CCP Report Final Version

100 YEARS OF SUPPRESSION:
THE CCP'S S T R AT E G I E S I N
T I B E T, T H E U YG H U R R EG I O N,
AND HONG KO N G
REPORT
N E W YO R K ,
AUGUST 2021
Prepared by:
Human Rights Foundation

Center for Law and Democracy
350 Fifth Avenue, #4202
New York, NY 10118
hrf.org
1
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
01 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
03 INTRODUCTION
04 BACKGROUND
China & the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Regime Type: China Under Xi Jinping
Tibet
Uyghur Region
Hong Kong
16 S U P P R E S S I O N TAC T I C S
17 Broken Promises: Political Disenfranchisement
Tibet: Unwarranted Interference
Uyghur Region: The Impossibility of Power Sharing
Hong Kong: The Fallacy of “One Country, Two Systems”
23 Tightening the Iron Grip: Crackdowns, Detainment, and Torture

Tibet: Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Religious Individuals
Uyghur Region: Quelling Civil Unrest Through Brute Force
Hong Kong: Behind Bars for Protecting the Truth
31 Precipitous Erasure: Cultural Suppression

The Dilution of Cultural Identity
Tibet: Sinicization of Tibetan Heritage
Uyghur Region: Destroying the Uyghur Identity
Targeting the Next Generation: Educational Interference
Tibet: The Power of Language and Textbooks
Uyghur Region: Chinese Language Promotion
Hong Kong: Looming Guidelines and Bans
42 Religious Repression
Systematic Destruction of Religious Institutions
Tibet: Dismantling of Religious Establishments
Uyghur Region: The Ruination of Religious Infrastructure
Doctrinal Manipulation
Tibet: Disruption of Religious Protocols and Reincarnations
Uyghur Region: Appropriating Islamic Texts
TA B L E O F C O N T E N T
The Disruption of Daily life

Tibet
Tightening Religious Expression
Curfews and Bans on Public Gatherings
Uyghur Region
Restricting Religious Behavior in Everyday Life
Reducing the Religiosity Among Youth
57 Surveillance in an Orwellian Society

Offline Surveillance
Tibet: Community Infiltration and Heavy Monitoring
Uyghur Region: The Creation of a Police State
Hong Kong: Emerging Espionage
Online Surveillance
Tibet: Plugged In but Disconnected from the World
Uyghur Region: Building a Digital Panopticon
Hong Kong: Intensified Fears
72 An Assault on Freedom of Movement

Tibet: A Myriad of Restrictions, Both Inbound and Outbound
The Uyghur Region: No One In or Out
Hong Kong: An International Hub, No More
78 The Uyghur Genocide: An Intent to Erase

“Re-Education” Camps
The Commodification of Uyghur Lives: The Ubiquitous Use of Forced Labor
Reducing Regenerative Capacity: IUDs, Sterilization, and Mass Birth Prevention
86 CONCLUSION
88 R E C O M M E N DAT I O N S
Recommendations for International Civil Society Organizations
Recommendations for Policymakers
Executive Summary
2021 marks the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the sole ruling party of China. In the past
several decades, the Chinese government has perpetrated some of the worst human rights abuses the
world has ever witnessed. The CCP’s worsening crackdown on fundamental freedoms and growing au-
thoritarian influence worldwide are of major concern to foreign leaders, concerned global citizens, and
international human rights advocates.
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the CCP’s ambitions, it is important to analyze both the
historical and current injustices perpetrated by the Chinese government, particularly in Tibet, Xinjiang1, and
Hong Kong — three regions where the CCP’s state-sanctioned policies appear to be the most widespread
and concerning.
The following are the main takeaways that are presented in this report:
1. The CCP aspires to create a society perfectly molded to the ideological tenets of Xi Jinping or what
the CCP refers to as the “Chinese Dream” and “national rejuvenation” — a society that is sinocentric,
socialist, and homogenous. Religious and cultural plurality are seen as hindrances to the CCP’s policy
of assimilation.2
2. Space for genuine political participation is nonexistent, despite promises of political autonomy. The
Chinese government’s rhetoric, which claims to safeguard “national security” and eradicate “terrorism,
separatism, and extremism,” is used as a pretext to hamper political involvement.
3. There is widespread use of brute force and mass crackdowns in all three regions. The latest crack-
downs in Hong Kong mirror the large-scale violence that is pervasive in Tibet and the Uyghur Region.
4. The Chinese government’s policies are designed to assimilate people in each focus region to be-
come “true patriots,” individuals who are fiercely loyal to the party. These policies are accomplished
through initiatives that target younger generations and aim to destroy cultural identity.
5. The incessant policing of religious practices has suffocated religious freedom in Tibet and the Uyghur
Region. The CCP uses repressive tactics to break down the links between Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan
heritage, and Islam and Uyghur identity. Religious repression is not as strong in Hong Kong at this time.
1 Xinjiang, officially called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China (XUAR), is referred to as the Uyghur Region throughout
the report.
2 Shaoying Zhang & Derek McGhee, Social Policies and Ethnic Conflict in China: Lessons from Xinjiang 44 (2014) at 96.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
6. The Chinese government uses an unprecedented amount of surveillance both online and offline to in-
vade people’s privacy. By tracking people’s speech, movement, and conduct, the government hopes
to police people’s behaviors and thoughts, and punish those who disagree with the regime.
7. The Chinese government severely limits freedom of movement among locals and foreigners. By pre-
venting people from entering or leaving the three regions, the government ensures that their residents
cannot access outside information and, by extension, democratic values.
8. The Uyghur genocide must serve as a warning to the international community. The genocide is a clear
indicator that the Chinese government will not stop until they have assimilated the Uyghur people so
that they align with the CCP’s goals and ideology.
9. The Chinese government’s tactics of repression are similar within all three regions, but vary in scope.
It is important to note that specific tactics are shaped by each region’s own unique histories, heritage,
and culture.
10. Suppression tactics are often refined and recycled. This is most evident when considering the expe-
riences of the Tibetan and Uyghur people, particularly with regards to their religious oppression and
surveillance. It is expected that the tactics used in Tibet and the Uyghur Region will be recalibrated and
used in Hong Kong in the future.
2
Introduction
HRF’s report, 100 Years of Suppression: The CCP’s Strategies in Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong,
highlights salient trends of human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese government in the three focus
regions. The purpose of this report is to provide a better understanding of the Chinese Communist Party’s
(CCP) state-sponsored repression against its own civilians in these areas.3 The report also presents recom-
mendations to international civil society organizations and policymakers on how to strategically counter
the CCP’s authoritarian influence, as well as how to safeguard fundamental human rights around the world.
To achieve this end, the report is divided into five parts.
In Section B, we provide background information about the CCP, along with a brief overview of the coun-
try’s political regime type. The section also introduces the three focus regions of this report — Tibet, the
Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong.
Section C lays out the Chinese government’s repressive tactics in all three regions and analyzes their
similarities and differences. Several tactics that the CCP relies on are identified in this section, including
political disenfranchisement; crackdowns, detainment, and torture; cultural suppression and educational
interference; religious repression; surveillance; and other severe limitations on fundamental freedoms. The
section ends with a focus on the Uyghur genocide.
Section D concludes how the Chinese government’s ideologies have led to widespread human rights vio-
lations, highlighting how various tactics and ideas have been transmitted across all three regions. It em-
phasizes how the Chinese government has acted with impunity for decades, and urges the international
community to no longer remain idle in the face of these atrocities.
Section E, the last section of the report, presents recommendations for international civil society organiza-
tions and policymakers on how to counter the CCP’s global threat to fundamental freedoms, and proposes
methods of how to uphold human rights.
3 The findings and analyses presented in this report are based on qualitative research due to limitations of accessing primary sources within
each region. It is important to note that it is virtually impossible for foreigners, independent researchers, and international NGOs to freely
enter Tibet and the Uyghur Region to obtain first-hand information and report on country conditions. In addition, it has become increas-
ingly dangerous for human rights advocates to enter Hong Kong and conduct critical investigations. As such, the report draws on existing
literature, current events, and shared narratives from activists abroad and those living in-exile. Due to the widespread human rights abuses
that are both historical and current, the findings of this report are by no means exhaustive. It is imperative to underscore that the CCP’s
campaign of persecution is ongoing.
3
Background
CHINA &
THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST
PARTY
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 and is currently the only ruling party of modern
China. The party maintains complete control over the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of
China’s government, as well as the economy, educational system, and military.4 The ideology of the
CCP is largely inspired by Marxism-Leninism, and consists of individuals who are primarily from the eth-
nic Han majority.
Chairman Mao Zedong was the founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which was es-
tablished on October 1, 1949. He inherited a land that was weakened and impoverished by two long-
fought wars. However, Mao strongly believed that through Marxist-Leninist derived tactics, he could
“achieve a Communist utopia through unity, physical labor, and sheer willpower.”5 His rhetoric champi-
oned an ideal known as “national rejuvenation,”6 a political and social aspiration to revitalize the country
after the trauma of the “century of humiliation,” which was left over from a series of historic wars dating as
far back as the 1800’s.7
4 Eleanor Albert, Beina Xu, and Lindsay Maizland, The Chinese Communist Party, Council on Foreign Relations (June 9 2020), https://www.cfr.
org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party.
5 Clayton D. Brown, US, Asia, and the World: 1914-2012: China’s Great Leap Forward, Asian Studies, 29 (2012), https://www.asianstudies.org/
wp-content/uploads/chinas-great-leap-forward-1.pdf.
6 Friso M.S. Stevens, China’s long march to national rejuvenation: toward a Neo-Imperial order in East Asia?, 17Asian Security, 46 (2021), DOI:
10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651.
7 Alison A. Kaufman, The “Century of Humiliation” and China’s National Narratives, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission Hearing on “China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy” (2011), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf.
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BACKGROUND
Within this context, the CCP capitalized on people’s fear of repeating the horrible past, in order to justify
having strong, centralized power under the guise of providing stability8 and cohesion. The CCP’s propa-
ganda served to appeal to the Chinese masses, and give the party legitimacy and justify its one-party
rule, as well as created a space for gross human rights violations to occur. Following this ideological narra-
tive, one-party rule was presented as the only way in which China can become a world power, otherwise it
might fall into “civil unrest, national turmoil, economic stagnation, and so forth.”9 In other words, the state
promulgated the idea that sacrifices must be made for the greater good of China. 10
Mao sought to realize his vision of “national rejuvenation” through political, social, and economic reforms.
His first and most notable program was the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in one of the largest fam-
ines in world history,11 during which an estimated 45 million people were starved and murdered between
1958-1961.12 Despite the clear failure of the economic plan, the Chinese government continues until this day
to deny the famine and resulting death toll, and refuses to acknowledge the long-lasting impacts the pro-
gram continues to have on communities throughout China.
When the PRC was founded it ensured that freedom of religion and equal rights were available to everyone
to provide the appearance that it had a cooperative relationship with the territories it had just invaded,
among which included the Uyghur Region, Tibet, and others. Chapter I of the PRC’s Constitution even in-
dicates that all people within China, including minorities, are treated equally and fairly.13 Similarly, Article
36 of the PRC’s Constitution formally recognizes the freedom of religious belief.14 In reality, however, Mao
considered religion a threat to the stability and cohesion that the CCP was trying to build. He believed that
religion and culture created division amongst the masses, and therefore, threatened the stability of the
nation and diminished the power of the party. Mao even once famously declared that “religion is poison.”15
He wished to replace any devotion that people held toward their faith with a “cult of Mao,” wherein his
thoughts and ideologies would reign supreme. Therefore, even though the CCP guaranteed de jure equal-
ity, Mao later cracked down on religious and ethnic minorities, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, in
order to elevate party ideology as well as his own political status.16
8 Jinghan Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy, and Party Cohesion 329-330 (2016).
9 Id. at 329.
10 Id. at 325.
11 Vaclav Smil, China’s Great Famine: 40 Years Later, US National Library of Medicine (Dec. 18, 1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti-
cles/PMC1127087.
12 Arifa Akbar, Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years,' The Independent (October 23, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/
arts-entertainment/books/news/mao-s-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-four-years-2081630.html.
13 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 1 Article 4,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm.
14 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 2 Article 36,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm.
15 The ‘Poisonous Fruit’ of Tibet’s Religious Policy as China Publishes ‘Living Buddha’ Database, International Campaign for Tibet (May 2,
2016), https://savetibet.org/the-poisonous-fruit-of-tibets-religious-policy-as-china-publishes-living-buddha-database/#17.
16 Maddie Brady, Religion and State in Communist China, http://blogs.bu.edu/guidedhistory/law-and-religion/maddi-b.
5
BACKGROUND
Mao sought to replace people’s devotion to their religion or culture with “Maoist thought.” By using his own
brand of thinking to anchor not only the party, but the nation itself, he could assert control over the mass-
es and solidify his power as supreme leader. According to Mao, “[g]etting to grips with the leadership of
thought control is the first priority in maintaining overall leadership.”17 Therefore, Mao launched the “Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1966, commonly known as China’s Cultural Revolution, which aimed to
destroy and eliminate the Four Olds — “old thinking, old culture, old customs, and old habits.”18 The destruc-
tion of the “Four Olds” also implied the replacement of these traditions with the party’s own ideologies and
customs. As a result, the country’s educational system was drastically altered not only to echo Mao’s polit-
ical ideology, but to also smother any “counter-revolutionary” voices. It was during this time that spying on
neighbors and loved ones was encouraged and youth were told to pay attention to neighbors, classmates,
and even relatives to find out if they harbored any criticism against the party.19 The decade-long Cultural
Revolution resulted in violent power clashes, the destruction of textbooks, and the eradication of historical
documents, and fostered a culture of deep distrust within countless families and communities. This cam-
paign ultimately created a complete upheaval of the economy, society, and the nation; it heralded a new
age of authoritarian governance wherein every aspect of society was remodeled according to the credo
of the head of state. This set an important precedent for the Chinese government, and explains much of
the inner workings of CCP’s authoritarianism today.
Following the death of Mao Zedong, his successor, Deng Xiaoping, committed to transforming and re-
building the country following the Cultural Revolution. Deng spearheaded a number of reforms that, in
practice, abandoned most tenets of Marxian economics to jumpstart the economy, encourage devel-
opment, and advance entrepreneurship. 20 His Open Door Policy welcomed and advocated for foreign
investors to enter the Chinese market. His successful initiatives proved that the CCP was not just a po-
litical faction with revolutionary ideologies but a ruling party capable of developing China into an eco-
nomic power. 21 The party widely promoted propaganda which stated that the Chinese political system
was more efficient at promoting economic growth and improving people’s quality of life than democratic
countries. 22 Interestingly, during this time, freedoms and civil liberties were tolerated for the most part, in
contrast to the previous decades. 23
In the late 1970’s, the United States of America was eager to increase its foreign diplomacy with China.
It hoped that deeper bilateral cooperation and economic integration would encourage the Chinese
government to fully reform and liberalize. However in recent decades — especially in the wake of the
brutal 1989 Tiananmen Massacre — it has become apparent that China, with the CCP at its helm, is far
from democratization.
17 Zeng, supra note 8 at 309.

18 Denise Y. Ho, Revolutionizing Antiquity: The Shanghai Cultural Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1968, The China Quarterly 69,
(2011), https://history.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/revolutionizing%20antiquity.pdf.
19 Denise Y. Ho, “Mao’s Last Revolution”: China’s Cultural Transformation, Ohio State University and Miami University, https://origins.osu.edu/
milestones/august-2016-chinese-cultural-revolution-fifty.
20 Shigeo Kobayashi, Jia Baobo, & Junya Sano, The “Three Reforms” in China: Progress and Outlook, Sakura Institute of Research (Sep. 1999),
https://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMe199904threereforms/.
22 Id.
23 Merle Goldman, The Development of Human Rights in Communist China, E-International Relations (July 21, 2009), https://www.e-ir.
info/2009/07/21/the-development-of-human-rights-in-communist-china/
6
BACKGROUND
Political regime type: China under Xi Jinping
Based on HRF’s political regime analysis, the Chinese government is a fully authoritarian regime where the
rule of law, transparency, and government accountability are severely lacking. There are no free and fair
elections, and independence between the different branches of government are nonexistent. Fundamen-
tal human rights and civil liberties are not respected — and as an officially atheist government, freedom of
religion is not embraced.24
While the CCP’s egregious human rights violations date

back several decades, they intensified when Xi Jinping as-
sumed power and became the leader of the party in 2013.25
Under Xi, the government has increased its efforts to repress
any dissent, particularly in China’s peripheries where calls for
independence and freedom are the loudest.
Through a series of ambitious policies and ideological re-

forms, it is evident that Xi is eager to cement his legacy as
September, 2018 - Vladivostok, Eastern Economic Forum the leader who transformed China into a global superpower.
in Vladivostok
Xi’s promise of a “Chinese Dream” is at the crux of his policymaking, and supposedly creates opportunity
for upward mobility and higher quality of life for those living in China.26 From a political perspective, it calls
for a renewal of the CCP’s power and a pledge to elevate China’s ranking in the world order. In practice,
however, this has translated into an aggressive campaign of persecuting dissenters and further tightening
the party’s control of “runaway” areas such as Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong, where the Chi-
nese government has never been viewed as a legitimate power. The “Chinese Dream” is used “to justify
political dictatorship and various limitations on civil rights,” notably in the aforementioned regions.27
In an effort to expand the “Chinese Dream,” Xi has more formally articulated his aspirations through his own
iteration of ideological reform. First, Xi has re-invoked Maoist concepts of “national rejuvenation” to assert
his own leadership as the linchpin to China’s ascendancy to the global stage. Under Xi’s interpretation of
“national rejuvenation,” the CCP endeavors to achieve four specific goals, known as the “Four Compre-
hensives”: build a moderately prosperous society, deepen reform, govern the nation according to law, and
tighten party discipline.28 In order to “tighten party discipline,” Xi further consolidated his power through a
24 According to a Chinese government document titled “China’s Policies and Practices on Protecting Freedom of Religious Belief,” there are
five religions that are formally recognized by the Party. The religious practices of these five must all be approved and registered with the
government.
25 Sarah Cook, The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping, Freedom House (Feb. 2017),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FH_ChinasSprit2016_FULL_FINAL_140pages.pdf.
26 Corporate Intimidation and Censorship in China: Recommendations for Foreign Companies, Human Rights Foundation, Center for Law
and Democracy (June 2020), https://hrf.org/press_posts/report-corporate-intimidation-censorship-in-china/.
27 Zheng Wang, The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context, 19 Journal of Chinese Political Science, (2013), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-
013-9272-0.
28 John Garrick and Yan Chang Bennett, « “Xi Jinping Thought” », China Perspectives (2019), http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspec-
tives/7872.
7
BACKGROUND
constitutional amendment which abolished term limits and firmly entrenched the government’s totalitarian
dictatorship.29 In the same amendment, the government also introduced “Xi Jinping Thought on Social-
ism With Chinese Characteristics For a New Era.”30 This philosophy, commonly referred to as “Xi Jinping
Thought,” formally embraces Xi’s own thinking, such as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and — once
again — achieving “national rejuvenation,” as party ideology.31
Xi’s “Chinese Dream” also has intentions to widen and deepen China’s reach at the global level. This is
best exemplified by his signature foreign policy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which was formed in 2013.
Through the BRI, Xi aims to connect China to the rest of the world via infrastructural developments such as
seaports, highways and railways, which will all be financed by the Chinese government. The BRI is one of
the most far-reaching campaigns spearheaded by Xi, touching virtually every corner of the earth, including
Europe, Latin America, and Africa. All three focus regions — Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong — are
of geopolitical and strategic importance to the Chinese government since their locations would help the
CCP easily gain access to other countries in the world. Tibet, whose natural resources serve as a lifeline for
harnessing energy, allows the Chinese government to reach Southeast Asia. Similarly, the Uyghur Region
serves as a gateway to Eastern Europe which is crucial for the BRI. In addition, through Hong Kong, the CCP
can access a well established free-market economy, seaports, and the international community.
Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong are all of geopolitical and strategic importance to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
29 James Doubek, China Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Xi Jinping to Rule Indefinitely, NPR (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely.
30 China Focus: China's national legislature adopts landmark constitutional amendment, Xinhua (March 11, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2018-03/11/c_137032165.htm.
31 Backgrounder: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Xinhua (March 7, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2018-03/17/c_137046261.htm.
8
BACKGROUND
Through repressive tactics, the CCP seeks to solidify its legitimacy as the ruler of the Uyghur Region, Tibet,
and Hong Kong.32 In the Uyghur Region and Tibet, the Chinese government is adopting the rhetoric of the
“global war on terror” and uses this as a pretext to justify its repression of ethnic minorities.33 The government
claims that cultural and religious expression are signs of “terrorism, extremism, and separatism,” which are
otherwise known as the “Three Evils.”34 The government also claims that there are issues of “national securi-
ty” in Hong Kong which are used as grounds to crack down on civil society and dissent against the regime.
The circumstances in Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong are emblematic of the worsening human
rights situation in China, and the regime’s widespread and systematic crackdown on anyone who opposes
the government and its ideologies. Despite the fact that the CCP relies on dangerous rhetoric that slightly
varies relative to each focus region, its goal remains the same: to shut down any dissenting voices and
“threats” to the regime.
TIBET
Tibet is situated on a plateau, and neighbors India, Burma, Bhutan,
and China. It is the homeland of the Tibetan people, a civilization
established in the region from as early as the 7th century with their
own religious heritage, unique culture, language, and nomadic
way of life. The Tibetan plateau is often referred to as the world’s
“Third Pole” due to its abundant natural resources, including rivers,
mountains, glaciers, and forests.35 Consisting of three provinces,
Tibet was historically independent with its own theocratic govern-
ment under the political and spiritual leadership of the Dalai La-
ma.36 The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama are two of the most
His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is the revered figures in Tibetan Buddhism as they are both believed to
spiritual and religious leader of the Tibetan people.
32 Zeng. supra note 8 at 373.

