Adverse Possession
Adverse Possession
Adverse Possession
Adverse possession
Adverse possession is a process by which premises can change ownership. It is a common law concept concerning the title to real property (land and the fixed structures built upon it). By adverse possession, title to another's real property can be acquired without compensation, by holding the property in a manner that conflicts with the true owner's rights for a specified period. For example, squatter's rights are a specific form of adverse possession. The circumstances in which adverse possession arises determine the type of title acquired by the disseisor (the one who obtains the title from the original owner), which may be fee simple title, mineral rights, or another interest in real property. Adverse possession's origins are based both in statutory actions and in common law precepts, so the details concerning adverse possession actions vary by jurisdiction. The required period of uninterrupted possession is governed by the statute of limitations. Other elements of adverse possession are judicial constructs.
History
At common law, where entitlement to possession of land was in dispute (originally only in what were known as real actions), the person claiming a right to possession was not allowed to allege that the land had come into his possession in the past (in older terminology that he had been "put into seisin") at a time before the reign of Henry I.[1] The law recognized a cut off date going back into the past, before which date the law would not be interested. There was no requirement for a defendant to show any form of adverse possession. As time went on, the date was moved by statute -- first to the reign of Henry II[2] , and then to the reign of Richard I.[3] No further changes were made of this kind. By the reign of Henry VIII the fact that there had been no changes to the cutoff date had become very inconvenient. A new approach was taken whereby the person claiming possession had to show possession of the land for a continuous period, a certain number of years (60, 50 or 30 depending on the kind of claim made) before the date of the claim.[4] Later statutes have shortened the limitation period in most common law jurisdictions.
Adverse possession
Adverse possession of right. Good faith (in a minority of states) or bad faith (sometimes called the "Maine Rule" although it is now abolished in Maine) Improvement, cultivation, or enclosure [5] Payment of property taxes. This may be required by statute, such as in California [6] , or just a contributing element to a court's determination of possession. Both payment by the disseisor and by the true owner are relevant. A legal document that appears (incorrectly) to give the disseisor title. [7] Dispossession not under force of arms. Dispossession by armed invasion does not establish a claim of adverse possession against the true owner.
Adverse possession Adverse possession may also apply to territorial rights. In the United States, Georgia lost an island in the Savannah River to South Carolina, when South Carolina used fill from dredging to attach the island to its own shore. Since Georgia knew of this yet did nothing about it, the U.S. Supreme Court (which has original jurisdiction in such matters) granted this land to South Carolina, although the Treaty of Beaufort (1787) explicitly specified that the river's islands belonged to Georgia.[9]
Squatter's rights
Most cases of adverse possession deal with boundary line disputes between two parties who hold clear title to their property. The term "squatter's rights" has no actual legal meaning, but is generally used to refer to a specific form of adverse possession where the disseisor holds no title to any properties adjoining the property under dispute. In most jurisdictions of the United States, few squatters can meet the legal requirements for adverse possession. If the squatter abandons the property for a period, or if the rightful owner effectively removes the squatter's access even temporarily during the statutory period, or gives his permission, the "clock" usually stops. For example, if the required period in a given jurisdiction is twenty years and the squatter is removed after only 15 years, the squatter loses the benefit of that 15-year possession (i.e., the clock is reset at zero). If that squatter later retakes possession of the property, that squatter must, to acquire title, remain on the property for a full 20 years after the date on which the squatter retook possession. In this example, the squatter would have held the property for a total of 35 years (the original 15 years plus the later 20 years) to acquire title. Depending on the jurisdiction, one squatter may or may not pass along continuous possession to another squatter, known as "tacking", until the adverse possession period is complete. Tacking is valid only if the conveyance of the property from one adverse possesser to another is founded upon a written document (usually an erroneous deed),
Adverse possession indicating "color of title." This concept is known as privity, a requirement for tacking under some statutes. If tacking requires privity in the jurisdiction, a squatter claiming adverse possession without a foundation on a written document (claim of right) may not tack previous periods of adverse possession onto his own for purposes of running out the statutory period.[19] A lawful owner may also restart the clock at zero by giving temporary permission for the occupation of the property, thus defeating the necessary "continuous and hostile" element. Evidence that a squatter paid rent to the owner would defeat adverse possession for that period.
