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Poetic Intuition: Spinoza and Gerard Manley Hopkins

Article in Philosophy Today · January 2013

DOI: 10.5840/philtoday201357434

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 POETIC INTUITION
SPINOZA AND GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS
Joshua M. Hall

As one commentator notes, Spinoza’s con- things.” First of all, an idea for Spinoza denotes
ception of “the third kind of knowledge”—intu- not a mental representation or the content of such
ition, has been “regarded as exceptionally ob- a representation, but “an action of the mind . . . in-
scure. Some writers regard it as a kind of mystic volving judgment.”3 By an adequate idea, in turn,
vision; others regard it as simply unintelligible.”1 Spinoza understands “an idea which, insofar as it
For Spinoza, the first kind of knowledge, which is considered in itself without relation to its ob-
he calls “imagination,” is a kind of sense-experi- ject, has all the properties, or the extrinsic de-
ence of particulars; the second kind, which he nominations, of a true idea” (e2d4). Adequacy,
calls “understanding,” involves the rational then, could be paraphrased as truth minus corre-
grasp of universals, and the third, in his words, spondence, or truth which remains at the level of
“proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal generality without any relation to a concrete ob-
essence of some of the attributes of God to an ad- ject. In other words, adequacy for Spinoza is de-
equate knowledge of the essence of things.”2 In termined by whether our ideas about something
this essay I will attempt to show, through an ex- are generally accurate, such as the abstract truths
plication of Spinoza’s concept of intuition, how a of mathematics. Regarding the second concept in
prime example of intuition can be found in the art Spinoza’s definition of intuition, namely,
of poetry. More specifically, I will examine reso- essence, he writes the following:
nances between the work of the poet Gerard
I say that there belongs to the essence of a thing,
Manley Hopkins (1844–1889) and Baruch de that which, being given, the thing is necessarily
Spinoza (1632–1677) by exploring the ways in posited, and which, being taken away, the thing is
which Hopkins’ poetry can work as both (1) an necessarily negated; or that without which a thing
exemplar of poetry qua Spinozistic intuition, and can neither exist nor be conceived, and conversely
(2) an intuition-based access to Spinoza’s that which can neither exist nor be conceived with-
thought. The upshot of this essay, then, is that out the thing. (e2d2)
there is a kind of knowledge, and by implication a
kind of education (through which to acquire that In other words, a being’s essence is that which
knowledge) which—even for a philosopher as is distinctive of that type of being and thereby de-
mathematically rigorous as Spinoza—may fines it. Spinoza’s defines the “actual essence” of
require recourse to the art of poetry. a thing (i.e., a thing’s essence as we conceive it)
as “the endeavor to persevere in its own being,”
Spinoza’s Third Knowledge condensed in the word “conatus” (e3p7). And the
“formal” of “formal essence” in Spinoza’s above
I begin with a close inspection of Spinoza’s definition, according to Parkinson, “means what
definition of the third kind of knowledge, consid- would now be called ‘real.’ . . . To talk of the for-
ering each concept in the definition mentioned mal essence of X is to talk of X itself” (Parkinson
above individually in the order in which it ap- 321).
pears in the definition. It is as follows: intuition is The third concept in Spinoza’s definition of
that which “proceeds from an adequate idea of intuition, finally, is an attribute, defined as “that
the formal essence of some of the attributes of which intellect perceives of substance as consti-
God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of tuting its essence” (e1d4). God and substance,
PHILOSOPHY TODAY WINTER 2013
401
for Spinoza, are the same, and thus human beings what thought is to understand a particular mental
for him can only perceive two of God/sub- thing.