33 James Millward and Dahlia Peterson, “China’s System of Oppression in Xinjiang: How it Developed and How to Curb it,” Brookings Insti-
tute( September 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_oppression_xinjiang_millward_pe-
terson.pdf at 3.
34 Ramtin Araboulei & Rund Abdelfatah, Who The Uyghurs Are And Why China Is Targeting Them, NPR (May 31, 2021), https://www.npr.
org/2021/05/31/1001936433/who-the-uyghurs-are-and-why-china-is-targeting-them.
35 Tandong Yao, Third Pole Climate Warming and Cryosphere System Changes, World Meteorological Organization, https://public.wmo.int/
en/resources/bulletin/third-pole-climate-warming-and-cryosphere-system-changes.
36 In March 2011, the Dalai Lama retired from his role as a political leader. He remains the religious and spiritual leader of the Tibetan people
and is currently living in exile in Dharamsala, India. The Sikyong, democratically elected by Tibetans in exile, serves as the Tibetan political
leader.
9
BACKGROUND
be reincarnations of the Buddha of Compassion and the Buddha of Boundless Light, respectively.37
Upon the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Tibetan government became in-
creasingly alarmed by the growing presence of Chinese troops approaching its borders. By late 1949, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had invaded Tibet, where they started their mass campaign of political,
cultural, and religious suppression. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the Chinese government’s objec-
tive was to achieve the “liberation of Tibet” by 1950.38 Mao and his troops aggressively sought to coerce the
Dalai Lama into accepting China’s rule, and the Tibetan government — determined to safeguard Tibet’s
sovereignty — pleaded with global leaders for support against the Chinese government’s encroachment.39
In 1951, a Tibetan delegation traveled to Beijing where the Chinese government presented them with the
Seventeen Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. The Plan emphasized how Tibet “shall return to the
big family of the Motherland — the People’s Republic of China.”40 According to several scholars and reports,
it is believed that Tibet signed the Seventeen Point Plan agreement under duress, as “the Chinese made it
clear to the Tibetan delegation that they had no choice but to sign it.”41 The Plan stated that Tibet would
maintain “regional autonomy”42 and that “the existing political system … the established status, functions
and powers of the Dalai Lama”43 would not be impacted. However, in the years following the ratification
of the treaty, the Chinese government gradually — and violently — enforced reforms and new policies that
were antithetical to the agreement in order to transform Tibetan society to fit China’s ideal vision of a “new
multiethnic Communist state.”44
Clashes often occurred between the people of Tibet

and the Chinese military. The Chinese government
knew they would need to have the Dalai Lama on
their side — even kill or kidnap him to silence him — if
they wished to successfully reign in Tibet.45 In March
1959, millions of Tibetans gathered in front of Potala
Palace46, where the Dalai Lama lived, determined to
provide him with protection. In what later became
known as the Tibetan Uprising Day, the Chinese mil-
The Potala Palace is one of the holiest sites in Tibet. itary violently suppressed the gathering and indis-
37 Is This the Face of a Man Held Captive Since the Age of Six?, BBC News (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-48071043.
38 Melvyn Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, University of California Press (1997), https://publish-
ing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft2199n7f4;brand=ucpress.
39 Id.
40 Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet: The Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, (May 1951), Point 1, https://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china3.html.
41 Claude Arpi, Facts about the 17-Point Agreement between Tibet and China, DIIR Publications, 58, https://tibet.net/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/10/FACTS-ABOUT-17-POINT-AGREEMENT.pdf.
44 These initiatives have been omnipresent, and are indicated throughout this report.
45 Jennifer Latson, How and Why the Dalai Lama Left Tibet, Time (Mar. 5, 2019), https://time.com/3742242/dalai-lama-1959/.
46 The Tibetan Uprising 1959, Free Tibet, https://freetibet.org/tibetan-uprising-1959.
10
BACKGROUND
criminately killed thousands.47 Shortly after the uprising, the 14th Dalai Lama — only in his early twenties at
the time48 — secretly fled to India where he established the Tibetan government-in-exile.49
All aspects of Tibetan identity, including Tibetan Buddhism, language, history, and heritage, are consid-
ered a threat and highly sensitive to the Chinese government because it differs from the CCP’s grand vision
of achieving the “Chinese Dream” and “national rejuvenation.” The Chinese government has continued
to enforce repressive measures to crack down on all dissent through a series of state-sponsored cam-
paigns — such as the aptly titled “Strike Hard” campaigns, “Go West Strategy,” and “Patriotic Re-educa-
tion” campaign — to sinicize Tibetan culture and language, to silence support for the Dalai Lama, and to
smother calls for Tibetan freedom and independence.50 The Chinese government refers to “liberation” and
promises of “ethnic regional autonomy”51 as a way to
mask their true intentions vis-a-vis Tibet in the inter-
national arena.
In 1965, the Chinese government renamed historic Ti-

bet to Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).52 The original
three provinces of Tibet — Kham, Amdo, and U-Tsang
— were split and reorganized into other provinces of
China, both within and outside of the TAR. Therefore,
while Tibetans predominantly reside in TAR, many
also live in the surrounding Chinese provinces of Qin-
ghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan.53
A map of historic Tibet, which includes the now-Chinese-controlled prov-

inces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai.
Due to the Chinese government’s tight control on all aspects of civilian life and the resulting severe lack of
political rights and civil liberties, Tibet has consistently ranked low on human rights indices. According to
the 2021 Freedom in the World Report by Freedom House, for example, Tibet scored 1 out of 100, ranking
lower than other authoritarian regimes such as North Korea and Eritrea.54
47 Statement of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile on the Commemoration of the 61st Tibetan National Uprising Day, Tibetan Parliament in
Exile (Mar. 10, 2020), https://tibetanparliament.org/statement-of-the-tibetan-parliament-in-exile-on-the-commemoration-of-the-61st-ti-
betan-national-uprising-day/
48 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, An Open Heart: Practicing Compassion in Everyday Life, Edited by Nicholas Vreeland, 7.
49 About Central Tibetan Administration, Tibet.net, https://tibet.net/about-cta/
50 “Yan Da” – China’s strike hard campaign in Tibet, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (December 30, 1996), https://tchrd.
org/yan-da-chinas-strike-hard-campaign-in-tibet/.
51 New Progress in the Human Rights in the Tibet Autonomous Region, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China (Feb. 1998), http://www.china-un.ch/eng/bjzl/t168910.htm.
52 Country Profile: Tibet Autonomous Region, Nations Online, https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/tibet.htm.
53 About Tibet, Students for a Free Tibet, https://studentsforafreetibet.org/about/about-tibet/
54 Freedom in the World 2021: Tibet, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2021.
11
UYGHUR
REGION
The Uyghur Region, officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China and also referred
to as East Turkestan, is China’s largest province and is located in the northwestern part of the country. The
region is bordered in the northeast by Mongolia, in the north by Russia, in the west by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, and in the south by Pakistan, India, and Tibet.55 Due to its location, the Uyghur Region
has historically been an important economic and cultural crossroad on the ancient Silk Road.56 Today, the
region contains many of China’s nuclear testing facilities and large oil and mineral reserves.57
The Uyghur Region is home to a number of ethnic minorities, most notably the Uyghurs. The Uyghurs are a
Turkic-speaking ethnic group native to the region and have a history that dates back 4,000 years. They are
predominantly Muslim with closer cultural and ethnic ties to groups in Central Asia as opposed to the Han
Chinese of China. The Chinese first made significant contact with the Uyghurs in 1758 when the Qing empire
conquered the Uyghur Region and named it “Xinjiang,” meaning new frontier.58 However, the Chinese em-
pire was unable to directly rule over Xinjiang until the CCP in 1949. 59
The CCP implemented what they claimed were ethno-pluralist policies, asserting cohesion between all
56 ethnic groups in China.60 In 1955, the Uyghur Region was designated the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), a symbolic gesture of ethnic unity.61 Similar to the promises that were made to Tibet, the
PRC stated that autonomous regions “have the right to formulate self-government regulations...in light of
the particular political, economic and cultural conditions of the ethnic group in that autonomous area.”62
However, in reality, the CCP was laying the foundation for its strategy of ethnic assimilation which continues
today. Any autonomy that may have once existed was replaced by the overarching control of the Chinese
government that provides no right of secession.63
55 James A. Millward and Peter C. Perdue, Political Cultural History of the XinJiang Region through the Late Nineteenth Century in Xinjiang:
China’s Muslim Borderland, 27-62.
56 Silk Roads Programme- Ürümqi, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/content/urumqi.
57 Starr, S. Frederick, “Introduction” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 3-26.
58 James A. Millward & Nabijan Tursun, “Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884-1978” in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 63-100.
59 Id.
60 Millward & Peterson, supra note 33.
61 China Primer: Uyghurs, Congressional Research Service (Jun. 7, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281.
62 How do China’s Autonomous Regions Differ from Provinces?, The Economist (May 23, 2021), https://www.economist.com/the-econo-
mist-explains/2021/03/23/how-do-chinas-autonomous-regions-differ-from-provinces?itm_source=parsely-api
63 Millward & Tursun, supra note 58.
12
BACKGROUND
In an effort to assimilate the region, the Chinese government appointed a new class of Uyghur officials who
pledged allegiance to the Chinese government to the local party committee with minor positions in the re-
gion.64 The CCP also weakened Islamic institutions by placing religious infrastructure under the jurisdiction
of the Beijing-based Chinese Islamic Association.65 All official religious activity, including training imams,
would occur under strict government oversight. Lastly, the Chinese government established the Xinjiang
Production Construction Corps (XPCC).66 Through the XPCC, the Chinese government resettled millions of
Han Chinese immigrants in the XUAR region, and built Han enclaves throughout the area which operated
numerous state farms, industrial enterprises, labor camps, prisons, and “re-education” camps.67
While most CCP leaders have sought to “tame” the “unruly province,” the region saw slight reprieve from
Beijing’s ironclad grip under Deng Xiaoping who espoused a policy of “Opening and Reform.”68 Deng’s lib-
eral policies allowed people to practice their cultural and religious customs with a higher degree of free-
dom.69 In the ‘80s, the CCP was divided in their strategy towards the Uyghur Region, but it escalated its
repressive tactics in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre.70
In the late 1990’s, the government refocused its attention on eradicating the “three evils” of terrorism, sep-
aratism, and religious extremism under the "Strike Hard" campaigns. CCP officials began to propagate the
notion that “separatists and anti-China forces use the cloak of religion to fan national separatism.”71 As
such, the government was able to stifle dissent and arrest political protesters who they argued threatened
national unity. In the words of one official, the goal of these “Strike Hard” campaigns is to “arrest quick-
er, sentence faster and punish harder.”72 The “Strike Hard” campaigns were coupled with the 2000’s “Go
West Strategy” which also sought to assimilate the Uyghur people through economic development and
modernization. The government characterized religion as a backwards tradition and breeding ground for
the “three evils,” and thus were a danger to the new and modern Xinjiang that the government was trying
to build.73 These measures came to the hilt in 2014 when Xi, once more, escalated repressive tactics to an
unprecedented degree.
64 Millward & Dahlia Peterson, supra note 33.

65 Millward & Tursun, supra note 58.
66 Debasish Chaudhuri, Minority Economy in Xinjiang—A Source of Uyghur Resentment, 46China Report 9, 10 (2010), DOI:
10.1177/000944551004600102.
68 Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/china0405.pdf.
69 Id.
70 Michael Dillon, Ethnic, Religious and political conflict on China’s Northwestern borders: The background to the violence in Xinjiang, 5IBRU
Boundary and Security Bulletin 5 80, 82 (1997), https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.503.2817&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
71 Human Rights Watch, supra note 68.
72 Zhang & McGhee, supra note 2.
73 Nicolas Becquelin, Staged Development in Xinjiang, 178 The China Quarterly 358, 366 (2004).
13
HONG
KONG
In 1842, following the First Opium War, the Qing dynasty ceded Hong Kong as a colony to the British Empire.74
Citizens of Hong Kong enjoyed substantial individual and financial freedoms under British rule, including
freedom of religion, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression.
On July 1, 1997, control over the entire Hong Kong territory was transferred by the British Empire back to
China in accordance with with a 99-year lease. The terms of Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty were stip-
ulated under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, a bilateral treaty signed between China and the United
Kingdom in 1984.75 In light of Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty back to China, the British government
was concerned about the CCP’s authoritarian influence and rule. Therefore, after lengthy discussions, the
two governments eventually reached an agreement — outlined in the Sino-British Joint Declaration — that
Hong Kong would be governed by the unprecedented “one country, two systems” principle.
Under the “one country, two systems” principle, Hong Kong would become a special administrative region
of China, and would keep its previous social and economic systems. This framework also includes the con-
tinued enjoyment of political and civil liberties — such as freedom of speech and assembly — for a period of
50 years, until 2047. The principle also outlined a unique governing structure for Hong Kong, in which Hong
Kong’s government would enjoy a high degree of autonomy with their own legislative council (LegCo), ex-
ecutive government, and judiciary. The chief executive, the highest position in the Hong Kong government,
is selected based on the results of limited committee elections and ultimately approved by the CCP; local
representatives are elected by Hong Kong citizens. The basic policies of China’s governing of Hong Kong
are stated in the Hong Kong Basic Law — essentially the city’s own mini-constitution — which also outlines
the fundamental rights and freedoms of Hong Kong citizens.76
74 This Day in History: Hong Kong ceded to the British, History (Jan. 2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/hong-kong-ceded-
to-the-british.
75 Hong Kong’s National Security Law: The Nail in the Coffin for One Country, Two Systems, Human Rights Foundation (July 1, 2020), https://
hrf.org/hong-kongs-national-security-law-the-nail-in-the-coffin-for-one-country-two-systems/
76 Id.
14
BACKGROUND
After Hong Kong’s return to China, the city struggled with its sudden change from democratic rule to au-
thoritarian rule. Culturally, the city is highly westernized, with English and Chinese as the city’s dual official
languages, and deeply integrated with British culture. This caused significant tension between the city’s
people — especially the younger generation — and the Chinese government’s authoritarian ideology. The
conflicts worsened when large groups of the mainland Chinese population migrated to Hong Kong with
ease, driving up already strained housing prices and causing further division between the two cultures.
Politically, because the Chinese government must approve the appointment of Hong Kong’s chief exec-
utive, Hong Kong’s government lacks the independence and autonomy that the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration envisioned. At the local level, elections in Hong Kong have been manipulated due to the Chinese
government’s interference and oversight, jeopardiz-
It is likely that the city’s ing the political rights of Hong Kong citizens. Under
complete assimilation to immense pressure from the Chinese government,

Hong Kong’s press freedom has declined rapidly.77
align with the CCP's Freedom of association has been under threat in
Hong Kong, with the government rejecting the reg-
ideology is the end goal. istration of pro-democracy groups. The Chinese
government has also exerted pressure on the Hong
Kong government to prosecute dissidents and opposition politicians. Over the years, persecution of Hong
Kong’s pro-democracy activists have intensified under Xi Jinping’s rule. It is likely that the city’s complete
assimilation to align with the CCP’s ideology is the end goal.
77 Sarah Cook, Hong Kong Press Freedom Suffocates under Beijing’s National Security Law, Freedom House (Oct. 8, 2020), https://freedom-
house.org/article/hong-kong-press-freedom-suffocates-under-beijings-national-security-law.
15
Suppression
Tactics
Fundamental human rights are protected by foundational documents, such as the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1976 International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These rights include freedom of speech, ex-
pression, association, thought, conscience, and religion, as well as the right to liberty
and security of the person which protects against arbitrary arrest and detainment.
Given its authoritarianism, the Chinese government does not respect these rights and
civil liberties. They are either declining or nonexistent within Tibet, the Uyghur Region
and Hong Kong, where the government has implemented harsh tactics to repress
human rights.
Although the CCP’s tactics to exert government control are similar between the
focus regions, they are not identical. The human impact of these tactics vary giv-
en each region’s unique history and culture. However, despite these differences, it is
evident that the common underlying threads between the CCP’s tactics through-
out all three of these regions are that they are far-reaching and are designed to
achieve the party’s authoritarian political and ideological ambitions. The resulting
campaigns and policies continue to have a lasting impact on the livelihoods of these
communities, both domestically and abroad.
16
S U P P R E S S I O N TAC T I C S
BROKEN PROMISES:
POLITICAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
17
Although the Chinese government maintains that Tibet, the Uyghur Region, and Hong
Kong are all “autonomous” regions that are able to go about their internal affairs with-
out external pressure from Beijing, the CCP has deliberately attempted to encroach on
these regions’ freedom by co-opting elites and loyalists to implement the CCP’s agen-
da.78 Over time, the CCP has intentionally and deceitfully chiseled away at the peo-
ples’ right to be freely involved in political affairs altogether.
Tibet:
Unwarranted
Interference
Tibet has its own government affairs run by the Kashag,79 the highest local government cabinet, which
counsels on political, external, and internal matters. When the Chinese government invaded Tibet in 1949, it
strategically targeted both the Kashag and the Dalai Lama in its attempts to convince the Tibetan people
to accept Chinese sovereignty. Their efforts were also in part driven by their desire to dissolve the Kashag,
and to advance their own ideological and political agendas.
In March of 1959 in response to the Tibetan Uprising Day, the Chinese government issued “Decisions on
Several Policy Issues Concerning the Implementation of Democratic Reforms by Crushing the Rebellion in
Tibet” which claimed the Kashag had “betrayed the motherland.” Following the issuance of this document,
more PLA troops entered the region — intensifying its political, social, and military control.80 While the Chi-
nese government claimed its actions were to “liberate” Tibet,81 in reality, they weaponized their control for
political gain, silencing dissent, and bolstering party ideology.
Since then, the Chinese government has continued to interfere in Tibet’s internal political, religious, and
social affairs and has created a hostile environment where people within Tibet are unable to freely ex-
press their desire for freedom and concerns about governance. Thousands of individuals are imprisoned
for speaking out against the regime and, therefore, are being used as examples by the government to
deter and pressure others not to engage in dissent. The Chinese government has arbitrarily detained thou-

79 The Kashag exists in-exile today under the Central Tibetan Administration based in Dharamsala, India.
80 Chen Jian, The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union, Harvard University, https://
sites.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/jcws.2006.8.3.pdf.
81 Sixty Years Since Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Gene-
va (Nov. 7, 2011), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cegv/eng/rqrd/jblc/t953962.htm.
18
sands of community figureheads and leaders, intellectuals, activists, environmentalists, nuns, and monks.
The CCP’s campaign of political disenfranchisement is heavily intertwined with the Chinese government’s
religious suppression of Tibetan Buddhism, as will be discussed later on in this report.82 According to the
Tibetan Political Prisoner Database, there are more than 5,000 political prisoners who have been artitraily
arrested and detained.83
A noteworthy feature of the Chinese government’s pursuit of the political disenfrachisement of Tibet is that
those who voice their discontent with its actions or express their desire for a free Tibet are targeted, and
deemed to be tainted by the “three evils” — terrorism, separatism, and extremism.84 Labeling individuals as
being infected by the “three evils” and as a threat to national security is a tactic that is not only employed
by the Chinese government in Tibet, but also one that is used in the Uyghur Region and Hong Kong to dis-
suade people from getting involved in political affairs.
Uyghur Region:
The Impossibility
of Power Sharing
Since being invaded by the Han Chinese during the 18th century, the Uyghur Region has been under a
variety of power sharing configurations. However, the region has always considered itself a separate en-
tity from China. Modern concepts of self-governance arose in the 1930’s when the short-term para-state
of Eastern Turkestan Republic was established.85 The state was founded based on the common identity
of Muslim Turks, grounded in the principle of self-determination.86 While the state was short-lived, the
idea that the Uyghur Region should have the right to self-governance continues to persist today.
The Uyghur people’s unique sense of identity and right to self-determination, as well as the notion of
the Uyghur Region being a sovereign state, have aroused fear and paranoia among the CCP. Ac-
cordingly, the government has used its fear of separatism, one of the “three evils,” to justify exerting
tight control over the region. Any form of legitimate political dissent is widely regarded as support for
a “separatist” agenda and is harshly stifled. As a result, few Uyghur leaders have even attempted to
participate in the political system.
82 More details in Religious Repression.

83 Tibetan Political Prisoner Database, Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, https://tchrd.uwazi.io/
84 Testimony of Tenzin Dorjee on Tibet from “All Angles”: Protecting Human Rights, Defending Strategic Access, and Challenging China’s
Export of Censorship Globally, Congressional Executive Commission on China (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.
house.gov/files/documents/Testimony%20by%20Dorjee%20for%20CECC%20on%20Tibet.pdf.
85 Sean R. Roberts, “Colonialism,1759–2001” in The War on the Uyghurs China's Internal Campaign against a Muslim Minority, Princeton Uni-
versity Press (2020), 21-62.
86 Id.
19
Historically, when the CCP formalized its power over

the region through its designation of the Uyghur
Region as the XUAR in 1955, they quickly sought
to consolidate the paramountcy of the party by
bringing in Han Chinese government officials into
the region. These officials comprised 50% of the
provincial people’s government and 75% of the Par-
ty committee.87 There was also a determined effort
to recruit a crop of loyal cadres of ethnic minorities
to support the Chinese officials, but only 5% of Uy-
ghur cadres held positions above the county level.88
Prominent Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer was also a former speaker at The select few Uyghur CCP officials had short-lived
HRF's Oslo Freedom Forum.
careers and were eventually ousted from the party.
This was the case for Rebiya Kadeer, who was a prominent political activist and government official in
the Uyghur Region. In a public government meeting, she vehemently condemned Chinese occupation of
the Uyghur Region.89 Two years later, she was arrested and falsely charged with tax evasion and leaking
state secrets.90 Stripped of all her titles, she was labeled "an ironclad separatist colluding with terrorists
and Islamic extremists" and sentenced to eight years imprisonment.91
Apart from political figures, the Chinese government has also targeted intellectuals, such as Ilham Tohti,
who advocated for a peaceful co-sharing power arrangement and interethnic understanding between
the Uyghur people and the Han majority. Tohti, a Uyghur economics professor, founded UighurOnline, a
Chinese-language website devoted to fostering understanding between Uyghur and Han people.92 In
2008, his website was shut down for alleged links to Uyghur “extremists” abroad.93 He was detained a
second time in 2014 and found guilty on trumped-up charges of “separatism.”94 The Chinese government
refuses to engage in any peaceful cooperation with the Uyghur people, because their engagement
would be predicated on the acknowledgement that the Uyghurs are a distinct group of people. As such,
there is little political space for Uyghurs to meaningfully participate in political discourse.
The constriction of political space for civil society to engage in governance and public affairs is also
evident in Hong Kong.
87 J. Lo, Five Years of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region 1955-1960, China Quarterly (1961)
88 Id.
89 Peter Ford, Spiritual mother of Uighurs or Terrorist?, Christian Science Monitor (July 9, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pa-
cific/2009/0709/p06s15-woap.html.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Prisoners by Country, China: Ilham Tohti, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/defend-
ing-freedom-project/prisoners-by-country/China/Ilham%20Tohti.
93 Id.
94 Per Liljas, China Charges Uighur Scholar Ilham Tohti With 'Separatism,' Time (Jul. 31, 2014), https://time.com/3062430/china-xinjiang-ui-
ghur-ilham-tohti-charged-separatism/.
20
Hong Kong:
The Fallacy of
“One Country,
Two Systems”
The CCP has long been intervening in Hong Kong’s internal affairs, despite its initial claims that the Hong
Kong government would enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the “one country, two systems” frame-
work. Fractures in the framework became especially evident since the Chinese government’s implemen-
tation of the national security law in 2020.
Immediately after the handover from the British in 1997, legislative interference became a point of con-
tention in Hong Kong. The Chinese government restructured Hong Kong’s LegCo into an arrangement
that made it easier for pro-Beijing fractions to gain seats. There are few limits on the chief executive,
who is not directly elected by the people and must be approved by the Chinese government. Though
the Basic Law allowed for universal suffrage after 2007, such a system was never implemented despite
calls from pro-democracy groups.
Despite significant obstacles, the pro-democracy lawmakers in Hong Kong continue to strive for uni-
versal suffrage. They have repeatedly called for a public referendum and also peacefully demonstrated
for democratic reforms. The 2014 Umbrella Movement, for example, was a major protest that brought
together pro-democracy activists and lawmakers who participated in a 79-day Occupy Central civil
disobedience movement.95
Since then, the space for political participation has shrunk even further. In 2016, candidates for the
LegCo election were screened by a government commission for their political loyalty, creating an en-
vironment preventing meaningful electoral competition. Multiple candidates who declined to sign a
statement affirming Hong Kong was an inalienable part of China were disqualified.96 Later, six elected
lawmakers were removed from office after allegedly failing to take proper oaths.97 In 2019, following the
decentralized anti-extradition pro-democracy movement, PRC’s National People’s Congress further
95 Explainer: What was Hong Kong’s ‘Occupy’ Movement all About?, Reuters (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hong-
kong-politics-occupy-explainer/explainer-what-was-hong-kongs-occupy-movement-all-about-idUSKCN1S005M.
96 Hong Kong Activist Candidates Disqualified from Election, Reuters (July 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-politics/
hong-kong-activist-candidates-disqualified-from-election-idUSKCN10B01I.
97 Joshua Berlinger & James Griffiths, 4 Hong Kong lawmakers disqualified, fueling worries about Beijing's influence, CNN (July 14, 2017),
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/14/asia/hong-kong-lawmakers-disqualified/index.html.
21
imposed restrictions on LegCo candidates, stating that candidates would be disqualified if they did not
respect China’s rule of Hong Kong, or if they engaged with “foreign powers” to jeopardize national secu-
rity.98 Four pro-democracy lawmakers were subsequently disqualified and barred from the 2020 LegCo
election.99 Soon after, the pro-democracy camp announced that Hong Kong’s democracy had met a
“death knell” and, in support of the four disqualified lawmakers, the entire group resigned en masse.100
Recently, as the world was distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress unilaterally approved of a controversial national security law in May 2020.
Drafted in secret, the proposed law bypassed Hong Kong’s legislative process and came into effect on
June 30, 2020, an hour before the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover from Britain to China. The
legislation gravely endangers the remaining civil liberties in Hong Kong given that any action that falls
under the vague and broadly-defined terms “secession, subversion, terrorism, or foreign interference”
are likely to be in violation of the law. “Offenders” can be sentenced to life in prison for nonviolent crimes,
including speech-related offenses, which is in contravention of international norms.101
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Space for genuine political participation is non-existent, despite promises
of political autonomy in the three focus regions.
• The Chinese government justifies its tactics of political disenfranchisement by

