prerequisites
Procedure
# podman images
REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE
registry.access.redhat.com/ubi8/ubi latest 096cae65a207 7 weeks ago 239 MB
2. Evaluate the compliance of the container image with the HIPAA profile and save scan results
into the report.html HTML file
57
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Replace 096cae65a207 with the ID of your container image and the hipaa value with ospp or
pci-dss if you assess security compliance with the OSPP or PCI-DSS baseline. Note that the
oscap-podman command requires root privileges.
Verification
NOTE
The rules marked as notapplicable are rules that do not apply to containerized systems.
These rules apply only to bare-metal and virtualized systems.
Additional resources
/usr/share/doc/scap-security-guide/ directory.
In the following tables, you can find the profiles provided in each minor version of RHEL, together with
the version of the policy with which the profile aligns.
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
59
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - Server t_profile_cis RHEL 8.9.3:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - Server t_profile_cis_server_l1 RHEL 8.9.3:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l1 RHEL 8.9.3:3.0.0
Workstation
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l2 RHEL 8.9.3:3.0.0
Workstation
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
PCI-DSS v3.2.1 Control Baseline xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:3.2.1
for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 t_profile_pci-dss RHEL 8.9.3:4.0
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:V1R11
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig RHEL 8.9.3:V1R13
Implementation Guide (DISA
STIG) for Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 8
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.9.0 and RHEL 8.9.2:V1R11
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig_gui RHEL 8.9.3:V1R13
Implementation Guide (DISA
STIG) with GUI for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - Server t_profile_cis RHEL 8.8.6:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - Server t_profile_cis_server_l1 RHEL 8.8.6:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l1 RHEL 8.8.6:3.0.0
Workstation
61
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:2.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l2 RHEL 8.8.6:3.0.0
Workstation
PCI-DSS v3.2.1 Control Baseline xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:3.2.1
for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 t_profile_pci-dss RHEL 8.8.6:4.0
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:V1R9
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig RHEL 8.8.6 and RHEL 8.8.7:V1R13
Implementation Guide (DISA RHEL 8.8.8 and later:V1R14
STIG) for Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 8
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.8.0 and RHEL 8.8.5:V1R9
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig_gui RHEL 8.8.6 and RHEL 8.8.7:V1R13
Implementation Guide (DISA RHEL 8.8.8 and later:V1R14
STIG) with GUI for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8
62
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
63
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.7.0 and RHEL 8.7.1:V1R7
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig RHEL 8.7.2 and later:V1R9
Implementation Guide (DISA
STIG) for Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 8
The Defense Information Systems xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.7.0 and RHEL 8.7.1:V1R7
Agency Security Technical t_profile_stig_gui RHEL 8.7.2 and later:V1R9
Implementation Guide (DISA
STIG) with GUI for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.6.0 to RHEL 8.6.2:1.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - Server t_profile_cis RHEL 8.6.3 to RHEL 8.6.15:2.0.0
RHEL 8.6.16 and later:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.6.0 to RHEL 8.6.2:1.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - Server t_profile_cis_server_l1 RHEL 8.6.3 to RHEL 8.6.15:2.0.0
RHEL 8.6.16 and later:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.6.0 to RHEL 8.6.2:1.0.0
Benchmark for Level 1 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l1 RHEL 8.6.3 to RHEL 8.6.15:2.0.0
Workstation RHEL 8.6.16 and later:3.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.6.0 to RHEL 8.6.2:1.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l2 RHEL 8.6.3 to RHEL 8.6.15:2.0.0
Workstation RHEL 8.6.16 and later:3.0.0
64
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
65
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
66
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
French National Agency for the xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.4.4 and later:1.2
Security of Information Systems t_profile_anssi_bp28_high
(ANSSI) BP-028 High Level
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.4.3 and earlier:1.0.0
Benchmark for Level 2 - Server t_profile_cis RHEL 8.4.4 to RHEL 8.4.10:1.0.1
RHEL 8.4.11 and later:2.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.4.4 to RHEL 8.4.10:1.0.1
Benchmark for Level 1 - Server t_profile_cis_server_l1 RHEL 8.4.11 and later:2.0.0
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.4.4 to RHEL 8.4.10:1.0.1
Benchmark for Level 1 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l1 RHEL 8.4.11 and later:2.0.0
Workstation
CIS Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 xccdf_org.ssgproject.conten RHEL 8.4.4 to RHEL 8.4.10:1.0.1
Benchmark for Level 2 - t_profile_cis_workstation_l2 RHEL 8.4.11 and later:2.0.0
Workstation
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
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CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
The OpenSCAP project page provides detailed information about the oscap utility and other
components and projects related to SCAP.
The SCAP Workbench project page provides detailed information about the scap-workbench
application.
The SCAP Security Guide (SSG) project page provides the latest security content for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux.
Using OpenSCAP for security compliance and vulnerability scanning - A hands-on lab on
running tools based on the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) standard for
compliance and vulnerability scanning in RHEL.
Red Hat Security Demos: Creating Customized Security Policy Content to Automate Security
Compliance - A hands-on lab to get initial experience in automating security compliance using
the tools that are included in RHEL to comply with both industry standard security policies and
custom security policies. If you want training or access to these lab exercises for your team,
contact your Red Hat account team for additional details.
Red Hat Security Demos: Defend Yourself with RHEL Security Technologies - A hands-on lab to
learn how to implement security at all levels of your RHEL system, using the key security
technologies available to you in RHEL, including OpenSCAP. If you want training or access to
these lab exercises for your team, contact your Red Hat account team for additional details.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SCAP page has a vast collection of
SCAP-related materials, including SCAP publications, specifications, and the SCAP Validation
Program.
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) has the largest repository of SCAP content and other
SCAP standards-based vulnerability management data.
Red Hat OVAL content repository contains OVAL definitions for vulnerabilities of RHEL
systems. This is the recommended source of vulnerability content.
MITRE CVE - This is a database of publicly known security vulnerabilities provided by the MITRE
corporation. For RHEL, using OVAL CVE content provided by Red Hat is recommended.
MITRE OVAL - This is an OVAL-related project provided by the MITRE corporation. Among
other OVAL-related information, these pages contain the OVAL language and a repository of
70
CHAPTER 7. SCANNING THE SYSTEM FOR CONFIGURATION COMPLIANCE AND VULNERABILITIES
OVAL content with thousands of OVAL definitions. Note that for scanning RHEL, using OVAL
CVE content provided by Red Hat is recommended.
Managing security compliance in Red Hat Satellite - This set of guides describes, among other
topics, how to maintain system security on multiple systems by using OpenSCAP.
71
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Prerequisites
Procedure
# aide --init
NOTE
In the default configuration, the aide --init command checks just a set of
directories and files defined in the /etc/aide.conf file. To include additional
directories or files in the AIDE database, and to change their watched
parameters, edit /etc/aide.conf accordingly.
3. To start using the database, remove the .new substring from the initial database file name:
# mv /var/lib/aide/aide.db.new.gz /var/lib/aide/aide.db.gz
4. To change the location of the AIDE database, edit the /etc/aide.conf file and modify the DBDIR
value. For additional security, store the database, configuration, and the /usr/sbin/aide binary
file in a secure location such as a read-only media.
Prerequisites
AIDE is properly installed and its database is initialized. See Installing AIDE
Procedure
# aide --check
Start timestamp: 2018-07-11 12:41:20 +0200 (AIDE 0.16)
AIDE found differences between database and filesystem!!
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CHAPTER 8. CHECKING INTEGRITY WITH AIDE
...
[trimmed for clarity]
2. At a minimum, configure the system to run AIDE weekly. Optimally, run AIDE daily. For example,
to schedule a daily execution of AIDE at 04:05 a.m. by using the cron command, add the
following line to the /etc/crontab file:
Prerequisites
AIDE is properly installed and its database is initialized. See Installing AIDE
Procedure
# aide --update
2. To start using the updated database for integrity checks, remove the .new substring from the
file name.
How AIDE uses rules to compare the IMA uses file hash values to
integrity state of the files and detect the intrusion.
directories.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Usage AIDE detects a threat when the IMA detects a threat when
file or directory is modified. someone tries to alter the entire
file.
Extension AIDE checks the integrity of files IMA ensures security on the local
and directories on the local and remote systems.
system.
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IMA places the measured values within the kernel’s memory space. This prevents users of the
system from modifying the measured values.
IMA allows local and remote parties to verify the measured values.
IMA provides local validation of the current content of files against the values previously
stored in the measurement list within the kernel memory. This extension forbids performing
any operation on a specific file in case the current and the previous measures do not match.
EVM protects extended attributes of files (also known as xattr) that are related to system
security, such as IMA measurements and SELinux attributes. EVM cryptographically hashes
their corresponding values or signs them with cryptographic keys. The keys are stored in the
kernel keyring subsystem.
The kernel integrity subsystem can use the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to further harden system
security.
A TPM is a hardware, firmware, or virtual component with integrated cryptographic keys, which is built
according to the TPM specification by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) for important
cryptographic functions. TPMs are usually built as dedicated hardware attached to the platform’s
motherboard. By providing cryptographic functions from a protected and tamper-proof area of the
hardware chip, TPMs are protected from software-based attacks. TPMs provide the following features:
Random-number generator
Hashing generator
Remote attestation
Additional resources
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Security hardening
Trusted and encrypted keys are variable-length symmetric keys generated by the kernel that use the
kernel keyring service. The integrity of the keys can be verified, which means that they can be used, for
example, by the extended verification module (EVM) to verify and confirm the integrity of a running
system. User-level programs can only access the keys in the form of encrypted blobs.
Trusted keys
Trusted keys need the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip, which is used to both create and
encrypt (seal) the keys. Each TPM has a master wrapping key, called the storage root key, which is
stored within the TPM itself.
NOTE
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 supports both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0. For more
information, see the Is Trusted Platform Module (TPM) supported by Red Hat?
solution.
You can verify that a TPM 2.0 chip has been enabled by entering the following command:
$ cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/tpm_version_major
2
You can also enable a TPM 2.0 chip and manage the TPM 2.0 device through settings in the machine
firmware.
In addition to that, you can seal the trusted keys with a specific set of the TPM’s platform
configuration register (PCR) values. PCR contains a set of integrity-management values that reflect
the firmware, boot loader, and operating system. This means that PCR-sealed keys can only be
decrypted by the TPM on the same system on which they were encrypted. However, when a PCR-
sealed trusted key is loaded (added to a keyring), and thus its associated PCR values are verified, it
can be updated with new (or future) PCR values, so that a new kernel, for example, can be booted.