Comparison to homesteading
Adverse possession is in some ways similar to homesteading. Like the disseisor, the homesteader may gain title to property by using the land and fulfilling certain other conditions. In homesteading, however, the possession of the property is not hostile; the land is either considered to have no legal owner or is owned by the government. The government allows the homesteader to use the land with the expectation that the homesteader who fulfills the requirements necessary for the homestead will gain title to the property. The principles of homesteading and squatter's rights embody the most basic concept of property and ownership, which can be summarized by the adage "possession is nine-tenths of the law," meaning the person who uses the property effectively owns it. Likewise, the adage, "use it or lose it," applies. The principles of homesteading and squatter's rights predate formal property laws; to a large degree, modern property law formalizes and expands these simple ideas. The principle of homesteading is that if no one is using or possessing property, the first person to claim it and use it consistently over a specified period owns the property. Squatter's rights embodies the idea that if one property owner neglects property and fails to use it, and a second person starts to tend and use the property, then after a certain period the first person's claim to the property is lost and ownership transfers to the second person, who is actually using the property. The legal principle of homesteading, then, is a formalization of the homestead principle in the same way that the right of adverse possession is a formalization of the pre-existing principle of squatter's rights. The essential ideas behind the principles of homesteading and squatter's rights hold generally for any type of item or property of which ownership can be asserted by simple use or possession. In modern law, homesteading and the right of adverse possession refer exclusively to real property. In the realm of personal property, the same impulse is summarized by the adage "finders/keepers" and is formalized by laws and conventions concerning abandoned property.
Copyrights
Some legal scholars have proposed to extend the concept of adverse possession to intellectual property law, in particular to reconcile intellectual property and antitrust law[20] or to unify copyright law and property law.[21]
Adverse possession successfully extinguish the easement. This is another reason to quiet title after a successful adverse possession or adverse prescription: it clarifies the record of who should take action to preserve the adverse title or easement while evidence is still fresh. For example, given a deeded easement to use someone else's driveway to reach a garage, if a fence or permanently locked gate prevents the use, nothing is done to remove and circumvent the obstacle, and the statutory period expires, then the easement ceases to have any legal force, although the deed held by the fee-simple owner stated that the owner's interest was subject to the easement. Strictly speaking, prescription works in a different way to adverse possession. Adverse possession is concerned with the extinction of the title of the original owner by a rule of limitation of actions. Prescription, on the other hand, is concerned with acquiring a right that did not previously exist.
References
[1] See Bevil's Case 10 Co. Rep. [2] By the Statute of Merton, 20 H. 3 [3] Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw 1 c. 29 listed in the chronological table of statutes as the Limitation of Prescription Act 1275. The situation was more complicated, the reign of Richard I applying only to Writs of Right. [4] 32 H. 8 c.2 (Limitation of Prescription 1540) [5] California Code of Civil Procedure Section 323, 325 [6] California Code of Civil Procedure Section 325 [7] California Code of Civil Procedure Section 323 [8] Acquiring Property By Adverse Possession (Peter Moulinos, Esq.) (http:/ / www. moulinos. com/ legal-update-peter-moulinos-acquiring-property-by-adverse-possession/ ) [9] ??Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376 (1990)?? [10] Sections 15 and 17 Limitation Act 1980 [11] Section 75 Land Registration Act 1925 or Schedule 6 Land Registration Act 2002, depending on when the limitation period is completed [12] Section 15(1) Limitation Act 1980 [13] Section 1 The Land Registration Act 2002 (Transitional Provisions) (No 2) Order 2003) [14] Section 75(1) Land Registration Act 1925 [15] Section 75(2) Land Registration Act 1925 [16] Schedule 6 Paragraph 1 Land Registration Act 2002 [17] Schedule 6 Paragraph 2 Land Registration Act 2002 [18] Smirk v Lyndale Developments Ltd [1974] 3 WLR 91 [19] Dukeminier et al. Property (6th Ed). 140. [20] Constance E. Bagley and Gavin Clarkson, "Adverse Possession for Intellectual Property: Adapting an Ancient Concept to Resolve Conflicts between Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws in the Information Age" Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 16:2 (Spring 2003) full text (http:/ / jolt. law. harvard. edu/ articles/ pdf/ v16/ 16HarvJLTech327. pdf) [21] Michael James Arrett, "Adverse Possession of Copyright: A Proposal to Complete Copyright's Unification with Property Law", Journal of Corporation Law 31:1 (October 2005) abstract; full text (pay) (http:/ / heinonline. org/ HOL/ Page?handle=hein. journals/ jcorl31& div=13& g_sent=1& collection=journals)
License
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported //creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/