claiming that it is safeguarding “national security” and eradicating the
“three evils.”
• The Chinese government has politically interfered with Tibet and the Uyghur
Region by supplanting local governance systems with centralized CCP rule. In
Hong Kong, however, the CCP is turning the Hong Kong government into a sub-
servient administration.
98 China: Disqualification of Hong Kong lawmakers Deals another blow to Rule of Law, Amnesty International (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/china-disqualification-of-hong-kong-lawmakers-deals-another-blow-to-rule-of-law/.
99 Id.
100 Zen Soo, Hong Kong’s Pro-democracy Lawmakers to Resign en Masse, Associated Press News (Nov. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/arti-
cle/hong-kong-pro-democracy-resign-en-masse-7434a6f1ac28a059827b51d02987f71c.
101 Hong Kong National Security Law Full Text, South China Morning Post (July 2, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/
article/3091595/hong-kong-national-security-law-read-full-text.
22
TIGHTENING THE
IRON GRIP:
CRACKDOWNS,
DETAINMENT, AND
TORTURE
23
The Chinese government’s clampdown on all three regions has been orchestrated
through mass crackdowns, arbitrary arrests, and even torture.
Tibet:
Arbitrary Detention
and Torture of
Religious Individuals
The Chinese government has arbitrarily detained and tortured countless Tibetan Buddhist monks and
nuns. Within Tibetan society, it is common for families to send at least one child to the monasteries to
receive an education and embrace the Tibetan Buddhist monastic lifestyle. As such, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s targeting of religious figures has reverberated throughout society, impacting virtually each
and every family.
Monks and nuns are highly respected leadership

figures due to their involvement in both religious
and community affairs. They also play an instru-
mental role in delivering speeches, distributing
pamphlets, documenting experiences, and orga-
nizing events dedicated to advocating for the Dalai
Lama, and opposing the Chinese government’s
authoritarian rule in their homeland.102 Therefore, the
Chinese government views nuns and monks as
“splittists”103 and threats due to their influential role
Tibetan monks and nuns are highly respected leadership figures due to in society and ongoing commitment to religion.
their involvement in both religious and community affairs.
Historically, as monasteries were destroyed or seized by the Chinese government104, monks and nuns
were forcibly evicted, de-robed, and humiliated. During the 1959 Tibetan Uprising and its aftermath,
countless civilians along with nuns and monks were arbitrarily arrested. In the present, Tibetan Buddhist
monks and nuns are often targeted by police, and arbitrarily detained for their involvement with religious
and community affairs.105 Those who speak out against the Chinese government’s actions in their home-
land, or continue to adhere to their religious beliefs, are arbitrarily detained and subject to horrific forms
of torture including severe beatings, rape, starvation, sleep deprivation, solitary confinement, lengthy
102 China’s Control of Religion in Tibet, Free Tibet (April 2016), https://www.freetibet.org/religious-freedom.
103 Metta Spencer, The Heart of the Tibetan Resistance, Peace Magazine, 8 (Mar. 3, 1998), http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v14n2p08.htm
104 Barbara Demick, Eat the Buddha, Random House, 47 (2020).
105 Tibet, University of Massachusetts, http://www.umass.edu/rso/fretibet/education.html.
24
interrogations, and other mental and bodily harm. They are even subjected to execution.106 This is in spite
of China having signed onto and ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.107
Former prisoner of conscience and Tibetan Bud-

dhist monk Palden Gyatso (1933-2018) was the first
to publicly reveal the Chinese regime’s tools of tor-
ture and campaign of political indoctrination and
forced labor to the United Nations in 1995.108 Ac-
cording to his testimonies, the Chinese government
relied on various tools such as iron bars, electric
shocks, leather belts, and cattle prods to torture
Tibetan Buddhist monk Palden Gyatso (1933-2018) was the first to publicly detainees. Gyatso was arbitrarily detained for 33
109
reveal the Chinese regime’s tools of torture to the international community. years in Chinese labor camps and prisons due to his
commitment to the Dalai Lama, his desire to safeguard an independent Tibet, and his participation in
the 1959 Tibetan Uprising.110
The Chinese government’s ongoing authoritarian rule has resulted in the continued arbitrary detainment
and torture of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, regardless of their age. In March 2008, for example, on
the 49th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising Day, hundreds of monks, nuns, and residents peacefully
gathered across the region to protest the Chinese government’s encroachment on their lifestyle, heri-
tage and culture. There were roughly 344 protests. Participants carried pamphlets, Tibetan flags, and
photographs of the Dalai Lama — all of which are banned. They peacefully chanted “Free Tibet,” “We
want freedom,” and “Long live His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” to which the Chinese police responded with
tear gas, brute force, and gunfire.111 Dozens of people were arrested for threatening China’s definition
of the country’s sovereignty, and “incitement to separatism.”112 Out of the people arrested, monks and
nuns were subject to increased torture and abuse.113 The timing of these protests were closely linked with
the timing of the then-upcoming Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, when the Olympic torch was to pass
through the capital of Tibet, Lhasa.
Following the March 2008 protests, the Chinese government enforced sweeping measures to further
crack down on civil society in Tibet, including increasing military presence, amplifying its propaganda
106 Jamyang Norbu, Buying the Dragon’s Teeth, High Asia Press (2004) 50.
107 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, United Nations Treaty
Convention, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
108 Tibetan Human Rights Advocated Palden Gyatso Passes Away at the Age of 85, Free Tibet (Nov. 30, 2018), https://freetibet.org/
news-media/na/tibetan-human-rights-advocate-palden-gyatso-passes-away-age-85.
109 Tibetan Monk Tortured for 3 Decades in China’s Prisons Dies, Voices of America (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/south-cen-
tral-asia/tibetan-monk-tortured-3-decades-chinas-prisons-dies.
110 Speakers: Palden Gyatso, Human Rights Foundation, https://hrf.org/event_speakers_posts/palden-gyatso/.
111 2008 Uprising in Tibet: Chronology and Analysis, Tibet, 17, https://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/tibetprotest2008.pdf.
112 “I Saw It with My Own Eyes”: Abuses by Chinese Security Forces in Tibet, Human Rights Watch (July 21, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/re-
port/2010/07/21/i-saw-it-my-own-eyes/abuses-chinese-security-forces-tibet-2008-2010.
113 Id.
25
expanding its re-education campaigns, and locking down all access into the region.114
To date, monks, nuns, and other individuals are virtually unable to freely express their religious beliefs
and political ideals. The severe repression that they are subjected to, coupled with the fear of arrest,
torture, and execution, have become so intense, that many monks, former monks, and civilians have re-
sulted to self-immolations to non-violently express their deep frustration with the Chinese government’s
actions, to publicly call for freedom, and to spur the international community to pay more attention to
the abuses within the region.115 More than 150 Tibetan people have self-immolated since 2009, following
the March 2008 protests.116
Uyghur Region:
Quelling Civil Unrest
Through Brute Force
With the increase of what the Chinese government perceives as “disruptive behavior,” the govern-
ment has employed excessive amounts of police force to quell any and all signs of dissent in the
Uyghur Region.117
The most notable example of police using deadly force took place in July 2009 in the city of Ürümqi. The
mass protests were triggered by the mob killing of two Uyghurs working in a Guangdong factory after
a fight broke out between Han and Uyghur workers.118 In order to dispel crowds and manage protesters,
police used tear gas and live ammunition, which sparked violence between Uyghurs and Han residents.119
After the July 5th clashes, a harsh crackdown was put in place, including the subsequent large-scale
disappearance of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs over the following days and weeks.120 Other pro-
testers were imprisoned and executed following the denial of fair legal proceedings.121 According to gov-
ernment sources, an estimated 592 Uyghurs were eventually tried on spurious security charges between
2013 and 2014.122
114 2008 Uprising in Tibet: Chronology and Analysis, Tibet, 177, https://tibet.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/tibetprotest2008.
pdf.
115 Human Rights Violations and Self-Immolation: Testimonies by Tibetans in Exile, International Federation for Human Rights, https://www.
fidh.org/IMG/pdf/tibet587a.pdf.
116 Self-Immolation Fact Sheet, International Campaign for Tibet (Jan. 13, 2021), https://savetibet.org/tibetan-self-immolations/.
117 While arbitrary detention, particularly the detainment of people with overt religious associations, is prevalent in the Uyghur Region, this is
discussed in more detail in Religion Repression: The Disruption of Daily Life.
118 Uyghur American Association, East Turkestan: UAA Condemns Killing Of Uyghur Workers, Unrepresented Nations and People Organization
(Jul. 1, 2009), https://unpo.org/article/9768.
119 “Justice, Justice:” The July 2009 Protests in Xinjiang, China, Amnesty International (Jul.12, 2010), https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/36000/asa170272010en.pdf at 15.
120 Millward & Peterson, supra note 46 at 3.
121 Cook, supra note 25.
122 Id at 78.
26
The constant use of indiscriminate violence and the inability to de-escalate high-tension situations
connote a low quality of policing. The low quality policing is a result of the aftermath of the 2009 pro-
tests where many Uyghur police officers reportedly resigned on ethical grounds and were replaced with
individuals who were not subjected to thorough background checks.123 Many of the new police officers
had violent criminal records.124 In addition, as random attacks against police increased in the region,
many police officers were armed with guns without having undergone adequate firearm training.125 The
police have continued to inflict violence against civilians even during smaller protests or house searches
where a heavy handed response is uncalled for. The indiscriminate use of live ammunition has resulted in
the injury and even death of parties involved, including bystanders and children.
The crackdowns in both Tibet and the Uyghur Region paint a picture about what may come next for the
city of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong:
Behind Bars For
Protecting the Truth
The right to freedom of assembly which is written in Hong Kong’s Basic Law, was generally accepted
and protected until the 2014 Umbrella Movement. During the 79-day protest that called for true univer-
sal suffrage, thousands of people joined the peaceful movement and camped out on the streets. To
disperse the crowds, the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) used tear gas to break up the protest without
provocation. In addition, student leaders that year, including Joshua Wong, Alex Chow, and Nathan
Law were charged with “unlawful assembly” for storming the Civic Square and sentenced to prison.126
Though their sentences were overturned later, their conviction was upheld. The three are referred to as
the first political prisoners of Hong Kong since the handover.127 More recently, the police prevented the
2021 Tiananmen Square vigil from taking place by barricading Victoria park and warning protesters of
possible persecution.128
123 Id at 74.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Writers at Risk: Joshua Wong, Alex Chow, and Nathan Law, PEN America, https://pen.org/advocacy-case/joshua-wong-alex-chow-
nathan-law/.
127 Suzanne Pepper, Hong Kong’s First Political Prisoners? A Stormy Fortnight for the SAR’s Core Values, Hong Kong Free Press (Aug. 27, 2017),
https://hongkongfp.com/2017/08/27/hong-kongs-first-political-prisoners-stormy-fortnight-sars-core-values/.
128 Brittany Gibson, China extends reach in Hong Kong over Tiananmen Square vigil, Vox (Jun. 5, 2021), https://www.vox.
com/2021/6/5/22520233/china-democracy-power-hong-kong-activist-tiananmen-square-vigil.
27
The 2014 police tactics set the tone for the later
2019 anti-extradition law protests, when the po-
lice’s use of force was even more rampant.129 In 2019,
the proposed Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amend-
ment) Bill — commonly referred to as the “Extradi-
tion Bill”130 — would have allowed the Hong Kong
chief executive to extradite fugitives on a case-by-
case basis and bypass standard legal procedures.
This led to an outpouring of condemnation among
Hong Kong citizens, who perceived the bill as Bei-
The 2019 anti-extradition law protests formed a new leaderless and
decentralized pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. jing’s latest attempt to attack fundamental free-
doms in Hong Kong. As a result, millions of people joined protests in the streets to demonstrate against
the passage of the bill.131
The overuse of force by police escalated on June 12 that year, two months after the start of the protest
movement, when approximately one million people marched peacefully on the streets of Hong Kong.
The HKPF targeted peaceful protesters and journalists with rubber bullets and pepper spray. There have
been multiple incidents since the 2019 protests of police using excessive force on the streets towards
protesters or those perceived to be pro-democracy activists.132 The protestors have urged that an inde-
pendent inquiry be conducted to investigate police brutality; the HKPF has not yet been held account-
able for their actions, especially as police presence has since increased due to the national security law.
Additionally, mass arrests have become the newest human rights issue in Hong Kong, a city that had no
political prisoners prior to the handover in 1997. On January 5, 2021, for example, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment conducted a mass arrest of many activists and virtually all pro-democracy lawmakers who,
two months prior, had resigned en masse in protest of the deteriorating legislative independence. All of
those arrested have been active in resisting the Chinese government’s influence in Hong Kong, whether
through grassroots activism, legislative means, or political activities. The arrests in 2021 came half a year
after the Chinese government’s widely-criticized, unilateral implementation of the national security law
in June 2020.
The overbroad and vaguely worded national security law has been used to justify the arrests and those
arrested were accused of “overthrowing” the government by organizing and participating in the prima-
ry. However, in reality, their arrests were an exercise of political cleansing.133 Multiple people, including
129 Hong Kong Police Use Teargas and Pepper Spray to Disperse Protesters, The Guardian (Sep. 24, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/sep/28/kong-kong-police-teargas-pepper-spray-pro-democracy-protesters.
130 Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation Amendment Bill 2019, Legislative Council of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/bills/b201903291.pdf.
131 Corporate Intimidation and Censorship in China, Human Rights Foundation (June 9, 2020), https://hrf.org/press_posts/report-corpo-
rate-intimidation-censorship-in-china/.
132 Haley Willis & Ainara Tiefenthäler, Hong Kong Police Shot a Protester at Point-Blank Range. We Break Down What Happened, NY Times
(October 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/asia/100000006745719/hong-kong-protester-shot.html.
133 Hong Kong Arrests Dozens of Pro-Democracy Figures in a Mass Raid, Human Rights Foundation (January 6, 2021),
https://hrf.org/press_posts/hong-kong-arrests-dozens-of-pro-democracy-figures-in-a-mass-raid/.
28
leading pro-democracy figures like activist Ag-

nes Chow134 and media tycoon Jimmy Lai, have
been arrested under national security charges. A
number of dissidents who went into exile are now
wanted in Hong Kong, including activists Nathan
Law, Sunny Cheung, and former British consulate
staffer Simon Cheng.135
The HKPF has also raided the headquarters of local

pro-democracy media platform Apple Daily twice,
resulting in the arrest of top executive staff and the
Agnes Chow was sentenced to Nathan Law is a prominent
prison for politically-motivated pro-democracy activist who was seizure of electronic devices of journalists.
charges in December 2020, and elected as the youngest lawmak-
spent her 24th birthday in jail. er in Hong Kong at the age of 23.
He is currently living in exile.
Alarmingly, after the second raid, the government froze millions of the publication’s assets,136 ultimately
forcing Apple Daily to end their operations.137 As of late June 2021, seven staffers of the publication have
been detained for violating the national security law.138
The national security law has played a striking role in the deterioration of civil liberties in Hong Kong,
once a city known as a bastion of freedom. In addition to crippling civil society by forcing prominent
local organizations such as Demosistō to disband139 and local media platforms such as Apple Daily to
shutter, the national security law also instilled a climate of fear amongst international NGOs and media
publications who previously held offices in Hong Kong.140 For instance, a unit of the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation relocated to Taiwan,141 and the New York Times relocated some of their staff in Hong Kong to
Seoul, South Korea.142
Overall, this series of events all point to how the national security law has placed enormous pressure on
civil society, private citizens, and media outlets to self-censor, remove content critical of the Chinese
government, or to completely end operations in order to stay safe and evade arrest.
134 Agnes Chow was released from prison in June 2021.

135 Jeffie Lam & Chris Lau, National Security Law and Hong Kong’s Exiled Dissidents, South China Morning Post (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.
scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3104917/national-security-law-and-hong-kongs-exiled-dissidents-wolds.
136 Hong Kong's Apple Daily says only has cash for few weeks after assets frozen, Reuters (Jun. 20, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/
china/hong-kongs-apple-daily-says-only-has-cash-few-weeks-after-assets-frozen-2021-06-20/.
137 Michelle Toh, Apple Daily's demise deals another blow to Hong Kong's battered reputation, CNN Business (Jun. 25, 2021), https://www.
cnn.com/2021/06/25/business/hong-kong-business-confidence-intl-hnk/index.html.
138 Helen Davidson, Hong Kong police arrest senior Apple Daily journalist at airport, The Guardian (Jun. 27, 2021), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2021/jun/28/hong-kong-police-arrest-apple-daily-journalist-airport-fung-wai-kong.
139 Kelly Ho & Tom Grundy, Joshua Wong’s Pro-Democracy Group Demosisto disbands hours after Hong Kong Security Law Passed, Hong
Kong Free Press (June 30, 2020), https://hongkongfp.com/2020/06/30/breaking-joshua-wongs-pro-democracy-group-demosisto-dis-
bands-hours-after-hong-kong-security-law-passed/.
140 Jessie Pang, Hong Kong pro-democracy paper Apple Daily to print last edition on Thursday, Reuters (June 23, 2021), https://www.reu-
ters.com/world/asia-pacific/hong-kong-police-arrest-apple-daily-columnist-under-security-law-media-2021-06-23/
141 Naumann Foundation relocates Global Innovation Hub to Taipei, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (March 11, 2020), https://
www.freiheit.org/pressemitteilung/naumann-foundation-relocates-global-innovation-hub-taipei.
142 Anne Marie Roantree & Marius Zaharia, New York Times to Move Part of Hong Kong Office to Seoul in Wake of Security Law, Reuters (July
14, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-security-media/new-york-times-to-move-part-of-hong-kong-office-to-seoul-in-
wake-of-security-law-idUSKCN24G08T.
29
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The use of brute force and mass crackdowns are evident in all three regions.
• Protesters, community leaders, and intellectuals are frequently arrested en
masse or arbitrarily detained.
• These tactics were only slowly introduced in Hong Kong following the 2014 Um-
brella Movement, and have since intensified in the aftermath of the 2019 anti-ex-
tradition movement.
30
PRECIPITOUS
ERASURE:
CULTURAL
SUPPRESSION
31
One of the striking similarities of the CCP’s policies in all three focus regions is their aim
to eradicate unique cultural aspects of all of their populations. The Chinese govern-
ment’s policies are designed to assimilate people in each focus region to become “true
patriots,” individuals who are fiercely loyal to the party. These policies have manifest-
ed themselves in the form of minimizing opportunities to learn and use the local lan-
guage and banning religious and cultural practices.
The Dilution of Cultural Identity
Tibet:
Sinicization of
Tibetan Heritage
In line with the Chinese government’s desire to force Tibet to align with its vision of a new “modern, dem-
ocratic socialist society,”143 the government has spearheaded population transfer initiatives from as early
as 1949 to encourage more Han Chinese — the ethnic majority group in China — to move from the main-
land to Tibet.144 These transfers drastically transformed the demographics in Tibet, and has amplified the
injustices and inequalities faced by Tibetans. Han Chinese settlers reap career and educational benefits
that are not offered to Tibetans, and are also enticed by jobs, housing, land, and financial incentives.
The government has propagandized the population transfer initiatives, by claiming it to be beneficial
towards boosting the economy, improving the quality of life, and combating the “developmental back-
wardness and remoteness of Tibet.”145 Accordingly, the Chinese government’s discriminatory and divisive
rhetoric has fueled prejudicial attitudes among Han Chinese who view the Tibetan people as “dirty” or
as “savages.”146
While the “Go West Strategy” from the 2000’s indeed did boost the economy and welcome investments,
the fruits of this campaign did not benefit the majority of Tibetan people. Since the Chinese govern-
ment’s encroachment has increased and tightened over the past few decades, Tibetans are left in “po-
sitions of relative disadvantage when compared to their Han Chinese counterparts.”147 For example,
143 Sixty Years Since Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Gene-
va (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.china-un.ch/eng/rqrd/jblc/t953962.htm.
144 Intervention on Population Transfer in Tibet, Tibet Justice Center, http://www.tibetjustice.org/?page_id=182.
145 Andrew Martin Fischer, ‘Population Invasion’ versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western China, Population and Development
Review 631, 631-662, (2008), https://case.edu/affil/tibet/documents/fischer.pdf at 638.
146 Barbara Demick, Eat the Buddha 80 (2020).
147 Dina Buck, Tibet Under Chinese Rule, University of Denver, Human Rights and Human Welfare, https://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/re-
searchdigest/china/TibetChina.pdf
32
population transfers have resulted in their unequal access to employment, business, and education
opportunities.148 It has also triggered the forced evictions and mass displacements of several communi-
ties from their ancestral lands, thus threatening Tibetan nomadic practices and diluting cultural identity.
Consequently, thousands of Tibetans have fled Tibet to live in exile in order to enjoy basic rights and
freedoms and to pursue lifestyles that are untainted by the party’s authoritarian agenda.
In 2020, when the world was distracted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government enforced
“Regulations on the Establishment of a Model Area for Ethnic Unity and Progress in the Tibet Autono-
mous Region." While the Chinese government has long claimed to be pushing for “harmony” and “unity”
among ethnic minorities and the majority Han Chinese, this legislation undermines human rights and
freedom for the people of Tibet. The law explicitly dictates how all individuals, institutions, and organiza-
tions — ranging from schools, religious centers, the military, businesses, and so on — must safeguard the
“oneness of motherland” and take “an unambiguous stand against separatism,”149 and also openly ad-
vocates for cross-ethnic marriages between Tibetans and Han Chinese.150 These efforts are orchestrated
by the Chinese government to further dilute Tibetan identity and sinicize the region, under the guise of
easing social tensions and achieving “harmony.”
The Dalai Lama has often referred to the Chinese government’s actions in Tibet as a cultural genocide
due to the government’s concentrated efforts to eliminate the distinct and unique characteristics of
Tibetan heritage and identity. Once the Dalai Lama went into exile in 1959, he established the Central
Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, India, which plays a key role in the preservation of Tibet-
an culture and identity. The CTA serves as Tibet’s government-in-exile and consists of democratically
elected officials and oversees departments such as the Department of Education and the Department
of Religion & Culture.151 The CTA and its departments, along with the global Tibetan community-in-exile,
have been crucial in protecting Tibetan heritage. Together, they have sounded the alarm on the plight of
the Tibetan people in the face of the Chinese government’s unrelenting targeting and persecution.152
148 Jamyang Norbu, Buying the Dragon’s Teeth 79 (2004).

