Letter From Arlington Town Manager

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Town of Arlington

Office of the Town Manager


Jim Feeney 730 Massachusetts Avenue
Town Manager Arlington MA 02476-4908

To: Arlington Community


RE: Arlington is Victim of Cybercrime (BEC Attack)
Date: June 5, 2024

It is my unfortunate duty to report that the Town of Arlington has been a victim of
cybercrime. Through what is known as a business email compromise (BEC),
perpetrators used phishing, spoofing, social engineering, and compromised email
accounts to ultimately facilitate wire fraud totaling $445,945.73. Most importantly, I want
to assure the public that no sensitive or resident data was compromised. Below, I
provide background on the crime and steps the Town is taking to recoup the loss and
avoid future fraud.

We have been working with local and federal law enforcement and specialized
consultants since we first became aware of the fraud. It is believed this BEC attack was
perpetrated by an organization that is well resourced and located overseas. Here is
what I am able to share. I have also provided an FAQ (frequently asked questions) at
the end of this letter to provide additional details.

In September of 2023 Town employees received legitimate emails from a known vendor
working on the Arlington High School Building Project to discuss issues with payment
processing. Unbeknownst to the Town, threat actors had already compromised certain
employee user accounts and were monitoring emails. They seized the opportunity to
impersonate the vendor with an email domain that appeared genuine, requesting a
change in their payment method from check to electronic funds transfer (EFT), a
common method used by municipalities for on-going payments. The scam was aided by
fabricating and subsequently deleting emails from employee accounts, as well as
creating inbox rules to manage and hide incoming messages. Once the payment
method was established, a series of four monthly payments were made. The monthly
payments were diverted until the vendor reported not receiving payments in February
2024. It was immediately apparent that we had been defrauded, so we alerted law
enforcement and our banking institution, began a digital forensics investigation, retained
a breach coach, and instituted immediate response measures to secure our network.
The investigation found that threat actor activity occurred in the Town’s Microsoft
environment between September 12, 2023 and January 30, 2024. It was also
discovered there were other attempts to intercept wire payments totaling approximately
$5 million during this time period. Fortunately, these attempts were unsuccessful. It was
further determined the threat actors had not infiltrated the network.

In the immediate aftermath of the scam the Town’s Information Technology Department
(IT) performed a force disconnection from the network, required a password change for
all users, and enabled multi-factor authentication for key personnel. Unrelated to this
incident, but due to an increase in phishing attempts, the IT Department had already
begun to reconfigure email security settings in November to improve our email security.
The Town reviewed other existing wire payments and also contracted a third-party
auditor to bolster internal controls with a stricter policy related to wire transfer payments
such as EFT and ACH (Automatic Clearing House).

As additional efforts to reduce the risk of falling victim to future cyberattacks, the Town
has instituted mandatory cybersecurity training for all staff through the state’s Municipal
Cybersecurity Awareness Grant Program and has applied for additional state grant
funding to be able to roll out multi-factor authentication for all staff. The Town was
already in the process of rolling out an endpoint detection and response platform as part
of the upcoming fiscal year. This platform will help prevent and detect malware,
ransomware, and other advanced threats, providing security of critical systems and
sensitive data.

With respect to the funds the Town was defrauded of, our banking institution was able
to recover $3,308. The Town has since filed a claim with our insurer to hopefully further
offset the loss. In the meantime, the vendor needed to be paid for services rendered
over a four-month period, so at their June 4th meeting, the Arlington High School
Building Committee voted to authorize payment to the vendor from the project funds.
Any monies we recoup from this fraud will go back into this fund.

I want to emphasize that this loss does not negatively impact the completion of the High
School Building project in any way.

In 2023 the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center received 21,489 BEC complaints
with adjusted losses over $2.9 billion. It’s a staggering number and a sobering reminder
that malicious actors are common and during the course of this experience, I learned,
well resourced. That being said, I want to you assure you that we are exhausting every
avenue to recoup the funds that we were defrauded of, and we are making every effort
to improve our cybersecurity posture. Cybersecurity is an ever-changing and evolving
threat. As an organization we will continue to adapt our defenses to emerging threats
through educating and training of our users, investing in the necessary tools moving
forward, and establishing policies and protocols to protect our digital operations.

Sincerely,

Jim Feeney

Arlington Town Manager


Arlington BEC Attack Frequently Asked Questions

Money and Budget Impacts

Who is responsible for the money?


