Introduction to Indian Philosophy∗

R. Venkata Raghavan
[email protected]

In this short introduction, we shall see what philosophy is, how it is related to other
subjects and then have a very brief overview of Indian philosophy. The purpose of this
article is to supply, to whatever extent possible, the necessary conceptual background
for introducing oneself to Philosophy in general and Indian Philosophy in particular.
Therefore, the aim is to present a broad understanding rather than an in-depth analysis.
Since the audience is unlikey to be familiar with ‘darśana’ it would be better to discuss
a more familiar word but closely related word ‘Philosophy.’ One important point to note,
at the outset, is that we are interested in Philosophy as an academic discipline. This
sets it apart from several colloquial uses of that word ‘philosophy.’ For example, we often
hear people asking “What is your philosophy in life?” or saying “Live and Let Live,
that is my philosophy” or commenting that “The philosophy of the so-and-so party is
utterly regressive”. Here ‘philosophy’ is used in the sense of principles, maxim or ideology
(respectively). We are not concerned with such uses of the term.

1 Philosophy: Contemporary Understanding

In this section we will see where philosophy finds itself amidst the multitude of (increas-
ingly specialized) disciplines in modern academic space. We will then attempt a tentative
definition of philosophy and go on to see its relation with Science. Since the audience
has a strong foundation in Science this comparison will be helpful in understanding the
nature of Philosophy. Lastly, we will see what are the major areas of contemporary
philosophy.

1.1 Philosophy: Its place in today’s academics

All contemporary disciplines can be broadly divided into two categories: Human Sci-
ences and Natural Sciences. Here, the word Science does not stand for Physics, Chem-
istry etc. but for any methodological inquiry into a well-defined set of problems. Thus,
two conditions go into labeling something a ‘Science:’ a domain or scope (the objects
∗
Only for internal circulation within IIT Bhubaneswar.
1
 Sciences

Natural Sc. Human Sc.

Physics,
Chemistry, Social Sc. Behavioral Sc. Humanities
Biology
Economics, History,
Pol.Sc, Psychology Literature,
Sociology... Philosophy

Figure 1: A Taxonomy of Modern Disciplines

which that discipline intends to study) and a method/methods (with which it will study
those objects). The method of inquiry may be (and generally is) different in different
disciplines and this is partly because of the difference in the object of inquiry. This first
level classification (into Human and Natural Sciences) is very intuitive to a modern mind
since it sets the enquirer on one side and everything else on the other side. Analogically,
if pigs were doing science, there would be Pig Sciences and Natural Sciences. Similarly,
if butterflies were doing science, there would be Butterfly Sciences and Natural Sciences.
Under the Natural sciences are grouped all those disciplines whose objects of inquiry
are not the enquirers (i.e Humans) themselves.1 Among the Human Sciences, we can
identify 3 further categories: Social Sciences, Behavioral Sciences and Humanities.
The object of inquiry of the Social Sciences is the human society and its various aspects.
Thus, we place Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, Political Science, Commerce etc
in this category. The Behavioral Sciences deal with the mental aspects of the human
being and we can place various disciplines of Psychology under this heading. Lastly, the
Humanities deal with all the cultural/creative output of human life. In this, we find
Literature, Linguistics, History and finally Philosophy. Note that this classification is
not rigid and is subject to change which may occur due to a change in method or due to
some fundamental shift in the concepts used in that discipline).2 Also, the disciplines do
not stand in isolation with one another but are (and should be) in continuous dialogue
with each other. Philosophers are as much informed by developments in Physics as
Physicists may be informed by developments in Psychology. Advances in the Social
Sciences may be due to advancements in Mathematics or Computer Science. Thus, though
logically and methodologically distinct, the Sciences form one huge web of knowledge.
1
In Biology, we may study the human body but this is done with the assumption that the specimen
under examination is primarily an object of nature.
2
For instance, Linguistics used to be considered to be a Behavioral Science in the first half of the 20th
Century

2
1.2 Definition of Philosophy
Now, that we have seen where Philosophy stands in the network of disciplines, we will
try to define this term. A tentative definition is:

Philosophy is a critical examination of our most general and abstract claims.3

Two terms are of importance in the above definition: Abstract and General. Philosophy
deals with abstract concepts and claims. An ‘abstract’ concept stands in opposition to
a ‘concrete’ concept in that the former is intangible. It cannot be observed under a mi-
croscope or ‘perceived’ by any other instrument. Take the example of ‘knowledge’ which
is the subject matter of one entire branch of philosophy called Epistemology (Section
1.4). We cannot ask a philosopher to show us knowledge just as we might as a chemist
to show us a chemical reaction. However, other disciplines too study abstract concepts.
For instance, ‘class’ which is studied by social scientists or ‘emotions’ which is studied by
psychologists. Then what differentiates philosophical topics from such topics?
The answer is: generality. Philosophical concepts are most general in nature. The
opposite of ‘general’ is ‘particular’ or ‘specific.’ The social scientists may be interested in
the concept of ‘class’ but they are more inclined to study this-or-that class as opposed to
studying what class itself means. Again, a psychologist may study this or that emotions
but takes it for granted that such a concept (as emotion) exists. It is left to the philosopher
(inclined towards social sciences or psychology) to ask these general questions. Because of
these two qualities, philosophical concepts tend to be at the very foundation of a Science.
A change in the understanding of these concepts may result in a significant shift in the
way the respective Science(s) is carried out.
Another aspect of contemporary philosophy is that it is a meta-discipline. ‘Meta’
is a prefix in Greek language meaning ‘beyond’ but in the current usage it means ‘about.’
Thus, meta-rules are rules about rules, meta-data is data about data and so on.4 We say
Philosophy is a meta-discipline because “[in] Philosophy the concepts with which
we approach the world themselves become the topic of inquiry.”5 To consider
the same example as above, ‘class’ is a concept used by the social scientist to understand
society. However, the philosopher is concerned with the concept of ‘class’ itself. Similarly,
a physicist may use time to study events. But a philosopher studies the concept of ‘time.’

1.3 Philosophy and Science

To understand, more clearly, how philosophy is a meta-discipline, let us examine how
scientific questions can lead to questions of philosophy. Consider the following set of
3
I owe this definition to Prof. S.G.Kulkarni, Univ. of Hyderabad. We find a similar definition is
Blackburn, Simon. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nd Revised Edition. 2008. entry on Philosophy
4
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta
5
Blackburn, op. cit.
3
questions:

1. At what speed does earth revolve around the sun?

2. What is speed?
3. What is time?
4. What is motion?
5. What is change?

As one can observe, the questions get more and more abstract and general from the
first to the fifth. Also, the last question asks something about the concept (change)
without assuming which the first question cannot be answered. This is an example of the
gradual shift from scientific inquiry to a philosophical inquiry. This also illustrates how
philosophical understanding of some concepts (like motion and change) can bring about
changes in the way scientific questions are answered. Consider two other examples which
illustrate the above points:
1. Should person over 70 be allowed to
1. What is the correct use of preposi-
contest election?
tions in English?
2. What are the criteria for good gov-
2. What are parts of speech in English?
ernance?
3. What are parts of speech?
3. Why should there be governance?
4. What is speech?
4. What is a community/society?
5. What is language?
5. What is an individual?
6. What is meaning?
6. What is ‘Self’?

Hence, rather than thinking of philosophy and science as two distinct and indepen-
dent disciplines, we may look at them as occupying varying positions on a spectrum of
questions ranging from the less abstract to the more abstract and less general to more
general (figure 13).

more specific more general

SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY
more concrete more abstract

Figure 2: The Science-Philosophy Continuum

1.4 Branches of Philosophy

Next, let us look at, briefly, the major branches of contemporary Philosophy. Broadly,
these are Metaphysics, Epistemology and Axiology (or Value theory).
4
 • Metaphysics is the study of Reality which lies beyond the access of Sciences.6 Typ-
ically, this includes questions of Mind-Body (their relation), Causation, God, Per-
sonal Identity and Ontology (a classification of the types of things in a world).

• Epistemology is the study of knowledge. While metaphysics studies the essence (or
nature) of events/objects in the world, epistemology studies how we have knowledge
about those events/objects and what is the nature of knowledge itself. Examples
of some epistemological questions are: What is the definition of knowledge? How
is knowledge possible? Can we be certain about anything? What are the sources
of knowledge? etc. With the pursuit of knowledge becoming more and more spe-
cialised, Epistemology itself can be bifurcated into ‘General Epistemology’ and
‘Special Epistemology.’ While the former is concerned with more general questions
about the nature of knowledge, the latter concerns itself with the philosophical
examination of knowledge claims of a particular discipline. For instance, Philoso-
phy of Science studies the knowledge claims of Science; Philosophy of Mind studies
knowledge claims about Cognitive Science and other disciplines which study the
mind. Philosophy of Mathematics would be a sub-branch of Epistemology which
examines the mathmatical claims and so on.

• Lastly, Axiology deals with the study of values, the pursuit of which makes human
life meaningful or purposive. Traditionally, three values are identified:

– Truth, which is studied by Logic. The various tool by which one can distin-
guish right reasoning to incorrect reasoning are examined.
– Good, which is studied by Ethics. Typically, the questions can be of the form:
What is a virtue? What kind of virtues lead to a good life? What is the
relationship between a moral life and a good life? etc.
– Beauty, which is studied by Aesthetics. Here, one can ask questions related to
beauty in nature or beauty in art. For instance, on what basis can we say that
a work of art (a painting, a movie, a sculpture, a poem) is beautiful? Why do
we find Nature captivating? etc.

To the values we may add another value called Justice which is the subject matter
of Social/Political Philosophy.

One way to reduce the above classification is to group the inquiry into 3 areas: those
related to the subject of inquiry, those related to the object of inquiry and those concern-
ing how the subject accesses the object. In all cases, the subject of inquiry is a human
agent. Hence, any branch of Philosophy which deals with the human being (where in-
dividually or as a group) may be put into this vertex. The object of inquiry need not
6
Note the occurrence of the prefix ‘meta.’ Here, it is being used in its original sense.
5
 Philosophy

Metaphysics Epistemology Axiology

General Special Truth Beauty Good Justice

Figure 3: Branches in Contemporary Philosophy

be physically external to the human agent. Sometimes it can be things like concepts,
dreams, thoughts, mind or self which are within the agent (or at least not external to
the agent). Depending upon the object of inquiry the agent chooses different modes of
access.

Access

Object of Subject of
inquiry inquiry

Figure 4: The Knowledge Triangle

1.5 Doing Philosophy

Before we end our general survey of Philosophy, we will do well to note some method-
ological aspects of this discipline. Firstly, given that its subject matter tends to be
abstract and general, there is no one way of ‘doing philosophy.’ Hence, unless we are
engaged in some meta-philosophical analysis,7 we cannot judge one method to be better
or worse than the other. However, a common tool used in all philosophical analysis is
‘argument.’ It is on the basis of examining the relative merits of different arguments than
we may conclude about something in Philosophy. There are several parameters to judge
an argument like validity, soundness, convincingness, parsimony of entities assumed, rea-
sonableness of assumptions, hidden premises etc.8 The history of philosophy is a history
of arguments and counter-arguments. No argument is perfect nor is it ever permanently
refuted. Hence, philosophers tend to revisit arguments which are centuries old, present
fresh criticism against them or revitalize them with new concepts and present them in a
fresh light to the philosophical community. Hence, one may say rather poetically that,
like love, philosophy is also timeless.
7
Philosophizing about philosophy itself!
8
For an introduction to these concepts one may refer to Introduction of Logic by Irving Copi, Carl
Cohen, Priyadarshi Jetli and Monica Prabhakar, Pearson, 2009, 13th Edition, Indian Subcontinent
Adaptation or A Concise Introduction to Logic by Patrick Hurley, Cengage Learning, 11th Edition, 2011

6
1.6 Why do Philosophy?
Any Science is a perspective into the world (it is analogous to wearing a coloured lens).
As with all perspectives, they become outdated and need to be revised from time-to-time.
Having a philosophical outlook helps us in this revision. Further, Philosophy also helps us
connecting the knowledge we derive from various sciences and give us ‘the big picture.’ As
the famous British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell said philosophical
knowledge “gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results
from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs.”9
This act of connecting the dots and having a vision of the unity enriches the pursuit of
our respective discipline. Further, examining our convictions, prejudices and beliefs from
time to time helps us adapt to changing times and be a better human being. Thus, the
pursuit of Philosophy serves us well both professionally and personally.

2 Philosophy in India
Now, that we have the required background to understand what Philosophy is, let us shift
our focus to the kind of philosophy inquiry that existed (and to some extent continues to
exist) in India.

