Appleqvist WITTGENSTEIN - AND - AESTHETICS
Appleqvist WITTGENSTEIN - AND - AESTHETICS
Appleqvist WITTGENSTEIN - AND - AESTHETICS
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Appelqvist, Hanne
2023-03-09
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/569284
10.1017/9781108946452
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Wittgenstein
and Aesthetics
About the Series Series Editor
This series provides concise and David G. Stern
structured introductions to all the central University of Iowa
Hanne Appelqvist
topics in the philosophy of Ludwig
Wittgenstein. The Elements are written
by distinguished senior scholars and
WITTGENSTEIN
AND AESTHETICS
Hanne Appelqvist
University of Helsinki
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https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108946452 Published online by Cambridge University Press
DOI: 10.1017/9781108946452
First published online: January 2023
Hanne Appelqvist
University of Helsinki
Author for correspondence: Hanne Appelqvist, hanne.appelqvist@helsinki.fi
1 Introduction 1
References 65
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Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 1
1 Introduction
Aesthetics is usually understood as the philosophical investigation of art,
beauty, and taste. Standard questions within the field pertain to the essence of
art, artistic and aesthetic value, aesthetic experience and judgment, and the
meaning, understanding, and interpretation of artworks. Most of these themes
figure in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writing, where, from 1915 onward, we find
observations on aesthetic contemplation, reason-giving in aesthetics, and the
nature of musical meaning and understanding. In Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, there
are also numerous remarks on composers, literary authors, poets, and, for
example, the notion of a genius, testifying to his awareness of the aesthetic
debates prevalent in his cultural milieu. Music in particular had a dominant role
in Wittgenstein’s life and thought, which is natural given his early immersion in
Viennese musical life.1
However, in addition to its narrow disciplinary sense, the term aesthetics has
a broader philosophical use. In the broad sense of the term, originating in the
work of Alexander Baumgarten and underscored by Immanuel Kant’s philo-
sophical project, aesthetics refers to the investigation of the domain of sensibil-
ity in general (Baumgarten 1954, §CXVI; CPR A21/B35–36). As such,
aesthetics is explicitly contrasted with the conceptual domain of logic.
Sensible perception, imagination, and feeling are treated as a realm independent
of and irreducible to the discursive realm of concepts, contributing to cognition
on its own terms.
The two senses of “aesthetics” have natural points of overlap, because
judgments about art and other objects of aesthetic appreciation are often treated
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1
Wittgenstein’s family was exceptionally musical and regularly hosted musical events attended by
people like Johannes Brahms, Josef Joachim, Gustav Mahler, Josef Labor, and Richard Strauss. It
is also indicative of the family’s eminence in musical circles that when Wittgenstein’s brother, the
concert pianist Paul Wittgenstein, lost his right arm in the war, Maurice Ravel, Sergei Prokofiev,
and Benjamin Britten composed music for the left hand specifically for him. On Wittgenstein’s
life and family, see Janik and Toulmin 1973; McGuinness 1988; Monk 1990; and Waugh 2008.
2 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
2
See Weitz 1956. For discussions on art in light of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see, for example,
Wollheim 1968; Eldridge 1987; Sedivy 2016, 97–147.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 3
3
Edited collections dedicated to Wittgenstein’s aesthetics include Johannessen 1998; Allen and
Turvey 2001; Gibson and Huemer 2004; Lewis 2004; Majetschak and Lütterdelfs 2007; Arbo, Le
Du, and Plaud 2012; Hagberg 2017. Special issues on the theme have been published in L’Art du
Comprende 20, 2011; Aisthesis 6 (1), 2013; Ápeiron: Estudios de filosofía 10, 2019; and Estetika:
The European Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1), 2020.
4
See, for example, Cavell 1969; Bell 1987; Moore 1987, 1997, 203–206; Appelqvist 2017, 2019b;
Day 2017.
5
This view is common among the representatives of the so-called traditional reading of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy and often reflects a strictly disciplinary understanding of aesthetics
(see von Wright 1977, ixe; Hacker 1986, 101; Glock 1996, 31; Budd 2011, 775; Schroeder 2017,
612).
6
Accounts on the strength, source, and pervasiveness of Kant’s influence on Wittgenstein and the
exegetical detail in which they are explicated vary across the literature. Accordingly, any given
Kantian interpretation is Kantian to a greater or lesser degree. Some argue that the similarities
between the two can be attributed to Schopenhauer’s influence (e.g., Hacker 1986; Pears 1987;
Stern 1995; Sluga 2011). Others have read Wittgenstein more directly in light of Kant’s transcen-
dental idealism. On Kant’s influence on Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, see Stenius 1960;
Kannisto 1986; Glock 1992, 1997; Moore 1987, 2013; Appelqvist 2013, 2016. On his influence
4 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
remarks on aesthetics (and ethics) cannot be seamlessly fitted into the larger
framework of his philosophy. I also contest the resolute readings that, while
stressing the ethical and sometimes aesthetic import of Wittgenstein’s work,
reject the notion of ineffability as central for Wittgenstein’s position.7 From the
Kantian viewpoint, ineffability – the principled impossibility of conceptually
determining every aspect of our encounter with reality – is but a natural corol-
lary of the essentially nonconceptual domain of aesthetics.
Reading one enigmatic philosopher with the help of another equally challen-
ging and complex thinker has its obvious dangers. Kant’s philosophy is subject
to as much controversy as Wittgenstein’s, and appealing to Kant always
involves interpretation. Moreover, if Wittgenstein was influenced by Kant’s
views, as I argue, those views have been transformed and incorporated into
his own project. The affinities between the two also come in degrees.
Sometimes we hear but faint echoes of Kant in Wittgenstein’s writing, at
other times a remark by Wittgenstein reads almost as a paraphrase of Kant’s
text.8 Finally, the views of both Kant and Wittgenstein have been appropriated
and developed further in aesthetics and elsewhere. It is not always easy to
disentangle Wittgenstein’s own position from a “Wittgensteinian” position, and
the same applies to Kant. I have tried to stay as close as possible to the original
texts, but some of Kant’s views have become so entrenched in aesthetics that it
is occasionally more natural to talk more generally about Kantian views.
Wittgenstein is notoriously sparing with his references to other philosophers,
including Kant. It is thus difficult to determine with certainty what the exact
sources of his expressed views are. We know that Wittgenstein read The
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108946452 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Critique of Pure Reason in 1918 and some of his explicit references to Kant
appear already in 1914.9 He also compares Kant favorably to Schopenhauer,
and claims that Kant’s method is the “right sort of approach” in philosophy
(LWL, 73; Rhees 1981, 95). Such remarks would be surprising had Wittgenstein
not had first-hand knowledge of Kant’s philosophy. Yet, to my knowledge, there
is no direct evidence of Wittgenstein reading Kant’s Critique of the Power of
on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, see Cavell 1969, 1979; Williams 1981; Bell 1987; Garver
1994; Appelqvist 2017, 2018, 2019b; Ritter 2020.
7
The resolute reading approaches the Tractatus as a text that employs literary techniques, thereby
bringing aesthetics to bear on Wittgenstein’s work. At the same time, it rejects the interpretation
according to which the early Wittgenstein is committed to the idea of inexpressible logical,
ethical, or aesthetic knowledge or understanding. See Diamond 1983, 1988, 2000; Kremer 2001;
Conant 2002, 2005.
8
Consider, for example, TLP 2.013 vs. CPR A24/B38; TLP 5.61 and PI §435 vs. CPR A 476/B504;
PI §118–119 vs. CPR Axiii; CV, 94 [82] vs. CPR A598/B626.
9
See McGuinness 1988, 252, 270; Monk 1990, 158. Ian Proops has argued that Wittgenstein’s
earliest references to Kant betray familiarity with Kant’s Prolegomena (Proops 2004, 109; see
NB, 15; TLP 6.36111).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 5
1933 notes have been meticulously taken and carefully edited. The 1938 notes,
while more well-known, are less reliable in this regard.10 The key theme
figuring in both sets of lectures is the nature of aesthetic judgment and the
possibility of its justification. In 1933, Wittgenstein stresses the Kantian con-
trast between judgments of beauty and of the agreeable, arguing against the
possibility of explaining aesthetics in a naturalistic fashion. In the 1938 lectures,
the notion of aesthetic explanation, given by reference to reasons rather than
causes, is developed further. Like Kant, whose account of beauty combines
a subjective and an objective component, Wittgenstein discusses the interface
between subjective reactions to aesthetic phenomena and the communally
shared rules, conventions, and practices that are constitutive of those phenom-
ena. The argumentative goal of Section 3 is to explicate how the two sides of
10
See Anscombe’s letter to von Wright on March 14, 1984, available at the National Library of
Finland; Diamond 2005, 99.
6 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
11
On the interconnections, see Barrett 1991; Tilghman 1991; Gmür 2000.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 7
the facts of the world are neither good nor bad. Accordingly, the problem of life
remains completely untouched even when all possible empirical questions
about the world have been answered (TLP 6.52). However, there is another
perspective that does not yield any thoughts or propositions. Wittgenstein calls
this perspective the view sub specie aeterni, the “view from eternity,” and
suggests that the experience of value or purpose resides in that perspective
(TLP 6.45).
The subject’s experience of value does not correspond to thoughts or pro-
positions in the technical sense of the Tractatus, because every possible thought
is about empirical facts, whether possible or actual (TLP 6.42). So instead of
characterizing the evaluative perspective or the experience emerging from it
as a thought or a proposition, Wittgenstein speaks of viewing and feeling. He
writes: “To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a
12
See Moore 1987; Appelqvist and Pöykkö 2020.
8 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical”
(TLP 6.45). Rather than approaching the world as an aggregate of mutually
independent and contingent facts – a complete catalogue of which is provided
by the corpus of the natural sciences – the evaluative perspective takes as its
object the world viewed as a limited whole (TLP 1–1.21, 4.11). As such, the
world is viewed from a unique point of view that belongs to the subject as the
world’s limit (TLP 5.632). Accordingly, the world takes on the character of
being the subject’s life: the world is given to me as “my world,” which is to say
that, for the subject, the “world and life are one” (TLP 5.62–5.621). This insight
falls outside the bounds of meaningful language. At the same time, it is the first
step for seeing how the world of contingent facts can relate to the subject’s will
and to good and bad as predicates of that will (NB, 79).13
The perspective on the world as a unique, limited whole is equally manifest in
aesthetics, ethics, and religion. While both ethics and religion, at least ordinarily
understood, are directly related to the question of the value and purpose of life,
the connection is not as obvious in the case of aesthetics. Yet, for Wittgenstein,
aesthetics actually assumes priority over ethics and religion. This is because
what he writes about the evaluative perspective echoes features that are trad-
itionally attributed to aesthetic attitude or judgment.