stance’s infinite attributes—thought and exten- I will now “zoom out” a bit, to flesh out the
sion (e1p15s). The reference to “some of the at- broader context in which Spinoza deploys this
tributes of God” in the definition of intuition can concept of intuition. Spinoza claims that intu-
thus only refer to thought and extension. ition, like understanding, “is necessarily true,”
I have so far explicated only the first part of and “teaches us to distinguish between the true
that definition. Intuition proceeds from “an ade- and the false” (e2p41). He compares intuition to
quate idea of the formal essence of some of the at- the intuitive grasp of a mathematical formula by
tributes of God” and to “an adequate knowledge considering the relationship among specific
of the essence of things.” I have observed that ad- numbers plugged into the formula, as opposed to
equate knowledge means the same thing as true calculating the problem using variables. Thus,
knowledge, but without reference to the existing intuition for Spinoza seems to involve universals
entity that is known. And I have established that grasped through particulars, despite the fact that
the essence of a thing for Spinoza is its conatus, my paraphrases of the definition seem to imply
its endeavor to persist in its being. As for the last that it is particulars that are grasped through uni-
phrase, “things” for Spinoza are what he terms versals—finite modes perceived through the at-
“finite modes” (Parkinson 322). tributes of thought or extension—and not the
Modes, in general, are “affections of sub- other way around.
stance, or, that which is in something else, Spinoza does provide a few other scattered
through which it is also conceived” (e1d5). They clues for understanding his concept of intuition.
are modifications of substance by being modifi- He describes it as being especially powerful in
cations of the attributes of substance such as overcoming the negative effects of the emotions
thought and extension. And finite modes—par- and as inspiring the intellectual love of God as
ticular things—“are nothing other than the affec- eternal and infinite (e5p20s). Further, he claims
tions, i.e., the modes, of the attributes of God, by that to “understand things by the third kind of
which the attributes of God are expressed in a knowledge” is the “highest endeavor of the mind,
certain and determinate way” (e1p25c). For ex- and its highest virtue,” (e5p25) because “the
ample, the attribute of extension is one way in more we understand things in this way [in their
which the intellect perceives the essence of sub- essence, i.e., reality] the more . . . we understand
stance, and a particular human body is simply God” (e5p25d). This understanding is described
one (finite) mode of extension. as the mind’s “power” and “virtue” and “na-
Having considered each of the concepts in the ture”—all of which are equivalent terms for
definition of intuition individually, I can now Spinoza. And the more things the mind grasps in
paraphrase it in its entirety as follows: one arrives this way, the more it wants to grasp things in this
at a rationally correct conception of the conatus way. It is in this pursuit, claims Spinoza, that the
of a thing (i.e., a finite mode) by means of a ratio- mind finds its greatest peace (e5p26–27). Also
nally correct conception of thought or extension. worth noting, the mind itself is regarded as the
Put differently, if one really understands thought cause of the third kind of knowledge (e5p31d).
and/or extension in principle, one can thereby in- In light of these observations, one possible
fer the essence of a particular thing. That is, if one understanding of intuition is that it consists in a
understands that thought and extension are the combination of the specificity and concreteness
intellect’s perception of the essence of God/sub- of the first kind of knowledge with the accuracy
stance, then one can understand that particular and generality of the second kind of knowledge.
things are conceived by human beings in terms of In other words, the universal and the particular
or by means of thought and extension. One must are understood through each other. Either
know what extension is in order to understand a thought or extension is grasped through the ac-
particular extended thing, and one must know tion of a specific idea. Conversely, a specific idea
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
402
is enacted by grasping the nature of thought or of language as itself a physically extended phe-
extension in itself. At any rate, what seems cen- nomenon, namely sound waves spun from
tral for intuition is that the relationship between vibrating vocal cords and inhabiting the
generality and specificity is affirmed. This con- surrounding air.
clusion would also seem supported by Deleuze’s Spinoza’s own limited use of poetry in the
“figure” for the third kind of knowledge, namely Ethics is also interesting with regard to its exem-
“a triangle that joins together the adequate ideas plification of his concept of intuition. In dealing
of ourselves, of God, and of other things” with the problem of “weakness of will,” for ex-
(Deleuze 82). ample, Spinoza in three separate places (e3p2s;
e4 Preface; e4p17s) “refers to Ovid’s lines, ‘I see
Spinoza’s Third Knowledge as Poetry and approve the better; I follow the worse’.” Ac-
Nothing, arguably, more effectively affirms cording to Parkinson, Spinoza’s solution for how
the generality-specificity relationship than lan- to overcome this weakness of will
guage, which is also the conceptual bridge be- involves the third kind of knowledge. Such knowl-
tween intuition and poetry. Via its connection to edge (cf. Section 8) is not universal, but is of par-
thinking, language is an attribute of thought; on ticular things, in the sense that we grasp the rule in
the other hand, and via its connection to speech, the particular instance. If we had such knowledge,
language is manifested as extension. Language is it would “affect our mind” (e5p36s) with such
thus distinctly capable of affirming, at an intu- power that our passion would be overcome.