You can save a single key also as multiple blobs, each with a different PCR value.
Encrypted keys
Encrypted keys do not require a TPM, because they use the kernel Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), which makes them faster than trusted keys. Encrypted keys are created using kernel-
generated random numbers and encrypted by a master key when they are exported into user-space
blobs.
The master key is either a trusted key or a user key. If the master key is not trusted, the encrypted key is
only as secure as the user key used to encrypt it.
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CHAPTER 9. ENHANCING SECURITY WITH THE KERNEL INTEGRITY SUBSYSTEM
Prerequisites
For the 64-bit ARM architecture and IBM Z, the trusted kernel module is loaded.
# modprobe trusted
For more information about how to load kernel modules, see Loading kernel modules at system
runtime.
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is enabled and active. See The kernel integrity subsystem and
Trusted and encrypted keys.
NOTE
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 supports both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0. If you use TPM 1.2, skip
step 1.
Procedure
1. Create a 2048-bit RSA key with an SHA-256 primary storage key with a persistent handle of, for
example, 81000001, by using one of the following utilities:
a. By using a TPM 2.0 with the syntax of keyctl add trusted <NAME> "new <KEY_LENGTH>
keyhandle=<PERSISTENT-HANDLE> [options]" <KEYRING>. In this example, the
persistent handle is 81000001.
The command creates a trusted key called kmk with the length of 32 bytes (256 bits) and
places it in the user keyring (@u). The keys may have a length of 32 to 128 bytes (256 to
1024 bits).
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
b. By using a TPM 1.2 with the syntax of keyctl add trusted <NAME> "new <KEY_LENGTH>"
<KEYRING>:
# keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 500 500 keyring: ses 97833714 --alswrv 500 -1 \ keyring: uid.1000
642500861 --alswrv 500 500 \ trusted: kmk
4. Export the key to a user-space blob by using the serial number of the trusted key:
The command uses the pipe subcommand and the serial number of kmk.
6. Create secure encrypted keys that use the TPM-sealed trusted key (kmk). Follow this syntax:
keyctl add encrypted <NAME> "new [FORMAT] <KEY_TYPE>:<PRIMARY_KEY_NAME>
<KEY_LENGTH>" <KEYRING>:
Additional resources
Prerequisites
For the 64-bit ARM architecture and IBM Z, the encrypted-keys kernel module is loaded:
# modprobe encrypted-keys
For more information about how to load kernel modules, see Loading kernel modules at system
runtime.
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CHAPTER 9. ENHANCING SECURITY WITH THE KERNEL INTEGRITY SUBSYSTEM
Procedure
The command generates a user key called kmk-user which acts as a primary key and is used to
seal the actual encrypted keys.
2. Generate an encrypted key using the primary key from the previous step:
# keyctl list @u
2 keys in keyring:
427069434: --alswrv 1000 1000 user: kmk-user
1012412758: --alswrv 1000 1000 encrypted: encr-key
IMPORTANT
Encrypted keys that are not sealed by a trusted primary key are only as secure as the user
primary key (random-number key) that was used to encrypt them. Therefore, load the
primary user key as securely as possible and preferably early during the boot process.
Additional resources
Prerequisites
NOTE
The securityfs file system is mounted on the /sys/kernel/security/ directory and the
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ directory exists. You can verify where securityfs is mounted
by using the mount command:
# mount
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
...
securityfs on /sys/kernel/security type securityfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
...
The systemd service manager is patched to support IMA and EVM on boot time. Verify by using
the following command:
For example:
Procedure
1. Enable IMA and EVM in the fix mode for the current boot entry and allow users to gather
and update the IMA measurements by adding the following kernel command-line
parameters:
The command enables IMA and EVM in the fix mode for the current boot entry and allows
users to gather and update the IMA measurements.
3. Optional: Verify that the parameters have been added to the kernel command line:
# cat /proc/cmdline
BOOT_IMAGE=(hd0,msdos1)/vmlinuz-4.18.0-167.el8.x86_64 root=/dev/mapper/rhel-root
ro crashkernel=auto resume=/dev/mapper/rhel-swap rd.lvm.lv=rhel/root
rd.lvm.lv=rhel/swap rhgb quiet ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix evm=fix
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# keyctl add user kmk "$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 2> /dev/null)" @u
748544121
The kmk is kept entirely in the kernel space memory. The 32-byte long value of the kmk is
generated from random bytes from the /dev/urandom file and placed in the user ( @u)
keyring. The key serial number is on the first line of the previous output.
The command uses the kmk to generate and encrypt a 64-byte long user key (named evm-
key) and places it in the user ( @u) keyring. The key serial number is on the first line of the
previous output.
IMPORTANT
It is necessary to name the user key as evm-key because that is the name
the EVM subsystem is expecting and is working with.
# mkdir -p /etc/keys/
7. Search for the kmk and export its unencrypted value into the new directory.
8. Search for the evm-key and export its encrypted value into the new directory.
The evm-key has been encrypted by the kernel master key earlier.
# keyctl show
Session Keyring
974575405 --alswrv 0 0 keyring: ses 299489774 --alswrv 0 65534 \ keyring:
uid.0 748544121 --alswrv 0 0 \ user: kmk
641780271 --alswrv 0 0 \_ encrypted: evm-key
# ls -l /etc/keys/
total 8
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 246 Jun 24 12:44 evm-key
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 32 Jun 24 12:43 kmk
10. Optional: If the keys have been removed from the keyring, for example after system reboot,
you can import the already exported kmk and evm-key instead of creating new ones.
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WARNING
Enabling IMA and EVM without relabeling the system might make the
majority of the files on the system inaccessible.
Verification
# dmesg | tail -1
[…] evm: key initialized
Additional resources
grep(1) manpage
Prerequisites
IMA and EVM are enabled. For more information, see Enabling integrity measurement
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IMA and EVM are enabled. For more information, see Enabling integrity measurement
architecture and extended verification module.
Procedure
IMA and EVM ensure that the test_file example file has assigned hash values that are stored as
its extended attributes.
# getfattr -m . -d test_file
# file: test_file
security.evm=0sAnDIy4VPA0HArpPO/EqiutnNyBql
security.ima=0sAQOEDeuUnWzwwKYk+n66h/vby3eD
The example output shows extended attributes with the IMA and EVM hash values and SELinux
context. EVM adds a security.evm extended attribute related to the other attributes. At this
point, you can use the evmctl utility on security.evm to generate either an RSA-based digital
signature or a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC-SHA1).
Additional resources
Security hardening
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
Red Hat Enterprise Linux uses LUKS to perform block device encryption. By default, the option to
encrypt the block device is unchecked during the installation. If you select the option to encrypt your
disk, the system prompts you for a passphrase every time you boot the computer. This passphrase
unlocks the bulk encryption key that decrypts your partition. If you want to modify the default partition
table, you can select the partitions that you want to encrypt. This is set in the partition table settings.
Ciphers
The default cipher used for LUKS is aes-xts-plain64. The default key size for LUKS is 512 bits. The
default key size for LUKS with Anaconda XTS mode is 512 bits. The following are the available ciphers:
Twofish
Serpent
LUKS encrypts entire block devices and is therefore well-suited for protecting contents of
mobile devices such as removable storage media or laptop disk drives.
The underlying contents of the encrypted block device are arbitrary, which makes it useful for
encrypting swap devices. This can also be useful with certain databases that use specially
formatted block devices for data storage.
LUKS devices contain multiple key slots, which means you can add backup keys or passphrases.
IMPORTANT
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IMPORTANT
Disk-encryption solutions such as LUKS protect the data only when your system
is off. After the system is on and LUKS has decrypted the disk, the files on that
disk are available to anyone who have access to them.
Scenarios that require multiple users to have distinct access keys to the same
device. The LUKS1 format provides eight key slots and LUKS2 provides up to 32
key slots.
Additional resources
The LUKS2 format enables future updates of various parts without a need to modify binary structures.
Internally it uses JSON text format for metadata, provides redundancy of metadata, detects metadata
corruption, and automatically repairs from a metadata copy.
IMPORTANT
Do not use LUKS2 in systems that support only LUKS1 because LUKS2 and LUKS1 use
different commands to encrypt the disk. Using the wrong command for a LUKS version
might cause data loss.
LUKS1 cryptsetup-reencrypt
Online re-encryption
The LUKS2 format supports re-encrypting encrypted devices while the devices are in use. For example,
you do not have to unmount the file system on the device to perform the following tasks:
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Conversion
In certain situations, you can convert LUKS1 to LUKS2. The conversion is not possible specifically in the
following scenarios:
A LUKS1 device is marked as being used by a Policy-Based Decryption (PBD) Clevis solution.
The cryptsetup tool does not convert the device when some luksmeta metadata are detected.
A device is active. The device must be in an inactive state before any conversion is possible.
checksum
The default mode. It balances data protection and performance.
This mode stores individual checksums of the sectors in the re-encryption area, which the recovery
process can detect for the sectors that were re-encrypted by LUKS2. The mode requires that the
block device sector write is atomic.
journal
The safest mode but also the slowest. Since this mode journals the re-encryption area in the binary
area, the LUKS2 writes the data twice.
none
The none mode prioritizes performance and provides no data protection. It protects the data only
against safe process termination, such as the SIGTERM signal or the user pressing Ctrl+C key. Any
unexpected system failure or application failure might result in data corruption.
If a LUKS2 re-encryption process terminates unexpectedly by force, LUKS2 can perform the recovery in
one of the following ways:
Automatically
By performing any one of the following actions triggers the automatic recovery action during the
next LUKS2 device open action:
Manually
By using the cryptsetup repair /dev/sdx command on the LUKS2 device.
Additional resources
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CHAPTER 10. ENCRYPTING BLOCK DEVICES USING LUKS
Prerequisites
WARNING
You might lose your data during the encryption process due to a hardware,
kernel, or human failure. Ensure that you have a reliable backup before you
start encrypting the data.
