e

General InTrODUCTIOn i

CONTOURS OF THE
EMERGENT AND ANCIENT
OROMO NATION

CASAS Book Series No. 84

i
 For Dureeti, Doie & the Oromo
youth of the Qubee generation

This issue is revised and published to celebrate

the 30th anniversary of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA)
 General InTrODUCTIOn iii

CONTOURS OF
THE EMERGENT AND
ANCIENT
OROMO NATION
Dilemmas in the Ethiopian
Politics of State- and Nation-Building

MEKURIA BULCHA

The Centre for Advanced Studies

of African Society (CASAS)
The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS)
P.O. Box 359 Rondebosch, 7701
Cape Town South Africa

© Mekuria Bulcha, 2016

First Published 2011, ISBN 978-1-920287-23-8

Printed by Creda Communications, Cape Town

Second edition, 2016

Cover picture: A statue in the image of an Abba Gadaa
– the president of Oromo Gadaa Republic in the past, Adana, Oromia
Cover design: Ann Svenske
Printed in Lithuania via Författares Bokmaskin,
Stockholm 2016

ISBN 978-91-639-1334-1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,

stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without prior permission of the copyright holder.
 General InTrODUCTIOn v
Contents

Glossary and Abbreviations ..................................................................... viii

Preface/Acknowledgements ......................................................................... x

PART ONE
BACKGROUND
PURPOSE, THEORIES, METHODS

Chapter I
General Introduction ....................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2:
Basic Concepts and Theoretical Considerations ....................................... 27

PART TWO:
THE LOCUS CLASSICUS OF OROMO-ETHIOPIAN CONFLICTS
AND CONTROVERSIES

Chapter 3
Frontiers of Abyssinian Expansion and Oromo Resistance:
A Critique of “Oromo-Migration and Invasion” Theses ....................... 65

Chapter 4
The Shawan Plateau: The Cradle of Oromo Civilization and
Springboard for Amhara expansion ........................................................ 131

Chapter 5
The Constitution of Waaqeffannaa: Historical-Sociological
Interpretations .................................................................................................... 223

PART THREE:
CONQUEST, COLONIALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Chapter 6
The nineteenth-Century Abyssinian Conquest of Oromoland:
From Booty Collection to Scramble for African Colonies ..................... 279

Chapter 7
Oromo Struggles against Abyssinian Colonial Conquests:
Unacknowledged Resistance and Unreported Battles ............................ 321
vi CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

Chapter 8
Prevalent Misconceptions about Oromo Identity: A Critique of the
“Greater Ethiopia” Discourse .................................................................... 379

Chapter 9
Structural Features of the Ancient Oromo Nation: Empirical and
Theoretical Appraisals .................................................................................. 406

PART FOUR:
TRAJECTORIES OF MODERN OROMO NATIONALISM:
CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT OROMO NATION

Chapter 10
Language Policies in the Making of Ethiopians .................................... 457

Chapter 11
Social Movements for Distributive Justice and R ecognition:
The Bale Peasant Uprising and Macca-Tuulama Association ..................501

Chapter 12
The Quest to ‘Break an Imperial Yoke’ and Build an Independent
O r o m o state ...................................................................................................535

Chapter 13
Political Contradictions and Dilemmas in Post-Dergue Ethiopia:
Ethnic Hegemony versus Democratic Federalism.....................................589

Chapter 14
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 630

Endnotes ...........................................................................................................658
Bibliography ....................................................................................................679
Index ....................................................................................................................... 696

Figures
Figure 1: Major Historical events in Oromo-Abyssinian
Contacts and relations................................................................... 72
Figure 2: Traces of the Oromo inhabitants of the Shawan
Plateau and the Muslim sultanates in the
medieval period ................................................................................. 143
Figure 3: Some of the major Oromo putative descent groups with
the Shawan Plateau as one of the probable centres of
development and directions of expansion.................................... 212
Figure 4: Religion and language in the definition of identity in
Ethiopia ................................................................................................ 230
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION vii
eneral INTRODUCTIOn

Figure 5: Assumptions about the origins of traditional Oromo

religion ..................................................................................................237
Figure 6: Myth of Common Descent: The Major Branches of the
Oromo nation ......................................................................................410
Figure 7: A Trajectory of Oromo nationalism: Changes in the
demands of Oromo social movements and the responses
of the Ethiopian regimes from the 1960s to 1991.......................539

Tables
Table 1: Sample: Livestock looted from the Oromo by King
Sahle Sellassie (r. 1813-1843) of Shawa ........................................285
Table 2: Sample: Livestock and human captives taken by
Menelik II King of Shawa (1865-1889) & Emperor of
Ethiopia (1889-1913) ........................................................................289
Table 3: Opinions about the Legitimacy of Present Government
by nationality ...................................................................................607
Table 4: Satisfaction with the Central Government Services by
Nationality ........................................................................................609
Table 5: Opinion about Self-Determination of Nationalities ..................620

