Energy Research & Social Science 31 (2017) 295–302

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Energy Research & Social Science

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Original research article

Informing decision making on climate change and low carbon futures: MARK
Framing narratives around the United Kingdom’s fifth carbon budget
⁎
Candice Howarth
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Narratives can help increase experiential engagement with climate change and build support for transitions to a
Climate change low carbon future. The UK’s 2050 climate targets provide indicatives frames through which emissions reductions
Narratives could be translated to different contexts. The scenarios outlined in the UK’s fifth carbon budget will require
Low-carbon future lifestyle changes which may need to counter low levels of acceptance of the need to change through techno-
Fifth carbon budget
logical, political and behavioural initiatives. This paper explores the role of narratives of the UK’s fifth carbon
budget in increasing engagement to climate change. Data are presented from thirty semi-structured interviews
with UK academic, policy and practitioner communities. Six narratives are identified that could enable positive
engagement with a low carbon future and better engagement on climate change: (i) showcasing investment
opportunities; (ii) maintaining independence and freedom of choice; (iii) guiding audiences to visualise a low
carbon future; (iv) demonstrating broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything; (v) supporting
transitions and change; (vi) highlighting benefits to quality of life. Implications of these findings to public en-
gagement on climate change and perceptions of how life may need to be reconfigured in a low carbon future are
discussed.

1. The context of engagement on climate change in the United questions the extent to which this narrative is effective. There is argu-
Kingdom ably a limited narrative which ties together this national imperative with
cross-government departmental focus on food, energy, transport, water,
The scientific imperative to act on climate change is mirrored by health.
increasing political ambition to limit global greenhouse gas emissions The UK’s 2050 targets provide indicatives frames through which
and ensure global temperatures do not rise beyond 2 °C [1], whilst emissions reductions could be translated to different societal contexts.
“pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C” [2]. The However, it is important to caveat that these are targets and hence it is
UK passed its Climate Change Act in 2008 providing the world’s first impossible to predict exactly what a 2030 UK would look like due to the
legally binding framework which imposes UK-wide Greenhouse Gas changes in economic, demographic, behavioural and other external
(GHG) emission targets of 80% reduction by 2050 over 1990 levels. The factors which could influence the way in which emission reductions
Act required that the UK government set legally binding carbon bud- occur and change. Importantly, many of these changes may be an ex-
gets, establish a Committee on Climate Change (CCC) as well as a Na- tension of the current ‘status quo’ with a number absorbed into social
tional Adaptation Programme (NAP) outlining the risks to the UK from and infrastructure ‘fabrics’ hence reducing their visibility.
climate change [3]. These carbon budgets (Table 1) ensure the im- Consequently, individuals may not be aware that the changes they are
plementation of the Act’s 2050 emissions targets [4] and in 2011, the making are a consequence of the need for emissions reductions nor is it
UK government released its Carbon Plan [5] outlining policies and possible to predict with certainty that changes that occur, resulting in
proposals to meet the fourth carbon budget; the overarching purpose GHG reductions, will be directly attributable to low-carbon initiatives.
being to serve as a plan for a transition to a low carbon economy in the This may be problematic considering the impact of perceived barriers
future. In 2016, the UK government approved the CCC’s proposals for on development of sustainable technologies such as smart homes which
the fifth Carbon Budget to reduce GHG emissions in 2030 by 57% [6]. can facilitate societal shifts to low carbon solutions [7]. Indeed, tech-
This forms a rich national government narrative on the need to act on nology such as smart meters generates both positive responses, in that it
climate change although a lack of substantial drop in GHG emissions can enable energy savings and accurate billing, and negative responses

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: [email protected].

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.06.011
Received 7 October 2016; Received in revised form 18 May 2017; Accepted 4 June 2017
Available online 10 June 2017
2214-6296/ © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
C. Howarth Energy Research & Social Science 31 (2017) 295–302