itive level, Spinoza’s central claim that thought (Parkinson 47)
and extension are merely two different ways of
representing the same substance. Furthermore, This intense “power” to “affect our mind” is of
whenever language is used to denote particulars, course characteristic of poetry as well, and is
it brings its nature as a universal medium to bear likely part of the reason Spinoza chose to appro-
on those particulars, and thus affirms the reso- priate the line from Ovid three times in illustrat-
nance between generality (that is, rationality) ing his understanding of “weakness of will.”
and specificity (that is, phenomena in the world). Moving beyond Spinoza’s specific invocation
The art of poetry, in turn, is arguably the most of Ovid to the world of poetry in general, there
effective genre for this evoking of generality are almost as many examples of how poetry
through particulars, insofar as it both utilizes lan- might function as a type of the third kind of
guage to describe particular situations, thoughts, knowledge as there are poets or even poems. But
feelings, observations, etc., and also manifests the poet that I find singularly illuminating in this
language as language. Poetry, in other words, regard is Gerard Manley Hopkins, as illustrated
foregrounds language’s capacities for affirming in the following first stanza of his well-known
the general-specific relationship at the same time sonnet “Carrion Comfort”:
as it refers to the phenomena in the world named Not, I’ll not, carrion comfort, Despair, not feast
by the language of the poem. In thinking about on thee;
poetry, perhaps while reading silently, one is Not untwist—slack they may be—these last
made aware not only of what the poem is describ- strands of man
ing about the world, but also of the activity of the In me ór, most weary, cry I can no more. I can;
attribute of thought, of thought taking place. And
Can something, hope, wish day come, not
in scanning poetry with one’s eyes, similarly, one 4
choose not to be.
is aware not only of how the words match up with
things in the world, but also of language as itself In these lines, one finds a powerful existential
an extended thing made of ink, a physical spread weariness and a counter-force of rugged tenacity
of words on a page. Similarly, when one reads fighting to overcome that despair. The poem is
poetry aloud, one is made aware not only of the thus both a description of these emotions and an
things in the world that the sounds evoke, but also expression of the speaker’s state of being; it is not
POETIC INTUTION
403
a purely conceptual explanation of despair and derstanding of either inscape or instress, but a
resistance, nor is it merely an immediate sensory- compilation of his notes, journal entries, and let-
experience of them—instead, it is somehow nei- ters (along with the abundant examples of these
ther and/or both. On the one hand, the words on two elements in his poems) provides a general
the page are sensory information for our eyes, picture of what he meant by them. According to
and thus subject to the process of imagination; on the literary critic J. R. Watson, “The first example
the other hand, there is a conceptual element in of the use of the words ‘inscape’ and ‘instress’ in
the lines that relates to the understanding. The Hopkins’ writings comes in his notes, dated,
poem intertwines both of these aspects, revealing 1868, on the Greek philosopher Parmenides”:
a connection between the essence/conatus of the
His great text, which he repeats with religious con-
reader, the speaker of the poem, the author of the viction, is that Being is and Not-being is not—
poem, and, by implication human beings in gen- which perhaps one can say, a little over-defining
eral. Cumulatively, these beings represent two of his meaning, means that all things are upheld by
the three angles of Deleuze’s aforementioned tri- instress and are meaningless without it. . . . His
angular figure for intuition (namely, ourselves feeling for instress, for the flush and foredrawn,
and other things). For the third angle of that and for inscape is most striking.