Maps
Map 1: The Horn of Africa and its Peoples ..............................................69
Map 2: The Muslim Sultanates of the Medieval Period........................148
Map 3: The Highlands mentioned in the history of Oromo
movement.........................................................................................204
Map 4: Land Tenure System prior to Land Reform of 1975 ................505
Map 5: Regional States of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia...............577

Pictures
1. General Waaqo Guutuu (1924-2006), Leader of the Bale
peasant uprising ........................................................................................513
2. Colonel Alemu Kiteessa (1914-2001), Chairman of the Macca-
Tuulama Association, in prison from 1966-74 .....................................520
3. Haji Robale Turee, MTA Branch leader in Arsi ................................520
4. Lt. Mammo Mazamir (1936-1970), one of the young ideologues
of the MTA. Executed in 1970 in prison .............................................520
5. Haile Mariam Gammada (1914-1970), Secretary General and
Ideologue of the MTA. Died from torture in prison..........................520
6. General Taddese Birru (1922-1975), MTA leader, with Nelson
Mandela, Finfinnee 1962. In prison from 1966 to 1974.
Assassinated by the military regime in 1975 ......................................521
7. Mme Warqee Odaa and Mme Atsede Habtemariam Kumsa
Members of the MTA. .............................................................................521
viii CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

Glossary of Oromo and Amharic words

aadaa (O) custom, culture

abba (O) father, owner of, for example land, in
charge of, for example office,
position, etc.
Afaan Oromoo (O) the Oromo language
gabbar (a, O) serf, tenant
awurajja (a) province
warada (a) district
caffee (O) assembly, Oromo parliament
chawa (chewa) (a) the militia of medieval Abyssinia kings;
a militiaman of the period
Dergue (a) the military committee formed in June
1974 and turned into ruling junta until June
1991
enset (a) false banana; a plant which provides the
staple food of parts of southern Ethiopia
guddifacha (O) adoption
kebele (a) unit, community; the smallest
administrative units created by the Dergue
and also used by the present government
of Ethiopia to organize, administer and the
urban population.
moggaasaa (O) naming, “sharing” identity through
adoption a group of people into a clan and
the nation, Oromo tradition of the collective
adoption of non-Oromos.
nagaa (O) peace; moral code governing peaceful co-
existence among humans and of human with
the natural environment
naftanya (neftegna) (a) gun-carrier (lit.), settler-colonizer, a class
of Amharic–speaking Orthodox
Christian-settler-colonizers established in the
wake of the Abyssinian conquest of the south
Odaa (O) sycamore; a symbol of the gadaa system;
Oromo national emblem
safuu (O) respect, awe
qaalluu (O) priest in traditional Oromo religion
 GENERSL INTRODUCTION ix

Waaqa (O) God

Waaqeffannaa (O) The traditional Oromo religion; its liturgy
and belief system
Waaqeffattaa (O) Believer in God; follower of the rites of
traditional Oromo religion

Abbreviations
AMC Agricultural Marketing Corporation
CCT Commission for Culture and Tourism of the
Regional State of Oromia
EPLF Eritrean People’s liberation Front
EPRP Ethiopian People revolutionary Party
EPRDF Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary
Democratic Front
MTA Macca-Tuulama Association
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF Ogaden National L iberation Front
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
POMOA Provisional Office for Mass Organizational
Affairs
SNNPP Regional State of the Southern
Nations and Nationalities and Peoples
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front
WSLF Western Somali Liberation Front
x CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

PREFACE AND ACKNOLEDGEMENTS TO THE FIRST EDITION

The idea of this study was conceived in the early 1990s in reaction to
the failure of the democratization process initiated by the Charter
which the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) had adopted
following the demise of the military regime in 1991. The TGE, a
coalition of all the political organizations opposed to the military
regime, was established as a halfway house to democratic state to be
formed through elections, but was dissolved within a year. The
Tigrayan People’s liberation Front (TPLF) which was, not only
militarily the strongest, but also supported by external powers
emerged as a dominant party. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)
which was a junior partner in the TGE was treated mercilessly by the
TPLF and eventually left the coalition in 1992. Its leaders were killed
or exiled and the former members of its guerrilla army were
massacred in thousands in legally setup camps. By the end of 1992,
the red Cross and other humanitarian organizations were reporting
that over 20,000 Oromos, including women and children, were in
concentration camps erected all over the Oromo country and
thousands of them were dying of infections with contagious diseases
in the foul camp environments.
What struck me most in the whole process was, not only the
impunity of the Tigrayan elite who dominated the new government,
but also of the behaviour of the Amhara opposition parties which
had lost power following the demise of the military regime. If
not physically, the Amhara opposition was also violent against
the Oromo, at least in their rhetoric. Infuriated by the moderate
gains which the Oromo made in terms of linguistic rights and
territorial autonomy after decades of struggle, they resorted to a
virulent discourse that denigrated Oromo culture and demonized
Oromo identity (Zitelmann, 1994). There were two questions which
occupied my mind: “Why did the members of the Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front (TPLF) which came to power as an opponent of
dictatorship turn into a brutal dictatorship itself in such a short
time? Why are the Amhara opposition parties so furious against
the Oromo who are not in power, and whose leaders are in exile or
in concentration camps?” The behaviour of the new government and
the Amhara opposition manifested their problem with Oromo
identity is even deeper than what Paul Baxter (1978) anticipated
two and half decades earlier in the now classic article, “Ethiopia’s
Unacknowledged Problem: The Oromo.” Born to Oromo parents,
 PREFACE AND
General ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
InTrODUCTIOn xi