Table 1 behavioural changes). This model fails to fully consider the complex-
The UK’s carbon budgets. ities and intricacies of social and cultural elements that affect in-
formation acquisition, the evidence-decision making ‘interface’, and
Budget Period Level (MtCO2e) % ↘ below base year
that knowing more about the science of an issue will not necessarily
1st 2008–2012 3018 23% increase understanding or lead to action [20]. It has been suggested
2nd 2013–2017 2782 29% that rather than fixating on gaps in knowledge or indeed polarised ar-
3rd 2018–2022 2544 35% by 2020
guments, that a focus on overlaps in perceptions and motivations to
4th 2023–2027 1950 50% by 2025
5th 2028–2032 1765 61% by 2030 engage with the issue would enable constructive dialogue and deeper
understanding of its intricacies and opportunities for societal shifts
[21]. Work by Shove addresses some of the complexities of informing
around privacy and mistrust of suppliers. Positive responses to en- sustainability-related decision-making processes, the importance of
vironmental concerns and engagement around the concept of sustain- going beyond information and the need to consider the impact of atti-
able changes [8] are facilitated by utilising these types of technologies tudes and values that drive behavioural traits and how these are im-
that are more salient and enable consumers to engage with the concept pacted by the context within which they are constructed and applied
of low carbon initiatives. [22]. Furthermore the complexities of the multiple disciplines that can
Tools are being developed to increase engagement with the concept help inform this process and shed light as to how better communication
of reducing personal carbon emissions and changes needed to reach of climate change may increase its efficiency, are vast and should not be
emissions targets. The 2050 Calculator, for example is such a tool de- neglected. The context within which communication on climate change
veloped by the UK’s Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) occurs is important as the nature of and the way methods are used to
enabling experts and non-experts to ‘play’ with and negotiate different engage audiences will go beyond the impact of content and affect how
energy mixes and behavioural changes to assess ways of achieving an communication is received, perceived and acted upon (or not).
80% reduction in GHG emissions [9]. In order for the UK and other This linear approach, whilst recognised as being limited in engaging
countries to take advantage of the opportunities associated with a low the public on the issue, is to some extent the process by which scientific
carbon future, a level of engagement at the individual level is required, evidence informs policy making, and hence an assumption that a si-
and reliance on policy regulation alone is insufficient. A core require- milar process would work with the public is not surprising. However
ment to ensure this engagement and achieve the fifth carbon budget this has important implications to decision-making and support for or
will be buy-in from consumers, specifically around energy efficiency in against particular policies because ‘if an individual’s level of scientific
buildings, driving a shift to low carbon forms of heating, continuing knowledge predicts one’s risk perceptions, and risk perceptions predict
efficiency improvement in vehicles, rolling out low-cost, low-carbon policy preferences, which can then influence the behaviour of policy
power and supporting the development of emerging options such as actors, then the public’s understanding of these complex issues becomes
carbon capture and storage. A larger dependence on public engagement a lynchpin to the policy process’ [23]. Deeper engagement is therefore
and behavioural approaches is therefore needed through a process of needed, above information dissemination, with the individual, to re-
active participation (whether physical or in thought), where mediation frame attitudes or behaviours and enable efficient transitions to low
and co-production are actively constructed through this engagement carbon lifestyles. However, as discussed above, people’s values, the
process, resulting from interactions between those involved in the degree of trust in the messenger and the context within which decisions
process: “The who (publics), what (issues), and how (procedural formats) are made influence people’s preference for certain policies. The per-
of participation do not externally exist in a natural state but are actively ceptions of climate change and associated risks are therefore much
constructed through the performance of collective participatory practices.” more complex in nature [12] and call for insights from across dis-
[10,586]). ciplines. Behavioural decision research, for example, emphasises the
The UK public supports climate change mitigation [11] and de- importance of context by measuring values and preferences of people
monstrates concern for energy security [12] with preference for de- when they are dealing with something unfamiliar [24]; Lichtenstein
mand-side as opposed to supply-side options [13]. There is public ap- and Slovic, 2006, cited in [12].
petite for action on climate change and reduction in carbon emissions Cox [25] makes a good case for scholars working on environmental
as evidenced by research on public engagement on the fourth carbon communication to consider the distinction between mobilizing on cli-
budget [14], which demonstrated a general sense of pride in the UK’s mate change and encouraging mobilization that provides a means to an
leading role in this space, and acknowledgement of the need for be- end. An understanding of the policy context is thus required to ensure
haviour change at the individual and household levels. The most ap- an alignment with environmental communication approaches to better
prehension, however, appears to be around the perceived cost of engage and mobilise publics. However ‘much of the scholarship in this
measures to address climate change and perceived trust towards new, area has focused on the discursive representations, framing, and per-
less-tested technologies, and narratives could be most effective in ad- ceptions of climate change itself and its seriousness, rather than the
dressing this. The scenarios outlined in the fifth carbon budget will relationships among specific communicative efforts (e.g. framing) and
require behavioural and lifestyle changes which may need to counter their strategic or consequential potential within the economic, political,
low levels of acceptance [15,16] and indeed framing this in a positive and ideological systems in which energy policy is embedded’ [25,123]).
and inclusive manner may further increase engagement to the issue Whereas, Daniels and Endfield [26], in their summation of narratives of
making it a social reality. climate change, suggest that the method in which people receive, in-
terpret and understand information on climate change, particularly of
its ‘dangerous’ nature, affects resulting actions. People often produce
2. Using narratives to engage with society on low carbon futures their own stories of climate change such as how they feel about it, how
it may have affected them, how they personally respond to it, providing
Individuals filter information (on climate change) based on their a window into personal experiences and self-reflection [27]. Such an
cultural and political viewpoints, weighing the risks of climate change approach where storytelling enables ‘individuals [to] re-work and order
with solutions available [17]. An over-reliance on a linear flow of in- experience, evaluate events and construct meaning and knowledge’
formation [18] where a ‘problem’ and ‘solution’ approach is adopted [28,p. 1086]) enables scientific data to be considered in the context of
[19] and where it is assumed that providing information about the issue the individual's own story as opposed to considered in isolation with
(e.g. climate change) will therefore be sufficient to lead to a solution to little context. Narratives enable the construction of a coherent message
alleviate its impacts (e.g. reduce greenhouse gas emissions through on climate change, and are better constructed from dialogues, where