Procedure
1. Unmount all file systems on the device that you plan to encrypt, for example:
# umount /dev/mapper/vg00-lv00
2. Make free space for storing a LUKS header. Use one of the following options that suits your
scenario:
In the case of encrypting a logical volume, you can extend the logical volume without
resizing the file system. For example:
Shrink the file system on the device. You can use the resize2fs utility for the ext2, ext3, or
ext4 file systems. Note that you cannot shrink the XFS file system.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
a52e2cc9-a5be-47b8-a95d-6bdf4f2d9325
b. Open /etc/crypttab in a text editor of your choice and add a device in this file:
$ vi /etc/crypttab
$ dracut -f --regenerate-all
a. Find the file system’s UUID of the active LUKS block device:
$ blkid -p /dev/mapper/lv00_encrypted
/dev/mapper/lv00-encrypted: UUID="37bc2492-d8fa-4969-9d9b-bb64d3685aa9"
BLOCK_SIZE="4096" TYPE="xfs" USAGE="filesystem"
b. Open /etc/fstab in a text editor of your choice and add a device in this file, for example:
$ vi /etc/fstab
Verification
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CHAPTER 10. ENCRYPTING BLOCK DEVICES USING LUKS
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 33554432 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
[...]
Additional resources
Prerequisites
WARNING
You might lose your data during the encryption process due to a hardware,
kernel, or human failure. Ensure that you have a reliable backup before you
start encrypting the data.
Procedure
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# umount /dev/nvme0n1p1
WARNING!
========
Header file does not exist, do you want to create it?
Replace /home/header with a path to the file with a detached LUKS header. The detached
LUKS header has to be accessible to unlock the encrypted device later.
Verification
1. Verify if the existing data on a block device using LUKS2 with a detached header is encrypted:
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 0 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
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cipher: aes-xts-plain64
sector: 512 [bytes]
[...]
Additional resources
Prerequisites
A blank block device. You can use commands such as lsblk to find if there is no real data on that
device, for example, a file system.
Procedure
WARNING!
========
This will overwrite data on /dev/nvme0n1p1 irrevocably.
Are you sure? (Type 'yes' in capital letters): YES
Enter passphrase for /dev/nvme0n1p1:
Verify passphrase:
This unlocks the partition and maps it to a new device by using the device mapper. To not
overwrite the encrypted data, this command alerts the kernel that the device is an encrypted
device and addressed through LUKS by using the /dev/mapper/device_mapped_name path.
3. Create a file system to write encrypted data to the partition, which must be accessed through
the device mapped name:
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Verification
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 16777216 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
sector: 512 [bytes]
[...]
Additional resources
You can use the storage role to create and configure a volume encrypted with LUKS by running an
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You can use the storage role to create and configure a volume encrypted with LUKS by running an
Ansible playbook.
Prerequisites
You have prepared the control node and the managed nodes
You are logged in to the control node as a user who can run playbooks on the managed nodes.
The account you use to connect to the managed nodes has sudo permissions on them.
Procedure
1. Create a playbook file, for example ~/playbook.yml, with the following content:
---
- name: Create and configure a volume encrypted with LUKS
hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
roles:
- rhel-system-roles.storage
vars:
storage_volumes:
- name: barefs
type: disk
disks:
- sdb
fs_type: xfs
fs_label: label-name
mount_point: /mnt/data
encryption: true
encryption_password: <password>
You can also add other encryption parameters, such as encryption_key, encryption_cipher,
encryption_key_size, and encryption_luks, to the playbook file.
Note that this command only validates the syntax and does not protect against a wrong but valid
configuration.
$ ansible-playbook ~/playbook.yml
Verification
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Version: 2
Epoch: 6
Metadata area: 16384 [bytes]
Keyslots area: 33521664 [bytes]
UUID: a4c6be82-7347-4a91-a8ad-9479b72c9426
Label: (no label)
Subsystem: (no subsystem)
Flags: allow-discards
Data segments:
0: crypt
offset: 33554432 [bytes]
length: (whole device)
cipher: aes-xts-plain64
sector: 4096 [bytes]
...
Additional resources
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.storage/README.md file
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/storage/ directory
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PBD allows combining different unlocking methods into a policy, which makes it possible to unlock the
same volume in different ways. The current implementation of the PBD in RHEL consists of the Clevis
framework and plug-ins called pins. Each pin provides a separate unlocking capability. Currently, the
following pins are available:
tang
Allows unlocking volumes using a network server.
tpm2
allows unlocking volumes using a TPM2 policy.
sss
allows deploying high-availability systems using the Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) cryptographic
scheme.
Figure 11.1. NBDE scheme when using a LUKS1-encrypted volume. The luksmeta package is not used
for LUKS2 volumes.
Tang is a server for binding data to network presence. It makes a system containing your data available
when the system is bound to a certain secure network. Tang is stateless and does not require TLS or
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authentication. Unlike escrow-based solutions, where the server stores all encryption keys and has
knowledge of every key ever used, Tang never interacts with any client keys, so it never gains any
identifying information from the client.
Clevis is a pluggable framework for automated decryption. In NBDE, Clevis provides automated
unlocking of LUKS volumes. The clevis package provides the client side of the feature.
A Clevis pin is a plug-in into the Clevis framework. One of such pins is a plug-in that implements
interactions with the NBDE server — Tang.
Clevis and Tang are generic client and server components that provide network-bound encryption. In
RHEL, they are used in conjunction with LUKS to encrypt and decrypt root and non-root storage
volumes to accomplish Network-Bound Disk Encryption.
Both client- and server-side components use the José library to perform encryption and decryption
operations.
When you begin provisioning NBDE, the Clevis pin for Tang server gets a list of the Tang server’s
advertised asymmetric keys. Alternatively, since the keys are asymmetric, a list of Tang’s public keys can
be distributed out of band so that clients can operate without access to the Tang server. This mode is
called offline provisioning.
The Clevis pin for Tang uses one of the public keys to generate a unique, cryptographically-strong
encryption key. Once the data is encrypted using this key, the key is discarded. The Clevis client should
store the state produced by this provisioning operation in a convenient location. This process of
encrypting data is the provisioning step.
The LUKS version 2 (LUKS2) is the default disk-encryption format in RHEL, hence, the provisioning
state for NBDE is stored as a token in a LUKS2 header. The leveraging of provisioning state for NBDE by
the luksmeta package is used only for volumes encrypted with LUKS1.
The Clevis pin for Tang supports both LUKS1 and LUKS2 without specification need. Clevis can encrypt
plain-text files but you have to use the cryptsetup tool for encrypting block devices. See the Encrypting
block devices using LUKS for more information.
When the client is ready to access its data, it loads the metadata produced in the provisioning step and it
responds to recover the encryption key. This process is the recovery step.
In NBDE, Clevis binds a LUKS volume using a pin so that it can be automatically unlocked. After
successful completion of the binding process, the disk can be unlocked using the provided Dracut
unlocker.
NOTE
If the kdump kernel crash dumping mechanism is set to save the content of the system
memory to a LUKS-encrypted device, you are prompted for entering a password during
the second kernel boot.
Additional resources
How to set up Network-Bound Disk Encryption with multiple LUKS devices (Clevis + Tang
unlocking) Knowledgebase article
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APTER 11. CONFIGURING AUTOMATED UNLOCKING OF ENCRYPTED VOLUMES BY USING POLICY-BASED DECRYPTION
Procedure
2. To decrypt data, use a clevis decrypt command and provide a cipher text in the JSON Web
Encryption (JWE) format, for example:
Additional resources
Built-in CLI help after entering the clevis command without any argument:
$ clevis
Usage: clevis COMMAND [OPTIONS]
Prerequisites
Procedure
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
1. To install the tang package and its dependencies, enter the following command as root:
2. Pick an unoccupied port, for example, 7500/tcp, and allow the tangd service to bind to that
port:
Note that a port can be used only by one service at a time, and thus an attempt to use an
already occupied port implies the ValueError: Port already defined error message.
# firewall-cmd --add-port=7500/tcp
# firewall-cmd --runtime-to-permanent
6. In the following editor screen, which opens an empty override.conf file located in the
/etc/systemd/system/tangd.socket.d/ directory, change the default port for the Tang server
from 80 to the previously picked number by adding the following lines:
[Socket]
ListenStream=
ListenStream=7500
IMPORTANT
Insert the previous code snippet between the lines starting with # Anything
between here and # Lines below this, otherwise the system discards your
changes.
7. Save the changes by pressing Ctrl+O and Enter. Exit the editor by pressing Ctrl+X.
# systemctl daemon-reload
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APTER 11. CONFIGURING AUTOMATED UNLOCKING OF ENCRYPTED VOLUMES BY USING POLICY-BASED DECRYPTION
Because tangd uses the systemd socket activation mechanism, the server starts as soon as the
first connection comes in. A new set of cryptographic keys is automatically generated at the first
start. To perform cryptographic operations such as manual key generation, use the jose utility.
Additional resources
Alternatively, you can rotate Tang keys by using the nbde_server RHEL system role. See Using the
nbde_server system role for setting up multiple Tang servers for more information.
Prerequisites
Note that clevis luks list, clevis luks report, and clevis luks regen have been introduced in
RHEL 8.2.
Procedure
1. Rename all keys in the /var/db/tang key database directory to have a leading . to hide them
from advertisement. Note that the file names in the following example differs from unique file
names in the key database directory of your Tang server:
# cd /var/db/tang
# ls -l
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 349 Feb 7 14:55 UV6dqXSwe1bRKG3KbJmdiR020hY.jwk
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 354 Feb 7 14:55 y9hxLTQSiSB5jSEGWnjhY8fDTJU.jwk
# mv UV6dqXSwe1bRKG3KbJmdiR020hY.jwk .UV6dqXSwe1bRKG3KbJmdiR020hY.jwk
# mv y9hxLTQSiSB5jSEGWnjhY8fDTJU.jwk .y9hxLTQSiSB5jSEGWnjhY8fDTJU.jwk
2. Check that you renamed and therefore hid all keys from the Tang server advertisement:
# ls -l
total 0
3. Generate new keys using the /usr/libexec/tangd-keygen command in /var/db/tang on the Tang
server:
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
# /usr/libexec/tangd-keygen /var/db/tang
# ls /var/db/tang
3ZWS6-cDrCG61UPJS2BMmPU4I54.jwk zyLuX6hijUy_PSeUEFDi7hi38.jwk
4. Check that your Tang server advertises the signing key from the new key pair, for example:
# tang-show-keys 7500
3ZWS6-cDrCG61UPJS2BMmPU4I54
5. On your NBDE clients, use the clevis luks report command to check if the keys advertised by
the Tang server remains the same. You can identify slots with the relevant binding using the
clevis luks list command, for example:
6. To regenerate LUKS metadata for the new keys either press y to the prompt of the previous
command, or use the clevis luks regen command:
7. When you are sure that all old clients use the new keys, you can remove the old keys from the
Tang server, for example:
# cd /var/db/tang
# rm .*.jwk
WARNING
Removing the old keys while clients are still using them can result in data loss. If you
accidentally remove such keys, use the clevis luks regen command on the clients,
and provide your LUKS password manually.