I have attended school and the university in Ethiopia and have

worked as a state employee before I left the country in August 1977,
but the behaviour that I have been witnessing since the early 1990s is
beyond what I had ever imagined. In my view, the fact that the
opposition was not only against the regime, but also the Oromo,
who are also in opposition against the same regime, suggested that the
question was deeper than power-politics. It had something to do
also with the way they perceive(d) the Oromo. Reflected in the
revival of Oromo language and territorial autonomy, collective Oromo
identity in-itself is posing a threat. Thus, the contradiction between
Oromo self-perception and how the Amhara and Tigrayan elite seem
to see them led me to engage in a research project on identity
politics. The investigation took me deeper into the history of Oromo-
Abyssinian relations.
Although the completion of the project took many years, the
process resulted in several book chapters and more than twenty
conference and workshop papers. In the meantime, many friends and
colleagues in several countries have contributed to the realization of
the objectives of the project. Constructive comments came from many
colleagues who read draft versions of the chapters of the book at
different stages in its development. It is impossible to list here all to
whom I am indebted; I will mention only some and also thank the
rest for their generous contributions.
Among those I must mention by name, special thanks are due to
my friends and colleagues Bichaka Fayissa, Tilahun Gamta, Marco Bassi,
Tasama Taye, Aneesa Kassam, Ezekiell Gebissa and Alemayehu
Kumsa for their insightful comments and criticism on the different
drafts of the chapters in this book. I particularly thank Marco Bassi for
his insightful comments which in some ways played what he called
avvocato del diaviolo (devil’s advocate), awakening me to rethink some of
the points I have stated in the manuscript. The friendship and support of
these colleagues have been of immense importance to me. My friends Ibsaa
Guutama, Abiyu Galata, Demissie Kebede, and Galaasaa Dilbo have been
sources of valuable information on the Macca-Tuulama Association and the
development of the Oromo liberation movement. Mekbib Gebeyehu and
Tesfaye Alemu have read and commented on earlier versions of several of
the chapters. My gratitude goes to all of them.
My colleagues in the Department of Sociology, Uppsala University,
have been a great source of inspiration in the initial stages of this
book project. In particular, my colleagues in the Development
Sociology Seminar and the Uppsala Theory Circle deserve m a n y
xii CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

thanks for their critical comments on the early draft versions of

several chapters. I am also indebted to my colleagues at the School of
Sustainable Development of Society and Technology, Mälardalen
University: Lars Ekdahl read the first eight chapters and gave me
his constructive comments; Rolf Gustafsson and Mohammadrafi
Mahmoodian have contributed to the theoretical approaches used in
the book with their critical comments on an early version of
Chapter 2. My friend and colleague Fred Hendricks of Rhodes
University, South Africa, has given valuable criticism of an early
version of Chapter 12.
Several people sent me useful documents. Tarfa Dibaba has been
most helpful in providing me with photos and videos on Oromo meetings
at ancient odaa sites in 1991 and 1992 and other useful documents.
Zelealem Aberra and Solomon Deressa suggested relevant sources of
information and also sent me books that were useful. Colleagues at the
universities of Addis Ababa, Alamaya, and Jimma, have provided me
with valuable documents. I thank them all.
I am grateful to Professor K. K. Prah, the director and Mrs
Grace Naidoo the administrator of Centre for Advanced Studies of
African Society (CASAS), Cape Town, South Africa, for accepting
and publishing this study in their 2011 Books Series.
My thanks are also to Jo Warner who proofread and edited the
manuscript, Sue Sandrock who laboured with the layout and prepared it
for publication, and Sture Balgård who drew the maps.
The Swedish Social research Council and Mälardalen University
have generously provided funds for the publication of this work. I am
grateful to both institutions. My deepest gratitude goes to my wife
Ma’azash Teferra Gurmessa and my daughters D ureeti and Doie
whose support and understanding made the completion of this
book possible.

A Note to the Second Edition

The first edition of this book which was published in 2011 and had a few
editorial errors. Those errors are corrected and two new photographs are
added to this edition. I would like to thank Princess Mahezent Habtemariam
Kumsa for sending me a copy of Madame Atsede Habtemariam Kumsa’s
photo and Mr. Lube Birru for a copy Madame Warqee Gadaa’s photo.