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C. Howarth Energy Research & Social Science 31 (2017) 295–302

there is a teller and a listener, and where communication through a the way in which complex climate science information in the Inter-
personalised every day lens offers the opportunity for social change. governmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment report, re-
The production of such narratives must be, according to Bushell et al. vealed that the Summary for Policy Makers, intended to be understood
[29], ‘seen as an iterative, engaging process of dialogues, not just a by non-experts, required readers to have a good understanding of sci-
single, linear process with a set of objectives and a narrative that is then entific knowledge in order to fully grasp the content and its applications
broadcast to the public’. [49]. The process of developing and using narratives could help as it is a
The way climate change is framed, therefore, has a profound impact common learning and teaching approach, as explained by Clark [43,3]
on how it is perceived (and the way it is perceived may also impact the “we make sense of all experience by narrating it (constructing it as a
way it is framed), and engagement may increase if the message is kind of story)” and thus adopting this approach is growing in popularity
framed to sub-groups of a population who may share similar values, in climate change communication [50,21]. Salience to climate change
beliefs and world views [30]. For example, framing the co-benefits of could be increased, highlighting the link between local impacts of cli-
climate change and low carbon transitions through health, well-being mate change (such as weather events) which may have an impact on the
[31,32] and energy security [33] lenses can increase engagement on the public’s construction of narratives and mental models of evidence. This
issue. Adopting such an approach which explores people’s values and would enable deeper engagement, increased concern and action on
how they relate to climate change and carbon emissions may therefore climate change [51], particularly so if narratives are framed around
provide an effective way of increasing engagement. There are a number local relevance and place attachment [52].
of ways in which narratives can be constructed depending on the issue The use of narratives can help overcome perceived barriers to
in question, the purpose of the narrative and the audience-messenger change [15] and bridge the gap between what is referred to as the
interface. However analysing narrative construction is not the focus of transmission approach (a linear process of information dissemination
this paper as there have been a number of persuasive accounts of the clearly distinguishing between a ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ of information,
role of narratives. For example, Throgmorton [34] compares narratives with limited public involvement) and the participatory approach
to planning where future-oriented texts and carefully chosen language (multi-directional process of dialogue between sender and receiver, and
are used to enable audiences to see a planned future as desirable, and with extensive public involvement) [53]. Narratives can enable a better
Janda and Topouzi [35] discuss how in the context of energy, story- appreciation of the audience’s interpretation of a message and better
telling is generally conducted through telling ‘hero stories’, ‘learning incorporation of the context of communication (often kept separate
stories’ or ‘horror stories’. Recognition of the role of narratives as me- from communication through the transmission approach) whilst an-
chanisms to inform awareness and decision making is reflected not only ticipating potential misinterpretation of communication and delayed
in research discussed in this paper but also in the growth of work in this decision making processes (recognised as weaknesses of a participatory
space. For example, in the UK, the Imperial College Grantham Institute approach). In addition, Spence and Pidgeon [54] found that positive
hosted a roundtable on climate change strategic narratives1 as did the engagement with climate change was found to occur when participants
Leeds Social Sciences Institute on exploring narrative in policy and were asked to consider the social impacts of climate change as opposed
policy analysis2 in January 2017. to personal ones. A survey of the UK public assessed what people value
Narratives are used in a variety of disciplines [36] as a mechanism the most in life with a focus on compassionate values such as ‘help-
for telling stories on issues which may be difficult to engage with and fulness’, ‘equality’ and ‘protection of nature’ as well as selfish values
provide useful mechanism through which to link them to an audience’s including ‘wealth’, ‘public image’ and ‘success’ [55]. Close to three
social reality [37]. There is no single definition of narratives but key quarters (74%) of people considered compassionate values to be more
characteristics have been identified in the literature (Table 2). They are important than selfish ones. This was found to be particularly true
useful tools and indeed politicians use narratives to engage with their amongst individuals who demonstrated low feelings of inclusivity, who
constituents [42], teachers adopt learning narratives in their teaching felt less positive about being involved with others, who experienced
methods [43] and enable a deeper connection between theoretical and greater social alienation, and who were less likely to feel like they fit in
experiential experiences [44]. Narratives are used to enable socio- with wider society. This suggests that increasing feelings of inclusive-
technical transitions [45] and artists utilise them in their work to fa- ness and positivity may reduce disengagement from the issue. Similarly,
cilitate deeper engagement with different audiences [38] enabling a Demski et al. [56] identify a set of core values which ‘represent iden-
better understanding of the personalised perceptions of climate change tifiable cultural resources people draw on to guide their preference
and the role of emotion and logic in engaging individuals with issues of formation’ (59) and that by focusing on these values when designing
climate change [46]. They enable the framing of complex and chal- communication approaches could lead to more constructive dialogue
lenging societal issues such as climate change, in a way that aligns and and decision making. These are important to consider when advancing
resonates with the values receiving these stories and makes climate climate communication and utilising narratives to increase engagement
change more tangible [47]. In particular, narratives can help with as this research suggests that moving away from personal impacts and
‘understanding the role of stakeholders and what drives them […] when broadening this out to the social scale may still enable salience to the
making policy predictions and implementing strategies’ and can pro- issue whilst facilitating constructive engagement.
vide additional support for explaining ‘unintended consequences in
policy/initiative outcomes’ and may help in testing ‘the ethical nature 3. Approach
of predictions in policy formulation and evaluation’ [35,529]).
Historically, climate change has been communicated primarily This paper assesses the role of narratives in increasing public en-
through the use of science-heavy data of facts and figures to help inform gagement to climate change where we explore how narratives framed
policy making, and whilst this provides useful anchors to communicate around a positive vision of a low carbon future could enable more
complex information, they are not known for their widespread success constructive public dialogue on climate change. This is discussed in the
in delivering a compelling argument to act on climate change to those, context of the UK’s fifth carbon budget, a particularly relevant and
such as the public, who are not data-inclined [48]. Indeed analysis of salient piece of legislation that will impact the UK’s path towards a low
carbon economy. In addition we consider this in the context of audi-
ences who might feel less inclined to respond favourably to such data.
1 The current state of play on increasing public understanding of climate
https://www.imperial.ac.uk/grantham/publications/briefing-papers/towards-a-
unifying-narrative-for-climate-change-grantham-briefing-paper-18.php. change and public engagement on low carbon transitions informed a
2
http://www.lssi.leeds.ac.uk/events/narrating-policy-exploring-narrative-in-policy- thematic approach to this research by exploring: (i) societal responses
and-policy-analysis/. and needs to a low carbon future, (ii) framing a low carbon future, and