5

triangle (namely, God), I turn to the second

stanza of this same poem: First of all, it is important to note Hopkins’ pro-
pensity for experimentation with diction, espe-
But ah, but O thou terrible, why wouldst thou cially his love of neologisms, which include
rude on me “heavengravel,” “wolfsnow,” “deathgush,”
Thy wring-earth right foot rock? lay a lionlimb “gaygear,” and “earl-stars.” Hopkins also
against me? Scan adopted various dialect words from Welsh and
With darksome devouring eyes my bruiséd other linguistic sources, including “voel,” which
bones? and fan, means “hill”; “degged,” meaning “sprinkled”;
O in turns of tempest, me heaped there; me fran- and “fashed,” for “troubled.” Additionally,
tic to avoid thee and Hopkins sought out “old-fashioned or obsolete”
English words such as “sillion,” meaning “fur-
flee?
row,” and “rivelled,” meaning “wrinkled,” the
The “O thou terrible” addressed in the first last of which he took from The Tempest, by
line refers of course to God, completing the Shakespeare, a fellow poet “whose coinages
triadic network of reference among the essence Hopkins admired greatly” (Watson 39–44).
of God and the list of essences elaborated above. Watson understands inscape for Hopkins as
In other words, one perceives intuitively, through “the essence or substance of the thing which pre-
the poem, something about the relationship of vents it from changing into something else, holds
human beings, the world, and God. And in this it as it is” (32). Watson also links inscape to the
way, the poem could be described as performing influence on Hopkins of the medieval philoso-
the kind of knowledge that Spinoza calls pher Duns Scotus, whose focus was on what he
“intuition.” called the haecceitas, or this-ness, or quiddity of
a thing in its radical singularity. Inscape, writes
Hopkins’ Knowledge Watson, “is the ‘within-scape’ of something, its
inner shape” (34). In this way, inscape can be un-
It is not only Hopkins’ poetry, however, that derstood as a sort of radical interiorizing of land-
resonates with Spinoza’s concept of intuition, but scape, and suggests that there is a particular inter-
also his theoretical writings on poetry, and in par- nal landscape proper to each being as its essence.
ticular his three concepts of inscape, instress, and These spatial/geographical aspects of inscape
sprung rhythm, all of which have distinct paral- noted in Watson suggest an affinity with
lels in Spinoza’s philosophy. Hopkins never Deleuze’s analysis of Spinoza’s thought as in-
clearly and comprehensively articulated his un- volving a “plane of immanence,” “ethology,” and
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
404
a geometrical model of “longitude and latitude” vague sense of essence expressed by inscape.
(Deleuze 127). Deleuze finds in Spinoza’s phi- Might not defining a thing’s essence in terms of
losophy a radical orientation toward univocal ex- what functions it can perform, for example, or in
tension, a conception of a singular plane of exis- terms of what physiological traits it has, or in
tence in which all bodies (human, animal, terms of its genetic background, be less suited to
mental, mathematical, etc.) are extended and find inscape than a Spinozistic conception based on
their habitats. Inscape, in other words, with its affectability? The following, brief analysis of
ties to landscapes and to an understanding of instress should help clarify this question.
things as consisting of interiorized landscapes, Instress is often described by Hopkins in con-
seems to belong among the concepts of what the junction with inscape (as in my first quote from
later Deleuze conceives as “geophilosophy.” Hopkins above). Instress, however, seems more
One can easily find certain parallels between commonsensical than inscape in its usage, espe-
Hopkins’ inscape and Spinoza’s conception of cially since Hopkins often uses the word stress as
essence, especially since each particular thing in a paraphrase for instress. In the quote above from
the world for Spinoza is further composed of an Hopkins’ notes on Parmenides, for example, one
infinite array of bodies. A body is defined by reads first about “the depth of an instress” and
Spinoza as “a mode which expresses in a certain then, only two sentences later, of a “stem of stress
and determinate way the essence of God, insofar between us and things.” According to Watson,
as he is considered an extended thing” (e2d1). instress is “the ‘within-stress’of a thing, the force
For example, the human body is a mode of the at- or stress that comes from within something and
tribute of extension, and is a body composed of which is felt by the beholder as ‘stressing’ it, giv-
organs, which are also bodies, which are com- ing it its stress from within itself. Instress is a
posed of tissues, cells, atoms, etc., all of which force and is felt” (34).
are bodies as well. Each body consists of both a Conjoining Watson’s analyses of inscape and
conglomeration of other bodies that are all af- instress, one observes that for him the two are
fected in similar ways, and also of groups of such “two related qualities” that are “closely con-
conglomerations, each of which is affected in nected (a) with the world of physical things, and,
similar ways. What defines the essence of each indeed, mental and spiritual things too (inscape)
thing—each distribution of bodies—is its affect- and (b) with our perception of the external world
ability. and the forces within it (instress)” (31–32). Wat-
The liver, for example, is formed by a vast son repeats two pages later that “inscape is
number of modes, all of which share certain closely related to instress,” and that “if the in-
kinds of affectability, such as the ability of each scape holds a thing, then it is the instress of the
of the cells of the liver to be nourished by the thing which is felt” (34).
