Power System Data

Communication
Standard
National Electricity Market

Prepared by: AEMO Operations

Version: 3.0

Effective date: 3 April 2023

Status: FINAL

Approved for distribution and use by:

Approved by: Michael Gatt

Title: Executive General Manager Operations

Date: 24 / 11 / 2022

aemo.com.au
New South Wales | Queensland | South Australia | Victoria | Australian Capital Territory | Tasmania | Western Australia

Australian Energy Market Operator Ltd ABN 94 072 010 327

Power System Data Communication Standard

Contents
Current version release details 3

1. Introduction 4
1.1. Purpose and scope 4
1.2. Definitions and interpretation 4
1.3. Related documents 7
1.4. Requirement to provide Intervening Facilities 7
1.5. Overview of Data Communication Facilities 8
1.6. Interdependence and cooperation 9
1.7. Content overview and application 10

2. Performance 10
2.1. Capability to transmit and receive Operational Data 10
2.2. Representation of data 11
2.3. Age of data 12
2.4. Control command delay 13
2.5. Data accuracy 13

3. Reliability 15
3.1. Reliability requirements 15
3.2. Redundant elements 16

4. Security 16
4.1. Standard applies in parallel with SOCI Act 16
4.2. Security risk management plans 16
4.3. Security incident reporting 17
4.4. Physical security and computer network security 17

5. Interfacing 18
5.1. Physical and logical interfaces with AEMO co-ordinating centres 18
5.2. Communication protocols 19

6. Maintenance, planning and testing 20

6.1. Governance and reporting on availability 20
6.2. Response to failures 20
6.3. Planned outage co-ordination 20
6.4. Data management and co-ordination 21
6.5. Testing to confirm compliance 22

7. Near real time data from PMU and HSM devices 22

8. Management of non-compliance 23
8.1. Consequences of non-compliance 23
8.2. Reporting and remediation 23

9. Transitional arrangements for 2023 Standard Update 23

9.1. Definitions, application and maximum timeframes 24
9.2. Transition plan 24
9.3. Deemed compliance between effective date and transition date 25

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Power System Data Communication Standard

Version release history 26

Tables
Table 1 Resolution required for analogue values ................................................................................ 11
Table 2 End to end time for data to be available for transmission to AEMO ....................................... 12
Table 3 Deadband for transmission of analogue values ..................................................................... 12
Table 3A Data accuracy tolerance ......................................................................................................... 14
Table 4 Maximum critical outages for RME and RCE ........................................................................ 16
Table 5 Maximum critical outages for intervening facilities over a 12-month period ........................... 16

Figures
Figure 1 General structure of DCF ......................................................................................................... 9

Current version release details

Version Effective date Summary of changes
3.0 3 April 2023 Revised following complete review

Note: There is a full version history at the end of this document.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose and scope
(a) This is the Power System Data Communication Standard (Standard) made under clause
4.11.2(c) of the National Electricity Rules (NER). It incorporates the standards and
protocols referred to in NER 4.11.1 and 4.11.2. This Standard has effect only for the
purposes set out in the NER. The NER and the National Electricity Law prevail over this
Standard to the extent of any inconsistency.
(b) This Standard sets out the standards and protocols applicable to the recording,
transmission or receipt of telemetered data required for the purposes of monitoring and
managing central dispatch and power system security and reliability (Operational Data)
(including indications, signals and instructions) by:
(i) remote monitoring equipment (RME) and remote control equipment (RCE)
installed and maintained by Registered Participants who are required to do so
under NER 4.11.1 and S5.2.6.1; and
(ii) primary and back-up communications facilities maintained by Network Service
Providers (NSPs) for the transmission of data between RME and RCE and
AEMO’s control centres, as required under NER 4.11.2, and by other Registered
Participants who may provide such facilities in some cases.

1.2. Definitions and interpretation

1.2.1. Glossary

Terms defined in the National Electricity Law and the NER have the same meanings in this
Standard unless otherwise specified in the table below. Terms defined in the NER are intended
to be identified in this Standard by italicising them, but failure to italicise a defined term does not
affect its meaning.
The words, phrases and abbreviations in the table below have the meanings set out opposite
them when used in this Standard.

Term Definition
Analogue Value Numeric representation of a continuous value (for example, a power flow)
Communication A communication protocol that is approved by AEMO for transmission of Operational Data
Protocol between Intervening Facilities and AEMO co-ordinating centres, in accordance with
section 5.2.
Control Command An electronic instruction to perform a defined action (for example a generation increase).
In the ICCP it is a special data type that is different from a standard Analogue Value or
Discrete Value type, and usually requires an acknowledgement of receipt to be sent back.
Critical Outage For an RME or RCE:
A loss of the ability to transmit Operational Data of Good Quality to AEMO or receive
Control Commands from AEMO exceeding 60 seconds, but excluding an outage that:
• affects less than 5% of all Operational Data items of that RME or RCE;
• only affects the transmission of Operational Data relating to scheduled plant that is not
available to participate in central dispatch;
• relates to a period when the plant associated with the RME or RCE is not in service and
AEMO has been notified of that fact;
• is planned for work to upgrade the RME or RCE, where AEMO has been notified in
advance; or