Notes on Oromo phonetics

Oromo words including Oromo places and personal names are spelled
according to the Oromo alphabet, qubee, which is based on the Latin script.
Five digraphs are used in the Oromo alphabet: ch, dh, ny, ph, sh. The
alveolar dental stop dh exists only in Cushitic and Omotic languages. The
glottal stop, which is a consonant in the Semitic and Cushitic languages, is
represented in Oromo by an apostrophe (‘), e.g. bu’ura ( basis), du’a (eath),
ho’a – heat
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION xiii

Qubee Sound Oromo Correspondence

spelling description example in English
ch a palatal voiceless stop achi – there as in ‘chain’
sh a palatal voiceless shan – five as in ‘shirt’
fricatice
ny a palatal nasal nyaata – food as in news
dh an alveolar voiced dhagaa – stone
implosive
c a palatal glottalized stop caalaa – more
q a velar glotallized stop qeesii – priest
x a dental glottalized stop xinnoo – small
ph a labial glottalized stop tapha – play

The gemination of consonants and lengthening of vowels are always

indicated by doubling the letter since they are of semantic importance.

Short Example English Long Example English

(O) (O)
a annan Milk aa anaan to me
e kennaa talent, gift ee keenyaa wall
i bifa Colour ii biifa spray
o bona dry season oo boonaa proud
u dugda Back uu duuba at the
back

One Example English Geminated Example English

consonant
y wayaa cloth, yy wayya better
dressing
l qalu to ll qaalluu Priest in
slaughter Oromo
religion
xiv COnTOUrS OF THe eMerGenT anD anCIenT OrOMO naTIOn
 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

At one and the same time, nationalism insures humanity against

imperial tyrannies, while lending its name and sometimes its
power to the creation of local tyrannies (Anthony D. Smith, 1994:
196).

BACKGROUND
Identity politics has occupied the centre stage in political debates
and academic discourses since the 1980s. However, there is still
a persisting ambivalence toward research on the subject. By the
concept of identity politics, sociologists, social philosophers, political
scientists, anthropologists, and scholars from related disciplines
mean social mobilization based upon various collective identities
(of subaltern groups, national minorities, colonized peoples, and
women) that were previously hidden, suppressed, or neglected by
the policy of the state or the dominant group. Identity discourse,
particularly when it comes to ethnic identity, is shunned by many
social scientists because of ethical and political considerations. There
seems to be a fear that research on the subject will widen differences
between groups. Doing research on ethnic identity in particular is
seen as playing into the hands of racists and social exclusionists.
While the fear may be warranted, we should also note that the typical
purpose of scholarly research on identity and culture is not to give
prominence to differences between peoples and cultures, but to
appreciate the values of diversity, or to expose the injustices that are
exercised by states against citizens who represent values, moralities,
and ethno-cultural identities that are different from those of the ruling
classes or the dominant groups. Therefore, I will argue that to ignore
differences in order to depoliticize ethnic identities can amount to
ignoring injustices committed against ethnic minorities. Furthermore,
as noted by a scholar,

1
2 CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

The idea that identity politics is incompatible with democratic

society is insufficiently nuanced, and an unnecessary position
to hold for liberals. The possibility that some of the different
moral goods generated by identity-based movements may be
conducive to liberal democratic citizenship, in particular, is
worthy of further consideration (Kenny, 2004: 87).

The point is that we should differentiate between the claims of the

oppressed peoples to have their identities recognized and xenophobic
discourse of racist organizations. Differently stated, the politics of
identity is not necessarily an anti-thesis of the politics of democratic
citizenship. It can and it does promote democracy when the dominant
and dominated groups concede, as the Canadian social philosopher
Charles Taylor (1995: 241) has cogently expressed it, to the principle of
reciprocal recognition among equals. The aim of the ethno-nationalism
of right-wing parties is the maintenance of a mono-cultural state
or cultural homogenization to create such a state. The struggle of
oppressed minorities is, by and large, for a positive recognition of
their cultures and identities.
Partly because of the ethical issues mentioned above, the politics
of recognition and social justice is still a contentious terrain in social
research. While some scholars ignore identity research in to,
others give priority to research on distributive justice over research
concerned with claims for recognition. Particularly, scholars within
Marxist perspectives tend to prioritize the equitable redistribution
of resources over the recognition of identity claims. However, as
indicated by some leading scholars in the field (Taylor, 1995; Fraser,
2003; Parekh, 2008), social justice requires both equitable redistribution
of resources and positive recognition of identity claims. These two
dimensions of justice are intricately interwoven, and in many cases
powerless minorities suffer injustice both in terms of misrecognition
(disrespect, denigration, and denial of their identities) and in terms of
inequitable distribution, which includes not only denial of their fair
share of resources but also the exploitation of their labour or other
resources by dominant groups.
The theories of recognition used in this study are addressed in
Chapter 2 below. Here, it is suffice to indicate that while the aim of
claims for recognition is to change social relations founded on the
denial of self-representation and to dispel humiliation resulting
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3