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Table 2
Definition and characteristics of narratives (from selected sources).

Definition and characteristics of narratives Source

“An account of a series of events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of connections between them; a narration, a story, an Oxford English Dictionary
account.”
“Stories of this form often have a beginning, middle, and end: an introduction to the situation, a series of events often involving tension or Segel and Heer [38:1]
conflict, and a resolution.”
“While stories often concern interacting characters, they may also present a sequence of facts and observations linked together by a
unifying theme or argument.”
Strategic narrative: “a dynamic and persuasive system of stories, originally generated and encouraged between government, business and Bushell et al. [7]
civil society”
“The development of a strategic narrative is a unifying concept, an umbrella under which the incredible diversity of literature and
projects that aim to inspire further action on climate change can be unified, bringing them together into a cohesive, coordinated and
effective message.”
“Organise a sequence of events into a whole so that the significance of each event can be understood through its relation to that whole. In Elliot [39]
this way a narrative conveys the meaning of events”
“discourses with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offer insights about the Hinchman and Hinchman [40,xvi]
world and/or people’s experiences of it”
“each narrative has a setting, characters, and a solution to the problem of climate change” Jones [60,8]
Narratives have a setting, a plot (beginning, middle, end), characters (heroes, villains and victims), and the moral of the story Jones and McBeth [36]
“visual ‘hooks’ on which to hang news reports” Wozniak et al. [41,470 & 471]
“narratives connect political debate about problems and solutions with media users’ experiences and identities by offering enduring
symbolic systems”

(iii) framing a low carbon future as positive and desirable. analysis via the software NVivo. Final interview transcripts were sent to
Thirty semi-structured interviews were carried out with individuals interviewees for review and quality assurance and responses were kept
working in academia (n = 10, labelled as ‘aca’ in the discussion), policy confidential and made anonymous to encourage a frank discussion of
(n = 10, labelled as ‘pol’) and practitioner organisations (n = 10, la- positions and to protect personal privacy. A thematic discourse analysis
belled as ‘pract’) in the UK, selected based on their knowledge and was conducted on the data to draw out prominent themes discussed
experience of climate policy, emissions reductions initiatives and con- with the interviewees.
structive mechanisms to engage the public. Organisations represented While the sample size (n = 30) and geographic representation of
by interviewees included universities, UK local and national govern- the participants (i.e. UK) necessitates caveats with regards to the re-
ment departments, city-based climate initiatives, consultancies and presentation of the findings and suggests the need for further research
climate media/communications agencies. Interviewees were from a with larger sample sizes and representation from different geographical
range of backgrounds and expertise with specialisms including climate and sectorial populations, data from these interviews nonetheless pro-
science, UK carbon budgets, public engagement, behavioural science, vide valuable insights into how to frame a 2030 future as positive and
climate policy, with varying levels of seniority to ensure a re- desirable and reduce perceived barriers to such a future.
presentative sample. Interviewees were asked a series of questions
about how to engage audiences on the UK’s fifth carbon budget, how 4. Results and discussion
this relates to people’s day to day lives, low carbon transitions and how
engagement on this could be framed more positively. Interviews con- Analysis of interview data revealed six dominant narratives that
sisting of 10 questions under the three themes outlined above (Table 3), participants stated would be most effective in engaging the public,
were conducted in the UK with scripts developed and piloted before- particularly individuals who may be less inclined to want to change
hand. The study received ethics approval by the Anglia Ruskin Uni- their behaviour, on the concept of a low carbon future. Framing these
versity Psychology Departmental Research Ethics Panel (DREP) and narratives in a positive way would further ensure greater salience and
ratified by the Faculty Research Ethics Panel under the terms of Anglia sustained engagement in the longer term.
Ruskin University’s Policy and Code of Practice for the Conduct of
Research with Human Participants.
4.1. Investment, wealth, cost
Interviewees were recruited by adopting a snowball methodology,
with interviewees identified based on an evidence review as well as
A dominant narrative that emerged was that a low carbon future
building on the networks and knowledge of the sector and assessing
could provide investment opportunities to individuals. This was felt to
additional suggestions of other experts to approach made by the in-
be particularly effective in engaging a less engaged subgroup of the
terviewees. Each interview lasted between 30 min and one hour, was
population who are more likely to seek personal gain from any changes
audio-recorded and data was transcribed and analysed using discourse
they felt they may need to endure in a low carbon future. This was felt