Wittgenstein’s identification between ethics and aesthetics emerges for the
first time in 1916 as an elaboration of the claim that ethics “must be a condition
of the world, like logic” (NB, 77). In the Tractatus, the identification is preceded
by a characterization of ethics as “transcendental” (TLP 6.421).14 From the
viewpoint of Kant’s philosophy, there is no essential difference between the two
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13
For an alternative reading of “feeling the world as a limited whole,” see (Friedlander 2001, 136–
144). Friedlander acknowledges the link between Kant and Wittgenstein, but overlooks the role
of the notion of a world-whole in their respective accounts (cf. Stenius 1960, 223; Moore 2013,
253).
14
In the Notebooks, Wittgenstein calls ethics “transcendent” (NB, 77). However, his characteriza-
tion of ethics as a condition of the world implies that what he means is transcendentality rather
than transcendence. This interpretation is reinforced by the mature formulation of the same point
in TLP 6.421.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 9
One way to approach the question is to start from the assumption that just as
meaningful thoughts or propositions must conform to the general propositional
form grounded in logic, judgments of value have a shared form (TLP 4.5).15
This proposal accords with Kant’s transcendental idealism: the forms of our
judgments condition our judgments as well as their objects, making it possible
for the two to have an internal, necessary relation (cf. TLP 2.0121; CPR A57/
B81). And indeed, Wittgenstein’s explanation of the oneness of ethics and
aesthetics emphasizes the shared perspective from which they arise: “The
work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the
world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between art and ethics”
(NB, 83).
At the outset, this remark might lead us to think that aesthetics refers to the
“view from eternity” when directed to works of art, whereas ethics takes the
world or one’s life as its object. However, Wittgenstein’s elaboration on
the theme and his emphasis on the formal features of the perspective cast
doubt on a neat separation between ethics and aesthetics even at this level of
abstraction.16
Granted, Wittgenstein mentions the work of art as the aesthetic manifestation
of the sub specie aeterni perspective (NB, 83; CV, 7 [5]).17 Yet, the only
concrete example of an object of aesthetic contemplation in his 1916 discussion
is a mundane, everyday object:
If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you
know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the
matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world.
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But if I was contemplating the stove it was my world, and everything else
colourless by contrast with it. (NB, 83)
1930, Wittgenstein notes that viewing one’s life sub specie aeterni is to view it
as a work of art (CV, 6 [4]). It thus seems that the distinction between an object
and the world is not relevant for the evaluative viewpoint, and accordingly that
there is no principled difference between ethics and aesthetics.
To understand ethics as conditioning the world is to identify it with the
perspective that shows the world of contingent facts as a limited whole and
hence as the subject’s unique life. Given that the judgments grounded in the sub
specie aeterni perspective show anything – the totality of facts, a work of art, or
a stove – as a possible “world,” the distinction between ethics and aesthetics
dissolves. It is the perspective itself that carries the entire weight of the
judgment being a judgment of value. Given Wittgenstein’s strict notion of
meaningful language as the totality of pictures of possible facts, judgments of
value cannot be discursively expressed. Their formal character as judgments
springing from the sub specie aeterni perspective just shows itself. In this
respect, transcendental ethics is similar to transcendental logic: both condition
the world as something given to the subject, albeit in different ways.
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. This work addresses the gulf between
contingent nature and the possibility of happiness associated with morality (CPJ
5:174–176). It begins from the assumption that the world may be approached
from two complementing perspectives: the discursive perspective operative in
the quest for knowledge and the reflective or intuitive perspective at work in
pure judgments of taste and teleological judgments. Kant’s argumentative goal
is to establish the legitimacy of the reflective perspective by analyzing the
judgment of beauty as a merely reflective judgment where the purposiveness
of the form of an object is felt rather than conceptually determined. Kant argues
that the reflective perspective can also be adopted toward the world as a whole.
In the First Critique, he had argued that the “world-whole” falls outside the
bounds of knowledge. However, in the Third Critique he claims that we have the
right to judge the world to be a purposive, limited whole, as long as we do not
take this judgment to yield knowledge (CPR A483–484/B511–512; CPJ 5:379).
And it is precisely the reflective viewpoint on the world that allows us to see the
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 11
possibility of harmony between contingent nature and the will bound by the
moral law.
Like Kant’s judgment of beauty, Wittgenstein’s example of the contempla-
tion of the stove explicitly contrasts the sub specie aeterni perspective with the
factual perspective that yields conceptually expressible knowledge. Since “pro-
positions can express nothing that is higher,” the perspective manifests a feature
that Kant requires of pure aesthetic judgments, namely, their nonconceptuality
(TLP 6.42; NB, 78; CPJ 5:221). It is impossible to express in language what it
means for an object to be “my world,” as anything I could possibly say about the
object will be mere statements of facts (TLP 4.1; see TLP 6.42–6.421). For
knowledge and indeed for meaningful thought in general, the stove is but
a trivial, contingent thing. However, the sub specie aeterni perspective does
not show the stove as a trivial thing among other things, “from the midst of
them” (NB, 83). Instead, the stove is seen “from outside,” not in space and time
but “together with space and time” (NB, 83).
Reading the final remark alongside the 1914 reference to space and time as
“forms of intuition” helps make more sense of the transcendental status
Wittgenstein assigns to ethics-cum-aesthetics (NB, 118). The view from eter-
nity transcends the spatiotemporally structured world not by turning away from
the world of facts toward another transcendent realm but by changing the
perspective from which those facts are seen. When the spatiotemporal order
of the world is set aside and I look at something as an object of wonder rather
than of empirical investigation, the potential conflict between contingent facts
and my will disappears. I can see that the “facts of the world are not the end of
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the matter” (NB, 74). The contemplative perspective that transforms the stove
into the subject’s world also lies at the heart of the mystical feeling of the world
as a limited whole: “Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That there
is what there is” (NB, 86; TLP 6.45). For knowledge, there are no miracles,
because the scientific way of looking at things is not to look at them as miracles
(LE, 11). But if we wonder at the existence of the world as a whole, then the
possibility of seeing that world as a miracle becomes available.
As Wittgenstein’s laconic remark about the world of a happy man being
different from that of an unhappy man suggests, it is something of a mystery
how the switch from the perspective of thought to that of valuation is actually
effected (TLP 6.43). What compels the subject to turn away from the spatio-
temporal order of contingent facts and contemplate them “from outside”?
Wittgenstein notes that art shows things from the right perspective
(NB, 83, 86). But while it might be easier to see beauty in a poem than in
a stove, art itself does not force any particular perspective on the viewer. It is
possible to read a novel as an exercise in a foreign language or as a source of
12 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
no fear. Not even in face of death” (NB, 74). Such a disinterested stance
allows my will to be in harmony with the world, however it might be.
Arthur Schopenhauer, whose influence is visible in Wittgenstein’s early
remarks, similarly saw disinterested contemplation as the essence of the aes-
thetic attitude. Building on Kant’s requirement that pure judgments of taste be
disinterested, Schopenhauer took the aesthetic attitude to have the capacity to
liberate the subject from torments caused by their insatiable will (Schopenhauer
1969, 195–200).18 Wittgenstein’s view diverges from Schopenhauer’s in that he
does not treat all willing as categorically bad. He sides with Kant by distin-
guishing between good and bad willing (see TLP 6.43; NB, 73; cf.
Schopenhauer 1969, 197). Nevertheless, the liberating aspect of the aesthetic
perspective is present in Wittgenstein’s thought:
18
On Schopenhauer’s influence on the early Wittgenstein, see Hacker 1986, 81–104; Glock 1999;
Jacquette 2017.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 13
Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world with
a happy eye?
Life is grave, art is gay.
For there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is the beautiful.
And the beautiful is what makes happy. (NB, 86; italics in original)
19
Translation altered to match the German original: “Dies Merkmal kann kein physisches, sondern
nur ein metaphysisches, ein transcendentes sein.”
20
On Kant’s notion of purposiveness and intentional causality, see Guyer 1997, 48–50; Allison
2001, 120–125.
14 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily, then this of itself
seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life seems to be justified,
of itself, it seems that it is the only right life.
...
But we could say: The happy life seems to be in some sense more
harmonious than the unhappy. But in what sense?? (NB, 78)
I have argued that the disinterested and nonconceptual sub specie aeterni
perspective makes the harmony between the will and the contingent world
possible. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I will argue that such a view entails neither
subjectivism nor relativism. That proposal will draw on Wittgenstein’s later
investigation into the grounds of attributing harmony to a musical work or
performance.
In my view, Wittgenstein’s position is Kantian not by following Kant’s moral philosophy to its
end, but rather by giving the judgment of beauty a pride of place in the attempt to reconcile
the morally obligated will and the world of contingent facts – a move anticipated by Kant
himself and brought to fruition by Wittgenstein’s identification between ethics and aesthetics
(see Moore 1987, 132–133).
16 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
The forms of objects allow them to combine with each other, thereby grounding
the forms of facts and ultimately the form of the entire world. This logical form
is the a priori form of any imaginable world: I could neither perceive nor
imagine any fact independently of it (TLP 2.022, 5.4731). That language and
reality have the same form makes the picturing of facts possible by allowing
names to combine together in the way in which the elements of the pictured fact
are claimed to be combined (TLP 2.151, 2.18). The referential relations between
names and objects, in turn, enable the proposition to “touch reality” and express
its empirical content unambiguously (TLP 2.1514–2.1515, 3.25).
