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INTRODUCTION

The steps required in a risk assessment :

‰ Hazard identification.
‰ Risk evaluation.
‰ Selection of suitable control measured.

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 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS (QRA)
CONCEPT
‰ What can Go Wrong ?
‰ What are the Causes ?
‰ What are the Consequences ?
‰ How Lilely Is It ?

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 QRA STEPS

‰ Hazard Identification
‰ Failure Frequency Estimates
‰ Consequence Analysis
‰ Event Probability Estimates
‰ Risk Calculations

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 OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

System
Description

Identify
Hazards

Analyze Analyze
Accident Accident
Causes Effects

Assess
Risks

Decision

Change No Change

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 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

‰ Phase 1 : Identify risks …. “I can only manage that which I know”.

‰ Phase 2 : Assess their significance …”Some are worse than
others.. Which ones?”
‰ Phase 3 : Develop options…”What can I do about it ?”
‰ Phase 4 : Decide what to do..”What things should I do..and in
what order ?”.

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 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

‰ Loss of Containment of Hazardous Materials in Process

Equipment.
‰ Equipment Failure and/or Malfunction
‰ Human Errors are Converted into Equipment/Process
Failures
‰ Typical Process Equipment Failures

• Vessel, Tank or Container Failures

• Pipe Work Rupture/Release
• Pressure Vessel Leaks
• Holes in Pipes
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 RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Answers these Fundamental Questions :

‰ What adverse events can happen ?

‰ How likely are these events to occur ?
‰ How severe would the consequences be if the events did occur ?

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 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Effect of Release :
‰ Fire - Jet, Pool and Flash Fires
‰ Explosion – Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion, Boiling
Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, Physical and confined
Explosions
‰ Toxic – Exposure Concentrations with Adverse Health Effects

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 HAZARDS COUNTER MEASURES
Non Hazardous Agent.
Substitution
Fail-safe Designs Less Hazardous Agent.

Remote Location
Warning Signals Isolation
Ventilation

Radiation Control
Continuous
Enclosure
Monitoring Devices Noise Attenuation

Preventive Maintenance
Hazard
Counter Interlocks
Measures

Energy Absorption Machine Guarding

Barricading
Access Limited

First-Aid and Rescue Ameliorate Energy

Hazard Sensing Devices Personal Protective Equipment Grounding

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 FAILURE FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

‰ Frequency of Equipment Failure

‰ Two Source Data Based Used :
¾ Fault or Event Tree Modelling
¾ Historical/Actual Failure Frequency Data

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 FAILURE RATE FOR PROCESS
PIPES
Pipe Diameter (inch) Mean failure Rate (per meter year)
1 1.9 x 10 -5
1.5 1.2 x 10 -5
2 9.3 x 10 -6

3 6.3x 10 -6

6 3.1 x 10 -6
8 2.3 x 10 -6

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 RISK CALCULATION

Combined of Consequence and likelihood of an

Incident Outcome to Provide a Measure Risk

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 RISK CALCULATION

‰ Risk is the chance of the loss of human life or serious injury,

loss of property, or damage to the environment measured in
terms of both probability or likelihood and consequence or
severity of the loss.
‰ Combined of Consequence and likelihood of an Incident
Outcome to Provide a Measure Risk.
‰ Risk can be represented by the relationship :

R=PxC

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 RISK CALCULATION CATEGORIES

‰ Risk Indices - single numbers or tabulations used to

convey risk criteria.
‰ Individual Risk – risk to a person in the vicinity of a
hazard.
‰ Societal Risk – risk to a group of people.

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 RISK EVALUATION

The steps of a simple risk evaluation are shewn in Figure 2.

‰ If the risk is not acceptable, we must seek appropriate
control measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable
level.
‰ If the risk is not significant, no additional measures are
required and the risk is under control.

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 SLR
S = The severity of the ultimate consequences
predicted
L = The likelihood of the ultimate consequences
developing given the safeguards that are currently
in place
R = The risk (per Risk Ranking Matrix) is a combination
of the likelihood and severity of the predicted or
ultimate consequences

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 RISK RANKING MATRIX
Figure 1 RISK RANKING MATRIX
SEVERITY OF M ajor Serious M inor Incidental
INCIDENT (1) (2) (3) (4)
(of CONSEQUENCES)
y PERSONNEL - Fatality or y PERSONNEL - One or m ore severe y PERSONNEL - Single injury, not y PERSONNEL - Minor or no injury,
perm anently disabling injury. injuries. severe, possible lost tim e. no lost tim e.