Additional resources
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APTER 11. CONFIGURING AUTOMATED UNLOCKING OF ENCRYPTED VOLUMES BY USING POLICY-BASED DECRYPTION
Prerequisites
The RHEL 8 web console has been installed. See Installing the web console for details.
A Tang server is available. See Deploying a Tang server with SELinux in enforcing mode for
details.
Procedure
1. Open the RHEL web console by entering the following address in a web browser:
https://<localhost>:9090
Replace the <localhost> part by the remote server’s hostname or IP address when you connect
to a remote system.
2. Provide your credentials and click Storage. In the Storage table, click the disk that contains an
encrypted volume you plan to add to unlock automatically.
3. In the following page with details of the selected disk, click + in the Keys section to add a Tang
key:
4. Select Tang keyserver as Key source, provide the address of your Tang server, and a password
that unlocks the LUKS-encrypted device. Click Add to confirm:
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The following dialog window provides a command to verify that the key hash matches.
5. In a terminal on the Tang server, use the tang-show-keys command to display the key hash for
comparison. In this example, the Tang server is running on the port 7500:
# tang-show-keys 7500
x100_1k6GPiDOaMlL3WbpCjHOy9ul1bSfdhI3M08wO0
6. Click Trust key when the key hashes in the web console and in the output of previously listed
commands are the same:
7. In RHEL 8.8 and later, after you select an encrypted root file system and a Tang server, you can
skip adding the rd.neednet=1 parameter to the kernel command line, installing the clevis-
dracut package, and regenerating an initial RAM disk ( initrd). For non-root file systems, the
web console now enables the remote-cryptsetup.target and clevis-luks-akspass.path
systemd units, installs the clevis-systemd package, and adds the _netdev parameter to the
fstab and crypttab configuration files.
Verification
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Verification
1. Check that the newly added Tang key is now listed in the Keys section with the Keyserver type:
2. Verify that the bindings are available for the early boot, for example:
Additional resources
The following commands demonstrate the basic functionality provided by Clevis on examples containing
plain-text files. You can also use them for troubleshooting your NBDE or Clevis+TPM deployments.
To check that a Clevis encryption client binds to a Tang server, use the clevis encrypt tang
sub-command:
_OsIk0T-E2l6qjfdDiwVmidoZjA
Change the http://tang.srv:port URL in the previous example to match the URL of the server
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Change the http://tang.srv:port URL in the previous example to match the URL of the server
where tang is installed. The secret.jwe output file contains your encrypted cipher text in the
JWE format. This cipher text is read from the input-plain.txt input file.
Use the advertisement in the adv.jws file for any following tasks, such as encryption of files or
messages:
To decrypt data, use the clevis decrypt command and provide the cipher text (JWE):
To encrypt using a TPM 2.0 chip, use the clevis encrypt tpm2 sub-command with the only
argument in form of the JSON configuration object:
To choose a different hierarchy, hash, and key algorithms, specify configuration properties, for
example:
To decrypt the data, provide the ciphertext in the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) format:
The pin also supports sealing data to a Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) state. That way, the
data can only be unsealed if the PCR hashes values match the policy used when sealing.
For example, to seal the data to the PCR with index 0 and 7 for the SHA-256 bank:
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WARNING
Hashes in PCRs can be rewritten, and you no longer can unlock your encrypted
volume. For this reason, add a strong passphrase that enable you to unlock the
encrypted volume manually even when a value in a PCR changes.
If the system cannot automatically unlock your encrypted volume after an upgrade
of the shim-x64 package, follow the steps in the Clevis TPM2 no longer decrypts
LUKS devices after a restart KCS article.
Additional resources
clevis, clevis decrypt, and clevis encrypt tang commands without any arguments show the
built-in CLI help, for example:
Prerequisites
Procedure
2. Identify the LUKS-encrypted volume for PBD. In the following example, the block device is
referred as /dev/sda2:
# lsblk
NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT
sda 8:0 0 12G 0 disk
├─sda1 8:1 0 1G 0 part /boot
└─sda2 8:2 0 11G 0 part
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3. Bind the volume to a Tang server using the clevis luks bind command:
_OsIk0T-E2l6qjfdDiwVmidoZjA
a. Creates a new key with the same entropy as the LUKS master key.
c. Stores the Clevis JWE object in the LUKS2 header token or uses LUKSMeta if the non-
default LUKS1 header is used.
NOTE
The binding procedure assumes that there is at least one free LUKS password
slot. The clevis luks bind command takes one of the slots.
The volume can now be unlocked with your existing password as well as with the Clevis policy.
4. To enable the early boot system to process the disk binding, use the dracut tool on an already
installed system:
In RHEL, Clevis produces a generic initrd (initial RAM disk) without host-specific configuration
options and does not automatically add parameters such as rd.neednet=1 to the kernel
command line. If your configuration relies on a Tang pin that requires network during early boot,
use the --hostonly-cmdline argument and dracut adds rd.neednet=1 when it detects a Tang
binding:
Alternatively, create a .conf file in the /etc/dracut.conf.d/, and add the hostonly_cmdline=yes
option to the file, for example:
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NOTE
You can also ensure that networking for a Tang pin is available during early boot
by using the grubby tool on the system where Clevis is installed:
Verification
1. To verify that the Clevis JWE object is successfully placed in a LUKS header, use the clevis
luks list command:
IMPORTANT
To use NBDE for clients with static IP configuration (without DHCP), pass your network
configuration to the dracut tool manually, for example:
Alternatively, create a .conf file in the /etc/dracut.conf.d/ directory with the static
network information. For example:
# cat /etc/dracut.conf.d/static_ip.conf
kernel_cmdline="ip=192.0.2.10::192.0.2.1:255.255.255.0::ens3:none
nameserver=192.0.2.100"
Additional resources
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Use the following steps to configure unlocking of LUKS-encrypted volumes by using a Trusted Platform
Module 2.0 (TPM 2.0) policy.
Prerequisites
Procedure
2. Identify the LUKS-encrypted volume for PBD. In the following example, the block device is
referred as /dev/sda2:
# lsblk
NAME MAJ:MIN RM SIZE RO TYPE MOUNTPOINT
sda 8:0 0 12G 0 disk
├─sda1 8:1 0 1G 0 part /boot
└─sda2 8:2 0 11G 0 part
└─luks-40e20552-2ade-4954-9d56-565aa7994fb6 253:0 0 11G 0 crypt
├─rhel-root 253:0 0 9.8G 0 lvm /
└─rhel-swap 253:1 0 1.2G 0 lvm [SWAP]
3. Bind the volume to a TPM 2.0 device using the clevis luks bind command, for example:
a. Creates a new key with the same entropy as the LUKS master key.
c. Stores the Clevis JWE object in the LUKS2 header token or uses LUKSMeta if the non-
default LUKS1 header is used.
NOTE
The binding procedure assumes that there is at least one free LUKS
password slot. The clevis luks bind command takes one of the slots.
Alternatively, if you want to seal data to specific Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)
states, add the pcr_bank and pcr_ids values to the clevis luks bind command, for
example:
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WARNING
Because the data can only be unsealed if PCR hashes values match the
policy used when sealing and the hashes can be rewritten, add a strong
passphrase that enable you to unlock the encrypted volume manually
when a value in a PCR changes.
4. The volume can now be unlocked with your existing password as well as with the Clevis policy.
5. To enable the early boot system to process the disk binding, use the dracut tool on an already
installed system:
Verification
1. To verify that the Clevis JWE object is successfully placed in a LUKS header, use the clevis
luks list command:
Additional resources
IMPORTANT
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IMPORTANT
The recommended way to remove a Clevis pin from a LUKS-encrypted volume is through
the clevis luks unbind command. The removal procedure using clevis luks unbind
consists of only one step and works for both LUKS1 and LUKS2 volumes. The following
example command removes the metadata created by the binding step and wipe the key
slot 1 on the /dev/sda2 device:
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. Check which LUKS version the volume, for example /dev/sda2, is encrypted by and identify a
slot and a token that is bound to Clevis:
In the previous example, the Clevis token is identified by 0 and the associated key slot is 1.
3. If your device is encrypted by LUKS1, which is indicated by the Version: 1 string in the output of
the cryptsetup luksDump command, perform this additional step with the luksmeta wipe
command:
Additional resources
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Procedure
1. Instruct Kickstart to partition the disk such that LUKS encryption has enabled for all mount
points, other than /boot, with a temporary password. The password is temporary for this step of
the enrollment process.
Note that OSPP-compliant systems require a more complex configuration, for example:
2. Install the related Clevis packages by listing them in the %packages section:
%packages
clevis-dracut
clevis-luks
clevis-systemd
%end
3. Optionally, to ensure that you can unlock the encrypted volume manually when required, add a
strong passphrase before you remove the temporary passphrase. See the How to add a
passphrase, key, or keyfile to an existing LUKS device article for more information.
4. Call clevis luks bind to perform binding in the %post section. Afterward, remove the
temporary password:
%post
clevis luks bind -y -k - -d /dev/vda2 \
tang '{"url":"http://tang.srv"}' <<< "temppass"
cryptsetup luksRemoveKey /dev/vda2 <<< "temppass"
dracut -fv --regenerate-all
%end
If your configuration relies on a Tang pin that requires network during early boot or you use
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If your configuration relies on a Tang pin that requires network during early boot or you use
NBDE clients with static IP configurations, you have to modify the dracut command as
described in Configuring manual enrollment of LUKS-encrypted volumes .
Note that the -y option for the clevis luks bind command is available from RHEL 8.3. In RHEL
8.2 and older, replace -y by -f in the clevis luks bind command and download the
advertisement from the Tang server:
%post
curl -sfg http://tang.srv/adv -o adv.jws
clevis luks bind -f -k - -d /dev/vda2 \
tang '{"url":"http://tang.srv","adv":"adv.jws"}' <<< "temppass"
cryptsetup luksRemoveKey /dev/vda2 <<< "temppass"
dracut -fv --regenerate-all
%end
WARNING
You can use an analogous procedure when using a TPM 2.0 policy instead of a Tang server.