One of Wittgenstein’s key claims is that the form shared by language and
reality cannot be expressed in language. According to him:
While conditioning facts, logical form itself is not a fact. Accordingly, it cannot
be expressed but rather “expresses itself ” in structured facts, whether linguistic
or nonlinguistic (TLP 4.121; see TLP 2.033, 3.14). And this just means that the
subject’s relation to the formal (internal) properties of facts, springing from
logical form, is not mediated by concepts. Instead, those properties are directly
seen in the facts. Wittgenstein suggests that we could call internal properties
features of facts “in the sense in which we speak of facial features” (TLP
4.1221). As will become clear once we turn to Wittgenstein’s work in the
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another (LC 8:59). He also notes that the grammatical investigation of the word
“not” is not like the investigation of the physical world but more like the
investigation of the geometry of a visual field (LC 5:75). These remarks indicate
that not just objects of aesthetic contemplation and geometry but also
a grammatical system can be viewed from a nondiscursive perspective that
focuses on the formal features of the system. The seeds of this idea, I want to
claim, are already in the Tractatus, where the form of a tautology and the
internal relation between two colors can be seen but not said.
The link between logic and aesthetics is visible throughout the Tractatus also in
a concrete way, because Wittgenstein evokes music at key moments of explaining
his notion of logical form. Logical form is first introduced in relation to objects that
are form and content (TLP 2.023, 2.025). While refusing to give concrete examples
of the objects, Wittgenstein illustrates their formal essence by reference to notes.
Like objects whose forms make it possible for them to combine in states of affairs,
notes “must have some pitch” that allows them to come together as musical themes
(TLP 2.0131). The second instance of Wittgenstein’s appeal to music arises in
relation to the articulate character of a proposition. Logical form grounds the
possibility of structure, which is the hallmark of both nonlinguistic and linguistic
facts (TLP 2.033, 2.141). Wittgenstein’s explanation of this idea goes as follows:
“A proposition is not a blend of words. – (Just as a theme in music is not a blend of
notes.) A proposition is articulate” (TLP 3.141).23 Just as the internal relations
between the notes of a scale make the overall structure (shape or pattern) of the
theme possible, the structure of the proposition rests on logical form. Finally, in
explaining the isomorphism between language and reality, Wittgenstein’s example
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A gramophone record, the musical idea, the musical notation, and the sound-
waves, all stand to one another in the same internal depicting relation that
holds between language and the world.
They all share their logical construction. (TLP 4.014)24
23
Wittgenstein uses the terms “tune” (in English), “Melodie,” and “musikalische Thema” inter-
changeably. See, for example, NB 40; NB 41 vs. TLP 3.141; BBB 166, 167; CV 54 [47];
Wittgenstein 2022, 188–197.
24
Here I use the new translation by David Stern, Joachim Schulte, and Katia Saporiti, forthcoming
from Cambridge University Press. I diverge from their translation by rendering “Notenschrift” as
“musical notation” instead of “the written music.”
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 19
refer to any objects, and musical themes do not picture states of affairs. In 1915,
Wittgenstein expresses the point explicitly. According to him, “musical themes
are in a certain sense propositions” (NB, 40). However, instead of being like
ordinary propositions that say something about the empirical world, “a tune is
a kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself” (NB, 40). Like
propositions of logic that only reveal the form necessary for the possibility of
thought and reality, the tune shows its form. In this way, then, Wittgenstein’s
early references to music make the key idea of the Tractatus, namely, the idea of
seeing logical form independently of empirical content intuitively available.25
itself” (PI §107; NB, 40). It is thus not surprising that the Tractatus has been
compared to both music and architecture.27 After completing the book,
Wittgenstein gives up philosophy for a decade.
After returning to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein begins lecturing under
the title “Philosophy.” G. E. Moore’s lecture notes from 1930 to 1933 give
us a vivid picture of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought in action during this
25
See Gmür 2000, 151–158. The interpretation I am proposing is directly opposed to that of Janik
and Toulmin, who claim that “Only art can express moral truth, and only the artist can teach the
things that matter the most in life.. . . To be concerned merely with form, like the aesthetes of the
1890s, is to pervert art. So in its own way, the Tractatus is every bit as much a condemnation of
l’art pour l’art as Tolstoy’s What is Art?” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 197; for Wittgenstein’s own
assessment of Tolstoy’s theory, see CV 67 [58–59]). On my reading, art does not express any
truths, and what it shows is precisely concerned with form.
26
For characteristic expressions of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic preferences, see, for example, CV, 4,
18, 27, 29, 40, 43, 76–77 [2, 21, 23, 25, 35, 37–38, 67].
27
See Stenius 1960, 5; Hyman 2001, 146–151.
20 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
so-called middle period of his philosophy. The problems covered in the lectures
correspond to those he thought he had solved in the Tractatus, including
linguistic meaning, relation between thought and reality, and the nature of
philosophy. Now the questions are treated by reference to the notions of
grammar, games, and conventional uses of language, familiar from
Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy.
A central notion of Wittgenstein’s middle period, marking an important
difference with the Tractatus’s atomistic picture theory of meaning, is that of
grammatical system. A word, he now claims, has meaning only in a system
constituted by grammatical rules. While the idea may not seem different from
his early account, according to which names have meaning only in the context
of propositions, Wittgenstein’s extension of the context principle to proposi-
tions changes the picture (TLP 3.3). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had claimed
that elementary propositions are independent of one another, but now he argues
that propositions too can only be understood in the context of a grammatical
system (TLP 2.061, 4.21–4.211, 6.3751; LC 5:35). Another, related Tractarian
assumption Wittgenstein abandons is that of immutable objects as the world’s
substance. The mistake in his early requirement of a unique analysis of every
proposition, intended to reveal referential connections between names and
simple objects, was to confuse logical with a chemical analysis – a confusion
that actually violated the Tractatus’s own dictum that the method of philosophy
is qualitatively different from that of the natural sciences (TLP 3.25, 4.111; LC
5:96, 6:17).
A third point of divergence from his early account pertains to Wittgenstein’s
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Wittgenstein’s first set of lectures on aesthetics opens with a reminder of his new
approach to meaning: “I stress the point of view which says: to know meaning is
to know use” (LC 8:59). The meaning of a word is neither an object nor a feeling
that the use of the word produces in us. And, while determined by grammar, the
meaning of a word is not reducible to a list of grammatical rules either. This
latter conception only arises due to our tendency to think of meaning as an entity
to which we can point. Wittgenstein mentions “God” and “soul” as expressions
easily misunderstood because of this very tendency. Rather than treating such
words as referential or statements like “The Lord is my shepherd” as expressing
facts (entailing that I am a sheep, say), we should investigate them grammat-
ically. This means that we should look at the actual uses of words and sentences
in the contexts to which they belong (LC 8:77). The contextual use of religious
expressions reveals that they are not empirical, let alone scientific. While
expressed in terms of Wittgenstein’s new approach to language, the overall
22 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
point is not far off from his early treatment of religious expressions. After all, in
the Tractatus, Wittgenstein deemed religious notions to lie outside the scope of
empirical language and in his Lecture on Ethics claimed them to be allegorical
expressions of experiences of absolute value (LE, 9).
Wittgenstein extends the rejection of the referential understanding of word
meaning to “good,” dismissing the idea of the good as a property (LC 9:2).
However, he quickly reverts to themes that are more readily understood as
belonging to aesthetics. He states: “Practically everything I say of ‘beautiful’
applies in a slightly different way to ‘good,’” thereby offering a new version of
his early alignment between ethics and aesthetics (LC 9:18; see LE, 4; LA I:1).
The bond between the two is now explained by reference to the grammar of the
words “good” and “beautiful.” According to Wittgenstein, the different ways in
which the words are used need not have anything in common any more than the
more familiar example of “game,” because the “way in which you use ‘good’ in
particular case is partly defined by the topic you’re talking of” (LC 9:3).
Similarly, it is a mistake to think of the word “beautiful” as referring to
a single property or a set of properties that all things called beautiful have in
common (LC 9:13; see LA 1:1). The role of the philosopher, then, is not to look
for essentialist definitions for these concepts, but simply describe the uses of
these words (LC 9:17, 9:19; see LA I:8, I:13). The contextual use of the words,
seen against the background of an entire culture, is what bestows them with
meaning (LC 9:2; LA I:26; PI §66; Z §164).
We might reasonably expect Wittgenstein’s new descriptive approach to
deliver empirical case studies of the diverse situations in which people talk
about the arts and other objects of aesthetic appreciation.28 However, as the
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28
If this were the case, aesthetic issues would indeed “belong to art criticism, rather than philoso-
phy,” as suggested by Severin Schroeder (Schroeder 2017, 612).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 23
wallpaper, tailoring, and arrangement of flowers in a flower bed (LC 9:14, 9:16,
9:20; BBB, 178; LA I:13).
Third, like Kant and in contrast to empiricist aesthetics, Wittgenstein argues
that aesthetic judgments are not mere sentiments or feelings of approbation. He
repeatedly ridicules psychological explanations of aesthetic judgments and
claims that endorsing naturalism would mean nothing short of the end of
aesthetics (LC 9:27). In 1933, Wittgenstein makes the point by reference to
the characteristically Kantian distinction between judgments of the beautiful
and of the agreeable, declaring that “‘Beautiful’ 6¼ ‘agreeable’” (LC 9:26). This
contrast originates in the Third Critique, which begins by distinguishing pure
judgments of taste from empirically conditioned judgments of the agreeable-
ness of tastes, smells, and isolated colors. For Kant, both judgment types are
“aesthetic” in the sense of pertaining to sensibility, but only pure judgments of
taste carry a legitimate claim to necessity. We do not expect others to agree with
our judgments of the agreeableness of wine or coffee, because such likings
24 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
reflect our subjective idiosyncrasies. Hence, while beauty and the agreeable
alike give rise to pleasure, the modal status of the judgments is different. The
agreeable has an actual relation to pleasure, whereas the judgment of the
beautiful claims that relation to be necessary (CPJ 5:236).29
Wittgenstein’s usage of the term agreeable [angenehm] corresponds to its
Kantian sense of being an empirically conditioned response of liking and hence
“merely subjective” (BBB, 48; see CPJ 5:206). Also, his examples of the
agreeable, such as the smell of a flower, the taste of coffee or roast beef, and
isolated colors, match those employed by Kant (LC 9:13–26; LA II:1–3; CPJ
5:212). For Kant, such features belong to the material side of the object and
elicit empirically conditioned responses in us. By contrast, the universally valid
judgment of beauty concerns features that manifest a priori forms of intuition,
such as the design of a painting or the formal structure of a musical composition
(CPJ 5:223–226).