Table 3
Themes and interview questions.

Theme Question

Societal responses and needs to a low carbon • Thinking of the year 2030, what does a low carbon future mean for society?
future in 2030 • What are the main opportunities that emerge for society from such a future?
• What are the main challenges/blockages/barriers that emerge for society from such a future?
Framing of a low carbon future in 2030 • Do you think that the ways we have been talking about this (as a transition, a low carbon future, climate mitigation) are
effective for a mainstream or sceptical audience?
• [How else] could we effectively frame these changes?
• How would people respond to changes needed in 2030?
Frame a low carbon future as favourable and
desirable
• Inevenwhatrestore
ways would a low carbon future validate and reinforce the qualities of life that people currently value most, or
the qualities they fear we might be losing?

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to be a clear way of appealing directly to their values and help over- introduction of smart technology to facilitate decisions (e.g. remote
come perceived negative feelings towards the need to change con- home heating controls) were considered fundamental to building a
sumption patterns by demonstrating the financial benefits of doing so. positive framing of a low carbon future
Ultimately, whilst change is needed and this may be costly, framing this
“Freedom to make your own choices, and benefit.” (Aca2)
as a benefit in the long term (even if short term costs are incurred), or as
an investment into one’s future, may prove more beneficial than simply “Encourage them to buy a different kind of car, heat their home in a
demonstrating the financial gains with no time frame associated. different way, see that it's very sensible to really transformed the way we
generate electricity in the country. I think the issue is … the time scale
“Just plain old investment opportunities, you know? Investment in dif-
dictates that you can’t just wait for a sort of generational change. I think
ferent types of energy and different types of technology. The challenge, I
there’s quite good argument that the next generation of conservatives will
guess, with the low-carbon future, is the narrative around reducing
be wholly bought into large parts of this agenda in a way that our age and
consumption because if you reduce consumption, that necessarily has
up generation may not be.” (Pol2)
implications for your mode of society, your economy.” (Aca8)
Preserving independence was a strong narrative that emerged from
Similarly, communicating certain incentives associated with a low
the interviews, and one which is constantly sought to be preserved,
carbon future, such as financial gains, without providing actual eco-
which emerges as key to minimise disengagement from climate change
nomic incentives, may prolong a desire to invest, financially or other-
and a low carbon future. Low carbon technology is not always con-
wise, in a low carbon 2030. This may overcome the limits of the in-
sidered to be appealing and discussing the changes needed under a
formation deficit approach and bypass the ‘need’ to seek to alter
2030 low carbon UK may have more appeal if framed in the general
attitudes, understanding and awareness (of the need for change and the
context of sustainability (moving away from environmental sustain-
case for a low carbon future). If these benefits are visible (with inter-
ability as a primary frame) towards sustainable independence and the
viewees emphasising that these do not need to be about low carbon or
benefits this brings.
sustainability) and framed appropriately, then the public should be able
to decide the most profitable situation they can create for themselves. “You’re moving towards more acceptable when you talk about sustain-
ability, but when you take it in its pure meaning, not this green language.
“If the circumstances changed, so that it were a financially attractive
Sustainability in that, if my house was sustainable, then I would be in-
proposition, and not too much of a hassle practically” (Aca2)
dependent. You know? I wouldn't need to rely on anyone, and that would
“I think that provided the net benefit is there, then sometimes you be great if it worked.” (Pol5)
don't necessarily have to win over hearts and minds first. They'll just
“This is not about constricting vintage freedoms, this is about giving
follow the behaviour” (Pol5)
people the opportunity to use their resources more efficiently.” (Pract10)