2.1 Philosophy: Equivalent words and place

Every civilization has produced philosophy to suite the needs of its people and this is
true of India too. Since Sanskrit was the language of intellectual discource (as English
is now?) most of the philosophical inquiry in India is in this language. Thus, let us
begin by looking at the words which were used in Sanskrit to refer to the activity of
philosophising. The most common word we find is ‘darśana’ which means a view or a
perspective. Thus, when we say ‘nyāya darśana’ or ‘vedānta darśana’ we may understand
these as ‘nyāya perspective’ and ‘vedānta perspective.’ The word ‘darśana’ derives from
the root drś (to see) giving the etyological meaning “instrument of seeing correctly or
that which causes us, allows us to see.” But what is it that we want to see? It is the true
nature of everything. Hence, Tattva-śāstra or Tattva-vidyā is another term proposed for
‘Philosophy’ since it aims at knowing the true nature or essence (tattva) of everything.
Now, let us turn to the place of Philosophy in the pre-modern Indian knowledge
systems. Kautilya, in the Arthaśāstra (2nd-3rd century B.C.E) classifies all knowledge
into Trayi (The 3 Veda10 ), Vārtā (Commerce and trade), Danḍa-Nīti (Science of polity)
and ānvīkṣikī (Philosophy).
9
“The Value of Philosophy” in The Problems of Philosophy.
10
Ṛg, Yajuś and Sāma

7
 vidyā

ānvīkṣikī Vārtā Trayi Danḍa-Nīti

Figure 5: Place of philosophy in Indian Knowledge Systems

He has the following to say about the nature and purpose of these sciences.11

ānvīkṣikī comprises the Philosophy of Saṃkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata (hetero-

dox thinking). Righteous and unrighteous acts (dharma-adharmau) are learnt
from the triple Vedas; wealth and non-wealth from Vārta (artha-anarthau);
the expedient and the inexpedient (naya-apanayau) from the science of gov-
ernment. The science of ānvīkṣikī, by means of various arguments decides the
significance (bala-abalau) of the various sciences, and is most beneficial to the
world of knowledge. It keeps the mind steady and firm in weal and woe alike
and bestows excellence of foresight, speech and action. Light to all kinds
of knowledge, easy means to accomplish all kinds of acts and the locus of
all kinds of virtues, is the Science of ānvīkṣikī ever held to be.

As we can see, ānvīkṣikī, is essentially a meta-discipline according to Kautilya. While

other sciences have a clear object of study, ānvīkṣikī studies/guides the sciences them-
selves. Hence, this conception of ānvīkṣikī agrees very well with our contemporary un-
derstanding of Philosophy.
A common claim about Indian Philosophy is that it is not merely an intellectual
exercise but practically oriented. This claim may be justified on the following grounds.
The Indian thinkers recognized four goal of human life called the Puruṣārtha. These
are Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa. The pursuit of each of these goals makes human
life meaningful. Hence, there evolved a tradition of knowledge devoted to explaining
the nature of each of these goals and setting out the best way to achieve them. The
Artha-śāstras concerned themselves with the means of attaining material goods that were
required to live a good life. The Kāma-śāstra explained the ways to attain pleasure (their
conception of kāma was not limited to physical pleasure alone). Both these śāstra-s were
regulated by the Dharma-śāstras which dealt with the various aspects of individual and
social morality. These three values (called the trivarga) were, however, considered as
means to achieve Mokṣa, the parama-puruṣārtha (supreme goal). The nature of mokṣa
and the means of attaining it was the subject matter of Philosophy. Hence, philosophy
in India may also be called Mokṣa-śāstra.
Thus, Indian Philosophy serves not only as meta-discipline, which sheds light on
all other disciplines, but also serves to achieve the most important goal of human life,
i.e liberation from it. However, philosophy, in the Indian context also serves mundane
11
Arthaśāstra Book 1, Ch 2, Section 1, The [Enumeration] of Sciences. Emphasis added
8
 Values

Dharma Artha Kāma Mokṣa

Dharmaśāstra Arthaśāstra Kāmaśāstra Mokṣaśāstra

Figure 6: The ethical motivation for Darśana-s

purposes as can be seen in the above lines from Arthśāstra (“It keeps the mind steady
and firm in weal and woe alike and bestows excellence of foresight, speech and action.”)

3 Philosophy and Darśana

Based on the above introduction, let us see how Philosophy and Darśana compare with
each other. Firstly, they are similar in their domain and method. Both try to understand
the true nature of the object under inquiry and adopt a critical approach (as is clear
from the quotation from Arthaśāstra). As further evidence that Indian philosophers
(dārśanika-s) were critical in their outlook one can state the popular practice of stating
the opponent’s position (called pūrvapakṣa) in a fair way and then proceeding to critique
it before establishing one’s own theory (called siddhānta or uttarapakṣa). Further, India
had a well attested tradition of discussion and debate (vāda) for which elaborate rules
were framed. Both Philosophy and Darśana are also meta-disciplinary in their approach
as both study the concepts used by the empirical sciences.
The various branches in Philosophy also find sufficient parallels in Darśana. For
instance, Metaphysics comes close to prameya śāstra. Epistemological questions are
called under pramāṇa śāstra and the inquiry in the subject (the Self) occupies the
entire discipline called Vedānta (There is nothing as ‘prāmātṛ śāstra’ in the primary
sourses). However, in the Indian society sought to inquire into a different set of values.
These were popularly called the puruṣārtha which constituted Dharma, Artha (material
wealth), Kāma (Sensual pleasures) and Mokṣa (Liberation).
On the other hand, there are certain important differences between the two philo-
sophical traditions. Firstly, the pursuit of any knowledge in the Indian context was
teleological, that is, it was aimed at a attaining a specific purpose (in this case mokṣa).
All Darśanas explicitly agree with this claim. The slogan “Knowledge for knowledge sake”
does not find much favour in the Indian context. As a result, philosophical knowledge in
India is never theoretical. Doing Philsophy it is not merely an intellectual exercise but
is done with a specific purpose in mind.
Secondly, Darśana was not seen as being different from ‘religion’ (whatever be its
equivalent term in the Indian context). Modern Western philosophy likes to maintain a
distinction between Philosophy and Religion. In the Indian context, Dharma is a integral
9
part of Darśana. Philosophical inquiry is not seprated from “religious practices” like
prayer, meditation, yajña and so on nor did religious observance come in the way of
philosophizing. Despite following different “religions” (which were mostly governed by
local traditions) “the society had enough common ground to launch in-depth explorations
of philosophy and theory of religion.”12 The Veda, which is traditionally seen as the
foundation of all Indian philosophical work, is certainly a religious work. However, just
because Darśanas evolved from the Veda, it does not follow that they will have the same
characteristics of the source.

4 Common Features of Darśana-s

Given the generality of the problem, different traditions emerged which focused on differ-
ent vertices of the Knowledge Triangle. However, some themes or ideas which resonate
with all the darśana-s (with the possible exception of the Cārvāka) which formed the
“common ground” referred to by Aklujkar above. Some of these commonalities are listed
below:13

1. Practically oriented: As we saw in section 2.1 philosophy is seen as the branch of

knowledge which addresses one of the puruṣārtha-s or goals of life, mokṣa. Hence,
all philosophical theorizing was directed towards this goal.

2. Spiritual Disquiet: Philosophy arouse out of a sense of disillusionment with the

empirical world; with the suffering that was so pervasive in it. Saṃkhya recognizes
3 types of suffering: ādhyātmika (suffering related to the inner self), ādhibhautika
(suffering due to the physical world), ādhidaivika (suffering due to divine forces).
All philosophies sought a permanent end to such suffering.

3. Faith in eternal moral order: The near obsession with suffering was countered
by a sincere faith in an eternal moral order which ensured that there would be
‘light at the end of the tunnel.’ This order was called Ṛta in the Vedic period
approx. 1500 B.C.E to 500 B.C.E and gradually developed into the law of karma.
Thus, such a faith prevented the Indian philosophers from descending into absolute
pessimism.

4. Ignorance as the cause and Knowledge as liberator: All philosophical sys-

tems agreed that ignorance, whether of the Self or the World or of Reality was
the root cause of all suffering and believed that only the true knowledge about
12
Ashok Aklujkar, “History and Doxography of the Philosophical Schools” in The Oxford Handbook of
Indian Philosophy, edited by Jonardon Ganeri.
13
This is a bulleted version of “Section 6, The Common Characters of the Indian Systems,” in An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy by Satishchandra Chatterjee and Dheerendramohan Datta, Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi, 2016, pp.12-22.
10
 the nature of these will liberate us from suffering. However, this knowledge was
not a merely of a theoretical nature but was required to be ‘lived’ or continuously
meditated upon in order to achieve the final aim of liberation.

5. The practice of Yoga: All traditions recognised the role played by Yoga to
inculcate a sense of discipline in one’s life which in turn would help one to slowly
detach themselves from the mudane world. Thus, the theoretical knowledge about
the nature of reality and self was combined the practical aspect of Yoga to set the
inquirer firmly on the path to liberation.

6. Liberation as highest end: As we have mentioned, mokṣa (liberation) is the goal

of all darṣana-s. Negatively this means the end of all suffering and this much is
agreed upon by all the schools. However, some philosophers add a positive aspect
to this state by proposing that it is also one of infinite joy.

7. Importance of Teacher: The teacher (Guru) holds a pre-eminent position in the

Indian culture even today. It was taken for granted that the path to liberation
cannot be achieved without the proper guidance of a teacher. These teachers were
assumed to have experienced the true nature of reality and the self and were hence
greatly revered. Thus, philosophical activity in India relied on a continued teacher-
student tradition (guru-śiṣya paramparā) via a reliant textual tradition aided by
discussion/debate (vāda).

5 Development of Indian Philosophies

Philosophy has had a history of more than two and half millennia in the sub-continent.
In this section, we shall set out a very brief (and simplified) picture of this history. The
story of darśanas may be divided in the following stages based of certain characteristic
features of that stage:

• STAGE 1: The Vedic Stage ( 1500 BCE to 1000 BCE14 )

• STAGE 2: The Upaniṣadic Stage ( 800 BCE to 2 or 1 BCE)

• STAGE 3: The Transitional Stage ( 700 BCE to 1 CE)

15
• STAGE 4: The Systematic Stage ( 600 BCE to 3 CE)
14
Note that these dates are only approximate. There is a general problem with accurately dating
Indian history and the problem continues with its philosophical traditions as well. After the end of the
first millenium CE, we have a little more reliable dating.
15
To this we may also add stages 5 and 6, the medieval stage and modern stage respectively. However,
in this course, since we are primarily concerned with classical Indian philosophies, these stages have not
be explained

11
5.1 The Vedic Stage
The foundational literature of Indian knowledge traditions is the Veda. All disciplines,
either directly or indirectly, draw their inspiration, problems, responses and authority
√
from the Veda. The Veda ( vid to know) is a unique genre of work, which was heard
(hence, it is also called śruti) and recited. It was, and continues to be, passed on orally
from teacher to student. They are considered to be unauthored (apauruṣeya) by any
agent, human or divine16 and hence free of any error and this in turn, gives them their
authority. The Veda were primarily used for ritual purposes in the Vedic sacrifices (yañja)
but they contain traces of knowledge belonging to different traditions. Broadly, the Veda
are classified into 4: Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Arthavanaveda. The
contents of these vedas may be divided into 4 conceptual categories: the Saṃhita, the
Brāhmaṇa, the Āraṇyaka and the Upaniṣad. The saṃhita is the collect of hymns
recited or sung in the praise of the deities (deva), the brāhmaṇas are ritual manuals
which explain how the sacrifice should be performed, the Āraṇyakas are certain hymns
which are recited in secluded areas (generally outside the vedic village, which incidentally
happened to be the edge of the forest, araṇya) and the upaniṣad are secret philosophical
teachings. Of these, the saṃhita were “composed” much earlier than the upaniṣads.
The vedic society was centred around the sacrifices. It served not just as the spiritual
path to the people but also was a means of livelihood. Though the philosophical inquiry
in the vedic age was highly speculative and not very pronounced, we do have some
remarkable examples of such inquiry in the early sections of the veda. We have seen in
class the Nāsadīya sūkta which explored the question of existence and the origin of this
world. Below, a few more characteristic features of the vedic stage are set out briefly :

1. Stress on pravṛtti mārga: Since the vedic society was yañja-centric, it stressed on
all members of the society doing their duties. It was assumed that doing one’s
duties was the only way of attaining loftier worlds (like svarga, heaven) and hence,
lead to happiness.

2. Highly speculative: Whatever philosophy one can extract from the saṃhita and
brāhmaṇa is very speculative and mystic. Also, since the meanings of these mantras
are not fixed, there is always room for individual interpretation.

3. Ṛta ( √ṛ to go): The most important philosophical idea was that of the ṛta, the
course/order of things. It was posited as the order according to which the world
operated properly. The sun rose everyday due to ṛta, the rains followed the order set
by ṛta, human beings experienced pleasure and pain as regulated by ṛta. Even the
deities functions according to ṛta. Though there are no hymns dedicated to it, there
16
Some traditions like the Nyāya consider these the words of Īśvara (God).

12
 is an acceptance of a cosmic order which directs the world. This very ṛta would go
on the be karma, apūrva, adṛṣṭa, dhamma in later philosophical traditions.

4. Gradual progress from “Polytheistic outwardness” to “Monistic inwardness”: The

Veda, when closely studied from the saṃhita to the upaniṣad show how philosoph-
ical thinking gradually progressed from an outward inquiry to an inward inquiry
- that the answer to the philosophical questions does not lie out in the external
world but within one’s self. Likewise, there is a shift from the belief in several gods
regulating our lives to a single principle which underlies all our experience. The
final stage of this transformation is the upaniṣad.