Fourth, like Kant, Wittgenstein juxtaposes the agreeable with the formal
features of objects of aesthetic appreciation. He states:
So to say King Lear is “agreeable” is like saying a chair has a smell. King
Lear is a very complex experience, & this is about the least important thing
you could say about it.
But now you might say: Surely people who have said that the beautiful is
the agreeable, can’t have been such absolute asses as to overlook this? There
must be some truth in it.
Suppose one talks of a beautiful color. To say this has 100 meanings,
& which way we use it depends on what we’re talking about. If I say
of a flower “Isn’t this a marvellous colour?” I mean something quite
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different from if I shew a painted pattern, where it may mean “is good for
a wall-paper.” (LC 9:16)
This passage confirms Kant’s analysis of the difference between the agreeable
and the beautiful. While smells and isolated colors may be pleasing, only form
opens up the possibility of free contemplation. Wittgenstein’s choice for an
example of the latter, namely, a pattern suitable for wallpaper, is all the more
striking given that Kant is famous for using the very same example and has been
ridiculed for doing so (CPJ 5:229; see LC 9:20). But if the objective is to
illustrate how form can be seen as purposive without any purpose, then it is hard
to find a better example. Absolute music, discussed extensively by Wittgenstein
and mentioned by Kant as an example of free beauty, is a similarly germane
29
Interestingly, both Henry Allison and Paul Guyer interpret Kant’s argument as an appeal to
linguistic usage, thus foreshadowing Wittgenstein’s later approach: unlike expressions of the
agreeable, the language of beauty is inherently normative (Guyer 1997, 119–123; Allison 2001,
103–104).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 25
30
Neither Kant nor Wittgenstein uses the term “absolute music” (i.e., music without text or
program). However, Kant’s text clearly indicates that he refers to music without extramusical
subject matter. Wittgenstein, in turn, expresses reservations about the possibility of smoothly
uniting the text with the musical form and focuses on the formal features of music (see RPP1
§545; Wittgenstein 2022, 90).
31
The centrality of formal features of art for Wittgenstein has been discussed in, for example,
Schroeder 2001; Schulte 2004; Appelqvist 2019a.
26 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
The question of Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?
Is “This bass moves too much” a psychological statement? Is it about
human beings?
If we ever we come to: I like this; I don’t, there is an end of Aesthetics; &
then comes psychology. (LC 9:27)
Rather than making a statement of actual fact, my aesthetic judgment of the bass
line makes a normative claim about how the base line should be constructed.
32
On Wittgenstein’s empirical experiments with rhythm, see Guter 2020.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 27
authority rests on a misleading analogy arising from our language, similar to the
case of thinking that the floor on which we stand is not solid because it consists of
electrons. Contrary to the received view of Wittgenstein’s later thought, personal
experiences need not be merely subjective. This is, of course, the very point of
Kant’s distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful. While both are
grounded in personal experiences, the former are merely subjective, whereas
the latter are universally valid in spite of their subjective ground in virtue of being
grounded in disinterested contemplation of form.
Despite the fact that the notion of the beautiful fades into the background in
Wittgenstein’s later remarks on aesthetics, he never abandons his critical stance
on the reduction of the aesthetic to agreeableness. As late as in 1947, he writes:
The “necessity” with which the second thought succeeds the first. (Overture
to Figaro.) Nothing could be more idiotic than to say it is “agreeable” to hear
one after the other. – But the paradigm according to which all this is right is
certainly obscure. “It is the natural development.” You gesture with your
hand, would like to say: “of course!” (CV, 65 [57]; translation altered)
28 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
looking for, namely, “utterances inside an aesthetic system” (LC 9:40). For just
as words and sentences become meaningful only within the grammatical system
to which they belong, aesthetic problems and solutions thereof emerge only
within an aesthetic system. This is because there are grammatical and hence
normative relations within such a system, similar to the relations that hold
between questions and answers, judgments and their justifications, and fear or
hope, say, and their intentional objects. Grammatical relations are necessary
in that they could not fail to obtain: a question is in part constituted by the range
of possible answers, a judgment by the reasons one can evoke to support it,
and so on.
The alignment between grammatical and aesthetic systems is particularly
salient in Wittgenstein’s treatment of his favorite aesthetic example, music. Like
numbers that do not refer to any mathematical objects, musical notes and chords
33
On Kant’s quest for such a standard for judgment in general, see Floyd 1998.
34
On Wittgenstein’s conception of mathematical investigation, see Floyd 2000 and Säätelä 2011.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 29
You misunderstand me: I know why you suggested that; you think this is what
I meant to say, but it wasn’t.
It’s not: this does not produce feeling I want to produce. (LC 9:30)
object but also between intentions and their expressions, whether linguistic or
musical.
That music is constituted by rules does not entail that those rules determine
the specific content of musical expressions or aesthetic judgments about music.
In fact, it entails the exact opposite. This is because Wittgenstein’s reason
for underscoring the notion of a rule – both in philosophy of language and
aesthetics – is intended as a guard against naturalistic explanations of meaning
and understanding. If the aesthetic choices made by the composer in writing
music, the musician in performing it, or the listener in judging it aesthetically
reflected empirical regularities, then the aesthetic domain would be closer to
a natural mechanism. But since aesthetic choices are made within a system of
conventional rules, we can treat those choices as grounded in reasons and in that
sense intentional rather than mechanistic. In other words, the sort of normativity
that lies at the core of Wittgenstein’s approach and is expressed by reference to
the notion of a rule goes hand in hand with intentionality and hence freedom, at
least when freedom is understood in the Kantian sense of responsiveness to
reasons we give to ourselves (see Allison 1986; Allison 1990, 204–207). But
this just means that the Kantian contrast between nature and freedom, which
I argued to underpin Wittgenstein’s early ethics, is still discernible in his middle
period. Now the contrast emerges in Wittgenstein’s distinction between the
normatively laden beautiful over the causally induced agreeable and in his
emphasis on reasons over causes in aesthetic explanations.
As indicated by the disagreement between Brahms and Joachim,
Wittgenstein is open to the possibility of genuine aesthetic disagreements.
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music but aim at realizing different expressive possibilities that lie within the
musical system. This implies that, in addition to the aesthetic system providing
the necessary framework for aesthetic judgments, those judgments incorporate
a personal element – a moment of endorsement, as it were, that reveals some-
thing about the musical thinking of its maker. As Wittgenstein says: “Every
artist has been influenced by others & shows (the) traces of that influence in his
works; but what we get from him is all the same only his own personality” (CV,
27 [23]).
For Wittgenstein, aesthetic discussions like the one between Brahms and
Joachim may reveal “something which might be called a difference of taste:
e.g., Yes, you always prefer slightly stronger contrasts, I always prefer slightly
weaker” (LC 9:4). Importantly, such a “difference of taste needn’t be as simple
as ‘I like this,’ ‘You like that,’” as it is in the case of the agreeableness of tastes
and smells (LC 9:4). In explaining the personal aspect involved in aesthetic
disagreements, Wittgenstein refers to aesthetic “ideals” (LC 9:18–22, 31–34).36
This notion, just like the notion of an aesthetic “paradigm,” functions as
a placeholder for the standard against which aesthetic judgments are made
and disagreements assessed. It is “like a norm of judgment,” as Joachim
Schulte notes (Schulte 2018, 227). Yet, Wittgenstein repeatedly states that it is
impossible to pin down what that ideal or paradigm actually is without turning
back to the aesthetic phenomenon itself (see LC 9:22; LA III:5; PI §537):
And the idea suggests itself that there must be a paradigm somewhere in our
mind, and that we have adjusted the tempo to conform to that paradigm. But
in most cases if someone asked me “How do you think this melody should be
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Getting closer to a given ideal takes place within an aesthetic system, which
includes the different aesthetic alternatives as possible moves one can make: “to
find what ideal we’re directed to, you must look at what we do” (LC 9:22).
Hence, aesthetic investigation is not unlike mathematical problem-solving. In
1941, Wittgenstein still writes:
Take a theme like that of Haydn’s (St. Antony Chorale), take the part of one of
Brahms’s variations corresponding to the first part of the theme, and set the
task of constructing the second part of the variation in the style of the first
part. That is a problem of the same kind as mathematical problems are. If the
36
Aesthetic ideals may be culturally shared, like the “ideal of Greek Sculpture,” but they may also
be personal (LC 9:24). When Wittgenstein states that “my ideal is a certain coolness,” he is not
talking about shared cultural norms but articulating his own aesthetic preference, albeit one
developed relation to the shared domain of the arts (CV, 4 [2]).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 33
solution is found, say as Brahms gives it, then one has no doubt; – that is the
solution.
We are agreed on this route. And yet, it is obvious here that there may
easily be different routes, on each of which we can be in agreement, each of
which we might call consistent. (RFM VII §11)
within the hierarchical structure of the scale. One would notice, for example,
that the note – the sixth of the scale, say – belongs to the subdominant chord and
hence takes the melody to a point of relative stability before it moves on to the
dominant or, alternatively, to the tonic.37 But importantly, the ultimate force of
the explanation resides in Wittgenstein’s claim that, if you did this exercise,
“you would see to which note the chord belongs” (LC 9:39). That is, you would
see (or hear) the place of the note within the system. Moreover, you would see
37
I deliberately talk about the scale (such as the major or the minor scale) rather than key (such as
G major). In my view, Wittgenstein’s musical examples are best understood in terms of the tonal
functions of the different scale degrees. These functions remain the same regardless of the
specific key in which the tune is written, as they reflect the overall shape of the scale that may be
transposed to any given key. Hence, when Wittgenstein says that “you would see to which chord
the note belongs,” he is not talking about, for example, the C major chord. Instead, he is drawing
attention to the harmonic function of the chord as, for example, the subdominant chord and
thereby to the tonal function of the individual, “necessary” note. It is possible to hear that
function, just as it is possible to hear whether the tune is in major or minor, without knowing the
specific key in which the tune is performed.
34 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
(or hear) that, unlike some other notes that one could dispense without too much
damage to the overall shape of the tune, the note in question fulfills a function
without which the tune would be incomplete.