blood, and to purify the blood of various toxins. It Each of these observations seems to ap-
is just these common affectabilities that make the proach, but not accomplish, an interpretive move
cells of the liver into the liver. Likewise, the liver uniting the two concepts in a more intimate way.
is part of a community of other organs in the hu- Watson’s formula, and perhaps Hopkins’ in-
man body that have in common the ability to be tended formula as well, seems to be the follow-
affected (as a human body) by various things. ing: inscape = essence of thing, and instress = en-
Similarly, the essence of a thing for Hopkins—its ergy of thing; or, inscape = thing, and instress =
inscape—can be thought of as a map of essential energy. Is it not also possible, however, that this
qualities, i.e., of the essential ways that some- description of the relationship between inscape
thing can affect and be affected by other things. and instress is burdened by an unacknowledged
In this case, the inscape might take the form of an metaphysical commitment, and a commitment
anatomical drawing of the liver. without which the texts of the poems themselves
One could argue, however, that this is only are still capable of functioning? More specifi-
one possible interpretation of Hopkins’ rather cally, does Watson’s understanding of inscape
POETIC INTUTION
405
and instress rely on a naïve subject-object dual- rhythm to be “stronger and more natural than the
ity, assuming a transcendent subjectivity encoun- customary metre of poetry, which counts an
tering alien objects? If so, what possibilities equal number of feet and syllables” (34). Watson
might be created by considering an alternative to then quotes a letter in which Hopkins poses the
this particular metaphysical picture? following question: “why, if it is forcible in prose
More specifically, what if one were to think of to say ‘lashed rod’, am I obliged to weaken this in
an inscape—following Deleuze’s understanding verse, which ought to be stronger, not weaker,
of Spinoza as working in a “common plane of im- into ‘lashed birch-rod’ or something?”7 Watson
manence”—as nothing other than the manifesta- also notes that it was crucial for Hopkins that “the
tion of its instress? (122) The Norton Anthol- poet is always counterpointing” the common
ogy’s essay on Hopkins seems to support this rhythms and meters underneath his sprung
view, in that it defines instress as simply a more rhythm, meaning that sprung rhythm, despite its
precise term for “liveliness,” describing it as “the flexibility, is not in fact a form of free verse, but a
power that holds inscape together, like the force careful structure built on a hidden foundation or
that binds the atom.” Borrowing further concept- abyss of counterpointed regular meter.
uality from physics, one might frame the ques- Strength and power are also crucial to
tion as follows: what if matter (essence, inscape) Spinoza’s entire philosophy, particularly his eth-
is nothing but a certain form of activity or energy ics and psychology. “By virtue and power [or
(force, instress)? conatus],” Spinoza writes, “I understand the
Having thus briefly interrogated inscape and same; that is . . . virtue, in so far as it is related to
instress, I now turn, finally, to Hopkins’ concept man, is the very essence, i.e., the nature, of man”
of “Sprung Rhythm,” which he discusses in the
(e4d8). I have already noted that conatus is the
“Author’s Preface” to Poems (1918).6 Sprung
essence of human being, to which I now append
Rhythm is a technique in prosody derived from
that the increase in power of acting/existing is
the application to traditional English metrical
what constitutes positive human emotion, such
forms (such as iambic pentameter) of the tech-
as joy. And a decrease in power is experienced as
nique Hopkins calls “counterpoint.” In counter-
point, similar to the jazz technique of syncopa- negative emotion, such as sadness (e3d3; e3p58;
tion, the positions of the stressed syllable(s) and de1–3). Similarly, what is good for something is
the unstressed syllable(s) are switched, produc- that which increases its power of acting, and what
ing a reversing or counter effect to the dominant is bad for something is that which decreases its
metrical pattern. When “counterpoint is used power of acting (e4d1–2, 8). These claims are the
throughout [the poem],” Hopkins writes, “since foundation for what might be broadly construed
one only of the counter rhythms [Sprung as Spinoza’s “naturalistic ethics.”