5.2 The Upaniṣadic Stage

As stated above, the vedic philosophy stressed on pravṛtti mārga (the path of action).
In this, one performed their duties according to social order throughout their lifetime
and based on the spiritual merit (puṇya) they accumulated, they spent proportionate
time in higher words (such as svarga) and then returned back to the mundane world
(bhūloka). The cycle went on, it seemed, infinitely. By the upaniṣadic age, people seem
to have developed a resentment towards this never ending cycle. “Isn’t it possible for one
to simply exist Without being attached to or identified with one’s action?” asked the
upaniṣadic thinker. And thus arose the stress on the nivṛtti mārga (path of renunciation).
As the verse of the Kaṭhopaniṣadic (2.2.1)17 tells us, the inquirer started to look inwards
rather than outward. This also meant a shift from ritual worship to gaining spiritual
insight18 .
The upaniṣads contain several speculations about the nature of the self (ātman), the
focal point of the inner world, the nature of Brahman, the foundation of the external world
and their relation. These works seek to explore the hidden connection between everything
that exists within and without. The word upaniṣad itself occurs in the Upaniṣads in the
meaning of a ‘secret connection’.19 . Traditionally there are upto 108 upaniṣads but the
most prominent ones are the following 11 since Śaṅkarācārya (early 8th cen CE), the
great proponent of monistic philosophy (advaita vedānta), commented on these works:
Aitareya (ṛgveda), Taittirīya, Śvetāśvatara, Kaṭha (all three part of kṛṣṇa yajurveda),
Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Īśa (both part of śukla yajurveda), Chāndogya, Kena (both part of
sāmaveda), Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya (all three part of atharvaṇaveda).
The central concern of the upaniṣads was to find the one principle that unites all
17
Please refer to the separate handout containing selections from Upaniṣads.
18
Note that this does not mean that the Upaniṣads were calling for abandoning rituals, they were only
shifting the emphasis from them to an inquiry into the Self
19
Etymologically it is explained as Upa (near)+ ni (with certainity) + √sad (to destroy, to go, to
loosen) + -kvip (instrument), the instrument which takes us near with certainty to the ultimate Reality,
i.e. Brahman, by destroying or loosen the bonds of ignorance

13
entities and experiences. In other words, the upaniṣadic thinker was trying to find the
metaphysical as well as the epistemological basis of everything. A dialogue between two
famous thinkers of that time, Yajñavalkya and Gārgī (BU III.6.1) tells us that Brahman
was the metaphysical basis of Reality. BU 1.4.1-5 and Aitareya I.1.1-4 also tell us the
same. On the other hand, Muṇḍaka 1.1.3 hints at the possibility that Brahman is also
the epistemological basis of all knowledge. In other words, Reality is possible because of
Brahman and Knowledge of this Reality is also possible because of Brahman. Or, what
is Known (the object) and what is Knowledge (the access), both are rooted in Brahman.
The masterstroke of the upaniṣad is to not just the unity of the Known and the
Knowledge but also of the Knower (the subject)! In other words, the inner-world which
is centred around the Self (ātman) is seen as being identical to the external Reality,
Brahman. Such sentences which propound the unity of the Brahman and ātman are
called Mahāvākyas.20 These sentences, though significant, are open to interpretation
and different traditions have explained them differently. Here, I have presented the
interpretation of Advaita Vedānta which proposes a non-dual relation between Brahman
and Ātman.
Through out the upaniṣads one can notice a trend to find the hidden, mystical connec-
tions between various spheres that concerned the vedic life: the natural world, the super
natural world, the ritual world and the inner world. Taittarīya Upaniṣad 1.5 is one such
mantra which postulates the homologism (bandhutā) between the worlds (Bhūḥ, Bhu-
vaḥ, Suvaḥ, Mahaḥ), the elements (fire, air, sun , moon), the ritual elements (ṛg, yajur,
sama and artharva veda) and the inner breaths (prāṇa). The upaniṣads also contain sev-
eral other interesting ‘theories’ like those on cosmogony (origin theories), transmigration,
different levels of consciousness and so on.
Though the upaniṣads represent a very important stage in development of Indian
philosophies, they are very speculative works which suggest several ideas but do not offer
rigorous arguments to defend their position (remember how Yajñavalkya simply warned
Gārgī from asking too many questions lest her head should shatter apart). The various
ideas suggested here needed elaborate explanation and also needed to be defended against
criticism which was levelled on them by the non-vaidika traditions which were beginning
to grow stronger.

5.3 The Transitional Stage

The above tension between pravṛtti mārga and nivṛtti mārga attained a definitive stage
somewhere around the 7th-6th cen BCE (approximately). A significant opposition to the
vedic ways started to develop and certain traditions emerged which proposed new ways
of attaining mokṣa. These traditions together were called the śramaṇa traditions (from
20
Please refer to the separate handout for details.

14
‘śram’ meaning ‘to exert’). These traditions were known for rigorous ascetic practices
which they believed to be the key to liberation. They also refused to confine themselves
to the social roles of the vedic society and become wandering medicants, withdrawing
themselves from society. In time, the śramaṇa traditions became systematic belief systems
with Bauddha and Jaina being the major ones which have survived until present day.
On the vaidika side, the most important development was the composition of the
Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata which would go on to become the most popular way of
communicating the vaidika principles to the masses. Part of the Mahabhārata is the
Bhagavad Gīta which continues to play an important role in contemporary Hindu religion.
It too addressed the problem of synthesising the pravṛtti mārga and nivritti mārga by
proposing that one can attain liberation even when performing action (pravṛtti) as long
as it was done with the sense of duty (dharma) and with a sense of detachment from the
results (niṣkāmya karma). Thus, the most important philosophical problem of this stage
could have been to understand the nature of dharma (or dhamma): the all encompassing
principle of one’s life (whether social or otherwise).

5.4 The Systematic Stage

As we saw in section 1.2, Philosophy concerns itself with the most abstract and general
claims. This is true of Indian Philosophy too. We also saw that there is no one method
of doing philosophy. Hence, different traditions of philosophy emerged in India. These
differences were either due to a difference in method or due to what they considered to
be the most fruitful object of philosophical inquiry.
As many as 16 schools have been mentioned in compendiums like Sarva-darśana-
saṃgraha (see Appendix). However, nine of these are very prominent. Broadly, we
can classify these schools as āstika and nāstika. The basis of this classification is the
acceptance or non-acceptance of the Veda as the valid sources of knowledge about events
which occur in the after life. It is important to note that the nāstika-s especially the
Bauddha and Jaina do not reject the Vedic knowledge altogether. For example, the
Vedic concepts of karma, transmigration of the soul, avidya, mokṣa are accepted to them
too (in suitably modified ways). It is only the statements of the Veda about the journey
of soul after death and matters related to vedic scarifies which the Bauddha and Jaina
philosophers find difficult to accept. The Cārvāka are a little more extreme and reject
even such concepts as karma etc.21
Further, these terms (āstika and nāstika) are translated as ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’
respectively. The word ‘orthodox’ has the connotation of being rigid and opposed to
change and thereby, ‘heterodox’, in comparison, may connote someone who is more open
21
This is a result of their epistemology according to which perception (via the 5 senses) alone is the
valid source of knowledge. Since one has never perceived things like a soul leaving a body and entering
another body, they do not believe in the concept of mokṣa or reincarnation

15
to change and inclusive. However, this is not the case. Every tradition, whether āstika
or nāstika, has a set of foundational beliefs. Any idea which is not in conflict with those
beliefs is acceptable to the traditions. New ideas must agree with the existing bank of
concepts (siddhānta). If it not, the idea will be rejected, whether it is the āstika or the
nāstika tradition. In other words, both are as welcoming about new ideas as they are
cautious. Hence, the terms orthodox and heterodox must be taken more literally being
made of the terms ‘ortho’ (straight or aligned with), ‘hetero’ (other) and ‘doxa’ (beliefs).
That is, the āstikas are aligned with the given set of beliefs coming from the Veda, while
the nāstikas are aligned with another set of beliefs. 22

Darśanā

āstika Nāstika

Six-Systems Bauddha Jaina Cārvāka/lokayāta

Figure 7: Different Darśana-s

The āstika-darśana-s, which are traditional six in number and hence called śaḍ-
darśana, are Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Saṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsa, Vedānta. Each of the six
schools have their own history and some continue to thrive independently. However,
based on certain conceptual grounds they may be paired up as shown in figure 8.

• Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika together form a system with the former providing the epistemolog-
ical tools and the latter providing the metaphysical concepts. Both view the world
from empirical perspective. Vaiśeṣika propose a theory of categories which account
for all the types of things we can know about. The Nyāya on the other hand, gives
a account of the right ways to knowing.

• Sāṃkhya-Yoga form a ‘theory-practice’ kind of pair with the former providing the
theory (metaphysical) and the latter providing the practical ways of disciplining
the mind and body in order to facilitate the attainment of the liberated state (the
nature of which is explained by Saṃkhya). Sāṃkhya explains how the suffering
comes to be and how to get rid of it, in principle. Yoga expands on the ‘how’ part
of the question and process certain ethical, bodily and spiritual practices which can
help one attain the goal easily.

• Mīmāṃsa-Vedānta together are concerned with the interpretation of Vedic corpus.

The former of these is concerned with the ritual practises prescribed in the Veda23
22
A bulleted summary of the key tenets and texts of these schools have been given to you as part of the
lecture handout. Please refer to Appendix 3 of Mohanty 2000 and An Introduction to Indian Philosophy
by Satishchandra Chatterjee and Dheerendramohan Datta, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2016, pp 12-22.
23
This is contained in the saṃhita and brāhmaṇā sections
16
 and the latter is concerned with explaining the philosophical or esoteric message
of the veda.24 Since they are concerned with different parts of the same corpus,
they are also called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsa and Uttara-Mīmāṃsa respectively.25 Since
these works are highly mystical, there are many apparent contradictions which
exist in them. Both these schools resolve these apparent contradictions and make
the meaning of the text clear.

śaḍdarśana

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Saṃkhya-Yoga Mīmāṃsa-Vedānta

Figure 8: The āstika darśana

5.5 Textual development of Indian Philosophies

Every school of Indian philosophy has a foundational text which contain all the key tenets
of that school is a short, easy to memorize format called sūtra. So, the foundational text
of, say, Nyāya is Nyāyasūtra and so on. One must not assume that there no Nyāya before
the corresponding sūtra-s were composed. In fact, a long tradition of thinking about a
set of ideas or along certain specific lines is a pre-requiste for the composition of sūtra-
s. What a composer of the sūtra-s does is to consolidate these ideas and arrange them
systematically. A student was expected to memorise all the sūtras as the first stage in his
education. However, given the terse nature of these sūtra-s they need to be elaborated
upon. Consider here the first 10 sūtras of the Mīmāṃsā darśana:

1. athāto dharmajijñāsā (Next therefore (comes) the enquiry into Dharma. )

2. codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmaḥ (Dharma is that which is indicated by (known by

means of) the Veda as conducive to the highest good.)

3. tasya nimittaparīṣṭiḥ (The examination of its means [follows].)

4. satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tatpratyakṣam animittaṃ

vidyamānopalambhanatvāt (That cognition by a person which appears when there
is contact of the senseorgans is ‘Sense-Perception’, and it is not a means (of knowing
Dharma), as it apprehends only things existing at the present time”.)

5. autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo ’vyatirekaś

cārthe ’nupalabdhe tatpramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt (The relation of the
word with its denotation is inborn. Instruction is the means of knowing it (Dharma).
24
This is mainly in the upaniṣad sections
25
Mīmāṃsa literally means examination
17
 Infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it
is independent. - According to Bādarāyaṇa.)

6. karmaike tatra darśanāt (“Word is a product (non-eternal), because it is seen to

follow (after effort)…” )

7. asthānāt (“Because it is does not persist”)

8. karoti śabdāt (“Also, because of the term ‘To make’ [Being used in connection with
words]”)

9. sattvāntare ca yaugapadyāt (“Also, because there is simultaneity (of the perception

of the word) in diverse places”)

10. prakṛti vikṛtyoś ca (“Also, because there are original forms and modification”)

Without a proper explanation, it is not possible for a student to understand all the
ideas which have been packed into a sūtra. Further, it is not possible to know that the
sūtras 6-10 present the thesis of the opponent (pūrvapakṣa) which will be eventually re-
futed. Originally this elaboration would have been oral just as, today, a teacher explains
concepts in class using powerpoint slides. Gradually, these explanations were commit-
ted to writing in texts called the bhāṣya-s (commentaries) and form the next stage of
development in Indian Philosophy. A commentator explains each word of the sūrta and
explains the concept therein. The commentator also tries to resolve any apparent incon-
sistencies/contradictions within the sūtra-s. The bhāṣya is followed by a vār�tika, which
is a further elaboration/clarification on the bhāṣya and responds to objections which may
have been raised over the centuries since the compilation of the bhāṣya.26

sūtra → bhāṣya → vārtika

Figure 9: Development of philosophical literature

On the foundation of the sūtra, vārtika and bhāṣya is built a formidable corpus of
philosophical literature of each school. There are further commentaries on the bhāṣya,
works dedicated to explain one particular idea of the school, works which defend the
position of the school against specific attacks and even textbooks for introducing the key
ideas of the school to beginners. The language in which philosophical discourse was
conduction was predominantly Sanskrit though in past few centuries we have several
works in regional languages too.
26
In the Vyākaraṇa, or Grammar, tradition, the vārtika preceeds the bhāṣya and is taken as an extension
of the sūtra itself. Whatever the sūtra has left out or stated something incorrectly, the vyākaraṇa vārtika
corrects these errors. In all other schools, the vārtika follows the bhāṣya and further elaborates the
concepts.

18
 Darśana Sūtra compiler Name of work Approximate
date
Vaiśeṣika Kaṇāda Vaiśēṣika sūtra ?
Nyāya Gautama Nyāya sūtra 0-250 CE
Sāṃkhya Kapila Sāṃkhya sūtra ?
(lost)
Yoga Patañjali Yoga sūtra 325 - 525 CE
Mīmāṃsā Jaimini Mīmāṃsā sūtra 250 BCE - 50 CE
Vedānta Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa Brahma sūtra (or 250 BCE - 50 CE
Vedānta sūtra)
Jaina Thīrthankaras Āgama 6th cen BCE
Bauddha Gautama Buddha Tipīṭika (in Pāli 5th - 6th cen BCE
language)
Cārvāka Bṛhaspati ? ?

6 Pramāṇa śāstra (Topics in Epistemology)

One of the verticles of the Knowledge Triangle (4) was the way in which the subject
of inquiry (the pramātṛ) has knowledge about the object of inquiry (the prameya). As
mention in the section ‘Branches of Philosophy,’ the area which deals with questions
related to knowledge is known as Epistemology. The Indian equivalent for the same is
Pramāṇa Śāstra. In this section we will acquaint ourselves with a few concepts in this
area.