In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, seeing was the mode of grasping that
aspect of language and reality which cannot be said. While we can express every
imaginable fact in language, we cannot express the form that makes linguistic
expression possible. Instead, we see the form directly in propositions of logic,
mathematical equations, and – as I suggested – in musical themes. The same
insight still informs Wittgenstein’s discussion in 1933, even if the focus now is
on aesthetic systems instead of an isolated tune resembling a tautology.38 The
moment of grasping the tonal function of the note within the scale, and hence
grasping the tune as an “organized whole” to which the note belongs, is the
moment where discursive justifications come to an end (LW1 §677). After the
exercise of writing the tune in chords, I must rely on my ability to see the note’s
necessity. Likewise, if I try to justify my aesthetic judgment of the note’s
necessity to others, I must appeal to their ability to see it for themselves. And
if, for some reason, you fail to see the note’s necessity and thus disagree with my
judgment, no rule-formulation will be sufficient to convince you. In aesthetics,
“A solution must speak for itself. If when I’ve made you see what I see, it
doesn’t appeal to you, there is an end” (LC 9:31).
38
Here, I disagree with Peter Hacker, according to whom the later Wittgenstein abandons his early
distinction between saying and showing, treats ethics and religion “naturalistically or anthropo-
logically as forms of life,” and presumes that “there is nothing ineffable about ethics, aesthetics
and religion” (Hacker 2001, 39).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 35
adjectives such as ‘beautiful,’ ‘fine,’ etc., play hardly any role at all” and repeats
the view that the word “beautiful” is all too easily misunderstood as a name of
a property (LA I:8,1; see LC 9:19). In spite of this heightened caution about the
term, the main insight motivating Wittgenstein’s earlier contrast between the
beautiful and the agreeable continues to dominate his discussion.39 He still
states: “I see roughly this – there is a realm of utterance of delight, when you
taste pleasant food or smell a pleasant smell, etc., then there is the realm of Art
which is quite different, though often you may make the same face when you
hear a piece of music as when you taste good food” (LA II:3). The two types of
judgments pertaining to sensibility are sharply contrasted despite the overlap in
their manifest expressions. Moreover, the key difference still resides in the
accountability of the judging subject, whose reasons for the judgment ought to
be relevantly related to the judgment and transparent to the subject. Connecting
aesthetic accountability to intentional action, Wittgenstein notes: “In a law-
court you are asked the motive of your action and you are supposed to know
it.. . . You are not supposed to know the laws by which your body and mind are
governed” (LA III:12; see LC 9:32; PI II §262). To know one’s motives does not
require introspective access to the contents of one’s mind. Rather, just as
grammar grounds the internal connections between motive and action, desire
and its fulfillment, or fear and its intentional object, aesthetic reasons arise
within the context to which the judgment belongs.
Given that aesthetic systems are autonomous and cannot be explained by
reference to another domain, the relevant kinds of reasons “are in the nature of
further descriptions” (LC 9:31). Sometimes, the explanations take the form of
comparisons between the aesthetic object and something else. One may find an
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39
Before the 2016 publication of Moore’s full notes from 1933, the notes from 1938 were the main
source on Wittgenstein’s aesthetics. This contributed, for example, to the mistaken view that
Wittgenstein rejected the notion of the beautiful altogether and hence took Kant’s aesthetics to
rest on a misunderstanding (see Lewis 1998, 21).
36 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
40
On Wittgenstein’s relation to conservatism in general, see, for example, Nyiri 1982 and Janik
1989, 40–58.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 37
remarks on modal music. Its difference from later Western music is vast enough
to prevent understanding; yet, pointing to similarities between the modal and
modern keys may help one understand the former (LC 9:41; PI §535; RPP1
§639).
Another measure against an overly conservative conception of the arts
emerges in Wittgenstein’s remarks on artistic masterpieces and the notion of
a genius. According to him, we do not apply the terminology of correctness to
Beethoven’s music or Gothic Cathedrals, because these aesthetic phenomena
strike us as “tremendous” or “grand.”41 For Wittgenstein, Mozart and
Beethoven are the “actual sons of God,” and he does not shy away from passing
judgment on other composers (and thinkers) for their lack of genius (CC, 19).
Yet, in contrast with most romantic aestheticians, who took freedom from
conventions to be the essential mark of the genius, Wittgenstein has a more
balanced view of the relation between conventions and originality in art.
Distinguishing between character and talent, he claims that while those we
call genius have both, the role of character in them is more dominant: “Genius is
not ‘talent and character,’ but character manifesting itself in the form of
a special talent” (CV, 40 [35]; see CV, 41, 49–50, 75 [43, 65]).
One can find echoes of Schopenhauer’s as well as Otto Weininger’s ideas in
Wittgenstein’s notion of genius (cf. Weininger 1906, 103–113; Schopenhauer
1969, 184–195). Especially Schopenhauer was influenced by Kant, and Kant’s
conception of the works of genius (if not exactly his notion of genius itself)
carries over to Wittgenstein’s remarks. This is especially true regarding the
balance that both seek to find between artistic conventions and originality. For
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Kant, the genius provides original sensuous material for art, but that material
must be cultivated by taste, which is “the discipline (or corrective) of genius,
clipping its wings and making it well behaved or polished” (CPJ 5:319; see
5:310). This is because if the artist did not adhere to the rules of artistic
practices, his works would be unintelligible to others (CPJ 5:307–308).
This idea may be seen as prefiguring Wittgenstein’s later argument about
communally shared rules grounding the possibility of communication (PI
§§240–242).42
So when introduced to a given aesthetic field, be that poetry, tailoring, or
music, one must learn the rules constitutive of the practice. The possibility of
making and refining aesthetic judgments arises only via such immersion into
our shared form of life. At the same time, aesthetic judgments involve an
irreducibly subjective moment of seeing for oneself. Kant argued that there
41
On the “tremendous things in art,” see Schulte 1989; Tilghman 1991, 86–87; Lewis 1996; Tam
2002.
42
On Kant and Wittgenstein on genius, see Lewis 2005.
38 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
I have read a line with a peculiar attention; I am impressed by the reading, and
this makes me say that I have observed something besides the mere seeing
of the written signs and the speaking of words. I have also expressed it by
saying that I have noticed a particular atmosphere round the seeing and
speaking. (BBB, 177)
What the peculiar attention with which the line is read brings to focus is not the
words themselves or the propositional content they express. What is brought to
focus instead is the “atmosphere” round the sentence. Another metaphor he uses
is facial features. As noted, the metaphor of facial features appears already in the
Tractatus as an illustration of internal properties that show themselves but
cannot be said (TLP 4.1221). I do not think it is a coincidence that
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In the case of the word “correct” you have a variety of related cases. There is
first the case in which you learn the rules. The cutter learns how long a coat is
to be, how wide the sleeve must be, etc. He learns the rules – he is drilled – as
in music you are drilled in harmony and counterpoint. Suppose I went in for
tailoring and I first learnt all the rules, I might have, on the whole, two sorts of
attitude. (1) Lewy says: “This is too short.” I say: “No. It is right. It is
according to the rules.” (2) I develop a feeling for the rules. I interpret the
rules. I might say: “No. It isn’t right. It isn’t according to the rules.” Here
I would be making an aesthetic judgment about the thing which is according
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to the rules in sense (1). On the other hand, if I hadn’t learnt the rules,
I wouldn’t be able to make the aesthetic judgment. In learning the rules you
get a more and more refined judgment. Learning the rules actually changes
your judgment. (LA I:15)
III:1). When an apt object of comparison is found, one experiences a “click”: all
of a sudden the theme, seen in light of the comparison, makes sense (LA III:1).
A similar “click” of aesthetic satisfaction arises when a disturbing feature is
amended by finding the right rhythm, tempo, or accentuation for
a performance – when the aesthetic object is as it “should” be (LA II:9–10).
Yet, Wittgenstein notes,
What does it mean to say ‘It’s right’? Can I prove to anyone that it is?
You might say it means: I’m now satisfied; I’m in a state of equilibrium, not of
tension.
This may be a good metaphor, but there isn’t one feeling which character-
izes the thousand different cases of equilibrium. (LC 9:30–31)
43
On Wittgenstein’s notion of aesthetic reactions, see, for example, Lewis 1998; Säätelä 2002; Tam
2002.
44
One should not forget that Kant, too, mentions displeasure as an equally relevant response to an
aesthetically contemplated form (see CPJ FI 20:224).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 41
Why should we care about the subjective side aesthetic judgment? Why
does Wittgenstein claim that the aesthetic reactions of discontent, disgust,
or discomfort are perhaps the most important thing about aesthetics?
And why does he repeatedly bring up personal experiences such as the
“click” or “equilibrium” of aesthetic satisfaction as central for
aesthetic investigation, elsewhere compared to grammatical investigation?
Is not such a personal experience just a “wheel that can be turned though
nothing else moves with it” or a “beetle” in a box that “doesn’t belong to
the language game at all; not even as a Something” (PI §§271, 293; see
Makkai 2021, 56)? In Section 4.2, I will return to this question and argue
that this is not the case.
Kantians and other formalists have been apprehensive about the traditional
theories, because those theories seem to assign a subservient role to the specif-
ically artistic and aesthetic features of art, thereby undermining art’s autonomy.
For them, it is a mistake to assimilate the reception of the arts to the discursive
model of propositional knowledge. Art should be treated as an end in itself, and
the highest gains of art are taken to depend on art’s specifically artistic, formal,
or sensuous features. Nevertheless, Kant himself argues that pure judgments of
taste can contribute to cognition, but only and precisely in virtue of being
nonconceptual (CPJ 5:217, 5:287). That the formal features of art are capable
of revealing something essential about reality appears repeatedly in subsequent
German philosophy. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Friedrich
Schelling, Friedrich Nietzsche, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Theodor Adorno, as
well as the Austrian formalist Eduard Hanslick all imply, in their respective
ways, that art and especially music discloses something essential about the
world by its specifically artistic forms.
The notion of art’s extra-artistic content, which motivates the traditional
theories of artistic meaning and is still discussed by aestheticians, albeit in
a more specialized and fine-grained fashion, fits awkwardly with Wittgenstein’s
commitment to aesthetic autonomy. It is thus no surprise that he is critical of
each of the traditional accounts. Commenting on Tolstoy’s What is Art?, he
writes:
There is much that could be learned from Tolstoy’s false theorizing that the
work of art conveys “a feeling.” – And you really might call it, if not the
expression of a feeling, an expression of feeling, or a felt expression. And you
might say too that people who understand it to that extent “resonate” with it,
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respond to it. You might say: The work of art does not seek to convey
something else, just itself.. . .