Additional resources
Procedure
2. Reboot the system, and then perform the binding step using the clevis luks bind command as
described in Configuring manual enrollment of LUKS-encrypted volumes , for example:
3. The LUKS-encrypted removable device can be now unlocked automatically in your GNOME
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3. The LUKS-encrypted removable device can be now unlocked automatically in your GNOME
desktop session. The device bound to a Clevis policy can be also unlocked by the clevis luks
unlock command:
You can use an analogous procedure when using a TPM 2.0 policy instead of a Tang server.
Additional resources
Clevis provides an implementation of SSS. It creates a key and divides it into a number of pieces. Each
piece is encrypted using another pin including even SSS recursively. Additionally, you define the
threshold t. If an NBDE deployment decrypts at least t pieces, then it recovers the encryption key and
the decryption process succeeds. When Clevis detects a smaller number of parts than specified in the
threshold, it prints an error message.
{
"t":1,
"pins":{
"tang":[
{
"url":"http://tang1.srv"
},
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{
"url":"http://tang2.srv"
}
]
}
}
In this configuration, the SSS threshold t is set to 1 and the clevis luks bind command successfully
reconstructs the secret if at least one from two listed tang servers is available.
The configuration scheme with the SSS threshold 't' set to '2' is now:
{
"t":2,
"pins":{
"tang":[
{
"url":"http://tang1.srv"
}
],
"tpm2":{
"pcr_ids":"0,7"
}
}
}
Additional resources
tang(8) (section High Availability), clevis(1) (section Shamir’s Secret Sharing), and clevis-
encrypt-sss(1) man pages
This is not a limitation of Clevis but a design principle of LUKS. If your scenario requires having encrypted
root volumes in a cloud, perform the installation process (usually using Kickstart) for each instance of
Red Hat Enterprise Linux in the cloud as well. The images cannot be shared without also sharing a LUKS
master key.
To deploy automated unlocking in a virtualized environment, use systems such as lorax or virt-install
together with a Kickstart file (see Configuring automated enrollment of LUKS-encrypted volumes using
Kickstart) or another automated provisioning tool to ensure that each encrypted VM has a unique
master key.
Additional resources
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Additional resources
Therefore, the best practice is to create customized images that are not shared in any public repository
and that provide a base for the deployment of a limited amount of instances. The exact number of
instances to create should be defined by deployment’s security policies and based on the risk tolerance
associated with the LUKS master key attack vector.
To build LUKS-enabled automated deployments, systems such as Lorax or virt-install together with a
Kickstart file should be used to ensure master key uniqueness during the image building process.
Cloud environments enable two Tang server deployment options which we consider here. First, the Tang
server can be deployed within the cloud environment itself. Second, the Tang server can be deployed
outside of the cloud on independent infrastructure with a VPN link between the two infrastructures.
Deploying Tang natively in the cloud does allow for easy deployment. However, given that it shares
infrastructure with the data persistence layer of ciphertext of other systems, it may be possible for both
the Tang server’s private key and the Clevis metadata to be stored on the same physical disk. Access to
this physical disk permits a full compromise of the ciphertext data.
IMPORTANT
For this reason, Red Hat strongly recommends maintaining a physical separation between
the location where the data is stored and the system where Tang is running. This
separation between the cloud and the Tang server ensures that the Tang server’s private
key cannot be accidentally combined with the Clevis metadata. It also provides local
control of the Tang server if the cloud infrastructure is at risk.
Prerequisites
The podman package and its dependencies are installed on the system.
You have logged in on the registry.redhat.io container catalog using the podman login
registry.redhat.io command. See Red Hat Container Registry Authentication for more
information.
The Clevis client is installed on systems containing LUKS-encrypted volumes that you want to
automatically unlock by using a Tang server.
Procedure
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2. Run the container, specify its port, and specify the path to the Tang keys. The previous example
runs the tang container, specifies the port 7500, and indicates a path to the Tang keys of the
/var/db/tang directory:
Note that Tang uses port 80 by default but this may collide with other services such as the
Apache HTTP server.
3. [Optional] For increased security, rotate the Tang keys periodically. You can use the tangd-
rotate-keys script, for example:
Verification
On a system that contains LUKS-encrypted volumes for automated unlocking by the presence
of the Tang server, check that the Clevis client can encrypt and decrypt a plain-text message
using Tang:
x1AIpc6WmnCU-CabD8_4q18vDuw
The previous example command shows the test string at the end of its output when a Tang
server is available on the localhost URL and communicates through port 7500.
Additional resources
RHEL 8.3 introduced Ansible roles for automated deployments of Policy-Based Decryption (PBD)
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RHEL 8.3 introduced Ansible roles for automated deployments of Policy-Based Decryption (PBD)
solutions using Clevis and Tang. The rhel-system-roles package contains these system roles, related
examples, and also the reference documentation.
The nbde_client system role enables you to deploy multiple Clevis clients in an automated way. Note
that the nbde_client role supports only Tang bindings, and you cannot use it for TPM2 bindings at the
moment.
The nbde_client role requires volumes that are already encrypted using LUKS. This role supports to bind
a LUKS-encrypted volume to one or more Network-Bound (NBDE) servers - Tang servers. You can
either preserve the existing volume encryption with a passphrase or remove it. After removing the
passphrase, you can unlock the volume only using NBDE. This is useful when a volume is initially
encrypted using a temporary key or password that you should remove after you provision the system.
If you provide both a passphrase and a key file, the role uses what you have provided first. If it does not
find any of these valid, it attempts to retrieve a passphrase from an existing binding.
PBD defines a binding as a mapping of a device to a slot. This means that you can have multiple bindings
for the same device. The default slot is slot 1.
The nbde_client role provides also the state variable. Use the present value for either creating a new
binding or updating an existing one. Contrary to a clevis luks bind command, you can use state:
present also for overwriting an existing binding in its device slot. The absent value removes a specified
binding.
Using the nbde_client system role, you can deploy and manage a Tang server as part of an automated
disk encryption solution. This role supports the following features:
Additional resources
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde_server/README.md file
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde_client/README.md file
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde_server/ directory
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde_client/ directory
Prerequisites
You have prepared the control node and the managed nodes
You are logged in to the control node as a user who can run playbooks on the managed nodes.
The account you use to connect to the managed nodes has sudo permissions on them.
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Procedure
1. Create a playbook file, for example ~/playbook.yml, with the following content:
---
- hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
roles:
- rhel-system-roles.nbde_server
vars:
nbde_server_rotate_keys: yes
nbde_server_manage_firewall: true
nbde_server_manage_selinux: true
This example playbook ensures deploying of your Tang server and a key rotation.
Note that this command only validates the syntax and does not protect against a wrong but valid
configuration.
$ ansible-playbook ~/playbook.yml
Verification
To ensure that networking for a Tang pin is available during early boot by using the grubby tool
on the systems where Clevis is installed, enter:
Additional resources
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde_server/README.md file
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde_server/ directory
With the nbde_client RHEL system role, you can prepare and apply an Ansible playbook that contains
your Clevis client settings on multiple systems.
NOTE
The nbde_client system role supports only Tang bindings. Therefore, you cannot use it
for TPM2 bindings.
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Prerequisites
You have prepared the control node and the managed nodes
You are logged in to the control node as a user who can run playbooks on the managed nodes.
The account you use to connect to the managed nodes has sudo permissions on them.
Procedure
1. Create a playbook file, for example ~/playbook.yml, with the following content:
- hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
roles:
- rhel-system-roles.nbde_client
vars:
nbde_client_bindings:
- device: /dev/rhel/root
encryption_key_src: /etc/luks/keyfile
servers:
- http://server1.example.com
- http://server2.example.com
- device: /dev/rhel/swap
encryption_key_src: /etc/luks/keyfile
servers:
- http://server1.example.com
- http://server2.example.com
This example playbook configures Clevis clients for automated unlocking of two LUKS-
encrypted volumes when at least one of two Tang servers is available
The nbde_client system role supports only scenarios with Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP). To use NBDE for clients with static IP configuration use the following
playbook:
- hosts: managed-node-01.example.com
roles:
- rhel-system-roles.nbde_client
vars:
nbde_client_bindings:
- device: /dev/rhel/root
encryption_key_src: /etc/luks/keyfile
servers:
- http://server1.example.com
- http://server2.example.com
- device: /dev/rhel/swap
encryption_key_src: /etc/luks/keyfile
servers:
- http://server1.example.com
- http://server2.example.com
tasks:
- name: Configure a client with a static IP address during early boot
ansible.builtin.command:
cmd: grubby --update-kernel=ALL --args='GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="ip={{
<ansible_default_ipv4.address> }}::{{ <ansible_default_ipv4.gateway> }}:{{
<ansible_default_ipv4.netmask> }}::{{ <ansible_default_ipv4.alias> }}:none"'
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Note that this command only validates the syntax and does not protect against a wrong but valid
configuration.
$ ansible-playbook ~/playbook.yml
Additional resources
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.nbde_client/README.md file
/usr/share/doc/rhel-system-roles/nbde_client/ directory
Looking forward to Linux network configuration in the initial ramdisk (initrd) article
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The following list summarizes some of the information that Audit is capable of recording in its log files:
Association of an event with the identity of the user who triggered the event
All modifications to Audit configuration and attempts to access Audit log files
Include or exclude events based on user identity, subject and object labels, and other attributes
The use of the Audit system is also a requirement for a number of security-related certifications. Audit is
designed to meet or exceed the requirements of the following certifications or compliance guides:
Evaluated by National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) and Best Security Industries
(BSI)
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Use Cases
NOTE
After a system call passes the exclude filter, it is sent through one of the aforementioned filters, which,
based on the Audit rule configuration, sends it to the Audit daemon for further processing.
The user-space Audit daemon collects the information from the kernel and creates entries in a log file.
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The user-space Audit daemon collects the information from the kernel and creates entries in a log file.
Other Audit user-space utilities interact with the Audit daemon, the kernel Audit component, or the
Audit log files:
The auditctl Audit control utility interacts with the kernel Audit component to manage rules and
to control many settings and parameters of the event generation process.