6.1 Definition of Knowledge (Pramā)

To begin with let us ask the question: What is knowledge ? An intuitive response
could be that Def1 = it is a bank of information. However, this needs some revision.
Supposing someone told you that it was snowing outside in the middle of summer, in
Bhubaneswar (or Chennai), you wouldn’t treat it as information nor would you count it
as knowledge ? Why not? Because it is unlikely to be true. Hence, truth is one of the first
characteristic features of knowledge. Based on this we revise our intuitive definition to:
Def2 = knowledge is a bank of true information. But what does it means for something
to be true? We will explore this question in greater detail below. For now, let us stick to
understanding how Indian philosophers understood knowledge.
Now, information is stored in the form of beliefs, which in turn is stored in language,
in sentences, or propositions, as it is called in philosophical literature. This makes our
intuitive definition a propositional account of knowledge. The atomic unit of such an
account of knowledge as beliefs which are expressed in language. This limits knowledge

19
to only that kind of knowing wherein what one knows is capable of being expressed in
sentences. It excludes other ways of knowing such as sensory knowing (knowing that your
voice is louder than your siblings voice just by hearing) or procedural knowledge (knowing
to ride a bicycle). The Indian account of knowledge was not a propositional account of
knowledge. Instead, it treated knowledge or knowing as a species of cognitive activity
(jñāna). Jñāna (cognition) is any awareness and in every awareness episode an object is
apprehended by the agent. Further, all cognitions are treated as properties of the soul
(ātman), i.e, the soul is locus of our cognitions. This is yet another important distinction
between the Indian theories and the modern theories which, based on cognitive sciences,
would locate cognitions in the brain. Doubting, error, dreams are also come under the
category of jñāna but they do not qualify as knowledge because they are not true. Thus,
we further revise our definition of knowledge as Def3 = knowledge is a bank of true
awareness.
Next, consider the word ‘bank’ in our intuitive definition. This gives the idea of knowl-
edge being stored in some place, mostly our memory, for future use (just as one stores
money in bank for future use). Such an account of knowledge is called a dispositional
account of knowledge. One knows something, if they are disposed to use that knowledge.
For example, we have dispositional knowledge of (a + b)2 because we can recall the for-
mula when asked to and solve a problem. Similarly, you have the knowledge of how to
brushing your teeth though you are not doing it as you are reading this handout because
you if you are told to brush your teeth in the next moment, you can. The Indian account
of knowledge was not dispositional. It seemed intuitive to the Indian philosopher that
knowledge should present the object as it is and not re-present it. For this reason, they
all considered knowledge, not as a bank of awarenesses, but as an episode of awareness
which the agent is currently having (anubhava). Hence, we further revise our intuitive
definition as Def4 = knowledge is an occurrent episode of true awareness. So, according
to the Indian philosopher, we cannot claim to know (a + b)2 unless we are actually having
the awareness of (a + b)2 currently. Such episodes of true occurrent awareness (yathārtha
anubhava) were called knowledge or pramā.

6.2 Memory excluded

Removing the word ‘bank’ from the above definition has the important consequence that
awareness which is based soley on memory cannot be treated as knowledge. Hence, smṛti
jñāna was not treated as knowledge in the Indian tradition. Apart from the above men-
tioned reason (that knowledge was seen as something occurrent rather than dispositional),
we find other reasons too for excluding knowledge. Some traditions, like the Sāṃkhya,
emphasised that knowledge must be novel (anadhigata). In other words, only that aware-
ness which apprehends a hitherto unknown object can be treated as knowledge. Since

20
awareness which relies purely on memory does not present a novel object to the inquirer,
such cognitions cannot be treated as knowledge. Further, suppose that we have never
seen a Zebra. The first time we see one, that awareness can be called knowledge (since it
meets the novelty criterion). However, when we see it a second time, we are not knowing
it as a zebra but only ( re)cognising it as zebra. In other words, as said above, memory
only re-presents an object and does not present it. Memory was also excluded for the
reason that memory cognition is wholly parasitic upon past experiences. Without past
experience, there is no memory. However, in other acts of awareness, though one makes
use of one’s memory, there is always something more, something new being presented to
the agent. For instance, when I am eating a sweet for the first time, I can say that I am
truly aware of the sweetness even if I have never eaten that particular sweet.
Lastly, it also possible to argue that memory was excluded because it is common to
all episodes of awareness. The purpose of giving a definition is to provide certain criteria
by which one can separate out the object being defined from other objects. Hence, we
must try and identify the unique properties it has rather than resorting to the properties
which it shares with other things. For instance, if a human being is defined as an animal,
it does not help us to different a human from say, a lion. On the other hand, if we
say a human being is a biped animal, it helps us separate out humans from many other
animals but it stills overlaps with animals like penguins or ostriches. If we further revise
our definition to: human beings are featherless biped animals, then we have managed to
give a reasonably good definition of human beings since it allows us to separate human
beings from all other creatures on earth. In the same way, when we are trying to define
knowledge we must try and identify what is unique to it rather than saying what it shares
with all other episodes of awareness. Memory happens to be one such common feature
among all awareness episodes. (Question: Can you think of other features which all
awareness episodes share?)
The discussion of the two foregoing subsections is summarised in the figure below.

Jñana (any awareness)

Anubhava Smṛti
(occurrent)) (memory or dispositional))

prāmāṇya (true)
aprāmāṇya (false) prāmāṇya (true) aprāmāṇya (false)
= Pramā (knowledge)

Figure 10: Cognition and Knowledge

21
6.3 Truth
As discussed above, one quality that separates knowledge from other kinds of awareness
(jñāna) is truth. But what is ‘truth’ or ‘prāmāṇyaṃ’? Different responses were given
to this question by different traditions based on their metaphysical commitments. The
most intutive answer seems to be that truth is something that agrees with Reality. A
statement or cognition is true if it corresponds with Reality. For instance, it is true that
you are reading this sentence since you are reading this sentence. It is false that there is
a hippopotamus next to me, because there is no hippopotamus next to me. Simply put,
a cognition is true because it presents the object as it is (yathārtha: yathā artha, as is
the object). The Nāyaya and Mīmāṃsā subscribe to such a theory of truth also called
the correspondence theory of truth.
However, this theory, though intuitive, relies on the assumption that we have un-
conditional access to Reality. Some philosophers, like the Bauddha, question such an
assumption. They argue that what we know as Reality is always mediated by our con-
ceptual framework and then it is impossible for us to check if our cognition corresponds
to Reality. For instance, if all human beings had a neuron in our brain due to which
everything we see will have a tinge on yellow, we will live all our life thinking that the
Reality is yellowish and we will never know! Further, what exactly this ‘correspondence’
means is also unclear. One can also argue that such a theory leads to other logical prob-
lems. For instance, I know that there is know hippopotamus next to be because there
is no hippopotamus next to me. But how do I know this? By perception. But how do
I know my eyes are working well? Because I am able to see this laptop in front on me.
But how do I know that there is indeed a laptop in front of me? If we say by perception,
our argument would be circular (we would be justifying our perception is fine by using
perception itself). If we say by some other means, then we will be asked how to know if
that is true. This leads to an infinite regress.
One way to overcome the above logical problem is to reply that ”I know there is a
laptop in front of me because I am able to type on it and send emails and other are
receiving those emails”. In other words, I am able to use the object in question. Hence,
something is true if it leads to successful activity (arthakriyā). Such a theory is called
the pragmatic theory of truth. This approach was taken by the Bauddha tradition. A
cognition is true if it produces success in any activity based on that cognition. Hence, that
I am drinking water is true because as I am drinking it my thirst is quenched. This theory
too suffers from the problem that sometimes, even false cognition can lead to successful
activity. For instance, for thousands of years, sailors were successfully navigating the
oceans assuming that the earth is at the center of the solar system and that the sun is
revolving around it. Likewise, astronomers were able to accurately predict eclipses with
the same geo-centric model of the solar system. Hence, just because ”it works” it need

22
not be true.
Staying with the same example, how did people come to abandon the geo-centric
model of our solar system? One reason is that it did not agree with the new observations
which were being reported by astronomers. For a long time, when the planets moved in
the direction opposite to the regular direction in which they were supposed to move (this
motion is called retrograde motion), astronomers explained this phenomenon by drawing
an epicycle within the planet’s orbit (imagine this as a smaller circle with a point on the
orbit as its centre). However, in time, such ad-hoc adjustments failed to work since more
and more observations were being reported which disagreed with such a model. In other
words, if the geo-centric model was true, it would have cohered with all observations. Since
it did not, it was abandoned. Such an example from our history can be cited as an instance
of the coherence theory of truth. A cognition is true if it agrees with (saṃvāda) what we
already know. Minimally, it should not disagree with what we already know (avisaṃvāda,
from saṃvāda meaning to agree, visaṃvāda meaning to disagree, avisaṃvāda meaning
to not disagree). Such a theory was adopted by the Sāṃkhya thinkers.
Now the problem with the coherence view is that it has to answer the charge of
circularity. All our knowledge claims are dependent on each other: A is true because
it coheres with B. B is true because it coheres with C and C is true because it coheres
with D. But D is true because it coheres with A! Further, one can also argue that under
the coherence theory is untenable because it makes no reference to Reality at all. The
purpose of knowledge is to provide us access to Reality. In the coherence view, all that
is assured is that our knowledge claims are in harmony with each other irrespective of
whether or not they have anything to do with reality. Most axiomatic systems are of this
type. Take euclidean geometry for instance. None of its objects occur in the real world
(it is impossible to draw a point which is a dimensionless entity, it is impossible to draw
a line since it is defined as having extension only in one direction) and yet we use it in
our constructions.
Thus, it appears that despite our best attempts, we are unable to give a positive
account of truth. Precisely this approach was taken by the Advaita Vedānta. They
defined truth in a negative ways as that which is uncontradicted (abādhita). A cognition
is true just so long as it remains uncontradicted by other cognition. One can immediately
see where such a theory of truth will lead to. There is no cognition which will remain
uncontradicted for all 3 times: past, present and future. Every empirical claims we
make may turn out to be false at a later date. Even mathematical claims are subject
to the axioms and definitions from which they are made (remember Peano’s Axioms for
arithmatic and the proof of 1+1=2). Hence, it appears that the only thing that is True
will be Brahman since existence is the very nature of Brahman.
The above theories of truth are summarised in the table below:

23
 Yathārtha (correspondence Truth is that which corre- Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā
theory) sponds with Reality
Arthakriya (pragmatic the- Truth is that which pro- The Bauddha
ory) duces successful activity
Avisaṃvādi (coherence the- Truth is that which coheres Sāṃkhya
ory) with what we know
Abādhita (non- Truth is that which re- Advaita Vedānta
contradiction theory) mains uncontradicted

Different theories of truth

6.4 Pramāṇa
So far we have explored what knowledge (pramā) is according to Indian thinkers. It
is a species of occurrent cognition or awareness and what separates it from other such
cognitions is that it is a true occurrent cognition. We also saw various theories of truth
(prāmāṇya). Now we shall ask ourselves the questions, how can we ensure that the
cognitions we have a true? What increases the probability of our awareness being true?
The India philosophers answered as follows. Cognitions which are the result of a
reliable causal process are recognised as true. Such reliable causal processes were called
pramāṇa (“that by which true cognition is arrived at” - pramīyate anena). “A pramāṇa
provides both an authoritative source for making a knowledge claim and a means for (or
way of) knowledge. In other words, a pramāṇa has a dual character: both evidential
and causal. It provides evidence or justification for regarding a cognitive episode as a
knowledge episode, but it is also supposed to be the most effective causal route to such
an episode” (Perrett 2016). When we say pramāṇa has a causal character we mean the
following: if we acquire cognition via the pramāṇas it is most likely to be true. When we
say pramāṇa has an evidential character we mean that if we are asked “how do you know
this?” or “what is the evidence for this knowledge?” we can reply “I acquired it through
a pramāṇa.”

jñāna pramā
Pramāṇa

Pramāṇa as causal process

The Indian philosophers identified the following pramāṇas:

Pratyakṣa (Perception) Arthāpatti (Inference to best explanation)

Anumāna (Inference) Upamāna (Comparison)
Śabda (Testimony) Anupalabdhi (Nonperception)

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 However, not all of these were acceptable to all the traditions. And some traditions
accepted a few more pramāṇas not listed above. For instance, the Jainas accepted 3
more pramāṇas avadhi (clairvoyence), manaḥ paryaya (telepathy) and kevalajñāna (om-
niscience) which required special training with the last two pramāṇas (manaḥ paryaya
and kevalajñāna) being reserved for the liberated souls alone. The below table summarises
which schools accepted each of the pramāṇas

Pratyakṣa (perception) All

Anumāna (inference) All except Cārvāka
Śabda (testimony) Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā,
Vedānta, Jaina
Upamāna (comparison) Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta
Arthāpatti (inference to best explanation) Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta
Anupalabdhi (nonperception) (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsā27 , Vedānta

Different Pramāṇas accepted by the different schools

When we say that a particular pramāṇa was not accepted by a certain school, we
mean that either they did not regard it as a reliable means of acquiring true awareness or
that they reduced it to some other pramāṇa or a combination of existing paramāṇas. The
Cārvāka rejection of Anumāna and Śabda is an instance of the first case. They argued
that these do not provide a reliable way of acquiring knowledge. Anumāna depends on the
invariable connection between two entities (like smoke and fire) and the Cārvāka argue
that one can never know such invariable connection. Likewise, śabda also is unreliable as
different testimonial authorities testify differently on a given topic. The Nyāya rejection
of Arthāpatti is an instance of the second type of rejection. They argue that arthāpatti
is a special case of anumāna and hence say that there is no need to list it as a separate
pramāṇa. The Bauddha rejection of Śabda is a variety of the last type. The Bauddha do
accept that testimony provides reliable knowledge; after all, the words of The Buddha
form the foundation of their philosophical view. However, they argue that testimonial
cognition can be explained as a combination of perception and inference.
Of all the pramāṇas, the first three have special importance since they are the most
common ones and appear is other sciences too like Āyurveda and Arthaśāstra. Hence, we
will discuss them separately in the subsequent sections. Below is a very brief summary
of the nature of each of the pramāṇas.