149 Kunsang Rinzin & Rikar Hussein, Exiled Tibetans Alarmed by China’s ‘Unity Law’, Voice of America (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.voanews.
com/extremism-watch/exiled-tibetans-alarmed-chinas-unity-law.
150 Freedom in the World 2020: Tibet, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/country/tibet/freedom-world/2021.
151 Official Website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Central Tibetan Administration, https://tibet.net/.
152 Lobsang Sangay, Democracy in Exile, Oslo Freedom Forum, https://oslofreedomforum.com/talks/democracy-in-exile/.
33
Uyghur Region:
Destroying the
Uyghur Identity
The Chinese government has long pushed for the assimilation and integration of the Uyghur people. A
common strategy that the CCP uses to assimilate its border regions is mass immigration, a policy seen
both in Inner Mongolia and Tibet.153 Through the XPCC, Beijing was able to initiate a policy of large-scale
Han Chinese migration composed mostly of retired PLA soldiers.154 The state also relocated skilled Han
migrants to work in the natural resource industries,
particularly the oil, gas, and cotton industries.155 The Chinese government
Much of the development of the Uyghur Region was
outsourced to Han migrants with minimal employ-
has long pushed for the
ment of Uyghur workers.156 Resultantly, between assimilation and integra-
1949-1976, the percentage of ethnic Chinese in the
Uyghur Region increased from 6% to 41.5%.157
tion of the Uyghur people.
In the late ‘80s and ‘90s, Beijing revived this policy of heavy state-sponsored migration as the CCP
leadership reverted to a strategy of tightening their grip on the outskirts of the nation. The government
flooded the area with Han Chinese influence and re-engineered a systematic migration that resulted
in 1.2 million Han Chinese settling in the region by the end of the ‘90s.158 Han Chinese were motivated to
partake in these waves of migration through economic and land ownership incentives. In the Uyghur
Region, Han migrants were not obliged to follow the one-child policy and entitled to property rights and
land ownership, unlike in the eastern parts of the nation.159 Han residents often live in segregated com-
munities with better facilities such as access to electricity and water and improved road conditions.160 In
addition, the government increased investment in infrastructure projects which created job opportunities
often reserved for Han migrants.161 In the face of discriminatory employment practices, Uyghurs faced
153 Dru Gladney, The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as an example of separatism in China, Pomona College (Jan. 2021), 85-104,
http://kulturnistudia.cz/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-Xinjiang-Uyghur-Autonomous-Region-as-an-example-of-separatism-in-China.
pdf at 95.
154 Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan, Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Han and Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi, 52Eurasian Ge-
ography and Economics 119, 120 (2011), DOI: 10.2747/1539-7216.52.1.119.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Human Rights Watch (April 2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/china0405.pdf.
158 Id.
159 Ayjaz Ahmad Wani, Socio-Economic Impact of Han Migration on Xinjiang, Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice 215, 220 (2014), https://
www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=141296.
160 Id.
161 Howell and Fan, supra note 154 at 120.
34
high rates of unemployment and lower incomes than their Han counterparts.162 The result is a settler class
of Han Chinese migrants, who have disproportionately benefited from the economic development of the
Uyghur Region as compared to the locals.
One of the few incentives directed at the Uyghur population are efforts to encourage interethnic mar-
riage with Han people through the promise of greater access to better welfare, education, and em-
ployment. The government believes that through intermarriage, the Uyghur people can be more quickly
assimilated into the Han majority while having their ethnic identity speedily diluted. The policies mirror
similar plans implemented in Tibet, which the government cites as a way to “ease social conflicts amid
increasing incidence of terrorist attacks in the region.”163
From cultural dilution to educational interference, the Chinese government has taken sweeping mea-
sures to ensure the homogenization of all people in the name of national unity and peace.
Targeting the Next Generation: Educational Interference
The Chinese government interferes with education because it plays a crucial role in the public per-
ception of the CCP. By implementing “bilingual” education with an emphasis on Mandarin learning
and doctoring curriculum materials that exalt the party, the CCP seeks to further assert its legitimacy
in the minds of students at an early age. These initiatives are violations of fundamental human rights,
and are the government’s attempts to mold the mindsets of future generations to be loyal to the party
for years to come.
162 Becquelin, supra note 73 at 72.

163 Cathy Wong, Mixed marriages get cash gifts in Xinjiang, Global Times (Sep. 30, 2014), https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/879657.shtml.
35
Tibet:
The Power of
Language and
Textbooks
The Chinese government has long felt threatened by Tibetan language and culture since they are so
intimately linked with Tibetan nationalism and identity. Therefore, the policies and reforms carried out by
the Chinese government include political, social, economic, religious and educational aspects of daily
life for the Tibetan people.
The education system in TAR and its environs are managed by China’s Ministry of Education whose ini-
tiatives, such as “bilingual education,” serve to forcibly assimilate Tibetans.164 The Chinese government
claims that educational institutions in TAR are championing “bilingual education” but, in practice, has
mandated that language courses in kindergarten, elementary, middle, and high schools are taught in
Mandarin at the expense of Tibetan language. In fact, it is compulsory for all teachers to be fluent in
Mandarin Chinese. As a consequence of this, young Tibetan students may feel unmotivated to learn their
traditional language and history not only due to the lack of access to such education, but also because
their teachers and classmates speak Mandarin, and their textbooks are written in Mandarin. According
to the Endangered Language Alliance,165 the Tibetan language is considered a language at risk of ex-
tinction. Notably, in 2018, the regime declared that institutions that aimed to protect the Tibetan lan-
guage would be considered illegal and would be considered as “underworld gang crime.”166 In addition,
Tibetan history is omitted from the curriculum and is replaced with CCP ideologies. These government
policies, therefore, actively phase out Tibetan identity from academic institutions, under the guise of
fostering “ethnic mingling.”167
Political indoctrination, referred to as “patriotic education,” is one of the most damaging tactics used by
the CCP towards Tibetans. The content taught in these sessions erase Tibetan history, shun religion, — in-
cluding through the denunciation of the Dalai Lama — and demand complete allegiance to the Chinese
government. “Patriotic education” was initially forced onto Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns, but has
since expanded into broader communities to include the targeting of farmers, entrepreneurs, members
of government, and academics. In addition to dictating the curriculum, the Chinese government has
164 Education in Tibet, K12 Academics, https://www.k12academics.com/Education%20Worldwide/education-tibet.

165 Voices of the Himalaya: Tibetan, Endangered Language Alliance, https://elalliance.org/languages/himalaya/tibetan/.
166 Sophie Richardson, In Tibet, it’s a Crime to Even Talk About the Value of Mother-Tongue Education, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/15/tibet-its-crime-even-talk-about-value-mother-tongue-education.
167 China’s “Bilingual Education” Policy in Tibet: Tibetan-Medium Schooling Under Threat, Human Rights Watch (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.
hrw.org/report/2020/03/04/chinas-bilingual-education-policy-tibet/tibetan-medium-schooling-under-threat.
36
reportedly even aimed to oversee the minor details of what students are permitted to wear and which
food is acceptable to be eaten within classrooms.168
Children as young as kindergarten are not spared from political indoctrination. According to a report
released by the Tibet Advocacy Coalition in 2021, toddlers in kindergartens are required to take part in
“military style political education” which includes partaking in flag-raising ceremonies, and even wearing
Chinese military uniforms.169 Additionally, Tibetan children living in rural areas or where the local schools
may have been shut down have been sent to boarding schools far away from their communities. Alarm-
ingly, there have also been reports that several students have been forcibly sent to these schools, de-
spite their parents’ protests and pleas.170 These schools are often located in cities where the population
is predominantly Han, in an effort to assimilate the children. The classroom curriculum includes “ideolog-
ical and political education, which include weekend visits to revolutionary and patriotic sites,” and there
are little to no opportunities to embrace their native language.171 This boarding-school scheme is a clear
example of the Chinese government specifically targeting the next generation through education, and is
evident in the Uyghur Region as well.
Uyghur Region:
Chinese Language
Promotion
As is the aim with bilingual education in Tibet, the “bilingual” system in the Uyghur Region also seeks to
erase local native languages and ensure proficiency in Mandarin.172 Over the past two decades, the
local government has gradually escalated its efforts to make Mandarin Chinese the lingua franca of the
region and eliminate the predominant use of the Uyghur language.
The Chinese government aimed to assimilate the Uyghur people through the sinicization of the educa-
tion curriculum and the creation of joint Han and Uyghur schools since as early as the 1960’s.173
168 The next generation: the state of education in Tibet today, Tibetan Centre for
Human Rights and Democracy (Sep.15, 1997), https://tchrd.org/the-next-generation-the-state-of-education-in-tibet-today/.
169 Assaulting Identity: China’s New Coercive Strategies in Tibet, Tibet Advocacy Coalition, 9 (2021).
170 Tibetan children in Qinghai being forced into Mandarin language boarding schools, Tibetan Review (Sep. 13, 2020), https://www.tibetan-
review.net/tibetan-children-in-qinghai-being-forced-into-mandarin-language-boarding-schools/.
171 James Leibold (2019) Interior Ethnic Minority Boarding Schools: China’s Bold and Unpredictable Educational Experiment, Asian Studies
Review, 43:1, 3-15, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2018.1548572, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10357823.2018.1548572?scroll=top&
needAccess=true.
172 Darren Byler, Xinjiang Education Reform and the Eradication of Uyghur-language Books, SupChina (Oct. 2, 2019), https://supchina.
com/2019/10/02/xinjiang-education-reform-and-the-eradication-of-uyghur-language-books/.
173 M.A. Rong, The development of minority education and the practice of bilingual education in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,
4Frontiers of Education in China 188, 203 (2009).
37
After the “reform era” of the ‘80s, the government sought to make Mandarin Chinese the default lan-
guage of the region by expanding the system of joint Han and Uyghur schools. In the 2000’s, the fur-
therance of bilingual education was consolidated under the “Go West Strategy.”174 Given the rush of
development and the influx of Chinese companies in the 2000’s, a bilingual education that minimized
teaching in local languages was justified under the importance of “modernizing” the Uyghur Region and
equipping local students for better job prospects.175
In the past decade, policy efforts have steadily been introduced in stride to move toward a Chinese-on-
ly monolingual system. Under a number of school systems in the Uyghur Region, non-Han students are
taught and tested solely in Mandarin Chinese.176 In 2008, the government increased recruitment of “bilin-
gual” teachers who, in actuality, were Han Chinese.177 By 2017, many counties across the Uyghur Region
have implemented Chinese-only language programs, some as early as primary school under the “The
Standard Plan for Bilingual Education Curriculum in the Compulsory Education Phase of the Autonomous
Region” directive.178 At one of the most prestigious Uyghur high schools, authorities have also upended
the curriculum, replacing Uyghur language instruction with Mandarin Chinese.179 Former student, Jurat
Obul, states that the move is an attempt by the local government to “whitewash [the school’s] impor-
tance as an institution of learning for Uyghur language, and culture.”180 Under this education system, the
state has even banned the purchase and use of textbooks that cover Uyghur culture and language.181 In
and out of the classroom, it is difficult for children to freely learn their native tongue and history.
The Chinese government also strives to block the transmission of Uyghur language and culture by phys-
ically separating children from their families and communities through a state-funded “boarding school”
program that coerces Uyghur students into Chinese-speaking environments.182 This practice started in
the early 2000’s when the Chinese government established the Xinjiang Class, a program that pays for
middle school students from Xinjiang — who are mostly ethnic Uyghur — to attend school in predomi-
nantly Han populated cities in eastern China.183 In this program, students are sent away from their homes
and only allowed to visit on the weekends.184 Today, nearly all schools above the eighth grade have been
converted to residential boarding schools, and in 2017, the government began converting many elemen-
tary schools and nurseries into boarding schools as well.185 This means that children as young as age 3
174 Id.
175 Sonika Gupta and Veena Ramachandran, Bilingual Education in Xinjiang in the Post-2009 Period, 52China Report 306, 309 (2016),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310471668.
176 Id.
177 Xinjiang Authorities Recruit More Teachers for Mandarin-Focused ‘Bilingual’ Education, Congressional Executive Commission on China
(Dec. 20, 2008), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/xinjiang-authorities-recruit-more-teachers-for-mandarin-fo-
cused.
178 Byler, supra note 172.
179 Xinjiang Authorities Institute Mandarin-Only Instruction at Prominent Uyghur High School, Radio Free Asia (Jun. 12, 2020), https://www.rfa.
org/english/news/uyghur/school-06122020180620.html.
180 Id.
181 Emily Feng, China Targets Muslim Scholars And Writers With Increasingly Harsh Restrictions, NPR (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.npr.
org/2020/11/21/932169863/china-targets-muslim-scholars-and-writers-with-increasingly-harsh-restrictions.
183 Timothy Grose, The Xinjiang Class: Education, Integration, and the Uyghurs, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs.
38
can be quasi-detained in Mandarin speaking boarding schools and are unable to be cared for at home.
By controlling what children learn through the school system, the government seeks to diminish the in-
fluence of local languages that dominate settings outside the classroom. This is also one of the goals of
educational interference in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong:
Looming Guidelines
and Bans
Though interference with Hong Kong’s education system emerged much later than in Tibet and the
Uyghur Region, the strategies employed by the state also consist of promoting Mandarin Chinese and
discouraging discussions on material deemed sensitive to the CCP.
Shortly after the handover, Mandarin Chinese was incorporated into the core curriculum across schools
in the city. Such a move indicated the beginnings of the government’s intent to slowly phase out the
local language, Cantonese.186 The Education Bureau of the local government explicitly stated their long-
term plans to implement Chinese — which they referred to as “the mother tongue” — officially in class-
rooms, under the guise of achieving a “biliterate... and trilingual” language environment to foster “better
cognitive and academic development.”187
Since the early 2000’s, the Hong Kong government has also attempted to implement a “national educa-
tion” curriculum that entails significant political indoctrination for primary and secondary schools. In 2012,
for example, the government proposed the implementation of a curriculum to which students, parents,
and teachers jointly protested against. They were concerned that the curriculum contained materials
that praised China’s one-party system and CCP leaders, and were alarmed that the proposal suggest-
ed that students should self-censor, asking them to “speak cautiously.”188 As a result of sustained public
pressure and peaceful demonstrations, which were only possible under the pre-national-security law
atmosphere, the government eventually withdrew the proposal.
186 Juliana Liu, Cantonese v Mandarin: When Hong Kong languages get political, BBC (Jun. 29, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-china-40406429.
187 [Archive] Medium of Instruction, Education Bureau --The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Sep. 1997),
https://www.edb.gov.hk/en/edu-system/primary-secondary/applicable-to-secondary/moi/guidance-index.html.
188 Hong Kong Fears Pro-China Brainwashing in Education, The Associated Press (Sep. 7, 2012), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/hong-
kong-fears-pro-china-brainwashing-in-education-1.1296013.
39
However, interference with the education system continued after the implementation of the national
security law. Following the law’s passage, the Hong Kong Education Bureau issued guidelines to schools
regarding national security, and banned on-campus “political activities,” as well as the expression of
political opinions.189 In addition, the guidelines stressed the importance of learning about the national
security law, despite its overbroad and abusive nature. As a consequence of this, the national security
law has had a chilling effect on freedom of expression in schools. For example, four students were ar-
rested based on their social media posts,190 while a teacher was disqualified for showing a documentary
about a pro-independence activist in class.191
In addition, the national education program omits historical events from the curriculum and discourages
teachers from discussing them, similar to what has been exhibited in Tibet and the Uyghur Region. For
example, educators have been warned against discussing the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and
following the 2014 Umbrella Movement, passages relating to Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi
were removed from textbooks. Many textbooks used in schools to teach liberal studies are undergoing
a voluntary screening process, which education authorities say will eventually become mandatory.192
Textbook makers have been told to remove "separation of powers" as a feature of the government, em-
phasize the legal consequences individuals may face as a result of engaging in civil disobedience, and
erase illustrations of anti-government protesters holding up political slogans and criticism of the Chinese
government.193 The government is editing educational materials to warn people from a young age that
dissent against the government will not be tolerated.
189 國家安全：學校具體措施 [National Security: Specific Measures for Schools], Education Bureau - The Government of the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region, https://www.edb.gov.hk/attachment/tc/sch-admin/national-security/specific-measures.pdf.
190 Hong Kong: National Security Arrests Over Social Media Posts Violate Freedom of Expression, Amnesty International (July 30, 2020),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/hong-kong-national-security-arrests-over-social-media-posts-violate-free-
dom-of-expression/.
191 Teacher Disqualified for ‘Promoting Hong Kong Independence’, BBC News (Oct 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-54431729.
192 Chan Ho-Him, Hong Kong publishers make changes to Liberal Studies textbooks after voluntary review, South China Morning Post (Aug.
18, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/3097873/hong-kong-publishers-make-changes-liberal-studies.
193 Id.
40
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Tactics of Cultural Suppression Used in Each Region
TIBET UYGHUR REGION HONG KONG

→ The majority of Hong-
Han settler migration X X kongers are ethnical-
ly Han. However, it is
important to note that
there are major linguistic
and cultural differences
between Hongkongers
and Mainland Han
Chinese.
Family separation X
programs
“Boarding school” X X
system in predominant-
ly Han cities
Promotion of intermar- X X
riage with Han majority
Erasure of local
languages education
X X X
Promotion of Manda- X X X
rin Chinese in schools,
curriculum, books
Recruitment of X X X
Chinese-speaking
teachers
Censorship on → Omitting → Bannings books in the → Banning pro-indepen-

Tibetan nation- Uyghur language that dence materials
campuses, including in
alism, history, include local stories and
teaching materials and → Omitting major political
religion, and traditions events
through self-censorship language from
textbooks and → Banning political activism
curriculum on campuses
→ Disqualifying teachers
who use censored materials
41
RELIGIOUS
REPRESSION
42
Religion can be a philosophy, a lifestyle, and a social institution that distinctively

marks a group of people as different from others. To many, religion is a way of life and
the bedrock of their society but, to the Chinese government, religion is regarded as a
threat to unity and symbolizes disloyalty to the CCP.
The systematic destruction of religious institutions reduces the power they have as
spaces for fostering a sense of community and creating networks of social support.
The incessant policing of everyday life ensures that people are unable to practice
their religion in even the most intimate and private settings. According to the CCP, to
disfigure every element of a religion is to take away from its legitimacy and assert the
primacy of the party. Their message is clear: “your religion cannot provide for you the
way the party can.”
Their message is clear: “Your The CCP uses particularly repres-

sive tactics to breakdown the
religion cannot provide for links between Tibetan Buddhism
and Tibetan heritage, and Islam
you the way the party can.” and Uyghur identity. In compari-
son, though the region has a siz-
able Christian and Catholic community, religion is not viewed as integral to the Hong
Konger identity, and will therefore not be addressed in this section of the report.
43
Systematic Destruction of Religious Institutions
Tibet:
Dismantling of Religious
Establishments
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries are not only an important place of worship, but also a central place
for gatherings. In addition to functioning as an institution for religious practice, they also serve as
community centers, libraries, schools, and cultural hubs. Many monks, community leaders, and other
Tibetan people often congregate at monasteries to organize initiatives to counter the Chinese gov-
ernment’s encroachment.
Because of the influence that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries have in Tibetan communities, the Chinese
government actively sought to destroy these institutions in the late 1940’s and into the 1950’s and in-
tensified its efforts after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising Day and into the Cultural Revolution.194 Hundreds, if
not thousands, of monasteries have been subject to the Chinese government’s tightened control under
the guise of “national security and enduring peace and stability.”195 In addition to demolishing monas-
teries, shrines, and temples, other aspects of Tibetan culture and religion such as prayer flags, ancient
art, statues, sacred texts, and photographs of the Dalai Lama were ruined. Through “struggle sessions,”
public humiliation,196 and the expansive system of spying on neighbors and loved ones that was common
during the Cultural Revolution, anyone who was caught practicing religious rituals or displaying symbols
of Tibetan Buddhism were violently suppressed, and even publicly executed.197
After the decade-long Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government became slightly more accepting of
religion under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in order to align with his vision for achieving opening and
reform.198 In stark contrast to Mao’s efforts to prohibit and eradicate religion, Deng encouraged “greater
194 Donald S. Jr., Lopez, The Monastery as a Medium of Tibetan Culture, Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine (March 1988), https://www.
culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/monastery-medium-tibetan-culture.
195 Xi Focus: Xi Stresses Building New Modern Socialist Tibet, Xinhua News (Aug. 29, 2020), http://www.xinhuanet.com/en-
glish/2020-08/29/c_139327765.htm.
196 Tsering Woeser, Robert Barnett, and Susan Chen, Lhasa in the Cultural Revolution: A Photo Essay, Los Angeles Review of Books China
Channel (Nov. 13, 2020), https://chinachannel.org/2020/11/13/forbidden-memory-photos/
197 Dan Southerland, After 50 years, Tibetans Recall the Cultural Revolution, Radio Free Asia (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.rfa.org/english/com-
mentaries/tibet-cultrev-08092016145355.html
198 The Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966 to 1976.
44
tolerance… and even state support for temple reconstruction.”199 These reforms, however, did not last and
the Chinese government once again clamped down on Tibetans after a series of pro-independence
protests in 1987.
Since then, the Chinese government’s control over monasteries has intensified, including through an
uptick of forced patriotic indoctrination, extreme surveillance, and heavy police presence within these
institutions.200 The United Front Work Department (UFWD)201 of the Chinese government spearhead-
ed many of these initiatives, claiming that monasteries were “breeding grounds for activism.”202 They
imposed strict regulations, allowing the government to have complete oversight and control over the
management and records of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and other places of worship. These restric-
tions include limiting the number of monks and nuns to perform rituals,203 and requiring large events that
are held in monasteries to first seek approval from the UFWD.204 Under the 1996 “Strike Hard” campaign,
the Chinese government doubled down on removing and prohibiting the possession of photographs of
the Dalai Lama in monasteries and even in private homes.205 Until this day, those found in possession
of a photo of the Dalai Lama, or any text in relation to him, are subject to severe punishment, including
arbitrary arrest and torture.206
Additionally, many monasteries and religious institutions have been appropriated by the Chinese gov-
ernment for the purpose of tourism. Trip packages and tours are only legally allowed to be conducted
by travel agencies who are registered with the China National Tourism and Tibet Tourism Bureau.207 As
such, Han Chinese settlers and loyalists to the party in Tibet benefit and profit the most from the region’s
tourism. Furthermore, travelers to the region are only permitted access to trip packages and tours whose
experiences and narratives are approved by the Chinese government. Alarmingly, it has been reported
that travelers who visit select religious institutions for tourist purposes are able to stay for “twice as long”
in comparison to those who frequent the institutions for religious purposes.208 The Chinese government
whitewashes its crimes by transforming these sacred monasteries and temples into financial opportuni-
ties that also amplify their own rhetoric.
199 Cook, supra note 25 at 28.