4.2. Maintaining independence and freedom of choice

4.3. Visualising the future
Interviewees referred to a fear that tends to emerge when engaging
All interviewees expressed how challenging it was to visualise a
the public on the need for transitioning to a low carbon future which is
2030 future, let alone a low carbon one. Similarly they felt that re-
that of the threat of, or perceived threat of, a loss of choice of options
flections in the future on what a past world had looked like were even
and freedom to make these choices. A low carbon future is, at times,
more challenging and less likely to occur. A way in which to overcome
understood to imply a considerable reduction in the range of options
and enable greater engagement and salience was thought to be through
that will be available to people and suggests a deliberate removal of
highlighting the possible future and the range of possible alternatives that
choices from people, with the perception of the government or big
may occur.
businesses taking control over decisions that are felt should remain with
the individual. “You have to first ask them, and then even the answer that they will give
about some hypothetical future is not how they will really react because
“Well it would simply mean that people find themselves with new options,
they will not be able to predict it themselves.” (Aca1)
some of which they will have little control over. And some of which they
will have some choice. So I suppose appliances and behaviors might have This would also work both in terms of framing and visualising the
changed a bit.” (Aca2) impacts of climate change that may manifest in a 2030 world just as
much as the mitigation approaches needed to reduce greenhouse gas
“They don’t want government out all-together but they want government
emissions that exacerbate these impacts. Changes that may be needed
playing an appropriate role and not being too present in their lives and
to adapt to climate change may therefore also align well (or indeed
therefore have more control over one’s own destiny and I think that’s why
conflict) with changes required to adjust to the requirements of a lower
it’s important in terms of society, I think that choice. And it’s forward
carbon world; interviewees felt that opportunities to highlight this
looking about the future, you know, choosing a better life or choosing a
should not be neglected in narrative development.
better future, I think that’s the kind of spirit you want to try and convey
to them.” (Pract7) “There would be benefits possibly around, you know, transitioning to
cheaper sources of fuel, or giving them more autonomy around that.”
A low carbon future would provide a new and different type of
(Pract2)
freedom which in itself may be difficult to envisage or visualise in the
short term. New options will be required to achieve the fifth carbon “On that time frame, by 2030, so there’s two different things that are
budget (for example through new technology as described in Section 1), going on. One is that on that time frame, you know, what climate impacts
possibly reducing the overall amount of decisions that need to be made are we going to be seeing, that we haven’t already seen? But the other one
by people, whilst ensuring the range of options available still provide is, what [are the] changes in people’s lives, on that time frame? It’s likely
the best range from which individuals can form their own decisions. In to be quite traumatic, and certainly much more dramatic than people
terms of energy generation and use, for example, a low carbon 2030 is have really internalized.” (Aca7)
expected to have a more electrified energy market with greater range of
freedom for consumers to choose where their energy is sourced (e.g.
from renewable sources, or local community initiatives). Maintaining a
similar level of freedom to make one’s own choices alongside the