from imposed identities, the struggle for fair distribution is against

exploitation and inequitable distribution of social and economic
resources. As a discussion of the politics of identity, this study
explores what happens at the interface between the expressions
of feelings of superiority, on the one hand, and the rejection of
hegemony and claims of equality – or the underdog’s language of
emancipation – in societies with hierarchically structured ethnicities,
on the other. Taking the Oromo as a case, the study identifies and
analyses the indignations that can be felt and conflicts that can
arise when a state and its agents actively negate ethnic identity
in terms of culture, language, and history. Without neglecting the
consequences of economic exploitation experienced by oppressed
peoples, and without disregarding the injustices of class oppression, it
is argued here that it is the harm caused of misrecognition and status
subordination – hierarchical treatment of ethno-national identities,
cultures, and languages – and not only the experience of economic
injustice that has politicized ethnicity in Ethiopia. In other words, the
study explores the counter-effects of the legal negation and physical
destruction of cultures and symbols that constitute the identities
of ethnic and national minorities when used as an instrument of
nation-building.
The physical or overt violence against what essentially symbolizes
the cultures and identities of national minorities is often enhanced by
epistemic violence, which is discursively perpetrated: minority cultures,
languages, and history are denied their worth by the educational
system, in the writing of history, and in the courts of law by members
and agents of the dominant culture. Epistemic violence is institutionally
framed and “pedagogically” executed by state-run educational
systems: it attacks the self-esteem of the dominated groups by
disparaging their cultures and collective identities. It denies them
worth. This study will demonstrate that it is the combination of the
two forms of institutionalized violence that had politicized identity in
Ethiopia and led to the development of ethno-national movements.
Ethnic nationalism often starts with claims for respect and equality.
When the appeal for respect and equality incessantly fall on the deaf
ears of conquerors and colonizers, it turns into what Frantz Fanon
(1959) called the “native’s violence”. This is the moment when the
oppressed decide to be their own masters: the moment when peaceful
claims for respect and equality are abandoned and armed struggle
Ś CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

for emancipation becomes the only option available to them. Starting

in the mid-1970s this was, by and large, the situation in Ethiopia.
The end of the cold war era in the late 1980s and the call for
democracy in the 1990s gave rise to unprecedented expectations all
over the world. In Africa, the 1990s witnessed the demise of some of
the worst dictatorships that had plagued the continent for decades,
and the departure of dictators such as General Siyyad Barre of Somalia,
General Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (Democratic republic of Congo),
and the abolishment of apartheid in South Africa seemed to usher the
continent into a post-colonial era of democracy.
In Ethiopia, the hope for democracy was kindled with the fall of
the military junta led by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991 and the
declaration of a charter for the formation of a Transitional
Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in July 1991. The TGE, which was
constituted mainly by a coalition of different liberation fronts,
including the Ethiopian Peoples’ revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which had toppled
the military dictatorship, promised to decentralize and democratize
the state, and end a history of centralized autocratic rule that had
characterized Ethiopian politics for more than a century.1 The task
that the TGE aimed to undertake was to lay the foundation for a new
constitution based on the will of the people. Therefore, by and large,
the measures which the TGE took departed dramatically not only
from the policies and practices of former Ethiopian regimes, but also
from policies adopted in other African states. Since the role that the
TGE was to play was that of taking Ethiopia out of the authoritarian
past into a new democratic political system, its mandate was limited
to eighteen months after which regional and national governments
were to be formally elected by popular vote and the state model
stipulated by the Charter was to be implemented.
The participants of the conference that drafted the Charter and
formed the TGE deemed “ethnic federalism” to be an appropriate
model for Ethiopia because in 1991, arguably, it was the only logical
alternative to the disintegration of Ethiopia as a state. The state-model
which was envisaged by the Transitional Charter and signed at the
conference was a “federation of nations, nationalities and peoples.”
The constitution that was subsequently drafted by the TGE, and was
adopted in 1995 as the Constitution of the Federal State of Ethiopia,
followed more or less that guideline.
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5

Today the Ethiopian Constitution recognizes over seventy ethnic

groups as nations, nationalities, and peoples. article 39 of the
Constitution defines nation, nationality, or people as “a group of
people who have or share a large measure of common culture, or
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common
or related identities, a common psychological makeup, and who
inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory”. The
definition makes it clear that most of these peoples have languages
and cultures that are distinctively and definitively their own. This and
the territorial restructuring of Ethiopia into a federation of
“autonomous” regional states is an acknowledgement of the fact that
Ethiopia is a multination state. The territorial demarcation of five of
these regional states – afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray – was
based on ethno-linguistic criteria. Four of them, the SNNP,
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Harar, are multiethnic.
Reactions to the idea of “ethnic” federalism have been mixed. In
the beginning it was both lauded and criticized at home and abroad
(Bulcha, 1991). Supporters of the Charter saw it as an instrument for
a transition from dictatorship and oppression, to freedom. Its critics
saw the recognition of ethnicity as antithetical to Ethiopian unity,
arguing that it would lead to the disintegration of the Ethiopian
state. It was predicted that the recognition which the Charter accords
to ethnicity would lead to the intensification of conflicts. It is
suggested that ethnicity is an invention of intellectuals “who have
devoted much time and energy in promoting it” (Poluha, 1998: 38).
Downplaying the importance ethnicity has played historically in the
contradictions between the Ethiopian state and the non-Amhara
peoples, it was maintained that the EPRDF had taken the initiative
“in camouflaging the roots of all problems and all contradictions in
Ethiopia in ethnic clothing” (ibid.). It is argued that the “agenda of
ethnification and ethnic decentralization is politically dangerous” for
the country and its people (ibid.). As the International Crisis Group
(2009: 23) correctly put it, “The constitutional clause that gives
nationalities the right to secede is touted as a proof of the EPRDF’s
anti-Ethiopian stance.” Notwithstanding the comments of critics, the
political model adopted at the transitional conference was dictated
by circumstances that had led to the fall of the Dergue. The political
and geographical restructuring of the Ethiopian state using language
and ethnicity as criteria was the only option that was acceptable to
6 CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