200 Sarah Cook, Tibetan Buddhism: Religious Freedom in China, Freedom House (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/2017/battle-chi-
na-spirit-tibetan-buddhism-religious-freedom.
201 The United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Chinese government is dedicated to specifically conducting influence operations
both within and outside the country. Their work includes the oversight of ethnic groups and religious affairs, as well as the development and
dissemination of propaganda.
202 Barbara Demick, Eat the Buddha, Random House, 144 (2020).
203 Tibetan Monks: A Controlled Life, BBC News (Mar. 20, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7307495.stm.
204 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: China - Tibet, United States Department of State: Office of International Religious Free-
dom, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/tibet/.
205 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, supra note 46.
206 March 10th 2019: 60th Anniversary of Tibetan Uprising Day, Tibetan Nuns Project, https://tnp.org/tag/tibetan-womens-uprising/.
207 A Gorgeous Trip To Tibet With Tibetan Travel Agency, Tibet Shambhala Adventure, https://shambhala-adventure.com/tibetan-trav-
el-agency-tibet-travel-agent/.
208 China Cuts Hours for Tibetan Buddhists at Lhasa’s Jokhang Temple to Half That of Tourists, Radio Free Asia (May 18, 2021), https://www.
rfa.org/english/news/tibet/hours-05182021154715.html.
45
These ubiquitous regulations in Tibet are similar to what has unfolded in the Uyghur Region, and have
had a tremendous impact on fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of association, freedom of
thought and religion, freedom of speech and expression, as well as freedom from interference and coer-
cion in matters of conscience.
Uyghur Region:
The Ruination of
Religious Infrastructure
The Uyghur people are a largely Muslim ethnic minority whose religion is an intrinsic part of their cultural
identity as well as everyday life. The Chinese government seeks to incapacitate Islamic institutions that
are fundamental to Uyghur life by physically reducing the visibility of Islam’s influence in the region.
In recent years, countless historic shrines, mosques, and other sacred sites have been physically de-
molished or gravely altered. They have been rendered unusable and unrecognizable to the public.
According to satellite imagery, approximately 16,000 mosques — 65% of the region’s total — have been
destroyed or damaged since 2017.209 In addition to the targeting of mosques, shrines and pilgrimage
routes have also been demolished or substantially altered.210 For example, at cemeteries, tombstones
with Perso-Arabic script were destroyed so that people couldn’t recognize their family member’s buri-
al site. Meanwhile, in an increasing effort to prevent Uyghur people from accessing their religious sites,
many Han tourism companies — in particular, ones that manage visits to local shrines and religious sites
— began instituting an entrance fee which the majority of local citizens cannot afford.211 These entrance
fees, which are prohibitively high, have effectively hindered Uyghur people from being able to physically
access their own places of worship. The Chinese government exploits the socioeconomic gap between
Han migrants or tourists and local Uyghur residents to disrupt religious practices.
209 Nathan Ruser, Dr. James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, & Tilla Hoja, Cultural Erasure, Australian Policy Institute (Sep. 24, 2020), https://www.aspi.
org.au/report/cultural-erasure.
210 Id.
211 Chris Buckley & Austin Ramzy, China Is Erasing Mosques and Precious Shrines in Xinjiang, New York Times (Sep. 25, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/25/world/asia/xinjiang-china-religious-site.html.
46
Additionally, the CCP also seeks to amplify the

hypervisibility of the Chinese government in the
region in both places of worship and daily life.
Many mosques and other religious institutions are
required to fly the Chinese flag.212 In one report, offi-
cials positioned the flag towards the city of Mec-
ca, implying that congregants are praying to the
Chinese flag.213 This action was regarded by many
Uyghur Muslims as deeply humiliating.214 Moreover,
architectural components deemed to be “un-Chi-
nese” such as domes and minarets have been
The hypervisibility of the Chinese government in the Uyghur Region.
removed from many religious buildings, while others
have been commercialized and turned into bars or commercial shopping centers.215 By destroying reli-
gious symbols or buildings altogether, the government is erasing important markers of heritage or sites
of gathering. It also displaces religious communities who are no longer able to congregate for prayer or
other religious purposes. To destroy or alter the physical infrastructure of religious institutions is to effec-
tively displace the history and identity of the Uyghur people embedded into those physical structures. It is
the literal manifestation of a strategy used to eradicate the quintessential pillars of the Uyghur community.
The Chinese government also uses less tangible methods to disrupt religious practices, including doc-
trinal manipulation. It interferes with traditions and customs integral to Tibetan Buddhism and Islam in
order to elevate party ideology.
212 Yu Ning, Concept of nation must be enhanced in religious people, Global Times (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1113427.shtml.
213 Massoud Hayoun, Uyghurs at Xinjiang mosque have to face China flag when praying, Al Jazeera (Sep. 18, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.
com/articles/2013/9/18/uighurs-bow-downtochineseflagatxinjiangmosque.html.
215 Buckley & Ramzy, supra note 211.
47
Doctrinal Manipulation
Tibet:
Disruption of
Religious Protocols
and Reincarnations
The Chinese government aims to undermine Tibetan Buddhism by not only the physical destruction of
sites and texts, but by also severely interfering with the religion’s reincarnation cycles. By disrupting this
sacred process and traditional belief, the Chinese government is sending a clear signal that they are
determined to stamp out any and all inkling of Tibetan Buddhism.
While the Dalai Lama acts as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, the Panchen Lama, the second
highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism, serves as a leading religious mentor. In the reincarnation cycles of Ti-
betan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama identifies the next Panchen Lama, who would
then discover the next Dalai Lama, and so forth. To date, there have been
fourteen Dalai Lamas and eleven Panchen Lamas; The current Dalai Lama,
Tenzin Gyatso, identified the 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, on
May 14, 1995.216
To express their utmost opposition toward Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan

heritage, the Chinese government abducted Gedhun Choekyi Nyima — who
was only six years old at the time — and his family members, just days after he
was identified by the Dalai Lama. At the time of his kidnapping on May 17, 1995,
he was considered “the world’s youngest political prisoner.”217 He and his family
members have not been seen since. At present, the Chinese government
The 11th Panchen Lama, Gedhun
claims that they took Gedhun Choekyi Nyima to protect him from “separatists,”
Choekyi Nyima, was kidnapped and that he is currently living safely in China. However, this has not been able
on May 17, 1995. He has not been
seen since. to be verified.
216 Gedhun Choekyi Nyima - The Panchen Lama, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, https://www.uscirf.gov/
religious-prisoners-conscience/current-rpocs/gedhun-choekyi-nyima-panchen-lama.
217 Senate Hearing 106-266, Challenges Facing the Next U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China -- (Includes Nomination Head-
ing of Adm. Joseph W. Prueher), Hearings before the Committee of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress,
First Session, Oct 27-29, 1999.
48
Shortly after the abduction of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the Chinese government announced that they
had selected Gyancain Norbu, a young Buddhist who was born to Communist Party members — and
himself a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),218 an advisory
body affiliated with the UFWD — as the 11th Panchen Lama.219 At first, Gyancain was largely out of public
view, but he has gradually started to participate in more public events. In fact, the Chinese government
often parades Gyancain around CCP gatherings, religious social events, and monasteries so that they
can push their own narrative and hand-picked successor onto the Tibetan community.220 In addition to
being the Beijing-approved Panchen Lama, Gyancain was also selected to serve as the vice president
of the Buddhist Association of China, a government-approved organization under the UFWD. As the vice
president of this association, he is known to echo the same rhetoric and ideology of the CCP, and regu-
larly states that Buddhism must “uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China.”221 He is there-
fore very unpopular among many Tibetans, who often refer to him as “the Chinese Panchen.”222
In 2007, the Chinese government’s State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA)223 passed a new law
called “Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism.”224
The legislation makes clear that all reincarnations must adhere to principles of “unification of the state,”
and undergo several approval processes.225 In essence, the CCP uses the law to exert complete control
over the reincarnation process which, in turn, helps them to tighten their grip over Tibetans. The current
Dalai Lama has publicly denounced this legislation and the regime’s authoritarian interference with
Tibetan religious affairs, highlighting how the Chinese government’s efforts are aimed “to eradicate our
Tibetan cultural traditions.”226
The tampering in Tibetan Buddhist reincarnations is a reflection of how the Chinese government per-
ceives the role of religion in society and more specifically, about the Dalai Lama as a leadership figure.
The Dalai Lama’s positive influence among the Tibetan people is viewed as a threat to the party, which
has — on multiple occasions — referred to him as a “wolf in monk’s robes'' and “a secessionist chief.”227
The Chinese government’s disruption of the reincarnation process, as well as its refusal to reveal the
whereabouts of the 11th Panchen Lama have sparked international outcry from foreign governments,
218 Apa Lhamo, Why the Chinese Communist Party Sees Tibetan Monks as ‘Troublemakers’, The Diplomat (Mar. 10, 2021), https://thediplo-
mat.com/2021/03/why-the-chinese-communist-party-sees-tibetan-monks-as-troublemakers/.
219 China urged to release Panchen Lama after 20 years, BBC News (May 17, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-32771242.
220 Tashi Wangchuk, Tenzin Dickyi, and Richard Finney, China’s Panchen Lama Tours Tibet to Push Chinese government Agenda, ‘Sinifica-
tion’ of Buddhism, Radio Free Asia (Oct. 29, 2020), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/panchen-10292020164639.html.
221 Jaime Flor Cruz, China’s Panchen Lama Gets High Profile, CNN World (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/03/03/
china.tibet/index.html.
222 ‘Chinese’ Panchen Lama Appears on TV, BBC News (Feb. 10, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1812130.stm.
223 The State Administration of Religious Affairs (SARA) was a department under the Chinese government that was specifically in charge of
the oversight of all religious affairs in the country. In 2018, SARA and its mandate officially was absorbed under the UFWD.
224 Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism (ICT Translation), Congressional Executive
Commission on China (July 18, 2007), https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-on-the-management-of-the-reincarna-
tion-of-living-buddhas-in-0.
225 国家宗教事务局令- 第5号 [The State Administration of Religious Affairs] , 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [The Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China] (July 23, 2007), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_923053.htm.
226 Reincarnation, His Holiness The 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, https://www.dalailama.com/messages/retirement-and-reincarnation/reincar-
nation.
227 Xinhua, Dalai Lama ‘Wolf in Monk’s Robes’: Official, China Daily (Mar. 7, 2011), https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/07/con-
tent_12131293.htm.
49
including members of the European Parliament,228 the United States Commission on International Reli-
gious Freedom,229 the chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Congress-
man Jim McGovern,230 and the former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo;231 civil society organizations,
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; and concerned global citizens. The Chinese
government’s actions are clear violations of religious freedom, freedom of thought and conscience, and
Article 9 of the UDHR which states “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.”232
They stand as strong indications of how the Chinese government continues to disrespect and sabotage
the culture and heritage of the Tibetan people.
Uyghur Region:
Appropriating
Islamic Texts
By distorting religious doctrine, the Chinese government attempts to control Islam’s influence in the
region in order to have it strictly align with the CCP’s values. Organizational bodies, including but not lim-
ited to the Islamic Association of China (IAC) and the SARA, are enlisted to parse through Islamic law and
tease out elements that can be “repurposed” to justify the Chinese government’s rule and give grounds
for a sinocentric society.233 This initiative places particular emphasis on the Uyghur translation of the Qu-
ran, highlighting passages that are congruent with state rhetoric.234 On top of that, the CCP announced
in November 2019 efforts to rewrite the Quran in its entirety to better reflect “socialist values.”235 Using
versions of the Quran that have not been approved by the CCP can be cause for arrest.236 The govern-
ment has allegedly also disseminated compilations of the state-sanctioned Islamic teachings to every
mosque in the Uyghur Region.237
228 David Thomas, Over 30 MPs from Belgium, Scotland, and EP join global call for the release of Panchen Lama of Tibet, The Tibet Post
(May 18, 2020), https://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/international/6774-over-30-mps-from-belgium,-scotland,-and-ep-join-global-
call-for-the-release-of-panchen-lama-of-tibet.
229 USCIRF Calls for Release of the Panchen Lama, The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (April 24, 2020),
https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/releases-statements/uscirf-calls-release-panchen-lama.
230 McGovern Statement on the Panchen Lama’s 30th Birthday, House Representative Jim McGovern (April 25, 2019), https://mcgovern.
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=398328.
231 CTA President welcomes US Secretary of State’s strong call for Panchen Lama’s release, Central Tibetan Administration, https://tibet.
net/us-secretary-of-state-to-china-reveal-the-panchen-lamas-whereabouts-immediately/
232 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
234 Id.
235 Sebastien Falleti, Xi Jinping veut réécrire la Bible pour l’adapter à la ligne du Parti communiste [Xi Jinping wants to rewrite the Bible to
adapt it along Communist Party lines], Le Figaro (Dec. 22, 2019), https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/xi-jinping-veut-reecrire-la-bible-pour-
l-adapter-a-la-ligne-du-parti-communiste-20191222.
236 Christian Shepherd, Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China’s war on Uighur Culture, Financial Times (Sep. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.
50
The Chinese government also attempts to control the religion by presiding over the recruitment, training,
and appointment of important religious leaders. In order to become a leader of a mosque or imam, stu-
dents can only study at one of 10 state-approved Islamic institutes where the curriculum is filled with po-
litical education and Marxist theory.238 Furthermore, in the Uyghur Region, imams are policed by security
personnel and undercover informants, and constantly risk dismissal, fines, and imprisonment if suspected
of violating a myriad of regulations and directives.239 According to a new report published by the Uyghur
Human Rights Project, since 2014, 1,046 imams and other religious figures have been detained for fulfilling
basic duties such as leading prayer circles or refusing to burn religious texts.240
The Chinese government’s effort to repress freedom of religion does not stop at the systemic level. The
government continues to implement policies that reshape the daily lives of Tibetans and Uyghurs.
The Disruption of Daily Life
Tibet:
Tightening
Religious Expression
The clamp down on religious expression has been perpetrated through political re-education classes,
and restrictions on worshipping and other religious practices. The Chinese government’s weaponiza-
tion of digital surveillance has also played a key role in the intensification.241 Openly venerating the Dalai
Lama or calling for the release of the Panchen Lama are considered crimes.242 Monks, nuns, community
leaders, and all supporters are forced to denounce these spiritual figures, or risk imprisonment under the
government’s “nationwide anti-organized crime program.”243 Under this program, anyone caught with
any pictures of the Dalai Lama or caught worshipping and supporting him are either detained, sent to
political re-education classes, interrogated, or even tortured.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Islam Disposessed: China’s Persecution of Uyghur Imams and Religious Figures, Uyghur Human Rights Project (May 13, 2021), https://uhrp.
org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Islam-Dispossessed_2021-05-15.pdf.
241 Refer to “Surveillance in an Orwellian Society: Online Surveillance” in the report
242 Tibetan Woman Jailed in Protest Over Panchen Lama is Released in Failing Health, Radio Free Asia (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.rfa.org/
english/news/tibet/released-08182020164629.html.
243 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: China—Tibet, United States Department of State, Office of International Religious Free-
dom (May 12, 2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/tibet/.
51
There have been countless people — not only religious figures, but also poets, intellectuals, writers, and
more — who have been punished simply for exercising their freedoms of expression and religion. For
example, Tibetan monk and prominent scholar Gō Sherab Gyatso was detained more than once for
expressing support of and owning a picture of the Dalai Lama, and for speaking up about the Chinese
government’s abuses and his desire for freedom.244 Gangbu Yudrum, a political activist, was detained
in 2008 for publicly calling for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet.245 He has since been arrested multiple
times again, in 2012 and 2021, because of his ongoing activism.246
Ever since Xi rose to power, the CCP’s control over religious institutions and religious expression has
escalated in an unprecedented manner to align with “Xi Jinping Thought” and his vision of the “Chinese
Dream.” In fact, it has been reported that all photos of the Dalai Lama in temples, private homes, and
even public areas have been replaced with photos of Xi.247
Curfews and Bans

on Public Gatherings
The Chinese government has labeled important events — including the peaceful demonstrations of the
1959 Tibetan Uprising, the pro-independence protests of 1987, the March 2008 rallies, the Dalai Lama’s
birthday, Tibetan New Year (Losar), and various CCP high-level political gatherings, among others248 — to
be “sensitive anniversaries and events.”249 As such, the strict regulations that are in place become even
harsher leading up to these events, where public gatherings are banned or subject to imposed curfews.
Extra security and roadblocks are set up, and government intimidation, harassment, and surveillance
intensifies. Events that are able to take place are subject to significant monitoring and may be forced
to shut down without notice should the Chinese security forces believe that the gathering has gotten
too big or has showcased any sign of Tibetan nationalism.250 These bans and security measures are yet
another tactic used by the government to tightly control the people of Tibet, providing no space for civil
society to openly and freely engage in cultural, religious, and social affairs.
244 Chinese Authorities Detain Tibetan Educator and Author in Sichuan Capital, Radio Free Asia (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.rfa.org/english/
news/tibet/detention-04052021184855.html.
245 China’s Arrest of Tibetan Writers Blocks Dissenting Views: Rights Group, Radio Free Asia (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.rfa.org/english/
news/tibet/views-04222021163150.html.
246 Chinese Police Arrest Six Prominent Tibetans in Kardze, Radio Free Asia (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/ar-
rest-04142021181927.html.
247 Sam McNeil, China Offers Glimpse of Tibetan Life Without the Dalai Lama, Associated Press News (June 16, 2021), https://apnews.com/
article/dalai-lama-tibet-china-europe-business-ee607f3daa747b03414c972541251306.
248 Access Denied: New Us Legislation, The Quest For Reciprocity In Europe And The Lockdown In Tibet, International Campaign for Tibet
(June 15, 2020), https://savetibet.org/access-denied-new-us-legislation-the-quest-for-reciprocity-in-europe-and-the-lockdown-in-tibet/.
249 China (Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) 2019 Human Rights Report, United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor (2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.
pdf.
250 Sarah Cook, Tibetan Buddhism: Religious Freedom in China, Freedom House (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/2017/battle-chi-
na-spirit-tibetan-buddhism-religious-freedom.
52
Due to the Chinese government’s ongoing lack of transparency and intense control over the entire coun-
try, curfews and other restrictions may be announced on “short notice” at any time.251 Such an environ-
ment deepens the sense of fear among society.
Uyghur Region:
Restricting
Religious Behavior
in Everyday Life
The minutiae of daily life in the Uyghur Region, ranging from religious attire to spiritual practices, is under
the scrutiny and regulation of the government. The Chinese government codified into law many of these
common practices that aim to restrict and punish religious behavior in daily life. In 2015, for example, the
local government passed the Xinjiang Religious Affairs Regulations which confine religious activity to
sanctioned realms and only permit religious expres-
The minutiae of daily sion in private spaces, effectively erasing religious
practices from public life.252 The regulations stipulate
life in the Uyghur region, that the possession of “undesirable items” such as
ranging from religious prayer rugs and the Quran can constitute “extremist
behavior.”253
attire to spiritual
practices, is under the Under the 2014 “Strike Hard” campaign, the gov-
ernment is attempting to remove any religious
scrutiny and regulation motifs that have the potential to inspire “religious
extremism.” This can include commonplace items
of the government. such as names and clothes. For example, Uyghur
babies who have Islamic or religious names are
barred from registering in the “hukou” household registration system through which healthcare and
education is accessed. 254
251 China Travel Advisory, United States Department of States• Bureau of Consular Affairs (June 16, 2021), https://travel.state.gov/content/
travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/china-travel-advisory.html.
252 Edward Wong, Wary of Islam, China Tightens a Vise of Rules, N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/world/
asia/19xinjiang.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
253 Ben Mauk, Inside Xinjiang’s Prison State, The New Yorker (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/chi-
na-xinjiang-prison-state-uighur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony.
254 China Bans 'Extreme' Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang's Uyghurs, Radio Free Asia (April 20, 2016) https://www.rfa.org/english/news/
uyghur/names-04202017093324.html.
53
In a similar vein, physical appearance is also systematically controlled through the regulation of commu-
nal institutions and the implementation of economic incentives. Public places, such as hospitals, libraries,
and banks can explicitly deny service to Uyghur women who wear veils or men who grow long beards
because they are considered by the state to have connotations that “incite religious extremism.”255 Some
social welfare payments have even stipulated that recipients must sign pledges not to wear veils prior to
receiving money.256 By exploiting the economic inequalities of the region, the government has created a
environment where it is not only unsafe, but also expensive to be Muslim.
In addition to assimilating the Uyghurs by standardizing physical appearance, the government also
heavily interferes with key religious practices from daily rituals to large holidays. Per the Xinjiang Religious
Affairs Regulations, religious activities can only take place in registered venues, and practice in govern-
ment offices, public schools, businesses, and “other places” is strictly prohibited.257 During the holy month
of Ramadan, which entails fasting from sunrise to sunset, there are accounts of students being forced
to eat in front of their teachers and blocked from attending prayers.258 Civil servants and teachers have
reportedly been forced to sign pledges ensuring that they have not been fasting.259 The local Chinese
government has even instituted programs that require Uyghurs to physically exert themselves in order
to deter them from fasting.260 The Chinese government also controls how the Uyghur Muslims make their
required religious pilgrimage to Mecca by running government-operated tours or seizing passports al-
together. No part of Islam, from that which is most sacred to the most ordinary, is off limits from govern-
ment intrusion. The Chinese government is creating an environment so inhospitable to the Muslims that
neither the Uyghurs of today nor the future are able to maintain their religious faith.
Besides increased scrutiny and regulations, the “Strike Hard” campaign also gave the local government
authorization to arrest Uyghurs for everyday activities critical to their religious practice. According to
internal documents, police can arrest Uyghurs without substantial justification. Uyghurs can be arrested
for committing activities as banal as group prayer, public dancing, and reading scriptures.261 The large
waves of detentions were in large part driven by quotas given to police, forcing them to arbitrarily arrest
scores of people who have otherwise committed no crime.262
On top of punishing the Uyghur people from living their life, the Chinese government hopes to lure Uyghur
children away from their religion.