The Town of Arlington – specifically the AHS Building Project - is responsible for the
$445,945.73 loss. The AHS Building Project funds have already been allocated and are
separate from the Town of Arlington’s annual operating budget.
The mechanism to pay the defrauded amount will be through the AHS Building Project
fund. Fortunately, the AHS Building Project fund can cover the loss at this time and no
aspects of the project will be altered or removed. The project schedule remains
unchanged and is anticipated to be complete in the Fall of 2025. Visit ahsbuilding.org
for more information on the AHS Building Project.

How does this impact the recent override and general budget?
As previously stated, the loss will be paid from the AHS Building project budget. Impacts
to the general operating budget will come from investments in enhanced cybersecurity,
which are outlined below under the question: “What is the Town doing now to avoid
being a victim of another cyberattack?” Future investments will be considered through
the Town’s usual budgeting process.

Will our insurance cover any of these losses?


The Town has filed an insurance claim and hopes to recoup some money. Any funds
recouped will go back into the AHS Building Project Fund.

Security and Incident

What immediate actions has the Town taken in response to this incident?
• Alerted law enforcement agencies and our banking institution.
• Began a digital forensics investigation and retained a breach coach.
• Instituted immediate response measures to secure our network.
• Completed an internal security audit of all transactions with this and other
vendors.
• Completed a full reconciliation of the AHS building project budget.
• Began implementation of increased IT security measures (multi-factor for
key personnel).
• Filed a claim with our insurance agency.

What is the Town doing now to avoid being a victim of another cyberattack?
• The Town has instituted mandatory cybersecurity training for all staff
through the state’s Municipal Cybersecurity Awareness Grant Program.
• In FY25 the Town will roll out a platform that continuously monitors end-
user devices to detect and respond to ransomware and malware threats
• The Town has applied for state grant funding to be able to roll out multi-
factor authentication for all staff.
• The Town will work with the Commonwealth to perform penetration
testing.
• Cybersecurity is an ever-changing and evolving threat. As an organization
we will continue to adapt our defenses to emerging threats through educating
and training of our users, investing in the necessary tools moving forward,
and establishing policies and protocols to protect our digital operations.
Future cybersecurity investments will be considered through the Town’s usual
budgeting process.

Why did it take so long to discover the fraudulent activity?


Once the EFT payment method was established, monthly invoices continued to be
successfully processed to the threat actors bank account. Legitimate payment
confirmations were sent to the intended vendor, but it was not immediately evident that
the payments were fraudulent.

Why did the Town wait so long to inform residents?


The matter was actively under investigation by law enforcement and our banking
institution and could not be made public until these investigations were complete.

Is the Town confident that no other cyberthefts have occurred?


The investigation found that threat actor activity occurred in the Town’s Microsoft
environment between September 12, 2023 and January 30, 2024. During this time other
attempts to intercept wire payments totaling approximately $5 million were discovered.
Fortunately, these attempts were unsuccessful as the targets were well-established
existing wires.

Was the vendor also compromised? What actions did they take following this
incident?
No, the vendor was not compromised. They verified that all internal email and electronic
files were secure. Additionally, they confirmed with all other vendors on the project that
payments were secure. All vendors will notify if any payments are overdue.

What state and federal agencies were/are involved with the investigation?
The Town of Arlington immediately contacted local and federal law enforcement
agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigations and Secret Service of the
fraudulent payments, as soon as the fraud was discovered.

Is there support from the federal government to recoup these losses?


Unfortunately, cybercrimes of this nature are becoming more commonplace and the
loss from this incident is lower than the minimum threshold considered for state or
federal support. FDIC insurance does not protect accounts from fraud.

Why didn’t Arlington’s bank catch these fraudulent payments? And what is their
liability, if any?
The bank likely would not realize these payments were fraudulent until they were
notified, as the transactions were processed as a normal course of business. The
transaction occurred between two legitimate domestic accounts, both originating and
receiving, per instructions provided. Under current regulations, banks enjoy broad
protections from liability resulting from wire fraud and their only duty is to their
respective customers. According to the Federal Trade Commission, bank payment and
transfer is the most prevalent payment method employed by fraudsters. As consumers
lose more and more to fraud each year, federal legislators have begun to push banks to
do more to protect consumers from wire fraud. The Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs is leading this effort.

Are we changing banks? If not, why?


At this time we do not feel compelled to change any of our banking institutions. These
transactions could have occurred within any financial institutions without being flagged
as problematic.

What other Massachusetts municipalities have been victims of cybercrime?


Since 2020, Tewksbury, Franklin, Quincy, Lowell, and Concord have all been victims of
some form of cyberattack.

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