The remaining Audit utilities take the contents of the Audit log files as input and generate
output based on user’s requirements. For example, the aureport utility generates a report of all
recorded events.
In RHEL 8, the Audit dispatcher daemon (audisp) functionality is integrated in the Audit daemon
(auditd). Configuration files of plugins for the interaction of real-time analytical programs with Audit
events are located in the /etc/audit/plugins.d/ directory by default.
log_file
The directory that holds the Audit log files (usually /var/log/audit/) should reside on a separate
mount point. This prevents other processes from consuming space in this directory and provides
accurate detection of the remaining space for the Audit daemon.
max_log_file
Specifies the maximum size of a single Audit log file, must be set to make full use of the available
space on the partition that holds the Audit log files. The max_log_file` parameter specifies the
maximum file size in megabytes. The value given must be numeric.
max_log_file_action
Decides what action is taken once the limit set in max_log_file is reached, should be set to
keep_logs to prevent Audit log files from being overwritten.
space_left
Specifies the amount of free space left on the disk for which an action that is set in the
space_left_action parameter is triggered. Must be set to a number that gives the administrator
enough time to respond and free up disk space. The space_left value depends on the rate at which
the Audit log files are generated. If the value of space_left is specified as a whole number, it is
interpreted as an absolute size in megabytes (MiB). If the value is specified as a number between 1
and 99 followed by a percentage sign (for example, 5%), the Audit daemon calculates the absolute
size in megabytes based on the size of the file system containing log_file.
space_left_action
It is recommended to set the space_left_action parameter to email or exec with an appropriate
notification method.
admin_space_left
Specifies the absolute minimum amount of free space for which an action that is set in the
admin_space_left_action parameter is triggered, must be set to a value that leaves enough space
to log actions performed by the administrator. The numeric value for this parameter should be lower
than the number for space_left. You can also append a percent sign (for example, 1%) to the number
to have the audit daemon calculate the number based on the disk partition size.
admin_space_left_action
Should be set to single to put the system into single-user mode and allow the administrator to free
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Should be set to single to put the system into single-user mode and allow the administrator to free
up some disk space.
disk_full_action
Specifies an action that is triggered when no free space is available on the partition that holds the
Audit log files, must be set to halt or single. This ensures that the system is either shut down or
operating in single-user mode when Audit can no longer log events.
disk_error_action
Specifies an action that is triggered in case an error is detected on the partition that holds the Audit
log files, must be set to syslog, single, or halt, depending on your local security policies regarding
the handling of hardware malfunctions.
flush
Should be set to incremental_async. It works in combination with the freq parameter, which
determines how many records can be sent to the disk before forcing a hard synchronization with the
hard drive. The freq parameter should be set to 100. These parameters assure that Audit event data
is synchronized with the log files on the disk while keeping good performance for bursts of activity.
The remaining configuration options should be set according to your local security policy.
You can temporarily disable auditd with the # auditctl -e 0 command and re-enable it with # auditctl -e
1.
You can perform other actions on auditd by using the service auditd <action> command, where
<action> can be one of the following:
stop
Stops auditd.
restart
Restarts auditd.
reload or force-reload
Reloads the configuration of auditd from the /etc/audit/auditd.conf file.
rotate
Rotates the log files in the /var/log/audit/ directory.
resume
Resumes logging of Audit events after it has been previously suspended, for example, when there is
not enough free space on the disk partition that holds the Audit log files.
condrestart or try-restart
Restarts auditd only if it is already running.
status
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NOTE
The service command is the only way to correctly interact with the auditd daemon. You
need to use the service command so that the auid value is properly recorded. You can
use the systemctl command only for two actions: enable and status.
Add the following Audit rule to log every attempt to read or modify the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:
If the auditd daemon is running, for example, using the following command creates a new event in the
Audit log file:
$ cat /etc/ssh/sshd_config
The above event consists of four records, which share the same time stamp and serial number. Records
always start with the type= keyword. Each record consists of several name=value pairs separated by a
white space or a comma. A detailed analysis of the above event follows:
First Record
type=SYSCALL
The type field contains the type of the record. In this example, the SYSCALL value specifies that this
record was triggered by a system call to the kernel.
msg=audit(1364481363.243:24287):
The msg field records:
A time stamp and a unique ID of the record in the form audit(time_stamp:ID). Multiple
records can share the same time stamp and ID if they were generated as part of the same
Audit event. The time stamp is using the Unix time format - seconds since 00:00:00 UTC on
1 January 1970.
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arch=c000003e
The arch field contains information about the CPU architecture of the system. The value, c000003e,
is encoded in hexadecimal notation. When searching Audit records with the ausearch command, use
the -i or --interpret option to automatically convert hexadecimal values into their human-readable
equivalents. The c000003e value is interpreted as x86_64.
syscall=2
The syscall field records the type of the system call that was sent to the kernel. The value, 2, can be
matched with its human-readable equivalent in the /usr/include/asm/unistd_64.h file. In this case, 2
is the open system call. Note that the ausyscall utility allows you to convert system call numbers to
their human-readable equivalents. Use the ausyscall --dump command to display a listing of all
system calls along with their numbers. For more information, see the ausyscall(8) man page.
success=no
The success field records whether the system call recorded in that particular event succeeded or
failed. In this case, the call did not succeed.
exit=-13
The exit field contains a value that specifies the exit code returned by the system call. This value
varies for a different system call. You can interpret the value to its human-readable equivalent with
the following command:
Note that the previous example assumes that your Audit log contains an event that failed with exit
code -13.
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The euid field records the effective user ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
suid=1000
The suid field records the set user ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
fsuid=1000
The fsuid field records the file system user ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
egid=1000
The egid field records the effective group ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
sgid=1000
The sgid field records the set group ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
fsgid=1000
The fsgid field records the file system group ID of the user who started the analyzed process.
tty=pts0
The tty field records the terminal from which the analyzed process was invoked.
ses=1
The ses field records the session ID of the session from which the analyzed process was invoked.
comm="cat"
The comm field records the command-line name of the command that was used to invoke the
analyzed process. In this case, the cat command was used to trigger this Audit event.
exe="/bin/cat"
The exe field records the path to the executable that was used to invoke the analyzed process.
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
The subj field records the SELinux context with which the analyzed process was labeled at the time
of execution.
key="sshd_config"
The key field records the administrator-defined string associated with the rule that generated this
event in the Audit log.
Second Record
type=CWD
In the second record, the type field value is CWD — current working directory. This type is used to
record the working directory from which the process that invoked the system call specified in the
first record was executed.
The purpose of this record is to record the current process’s location in case a relative path winds up
being captured in the associated PATH record. This way the absolute path can be reconstructed.
msg=audit(1364481363.243:24287)
The msg field holds the same time stamp and ID value as the value in the first record. The time
stamp is using the Unix time format - seconds since 00:00:00 UTC on 1 January 1970.
cwd="/home/user_name"
The cwd field contains the path to the directory in which the system call was invoked.
Third Record
type=PATH
In the third record, the type field value is PATH. An Audit event contains a PATH-type record for
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In the third record, the type field value is PATH. An Audit event contains a PATH-type record for
every path that is passed to the system call as an argument. In this Audit event, only one path
(/etc/ssh/sshd_config) was used as an argument.
msg=audit(1364481363.243:24287):
The msg field holds the same time stamp and ID value as the value in the first and second record.
item=0
The item field indicates which item, of the total number of items referenced in the SYSCALL type
record, the current record is. This number is zero-based; a value of 0 means it is the first item.
name="/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
The name field records the path of the file or directory that was passed to the system call as an
argument. In this case, it was the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file.
inode=409248
The inode field contains the inode number associated with the file or directory recorded in this
event. The following command displays the file or directory that is associated with the 409248 inode
number:
dev=fd:00
The dev field specifies the minor and major ID of the device that contains the file or directory
recorded in this event. In this case, the value represents the /dev/fd/0 device.
mode=0100600
The mode field records the file or directory permissions, encoded in numerical notation as returned
by the stat command in the st_mode field. See the stat(2) man page for more information. In this
case, 0100600 can be interpreted as -rw-------, meaning that only the root user has read and write
permissions to the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file.
ouid=0
The ouid field records the object owner’s user ID.
ogid=0
The ogid field records the object owner’s group ID.
rdev=00:00
The rdev field contains a recorded device identifier for special files only. In this case, it is not used as
the recorded file is a regular file.
obj=system_u:object_r:etc_t:s0
The obj field records the SELinux context with which the recorded file or directory was labeled at the
time of execution.
nametype=NORMAL
The nametype field records the intent of each path record’s operation in the context of a given
syscall.
cap_fp=none
The cap_fp field records data related to the setting of a permitted file system-based capability of
the file or directory object.
cap_fi=none
The cap_fi field records data related to the setting of an inherited file system-based capability of
the file or directory object.
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cap_fe=0
The cap_fe field records the setting of the effective bit of the file system-based capability of the
file or directory object.
cap_fver=0
The cap_fver field records the version of the file system-based capability of the file or directory
object.
Fourth Record
type=PROCTITLE
The type field contains the type of the record. In this example, the PROCTITLE value specifies that
this record gives the full command-line that triggered this Audit event, triggered by a system call to
the kernel.
proctitle=636174002F6574632F7373682F737368645F636F6E666967
The proctitle field records the full command-line of the command that was used to invoke the
analyzed process. The field is encoded in hexadecimal notation to not allow the user to influence the
Audit log parser. The text decodes to the command that triggered this Audit event. When searching
Audit records with the ausearch command, use the -i or --interpret option to automatically convert
hexadecimal values into their human-readable equivalents. The
636174002F6574632F7373682F737368645F636F6E666967 value is interpreted as cat
/etc/ssh/sshd_config.
The auditctl command enables you to control the basic functionality of the Audit system and to define
rules that decide which Audit events are logged.
1. To define a rule that logs all write access to, and every attribute change of, the /etc/passwd file:
2. To define a rule that logs all write access to, and every attribute change of, all the files in the
/etc/selinux/ directory:
1. To define a rule that creates a log entry every time the adjtimex or settimeofday system calls
are used by a program, and the system uses the 64-bit architecture:
2. To define a rule that creates a log entry every time a file is deleted or renamed by a system user
whose ID is 1000 or larger:
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Note that the -F auid!=4294967295 option is used to exclude users whose login UID is not set.