And it does start to be really absurd, to say, the artist wishes that, what he
feels when writing, the other should feel when reading. Presumably I can
think I understand a poem (e.g.), understand it in the way its author
would wish, – but what he may have felt in writing it, that doesn’t concern
me at all. (CV, 67 [58–59])
The absurdity of treating the artist’s private feelings as the content of their art
lies in the fact that the two are only externally related to one another. We do
speak about understanding a poem as its author intended, but just as “it is only in
a language that I can mean something by something,” artistic intentions are not
independent of the medium of their expression (PI, 22, see PI §§243–248). As
explained above, for Wittgenstein, the musician’s intentions, thoughts, and
ideas are musical from the very beginning, related to music as the meaning of
“If it doesn’t rain, I shall go for walk” relates to the sentence (PI, 22; see PPF
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 43
§§35–51 [PI, vi]; LW1 §§373–382).45 Insofar as the intention is not captured by
its expression, it drops out of the picture as superfluous.
Wittgenstein’s remarks on the arousal theory similarly target the contingency
of the link between the work and aroused feelings:
It has sometimes been said that what music conveys to us are feelings of
joyfulness, melancholy, triumph, etc, etc. and what repels us in this account is
that it seems to say that music is an instrument for producing in us sequences
of feelings. And from this one might gather that any other means of producing
such feelings would do for us instead of music. – To such an account we are
tempted to reply “Music conveys to us itself !” (BBB, 178)
Like his criticism of confusing the beautiful with the agreeable, Wittgenstein’s
stance on the arousal theory has an almost ethical undertone. The failure to
appreciate art for its own sake in favor of merely subjective sensuous effects is
to subsume art to a mechanistic, causal model. If art is treated as a mere
instrument of producing effects – which is of course possible – then it becomes
redundant. Such effects could equally well be drawn from other resources. The
same argument may be extended to aesthetic cognitivism, according to which
art has both the ability and the purpose to provide propositional knowledge
about the world. While ostensibly nobler than sensuous pleasure or emotional
rush, potential cognitive gains of art could also be acquired by other and
probably more efficient means.
Wittgenstein’s arguments against the expression and arousal theories accord
with his later account of language, which similarly attacks the explanation of
meaning by reference to the mental acts, states, processes, or dispositions of the
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speaker or the listener (e.g., BBB, 21–22, 64; PR §§12–22; PI §§143–184, 437–
440). Wittgenstein is usually credited for questioning the relevance of mental
states for the constitution of meaning, but similar views can be found in the
history of aesthetics. The alignment of artistic intentions and their expressions
figures in Kant’s emphasis on the communicability of art and his characteriza-
tion of the artist’s “aesthetic ideas” as sensible representations of the imagin-
ation which “no language fully attains or can make intelligible” (CPJ 5:314; see
CPJ 5:307–308). The point is formulated even more sharply by Hanslick, who
rejects the expression theory of music by arguing that whatever “does not
become outwardly apparent is, so far as music is concerned, altogether nonex-
istent, but whatever has become apparent has ceased to be mere intention”
(Hanslick 1986, 36).
45
I use the 2009 edition of the Philosophical Investigations throughout this book. References to
“Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment” (PPF), which used to be known as Part II of
Philosophical Investigations, are cited from both the 2009 and 1958 editions. References to
the latter are given in square brackets.
44 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
The dismissal of the causal model of art’s reception is equally typical in the
Kantian tradition. Kant notes that if empirically conditioned pleasure “were all
that is at stake, then it would be foolish to be scrupulous with regard to the
means for providing ourselves with it” (CPJ 5:208). Wittgenstein makes the
same observation: “If we have a certain arrangement of colours & say it is
beautiful, & you suggest that what this means is that it gives us pleasure. I ask:
Why should we use so many different means to get pleasure?” (LC 9:18–19).
Hanslick reprimands listeners who voluntarily subject themselves to music’s
empirically conditioned effects and as a result ignore the specifically musical.
Such listeners treat musical works like “products of nature,” on a par with a fine
cigar or a spicy delicacy, and could equally well resort to using sulfuric ether
and chloroform (Hanslick 1986, 60; see BBB, 178; LC 9:20; LA II:2–3). Even
animals are influenced by music, but we do not treat their reactions as signs of
aesthetic understanding (Hanslick 1986, 61–62; see CPJ 5:210). Wittgenstein
uses the same illustrations. Juxtaposing art with nature, he notes that to seek
emotional effects from music is to treat music as a drug (BBB, 178). And he
distinguishes the understanding of music from its causal effects by reference to
animals: “We use the phrase ‘A man is musical’ not so as to call a man musical if
he says ‘Ah!’ when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog
musical if it wags its tail when music is played” (LA I:17).
It has been argued that Wittgenstein’s reasons for rejecting the expression and
arousal theories are exhausted by his rejection of reductionism and his anti-
Cartesian “anxiety” and that he should be open to other explanations of art’s
extra-artistic content.46 It has also been argued, originally by appealing to the
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46
For proposals on how Wittgenstein’s later view could be combined with art’s emotive content,
see Scruton 2004 and Hagberg 1995, 99–109.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 45
dance is what matters, it would be better that, rather than the music, were
performed. But that is all a misunderstanding. (CV, 79 [69])
This reduction, once again, gives the musical phrase a sovereign identity by
insisting that the content of music cannot be translated into another medium
without loss. Even if music resembles other phenomena, like gestures, facial
expressions, or dance steps, such resemblances do not warrant the ascription of
extramusical content to musical phrases or themes.47
That the content of music cannot be expressed in another medium without
loss is the core thesis of musical formalism. Hanslick, the main proponent of the
view, argues that while music resembles the dynamic of human emotions, it
does not have any specific extramusical subject matter. Instead, “the content of
music is tonally moving forms” (Hanslick 1986, 29). Hence, the use of emotive
terminology in our descriptions of music should not be read literally (30).
A similar view follows from Wittgenstein’s later conception of language.48 If
the meaning of words and sentences is their use within a linguistic context, then,
mutatis mutandis, musical notes, chords, cadences, and tunes acquire their
meaning from the role they have within the musical system. This is why it is
impossible to translate them it into pictures or words. For the same reason, in
order to explain the content of music, I can either describe the roles of the
musical elements within the system (“This is the dominant,” etc.), resort to
indirect descriptions or comparisons that aim at illuminating the musical phrase,
or else just whistle the tune.
In Section 3.2, I noted that just as the content of fear is partly constituted by its
intentional object, aesthetic judgments are internally related or “directed” to the
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47
Oswald Hanfling aptly describes the experience as a “hearing-as-if” experience (Hanfling 2004,
152).
48
Here, I disagree with Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin who call Hanslick the “voice of medioc-
rity” (Janik and Toulmin 1973, 35) and with Béla Szabados who contrasts Wittgenstein’s later
account of music with Hanslick’s formalism (Szabados 2014, 59–72, 87–97). On my reading, the
similarities between the two Viennese greats surpass the differences and reflect their shared
background in the Kantian tradition (see Appelqvist 2019a).
46 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
The same strange illusion which we are under when we seem to seek
something which a face expresses whereas, in reality, we are giving ourselves
up to the features before us – that same illusion possesses us even more
strongly if repeating a tune to ourselves and letting it make its full impression
on us, we say “This tune says something,” and it is as though I had to find
what it says. And yet I know that it doesn’t say anything such that I might
express in words or pictures what it says. And if, recognizing this, I resign
myself to saying “It just expresses a musical thought,” this would mean no
more that saying “It expresses itself.” (BBB, 166)
Since intransitive meaning resides in the structure of the sentence, in the exact
choice of its words and their order, it cannot be explained by any other means
except by repeating the sentence – a feature of language that Wittgenstein in
1931 connects with “the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy” (CV,
13 [10]). Intransitive meaning thus has a role analogous to Wittgenstein’s early
logical form, whose inexpressibility he illustrated by reference to facial features
and music (TLP 4.014, 4.1221).49
Art’s autonomy and the inadequacy of our discursive resources for explaining
the content of art are common commitments among Kantians and other formal-
ists. What is less common, though, is the extension of the idea to language,
typically treated as a means of communicating extralinguistic facts. While the
later Wittgenstein is famous for emphasizing the uses of language, he is also
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49
For discussions on intransitive meaning and aesthetics, see Johannessen 1990; Hagberg 1995,
99–117; Escalera 2012.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 47
language belongs to an activity. But this does not mean that we could
reductively explain language by reference to language-independent uses or
purposes (PI §§23, 496; see PI II §365). The activities, customs, institu-
tions, and our biological and social constitution, which together make up
our human form of life, are irreducibly intertwined with language from the
beginning. The objects we encounter, the thoughts we entertain, and the
actions we perform are all shaped by grammar. Besides, keeping in mind
the differences across the family of language-games, including artistic
ways of using language, we should not assume that in each case we will
find the sort of use that is characteristic of factual statements. As
Wittgenstein reminds us: “Do not forget that a poem, even though it is
composed in the language of information, is not used in the language-game
of giving information” (Z §160). Considering such creative and artistic
uses of language as making up stories, acting in a play, guessing riddles,
cracking jokes, solving arithmetic problems, cursing, or praying – all
48 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
music than what we hear in music itself (CV, 67 [58].). Besides, there is no
reason to think that specifically artistic forms of expression could not be part of
our expressive resources on their own terms: “If a theme, a phrase, suddenly
means something to you, you don’t have to be able to explain it. Just this gesture
has been made accessible to you” (Z §158).
50
On such interconnections, see, for example, Schulte 1993, 37–44; Guter 2017.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 49
point of the comparison still lies in the ineffability of the tune’s meaning (LC
8:66). Moreover, the linguistic objects of comparison for music are still formal
in character: a feature of a melody may be explained by comparing it with
a colon or by characterizing a musical phrase as an answer to what came before
(BBB, 166). However, in the Brown Book, the direction of the analogy between
language and music has reversed. When the 1915 remark promises that know-
ledge of logic will shed light on music, Wittgenstein now states:
What is remarkable about this statement, which later appears slightly reformu-
lated in the Investigations, is the suggestion that a proper grasp of musical
understanding will illuminate the key theme of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy,
the understanding of language (see PI §527).