the national liberation fronts that participated in the transitional

conference of July 1991.
Two decades have passed since the transition to democracy
was solemnly declared by the TGE, but Ethiopia has become a de
facto one-party state2, and notwithstanding the constitution it had
adopted in 1995, authoritarianism continues to be the style of its
rulers. Sources such as the US State Department, Human Rights
Watch, and the International Crisis Group report intermittently that
Ethiopia’s military forces have been engaged in armed conflicts, albeit
low in intensity, with opposition forces in some of the regional states
in the country. Crackdowns and mass arrests are conducted almost
routinely by the Ethiopian security police against members of ethnic
groups and their organizations are strong indications that the rule of
law has not been respected by the regime. The International Crisis
Group (2009: 27) reports that “Oromo nationalism is increasing, as
pervasive government repression increases both real and perceived
grievances.” Ethiopia’s socio-economic situation has not shown any
significant improvement over the decades following the change, and
millions of the country’s citizens are constantly threatened by famine
in the southern regions, which were traditionally surplus producers
of food crops.3 The democratic promise of the Transitional Charter
was not respected in either political or economic terms.
The political problems started to surface in June 1992, when a
number of important parties, which together claimed to represent
the interests of the majority of the country’s population, not only
withdrew from the transitional government (TGE), but also boycotted
the regional elections that were held later that month. The negation of
the essence of the Charter as a passageway from dictatorship to
democracy became clear as the OLF accused the EPRDF, the largest
and dominant party in the TGE, of a catalogue of crimes including
the assassination of OLF members and of harassing and intimidating
the OLF’s candidates for the local and regional elections (Norwegian
Institute of Human Rights, 1992). Supported by its military muscles,
the EPRDF, an umbrella organization dominated by members of the
Tigrayan People’s liberation Front (TPLF), “won” not only the 1992
local and regional elections, but also more than 90 per cent of the
seats in federal parliament in the national elections which were held in
1995, and formed the national government that replaced the TGE.
Anyway, according to international observers, the 1992 elections
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 7

“did not in any meaningful way represent the free and fair will of the
Ethiopian people in a democratic manner” (ibid. p. 14). This brought
the transition to democracy envisaged at the transitional conference
of July 1991 to an early end. The parliamentary elections of 1995 more
or less confirmed the 1992 results. The results of the 2000, 2005, and
2010 elections showed no improvements over the previous ones. Today
Ethiopia is a one-party state.
The most crucial questions are why the EPDRF members
who came in as opponents of dictatorship had turned into
dictators negating the spirit of the Charter, and why the other
parties failed to restrain them. It is not the first time that the
Ethiopian state missed the opportunity for change and democratic
development. This had happened in 1960 as well as in 1974. The
abortive coup against Emperor Haile Selassie I was to change an
extortive feudal state in which half of the population consisted of
serfs exploited by a small minority of landlords. Haile Selassie did
not take that as an opportunity for change (Greenfield, 1965). Instead,
he used the suppression of the coup for the consolidation of his
autocratic rule. The consequence of the decision was continued
tension and dissatisfaction that led to a revolution in 1974 and
the demise of the monarchy. The revolution created another
opportunity for change. It abolished not only the monarchy but also
a feudal landholding system which had been the main pillar
supporting the old system. But the structural opening was closed
as soon as autocratic centralism of the so-called Solomonic Dynasty
of which emperor Haile Selassie I was said to be the 225th monarch
was replaced by military dictatorship which turned the empire into
a killing field of civilians and combatants.4The question is, what is
the source of this seemingly never-ending political problem?

Ethiopia’s political malaise

Historians and sociolinguists categorize the Ethiopian population
into four linguistic clusters: Semitic-speaking, Cushitic-speaking, and
speakers of Omotic and Nilotic languages. although the contours
of these clusters shade into each other in many instances, they also
represent a dividing line between conquerors and the conquered, that
is, between the politically dominant Semitic-speaking Abyssinians,
who constitute about thirty-five per cent of the population, on one
hand and the Cushitic, Omotic and Nilotic-speaking majority, who
constitute 65 per cent of the population, on the other (CSA Report, 2001
Ş CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