Executable-file rules
To define a rule that logs all execution of the /bin/id program, execute the following command:
Additional resources
Note that the /etc/audit/audit.rules file is generated whenever the auditd service starts. Files in
/etc/audit/rules.d/ use the same auditctl command-line syntax to specify the rules. Empty lines and text
following a hash sign (#) are ignored.
Furthermore, you can use the auditctl command to read rules from a specified file using the -R option,
for example:
# auditctl -R /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/30-stig.rules
WARNING
The Audit sample rules in the sample-rules directory are not exhaustive nor up to
date because security standards are dynamic and subject to change. These rules are
provided only to demonstrate how Audit rules can be structured and written. They
do not ensure immediate compliance with the latest security standards. To bring
your system into compliance with the latest security standards according to specific
security guidelines, use the SCAP-based security compliance tools .
30-nispom.rules
Audit rule configuration that meets the requirements specified in the Information System Security
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Audit rule configuration that meets the requirements specified in the Information System Security
chapter of the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual.
30-ospp-v42*.rules
Audit rule configuration that meets the requirements defined in the OSPP (Protection Profile for
General Purpose Operating Systems) profile version 4.2.
30-pci-dss-v31.rules
Audit rule configuration that meets the requirements set by Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) v3.1.
30-stig.rules
Audit rule configuration that meets the requirements set by Security Technical Implementation
Guides (STIG).
To use these configuration files, copy them to the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory and use the augenrules
--load command, for example:
# cd /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/
# cp 10-base-config.rules 30-stig.rules 31-privileged.rules 99-finalize.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/
# augenrules --load
You can order Audit rules using a numbering scheme. See the /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/README-
rules file for more information.
Additional resources
10
Kernel and auditctl configuration
20
Rules that could match general rules but you want a different match
30
Main rules
40
Optional rules
50
Server-specific rules
70
System local rules
90
Finalize (immutable)
The rules are not meant to be used all at once. They are pieces of a policy that should be thought out
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The rules are not meant to be used all at once. They are pieces of a policy that should be thought out
and individual files copied to /etc/audit/rules.d/. For example, to set a system up in the STIG
configuration, copy rules 10-base-config, 30-stig, 31-privileged, and 99-finalize.
Once you have the rules in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory, load them by running the augenrules script
with the --load directive:
# augenrules --load
/sbin/augenrules: No change
No rules
enabled 1
failure 1
pid 742
rate_limit 0
...
Additional resources
Procedure
# cp -f /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service /etc/systemd/system/
2. Edit the /etc/systemd/system/auditd.service file in a text editor of your choice, for example:
# vi /etc/systemd/system/auditd.service
3. Comment out the line containing augenrules, and uncomment the line containing the auditctl -
R command:
#ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules
# systemctl daemon-reload
Additional resources
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dnf [4]
yum
pip
npm
cpan
gem
luarocks
By default, rpm already provides audit SOFTWARE_UPDATE events when it installs or updates a
package. You can list them by entering ausearch -m SOFTWARE_UPDATE on the command line.
In RHEL 8.5 and earlier versions, you can manually add rules to monitor utilities that install software into
a .rules file within the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory.
NOTE
Pre-configured rule files cannot be used on systems with the ppc64le and aarch64
architectures.
Prerequisites
auditd is configured in accordance with the settings provided in Configuring auditd for a secure
environment .
Procedure
1. On RHEL 8.6 and later, copy the pre-configured rule file 44-installers.rules from the
/usr/share/audit/sample-rules/ directory to the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory:
# cp /usr/share/audit/sample-rules/44-installers.rules /etc/audit/rules.d/
On RHEL 8.5 and earlier, create a new file in the /etc/audit/rules.d/ directory named 44-
installers.rules, and insert the following rules:
You can add additional rules for other utilities that install software, for example pip and npm,
using the same syntax.
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# augenrules --load
Verification
# auditctl -l
-p x-w /usr/bin/dnf-3 -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/yum -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/pip -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/npm -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/cpan -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/gem -k software-installer
-p x-w /usr/bin/luarocks -k software-installer
3. Search the Audit log for recent installation events, for example:
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Prerequisites
auditd is configured in accordance with the settings provided in Configuring auditd for a secure
environment .
Procedure
To display user log in times, use any one of the following commands:
You can specify the date and time with the -ts option. If you do not use this option,
ausearch provides results from today, and if you omit time, ausearch provides results from
midnight.
You can use the -sv yes option to filter out successful login attempts and -sv no for
unsuccessful login attempts.
Pipe the raw output of the ausearch command into the aulast utility, which displays the output
in a format similar to the output of the last command. For example:
Display the list of login events by using the aureport command with the --login -i options.
# aureport --login -i
Login Report
============================================
# date time auid host term exe success event
============================================
1. 11/16/2021 13:11:30 root 10.40.192.190 ssh /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6920
2. 11/16/2021 13:11:31 root 10.40.192.190 ssh /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6925
3. 11/16/2021 13:11:31 root 10.40.192.190 ssh /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6930
4. 11/16/2021 13:11:31 root 10.40.192.190 ssh /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6935
5. 11/16/2021 13:11:33 root 10.40.192.190 ssh /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6940
6. 11/16/2021 13:11:33 root 10.40.192.190 /dev/pts/0 /usr/sbin/sshd yes 6945
Additional resources
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[4] Because dnf is a symlink in RHEL, the path in thednf Audit rule must include the target of the symlink. To
receive correct Audit events, modify the 44-installers.rules file by changing the path=/usr/bin/dnf path to
/usr/bin/dnf-3 .
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fapolicyd service
fagenrules script
The administrator can define the allow and deny execution rules for any application with the possibility
of auditing based on a path, hash, MIME type, or trust.
The fapolicyd framework introduces the concept of trust. An application is trusted when it is properly
installed by the system package manager, and therefore it is registered in the system RPM database.
The fapolicyd daemon uses the RPM database as a list of trusted binaries and scripts. The fapolicyd
RPM plugin registers any system update that is handled by either the YUM package manager or the
RPM Package Manager. The plugin notifies the fapolicyd daemon about changes in this database.
Other ways of adding applications require the creation of custom rules and restarting the fapolicyd
service.
The fapolicyd service configuration is located in the /etc/fapolicyd/ directory with the following
structure:
The /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.trust file contains a list of trusted files. You can also use multiple
trust files in the /etc/fapolicyd/trust.d/ directory.
The /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/ directory for files containing allow and deny execution rules. The
fagenrules script merges these component rules files to the /etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules file.
The fapolicyd.conf file contains the daemon’s configuration options. This file is useful primarily
for performance-tuning purposes.
Rules in /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/ are organized in several files, each representing a different policy goal.
The numbers at the beginning of the corresponding file names determine the order in
/etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules:
10
Language rules.
20
Dracut-related Rules.
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21
rules for updaters.
30
Patterns.
40
ELF rules.
41
Shared objects rules.
42
Trusted ELF rules.
70
Trusted language rules.
72
Shell rules.
90
Deny execute rules.
95
Allow open rules.
You can use one of the following ways for fapolicyd integrity checking:
File-size checking
By default, fapolicyd does no integrity checking. Integrity checking based on the file size is fast, but an
attacker can replace the content of the file and preserve its byte size. Computing and checking SHA-
256 checksums is more secure, but it affects the performance of the system. The integrity = ima option
in fapolicyd.conf requires support for files extended attributes (also known as xattr) on all file systems
containing executable files.
Additional resources
The Enhancing security with the kernel integrity subsystem chapter in the Managing,
monitoring, and updating the kernel document.
Procedure
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Verification
2. Log in as a user without root privileges, and check that fapolicyd is working, for example:
$ cp /bin/ls /tmp
$ /tmp/ls
bash: /tmp/ls: Operation not permitted
NOTE
Marking files as trusted using fapolicyd.trust or trust.d/ is better than writing custom
fapolicyd rules due to performance reasons.
Prerequisites
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Procedure
$ cp /bin/ls /tmp
$ /tmp/ls
bash: /tmp/ls: Operation not permitted
2. Mark your custom binary as trusted, and store the corresponding entry to the myapp file in
/etc/fapolicyd/trust.d/:
If you skip the --trust-file option, then the previous command adds the corresponding line
to /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.trust.
To mark all existing files in a directory as trusted, provide the directory path as an argument
of the --file option, for example: fapolicyd-cli --file add /tmp/my_bin_dir/ --trust-file
myapp.
# fapolicyd-cli --update
NOTE
Changing the content of a trusted file or directory changes their checksum, and therefore
fapolicyd no longer considers them trusted.
To make the new content trusted again, refresh the file trust database by using the
fapolicyd-cli --file update command. If you do not provide any argument, the entire
database refreshes. Alternatively, you can specify a path to a specific file or directory.
Then, update the database by using fapolicyd-cli --update.
Verification
1. Check that your custom binary can be now executed, for example:
$ /tmp/ls
ls
Additional resources
For basic scenarios, prefer Marking files as trusted using an additional source of trust . In more advanced
scenarios such as allowing to execute a custom binary only for specific user and group identifiers, add
new custom rules to the /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/ directory.
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The following steps demonstrate adding a new rule to allow a custom binary.
Prerequisites
Procedure
$ cp /bin/ls /tmp
$ /tmp/ls
bash: /tmp/ls: Operation not permitted
3. Use debug mode to identify a corresponding rule. Because the output of the fapolicyd --debug
command is verbose and you can stop it only by pressing Ctrl+C or killing the corresponding
process, redirect the error output to a file. In this case, you can limit the output only to access
denials by using the --debug-deny option instead of --debug:
$ /tmp/ls
bash: /tmp/ls: Operation not permitted
# fg
fapolicyd --debug 2> fapolicy.output
^C
...
# kill 51341
7. Locate the file that contains a rule that prevented the execution of your custom binary. In this
case, the deny_audit perm=execute rule belongs to the 90-deny-execute.rules file:
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# ls /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/
10-languages.rules 40-bad-elf.rules 72-shell.rules
20-dracut.rules 41-shared-obj.rules 90-deny-execute.rules
21-updaters.rules 42-trusted-elf.rules 95-allow-open.rules
30-patterns.rules 70-trusted-lang.rules
# cat /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/90-deny-execute.rules
# Deny execution for anything untrusted
8. Add a new allow rule to the file that lexically precedes the rule file that contains the rule that
denied the execution of your custom binary in the /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/ directory:
# touch /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/80-myapps.rules
# vi /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/80-myapps.rules
Alternatively, you can allow executions of all binaries in the /tmp directory by adding the
following rule to the rule file in /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/:
IMPORTANT
To make a rule effective recursively on all directories under the specified directory, add a
trailing slash to the value of the dir= parameter in the rule ( /tmp/ in the previous example).