256 Id. at 78.
257 Wong, supra note 252.
258 Emily Rauhala, China Bans Ramadan Fasting for Officials, Students in Restive Northwest, Time (Jul.3, 2014), https://time.com/2952833/
china-bans-ramadan-fasting-for-officials-students-in-restive-northwest/.
259 China bans Xinjiang officials from observing Ramadan fast, BBC (Jul. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-28123267.
262 Id at 74.
54
Reducing
the Religiosity
Among Youth
The Chinese government has implemented laws and programs to curtail the intergenerational transmis-
sion of religion. The programs are designed to reduce a desire to continue religious practices among the
youth to make certain that the religious and cultural identity of the Uyghur people can not continue as is.
These invasive regulations aim to sever children’s ties from their culture and family. At school, children are
heavily supervised to ensure that they do not participate in religious activities.263 In addition, atheism is
promoted in school textbooks to dilute religiosity among youth.264 Just as religious leaders are meticu-
lously screened for party loyalty, community leaders are also vetted for religious piety. Adults and ed-
ucators who spend time with children are thoroughly vetted to ensure that devout believers do not be-
come teachers or professors who may influence the students.265 The government has even stepped in to
dictate how parents can or can not raise their children. In 2016, new education rules stated that parents
and guardians could not “organise, lure or force minors into attending religious activities” nor could they
force their children to wear “extremist” clothing, a term that connotes traditional Uyghur clothing.266 The
goal of these measures is to limit children’s exposure to Islam in order to weaken their sense of belonging
to the Uyghur people.
The government also purposely promotes habits that are restricted in the Muslim faith.267 For example,
the Uyghur government has worked to boost the use of alcohol and cigarettes, substances traditionally
forbidden for Muslims, among children. While seemingly unrelated, a local Chinese government cadre
admitted that cigarettes and alcohol are purposely paired with glossy advertisements and “eye-catch-
ing displays” to tempt Uyghur children who have quit smoking and drinking due to their Muslim faith. In
June 2015, a beer festival and drinking competition took place in southern Xinjiang, which the state me-
dia proudly admitted was an attempt to “squeeze the space for illegal religious promotion.”268
263 Chelsey Zhu, Constantly Watched But Nearly Invisible, The Daily Pennsylvanian (Sep. 30, 2020), https://www.34st.com/article/2020/09/
uyghur-college-students-xinjiang-china-internment-camps.
264 Lin Yi, A failure in ‘designed citizenship’: A case study in a minority-Han merger school in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 17Japa-
nese Journal of Political Science 22, 29 (2016).
265 Cook, supra note 25.
266 China targets parents in new religion rules for Xinjiang, Reuters (Oct.11, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/china-
targets-parents-in-new-religion-rules-for-xinjiang-idUSKCN12C0A6.
267 Simon Denyer, China orders Muslim shopkeepers to sell alcohol, cigarettes, to ‘weaken’ Islam, The Washington Post (May 5, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/05/china-orders-muslim-shopkeepers-to-sell-alcohol-cigarettes-to-weaken-is-
lam/.
268 Exiles angered as China holds beer festival in Muslim county, Reuters (Jun 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ramadan-chi-
na-idUSKBN0P20L620150622.
55
From explicit legislation to clever market schemes, the Chinese government has an extensive series of
stratagems to undermine religion’s authority in Tibetan and Uyghur society.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Tactics of Religious Repression Used in Tibet and the Uyghur Region
TIBET UYGHUR REGION
→ Appropriating for tourism → Destroying mosques and shrines

→ Heavy policing of religious sites → Heavy policing of religious sites
Religious sites → Limiting worshippers' access to → Increasing entrance fees to prevent
monasteries and temples locals from entering often
→ Replacing flag flying toward Mecca

→ Banning prayer flags, ancient art,
Symbols of religion at mosques with the Chinese flag
statues, and sacred texts
→ Banning possession of religious texts
→ Limiting the number of monks and → Initiating government recruitment

Government oversight nuns who are able to perform rituals and training of Imams
of religious personnel → Disrupting the reincarnation process → Appointing religious leaders
→ Requiring approval from the Chinese → Forbidding public prayer sessions or

Freedom of assembly government to host religious gatherings religious activities
→ Washing religious texts and photos → Selecting quotes from the Quran that
Doctrinal manipulation with “Xi Jinping Thought” and CCP align with CCP ideology
ideology
→ Banning images and veneration of → Banning women from wearing hijabs

His Holiness the Dalai Lama in public
Policing daily → Intense controlling of religious gath- → Banning beards on men
erings and prayer → Banned names with religious under-
religious life
→ Dictating what clothing can be worn, tones/that sound religious
which festivals can be celebrated, and → Forcing civil servants to eat during
which food is acceptable to be eaten religious fasting holidays
→ Imposing curfews and banning gath- → Confiscating passports to prevent

erings during important holidays (Tibet- Uyghurs from performing the Hajj pil-
Restricting travel an New Year, Dalai Lama’s birthday) grimage to Mecca on their own
→ Confiscating passports to restrict
religious pilgrimages
→ Promoting atheism → Promoting atheism

→ Mandating political re-education → Encouraging habits that are forbid-
Reducing the religiosity classes den in Islam (eg. the consumption of
of future generations alcohol and cigarettes)
→ Mandating political re-education
classes
56
SURVEILLANCE IN
AN ORWELLIAN
SOCIETY
57
Surveillance remains one of the Chinese government’s central tactics of suppression. The govern-
ment’s emphasis and reliance on surveillance dates back to as early as the Cultural Revolution. Today,
surveillance is conducted not only within mainland China, but also in Tibet and the Uyghur Region;
what has unfolded in these two regions in the past few decades is likely to extend to Hong Kong in
the coming years as well, especially as the city’s freedoms continue to backslide under its draconian
national security law.
The Chinese government’s constant monitoring of people has a drastic impact on their livelihoods and
freedoms given that at any time the actions and even thoughts of thousands of individuals are surveilled
and heavily scrutinized by the regime. It is impossible to escape the Chinese government’s watchful eye,
since their surveillance circumvents boundaries and are ubiquitous both offline and online.
Offline Surveillance
Ever since Chinese troops invaded Tibet and the Uyghur Region, offline surveillance has been omni-
present in all aspects of life. There are now fears that the same tactics of offline surveillance will be
applied in Hong Kong in the future.
Tibet:
Community
Infiltration and
Heavy Monitoring
For decades, the Chinese government has continuously intensified their presence in TAR and Tibetan
communities throughout China in order to keep a close eye on the Tibetan people. Their surveillance
intensified after the 1959 Tibetan Uprising Day and the March 2008 demonstrations, and continues at the
whim of the Chinese government. The intensification — which includes heavier police and military pres-
ence in the streets, both in uniform or undercover as plainclothes officers — is largely due to the govern-
ment’s desire to tightly put a lid on freedoms, dissent, and protests. There are also many checkpoints,
where people are forced to share government documents — including certificates of residence, identity
cards, vehicle registrations, and even documentation indicating whether or not they have a criminal
58
record269 — and where officers ensure that travelers are not carrying items that are considered to be
dangerous to the government, such as pictures of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan flags, or books about Tibetan
freedom and independence. Similar to the Cultural Revolution, people are encouraged to spy on one
another, and to report to the police if they suspect anyone of “separatism” or “religious extremism.”270
Surveillance is heightened especially within monasteries and nunneries. In line with the Chinese govern-
ment’s religious oppression, police and military personnel have been embedded in these institutions to
ensure that events, publications, speeches, and other texts that are studied “serve the goals of the CCP
and Chinese government.”271 The increased physical presence of the military and police has added an-
other layer of fear and is used as a tactic of intimidation to coerce people to align strictly with the party’s
goals and ideologies.
Tibet has often been referred to as “China’s laboratory for repression,” because the Chinese government
has tried a variety of surveillance methods in the region. As a result of the creation of the “grid system of
social management,” which was spearheaded by then-Party Secretary of TAR Chen Quanguo, offline
surveillance escalated dramatically in 2011.272 273 Under this system, entire neighborhoods were divided
into smaller segments, allowing for more micro-level monitoring and even home searches. It introduced
“convenience police-posts,” which are disguised as community centers274 275 and volunteer groups called
the “Red Armband Patrols,”276 which were reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution’s “Red Guards.”
The “grid system of social management” was so successful that the CCP subsequently refined the sys-
tem and implemented it in the Uyghur Region.
269 Tsering Woeser, Checkpoint on the road to Lhasa, New Statesman (October 18, 2012), https://www.newstatesman.com/lifestyle/life-
style/2012/10/checkpoint-road-lhasa.
270 United States Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom, supra note 215.
271 Congressional Executive Commission on China, supra note 84.
272 A Joint Solidarity Statement. UN Human Rights Declaration: 70 Year Milestone – Stand Up for Human Rights for All People Under Chinese
Rule, International Tibet Network (December 9, 2018), https://tibetnetwork.org/hrd2018_jointstatement/.
273 Chen Quanguo in Tibet, Free Tibet, https://freetibet.org/take-action/ban-chen/chen-in-tibet.
274 Chun Han Wong, China’s Hard Edge: The Leader of Beijing’s Muslim Crackdown Gains Influence, Wall Street Journal (April 7, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-hard-edge-the-leader-of-beijings-muslim-crackdown-gains-influence-11554655886.
275 United States Department of State, Office of Religious Freedom, supra note 228.
276 China: Alarming New Surveillance, Security in Tibet, Human Rights Watch (March 20, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/20/chi-
na-alarming-new-surveillance-security-tibet.
59
Uyghur Region:
The Creation of
a Police State
The erosion of cultural-religious identity among the Uyghur people — which is enforced through vigilant
monitoring — has resulted in the most modern and invasive iteration of a police state. Through extensive
laws and regulations, the government has painstakingly articulated a litany of illegal behaviors that
the police can then actualize through wakeful enforcement. The result is a world where no action goes
unmonitored, unrecorded, and unpunished.
Police are explicitly told to supervise Uyghurs and pay close attention to religious activity that can be
linked to “extremism.” In order to scrutinize the Uyghur population to the extent required, hundreds of
thousands of police are dispatched and organized into networks of units. This system called the “grid
management system” was pioneered by XUAR party secretary Chen Quanguo, who piloted this surveil-
lance methodology in Tibet.277 Under this system, the police divide each city or village into squares; every
square has a police station that collect information on the inhabitants through regular house visits.278
This information is corroborated through police officers' extensive databases with detailed tracking infor-
mation from where people refueled their cars and which hotels they have stayed in.279 In less populous
areas, there is a sub-management arrangement that pairs a unit of six policemen or local officials with
one native Uyghur who goes from house to house compiling dossiers of residents’ personal informa-
tion.280 Some of these units may conduct random police raids in search of illegal activity.281
Busier public areas are also surveilled through security checkpoints, which have become ubiquitous in
the region. Many are equipped with armed guards, metal detectors, and police patrols in armed vehi-
cles.282 At major transit points, the identity cards of all passengers are scanned, photos are taken, and
fingerprints are obtained, and women are demanded to remove their headscarves.283 Travellers have to
undergo three rounds of bag checks before they are able to buy a ticket.284
277 China has turned Xinjiang into a police state like no other, The Economist (May 31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/brief-
ing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-a-police-state-like-no-other.
278 Yael Grauer, Revealed: Massive Chinese Police Database, The Intercept (Jan. 29, 2021), https://theintercept.com/2021/01/29/china-uy-
ghur-muslim-surveillance-police/.
279 Bitter Winter, The Police Region of Xinjiang: Checkpoints, Camps, and Fear, World Uyghur Congress (May 12, 2020), https://www.uyghur-
congress.org/en/the-police-region-of-xinjiang-checkpoints-camps-and-fear/.
280 ‘Extremist’ behavior is recounted in detail under “Religious Suppression -- Uyghur Region: Restricting Religious Behavior in Everyday Life.”
281 Mauk, supra note 253
282 Id.
283 The Economist, supra note 277.
284 Id.
60
In regards to activity that is difficult to monitor, the local government relies on willing community mem-
bers to police other residents. Monetary awards are regularly offered to informants who provide infor-
mation about the illegal behaviors of Uyghurs in their homes.285 The state may threaten Uyghurs with the
loss of social benefits, dismissal from work, expulsion from universities and fines if they are made aware
of any transgressions.286 This creates a toxic atmosphere of distrust, self-censorship, and surveillance,
fracturing community ties and fragmenting Uyghur society.
In addition to this informal network of informants, the Chinese government also carried out the “Pair Up
and Become Family” program.287 Under this program, male Han Chinese officials, dubbed “relatives,” are
assigned to monitor Uyghur homes where they teach Chinese and give lessons on political indoctrina-
tion.288 They stay in Uyghur homes for up to six days every two months, where they work, eat, and report-
edly sleep in the same bed together.289 There are a number of disturbing accounts from Uyghur women
who reveal that they have been taken advantage of when being forced to sleep in the same space
with officials.290 According to a report in 2018, 1.1 million officials had already been paired with 1.6 million
families, approximately half of the number of Uyghur households in the region.291 The “Pair Up” program
demonstrates the institutional ways in which mass
rape of Uyghur women are implemented under the The CCP’s surveillance
guise of surveillance and political indoctrination.
knows no bounds and,
The Uyghur Region demonstrates how surveillance
has become formalized and normalized through
disturbingly, has made
intricate methodologies of policing and government its way into the most
oversight. The CCP’s surveillance knows no bounds
and, disturbingly, has made its way into the most intimate corners of
intimate corners of home life. home life.

286 Id.
287 Male Chinese ‘Relatives’ Assigned to Uyghur Homes Co-sleep With Female ‘Hosts’, Radio Free Asia (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.rfa.org/
english/news/uyghur/cosleeping-10312019160528.html.
288 Id.
289 Alexandra Ma, China is reportedly sending men to sleep in the same beds as Uighur Muslim women while their husbands are in prison
camps, Business Insider (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-uighur-monitor-home-shared-bed-report-2019-11?op=1.
290 Rosie Perper, 'This is mass rape': Uighur activist condemns program said to pay Chinese men to sleep with Uighur women to promote
'ethnic unity', Business Insider (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.insider.com/uighur-activists-mass-rape-chinese-men-xinjiang-2019-12.
291 Fact Check: Lies on Xinjiang-related issues versus the truth, Xinhua (Feb. 15, 2021), http://www.xinhuanet.com/en-
glish/2021-02/05/c_139723816.htm.
61
Hong Kong:
Emerging Espionage
Following the implementation of the national security law in Hong Kong, a national security bureau was
set up to specifically examine and investigate cases that may have violated the legislation’s stipula-
tions.292 Activists, including Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow, reported that they were followed by state
agents, and that surveillance vehicles — likely from the new bureau — were stationed outside of their
homes.293 294 In a particular incident, former pro-democracy politician Ted Hui confronted the agents
who were monitoring him in a car with extensive filming equipment. The car escaped and injured him in
the process.295 Notably, in the one-month period after the national security law came into effect, at least
five activists reported being followed. Although the figures are likely to be higher, most pro-democracy
activists are currently imprisoned and are unable to report on their experiences.
Additionally, in November 2020, the HKPF has spearheaded a “National Security Reporting Hotline,”
encouraging citizens to report on community members, colleagues, teachers, and even family mem-
bers, should they suspect someone of breaching the national security law. 296 Such a tip-off line cre-
ates an atmosphere of fear and distrust in order for the state to exert stronger pressure on society, to
achieve far-reaching thought control, and to ensure self-censorship. In essence, this hotline has turned
regular citizens into community informants for the party to help surveil the thoughts, comments, and
actions of society. 297
The invasive level of monitoring creates the illusion that the government is inescapable. There is no room
for freedom of thought and expression, as there are constant fears that one may be punished by the
government. The Chinese government has used technology to perfect their veil of omniscience.
292 China’s National Security Office to Open Permanent Base in Hong Kong, Reuters (April 23, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/hong-
kong-security/chinas-national-security-office-to-open-permanent-base-in-hong-kong-idUSL4N2MG2I8.
293 Hong Kong activist Joshua Wong: ‘A few cars are following me’, BBC News (July 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-
china-53491274.
294 Zhou Ting's apartment under surveillance and Huang Zhifeng suspected of being followed by Guoan, Apple Daily (Oct. 8, 2020), https://
hk.appledaily.com/local/20200810/6D5R4MWPSD5K4QZ2W7XBI46RW4/.
295 Anzuna, Many pan-citizens claimed that Zhou Ting was followed by mysterious people and received far more attention than Huang
Zhifeng and Xu Zhifeng, HK01 (Aug. 15, 2020), https://bit.ly/3xCNcUL.
296 Hong Kong: HRF Sends UN Urgent Appeal to Condemn National Security Law, Human Rights Foundation (Nov. 25, 2020), https://hrf.org/
hong-kong-hrf-sends-un-urgent-appeal-to-condemn-national-security-law/.
297 Id.
62
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Offline Surveillance Tactics Used In Each Region

→ Police presence, → Police presence, both → Individuals are encour-
both in uniform or as in uniform or as plain- aged to spy on
plainclothes officers, is clothes officers, is evident each other
evident in everyday life, in everyday life, including
including at religious at religious institutions
Community infiltration institutions and at home and at home searches
searches → Individuals are en-
→ Individuals are encour- couraged to spy on each
aged to spy on other
each other → “Pair Up and Become
Family” program
Security checkpoints X X
→ Spearheaded first → Refined and used in
Grid-system monitoring in Tibet the Uyghur Region
Online Surveillance
The Chinese government has gone to great

lengths to censor and monitor access to informa-
tion in the digital space within the country. These
efforts are colloquially referred to as the “Great
Firewall.” The restricted internet is only filled with
propaganda and messaging that strictly align
with the CCP’s ideologies. It is impossible to open-
ly post and engage with content that is deemed
to be a threat to the party — those who dare to
do so are immediately censored, or risk impriso-
Online surveillance has expanded the Chinese government's reach into
the daily aspects of everyday life.
63
ment, fines, and threats from the government. 298 The Great Firewall is fully enforced within Tibet and
the Uyghur Region, and has yet to expand into Hong Kong. However, when the national security law
was passed in Hong Kong in July 2020, many activists in the city decided to either close their online
profiles, erase personal content on social media, or change their usernames to hide their identities in
order to better protect themselves should greater government censorship and monitoring arise. 299
Overtime, China’s system of mass surveillance has also expanded due to the advent of new technol-
ogies, including but not limited to, smartphones, mobile applications, artificial intelligence (AI), big
data analysis, movement tracking, and facial recognition systems. These technological advancements
have resulted in a greater loss of privacy and even more human rights abuses, expanding the Chinese
government’s reach into the most personal parts of peoples’ lives.300
Tibet:
Plugged In but
Disconnected
from the World
The Chinese government’s efforts to quash dissent,

demand ideological compliance, and silence criti-
cism can aptly be described as “repression without
borders.”301 The constant surveillance conducted
by the government is expanding and evolving due
to the newest emerging technologies. For exam-
ple, checkpoints, monasteries, “convenience po-
lice-posts” and city streets are lined with video sur-
veillance cameras equipped with facial recognition
Example of a police checkpoint in Lhasa
298 Greg Baker, Great Firewall of China closes loopholes, Reporters Without Borders (Oct. 9, 2017), https://rsf.org/en/news/great-fire-
wall-china-closes-loopholes.
299 Hong Kong’s National Security Law: The Nail in the Coffin for One Country, Two Systems, Human Rights Foundation (Jul. 1, 2020), https://
hrf.org/hong-kongs-national-security-law-the-nail-in-the-coffin-for-one-country-two-systems/.
300 Key Takeaways from HRF’s Event Series on China, AI, and Human Rights, Human Rights Foundation (Nov. 2, 2020), https://hrf.org/key-
takeaways-from-hrfs-event-series-on-china-ai-and-human-rights/.
301 Testimony of Tenzin Dorjee, Tibet Action Institute, before the Congressional Executive Commission on China (Sep. 30, 2020), https://www.
cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Dorjee%20CECC%20Testimony%20Final%20Final.pdf.
64
technologies,302 and AI.303 The Chinese government has started to build extensive biometric collections,
utilizing advanced algorithms and high-tech systems to develop databases containing fingerprints,
voice patterns, and even urine and DNA samples.304 Not only are these practices and collections viola-
tions of privacy, they are also incredibly discriminatory since they have been developed to specifically
target religious minorities by detecting facial features, attire, and other identity indicators.305 Further-
more, due to the grid management system, police units assigned have “access to video and commu-
nications feed” within each of their respective grid areas, allowing for even more surveillance over the
everyday actions and thoughts of these communities.306
The Chinese government’s sophisticated use of surveillance is evident in the digital space and, in partic-
ular through the Great Firewall. The juxtaposition between being connected to the internet and simulta-
neously disconnected from the rest of the world due to extreme censorship, has been referred to as “dig-
ital apartheid.”307 Notably, it is not uncommon for widespread internet shutdowns to occur during and
after mass gatherings, pro-democracy demonstrations and self-immolations, further isolating Tibetans
from the rest of the world.308
Digital security, privacy and anonymity are non-existent for the Tibetan people since the CCP has
mandated that real names are used when registering for SIM cards, internet access, and all online plat-
forms.309 As a result of this requirement, Tibetans experience significant limitations to their freedom of
expression, firstly because of the internet censorship, and secondly because of their lack of anonymity
which places them at a heightened risk of being detained if
they share their candid thoughts and opinions online. In fact,
there have been many examples of Tibetans who have been
unjustly punished by the government for their private mes-
sages via mobile applications. For example, in 2019, Sonam
Palden, a young Tibetan Buddhist monk, was arrested for
sharing a poem — titled “Father Tongue” — which expressed
his views on Beijing’s suppression of the Tibetan language
via WeChat, a Chinese messaging and social media phone
WeChat is one of the most popular apps used in China. In
addition to text messaging, the app also allows for making application.310 He remains detained incommunicado to this
mobile payments, networking, and location-sharing.
302 Chris Meserole, Technological surveillance of religion in China, Brookings Institute (Jul. 22, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2020/07/Meserole_USCIRF-testimony_7.21.20.pdf.
303 Tibet Raised at UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, Central Tibetan Administration (November 27, 2018), https://tibet.net/tibet-
bureau-geneva-at-un-forum-on-business-and-human-rights/.
304 China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy, Human Rights Watch (October 22, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/
china-voice-biometric-collection-threatens-privacy.
305 Chris Meserole, supra note 302.
306 Id.
307 Nithin Coca, China’s Digital Wall Around Tibet, .coda (May 16, 2019), https://www.codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/china-digi-
tal-wall-tibet/.
308 Oiwan Lam, In Tibet and Uyghur Regions, Internet Blackouts Are the Norm, Advox (Dec. 17, 2013), https://advox.globalvoices.
org/2013/12/17/in-chinas-ethnic-minority-regions-internet-blackouts-are-the-norm/.
309 Chris Meserole, supra note 302.
310 Submission to the UN committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Follow-up to the concluding observations of China’s
Combined Fourteenth to Seventh Periodic Reports, Tibet Advocacy Coalition (July 30, 2020), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/
Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CERD_NGS_CHN_43689_E.pdf at 11.
65
day. In 2021, it was reported that several Tibetan teenagers were arrested and tortured simply for not
registering and receiving approval for the creation of a WeChat group chat.311 Merely communicating
with Tibetans overseas has also served as grounds for arrest or increased police surveillance.312 Addition-
ally, similar to how physical photos of the Dalai Lama are confiscated, digital photos are censored and
filtered. Those caught with these photos have been reportedly arbitrarily detained.313
The government has claimed that its use of mass surveillance is necessary to enhance “the development
and long-term stability” of “a beautiful Tibet” for “the happiness of the people.”314 However, the reality is
far from it as the Tibetan people continue to live under the Chinese government’s extreme suppression.315
Uyghur Region:
Building a Digital
Panopticon
In the Uyghur Region, surveillance technology is justified by the CCP to the platitudinous phrases of
“counter-terrorism” and “combat extremism.” In every corner of the region, the Chinese government is
experimenting with the most advanced surveillance technology to perfect their police state into an un-
precedented digital panopticon.
While the internet is often viewed as an untameable and overgrown wasteland, the Chinese government
has sought to master the domain. Initially, the government would impose internet shutdowns after social
activism and intense political events, such as the 2009 protests. In some extreme cases, network shut-
downs included mobile networks so that even phone calls couldn’t be made into and from the region.316
In the past decade, online surveillance has embraced the latest emerging technologies, including cut-
ting-edge cloud-based databases and AI-driven technology. The objective is to monitor all internet
activity, filter through the information, then organize the data into a comprehensive database. In order
311 Three Tibetan Teens Arrested, One Put in Hospital, Over Failure to Register Chat Group, Radio Free Asia (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.rfa.
org/english/news/tibet/teens-03032021205631.html.
312 China’s Crackdowns on Tengdro Monastery and Restrictions on Communications in Tibet, Human Rights Watch (July 6, 2021), https://
www.hrw.org/report/2021/07/06/prosecute-them-awesome-power/chinas-crackdown-tengdro-monastery-and-restrictions.
313 China surveillance: WeChat users’ messages on Dalai Lama, Tibet disappear, Tibet Action Institute, https://tibetaction.net/project/chi-
na-surveillance-wechat-users-messages-on-dalai-lama-tibet-disappear/.
314 Development of Tibet in the New Era in Tibet -- Its Ownership And Human Rights Situation, Information Office of the State Council of The
People's Republic of China (Sep. 1992), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2019-03/28/content_74622432.htm.
315 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China- Tibet, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/tibet/
316 Lam, supra note 308.
66
to tackle this enormous goal, residents in the Uyghur Region are forced to install “nanny apps” onto their
personal phones.317 If an individual’s device has not downloaded the software, they can be detained for
up to 10 days.318 The app is intended to “prevent [residents] from accessing terrorist information,” as well
as “illegal religious” activity and “harmful information.” In reality, the state uses the app’s hidden func-
tionalities to observe personal messages and activity.319 The app’s “remote control” feature can allow
state actors or hackers to manipulate or steal from a person’s home network.320 Data can also be forcibly
retrieved by requiring Uyghurs to give their phones to police, who then download their phone content for
later analysis and scrutiny.321
Many of China’s leading AI startups are dedicated to filtering through enormous amounts of text mes-
sages, as well as other forms of media messages, mostly on the commonly used super-app Wechat.
This advanced technology enables the government to sort through massive amounts of information by
filtering for keywords that are deemed to be extremist, such as “Quran” or “Allah.”322 AI technology can
also transcribe Uyghur speech sent in audio messages and then screen the transcripts for keywords as
well.323 One start-up is working on “voice pattern” samples of individuals to establish a national voice
database.324 The company hopes to develop a surveillance system that can identify targeted voices in
phone conversations or recorded messages.325 Much of the information collected is then stored on cloud
computing-based systems and organized using data analytics to more efficiently filter personal infor-
mation.326 The government’s goal is to connect databases across regions and government departments
to improve data sharing. By amalgamating both public and private information, the government can use
voice recordings, personal communications, medical history, and even delivery records to account for
every person’s whereabouts at any given point in time.327
In addition to an extensive dossier of a person’s whereabouts, the Chinese government is attempting