In the Investigations, the question of understanding is formulated as
a question of following a rule. If linguistic meaning is best treated as the rule-
governed use of a word or a sentence within the context of a language-game,
then under what criteria am I entitled to say that I understand that meaning (PI
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§43)? It is not sufficient that my behavior conforms to the rule that is constitu-
tive of the game providing the context of the use. If I understand, then my
behavior ought to be internally related to the rule so that I can appeal to the rule
in explaining my application thereof. The rule is, as the traditional interpretation
notes, “involved in [my] activity as a reason or part of a reason for acting thus-
and-so” (Baker and Hacker 2009, 138). Otherwise it would make no sense to
talk about understanding, which is a normative notion standing in need of
a criterion to distinguish it from misunderstanding.
Setting aside the seeming dissimilarity between the outwardly passive music
listener and the speaker of language, the way in which the rule-following
problem is formulated closely resembles the case of aesthetic judgments and
their justification, discussed in Section 3.3.51 On what grounds am I entitled to
51
As indicated by his example of whistling a theme as an answer to the question of how it should be
played, Wittgenstein’s own take on the understanding of art includes a performative aspect (see
BBB, 166; LC I:12; CV, 80 [70]; PI II §178; Hanfling 2004, 157–160).
50 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this
chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one
contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying
behind it. For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping
a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of
application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going
against it.” (PI §201)
aesthetic reasons, “they are in the nature of further descriptions” of the original
rule (LC 9:30).
So if the mistake underlying the paradox is to equate understanding with an
interpretation, available to the speaker in the form of an explicit rule-
formulation, then what else is left? What does it mean to grasp the rule in
a way that is not an interpretation but not mere empirical regularity of behavior
either? Wittgenstein’s initial reply is formulated by reference to the notion of
a practice: “That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is
following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow
a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the
same thing as following it” (PI §202). However, without further explication, the
appeal to practice is open to various interpretations ranging from a reduction of
linguistic norms to practical utility to Kripke’s skeptical solution, namely, that
there is no norm beyond the consensus of the community upholding assert-
ability conditions (Kripke 1982, 74–79). Yet, neither language-independent
practices, nor communal consensus will explain the notion of understanding.
Consensus is an empirical, statistical notion, whereas understanding is
a normative one (PI §241).
Unlike causes, the chains of which continue indefinitely, reasons come to an
end. According to Wittgenstein, “Once I have exhausted the justifications,
I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say:
‘This is simply what I do’” (PI §217; see PI §§326, 482, 485). While there is
a scope of justifications available both in aesthetics and in language, these will
soon run out. In a way reminiscent of the Tractatus’s imagery of logic as the
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you in the sense in which we are expected to know our motives for action, you
must personally endorse it (LC 9:31; LA III:12). The “appeal” in question is not
a psychological notion, but already incorporates a normative pull: you “try to
clear up circumstances; & in the end what you say will appeal to the judge” (LC
9:32). But if, in spite of my efforts to demonstrate the note’s necessity, “it does
not appeal to you, there is an end” (LC 9:31). Taking my lead from
Wittgenstein’s statement that the understanding of a sentence is like the under-
standing of a musical tune, I want to suggest that this “end” of aesthetic reasons
gives us the most viable model for what he means by blind rule-following.
Wittgenstein is not the first to ask how it is possible to apply a rule to
a particular case. Nor is he the first to connect the moment of blind rule-
following (i.e. rule-following without a conceptually formulated justification),
to practice and to aesthetic judgment. We find a version of the rule-following
problem already in Kant’s First Critique (CPR A132–136/B171–175).
Moreover, as some commentators have noted, Wittgenstein’s rule-following
paradox resembles Kant’s treatment of the problem.52 Indeed, the theme is as
central for Kant as it is for Wittgenstein. This is because, in every cognitive
judgment, a general rule, which for Kant is typically a concept, is applied to
a sensible intuition. Without intuitions, concepts are empty, and without con-
cepts, intuitions remain blind, as he famously states (CPR B75). Understanding
as the faculty of rules is not yet capable of applying those rules to concrete
particulars, because to justify the application of a rule by reference to a further
rule will only lead to an infinite regress (CPR A133). Hence, Kant claims, in
order to apply the rules in concreto and to distinguish which particulars fall
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under their scope, understanding needs help from the power of judgment,
which, in the First Critique, is introduced as the faculty of subsuming intuitions
under conceptual rules. The power of judgment is developed by concrete
training and by means of examples. But while training and the imitation of
others can provide a “limited understanding of the rules,” ultimately “the
faculty of making use of them correctly must belong to the student himself”
(CPR A133).
Now consider the student in the Investigations, learning the rule governing
the series of natural numbers. Wittgenstein writes: “At first, perhaps, we guide
his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but then the possibility of communica-
tion will depend on his going on to write it down by himself” (PI §143). He
continues: “Let us suppose that after some efforts on the teacher’s part
he continues the series correctly, that is, as we do it. So now we can say that
52
See Cavell 1969, 88–96; Bell 1987; Glock 1996, 326; Haugeland 1998, fn 4; Eldridge 2004;
McDowell 2009, 110; Baz 2016.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 53
At this point, one might object that escaping the regress of conceptual
justifications is not much comfort if we fall back on something as foggy as
aesthetic judgment. Surely such a move must undermine Wittgenstein’s core
commitment to the normativity of grammar, not to mention conflict with his
rejection of a private language. The concern would indeed be warranted if
Wittgenstein’s account of aesthetic judgment were empiricist, reducing the
aesthetic judgment to mere feelings of approbation. However, as argued in
Section 3.2, Wittgenstein rejects just such a view in favor of the Kantian
conception of aesthetic judgment, which assumes that pure aesthetic judgments
are universally valid and make a justified claim to necessity in spite of relying
on feeling. Even without an established conceptual rule, the judgment of beauty
is offered “as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce” in the
form of an explicit rule-formulation (CPJ 5:237).
What Kant is ultimately after in the Third Critique is reassurance of our right
to think of “the particular as contained under the universal” when the fit between
the general conceptual rule and the sensible particular cannot be justified by
54 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
appeal to further concepts (CPJ 5:179). Cognitive judgments need not remain
paralyzed in the face of the infinite regress of rules on the application of rules,
because the particular intuition and the concept are united by a feeling of
appropriateness – a feeling that finds its paradigmatic manifestation in
a judgment of beauty. This is why Kant claims that in a judgment of beauty
we find something that is “requisite for possible cognitions in general” (CPJ
5:290; see CPJ 5:286–287).53
A point that often goes unnoticed is that the sections usually treated as
Wittgenstein’s discussion of how the rule can determine its correct application
are immediately preceded by a remark on music (PI §§185–242). In section 184,
Wittgenstein gives a musical version of the more well-known mathematical
example of the rule-following problem (PI §§143–149). He writes:
I want to remember a tune, and it escapes me; suddenly I say “Now I know it,”
and I sing it. What was it like suddenly to know it? Surely it can’t have
occurred to me in its entirety in that moment! – Perhaps you will say: “It’s
a particular feeling, as if it were now there” – but is it now there? Suppose
I then begin to sing it and get stuck? – But may I not have been certain at that
moment that I knew it? So in some sense or other it was there after all! – But
in what sense? Perhaps you would say that the tune was there if, for example,
someone sang it through, or rehearsed it in his imagination from beginning to
end. I am not, of course, denying that the statement that the tune is there can
also be given a quite different sense – for example, that I have a bit of paper on
which it is written. (PI §184)
The challenge of knowing the tune is in many ways like that of grasping the rule
determining the series of natural numbers (PI §143). Individual performances of
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the tune are, as it were, applications of the rule that determines whether
a particular performance counts as a performance of that tune (just as the
rule constituting the use of the word “table” determines what particular things
are correctly called tables). Also Wittgenstein candidates for the criterion of
knowing the tune – a particular feeling, performance, a mental image, etc. – to
be rejected as unsuccessful, correspond to the mathematical example (see PI
§§147–155).
But importantly, the example of the tune immediately evokes the moment at
which justifications given by rule-formulations come to an end. For what would
a rephrase or an alternative expression of the tune, given as an interpretation of
the original, look like? While I can try and justify my claim to knowledge of the
tune by writing it down on the bit of paper Wittgenstein mentions or by
analyzing the tune in terms of tonal functions, such explanations capture the
53
On the contribution of reflective judgment in cognition, see, for example, Bell 1987; Ginsborg
1997; Allison 2001, 150–155, 176–177.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 55
tune in a “quite different sense” (PI §184). For to know a tune is also to have
a hold of its internal, purposive unity, to have a grasp of the “completeness of the
tune” (NB, 40).
Later in the text, Wittgenstein returns to the parallel between understanding
a sentence and a musical tune, offering a revised version of the Brown Book
remark:
The import of the remark is threefold. First, music and language alike are
systems constituted by autonomous rules that cannot be justified by reference
to something external to those systems. Second, my understanding of a specific
expression (a chord, cadence, tune, word, or sentence) requires mastery of those
rules. Without such mastery, my responses will be like those of a dog that “wags
its tail when music is played” (LA I:17). And yet, third, that understanding
cannot be exhaustively explained by explicit rule-formulations, nor derived
from them. In language and music alike, I will reach a point where explanations
come to an end, where “I’d not be able to say” (PI §527; emphasis added). After
the explanations, examples, and exercises that are part of my immersion into the
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54
Bell 1987, 239–244; see also Moore 2007 and 2011.
56 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
end the regress of rules. Claiming that the feeling thus postulated is not a proper
act of judging but an “object of fantasy,” she argues that Bell’s interpretation
leads to an illusory notion of self-determining rules (Makkai 2021, 54). Without
a “separate explanation or elaboration,” an immediate act of seeing or feeling
cannot “bear the explanatory weight for which it is invoked,” which is what
Wittgenstein, on Makkai’s reading, aims to expose (56).55 In my view,
Wittgenstein’s attention to aesthetic judgment, and especially its difference
from merely subjective feelings, is meant to provide just the sort of separate
explanation of the validity of a judgment grounded in a feeling that Makkai
finds missing. Makkai’s argument relies on the claim that the feeling of the
applicability of a rule is not a proper act of judging (54). But the aesthetic
judgment is an act of judging, albeit one that involves no concepts and hence is
“blind” in Kant’s sense of the term. Moreover, since aesthetic judgment
55
For another critical take on Bell’s argument, see Sullivan 2011.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 57
involves reasons which I must personally endorse, blind rule-following does not
entail that “I am relieved of responsibility” as Makkai suggests (60).