9. To prevent changes in the content of your custom binary, define the required rule using an
SHA-256 checksum:
$ sha256sum /tmp/ls
780b75c90b2d41ea41679fcb358c892b1251b68d1927c80fbc0d9d148b25e836 ls
10. Check that the list of compiled differs from the rule set in /etc/fapolicyd/rules.d/, and update
the list, which is stored in the /etc/fapolicyd/compiled.rules file:
# fagenrules --check
/usr/sbin/fagenrules: Rules have changed and should be updated
# fagenrules --load
11. Check that your custom rule is in the list of fapolicyd rules before the rule that prevented the
execution:
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# fapolicyd-cli --list
...
13. allow perm=execute exe=/usr/bin/bash trust=1 : path=/tmp/ls ftype=application/x-
executable trust=0
14. deny_audit perm=execute all : all
...
Verification
1. Check that your custom binary can be now executed, for example:
$ /tmp/ls
ls
Additional resources
Prerequisites
Procedure
1. Open the /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf file in a text editor of your choice, for example:
# vi /etc/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.conf
2. Change the value of the integrity option from none to sha256, save the file, and exit the editor:
integrity = sha256
Verification
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security hardening
# cp /bin/more /bin/more.bak
# su example.user
$ /bin/more /etc/redhat-release
bash: /bin/more: Operation not permitted
# mv -f /bin/more.bak /bin/more
If you install an application by using the rpm command, you have to perform a manual refresh of
the fapolicyd RPM database:
# rpm -i application.rpm
# fapolicyd-cli --update
If you skip this step, the system can freeze and must be restarted.
Service status
The --check-config, --check-watch_fs, and --check-trustdb options help you find syntax
errors, not-yet-watched file systems, and file mismatches, for example:
# fapolicyd-cli --check-config
Daemon config is OK
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# fapolicyd-cli --check-trustdb
/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts miscompares: size sha256
/etc/selinux/targeted/policy/policy.31 miscompares: size sha256
Use the --list option to check the current list of rules and their order:
# fapolicyd-cli --list
...
9. allow perm=execute all : trust=1
10. allow perm=open all : ftype=%languages trust=1
11. deny_audit perm=any all : ftype=%languages
12. allow perm=any all : ftype=text/x-shellscript
13. deny_audit perm=execute all : all
...
Debug mode
Debug mode provides detailed information about matched rules, database status, and more. To
switch fapolicyd to debug mode:
# fapolicyd --debug
Because the output of the fapolicyd --debug command is verbose, you can redirect the
error output to a file:
Alternatively, to limit the output only to entries when fapolicyd denies access, use the --
debug-deny option:
# fapolicyd --debug-deny
To solve problems related to the fapolicyd database, try to remove the database file:
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WARNING
The fapolicyd contains entries from all enabled trust sources. You can check the entries after
dumping the database:
# fapolicyd-cli --dump-db
Application pipe
In rare cases, removing the fapolicyd pipe file can solve a lockup:
# rm -f /var/run/fapolicyd/fapolicyd.fifo
Additional resources
Prerequisites
You have prepared the control node and the managed nodes
You are logged in to the control node as a user who can run playbooks on the managed nodes.
The account you use to connect to the managed nodes has sudo permissions on them.
Procedure
1. Create a playbook file, for example ~/playbook.yml, with the following content:
---
- name: Preventing execution of unknown code
hosts: all
vars:
fapolicyd_setup_integrity: sha256
fapolicyd_setup_trust: rpmdb,file
fapolicyd_add_trusted_file:
- </usr/bin/my-ls>
- </opt/third-party/app1>
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- </opt/third-party/app2>
roles:
- rhel-system-roles.fapolicyd
You can further customize the protection by using the following variables of the linux-system-
roles.fapolicyd RHEL System Role:
fapolicyd_setup_integrity
You can set one of the following types of integrity: none, sha256, and size.
fapolicyd_setup_trust
You can set trust file types file,rpmd, and deb.
fapolicyd_add_trusted_file
You can list executable files that you trust and that fapolicyd does not prevent from
executing.
Note that this command only validates the syntax and does not protect against a wrong but valid
configuration.
# ansible-playbook ~/playbook.yml
Additional resources
/usr/share/ansible/roles/rhel-system-roles.fapolicyd/README.md file
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14.1. USBGUARD
With the USBGuard software framework, you can protect your systems against intrusive USB devices by
using basic lists of permitted and forbidden devices based on the USB device authorization feature in
the kernel.
The system service component with an inter-process communication (IPC) interface for
dynamic interaction and policy enforcement
The C++ API for interacting with the system service component implemented in a shared library
IMPORTANT
The system service provides the USBGuard public IPC interface. In Red Hat
Enterprise Linux, the access to this interface is limited to the root user only by default.
Ensure that you do not leave the Access Control List (ACL) unconfigured as this exposes
the IPC interface to all local users and allows them to manipulate the authorization state
of USB devices and modify the USBGuard policy.
Procedure
3. Start the usbguard daemon and ensure that it starts automatically on boot:
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Verification
# usbguard list-devices
4: allow id 1d6b:0002 serial "0000:02:00.0" name "xHCI Host Controller" hash...
Additional resources
Prerequisites
Procedure
# usbguard list-devices
1: allow id 1d6b:0002 serial "0000:00:06.7" name "EHCI Host Controller" hash
"JDOb0BiktYs2ct3mSQKopnOOV2h9MGYADwhT+oUtF2s=" parent-hash
"4PHGcaDKWtPjKDwYpIRG722cB9SlGz9l9Iea93+Gt9c=" via-port "usb1" with-interface
09:00:00
...
6: block id 1b1c:1ab1 serial "000024937962" name "Voyager" hash
"CrXgiaWIf2bZAU+5WkzOE7y0rdSO82XMzubn7HDb95Q=" parent-hash
"JDOb0BiktYs2ct3mSQKopnOOV2h9MGYADwhT+oUtF2s=" via-port "1-3" with-interface
08:06:50
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NOTE
USBGuard uses the terms block and reject with the following meanings:
block
Do not interact with this device for now.
reject
Ignore this device as if it does not exist.
Additional resources
Prerequisites
Procedure
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# usbguard list-devices
1: allow id 1d6b:0002 serial "0000:00:06.7" name "EHCI Host Controller" hash
"JDOb0BiktYs2ct3mSQKopnOOV2h9MGYADwhT+oUtF2s=" parent-hash
"4PHGcaDKWtPjKDwYpIRG722cB9SlGz9l9Iea93+Gt9c=" via-port "usb1" with-interface
09:00:00
...
6: block id 1b1c:1ab1 serial "000024937962" name "Voyager" hash
"CrXgiaWIf2bZAU+5WkzOE7y0rdSO82XMzubn7HDb95Q=" parent-hash
"JDOb0BiktYs2ct3mSQKopnOOV2h9MGYADwhT+oUtF2s=" via-port "1-3" with-interface
08:06:50
# usbguard allow-device 6 -p
# usbguard reject-device 6 -p
# usbguard block-device 6 -p
NOTE
USBGuard uses the terms block and reject with the following meanings:
block
Do not interact with this device for now.
reject
Ignore this device as if it does not exist.
Verification
# usbguard list-rules
Additional resources
Prerequisites
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The /etc/usbguard/rules.conf file contains an initial rule set generated by the usbguard
generate-policy command.
Procedure
1. Create a policy which authorizes the currently connected USB devices, and store the generated
rules to the rules.conf file:
The --no-hashes option does not generate hash attributes for devices. Avoid hash attributes in
your configuration settings because they might not be persistent.
2. Edit the rules.conf file with a text editor of your choice, for example:
# vi ./rules.conf
3. Add, remove, or edit the rules as required. For example, the following rule allows only devices
with a single mass storage interface to interact with the system:
See the usbguard-rules.conf(5) man page for a detailed rule-language description and more
examples.
Verification
1. Check that your custom rules are in the active policy, for example:
# usbguard list-rules
...
4: allow with-interface 08:*:*
...
Additional resources
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Prerequisites
Procedure
1. Create a policy which authorizes the currently connected USB devices, and store the generated
rules to a new .conf file, for example, policy.conf.
The --no-hashes option does not generate hash attributes for devices. Avoid hash attributes in
your configuration settings because they might not be persistent.
2. Display the policy.conf file with a text editor of your choice, for example:
# vi ./policy.conf
...
allow id 04f2:0833 serial "" name "USB Keyboard" via-port "7-2" with-interface { 03:01:01
03:00:00 } with-connect-type "unknown"
...
NOTE
The two digits at the beginning of the file name specify the order in which the
daemon reads the configuration files.
For example, copy the rules for your keyboards into a new .conf file.
Verification
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# usbguard list-rules
...
15: allow id 04f2:0833 serial "" name "USB Keyboard" hash
"kxM/iddRe/WSCocgiuQlVs6Dn0VEza7KiHoDeTz0fyg=" parent-hash
"2i6ZBJfTl5BakXF7Gba84/Cp1gslnNc1DM6vWQpie3s=" via-port "7-2" with-interface {
03:01:01 03:00:00 } with-connect-type "unknown"
...
2. Display the contents of the rules.conf file and all the .conf files in the /etc/usbguard/rules.d/
directory.
3. Verify that the active rules contain all the rules from the files and are in the correct order.
Additional resources
Prerequisites
The /etc/usbguard/rules.conf file contains an initial rule set generated by the usbguard
generate-policy command.
Procedure
# vi /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
2. For example, add a line with a rule that allows all users in the wheel group to use the IPC
interface, and save the file:
IPCAllowGroups=wheel
3. You can add users or groups also with the usbguard command. For example, the following
command enables the joesec user to have full access to the Devices and Exceptions sections.
Furthermore, joesec can list and modify the current policy:
To remove the granted permissions for the joesec user, use the usbguard remove-user joesec
command.
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Additional resources
Prerequisites
Procedure
# vi /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
AuditBackend=LinuxAudit
Verification
1. Query the audit daemon log for a USB authorization event, for example:
Additional resources
USBGuard Homepage.
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156