cited in Gudina, 2003: 132). The Oromo, who are Cushitic-speaking,

belong to the latter group.
It is common knowledge that the Oromo are the largest
population group in northeast Africa and, perhaps, also the second-
or third- largest nationality in the whole of Africa. There are no
accurate population statistics in Ethiopia. The reason is political.
However, estimates by various sources indicate that for the last
eighty years, the Oromo constituted about 40 per cent of the
Ethiopian population (Perham, 1969; Keller, 1988). In 2010, the total
population of Ethiopia is estimated at 80 million, of which the
Oromo are said to constitute 40 per cent, the Amhara 25 per cent,
the Sidama 9 per cent, the Somali 7 per cent, the Tigray 7 per cent,
the afar 4 per cent, the Walayta 4 per cent, the Gurage 2 per cent,
and other nationalities 3 per cent (US Bureau of African affairs,
November 5, 2010).
Observers have explained the sources of the deplorable political
situation of Ethiopia in different ways, mentioning both actor- and
structure-related factors. There are those who blame the government
and opposition for the political problems of the country, while others
explain Ethiopia’s economic problems by lack of resources and
technology. There are even those who look at the problems in an
historical perspective, positing that the failures and decline of Ethiopia
are caused by its “estrangement” from the imperial tradition under
the previous and present regimes and arguing for a “return to the
source” as the sole panacea for the country’s political and economic
malaise (Kebede, 1999: 397). However, the nature and sources of the
Ethiopia’s problem are more complex than these scholarly theses
seem to explain.
It is plausible to argue that the problem of the Ethiopian state is
essentially similar to the problems facing many African states. The
people in these states are oppressed and poor. Their poverty is often
not the result of a lack of exploitable resources, but, to a greater extent, a
consequence of bad governance often reflecting colonial heritages
(Diamond, 1988). Bad governance, corruption, regime tyranny, etc.,
which arise partly from the colonial heritage, often make conflict
inevitable, and in many of the African states political conflict creates
preconditions for abject poverty. Thus, often trapped in the tenacious
grip of tyrannical regimes and humiliating destitution, many of the
African peoples have lived and continue to live in post-colonial states
that seldom respect human rights, observe social justice or satisfy basic
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 9

human needs. In its broad outlines, the source and nature of Ethiopia’s
political problems should be seen in this perspective.
The boundaries of the modern state of Ethiopia, like those of the
other post-colonial African states, were drawn during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century. However, the making of the Ethiopian state
was different in one aspect: unlike the other African states,
Ethiopia’s boundaries were not drawn by Europeans but by the
Abyssinians, who at the time of the European colonization of
Africa conquered and annexed the territories of self-governing
neighbours, thereby becoming the only African nation that
participated in what historian have called the “Scramble for Africa”
(Bulatovich, 1898 [2000]; Gann and Duignan, 1969; Marcus, 1969).
The state that resulted from Abyssinia’s conquest of its neigh-
bouring territories and peoples was consecutively known as the
Ethiopian empire (until 1974), the Democratic Socialist republic
of Ethiopia (1974 to 1991), and the Federal Democratic republic of
Ethiopia (since 1991), depending on the declared ideology of the
ruling elite. as an empire, modern Ethiopia was ruled by emperors
from the 1880s to 1974; as a “socialist republic,” it was controlled by
a military dictator from 1974 to 1991; and for the last twenty-five
years, the self-styled “democratic republic” has been headed by a
prime minister who wields political power in a manner that barely
differs from that of his predecessors. It is important to point out here
that the frequent changes of names and ideologies have much to do
with the idea of creating a homogenous Ethiopian nation which has
occupied the Ethiopian regimes for a long time. Since the aim was to
assimilate the non-Amhara peoples and put an Abyssinian cultural
and linguistic stamp on Ethiopian identity and state, the goal of
“national-building” did not become a reality.
However, despite the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity
that characterizes its inhabitants, Ethiopia was presented by its ruling
elite as a Christian nation with Amharic as its indisputable official
language until the revolution of 1974.
The source of this exclusionary policy and practice has, in
part, been an imperialist arrogance that regards other cultures and
languages as “inferior” and un-Ethiopian. It was hoped that all the
non-Abyssinian peoples would opt for the politically dominant
or “superior official” culture and abandon their own language
and cultural traditions. Consequently, little effort was made to
ŗŖ CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

accommodate the different cultures into a national framework (Keller,

1988).
Rejected by the populations it had targeted, the policy of cultural
homogenization and “nation-building” has never been a success story.
But failure did not discourage the ruling elite who remained quite
adamant about their assimilation policies. They used repression, both
during the long reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974) and the
military regime (1974-1991) of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, to
prevent organized expressions of ethno-national identity, which were
deemed a hindrance to their nation-building policies.
While the purpose of the repression used by the different regimes
was similar, the forms it took, i.e. the methods adopted by the state
agents who have been responsible for its execution, as well as the
groups of people who were affected by it, have varied significantly
over time. The conquered groups were not only occasionally brought
to their heels by the state’s “raw coercive power”, to use Edmond
Keller’s (2005: 87) words, but many of their members were also so
intimidated that they had to understate or even abandon their ethnic
and cultural identities. However, in the final analysis, terror and
violence proved to be counterproductive as instruments of nation-
building: terror and violence only deepened old conflicts and created
new ones between the state and many of the ethnic groups and led to
the proliferation of “ethnic” nationalisms and the intensification of the
struggle for ethno-national identities, and in several cases demands
for independent states (Markakis, 1987; Clapham, 1988).