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4.4. Broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything and political views, required under a 2030 low carbon UK. This is
further likely to increase disengagement due to the perception for the
Whilst a low carbon future in 2030 may be difficult to visualise, need for significant, disruptive and unappealing changes to one’s life-
creating a narrative that increases salience to changes that will be re- style. As interviewees revealed, however, persevering and maintaining
quired, bringing it home to people, how these may entail little rather engagement through demonstrating the broader social benefits of
than large changes, and how these align with existing lifestyles may change (moving away from low carbon frames) could help address
further enable deeper engagement from people. For example, demon- perceived barriers to change and enable individuals to understand
strating how changes needed are and will be logical, will essentially changes required may not be as large as they expect.
align with existing and evolving needs of individuals. Building this
“I think there would be more appreciation of the social benefits at hand
narrative would increase salience towards trends in lifestyles and be-
by moving to a low-carbon future that was devolved in that way, but
haviours that make sense and fit within individual’s lifestyles, further
you’ll also have a segment of society who have no interest at all, and
helping to normalize the lifestyle shifts needed.
you'll actually … you're going to be forcing them to consider these
“I think perhaps, something to do with normalizing things would be things.” (Pol5)
helpful, so things not feeling like they’re particularly radical, but that
“If they choose to be disengaged, they don’t want to be engaged, and
they are sensible and logical, and they’re the solutions that need to be
you’re saying, well, this is actually going to impact your life very little
found, and that they’re not coming from an agenda. They’re not from an
and you just introduce it” (Pol5)
opinionated viewpoint or a green or a left agenda. It's just sensible, logical
steps based on evidence.” (Pract3) As discussed above, a 2030 low carbon world will require changes
in terms of emission reductions and adaptation to impacts of climate
“I think, make it more about people’s day to day lives. I think that, that's
change ultimately to help maintain current standards of living, there-
been missing from the conversation.” (Aca5)
fore disengagement could dissipate and provide an opportunity to en-
“I think of actually kind of bringing it home to people, (…) making it real gage on the positive and beneficial elements of a low carbon 2030. This
to them.” (Pol3) could mean that a change taking place in one area (e.g. adoption of a
new technology) may open doors to change others; and changes re-
Such a salient narrative would broaden out to a wider appeal of
quired under a changing climate and low carbon world may take place
enacting initiatives than enable a shift to a low carbon future. In doing
even for non-low-carbon reasons.
so a greater connection between individuals and climate change would
highlight the implications of not adopting changes required. The “So, you could argue anything that hints at change or transition, however
broader impacts, in terms of benefits and convenience for example you couch it, could to some audiences, possibly [who] by their own
would, as a result, become more apparent and lead to sustained changes nature, they’re conservative, they want to make things stay the same.”
in the long run. (Pract6)
“I think the idea of not wasting energy, of not buying more stuff than you “It could be it’s about preserving the aspects of ways of life that people
need. Of taking care of your local environment, not having, totally like and they’re familiar with and perhaps highlighting how things could
congested, urbanized areas, is one that resonates with them.” (Pol2) change in the future in a positive context as well that could be of things
that they value personally, whether that’s, you know, their homes, the
“.their lives, so their communities, their towns, their villages and cities
kind of episodes of winter flooding is highlighted vulnerability in certain
and what it would mean for their lifestyle and their groups, whatever
communities and an Englishman's home is his castle etc so appealing on
social group they fit in’s lifestyle” (Pol3)
that front could be an issue” (Pol1)
“Cost, convenience possibly because I don’t think that the convenient
“So I guess there might be an angle there, uh, because if you’re worried
solutions are being created, you know, the technological leaps that means
about external threats to a great degree, then you might be more inter-
that actually greener living is going to be really quite pleasant. I don’t
ested in creating a self-sustaining environment.” (Pol5)
think that case has been made yet.” (Pol5)
Providing aspirational frames and narratives through which to
Showing what a high carbon world might look like could be an ef-
communicate may further increase the appeal of a low carbon future
fective method of overcoming resistance to change, if managed tact-
and demonstrate how this can align with the status quo, thereby alle-
fully. By addressing fears associated with change and providing nar-
viating fears and unease about the need for change. Change, inter-
ratives on lower uncertainty about the future, a more secure future due
viewees stated, could also be good, however rarely is this considered to
to more efficient and sustainable options would enable individuals to
be the case in reality. Whilst visioning 2030 may be a slight challenge,
understand where they still have choices to make.
reflection on how transitions have occurred in the past and how in-
“So, a low-carbon society, the benefits being around clean, healthy en- dividuals responded to this (i.e. whether these were out of necessity or
vironment to live, work, enjoy. I think for that audience in particular, inadvertent) may enable deeper engagement with the process of change
perhaps emphasizing the benefits to the countryside, and to the land- and further reduce resistance to this.
scape, and to the more conservation elements of what a low carbon so-
“I think the benefits could be around the smarter ways of doing things,
ciety could bring or what the opposite for low-carbon society wouldn’t
and I think it would need to somehow tap into the aspirational qualities
enable. So, if we’re not to go down that route, then what the flip-side
that might appeal …” (Pract3)
would be and how unappealing that would be.” (Pract3)
“Well, I guess that we’ve been trying to think about how transitions
“It would be that, painting a very clear, secure future and we have a plan
happened in the past. I don’t think it's about, say, trying to predict the
to get to this point; um, that it is feasible and doable. Um, and that, it’s a
future, saying, ‘This is what will be in your home. This is what it will look
positive thing to get there, rather than a scary thing.” (Aca8)
like. This is how the future will be,” but kind of trying to emphasize the
positive benefits of change that has happened previously.’ (Aca8)
4.5. Preserving the status quo/less change “I think climate change is scary, in part, because it’s uncertain. And how
we go about dealing with it, I don't think … Because it’s very compli-
Many of the interviews highlighted the prevalence of general re- cated, no one knows what’s gonna happen, there’s a lot of uncertainty
sistance to change within people’s lives, regardless of personal values and risk around what, what will happen in the future. What will our

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C. Howarth Energy Research & Social Science 31 (2017) 295–302