Just as an aesthetic judgment is not detached from their object, intransitive
understanding of a sentence, manifest in seeing or feeling the form of the
sentence, is not detached from the rules of grammar. It is not a causally induced
response to the sentence, where no norms are involved (PI §289). The point is
rather that, at the boundary of the game, I do not look for yet another justifica-
tion, but rely on my feeling of the formal purposiveness of the rule-governed
language-game as a whole. It makes no sense to ask for a justification for the
grammatical proposition “Every rod has a length,” as this is what I must take for
granted in the game of measuring (PI §251). Yet I may experience the clicking
together of the parts of that game and come to see how the grammatical
proposition is, as it were, the missing piece of the puzzle. It makes the game
complete in a way that allows for the realization of various purposes within the
game, in spite of having no purpose to be established from without. The
situation is like grasping the necessity of the note as part of a melody. While
I must see or hear that necessity, this can only happen by turning my attention to
the formal features of the melody made possible by the rules of the musical
system. This formalistic emphasis on shared rules is vital for the possibility of
communication. And while there is more room for disagreement in the domain
of aesthetics in comparison to measuring, say, we must accept something as
a given in both cases. If you fail to see the unshakeable certainty of “Every rod
has a length” or refuse to accept that “This is where the cadence comes to an
end,” our possibility of understanding one another soon comes to an end.56
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the explanation to appeal to you and to become a reason for you, you must see or
feel the “click” between a particular feature and the system. In this respect, the
grasp of the “necessity,” “rightness,” or “wrongness” of an aesthetic feature
involves an irreducibly subjective moment of endorsement.
In 1933, Wittgenstein asks: “Are the same sort of reasons given elsewhere
except in Ethics?” His answer is: “Yes; in philosophy” (LC 9:32). The obvious
similarity between aesthetics and philosophy is that for Wittgenstein, just as for
Kant, both are qualitatively different from natural sciences. Both Kant and
Wittgenstein argue that philosophical illusions, manifest most notably in meta-
physics, arise from our failure to properly distinguish between factual state-
ments and the conditions of those statements (BBB, 18; RPP I:949; Z §458; PI
§90; CPR A295–302/B352–359). For the early Wittgenstein, this means
a failure to distinguish between the form and content of language; for the later
Wittgenstein, between what people say and the grammar that makes
saying something possible (TLP 3.323–3.33, 4.113–4.1212; PI §240–242).
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 59
That philosophy does not aim at establishing new facts but turns to reflect the
possibility of that which we already know is one of Wittgenstein’s most firmly
held beliefs from the very beginning. In the Tractatus, he states that “philosophy
is not a body of doctrine, but an activity”; it “does not result in ‘philosophical
propositions,’ but rather in the clarification of propositions” (TLP 4.112; see
TLP 4.0031; CPR A11–12/B24–26). And he reaffirms the correctness of his
view in the Investigations, noting that “It was correct to say that our consider-
ations must not be scientific ones.. . . All explanation must disappear, and
description alone must take its place” (PI §109; see TLP 4.111; LWL, 73–74;
PI §§124–128).
As in aesthetics, where the investigation begins from an aesthetic puzzle like
“Why is this note absolutely necessary?,” a philosophical puzzle arises from our
failure to grasp the “forms of language” (PI §111). A description of the musical
context of the note or of the language-game to which a word belongs allows us
to see how the note or the word contributes to the overall structure of that
organized whole (PI §§23, 43, 108). And just as in aesthetics, where an apt
comparison allows us to see how the pieces of the aesthetic puzzle fit together,
so too in philosophy the right object of comparison may reveal the source of our
philosophical confusion (PI §§130–131). The perspective or “overview” we
acquire from grammatical investigation reveals the similarities and differences
between language-games, but also the difference between what people say and
what they take for granted (PI §§122, 241–242). Instead of giving a reductionist
explanation of language, the resulting “surveyable representation produces
precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’”
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57
On the connection between aesthetics and the descriptive method, see, for example, Kuusela
2017; Schulte 2018; Moyal-Sharrock 2020.
58
Cavell’s work has heavily influenced the reception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and aesthetics
especially in North America. See, for example, Gibson and Huemer, 2004; Friedlander 2011a;
Hagberg 2008, 2018; Hagberg 2017; Sedivy 2016; Makkai 2021.
60 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Unlike the duck–rabbit picture, which stays the same while my impression of it
changes, the musical performance itself changes together with its tempo (PPF
§§130–131, 152 [PI, xi, pp. 196, 199]).
Drawing on Cavell, Avner Baz has explored Wittgenstein’s aspect-seeing as
a model for bringing together a concept and a particular. While acknowledging
the parallel, he argues that to expand Kant’s account of beauty to aspect-seeing
would be to “aestheticize . . . our ordinary and normal relation to our world”
(Baz 2016, 619). I agree, but on grounds different from Baz’s. Unlike Baz, who
denies the conceptuality of aspects, I take at least some aspects to be dependent
on the conceptual (see Baz 2020, 10–19). As Wittgenstein notes, “Sometimes
the conceptual is dominant in an aspect” (LW1 §582; see RPP1 §§70–74; PPF
§§139–140, 144 [PI, xi, 197]). However, this need not render the perception of
an aspect “objective,” at least if we take our lead from Kant as Baz does. This is
because the judgment of beauty is not, pace Baz, the only judgment Kant takes
to fall between objective empirical judgments and merely subjective likings (cf.
Baz 2016, 612). Teleological judgments are not objective in the sense of
determining particulars under given concepts. Yet, they involve concepts as
they attribute purposes to natural organisms. But for Kant, purposes are not
objective properties: it looks as if the purpose of the heart is to pump blood, but
from the viewpoint of theoretical reason we cannot claim to know this (CPJ
5:360–361; 5:370). This “as if” quality of teleological judgments and their
unique relation to concepts, might make them a more suitable point of compari-
son for Wittgenstein’s aspects as an “intermediate link” between aesthetic
judgments and ordinary empirical judgments (PI §122).
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But now it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is another
through which the world may be captured sub specie aeterni. It is – as
I believe – the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and
leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight. (CV, 7 [5])
of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case
differently: that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures. I have
changed his way of looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at
this!”) (PI §144)
61
See, for example, TLP 4.023, 6.1221, 6.2321; PI §§37, 66, 72–74, 122, 340, 401, 483, 490, 578.
Wittgenstein and Aesthetics 63
availability of such expressible truths and does so from the very beginning. At
the same time, he acknowledges necessities we endorse as self-evident, such as
the superiority of living in harmony with the contingent facts of the world, the
necessity of a note having some pitch, or the unshakeable certainty of a rod
having some length (NB, 78; TLP 2.0131; PI §251; RFM III §39). These
necessities are formal. They are not statements about empirical reality, but
features of our way of encountering the world to be uncovered by turning to
look at what lies in front of our eyes.62 In this respect, the weight Wittgenstein
gives to the reflective perspective actually surpasses its role in Kant’s
philosophy.
Referring to Goethe’s study of plants – which in Goethe’s own judgment is
“entirely in the spirit of [Kant’s] ideas” (Cassirer 1945, 61) – Wittgenstein
writes:
62
On the relation between necessity and contingency in Wittgenstein and the difference with Kant,
see Moore 1997, 126–136.
64 The Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein
Goethe in Metamorphose der Pflanzen, suggests that all plants are variations
on a theme. What is the theme?
Goethe says “They all point to a hidden law.” But you wouldn’t ask: What
is the law? That they point, is all there is to it. (LC 9:33)
The final remark accords with Kant’s principle of the “lawfulness of the contin-
gent as such.” The lawfulness we see in beauty and in plants and other organisms
of nature cannot be explained by reference to empirical facts, as it essentially
depends on our own activity of looking at the phenomenon from the right
perspective. Returning to Goethe in 1947, Wittgenstein contrasts philosophical
investigation with factual investigation. Once again he highlights descriptions
and comparisons as essential for philosophy, and claims that Goethe aimed at
something similar. In his description of plants, Goethe aimed at showing “analo-
gies in their structure” and thereby established a “new order among these
descriptions” (RPP I §950; see PI §§73, 90, 132; PO, 133). Instead of explaining,
he is just describing and “saying: ‘Look at it like this’” (RPP I §950).63
For Wittgenstein, looking and seeing are not philosophically innocent
notions. Drawn from the aesthetic domain broadly conceived, they signify
a mode of grasping reality that cannot be pinned down by discursive explan-
ations. Yet, as Wittgenstein’s repeated instruction for philosophers to look and
see demonstrates, the kind of understanding they offer is vital for our grasp of
logical form and, later, grammar. This is why we cannot afford to dismiss
Wittgenstein’s interest in aesthetics as a secondary preoccupation, unrelated
to the philosophical core of his work. What he has to say about aesthetics,
understood as an investigation of the domain of sensibility in general, is
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63
On the affinities between Wittgenstein and Goethe, see Rowe 1991; Schulte 2003; Friedlander
2011b.
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David G. Stern
University of Iowa
David G. Stern is Professor of Philosophy and Collegiate Fellow in the College of Liberal Arts
and Sciences at the University of Iowa. His research interests include history of analytic
philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. He is
the author of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction (Cambridge
University Press, 2004) and Wittgenstein on Mind and Language (Oxford University Press,
1995), as well as more than 50 journal articles and book chapters. He is the editor of
Wittgenstein in the 1930s: Between the ‘Tractatus’ and the ‘Investigations’ (Cambridge
University Press, 2018) and a co-editor of the Cambridge Companion to
Wittgenstein (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2018), Wittgenstein: Lectures,
Cambridge 1930–1933, from the Notes of G. E. Moore (Cambridge University Press, 2016),
and Wittgenstein Reads Weininger (Cambridge University Press, 2004).