1. Pratyakṣa (Perception): This is the pramāṇa we use most often. Knowing an object
through its contact with one of the five indriya-s (sense, not the physical sense organ
like the eye) is called pratyakṣa. It should be noted that the mind (manas) is also
regarded as an internal sense organ.

2. Anumāna (Inference): The means by which an agent arrives at a cognition based

25
 on some other cognition (‘anu-’ = ‘after’ or ‘follows’ and ‘māna’ = ‘cognition’) is
called anumāna. For example, following the perception of smoke at some place,
say a distant hill, an agent arrives at the cognition that there is fire there. Such
cognition requires that there is a invariable relation between the two objects which
are part of the inferential process, as in the case of smoke and fire.

3. Śabda (Testimony): Cognition of an entity based on a sentence uttered by a reliable

source is testimony. The testimony so offered could be about empirical reality or
about things beyond the empirical realm, such as, soul, heaven, God etc.

4. Upamāna: The means by which an agent cognises the relationship between a word
and its meaning based on a similarity relation is upamāna. The classical example
is that of a person who does not know the meaning of ‘gavaya’. They are told that
gavaya means an animal that resembles a cow. Later, when they actually see such
an animal (the Neelgai), the relation of similarity causes the agent to know that
this is what ‘gavaya’ means.

5. Arthāpatti (Inference to best explanation): When we cognise two facts which are
incompatible with each other, we postulate a third fact which would explain and
thus remove the incompatibility. Such a process of arriving at knowledge is called
arthāpatti. For example, we know that when we went to sleep last night, the ground
outside our home was dry but when we woke up in the morning it was completely
wet. So, we postulate that it must have rained last night.

6. Anupalabdhi: This is a peculiar pramāṇa reserved for cognising absences. That

cognition which allows us to perceive the absence of an entity at a particular place
when all the conditions for its perception are present is called anupalabdhi. For
example, the cognition of the absence of a rhinoceros in my room is based on
anupalabdhi pramāṇa according to some Indian philosophers.

6.4.1 Pratyakṣa (Perception)

This is the most common process of acquring knowledge. Various definitions of perception
have been proposed in by Indian philosopher. Some rely on the causal mechanism of
perception while others draw on its very nature. In this section we will discuss two
definition of the former kind.
Def1 = That cognition which is caused by the contact of senses with the corre-
sponding objects.
To expand, one has perceptual cognition when our visual (cakṣu), auditory (śrotra),
gustatory (rasana), olfactory (ghrāṇa) or tactile senses (tvak) come into contact with
the respective objects like colour (rūpa), sound (śabda), taste (rasa), smell (gandha)

26
and touch (sparśa). To this we must also add manas (mind) as an internal sense organ
by which one can have perceptual cognition of one’s inner states like cognition (bud-
dhi/jñāna), sadness (duḥkha), happiness (sukha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), effort
(prayatna), dharma and adharma. Note that there is a distinction between the sense –
visual, audiroty and so on – and the sense organ – eye, ear and so on. The definition
stresses on the sense being in contact with the object and not the sense organ.
However, such a definition runs to some problems when one has to explain the cogni-
tion of absence of something. For instance, how do we know that there is no hippopotamus
in this room? One would reply by sayin ”Because I don’t see one.” But how is it possible
to ‘see’ anything when the visual sense has not come into contact with its corresponding
object. It seems absurd to say that the sense was in contact with absence of the corre-
sponding object (how can a relation, like contact, arise when one of the relata is absent).
Further, a somewhat metaphysical objection arises when one has to explain God’s per-
ception. If the above definition is accepted, one has to admit that even God has senses
and therefore sense organs. This was not acceptable to some of the philosophers. Hence,
a negative definition was advanced by the Nyāya philosophers.
Def2 = That cognition which is not caused by any other cognition
This definition manages to separate out perception from other pramāṇas as follows:
Inference is caused by prior knowledge of invariable relation between hetu and sādhya,
hence excluded; memory is excluded since it is caused by past cognition; testimony is
excluded because it is caused by knowledge of meaning of words.28
However, all accounts of perception offer a phenomenological view rather than physical
view of the perceptual process. That is, it understands perception from the perceiver’s
point of view rather than from an objective, third person point of view. In such an
account it is more important for the sense to be in contact with the object rather than
some physical entity like light or sound waves or vapours (in the case of smell) coming
into contact with our physical sense organ like eyes/retina or ear drum or nostrils. The
mind (manas) in turn has to in contact with the sense-organ and finally the ātman must
be in contact with the manas. Only then will the agent be conscious of what they are
perceiving. If any link in the above chain is broken, knowledge will not be generated.
The process is summarised in the schematic diagram below:

ātman (soul) manas (mind) indriya (sense) Viṣaya (object)

The process of perception

We can give some day-to-day evidence for such need for such an account. Sometimes,
28
Paraphrased from Mohanty 2000:17
27
we we are in a hurry and we are searching for an object in our room, we don’t find it
even though the light from the object is falling on the retina and so on. Likewise, though
we are eating a dish, if we are not conscious of what we are eating, we cannot recall or
recognise what we ate or are eating, though the chemical compounds from the dish are
in contact with our tongue. Sometimes, we sit through an entire lecture but “don’t pay
attention.” This “not paying attention” would be explained by the Indian philosophers
as a break in the above causal process. The ātman may not being in contact with manas
or the manas not being in contact with the indriya or the indriya (auditory sense) not
being in contact with the object (the words of the speaker).

Perception and Language Next, we ask ourselves the question: In the above process
where does language get involved ? When do we perceive (by touch) a table as ‘table’,
rather than something which is made of wood, something which is flat, or just as some
substance?
There are two extreme views among the Indian philosophies, one held by the Gram-
marians29 Jains and the navya-Nyāya which believed that all cognition, and hence, all
perception, is linguistic, and hence, conceptually loaded. They based such a view on
their claim that a thing and its name are inseparable (cognitively, not logically). To
know a table is to know something called ‘table.’ There is no aspect of cognition which
is untouched by language.
The other extreme, held by certain schools of the Bauddha tradition said that per-
ception should be limited to bare sensation. Whatever concepts are imposed on it should
be regarded as a separate process by the mind (which is beyond the scope of the actual
perceptual process). In such an account, perceptions are free from association with names
and categories.
A mid-way between the two extremes is to accept that they both constitute two stages
of perception. Initially, the agent as bare sensation of the object. This stage is called
nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. This is indeterminate, non-conceptual, non-linguistics. Next,
it acquires some determinate concept and is expressible in language. This stage is called
savikalpaka pratyakṣa. The interesting point to note is that those who accept such
an account of perception think that the first stage (indeterminate perception) can only
be inferred. It is not directly known to the agent since there is no object at all which
is cognised at that stage. This inference is based on the fact that if we are perceiving a
table, we should have had a congition of something made of wood (or steel) and for that
we should have had some cognition of something smooth, something hard, something
flat. And for that, we should have had some bare sensations which subsequently led us
29
This school is not listed above. It is a school which is built aroung the scince of Vyākaraṇa (Gram-
mar). Its chief figures are Panini, Katyayana, Patanjali and most importantly Bhartrhari (around 5 cen.
CE).

28
to label it as ‘smooth,’ ‘flat,’ etc.

Types of Perception Based on the object of perception, it may be classified as internal

(mānasa pratyakṣa) and external perception (bhāhya pratyakṣa). The former refers to
the perception of one’s inner states such as cognition, pleasure, pain and so on and the
latter refers to the perception of external objects from the 5 ‘outer’ senses. In most
cases, there is an ordinary contact between the senses and the corresponding object.
For instance, when we taste sugar in a particular dish, or sense that the table is not flat
etc. Perceptual cognition arising from such ordinary contact is called ordinary perception
(laukika pratyakṣa). However, in some cases, there is an extraordinary contact between
the senses and the object. Perceptual cognition arising from such extraordinary contact
is called extraordinary perception (alaukika pratyakṣa). One such case happens in the
case of yogis, who because of their yogic powers are able to perceive entities which are
not directly presented to them and also entities in the past and future. Secondly, in some
cases, we have a perceptual cognition based on prior cognitive association between two
things. For instance, by seeing outside, we can say that it is hot. Here, heat is an object
of tactile perception while we have had only perceptual experience of the environment
outside. Likewise, we see a blanket or peice of cloth and remark how soft it looks; or
on seeing a dish we say that it looks tasty. In all of these cases, the visual sense is
triggering the perception of certain non-visual objects based on the prior association.
Such perception is called jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa (contact through a cognition).

6.4.2 Śabda (Testimonay)

Much of what we know is because of utterances of other people. By utterance we include

both oral and written. All such knowledge derived from the words is called śābdabodha
and the cause (pramāṇa) for such cognitions is called śabda. One of the important
conditions for such utterances to count as knowledge is that the speaker should be a
reliable person. Such a person is referred to as āpta. In fact, the Nyāya sūtra defines śabda
as “The assertion of a reliable person (āpta) is word (NS 1.1.7)”30 . The commentators
further expand on the qualities of the ātpa:

• who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things,

• who is moved by a desire to make known (to others) the thing as he knows it,

• and who is fully capable of speaking it.

Further descriptions can be found in non-philosophical texts like the Caraka Saṃhitā
(which is a text of Āyurveda) which specify that the āpta must be devoid of attachment
30
āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ

29
and aversion. Thus, an āpta is not just a ‘subject-matter expert’ but also someone who
is morally competent.
However, further commentators recognise that it is not possible for someone to be true
all the time, and also that one’s character in one domain need not affect their testimony
about another domain. The classical example given is that of a robber who has robbed
the travellers on the highway and yet provides true directions to the next village when
asked. Hence, some philosophers argued that it is sufficient if the speaker has no motive
for giving incorrect information. It is not necessary that they should be completely free
from all defects.
All traditions agreed that testimony of omniscient people (which includes the scrip-
tural sources) is unquestionable. The underlying assumption was that an omniscient
person would automatically be free from all defects of ignorance, love, hatred etc. Hence,
it is impossible for such a person (or text) to provide false testimony. It is interesting to
note how knowledge and morality coincide after a certain point. Indeed, that knowledge
which does not help us become a better moral agents has only limited use.
Further, śabda, even today, holds a unique place, as a pramāṇa, in Indian culture.
Both the āstika as well as nāstika (apart from the Cārvāka) recognised its importance.
In some cases, it is even recognised as the source of initial knowledge based on which
one can gather more knowledge from perception and inference. The Caraka Saṃhita
says “Out of these three sources of knowledge [perception, inference and testimony], first
of all knowledge is obtained from [testimony]. Thereafter, examination proceeds with
perception and inference because if there be no authoritative material beforehand what
one would know from perception and inference” (CS III.IV.5, emphasis added). Even
today, we find that Scientific research never happens in vacuum but based on existing
knowledge in the form of well-established theories. These theories can be treated as
testimony of the people who proposed them.

6.4.3 Anumāna (Inference)

“Next to perception, the most discussed means of knowing for the Indian philosophers
in inference. The Sanskrit term for it is ‘anumāna,’ etymologically meaning a cognition
that follows upon some other cognition or cognitions (‘anu’: after, ‘māna’: cognition)”
(Mohanty 2000:21-22). The paradigmatic, classical example is the case of inferring fire
in some distant place after seeing smoke rising from that place. We can roughly define
anumāna as: Inferring the presence/absence of an entity at some place based on knowing
the presence/absence of another entity with which the former is invariable related.
An inference has 4 logical components:

1. Hetu (The sign/reason: the property which is known)

2. Sādhyā (The unknown: the property we want to infer)

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 3. Vyāpti (The invariable rule relating the hetu and the sādhya)

4. Pakṣa (Locus: The place where one wants to prove the sādhya)

Let us understand these using an example. Suppose I infer that a ball has been
subjected to force since I have seen that it is moving. In this case, what we know is
that the ball is moving. Hence, this will be the hetu (the property of possessing motion).
Based on this property, I want to infer that the ball has been subject to some force. It
should be noted that I have not actually seen the force being applied to the ball. I want
to infer so based on the hetu. Hence, the property of being subjected to force will be
the sādhya. When I am inferring so, I am assuming a general rule which relates motion
to force, i.e. wherever there is motion, there is force. It should be noted that this rule
should be invariable or else the inference will not always lead to true cognition. This
invariable relation is called the vyāpti. Notice that both hetu and sādhyā are properties
(the property of having motion, the property of being subjected to force). Now, properties
do not hang around in vacuum. They need a substratum in which they are located. That
substratum or locus in called the pakṣa.
Now, that we have identified the logical components, we need to set out the inference
as we would to demostrate our reasoning. This is done so by arranging these components
in a 5-membered standard form (called pañca-avayava anumāna) as follows:
Pratijñā: The ball has the property of being subjected to force
Hetu: Because it has motion.
Udāharaṇa: Wherever there is motion, there is the property of being subjected to
force, like a cart.
Upanaya: This ball is also so.
Nigamana: Hence, the ball has the property of being subjected to force.

The general form the above argument can be set out as follows:
Pratijñā: The Pakṣa has Sādhya
Hetu: Because of having hetu
Udāharaṇa: Wherever there is hetu, there is sādhya, like example1 .
Upanaya: This pakṣa is like the example1 .
Nigamana: Hence, the pakṣa has sādhya.