homes look like? What will we be able to afford? What will our lifestyles of the political spectrum.
be like? What will our communities look like? And this, you know, even Although climate change information is not a driver of behaviour
relates to things like, you know, more migrants from climate-change- change, it has been found to be a powerful re-enforcer for example with
affected areas, things like that.” (Aca8) travel behaviour [58] when combined with specific information re-
levant to the individual and to contexts in which decisions are made.
This further enables connection to and salience with climate change
4.6. Quality of life: safe, clean world through which narratives can act as an important medium. For those
individuals who may remain undecided on climate change these could
Preserving or enabling a better quality of life is often associated more easily be reached by personal experiences of climate change [59].
with cleaner air and water and less pollution, which fits well within a Climate communication must therefore go beyond traditional linear
narrative that creates a positive vision of a (low carbon) future and models of communication and aim to engage its audiences by in-
appeals to the values of many. Broader benefits of the changes needed creasing deep engagement and the perceived ability to change beha-
can demonstrate the appeal of a low carbon, less polluted future whilst viour whilst informing on the availability of alternative options. It is
highlighting social benefits that accompany these changes such as a safe apparent from the data reported in this paper that there is a reluctance
and secure future to better suit the needs of individuals, families, to adopt changes necessary for a low carbon future, or even in some
communities and wider aspects of people’s lives. case to visualise what these changes may entail, due to a lack of tan-
“Being able to go somewhere that it’s safe and clean with their children, gible examples and narratives of what it would look like to live in a low
and to have a knowledge that the child’s future is safe… It’s really dif- carbon world, what life would look like, how people would (continue
ficult because the alternative is not really viable, so a non-low carbon to) prosper while adopting the changes necessary within a low carbon
society is so unappealing and potentially so disastrous…” (Pract3) future.
The research reported here outlines six possible narratives, ex-
“And you know, benefits around other lifestyle or living type factors, so, tracted from interviews, which would be most effective in framing a
things like air pollution, noise.” (Pract2) low carbon future as one that is positive and desirable, and hence more
Combining this with a narrative highlighting how changes are likely to engage those who are less inclined to want to change their
needed in a low carbon future, which are in fact a way of maintaining behaviours or lifestyle. These are: (i) showcasing investment opportu-
current lifestyle standards and preferences, would enable a better sense nities; (ii) maintaining independence and freedom of choice; (iii)
of what is achievable to be constructed with minimal disruption to guiding audiences to visualise a low carbon future; (iv) demonstrating
individuals. broader appeal, salience and impact of not doing anything; (v) sup-
porting transitions and change; (vi) highlighting benefits to quality of
“So maybe it should be framed as building, you know, as opposed to life. The paper discusses the implications of these findings to public
moving away, or transitioning, it should be reinforcing, or building, or engagement on climate change and perceptions of how life may need to
foundation. It should be that kind of wording… Going back to that be reconfigured in a low carbon future. Whilst change is needed and
building narrative, let’s rebuild, and regenerate, and build a better city.” may be costly, framing this as an investment into one’s future may
(Pract6) prove beneficial. This may appeal directly to people’s values and help
“It would need to be showing how this makes the UK a more secure overcome perceived negative barriers towards the need to change
country. How it’s driving the economy, how decarbonization is actually consumption patterns. A fear that emerged is that of a loss of choice and
creating economic opportunities.” (Pol6) freedom of choice. A low carbon future provides a new and different
type of freedom, whilst maintaining independence, which in itself may
be difficult to envisage or visualize in the short term. Whilst a low
5. Conclusion carbon future in 2030 may be difficult to visualize highlighting how
these may entail little rather than perceived large changes, and how
Research has indicated, further reinforced by the data reported these align with existing lifestyles may further enable better engage-
here, that engagement to climate change may increase if messages are ment.
framed as narratives around specific themes such as those described in Interviewees also demonstrated the view that change could also be
this paper. This is particularly true if these narratives move away from good, and hence should be framed appropriately in narratives, how-
the data, facts and figures the public often associate with climate ever, this is rarely considered. Interestingly, whilst visioning 2030 may
change, which often form the basis of communication on the issue, and be a challenge, reflecting on how transitions have occurred in the past
are aimed at specific audiences who may share similar values, beliefs and how individuals responded to this can be useful. Broader benefits
and world views [30]. In addition, research suggests that the way in could also demonstrate the appeal of a low carbon, less polluted future
which evidence assessments on climate change are put together and whilst highlighting social benefits such as a safe and secure future, with
disseminated do not fully align with the needs or ability of end users better quality of life to better suit the needs of individuals, families,
[49,57] and hence narratives would offer a viable mechanism through communities and wider aspects of people’s lives. Demonstrating what a
which to do so. high carbon world would look like could be an effective method to
In order for the UK to take advantage of opportunities associated overcome resistance to change, if managed tactfully. Ultimately, fo-
with a low carbon future, reliance on policy regulation alone is in- cusing on positive visions of a low carbon future and increasing public
sufficient and deeper engagement at the individual level is required. engagement on the issue could enable better acceptance of the need for
Engaging people on a low carbon future is therefore vital for the UK to reconfiguring lives.
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and achieve its carbon budgets. A This paper has explored how creating narratives of a low carbon
variety of approaches exist in order to address this including informing future, which is seen as positive and desirable, whilst honing identities,
people about the risks and/or encouraging behaviour change through values and status, is perceived by interviewees as a way to increase
policy. However, there are key issues, stemming from limits of adopting engagement on the issue. By adopting a narrative approach which
an ‘information deficit’ approach, cognitive dissonance and a need to translates the complexities of scientific jargon into salient frames, this
account for the different values of audiences as well as various contexts can create a common base for learning and dialogue, whilst creating the
which can influence decision-making processes. It is possible to identify space to connect and discuss what a low carbon future may look like
key opportunities to engage people, especially those that may be and life within it.
sceptical about the need for action and who may tend to be on the right

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