y ENVIRONM ENTAL - Significant y ENVIRONM ENTAL - Significant y ENVIRONM ENTAL - Release which y ENVIRONM ENT - Environm entally
release with serious off-site im pact release with serious off-site im pact. results in Agency notification or recordable event with no Agency
and m ore likely than not to cause Perm it violation. notification or Perm it violation.
im m ediate or long-term health y FACILITY - Major dam age to
effects. process area(s) at an estim ated y FACILITY - Som e equipm ent y FACILITY - Minim al equipm ent
cost greater than US$1m illion; 10 to dam age at an estim ated cost > dam age at an estim ated cost less
y FACILITY - Major or total destruction 90 days of downtim e. US$100,000; 1 to 10 days of than US$100,000; negligible
to process area(s) estim ated at a downtim e. downtim e.
cost > US$10 m illion; downtim e in
PROBABILITY OF excess of 90 days.
OCCURRENCE
(or LIKELIHOOD)
Frequent
(1)

Incident is likely to occur at this facility 1 1 2 4

within the next 5 years.

Occasional
(2)

Incident is likely to occur at this facility 1 2 3 5

within the next 15 years.

Seldom
(3)

Incident has occurred at a sim ilar 2 3 4 5

facility and m ay reasonably occur at
this facility within the next 30 years.
Unlikely
(4)

Given current practices and 4 5 5 5

procedures, incident is not likely to
occur at this facility.

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Legend: 1 - Very high risk; recom m endation required 4 - Possible risk; recom m endation at descretion of team .
2 - High risk; recom m endation required 5 - Negligible risk
3 - Significant risk; recomm endtion required
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 Risk Magnitude

Unacceptable Risk
- Fatality
- Probability > 1 x 10 -4

Tolerable Risk

Negligible Risk

Principle of ALARD (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)

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 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FFA)

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 FTA SYMBOLS

Top Event

Output

Or Gate
Input

And Gate :

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 FTA SYMBOLS

Basic Event

Intermediate Event

Undeveloped Event :

Transfer Symbol

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 FAULT
FAULT TREE
TREE NO
LIGHT

SYSTEM
SYSTEM
OR
NO POWER
Bulbs WITH
LIGHT SWITH
Failed
BATTERY LIGHT BULB
BULB #2
CLOSED
SWITCH
#1
LEFT
OPEN
OR
AN
D

BULB # 1 BULB # 2
OUT OUT COMMON BATTERY
WIRE DEAT
SWITCH BROKEN

OR OR

BULB # 1 BULB # 1 BULB # 2 BULB # 2

BURNED LOOSE BURNED LOOSE
OUT OUT

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 CONTOH 3 :

1
4

2 6

5
3

“ Series – parallel reliability sytem”

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 NO Output
efen ‡ 6

OR

No Input Failure

event ‡ 6 event ‡ 6

OR
AND

No Output No.Output
event ‡ 4 event ‡ 5

etc etc
OR

etc etc

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 Pressure Overpressure
Pressur (Explosion)
Switch
e
Alarm
at
Setting Solenoid value
P > PA

RR ee aa cc tt o
o rr Setting Pressure Alarm
FF ee ee d
d
S
So o ll ee n noo ii
d
d Normal Operasi.
V
V aa ll vv ee

Failure Data :
• Probability failure Pressure Switch = 0,13 /
yr
• Probability failure Pressure Alarm = 0,04 /
yr
34 • Probability failure Solenoid Value = 0,34 /
yr
 Tabel 1. Failure Rate Data For Varions Selected Process Components
Instrument Faults / year
Controller 0.29
Control valve 0.60
Flow measurement (fluids) 1.14
Flow measurement (solids) 3.75
Flow switch 1.12
Gas – liquid chromatograph 30.6
Hand valve 0.13
Indicator lamp 0.044
Level measurement (liquids) 1.70
Level measurement (solids) 6.86
Oxygen analyzer 5.65
pH meter 5.88
Pressure measurement 1.41
Pressure relief valve 0.022
Pressure switch 0.14
Solenoid valve 0.42
Stepper motor 0.044
Strip chart recorder 0.22
Thermocouple temperature meas 0.52
Thermometer temperature meas 0.27
Valve positioner 0.44
Selected from Frank P.Lees Prevention in the Process Industries
(London : Butterworths, 1986)
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 Failure
rate Reliability Failure
Component (faults/yr R= e - μt Probability
) P=1-R
μ