PURPOSE, SCOPE AND THEMATIC FRAMEWORK

As indicated above, one of the consequences of cultural and political
repression in Ethiopia is the growth of dissident nationalism in
opposition to the “official” nationalism promoted by the state. Oromo
nationalism which is in focus here is one of the dissident voices of
nationalism opting for an independent state. Although some of
the repressive policies of the previous regimes were relaxed and a
quasi-federal system of government has been adopted by the current
Ethiopian regime two decades ago, much of the age-old socio-political,
economic, and cultural problems are yet to be resolved. The conflicts
that have characterized relations between most of the conquered
peoples and the Ethiopian state for more than a century still remain in
place. By and large, the contradictions reflect struggles for and against
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11

the recognition of ethno-national identity, or conflict between the

subjugated peoples’ claims for recognition on the one hand, and the
Abyssinian-cum-Ethiopian elite’s interests to maintain their
dominant political position in the country, on the other.
Since there are many non-Abyssinian nationalities who share
the experience of conquest and imperial domination, a question
may arise as to why I have limited my focus on the Oromo and
not conducted a comparative study. Principally, the decision is
dictated by methodological considerations: the sheer number of the
subjugated national minorities and differences in the trajectories of
their interactions with the Ethiopian state suggests treating them as a
group in a project like this one, unwieldy. In terms of its manifestations
and duration, the conflict between the Abyssinian state and the Oromo
people differs markedly from the interactions it has had with most of
the other conquered peoples. Therefore, the aim here is to gain deeper
insight into the history of the struggle of the Oromo people, and for
that, case study is a more fruitful approach than a comparative study of
the struggles conducted by the non-Abyssinian national minorities.
The historical sources (Asmé 1905[1987]) indicate that the long
history of Oromo-Abyssinian interactions is punctuated with conflict.
The political and scholarly discourse about Oromo history and identity
reflect negative experience from the past which is still retained in
the collective memory of the Abyssinian ruling elite. However, the
overriding fear is that a full expression of Oromo identity will mean
the end of their power as well as that of Ethiopia’s present cultural
and linguistic identity. The Ethiopian regimes’ worries about Oromo
identities are deepened by Oromo geography and demography.
If acknowledged as a contiguous territory, Oromoland, due to its
size, would dominate the geographical map of Ethiopia. Thus, an
acknowledgement of collective Oromo identity and history tends
to be difficult for every regime as it would contribute to political
consciousness among the largest nationality in the country. It is
understood as a threat to Ethiopian identity as a “nation” and a
state. Consequently, in the past, Ethiopian regimes have spent much
energy manipulating information about the territorial identity and
demographic facts about the Oromo people.5 Paul Baxter, Jan Hultin
and Alexandro Triulzi have argued that for the Amhara ruling elite,
the Oromo not only posed a political challenge, but also a cultural and
national one. They note that the Oromo political movement was seen
12 CONTOURS OF THE EMERGENT AND ANCIENT OROMO NATION

by the former as “doubly subversive because it stood for a different

sort of moral order to that of the Amhara elite which explains why the
regime [Dergue] used its cruellest and crudest forms of violence against
any signs of distinctive Oromo identity” (Baxter et al, 1996: 13).
This views of the Ethiopian ruling elite are shared by many scholars
who believe that the creation of solidarity among the Oromo based
on the idea of being Oromo would entail the dissolution of the
Ethiopian state. Therefore, though indirectly, Ethiopianist scholars
have even contributed to the suppression of collective Oromo
identity, while some of them deny the existence of such identity;
others have made it invisible.
Taking into account what is said above, the study of identity
politics which is presented in this work is framed in the five sets of
themes discussed below. Under the first set of themes which run
through several chapters, the study will reinterpret old facts and
unearth new ones about Oromo history and society. The second
set of themes supplements the first set, focusing on the nature and
consequences of the nineteenth-century Abyssinian conquest of
Oromoland. The third set of themes describes the struggle which
the Oromo people have been waging since the 1960s, the hopes
for democratic accommodation that have been raised and dashed
and, consequently, the trajectory which the development of Oromo
nationalism has taken. The fourth set of themes outlines the contours
of the emergent Oromo nation. The fifth set of themes speculates about
the future of Oromo relations to the Ethiopian state. The themes are
all elaborated in the following section.

1
CONTOURS OF THE ANCIENT OROMO NATION: HISTORY,
TERRITORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
This study starts with a critical analysis of the identity of the Oromo
people as represented in Ethiopianist historical discourse. The
discourse is located in a historical trajectory that spans a period of five
centuries: the first set of themes focuses, inter alia, on the territorial
origins of the Oromo people and the so-called Oromo invasion of
Ethiopia in the sixteenth century. Ethiopianist historiographers posit
that the Oromo were unknown to the Abyssinians before the sixteenth
century: while presenting the Abyssinian–cum–Ethiopian territorial