to create a database of “multi-modal” biometric portraits of all residents in the Uyghur Region aged 12
to 65 under the Population Registration Program,328 including DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and
blood types.329 Sensitive biometrics, such as DNA and blood type, are collected by health personnel as
part of the Physicals for All program.330 The program offers free medical screenings for all residents for
317 Lam, China's Xinjiang Residents Are Being Forced to Install Surveillance Apps on Mobile Phones, Global Voices (July 19, 2017), https://
globalvoices.org/2017/07/19/chinas-xinjiang-residents-are-being-forced-to-install-surveillance-apps-on-mobile-phones/.
318 Phil Muncaster, Xinjiang Users Arrested over State Spyware Usage, Info Security Magazine (Jul. 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/3e7DzGc.
321 Darren Byler, The Xinjiang Data Police, Noema Magazine (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.noemamag.com/the-xinjiang-data-police/.
323 Id.
324 China: Voice Biometric Collection Threatens Privacy, Human Rights Watch (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/chi-
na-voice-biometric-collection-threatens-privacy.
325 China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent.
327 Id.
328 China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions, Human Rights Watch (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-mi-
nority-region-collects-dna-millions.
329 Id.
330 Sui-Lee Wee, China Uses DNA to Track Its People, With the Help of American Expertise, NY Times (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/02/21/business/china-xinjiang-uighur-dna-thermo-fisher.html.
67
the “purpose” of improving healthcare, detecting major diseases, and establishing digital health re-
cords.331 This biometric database is once more justified as a way to bring “scientific decision-making”
into policymaking with the end goals of alleged poverty alleviation, improved management, and social
stability.332 In actuality, this information is sent to the county police bureau for profiling and linked to each
person’s national identification number.333 The accumulation of such sensitive information only fortifies
the Chinese government’s ability to repress the Uyghur population.
With facial recognition cameras, the Chinese government is able to overcome a historically troublesome
hurdle to population control — large crowds. City streets in the Uyghur Region are tightly lined with video
cameras that are equipped with the capacity to identify pedestrians, even those wearing masks,334 read
car number plates, and correlate them with the face of the driver.335 One company in particular claimed
that its software could automate the identification of Uyghur faces based on physiological phenotypes.336
The government capitalizes on its surveillance infrastructure in order to arrest more “suspicious” persons
who will then be funnelled into internment camps. The ultimate goal of these comprehensive surveillance
measures is to be able to “predict … individuals posing heightened risks” to public “safety.”337 The gov-
ernment hopes that they will be able to rely on an algorithm to determine future “security threats'' and
preemptively eliminate them. In the Uyghur Region, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) is the
regional data system used to determine individuals who are considered security threats by the state.338
If an individual is flagged as a potential terrorist in IJOP, they are automatically barred from entering
public institutions such as hospitals, banks, parks, or shopping centers without the police being alert-
ed.339 Other programs perform automatic searches of Uyghur internet activity and compare the activity
to the database to look for predictors of “abnormal” behavior.340 The police then follow-up and conduct
face-to-face interviews to assess whether the individual should be given a rating of “safe,” “average,”
or “unsafe.”341 Determinants of an “unsafe” rating include many factors discussed in detail in previous
sections: whether or not they are Uyghur, if they pray regularly, have an immediate relative living abroad,
travelled abroad, or have taught their children about Islam in their home.342 Those with an “unsafe rat-
ing” are immediately detained and asked to name others who are also “unsafe.”343 In any given week,
the system can flag approximately 25,000 “suspicious persons,” of which more than half will be sent to

332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Ross Andersen, The Panopticon is Already Here, The Atlantic (Sep. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/
china-ai-surveillance/614197/.
335 The Economist, supra note 277.
336 Darren Byler, China’s Hi-tech war on its Muslim minority, The Guardian (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/apr/11/
china-hi-tech-war-on-muslim-minority-xinjiang-uighurs-surveillance-face-recognition.
337 Maya Wang, Opinion: China’s dystopian push to revolutionize surveillance, Washington Post (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/08/18/chinas-dystopian-push-to-revolutionize-surveillance/.
338 China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App, Human Rights Watch (May 1, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass.
339 Id.
340 Elaine Yu, Xinjiang surveillance app targets legal, everyday behavior: rights group, Agence France Press (May 1, 2019), http://southasia-
journal.net/xinjiang-surveillance-app-targets-legal-everyday-behaviour-rights-group/.
342 Id.
343 Id.
68
internment camps.344 Through their systematic spying, the Chinese government was able to “legally”
prosecute more than 350,000 people in 2017 and 2018.345
The Chinese government has harnessed the “The only kind of U[y]ghur
power of AI and other technology to digitize the
repression of the Uyghur people. Through the life that can be
digital mechanization of policing, it is evident
that the government sees no humanity in the
recognised by the state is
Uyghur people: “The only kind of U[y]ghur life the one that the
that can be recognised by the state is the one
that the computer sees.”346
computer sees.” 346
Hong Kong:
Intensified Fears
Since the 2014 Umbrella Movement, activists have reported possible surveillance by the Chinese gov-
ernment during phone calls. According to a US cybersecurity company, there was at least one spy ring
coordinated by the Chinese government to surveil Hong Kong activists. One method that was used to
infiltrate activists’ mobile phones was to send text messages containing malware, which, when opened,
gave hackers access to the phones’ stored information.347
Concerns over digital surveillance intensified during the 2019 protests. Online, activists resorted to se-
cured messaging services like Telegram which were used to organize some of the largest protests in the
city’s history. However, the Hong Kong government managed to infiltrate certain protest-related Tele-
gram groups, and protesters searched for yet another method of secure communication. Bluetooth be-
came a popular way to spread protest information as the transmission is offline and cannot be traced.
It has not yet been proven whether or not the Chinese government has deployed the same invasive
technologies in Tibet and the Uyghur Region across Hong Kong to conduct surveillance. However, there
have been increasing concerns among Hong Kong’s population since it has been reported that the HKPF
have purchased these technologies from Chinese companies affiliated with the atrocities in the Uyghur

345 Id.
347 Suzanne Sataline, Hong Kong activists fear they are being monitored by Beijing, The Guardian (Dec. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/dec/14/hong-kong-activists-beijing-chinese-spying-pro-democracy.
69
Region. Furthermore, current laws in Hong Kong do not explicitly bar police from using these technolo-
gies to monitor Hong Kong citizens.348 In order to further protect themselves from digital surveillance at
pro-democracy demonstrations and everyday life, protestors and concerned citizens have also opted
to turn off location tracking on their mobile devices and to hide their faces by wearing masks and hel-
mets — some even have decided to no longer carry a personal mobile phone with them.349 Ever since the
passage of the national security law, there have been increased fears that Hong Kong is quickly becom-
ing a police-state.350
Additionally, doxxing by the pro-Beijing camp has become an issue that many protesters have become
worried about. Around the height of the 2019 protests, the “HK Leaks” website emerged as a doxxing tool
to instill fear amongst pro-democracy activists. The website collected and leaked personal information,
including Hong Kong identification card numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and photos of
protesters, activists, and opposition politicians. It targeted anyone — including both well-known activists
and individual protestors — who had a pro-democracy stance. Thousands of people have been doxxed
and listed on the website, which was registered on a Russian domain. The Russian origin of the website
prevented the victims from taking the website down through legal means in Hong Kong. As of June 2021,
the website is still live.351
The Chinese government’s holistic approach to surveillance, evident both in the offline and online
spheres, portray their strong desires to amplify the party’s control and power. Understanding how the
state has weaponized surveillance technologies in Tibet and the Uyghur Region, Hongkongers fully
grasp how China’s surveillance tactics know no borders or limits — and may one day be inescapable
within the once-free city.
348 Blake Schmidt, Hong Kong police have AI facial recognition tech — are they using it against protesters?, The Japan Times (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/10/23/asia-pacific/hong-kong-protests-ai-facial-recognition-tech/.
349 K. G. Chan, Surveillance fears over new HK ID cards, Asia Times (Jul. 17, 2019), https://asiatimes.com/2019/07/surveillance-fears-over-
new-hk-id-cards/.
350 China: National security law for Hong Kong risks turning city into police state, Amnesty International (June 28, 2020), https://www.am-
nesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/china-national-security-law-for-hong-kong-risks-turning-city-into-police-state/.
351 Hong Kong protesters personal data leaked by Russian website, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/hong-kong-protesters-personal-data-
leaked-by-russian-website/a-50515519.
70
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Online Surveillance Tactics Used In Each Region
Internet shutdowns X X
Infiltration of personal X X X
communication
→ Biometric database → Integrated Joint Oper-

Centralized database complete with voice ations Platform (tracking
of all residents scans, urine samples, information and biomet-
DNA, fingerprints, etc. ric data)
Weaponization of the → Surveillance camer- → AI-powered surveil- → Increased concerns

as with AI-power facial lance cameras about surveillance tech-
internet and emerging recognition → Installation of “nanny” nologies
technology apps with trackers → Doxxing conducted by
pro-Beijing individuals
71
AN ASSAULT ON
FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT
72
The Chinese government views the freedom of movement as profoundly dangerous because it opens
up the potential for liberal ideas to enter the country that may threaten the CCP’s authoritarian rule.
Furthermore, citizens who are not on home territory are less easily controlled by the government.352
As such, the Chinese government has deliberately made it difficult for ethnic groups such as Tibetans
and Uyghurs to exercise their right to freely leave and return to their country of origin. In addition, as
the Chinese government continues to exert control over Hong Kong, many Hongkongers are becoming
concerned that one day, it will be difficult for them to freely leave as well.
Tibet:
A Myriad of Restrictions,
Both Inbound and Outbound
The Chinese government exerts its powerful influence over the TAR and its surrounding areas by heavily
limiting freedom of movement. The restrictions constrain travel plans and leisure activities. It has become
increasingly difficult for Tibetans to freely leave TAR — and China — and, by the same token, it is practi-
cally impossible for foreigners, such as journalists and diplomats, to enter the region.
When Han Chinese apply for passports to leave the country, they are able to receive their required
documents and approvals in a timely fashion. However, when Tibetans apply for passports, they are
faced with a number of hurdles that are intentionally set up by the Chinese government which include
time-intensive paperwork and often-delayed approval procedures to essentially prohibit and block
Tibetans from travelling internationally. These hurdles also aim to instill fear, and to monitor Tibetans who
travel. The required paperwork reportedly includes waivers which indicate that they will not partake in
“illegal activity” or “activities harmful to the nation” while overseas.353 Oftentimes — even after waiting for
months and even years — Tibetan passport applications have been denied, with no clear and justifiable
explanation from the government.354
Those who have been able to receive passports and travel abroad are frequently faced with interro-
gations, and even imprisonment, when they return back to Tibet. In particular, because of the Chinese
government’s hostility toward religion and their ongoing desire to silence rhetoric that falls outside of
the party’s narrative, Tibetans who have traveled abroad for religious pilgrimages — such as to India
352 While more difficult, the Chinese government does intimidate activists overseas to remain silent.
353 Husna Haq, Passport Restrictions in Tibet, BBC Travel (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20130129-passport-restric-
tions-in-tibet.
354 One Passport, Two Systems, Human Rights Watch (July 13, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/07/13/one-passport-two-systems/
chinas-restrictions-foreign-travel-tibetans-and-others.
73
to receive the Dalai Lama’s blessing355 or to Nepal to visit holy sites — have reportedly been arrested or
subjected to heavy fines, physical harm, and strict government monitoring upon returning.356
It is also extremely challenging for foreigners to enter the Tibetan region. In fact, it is impossible to safely
set foot in Tibet without explicit permission and approval from the Chinese government. Those who are
granted permission to visit are only able to see controlled aspects of life that are staged and accept-
ed by the government. The Chinese government has weaponized access to the region, using it as a key
component towards whitewashing its crimes. For example, in a piece published by The Guardian in June
2021, the journalists that were granted access to Tibet for this assignment were only able to capture
picturesque and government-approved images of the region — completely neglecting the atrocities
ongoing within.357 Such restrictive travel policies for foreigners, such as diplomats and journalists, to freely
enter Tibet have grave human rights implications. It hinders access to witnessing first-hand the severe
erosion of fundamental freedoms in the region and speaking candidly with locals about the human
rights situation on the ground. These obstructions deeply hamper the ability to get information out of the
region to help the international community hold the Chinese government accountable for their crimes
against humanity.
These tight restrictions are not only limited to foreign journalists and diplomats, but also Tibetans living
in the diaspora. Many Tibetans-in-exile overseas are unable to freely return to Tibet because they also
face lengthy protocols, interrogations about their personal lives and religious beliefs, and discriminatory
practices in Chinese consulates abroad while applying for a visa. Additionally, Tibetans in the diaspora
who are outspoken against the Chinese government fear for their safety and the safety of their relatives
should they be able to return to the region. Not only is this an example of severe restrictions of freedom
of movement and overseas intimidation, but it is also a well-calculated strategy conducted by the Chi-
nese government to fully break down cultural, and social ties among Tibetans by limiting access to their
ancestral lands and relatives.358
The intensity of the Chinese government’s efforts to limit all access to and from the region is similar to
their actions northwest of Tibet, in the Uyghur Region.
355 Arrested on return from India, Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (March 1, 1998), https://tchrd.org/arrested-on-re-
turn-from-india/.
356 Dr. Uwe Meya, Arrest Tibetan pilgrims returning from India and Nepal, Swiss-Tibetan Friendship Association (April 23, 2018), https://gstf.
org/en/2018/04/23/tibetische-pilger-nach-rueckkehr-aus-indien-und-nepal-verhaftet-strafen-fuer-pilger/.
357 Kevin Frayer, Tibet: On the Roof of the World - in Pictures, The Guardian (June 14, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/
gallery/2021/jun/14/tibet-on-the-roof-of-the-world-in-pictures.
358 Congressional Executive Commission on China (Sep. 30, 2020), supra note 301.
74
Uyghur Region:
No One In or Out
The policy of restricting travel in and out the Uyghur Region mimics those seen in Tibet. Harsher measures
were implemented in the early 2000’s, likely due to the “Go West Strategy” and the rise of unrest that en-
sued. The government began to deny applications and confiscate Uyghur passports.359 Firsthand accounts
detail how local residential officers collected passports under the false pretext of “registering” local resi-
dents.360 The Chinese government has also intervened in the ability of Uyghurs to make the Hajj pilgrimage
— one of the main pillars of Islam — to Saudi Arabia. Passports are often seized to force Uyghur residents to
join government-run Hajj tours or to prevent them from going to Saudi Arabia altogether.
In 2009, due to the escalation of the “Strike Hard” campaign, the local government shifted primarily to a
policy of passport denials.361 Many accounts describe how their passport applications have been denied
on baseless grounds. The government, once again also, exploits the comparatively low-income Uyghur
population, instituting prohibitively high costs to prevent Uyghurs from obtaining passports.362 As of 2015,
the government has begun to require all passport applicants in the Uyghur Region to provide biometrics as
well.363 As a result of the myriad of bureaucratic hurdles, “virtually no Uyghurs have passports” — creating a
region where Uyghurs are essentially unable to escape the clutches of the Chinese government.364
As is the case with Tibet, it is incredibly difficult for foreigners to enter the Uyghur Region. Few foreign
journalists have ever visited because of the guaranteed harassment and surveillance they'd face. Chi-
nese officials have only invited journalists and politicians on strictly monitored state-sanctioned tours.365
Foreign journalists who have not reproduced state narratives on “happy Uyghurs” — instead reporting
on internment camps or other atrocities — have been denied visas366 or expelled from China.367 Through
these restrictions on people’s movement in and out of the region, the Chinese government has effective-
ly siloed the region from the rest of the world.
359 Briefing: Refusals of passports to Uyghurs and confiscations of passports held by Uyghurs indicator of second-class status in China,
Uyghur Human Rights Project (February 7, 2013), https://docs.uhrp.org/briefing-uyghur-passports.pdf at 2.
360 China Confiscates Muslims Passports, Radio Free Asia (June 27, 2007), https://www.rfa.org/english/uyghur/uyghur_passports-20070627.
html.
361 Uyghur Human Rights Project, supra note 359.
362 Guligiekela Kevoumu, Passport Application Process 'Not Easy' for Uyghurs, Radio Free Asia (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.rfa.org/english/
news/uyghur/process-11202013151356.html/.
364 Uyghur Human Rights Project, supra note 359 at 2.
365 Thomas Peter & Cate Cadell, In China’s New Xinjiang: Patriotic Tourism, Police and Propaganda, Reuters: The Wider Image (June 21,
2021), https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/in-chinas-new-xinjiang-patriotic-tourism-police-and-propaganda.
366 Josh Rudolph, Buzzfeed’s Megha Rajagopalan Denied Visa, China Digital Times (Aug. 22, 2018), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/08/
buzzfeeds-megha-rajagopalan-denied-visa/.
367 Reuters in Paris, China Expels French Journalist Who Questioned Treatment of Uighurs, The Guardian (Dec. 2015), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/media/2015/dec/26/french-journalist-expelled-from-china.
75
Hong Kong:
An International
Hub, No More
Hong Kong has been an international travel hub for decades since its colonial times. Activists were free
to travel in and out of the city. There were no serious concerns regarding freedom of movement until very
recently. Concerns related to freedom of movement arose after the Chinese government’s unilateral
implementation of the national security law. The law drew widespread criticism from around the world,
including from the British government.
Designed to solve the citizenship issue created with the 1997

transfer of sovereignty, permanent residents of Hong Kong
prior to 1997 who met certain requirements were eligible to
apply for a British National Overseas passport, commonly
referred to as BN(O). The BN(O) granted its holders an extend-
ed visa to live, work, and stay in the United Kingdom for five
years. Originally, BN(O) did not offer its holders a direct path-
Holders of the British National Overseas Passport, the way to citizenship, but the British parliament voted to change
BN(O), from Hong Kong are now provided a pathway to
citizenship in the United Kingdom. This new visa scheme this rule after the promulgation of the national security law.
was launched in early 2021. The Chinese government now
no longer recognizes the BN(O). The British parliament criticized the restriction of freedoms in
Hong Kong, and voted to offer a pathway to citizenship for thousands of current BN(O) holders, as well as
millions of potential BN(O) holders in Hong Kong. The intention is to give Hong Kong residents a way to
emigrate from the increasingly authoritarian city.368
The Chinese and Hong Kong governments criticized the British parliament’s vote to offer BN(O) holders
and prospective holders a pathway to citizenship. A few months after the vote — perhaps in an attempt
to prevent mass emigration that would negatively impact the city’s economy, or perhaps to indirectly
dissuade citizens from considering emigrating — the Hong Kong government passed the Immigration
(Amendment) Bill that allows the immigration director to impose entrance or exit bans on those who
emigrate, with judicial review.369 The bill gives the immigration director broad powers to not only regulate
migration at the border, but also to prevent airlines from carrying certain passengers.370 The announce-
ment raised concern in Hong Kong that their freedom of movement would be severely compromised.
368 Hong Kong: UK makes citizenship offer to residents, BBC News (July 1, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-53246899.
369 Selina Cheng, Hong Kong Lawmakers Approve Changes to Immigration Law Prompting Fears of ‘Exit Bans’, Hong Kong Free Press (April
28, 2021), https://hongkongfp.com/2021/04/28/hong-kong-lawmakers-approve-changes-to-immigration-law-prompting-fears-of-exit-
bans/.
370 Hong Kong passes new immigration law that could enable China-style exit bans, CNN (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.
com/2021/04/29/china/hong-kong-china-immigration-intl-hnk/index.html.
76
These concerns have compounded, especially for activists and journalists. Shortly after the forced clo-
sure of Apple Daily, it was reported that a former senior-level journalist was arrested at the airport while
trying to flee the city.371 This arrest serves as an indicator of how the government is willing and able to
restrict the movement of those that may have violated the national security law. Many foreigners based
in the city are now also concerned with whether or not they should stay.
Additionally, similar to what has happened in Tibet and the Uyghur Region, the Chinese government and
the puppet Hong Kong government have started to delay and even deny issuing visas to foreign reporters.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Restrictions Imposed on Freedom of Movement Across the Three Regions
Denial or confiscation of X X
passports
Complicated passport X X
application
Entrance and exit bans X

on emigration
Halting the issuance of X X X

visas to foreign reporters
Limited approval of for- X X

eign visitors
371 Helen Davidson, Hong Kong police arrest senior Apple Daily journalist at airport, The Guardian (Jun. 27, 2021), https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2021/jun/28/hong-kong-police-arrest-apple-daily-journalist-airport-fung-wai-kong .
77
THE UYGHUR
GENOCIDE:
AN INTENT TO ERASE
78
The genocide against the Uyghurs is perhaps the most heinous crime being perpetrated by the CCP
today. While the Chinese government has constantly villainized the Uyghurs as “separatists,” Xi
Jinping incited genocide when he ordered the local government to use the “organs of dictatorship”
to show “absolutely no mercy” and subdue the Uyghur Region.372 Under the false pretext of reducing
poverty and curbing extremism, the Chinese government is attempting the complete eradication of a
religious group through campaigns of mass internment, coerced labor, and forced sterilization.
“Re-Education” Camps
“Re-education” camps are a network of internment centers where Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims are
imprisoned en masse. They were constructed under the expansion of the “concentrated educational
transformation” program which seeks to reform lawbreakers, such as drug addicts and problem children,
into model citizens.373 These vocational facilities in the Uyghur Region are marketed as centers for people
to learn new skills to advance their careers and combat poverty. In reality, they are internment camps
where mass atrocities are committed. These camps are intended to "break the [Uyghur peoples’] lin-
eage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins."374
An estimated one million people have been subject to internment since the camps’ inception.375 In spite
of vehement denials by the Chinese government, satellite imagery has been able to identify and ver-
ify dozens of internment camps.376 An examination of more than 1,500 public government documents
exposes that these re-education centers operate more like jails than schools. Cadres are instructed
to “detain those who should be detained to the greatest extent possible.”377 As a result, the number of
detention camps have outpaced the construction of these facilities — prompting retirement homes,
hospitals, and even schools to be converted into camps,378 and private corporate bids to build dozens
more.379 Though the Chinese government has not disclosed exact numbers, it is likely that more than 1
million Uyghurs have been detained.380
372 Austin Ramzy & Chris Buckley, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims, N.Y. Times
(No. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.
374 Ben Dooley, Inside China’s Internment Camps: Tear Gas, Tears, and Textbooks, Agence France Presse (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.afp.
com/en/inside-chinas-internment-camps-tear-gas-tasers-and-textbooks.
376 Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, and Christo Buschek, China Secretly Built A Vast New Infrastructure To Imprison Muslims, Buzzfeed
News (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-new-internment-camps-xinjiang-uighurs-muslims.
377 Ben Dooley, supra note 374.
378 Rajagopalan, Killing & Buschek, supra note 376.
380 “Like we were enemies in a war:” China’s Mass Internment, Torture and Persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang, Amnesty International (2021),
http://xinjiang.amnesty.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ASA_17_4137-2021_Full_report_ENG.pdf.
79
Internment camps seem to vary in levels of confinement, ranging from reform school to prison.381 Place-
ments within internment camps are determined by initial screenings which calculate the severity and
length of detention.382 Descriptions of the internment camps consistently illustrate a desolate environ-
ment of torture, hunger, and abuse. The camps are thoroughly secured with high and thick concrete
walls surrounding the compounds, barbed wire, and guard towers.383 The interior is filled with triple lock-
ing doors, locked cells, bolted corritors, and inescapable video surveillance.384 Due to the high number of
detainees, hunger and overcrowding are frequent.385 Detainees are often forced to share a twin bed or
sleep in shifts given the limited space.386 Furthermore, the “dorms” have no running water and the toilet
is a bucket in the corner of the room.387 Detainees are handed food through an opening in the door and
fed meager amounts of rice or porridge with
“You don’t have the right to little to no protein.388 The detainees are tightly
talk, because you are not monitored by cameras to ensure that they do
not freely speak to each other.389 “You don’t
humans,” one guard report- have the right to talk, because you are not hu-
edly said. “If you were humans, mans,” one guard reportedly said. “If you were
you wouldn’t be here.” 390 humans, you wouldn’t be here.”390
Detainees are also subject to a regimented daily routine comprised of political indoctrination, Chi-
nese language training, and forced renunciations of Islam and Uyghur culture.391 For several hours, they
must memorize key principles of “Xi Jinping Thought” by watching news broadcasts, documentaries,
and speeches.392 Detainees are also instructed to sing “red” songs praising the CCP.393 More formal-
ized courses take place in rooms that are partitioned by iron bars, effectively caging in students while
rifle-wielding guards watch over them.394 Students are sorted based on their education level: those who
have a second-grade education take the lowest level class where detainees learn basic Chinese.395