Given, any inference, we can set it out in the standard from once we have identified
the hetu, sādhya, pakṣa correctly. The vyāpti can be formulated in two ways:

Formulation 1: Wherever there is hetu, there is sādhya.

Formulation 2: Wherever there is absence of sādhya, there is absence of hetu.

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 In some cases, like in the case of smoke-fire, both formulations are possible (i.e. we
can give examples in both formulations): wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like in the
kitchen (imagine an old style kitchen which uses coal or wood as fuel) and wherever there
is absence of fire, there is absence of smoke, like on a lake. However, in some cases only
one formulation is possible since no real example of the other formulation is available. For
instance, if I argue based on a vyāpti that whatever is knowable is nameable, I can give
examples like book, pen, clouds etc. However, if I use the second formulation: whatever
is not-nameable, is not-knowable, I will not be able to give any example since as soon
as I give the example, I would have named it. Hence, in this case only 1 formulation is
possible.

Anumāna and Modern Research Methodology Let us compare how the various
steps of Anumāna overlap with contemporary steps in generating new knowledge. The
motivation behind this section is not to claim that Indian thinkers anticipated all that
modern researchers do. It is to look at anumāna through the lens of modern research
methods, and since the reader may be more familiar with these contemporary terms, this
may help them understand anumāna better.
The below table compares each step of the inferential process to certain steps in
modern research practice. The reader is urges to evaluate for themselves so deep or
superficial the similarity is (in the table ‘P’ stands for pakṣa, ‘S’ for sādhya and ‘H’ for
hetu).

Pratijñā P has S Hypothesis

Hetu Because of H Main Reason/Evidence
Udāharaṇa Wherver there is H there is S, like General Rule (Establishing suffi-
example1 cient relationship between reason
and hypothesis) + Prior studies
Upanaya This P is like example1 Establishing that the current case
is comparable to prior studies
Nigamana Therefore, P has S Conclusion

Figure 11: Anumāna and Modern Research

Unique Aspects of Anumāna In the above inference pattern, one will notice that
the vyāpti rule is accompanied by an example which satisfies that rule. For instance, if
the rule is ‘wherever there is smoke there is fire’ an example like kitchen is given. Such
a feature sets apart the anumāna scheme from Greek logic. For instance, in Greek logic,
the following inference is valid

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 All men are pink.

Rama is a man.

Therefore Rama is pink.

However, to the Indian logician, the above scheme would not be acceptable since
the conclusion (Rama is pink) is false. An inference scheme that allows for such false
conclusions to be derived would not be accepted. The reason is that in India, anumāna
is a pramāṇa - it is meant to be a reliable process which generates knowledge and not
merely a set of formal rules which separate out valid forms from non-valid forms. Since
the inference must lead to knowledge, one cannot use a rule like ‘All men are pink’ (or to
paraphrase it as a vyāpti: Wherever there are the property of being a man, there is the
property of being pink) without giving a legitimate example satisfying this rule. Such
no such example exists, the inference would never proceed ahead. Technically, it is said
that Indian logic is a logic of objects (or cognitions about objects) while Greek logic is a
logic of terms (’Men’ , ’pink’, ’Rama’ are terms, which can be substituted with any other
terms).
Due to the above characteristic, Indian logicians did not make the distinction between
deductive reasoning and non-deductive reasoning. Deductive resoning is one in which the
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, like in the example given above (All men
are pink...). In such cases, if one accepts the premises, the conclusion must be accepted.
On the other hand, non-deductive reasoning is one in which the conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the premises. The premises only make the conclusion more likely.
For instance, after observing 100 crows which are black, one can conclude that ‘All crows
are black’ but it is (logically) possible that there may be a crow of some other colour.
In Indian logic, the two elements of the vyāpti – the hetu and the sādhya – must be
necessarily related. To this extent the inference seems deductive. However, since we are
also required to give an real instance of that relation, the inference also becomes inductive
(we are concluding based on previous co-occurrence of the hetu and sādhya, just like we
concluded that all crows are black based on co-occurrence of crowness and blackness in
100 cases).

Types of Inference The inferences may be classified into two based on the purpose for
which the inference is made. If it is for one’s own knowledge, it is called Svārtha-anumāna
(inference for self) but if it is to demonstrate one’s reasoning to others, then it is called
Parārtha-anumāna (inference for others). In the inference for self, not all the 5 steps
mentioned above are needed. One can simply spot the smoke, remember its relation with
fire (the vyāpti) and conclude that there is fire there. However, in order to demonstrate
our reasoning to others to convince them about the truth of a certain claim, we need to
use all the 5 members and set out our argument.
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 Based on logical relation between the hetu and sādhya we can classify the anumāna
as follows:

1. Pūrvavat: Inferring the effect based on the cause (for instance, inferring the coming
of rain based on seeing clouds) OR inferring something based on previous experience
of their co-occurrence (inferring the existing of fire based on seeing smoke since both
have been previously observed as co-occurrent).

2. Seśavat: Inferring cause from effect (for instance inferring rain last night on seeing
wet ground) OR Inferring based on a sample (testing a few people for COVID to
conclude that the area is COVID free) OR Inferring based on elimination (Given
that a train will come on Platform 1 or 2 and there is already one train on platform
2, inferring that the train has to come on platform 1)

3. Sāmānyato-dṛsṭam: Inferring particular from general OR any form of non-causal

reasoning (Inferring that celestial bodies possess motion based on their displace-
ment, by comparing them to ordinary objects on earth which are displaced due to
motion)

Common Fallacies in Anumāna In certain cases, our inference can lead to false
cognitions. The following are some of the reasons identified by Indian logicians

1. Vyabhcāra (Straying): Hetu occurring in the places where sādhya is not present.
The hetu is supposed to be present in all the places the sādhya is present and absent
in case the sādhya is absent. However, if we infer something based on a hetu which
occurs both when sādhya is present and absent, it may lead to fallacious results.
For instance, suppose we infer that a bird can fly because it has feathers. The hetu
(having feathers) is present in places where the sādhya (having flight) is present (as
in the case of crows) and also in the case where it is absence (as in kiwis). Hence,
having feathers is not a good hetu to infer flight.

2. Asiddha (Unproved): Hetu itself is not known/Pakṣa is unknown. In all cases of

inference, the hetu is something that is known. However, if we use a hetu which
itself needs proof, we are unlikely to arrive at a convincing conclusion. For instance,
if we conclude that the world was created by a divine entity since it perfect, we are
using a hetu (being perfect) which itself needs proof. Hence, it does not serve as
a good hetu. In some cases, the pakṣa itself may be unknown. For instance, if we
want to conclude that ‘Dark matter’ is a non-renewable because of being a form
of matter, we would be making a fallacy since the existence of dark matter itself
needs proof.

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 3. Viruddha (Contradiction): Hetu contradicts the sādhya. Suppose one argues that
God is all-powerful because of not over-riding our freewill, it proves that there are
somethings which God cannot do, making God not all-powerful. In this case, the
hetu (not over-riding our freewill) ends up proving the opposite of the sādhya. Such
instances happen when one ends up contradicting themselves.

4. Bādhita (Non-coherent): The inference is overpowered by another pramāṇa. In-

ference is a pramāṇa but all pramāṇas are falliable (they can fail). In some cases,
based on our inference we may arrive at some conclusion which stands disproved
by another pramāṇa. In the popular proof of 1=2, the conclusion is known to be
false based on previous knowledge that they are not equal. Likewise, based on ini-
tial symptoms we may infer that we have a certain illness but after consulting the
doctor, our inference may be rendered incorrect by the testimony of the doctor.

7 Prameya śāstra (Topics in Metaphysics)

Having acquainted ourselves with the right ways of knowing, we may now ask the question:
what are those things which we can know using the above pramaṇās or what are the things
(or types of things) about which we can have pramā? This questions takes us to another
vertex of the Knowledge Triangle (4), i.e. the prameya or objects of inquiry. As mention
in the section ‘Branches of Philosophy,’ the area which deals with such questions is known
as Metaphysics. The Indian equivalent for the same is Prameya Śāstra. In this section
we will acquaint ourselves with a few concepts in this area.

7.1 Nature of Reality

The first question we can ask in this area is ’What is the nature of Reality’? Given
the complex nature of the question, there is a whole range of answers which Indian
philosophers have given owing to their metaphysical or epistemic commitments. On the
one hand, we the Advaita Vedānta who held that permanence is the true nature of Reality.
According to them, Reality is Unchanging. But then does this make our world, which
we live in, in which we transact so many activities, unreal? We will answer this question
in coming sections. On the other hand, the Bauddha held that change is the true nature
of Reality. What we perceive as permanence is due to our ignorance. The Buddha
came upon this truth when He was meditating upon the nature of suffering. We suffer
because we cling on to temporary things as if they were permanent and when those things
disappear or get destroyed (by natural processes like death) we suffer. Hence, to remove
suffering we must realise that everything is momentary (kṣāṇika). The Advaita Vedānta
agrees with the Buddhists in so far as suggesting that things are temporary. However,
rather than stopping here, they suggest that beyond this temporary world is Reality
35
which is the ātman or the Brahman. They too believe that to remove the suffering we
must realise that everything is momentary, but then we must also realise the unchanging
Reality underlying this ephemeral world.
Between these two extremes, lie a variety of responses which characterise Reality as
consisting of both Permanence and Change (for instance the Jaina take such a view).
Or, another response is to posit something which does not change (like the Soul) and
something which do (material world). Another position held by the great Buddhist
scholar Nagarjuna is to suggest that the true nature of Reality is beyond this binary of
Change/Permanence and hence, that is Śūnya (devoid of any expression).

Permanence Indescribable Change

Both permanence and change
Somethings are permanent but some change

Figure 12: Different views on nature of Reality

Another way we can answer the question is to say whether mind/spirit or matter is the
nature of Reality. Here too we have a variety of answers with the Advaitins and Yogacāra
Buddhists (one of the four major schools of Buddhism) who say that the true nature of
Reality is Spirit (Brahman) or the Consciousness (Vijñāna). According to them, since
we access the so-called material world through our conceptual framework (our thought-
complex), we can only know about the conceptual framework. What lies beyond it is
a creation of our conceptual framework. On the other hand, the Cārvāka hold that
matter alone is Real. What we consider non-material like soul, mind, consciousness and
either Unreal or are by-products of material entities combining with each other. Between
these two extremes are, once again, several positions which posit a combination of these
extremes (i.e. Reality is a combination of spirit and material entities OR a combination
of mental and material entities).

Mind/Spirit Matter

Figure 13: Different views on nature of Reality

7.2 Criteria for Existence

Based on their view of the fundamental nature of Reality, different philosophical traditions
gave different criteria of what it means for something to exist. In other words, how can
you say that something is Real? Since, the Advaitins believed that Reality is unchanging,
this translated into their criteria for existence too. According to them Defav = Real is
that which is never sublated (abādhita) by any manner or means. The logical conclusion of

36
this definition would ensure that only Brahman is Real since it alone remains unsublated
for all 3 times, past, present and future. The world that we live in undergoes modification
from time to time, hence it cannot be regarded as Real.
On the other extreme, the Buddhists who believed that Change alone is Real, believed
that for something to Real, it must be capable of change and since change happens over
a causal process, they defined Defbhu = An entity is real if and only if it has causal
powers. By this definition, if we posit an entity such as a soul but if we say that it does
not cause any effect, then the Buddhists will not treat such an entity as Real. Likewise,
even we believe that there is God but that God does not affect any change in our lives,
the Buddhists will ask what is the point of believing in such an entity.
The Jainas believed that it is ignorant to believe that Reality has only one facet,
either Change or Permanence. According to them, we all have only a partial access
to Reality. They give the metaphor of blind people trying to describe an elephant by
touching different parts of it. Just like the blind people, we think that what Reality we
access to is ultimate, which is erroneous. Only the omniscient beings (the Thīrthaṅkara)
have the access to Reality in its entirety. The rest of us must agree that whatever Reality
we experience is partly true. Hence, since we experience change as well as permanence
in our day-to-day life, we must accept both as the nature of Reality. Hence, according
to them Defj = Reality is that which possesses the three characteristics of production
(utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya). “[Reality] has its unchanging
essence and therefore is permanent. But it also has changing modes and therefore is
subject to origination and decay.” (Sharma 2009: 51)
There are some criteria of Reality which are motivated by the epistemological com-
mitments of the schools. For instance the Cārvāka believed that pratyakṣa (perception)
is the only reliable pramāṇa. Hence, following such an epistemic stance, their definition
of Reality will be Defcar = That which we are access via pratyakṣa. Another instance of
such an epistemically motivated definition of Reality is provided by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,
according to whom Defnv = Whatever is knowable and nameable is Real. When they say
‘knowable’ they mean knowable via the pramāṇas accepted by their school. Moreover,
it need not be already known to us (or named), it should only be knowable in principle.
Likewise, when they say ‘nameable’ they mean that it must be expressible in language.
Hence, the Advaitic position that Brahman exists but is inexpressible in language would
be unacceptable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
The above criteria are summarised in the following table

37
 Advaita Vedānata Real is that which is unsublated in any way
Bauddha Real is that which has causal potency
Jaina Real is that which is possesses the three characteristics of produc-
tion, destruction and permanence
Cārvāka Real is that which we can know through pratyakṣa
Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Real is that which is knowable and nameable