Rhythm] is actually heard, the other [conven- The major affinity then, between Spinoza’s
tional rhythm] is really destroyed or cannot come ethics and psychology and Hopkins’ Sprung
to exist, and what is written is one rhythm only Rhythm, is that both opt for a more vigorously af-
and probably Sprung Rhythm” (7). The resulting firmative alternative in the face of something
metrical form is as follows: one to four metrical more passive. Spinoza rejects the good-evil dual-
feet, each of which begins with a stressed syllable ity of what Nietzsche would call the “slave” char-
followed by only unstressed syllables. This flexi- acter of Judeo-Christian morality in favor of a
ble structure gives the poet considerable freedom “noble” ethics based on one’s power of acting,
with regard to line composition. and Hopkins rejects traditional English meter for
The most important aspect of sprung rhythm a more condensed and percussive metrical sys-
for the purposes of the present essay is its focus tem. The celebration of power as virtue itself is
on strength and power over against more tradi- evident in these lines from Hopkins’ “The
tional English metrical patterns. Watson notes in Windhover: to Christ our Lord,” which describes
his analysis that Hopkins considered sprung the flight of a falcon:
PHILOSOPHY TODAY
406
 As a skate’s heel sweeps smooth on a bow-bend: lived in the scientism-obsessed era known as
the hurl and modern philosophy, and who even understood
gliding his magnum opus as an elaborate geometric
Rebuffed the big wind. My heart in hiding proof (complete with axioms and postulates), af-
Stirred for a bird,—the achieve of, the mastery firmed the irreducibility and importance of an en-
of the thing! tire other way of knowing that has a particular af-
Brute beauty and valor and act, oh, air, pride, finity to something outside of philosophy proper,
plume, here namely the arts, and in particular poetry. What
Buckle! AND the fire that breaks from thee this suggests, in turn, is that human knowledge
then, a billion for Spinoza, and thereby education, can never be
Times told lovelier, more dangerous . . . (24) complete as long as we look only to philosophy,
In the “rebuffing” of the “big wind,” and the or rationalistic discourse. Instead, we must also
“mastery of the thing,” one can hear the praise of move into the sphere of the arts.
strength for its own sake, albeit symbolically as This latter move remains a controversial one
praise of the figure of Jesus. The phrase “Brute in philosophy to this day, so much so that (as I
beauty” emphasizes the positive valuation of this noted at the beginning of my essay), some schol-
strength; it is not a monstrous image of strength ars would rather even pretend that Spinoza never
that is honored, but a brutality permeated by introduced the concept of intuition rather than
beauty. And in the “fire that breaks” from the fal-
linger with the kind of radical implications that I
con one can hear the “dangerous” manifestation
of that power, a manifestation which is the power have elaborated in this essay. But to engage in
of both the speaker of the poem, and of the poet this willful make-believe is to blind oneself, not
himself, despite the latter’s willingness to defer only to an important and fascinating aspect of
all honor to God. Spinoza’s philosophy, but also to one of the many
ways that arts such as poetry can contribute to our
Poetic Knowledge knowledge of our place in our world—not to
In conclusion, I wish to draw attention to the mention the conceptually rich work of poets such
fact that Spinoza, a canonical philosopher who as Gerard Manley Hopkins.

NOTES

1. G. H. R. Parkinson, “Editor’s Introduction” to (So, for example, e2p40s2 refers to Ethics, Part 2,
Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson Proposition 40, Scholium 2).
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 35. 3. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,
2. Spinoza’s Ethics, 149. We will follow the system of trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights,
citation used by Parkinson in his edition: 1988), 52.
A = Axiom 4. The Norton Anthology of Modern Poetry, ed. Richard
C = Corollary Ellmann and Robert O’Clair (New York: Norton,
D = Definition 1988), 90.
DE = Definition of the Emotions (Part 3) 5. J. R. Watson, The Poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins,
L = Lemma (London: Penguin, 1989), 127.
P = Proposition 6. Gerard Manley Hopkins, Poems of Gerard Manley
S = Scholium Hopkins (New York: Digireads.com, 2010), 7.

Mukingum University, New Concord, OH 43762

POETIC INTUTION
407
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