382 Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/19/break-their-lin-
eage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting#_ftn63.
383 Secret documents reveal how China mass detention camps work, Associated Press (Nov. 25, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/chi-
na-cables-ap-top-news-international-news-china-race-and-ethnicity-4ab0b341a4ec4e648423f2ec47ea5c47.
386 Allison Killing and Megha Rajagopalan, What They Saw: Ex-Prisoners Detail the Horrors of China’s Detention Camps, Buzzfeed News
(Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/china-ex-prisoners-horrors-xinjiang-camps-uighurs.
387 Darren Byler, How companies profit from forced labor in Xinjiang, SupChina (September 4, 2019), https://supchina.com/2019/09/04/
how-companies-profit-from-forced-labor-in-xinjiang/.
389 Id.
391 Massimo Introvigne, Uyghurs Are Forced To Denounce Their Faith To Survive, The Association on Study and Human Rights (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://www.tasrhr.org/news-and-videos/conferences/uyghurs-are-forced-to-denounce-their-faith-to-survive.
392 Mauk, supra note 253
393 Elise Anderson, Compelled Silence and Compelled Sound in the Uyghur Genocide, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Dec. 15,
2020), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/12/15/compelled-silence-and-compelled-sound-in-the-uyghur-genocide/.
394 Christina Lu, Painting Xinjiang’s Brutal Camps in 3D, Foreign Policy (Mar. 16, 2021), https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/16/xinjiang-reedu-
cated-documentary-uyghur-china-vr/.
395 Mauk, supra note 253.
80
For more advanced learners, detainees take ideological indoctrination courses where they recite laws
banning unapproved religious practices, for example.396 These language and political indoctrination
courses emulate previously discussed cultural and religious suppression tactics geared towards erasing
Uyghur, language, culture, and identity.
Countless testimonies reveal the heinous violence that takes place in the internment camps. First-hand
accounts describe being forced to strip, being drenched with water during interrogations, and being
shocked with an electric prod. Detainees are also frequently put in solitary confinement in squalid cells
that are too small to even lie down in.397 Harrowing testimonies from former female detainees uncover
the systematic abuse Uyghur women face at the hands of prison guards. Female detainees were tightly
guarded and taken into separate “dark rooms” at night where they were raped, sometimes by multi-
ple guards.398 Others recall being tortured by electric sticks that were forcibly inserted into their genital
areas.399 It is evident that while marketed as educational facilities, the detention camps are sites where
mass atrocities are committed.
The Commodification of
Uyghur Lives: The Ubiquitous Use
of Forced Labor
The commodification of Uyghur people is a key strategy to erase the Uyghur people and exploit them for
the purpose of boosting China’s economic power. According to the Center for Strategic and Internation-
al Studies, “the use of compelled labor as part of a concerted effort to eliminate a culture and religion
sets the situation in Xinjiang apart.”400
Forced labor programs intersect and run parallel to detention camps. Detainees who have completed
their sentence often enter into vocation programs and are then funneled into forced labor; laborers who
have not been detained work in inhospitable conditions under the constant threat of detention. Forced
labor programs are touted as “poverty alleviation” efforts, directed at providing “jobs” to current and
former detainees, and poor rural individuals.401 The “vocational” training is a coverup for the forced labor
396 Christian Shepherd, Fear and oppression in Xinjiang: China’s war on Uighur culture, Financial Times (Sep. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/
content/48508182-d426-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.
397 Mauk, supra note 253.
398 Matthew Hill, David Campanale and Joel Gunter, 'Their goal is to destroy everyone': Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape, BBC
(Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071.
399 Id.
400 Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis, Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang: Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains,
CSIS (Oct. 2019), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Lehr_ConnectingDotsXinjiang_interior_v3_FULL_WEB.
pdf at 2.
401 Id. at 5.
81
and even detainment sentences that Uyghurs must complete. The local government is given quotas to
ensure that a significant proportion of the population is interned, and local officials have been told that
at least one member of each household must receive vocational training for a minimum of one to three
months.402 In addition to gruesome manual labor with minimal to no pay, workers are subject to “re-edu-
cation” that consists of political indoctrination, Chinese language learning, and other courses similar to
those of the internment camps themselves.
Many detainees are placed in factories inside of or adjacent to internment camps.403 Others are as-
signed to factories in newly built industrial parks, also known as “satellite factories” in the Uyghur Re-
gion.404 Many factories strategically assign laborers to different factories in order to keep families apart
through long hours and laborious work. A subset of satellite factories, for instance, are equipped with
daycare facilities nearby to justify the coercion of young female laborers with children.405 Another pro-
gram titled the “secondary vocational training enrollment plan” prevents certain students from attend-
ing regular high schools and coerces them into factory work.406 In the region, students as young as 15 are
being groomed to eventually work in factories as “surplus laborers.”407 These students are transferred to
their work outposts without the consent or knowledge of their families, resulting in the disappearance of
many working-age persons.408
A subset of laborers are also detained and transferred out of the region to work. Between 2017-2019,
80,000 Uyghurs were moved to work in factories across mainland China through the “labor transfer”
program, also known as “Xinjiang Aid.”409 Workers live in segregated dormitories, undergo ideological
brainwashing, and are stripped of any personal freedoms. Government documents reveal that work-
ers are also assigned to government minders and security personnel who monitor their every move and
regularly search their dorms.410 Uyghurs were also forbidden from practicing their religion. If a Quran was
found, the owner could be detained for three to five years.411 The physical monitoring of Uyghurs is cou-
pled with electronic monitoring of WeChat messages.412 There are suspicions that workers are forced to
download an unnamed smartphone app that tracks their movement.413 The inhospitable working condi-
tions — political indoctrination, invasive surveillance and physical abuse — recreate the conditions of the
internment camps.

404 Id.
405 Id.
407 Xinhua, Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (September
2020), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202009/17/content_WS5f62cef6c6d0f7257693c192.html.
409 Vicky Xiuzhong Xu et al., Uyghurs for Sale, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uy-
ghurs-sale.
410 Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, https://www.dol.gov/agen-
cies/ilab/against-their-will-the-situation-in-xinjiang#.
411 Xu et al., supra note 409.
412 Id.
413 Id.
82
Forced labor is becoming deeply embedded into the global supply chains of the world’s largest compa
nies. The coercion of Uyghur labor has become profitable for both Chinese and global companies, who
are able to sell products made by detainees
and forced laborers at competitively low prices. Global consumer markets and
According to the Coalition to End Uyghur Forced
multinational companies
Labor, “virtually the entire apparel industry is
tainted by Uyghur and Turkic Muslim labor.”414 implicated in these schemes
These global consumer markets and multina- are complicit in genocide and
tional companies implicated in these schemes
are complicit in genocide and are responsible are responsible for perpetuat-
for perpetuating the continued commodifica- ing the continued commodifi-
tion of Uyghur labor.
cation of Uyghur labor.
Reducing Regenerative
Capacity: IUDs, Sterilization,
and Mass Birth Prevention
While internment and forced labor have disrupted the bedrock of Uyghur society, the Chinese government
has implemented a mass birth-prevention strategy to erase the Uyghur people in its totality. The tactics
used to prevent the regenerative capacity of Uyghur people make clear the Chinese government’s intent
not just to repress, but utterly eradicate an entire people. Leaked documents have revealed government
policies and directives to “carry out family planning sterilization,” “lower fertility levels,” and to “leave no
blind spots.”415 While young Uyghur men are specifically interned to prevent them from procreating, former
female detainees recount gruesome stories of systematic rape, forced sterilization, coerced IUD implanta-
tion, and the administration of anti-fertility drugs both within and outside the internment camps.416
Within the camps, Uyghur women are subjected to forced IUD insertions, abortions, and injections, and
are coerced into taking medication which halts their menstrual cycles. They are rarely provided with ex-
planations as to what kind of injections and pills they are given. Former detainees recall being released
from camps and getting medical check-ups only to find out that they were sterile.417 On the other hand,
414 180+ Orgs Demand Apparel Brands End Complicity in Uyghur Forced Labour, End Uyghur Forced Labour (July 23, 2020), https://enduy-
ghurforcedlabour.org/news/402-2/.
415 The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention, Newsline Institute for Strategy and Policy
and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, (Mar. 4 2021), https://newlinesinstitute.org/uyghurs/the-uyghur-genocide-an-examination-
of-chinas-breaches-of-the-1948-genocide-convention/.
417 China cuts Uighur births with IUDs, abortion, sterilization, The Associated Press (June 29, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/
ap-top-news-international-news-weekend-reads-china-health-269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c.
83
Uyghur men of childbearing age are targeted for internment and confined separately, preventing them
from reproducing.418 Detainees must also attend lectures on how many children they should have.419
The Chinese government has expanded its efforts of population control outside of the walls of the
internment camps. Women are often subject to pregnancy checks, forced sterilization, forced implan-
tation of IUDS, and even abortion.420 In 2014, the government forcibly inserted just over 200,000 IUDs in
Uyghur women. By 2018, that figure rose to nearly 330,000 IUDs.421 Sterilization rates surged seven-fold in
the Uyghur Region from 2016 to 2018.422 In Hotan, a city in the region where the population is almost en-
tirely Uyghur, the government instituted a “free birth-prevention surgery” program, which aimed to steril-
ize more than a third of all women of childbearing age by the end of 2019.423 As a result of a combination
of these efforts, the birth rate in the Uyghur Region plummeted by an estimated 60% in three years.424
The state’s intervention in family planning measures in the Uyghur Region contradicts its own measures
to ease population control for the rest of mainland China. In spite of exceptions in place for minority
groups, Uyghur parents with three or more children are heavily fined, threatened with detention, and
in some instances, forced to have late-term abortions.425 In addition to these fees, police often unex-
pectedly raid Uyghur homes searching for hidden children.426 Through these family planning and birth
planning campaigns, the Chinese government has created a climate of terror around having children, an
implicit fear embedded into people’s minds to act that the state no longer needs to verbalize.
It is clear that the Chinese government engages in policies to destroy the Uyghur identity. The deliberate
targeting of “guardians and transmitters of Uyghur identity” through the detention of community leaders,
in combination with the destruction of key cultural sites and the disruption of religious practices, reveal
an intent to “destroy the essential elements of Uyghur identity and communal bonds.”427 Policies, such as
bilingual education, boarding schools, mandatory family planning, detention of young adults, restriction
of movement, incessant surveillance and the promotion of inter-ethnic marriage, are all tailored to
disrupt the foundational fabric of Uyghur society and eliminate the ethnic group over time. In light of the
revelation regarding the detainment camps, mass sterilization, coerced labor coupled with the scores
of suppressive tactics implemented, a number of experts, lawmakers, and governments around the
world have declared that the Chinese government is committing genocide and crimes against humanity
against the Uyghur people.428
418 Newsline Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, supra note 415 at 5.
419 The Associated Press, supra note 417.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id.
424 China denies coercive birth control measures in Xinjiang, The Associated Press (Jan. 11, 2021) https://apnews.com/article/internation-
al-news-race-and-ethnicity-beijing-birth-control-china-84b8a13dbbb3d9a24d25bd0db7ad746e.
425 Xinjiang Hospitals Aborted, Killed Babies Outside Family Planning Limits: Uyghur Obstetrician, Radio Free Asia (Aug. 17, 2020), https://
www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/abortions-08172020144036.html.
426 The Associated Press, supra note 424.
427 Newsline Institute for Strategy and Policy and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, supra note 415 at 4.
428 Edward Wong & Chris Buckley, U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide’, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/01/19/us/politics/trump-china-xinjiang.html.
84
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The Uyghur genocide committed by the Chinese government in the Uyghur
Region must act as a warning to the international community.
• Because of the international community’s inaction toward the regime’s se-

vere human rights atrocities in both Tibet and the Uyghur Region over the
past several decades, the CCP has seen that they can get away with such
abuses without being held accountable and has since felt emboldened.
This sentiment is especially evident, given the recent events in Hong Kong.
• This genocide is a clear indicator that the Chinese government’s end goal
is to secure absolute ideological compliance and complete assimilation
among Uyghurs so that they align with the CCP’s ideology.
85
Conclusion
The CCP remains steadfast in its main objective to assert its legitimacy as the sole ruling party in Chi-
na. The CCP promises to be the only ruling party who can bring about “national rejuvenation” and fully
realize the “Chinese Dream.” The “Chinese Dream” entails a world of sinicized uniformity, a citizenry with
unwavering loyalty, and a cultish veneration of not only the CCP, but also of Xi Jinping. For decades, the
CCP has actively molded an environment to ensure that the CCP’s legitimacy and the nation’s cohesion
would be indivisible.429
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Chinese government viciously purges the country of people whose inherent
identity is incongruous with the party’s ideals of homogeneity. The very existence of Tibet, the Uyghur
Region, and Hong Kong — which each have their own unique identities and even separate ideas of
statehood and sovereignty — is considered a threat to the survival of the CCP. As a result, the people of
these regions have consistently been denied their fundamental freedoms and human rights.
The CCP’s suppressive tactics vary in terms of implementation, but are modeled off of successful prac-
tices between regions. The Uyghur Region which has become a police state is built on policies that were
previously implemented in Tibet. The policies of these regions highlight how the communication and
transmission of ideas across regions has enabled the Chinese government to more effectively commit
mass atrocities. Policies within the two regions riff on each other, inform each other and ultimately share
the final goal of quashing local traditions and practices. In Hong Kong, the CCP’s history of repression
is slightly different, but have begun to mirror the government’s strategies to ostracize and oppress. The
CCP has justified taking away Hong Kong’s freedoms because it believes that Hong Kong was taken
away by the British and was finally returned to China, where it belonged and should have always been.
The Chinese government rejects western influence over Hong Kong, and sees a total sinicization as the
end goal. In all three focus regions, the CCP believes that ultimate control is required and, as a result,
engages in widespread human rights violations — including genocide — with unparalleled force. At the
time of writing this report, these countless atrocities are still ongoing.430

430 The authors acknowledge that this report has not captured everything that has happened, or is still currently unfolding.
86
Due to the international community’s inaction in face of the CCP’s severe human rights abuses in Tibet,
the Uyghur Region, and Hong Kong, the Chinese government has felt emboldened and has continued
to carry out its campaign of repression with impunity. It has also relied on its economic clout to grow and
strengthen its global political influence. Despite these challenges, activists and communities both within
China and abroad remain dedicated to the struggle for freedom and human rights and engage in acts
of resistance every day.
It is imperative that the international community pay close attention to the CCP’s gross human rights
abuses and culture of impunity, so that they realize that what is happening in the three focus regions
has the capacity to extend beyond China’s borders in the future. Members of civil society and poli-
cymakers around the world must implement coordinated plans and strategies to combat the CCP’s
growing global authoritarian influence, and stand in solidarity with the people of Tibet, the Uyghur
Region, and Hong Kong.
87
Recommendations
To date, the Chinese government is continuing to crush dissent through brutal, state-sponsored
campaigns. Through its imposition of extreme human rights abuses, including religious persecution in
Tibet, internment camps in the Uyghur Region, and the national security law in Hong Kong, the Chi-
nese government has imposed a widespread climate of fear in all three regions.
As the space for dissent within China is rapidly shrinking, the Chinese government is also extending
its influence far beyond its borders. In fact, the Chinese government aims to export its authoritarian-
ism overseas through trade deals, technology, and the BRI. In the process, the Chinese government
bolsters other authoritarian regimes around the world and undermines democracy. Accordingly, civil
society organizations and policymakers around the world must act. The international community
must help to amplify the voices of activists in China, and sound the alarm against the CCP’s unre-
lenting campaign of repression. Together, we must condemn the Chinese government’s abuses, and
stand together to protect human rights, the rule of law, and democratic institutions.
The following are a series of recommendations for international civil society organizations and
policymakers.
88
Recommendations for International Civil Society Organizations
1. Create and/or support platforms that provide a safe space for grassroots activists to tell their
stories and to expose the Chinese government’s human rights abuses. It has become increasingly dif-
ficult for activists, both in China and abroad, to safely speak out against the severe erosion of human
rights in the country. These platforms are necessary to both spread awareness and hold the Chinese
government accountable.
2. Strengthen activist movements by building cross-border, multi-generational coalitions. International

civil society organizations should learn more about the struggles that activists are facing, and should
strive to work together. By embracing common interests and goals, organizations and activists can
form important alliances.
3. Take a clear, public stance in solidarity with activists and pro-democracy efforts. Civil society organi-
zations can no longer claim that they are unaware of the human rights situation in the focus regions. In
order to avoid being complicit, they must ensure that they use their platforms to support human rights
efforts on the ground and condemn the Chinese government.
Recommendations for Policymakers
1. Incorporate human rights in foreign policy and economic agendas by adhering to international
standards, and by consulting with local and diasporic civil society groups. States have a moral and
legal obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill fundamental human rights. As such, human rights must
be at the forefront of international negotiations and agreements. In order to do so, policymakers and
relevant stakeholders should familiarize themselves with international human rights frameworks and
conventions, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights. Furthermore, states should engage with civil society groups and independent
experts to ensure that their foreign policies and economic negotiations are not complicit to the Chi-
nese government’s crimes including genocide, and Uyghur forced labor.
2. Bridge the gap across political aisles. Discussions about China should be non-partisan and should
underscore the importance of the protection of human rights. Policymakers should also find ways to
work human rights into conversations with high-level decision-makers, while also recognizing that
the people within China are not a monolith. They should remain cognizant to stray from any lan-
guage that may be fear-mongering or xenophobic.
89
3. Spearhead the creation of a multilateral infrastructure initiative to counter China’s BRI. Most
importantly, such an initiative should include clear human rights clauses and robust accountability
mechanisms. With China’s economic clout, the Chinese government is strategically expanding its
political influence throughout Southeast Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa. As a result, countries
on the receiving end of BRI loans are more eager to help amplify China’s authoritarian rhetoric and
goals. In order to combat the CCP’s authoritarian influence, policymakers from democratic countries
should spearhead a new infrastructural initiative that could be an alternative to the BRI, and that
could ultimately provide support to countries in need.
90

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100 YEARS OF SUPPRESSION:

Human Rights Foundation

23 Tightening the Iron Grip: Crackdowns, Detainment, and Torture

31 Precipitous Erasure: Cultural Suppression

The Disruption of Daily life

57 Surveillance in an Orwellian Society

72 An Assault on Freedom of Movement

78 The Uyghur Genocide: An Intent to Erase

17 Zeng, supra note 8 at 309.

Political regime type: China under Xi Jinping

While the CCP’s egregious human rights violations date

Through a series of ambitious policies and ideological re-

32 Zeng. supra note 8 at 373.

Clashes often occurred between the people of Tibet

In 1965, the Chinese government renamed historic Ti-

A map of historic Tibet, which includes the now-Chinese-controlled prov-

64 Millward & Dahlia Peterson, supra note 33.

complete assimilation to immense pressure from the Chinese government,

78 Zeng, supra note 8 at 450.

82 More details in Religious Repression.

Historically, when the CCP formalized its power over

• The Chinese government justifies its tactics of political disenfranchisement by

Monks and nuns are highly respected leadership

Former prisoner of conscience and Tibetan Bud-

leading pro-democracy figures like activist Ag-

The HKPF has also raided the headquarters of local

134 Agnes Chow was released from prison in June 2021.

The Dilution of Cultural Identity

148 Jamyang Norbu, Buying the Dragon’s Teeth 79 (2004).

Targeting the Next Generation: Educational Interference

162 Becquelin, supra note 73 at 72.

164 Education in Tibet, K12 Academics, https://www.k12academics.com/Education%20Worldwide/education-tibet.

TIBET UYGHUR REGION HONG KONG

Censorship on → Omitting → Bannings books in the → Banning pro-indepen-

Religion can be a philosophy, a lifestyle, and a social institution that distinctively

Their message is clear: “Your The CCP uses particularly repres-

Systematic Destruction of Religious Institutions

199 Cook, supra note 25 at 28.

Additionally, the CCP also seeks to amplify the

To express their utmost opposition toward Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan

The Disruption of Daily Life

Curfews and Bans

255 Cook, supra note 25 at 71.

TIBET UYGHUR REGION

→ Appropriating for tourism → Destroying mosques and shrines

→ Replacing flag flying toward Mecca

→ Limiting the number of monks and → Initiating government recruitment

→ Requiring approval from the Chinese → Forbidding public prayer sessions or

→ Banning images and veneration of → Banning women from wearing hijabs

→ Imposing curfews and banning gath- → Confiscating passports to prevent

→ Promoting atheism → Promoting atheism

285 Cook, supra note 25 at 78.

TIBET UYGHUR REGION HONG KONG

The Chinese government has gone to great

The Chinese government’s efforts to quash dissent,

In addition to an extensive dossier of a person’s whereabouts, the Chinese government is attempting

331 Human Rights Watch, supra note 328.

344 Millward & Peterson, supra note 33 at 5.

TIBET UYGHUR REGION HONG KONG