Different theories of truth

7.3 What is Reality Composed Of?

In the previous sections we surveyed various views on Reality and what is the criterion to
be Real. Now we ask the question, using the above criteria, what are the types of things
that we believed to be Real. Notice that we are inquiring into the types and not tokens
of things that exist. Rather than giving an account of each and every thing that exists,
a philosopher tried to categorise the things into finite groups and give an account of that
group. To illustrate, the blue of the sky, the blue of your pen, the blue of a flower are
specific token of the same type of colour called blue. Likewise, blue, green, yellow, orange
are token of a more general type called colour. Further more, colour, taste, extension,
smell are token of a even more general type called qualities. Now, the philosopher tries to
give an account of what qualities (guṇa) are. Similarly, pen, book, car, bottle, watch may
be different token of a single category called Substance (Dravya). The groups into which
we segregate various tokens are called Categories or Padārtha in the Indian context. To
rephrase the question we are asking now: What are the padārthas that exist?
Given the multiple opinions on Reality and the criteria for It, different traditions have
proposed different padārthas. On one extreme, we have the Advaitins who hold the view
that there is only one type of thing as well as only one thing, i.e. Brahman. Some others
like the early Buddhists or Yogācāra Buddhists share the belief that there is only one
type of thing (Dhamma or Vijñāna) but there are infinite tokens of this one type. On
the other extreme, the Jainas (as well as the Dvaita Vedāntins) believe that there are
infinite categories. Reality is not only pluralistic but it is relativistically so. Each of
the categories we create is partially real. Such an idea follows from their philosophy of
anekāntavāda that Reality has innumerable characters.
Between these two views, a variety of other categorisations are proposed. The
Sāṃkhya philosophers believe that there are two types of things: matter (prakṛ�ti) and
consciousness (puruṣa) and each has infinite tokens. Each of us has a consciousness which
is different in each of us but it all belongs to the same type called puruṣa. There is no
qualitative difference between difference between the individual puruṣas only quantita-
tive difference. Likewise, trees, oceans, buildings, metals, our body, our senses are all
numerically distinct but belong to the same type of entity called Prakṛ�ti. Others like
the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā thinkers have provided their own list of padārthas (categories)

38
based on their epistemology and other metaphysical commitments. Just as in the case
of pramāṇas, when some tradition does not accept a certain category, it may be because
they do not think it is Real or because it can be reduced to a combination of other cate-
gories and thus does not deserve the independent status of a padārtha (the Cārvāka are
an example of such a tradition. They reduce mental entities to a combination of material
entities).
The following tables summarises the above discussion:

Types Tokens Proponent

One One Advaita Vedānta
One Infinite Early Bauddha, Yogācāra
Two Infinite Sāṃkhya (and Yoga)
Many (but finite) Infinite Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Cārvāka(?)
Infinite Infinite Jaina, Dvaita Vedānta

Padārthas of Reality

Let us now examine a few accounts of Reality in a little more detail.

7.3.1 Advaita Vedāta View of Reality

As it has been observed above, Advaita Vedānta, as the name itself suggests, holds that
Reality is non-dual (a-dvaita). This non-dual Real is Brahman (or ātman). According
to their criterion of Reality, something is real only if it real for all 3 times, past, present
and future. All the entities in this world, from amoeba, to plants to human beings, even
stars and galaxies came into existence at one point, undergo change and will go out of
existence at some point. Hence, they cannot be regarded as Real, just as a dream cannot
be regarded as Real. The only Real is Brahman whose every nature is existence (sat).
But does it mean that the world we live in is Unreal. No, it is mithyā, replies the
Advaitin. Only that which has no existence in past, present and in the future can be
regarded as Unreal like a pegasus or a round-square or a married bachelor. Everything
else which limited by space, time or individuality is mithyā. Once we realise the limited
nature of this world, we become liberated from its suffering.
The Advaitins propose a 3 level model of how Reality manifests itself. At one level is
dream reality or illusory experience (like when you wrongly congnise a rope for a snake
or a pillar for a person or a mirage for a pool of water). This level is called Prātibhāsika
Satta. Can we say that dream is Unreal? It appears not. After all, we have all experienced
a dream from which we have woken up startled or sweating. How could an unreal thing
cause real physical reaction? Likewise, when we mistake a rope for a snake, we feel scared
and run away momentarily. It the snake was completely unreal, how could it produced
39
a real sense of fear in us? However, once we wake up (or when we examine the object
more closely) we realise it was mithyā jñāna (false cognition). In other words, the falsity
of this stage is experienced only from another level of reality, i.e. the waking state or the
empirical state. This level is called Vyāvahārika Satta. This is the state in which we spend
most of our lives. All entities like mind, body, trees, plants, and events like birth, death,
social structures, all change is experienced at this stage. When we were experiencing the
dream, it felt real to us. In the same way, when we experience this Empirical Stage, it
appears real to us. We think that I am really so-and-so, I am really sitting in front of a
computer, I have such-and-such name etc. But just as the illusion is dispelled when we
go to a higher state, the transactional nature of these entities and events becomes clear
to us when we go to another, higher level of reality called Pāramārthika Satta. This is
the absolute standpoint which alone is Real. This is the state in which the ātman has
realised its true nature and all ignorance is removed.
These three stages correspond to three types of experiences we all have on a day-to-day
basis. The dream cognition (svapna avasthā), the waking cognition (jāgṛta avasthā) and
deep sleep state (suṣupti). In the dream cognition, we experience illusions which appear
real but are sublated in the waking experience. But the consciousness which experienced
these is still present. Likewise, we experience pleasure and pain in our waking state but
these too are sublated in the state of deep sleep, in which we experience nothing. However,
the consciousness which experienced the deep sleep still exists since, after waking up, we
are able to recall that we had a very good sleep. However, this state of deep sleep is only
temporary. Hence, the Upaniṣads speak of a fourth state (Turiyā) beyond these three
where the Ātman exists in its true nature for all time. That state alone is Real in the
Advaitic Sense of ‘Real’.
But then how to the Advaitins explain change? They prescribe to the theory called
Sat-kārya-vāda, first proposed by Sāṃkhya thinkers, according to which the effect pre-
exists in the (material) cause31 and is only transformation or manifestation of the material
cause. A simple argument to prove this theory is to observe that when we want a specific
effect, we look for specific material causes. For instance, when we want curd, we take
milk; when we want oil, we look for some seeds (or nuts) and not sand or paper. This
shows that the effect is already present in a latent form in the cause. Further, if we argue
that the effect is not existing prior to its creation, it will seem like the causal process is
bringing a non-existent thing into existence, which is impossible.
So, what is the material cause out of which all the entities in the world have come?
Drawing from Upaniṣadic sources, they propose that the material cause for everything
31
A entity may be said to have multiple causes: For instance, a pot is made out of mud. Thus mud is
called the material cause. However, mud needs to be fashioned into a pot. Thus, the potter is also a cause
for the pot to come into existence. He is the efficient cause. However, the pot has been made for some
purpose, perhaps someone commissioned the pot. That purpose or person should also be considered as
one of the causes of the pot. Such a cause is called the Final cause.

40
is Brahman. But does it means that Brahman undergoes a transformation in order to
create all these things? No. Brahman being Real, can never be subjected to any change.
The Advaitins argue that the It only appears to have transformed into the effect. There is
no Real transformation (remember the Advaitic definition of ‘Real’). It appears to be real
because of Māya or Avidyā. Such an illusion is called vivarta and the theory of change
is called Brahma-Vivarta-Vāda (The Theory of Illusory Transformation in Brahman). In
other words, Change itself is a illusion we impose the world due to ignorance. Once the
ignorance is removed, we will realise that there is only One, i.e. Brahman. Remember
that the Advaitins are not denying that computers, laptops, mobiles exist nor are they
denying that they undergo change. All they are saying is that these changes appear real
only in the Vyāvahārika stage. From the Pāramārthika level, these mithyā nature of these
changes will be apparent, just like the changes we experience during a dream or illusory
cognition disappear in the waking stage.

7.3.2 Cārvāka View of Reality

From a monistic, non-corporeal model of Reality, we go to an extremely corporeal model

of Reality. The Cārvāka held that pratyakṣa (perception) alone is a reliable pramāṇa,
and since this gives us access only to material/physical entities, the Cārvāka, accepted
matter alone as Real. Whatever exists is composed of the 4 elements: Pṛthivi (Earth),
Ap (Water), Teja (Fire), Vāyu (Air). They do no accept the existence of Ākāśa since it is
not perceivable. Everything is a combination of these 4 elements in various proportions.
But then how to the Cārvāka account for the mental phenomenon. Surely, they cannot
deny that entities such as mind, consciousness, emotions exist. Yes, they accept the
existence of such entities but do not think they have an independent existence. Instead,
they regard mental entities as by-products (or epiphenomenon) of the combination of the
four elements. They give the example of how the red colour is produced from chewing
the combination of betel leaf and lime. One may ask the question that is everything is a
combination of the 4 elements how is it that rocks don’t have consciousness while we do?
Their answer would be that the proportions in which the 4 elements have combined to
form rocks is different from that combination which produced human beings, hence one
combination did not produce consciousness as a by-product while the latter did. Thus,
when the combination is disrupted (as it happens when one dies) the consciousness also
disappears. They do not believe in the existence of Soul as an independent entity but
consider the conscious body itself as the soul.
How to the Cārvāka account for the change in these material entities? The Cārvāka
do not accept causation as a invariable and unconditional relation. Since, we can only
perceive a conjunction of events and not a dependence relation between events, we cannot
say that the two events are connected by a cause-effect relation. But then what makes

41
these events occur in conjunction ? Surely there has to be some force, plan or law
which governs them and ensures that they repeatedly occur in conjunction. No, say the
Cārvāka. The conjunction are purely accidental. Hence, their view of causation is called
Yadṛcchāvāda (accidentalism). No one directs these elements to combine is this or that
proportion. They do so out of their own nature (svabhāva). So, their view is also called
svabhāvavāda (natualism). [Question: For someone who believes only in Pratyakṣa, is it
legitimate to accept that things have “their own nature.”]

7.3.3 Sāṃkhya View of Reality

Drawing from Upaniṣadic sources, Sāṃkhya had proposed one of the oldest models of
Reality. According to them, everything in the world may be categorised into 2 types of
entities: Puruṣa and Prakṭi. The former accounts for everything consciousness, while the
latter accounts for non-conscious entities.

Puruṣa : Puruṣa is the Pure Consciousness. It is neither the body, nor the mind, nor
the senses nor the ego. It is different from all of these. Again, it is not a substance
on which consciousness is a property. Consciousness is Puruṣa; it is its very essence.
Unlike the ātman of Advaita, the Puruṣa is not eternally blissful (ānanda). It is just pure
consciousness. It is the ultimate knower of all knowledge, but itself is never the object of
any knowledge. It is the silent witness a neutral seer of all the changes that happens in
Prakṛti. It is beyond time and space, change and activity. In other words, it is not the
agent of any action. It is uncaused, eternal (and hence unchanging) and all-pervading. It
is also beyong the 3 guṇas (see below). It is the final cause for which Prakṛti undergoes
the various cycles of evolution and dissolution.
Unlike Advaitic ātman, the Sāṃkhya believed in a plurality of puruṣas. There are
infinite puruṣas each of which are qualitatively alike (being pure consciousness) but quan-
titatively different.

Prakṛti : Contrary to Puruṣa, Prakṛ�ti is the unconscious and unintelligent (jaḍa)

material cause of all entities in the world. Everything which is non-conscious, both
material (like the trees, mountains and laptops) as well as non-material (like mind, senses,
ego) evolves out of prakṛti. Like Puruṣa, Prakṛti is also uncaused but unlike Puruṣā
it is ever changing. Its presence can only be inferred from the effects of its evolutes.
Importantly, Prakṛ�ti is said to constitute of three guṇas: Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.
These guṇas are not properties of Prakṛ�ti (just as consciousness is not a property of
Puruṣa) but are its very nature. These guṇas are infered from the effects they have on
us - pleasure, pain and indifference (respectively). All entities in the world are a unique
combination of these guṇa. The nature of an entity depends on which guṇa dominates.

42
 Sattva is illuminating in nature and embodiment of happiness. It is light, bright and
buoyant. Effects like upward motion, pleasure, contentment are due to sattva. It produces
a longing for liberation and divine tendencies in us. Rajas produces pain. Restless
activity, feverish effort and passions are its results. It is mobile and stimulating. It
produces effects like anger, pride, envy in us. Tamas is the principle of interia. It produces
apathy (or indifference) as well as absence of right judgement, aversion to learning and
rest. It is heavy and enveloping and is opposed to Sattva (which is illuminting). It is also
opposed to Rajas since it arrests activity.
Though the three guṇas seem to be opposing to each to other, all three are essential
for the evolution of the world. The Saṃkhya explain their complimentary nature by
comparing them to the oil, wick and flame which produces the light. The flame cannot
burn without consuming the oil, which in turn is preventing the wick from burning
immediately but at the same time, is acting as a vehicle to supply the flame with more
and more oil.
As it was mentioned earlier, Prakṛ�ti is ever changing. Even when it is in the dormant
form, the 3 guṇas are in a constant state of change. Only that this change is homogeneous
(saraūpa pariṇāma): sattva changes into sattva, rajas into rajas and tamas into tamas.
Thus, Prakṛ�ti is in a state of equilibrium. This equilibrium is disturbed when Puruṣa
and Prakṛ�ti come into contact with each other32 resulting in heterogenous changes. One
guṇa dominates the others and evolution (sarga) begins.
The first evolute is Mahat or Buddhi (Intellegence). It is the locus of Dharma (virtue),
Jñana (knowledge), Vairāgya (Detachment), aiśvarya (Power), and their opposites. Mem-
ories are also stored in the Buddhi. From Mahat comes Ahaṅkāra (ego). It is the principle
of individuation. It generates the notion of ‘I’. Puruṣa wrongy identifies Itself with this
ego and thinks that It is the agent of action, desirer, possessor and enjoyer of ideas, emo-
tions and material objects. From the Sāttvik aspect of this Ahaṅkāra, the five jñānedriya
(senses organs), the five karmendriya (mortor organs33 ) and the manas ( mind) evolve.
From the Tāmasik aspect of Ahaṅkāra the five tanmātras (the subtle elements) evolve
and from these subtle elements the five mahābhūta (gross elements34 evolve. It must be
noted that being evolutes of Prakṛ�ti none of these evolutes is conscious. It is Puruṣa alone
which is conscious. Also, apart from the 5 gross elements, all others are non-corporeal
(they are not physical entities). Hence, the Sāṃkhya model is able to give a compre-
hensive picture of Reality which includes conscious entities (puruṣa) and non-conscious
entities (prakṛ�ti) and also physical entities as well as non-physical entities (like manas,
ahaṅkaāra, buddhi). The above evolution is presented in the schematic diagram below
Notice that in the above process, all the effects of Prakṛti are called ‘evolutes’ this is
32
Sāṃkhya is unable to give a satisfactory account of how or why these two come into contact.
33
Speech, Grasping, Movement, Exretion and Reproduction
34
Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa

43
Kushal Bansal

The 25 Tattvas of Sāṃkhya

because Sāṃkhya also holds the theory of Sat-kārya-vāda according to which the effect
pre-exists in some form in its material cause. And here, since Prakṛti is the material cause
for all things, these are latent in Prakṛti. Prakṛ�ti just transforms itself into these evolutes
when the conditions are right. However, unlike the Advaitins, the Sāṃkhya holds that
the transformation is Real and not an illusion. In other words, Prakṛ�ti Really transforms
in to Buddhi. Buddhi Really transforms into Ahaṅkāra and so on. Hence, this theory is
called Prakṛti-Pariṇāma-Vada (the real transformation of Prakṛ�ti). The only thing that
remains unchanging is Puruṣa.