1. Pressure Switch #1 0.14 0.87 0.13

2. Alarm Indicator 0.044 0.96 0.04

3. Pressure Swith #2 0.14 0.87 0.13

4. Solenoid Valve 0.42 0.66 0.34

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 Overpressur of TOP Event
Reactor

P =
A 0.0702
R = 0.9298

Failure of Alarm Failure of Emergency

Indicator Shutdown
P = P =
C 0.1648 C 0.4258
R = 0.8352 R = 0.5742

Pressure Pressure Solenoid

Pressure
Indicator Switch 2 Valve
Switch 1
Light Failure Failure
Failure
Failure
1 2 3 4
P = 0.13 P = 0.04 P = 0.13 P = 0.34
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R = 0.87 R = 0.96 R = 0.87 R = 0.66
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 Storage Sphere Release Scenarios

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Effects of Thermal Radiation

Radiation intensity
(kW/m2) Observed effect (World Bank)

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

25 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposures (nonpiloted)
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting of plastic tubing
9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8s;second degree burns after 20s
4 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however
blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely;0: lethality
1.6 Will cause no discomfort for long exposure

The time for which the radiation is experienced is a major factor in determining the consequences:

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FLAMMABLE MODELLING
THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CALCULATED
OVERPRESSURE LEVELS
Pressure
(psig) Damage Produced by Blast (Clancy)
0.02 Annoying noise (137 dB if of low frequency 10-15 Hz)
0.03 Occasional breaking of large glass windows already under strain
0.04 Loud noise (143 dB), sonic boom glass failure
0.1 Breakage of small windows under strain
0.15 Typical pressure for glass breakage
0.3 "Safe distance" (probability 0.95 no serious damage beyond this value); projectile limit; some damage to
house ceilings; 10% window glass broken
0.4 Limited minor structural damage
0.5-1.0 Large and small windows usually shattered; occasional damage to window frames
0.7 Minor damage to house structures
1.0 Partial demolition of houses, made uninhabitable
1-2 Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminum panels, fastenings fail, followed by
buckling; wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown hi
1.3 Steel frame of clad building slightly distorted
2 Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses
2-3 Concrete or cinder block walls, not reinforced, shattered
2.3 Lower limit of serious structural damage
2.5 50% destruction of brickwork of houses
3 Heavy machines (3000 1b) in Industrial building suffered little damage; steel frame building distorted and
pulled away from foundations
3-4 Frameless, self-framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage tanks
4 Cladding of light industrial buildings ruptured
5 Wooden utility poles snapped; tall hydraulic press (40,000 1b) in building slightly damaged
5-7 Nearly complete destruction of houses
7 Loaded train wagons overturned
7-8 Brick panels, 8-12 in. thick, not reinforced, fail by shearing or flexure
9 Loaded train boxcars completely demolished
10 Probable total destruction of buildings: heavy machines tools (7000 lb) moved and badly
damaged, very heavy machine tools (12,000 lb) survived
300 Limit of crater lip
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The significance of radiation levels is listed below:
 To Spare Pump
Valve No.1
is relocated
Open

Press 6,8 kg/cm2

Temp 580 C

Simplified Piping & Instrumentation Diagram For Butane Facility

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 HAZOP WORKSHEET
Facility : Butane Facility.
Node : Butane Accumulator to Suction Pump No.5
Parameter : Leak.
Guide S L R
Word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Recommendations
H M H

More More Leak 1.Line leak between Vapour Cloud Isolation H M H 1.Relocate Valve
bottom Accumulator dispersion of valve No.1 No.1 to the bottom
and suction Pump Butane lead to will be of Accumulator to
No.5 potential fire and difficult to easily isolate leak
2.Valve No.2 explosion due to close due to at on pipe line, or
passing during ignition sources, high location, passing on Valve
strainer clea ning of such as furnace, and valve no.2 during strainer
Pump No.5 electrical motor. No.2 will be cleaning of Pump
difficult to No.5
closed due to 2.Install Blind and
potential icing provide LOTO for
during Butane valve no.2 during
release. strainer cleaning of
Pump no.5
3.Install steam
curtain in front of
Furnace which is
activated by gas
detector in case of
Butane release to
prevent potential
fire or explosion..
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 Vapor Cloud Dispersion Model

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Radiation Vs Distance of Butane Fire

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Overpressure Vs Distance of Butane Fire

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 Pre Fire Planning Of Butane Release

12,5 kW/m2_
4 kW/m2
2 3
37,5 kW/m2
1

Furnace

Fire Hyddrant

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