8 Pramātṛ�Śāstra (Study of the Inquirer)

In the preceding two sections, we had a glimpse of what the Indian philosophers had to
say about the Reality and how we have access to that Reality. Now, we will turn our
attention to the world of the inquirer. Strictly speaking, this would involve a study in the
nature of the ātman (soul). However, to maintain our parallel with branches of modern
Western Philosophy, we will survey what the Indian thinkers had to say about the values
pursued by Indian thinkers. We have already made a mention of the Puruṣārthas in
section 2.1. Let us explore this framework in this section.
The term Puruṣārtha contains two words ‘puruṣa’ (human) and artha (end). So we
may understand this term either in a description way: the ends/goals which humans seek
(or the ends/goals of human life) or in a normative way: the ends/goals which humans
ought to seek. These ends could be instrumental in nature (i.e. we seek them as a
means to achieve something else) or intrinsic in nature (i.e. we seek them for their own
sake). Further, the term ‘puruṣa’ is not meant to connote that these ends are unique
44
to human beings alone. Indeed, we share several ends with other living beings (like
need for food, shelter, aversion from pain). However, according to the prominent Indian
philosopher of the previous century, M. Hiriyanna, while other beings may pursue these
goal instinctively, human beings pursue them consciousness. Putting the above nuances
together, Hiriyanna defines puruṣārthas as def = An end which is consciously sought to
be accomplished either for its own sake or for the sake of utilizing it as a means to the
accomplishment of a further end.
Now, each human being may want a multitude of things and since each person is
different, there is a relativistically infinte things that we pursue (or ought to pursue). A
philosopher would not be interesting in giving an account of each and every thing that
we pursue. As usual, our task is to categorise these goals into broad categories and give
an account of that category. In this way, the Indian thinkers categories human goals into
4 categories: Artha, Kāma, Dharma and Mokṣa.

Artha : This accounts for the material goals of our life. According to some verses in
the Mahābhārata, it is the foundation from which all other goals can be pursued. The
traditional sources list several examples of artha-puruṣārtha such as agriculture, animal
husbandry, trade and business, handicrafts and skilled workmen. The Kāmasūtra(1.2.9)
lists knowledge, land, gold, cattle, crops, utensils, apparels and dresses, ornaments, house-
hold good and friends as artha as well as the pursuit of increasing these when acquired.
Whatever may be the specific instances of artha (which changes according to location
and time), it is clear that it is the most instrumental goal among the 4. Wealth is never
gained for its own sake but to be put into use to pursue something more valueable (like
power, respect, comfort, removing sorrow etc).

Kāma : All the sensual needs of our life come under kāma puruṣārtha. Note that
kāma does not mean only sexual pleasure as is commonly understood but should be
more broadly understood as the gratification of the sense organs. Hence, enjoying good
food, watching beutiful scenery, listening to good music would also be part of kāma. The
unique aspect of kāma is that it appears to be intrinsic in nature. We want to satisfy
our sense because it brings us happiness and not for any other purpose. I want to enjoy
a plate of noodles because it bring me joy (or keeps me away from sorrow), not because
I want to achieve something else from it. On the other hand, I would like to buy a car
so that I can commute freely to one place to the other. The car in itself has little value
for me. It is the comfortable travel that is more valuable.
The above two puruṣārthas are ones which we share with animals too and which we
naturally pursue. They involve the pursuit of (relatively more) tangible and physical
objects (such as cars, houses, music, jobs, knowledge, family, social relations). However,
the pleasure or happiness we derive from them is not enduring. It lasts as long as the

45
object exists and also tends to decrease with every successive day (we may compare it
to law of diminishing marginal utility in Economics). On the other had, the next two
puruṣārthas, Dharma and Mokṣa give more enduring happiness and, arguably, ‘higher’
kind of happiness (the joy of being truthful or practicing non-violence is ‘higher’ than the
joy of eating a plate of your favourite dish). They also involve the pursuit of (relatively
less) tangible and physical objects and (relatively more) complex and abstract objects. As
anything which is more valuable, the pursuit of Dharma and Mokṣa is far more difficult
and hence, human beings do not tend to do it naturally. But since they give us enduring
happiness, we ought to pursue them.

Dharma : Dharma is one of the most complex concepts to understand. Some philoso-
phers think that it is unique to human beings. It is loosely translated as Morality but it
is much more than that. It may be understood as a set of virtues, rules and duties which
one has to follow in one’s life. These virtues (rules and duties) may be common to all
people, in which case they are called Sāmānya Dharma, such as non-violence, truthful-
ness, refusal to take what is not given, non-stealing, charity, study, freedom from anger
etc. In some cases, they may be limited to certain social hierarchies or according to
one’s social responsibilities. For example, the āśrama dharma are the dharmas which
people in different āśramas are supposed to follow.35 Likewise, Rajadharma is unique to
the King alone. Even the so-called ‘sāmānya dharma’ are not universal. In some cases,
truthfulness may not be the dharmik thing to do. Again, when someone is coming to
attack you, ahiṃsā (non-violence) would be adharma while protecting yourself would be
dharma. In other words, dharma is never universal. It is always subject to the place,
time and the social situation in which the individual is present. It is for this reason that
it is so complex to understand and practice, thereby requiring a lot more patience and
effort.
Dharma may also be understood as a regulatory force to guide the rightful pursuit
of artha and kāma. Only that artha or kāma that is in accordance with Dharma is fit
to be pursued. For instance, stealing someone’s wealth to increase one’s own wealth will
not be the dharmik way of accumulating artha. Likewise, indulging in the senses at the
cost of doing violence on to others and also onto one’s sense is not adharma (for instance,
listening to music in the classroom when the lecture is going on). Whenever there is
a conflict between Dharma and Artha or Dharma and Kāma it is better to side with
Dharma.
Most thinkers agree that Dharma is also instrumental in nature. But it is different
from artha (which is also instrumental) because Dharma invariably leads to a greater good
(abhyudaya) while the good of accumulating artha is likely to be limited to an individual.
35
There are 4 āśrama in the Vaidika tradition: brahmacarya (the student life), the grahastha (the
householder’s life), the vānaprastha (the reclusive life) and the sanyāsa (the renunciate’s life).

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Also, the good resulting from Dharma is more inclusive than the good resulting from the
pursuit of artha (or Kāma). Dharma is also an instrument to mokṣa (niḥśreya) since
following one’s Dharma makes the mind (citta) clear and makes it ideal to receive ātma
jñāna (knowledge of the true nature of soul). It also helps one is staying away from pāpa
(loosely translated as sin) and puts one in the path of gaining more puṇya (virtue or
good).

Mokṣa : The above three puruṣārthas were recognised from a very early period in
among the Indian thinkers. However, gradually, a need was felt for a liberation from the
cycle of birth and death (saṃsāra). This need gave rise to mokṣa as a puruṣārtha and
in time, it became the most important puruṣārtha (parama puruṣārtha). All thinkers
agreed that once the ātman is liberated, it breaks free from the saṃsāra cakra. However,
there was a disagreement about the nature of mokṣa and how to attain it. Some thinkers
understood mokṣa as a state in which the āṭman enjoys eternal bliss (ānanda) while
others felt that it was a state where the ātman existed in its true nature beyond pleasure
or pain. Still other, characterised it as a state in which there is no element of suffering.
There was also a disagreement about whether the ātman undergoes any change when
it becomes liberated. Most traditions felt that it did undergo a change involving removal
of all consciousness, pain, pleasure, memories, karma etc. Some, like the Advaita Vedānta
felt that ātman is never subjected to any change. Hence, to them mokṣa is the natural
state of the ātman, and one only needs to remove the ignorance (avidyā) surrounding
it. Thus, for the former traditions the ātman becomes liberated, while according to the
latter ātman is liberated (already).
Some traditions believed that one can be liberated even when the soul is conditioned
by the mortal body (a state called Jivanmukta). People like the Buddha are historical
examples of such people, who, though having a physical existence, realised the true nature
of the self. Others believed that as long the soul is embodied, it is subject to karma and is
hence not liberated. It is only when it becomes free from such limitations that it becomes
free (a state called Videhamukta).
The state of mokṣa may seem very mystical and other-worldly but historical examples
tell us that it need not be so. People who have attained mokṣa need not disconnect
themselves totally from society; they may still engage in certain social activities. The
Buddha, for instance, taught for many years after attaining true knowledge. Likewise,
Shankaracharya, travelled the whole length of the country engaging himself in debates
with various scholars though he was possessed of ātma jñāna. However, being free from
ignorance, such people do not accumulate any more karma even if they perform actions
(since they know that they are not the doer of the action).
Different traditions have laid out different paths to attain mokṣa. The earliest path
was the jñāna mārga, which involved attaining knowledge about the true nature of soul.
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However, some thinkers felt that doing one’s duties would ensure liberation according to
the law of karma. This was the karma mārga. Later, when theistic traditions arose, the
path of devotion or Bhakti became importat. It did not require people to gain abstract
knowledge nor did it need them to perform complicated karma. They had to just surren-
der one self to God with the faith God will liberate them. Some traditions advocated a
combination of these method, such as the Tri-Ratna of Jaina darśana. According to this,
one needed Samyak Darśana (right faith, in the teachings of the Tīthankaras), Samyak
Jñāna (right knowledge) and Samyak Cāritra (right conduct) to attain liberation. The
Buddha laid out the 8-fold path36 for his followers. The Yoga darśana developed the
aṣṭāṅga yoga to take one to liberation (samādhi).37
The puruṣārtha framework not only gives an account of what human pursue and what
they ought to pursue but indirectly also answers the question “What is the purpose of
human life?” The answer, according to this framework would be “The purpose of human
life is to pursue artha, kāma, dharma and mokṣa in a balanced way” or as most Indian
philosophers (except the Cārvāka) would agree “The purpose of human life is to pursue
artha and kāma in accordance with dharma to ensure that we are on the right path to
Mokṣa.”

9 Suggested Reading
Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy, Hiriyanna, Kavyalaya, 1952

Essentials of Indian Philosophy, Hiriyanna, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers; Fourth

Reprint edition (2015)

Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Roy Perrett, Cambridge University Press, 2016

Classical Indian Philosophy, J N Mohanty, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000

The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. III, The Philosophies, Edited by Haridas
Bhattacharyya, Ramakrishna Mission

An Introduction to Indian Philosophy by Satishchandra Chatterjee and Dheeren-

dramohan Datta, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2016
36
Right faith, Right resolve, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right through and right
concentration
37
These 8 steps were: 1. Yama (non-violence, truthfulnes, non-stealing, non-indulgence in sensual
pleasures and not being greedy), 2. Niyama (cleanliness, contentment, austerity, self-study, devotion
to Īśvara) 3. Āsana (a steady posture to discipline the body) 4. Prāṇāyāma (regulation of breath) 5.
Pratyāhāra (drawing the sense organ inwards) 6. Dhāraṇa (Meditating on a mental object) 7. Dhyāna
(Uninterrupted flow of thought on the object of meditation) 8. Samādhi (Cessation of all mental activity
and realisation of the distinction between Prakṛ�ti and Puruṣa)

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 A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Chandradhar Sharma, Motilal Banarsidass,
Dehi, 2009 (Reprint)

Appendix: The sixteen schools

Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha by Mādhavācārya (14th C.E) presents the key tenets of the
15 prevelant schools of philosophy at his time (though as the word ‘sarva’ in the title
suggests, these are all the schools that existed) and finally presents the views of Advaita
Vedānta to which the author subscribes. Thus, all the 15 schools should be seen as
the pūrva-pakṣa or opponent’s view (or alternate hypothesis) and Advaita Vedānta as
siddhanta or uttara-pakṣa (the thesis). The sixteen schools taken up are

The Cārvāka System The Raseśvara

The Bauddha System The Vaiśeṣika
The ārhata (Jaina) Nyāya System
The Rāmānuja System The Jaiminīya System
The Pūrṇa-prajña System The Pāṇinīya System
The Nakulīśa-Pāśupata System The Sāṃkhya System
The śaiva System The Pātañjala or Yoga System
The Pratyabhijñā The Vedānta or System of Saṃkara āchārya

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