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Power System Data Communication Standard

Term Definition
• is caused solely by an outage of an Intervening Facility.
For an Intervening Facility:
A loss of the ability to transmit Operational Data of Good Quality to AEMO or receive
Control Commands from AEMO exceeding 3 minutes, but excluding an outage that:
• lasts less than 10 minutes and does not affect the transmission of Dispatch Data; or
• is planned for a test of:
– DCFs at a disaster recovery site; or
– a major upgrade of an Intervening Facility,
for which AEMO has been given at least 24 hours’ notice and which affects no more
than one trading interval (or a longer period agreed with AEMO in advance).
Data Communication Any:
Provider (DCP) • Registered Participant required to install and maintain RCE and RME in accordance
with NER 4.11.1; and
• Network Service Provider required to provide and maintain communications facilities in
accordance with NER 4.11.2.
Data Communications A generic term used to denote any part of equipment used to transmit Operational Data
Facility (DCF) from one site to another, and includes:
• the part of RME and RCE providing analogue to digital conversion functions;
• the part of RME and RCE providing data communication functions.
• the parts of an Intervening Facility providing data communications functions
• telecommunications equipment and media.
• power supply equipment for the above equipment.
Deadband A deadband is a region of values where a change in the value of data will not result in
activation of data transmission. A deadband may be necessary to prevent repeated
transmission of data when it has not changed materially.
Discrete Value A numeric representation of one of a limited set of values (for example a transformer tap
position).
Dispatch Data Telemetered data that is required for the operation of the 5-minute central dispatch
process, representing any of the following:
• the operational status and measurement of the production, consumption or flow of
scheduled plant or a wholesale demand response unit1, including aggregated data for
plant or services that are dispatched in aggregate; .
• measurements of interconnector flow;
• the enablement status or amount, of a market ancillary service, non-market ancillary
service, system strength service, inertia network service or inertia support activity;
• a dispatch instruction or other Control Command.
• indications and measurements for, and instructions from, the VAR dispatch system
(VDS)
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol 3 version SAv5 or later.
End to end time End to end time means time between:
(latency) • detection of an event or change in value at RME and receipt of the associated data at
an AEMO co-ordinating centre; or
• transmission of a command from an AEMO co-ordinating centreand receipt of the
command at RCE.
Force Majeure An event or circumstance that directly affects the ability of a DCF to transmit or receive
Operational Data, to the extent that:
• the occurrence of the event or circumstance is not within the reasonable control of the
relevant DCP, its related bodies corporate or its service providers or subcontractors;
and
• the impact of the event or circumstance could not reasonably have been anticipated,
and either mitigated or prevented, by the relevant DCP, its related bodies corporate,
service providers or subcontactors.
Good Quality Data that is a true representation of the equipment state, quantity or other indication being
measured. It is not replaced or modified, other than for the purpose of conversion to the
agreed unit of measure, and is indicated by data quality flags in accordance with section
2.2.

1
From 3 June 2024, scheduled plant and wholesale demand response units will be referred to by the umbrella term ‘scheduled
resources’.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

Term Definition
High Resolution Data Data measured and transmitted to AEMO in near real time by devices with GPS clock
synchronisation (or equivalent technology) and a typical sample rate of 20 millisecond
intervals, allowing for accurate representation of power system behaviour, including
during transient events, including:
• measurements of system frequency and electrical time; and
• data measured by PMU and HSM devices that is transmitted for real time operation
purposes,
but excluding Dispatch Data.
HSM High Speed Monitor
ICCP Inter-Control Center Communications Protocol - IEC 60870-6 TASE.2 and its extensions2
Intervening Facility An NSP Intervening Facility or a Non-NSP Intervening Facility, being a DCF that is
required or permitted to transmit Operational Data directly to and from an AEMO co-
ordinating centre under this Standard.
For clarity, an Intervening Facility does not include any facility or service provided by
AEMO for communication between an Intervening Facility and an AEMO co-ordinating
centre.
NER National Electricity Rules. A reference to NER followed by a number is to the
corresponding rule or clause of the NER.
Non-NSP Intervening A DCF that:
Facility • is not an asset of, or provided by, an NSP;
• receives Polls directly from AEMO co-ordinating centres;
• collects data from an RME (whether directly or via an aggregation facility) and relays
that data to AEMO co-ordinating centres; and
• relays Control Commands from control centre to RCE.
NSP (TNSP, DNSP) Network Service Provider (including a Transmission Network Service Provider, and a
Distribution Network Service Provider, but excluding a Market Network Service Provider)
NSP Intervening Facility A DCF that:
• is provided and maintained by an NSP;
• receives Polls either directly from an AEMO co-ordinating centre or (where this
Standard permits) via another NSP Intervening Facility;
• collects data from RME or another NSP Intervening Facility and relays that data to an
AEMO co-ordinating centre or (where this Standard permits) another NSP Intervening
Facility; and
• relays Control Commands from an AEMO co-ordinating centre to RCE or another NSP
Intervening Facility.
Operational Data An umbrella term for all data required to be transmitted to or from AEMO co-ordinating
centres using RME, RCE and the Intervening Facilities for AEMO’s market and power
system security functions. Unless otherwise specified, Operational Data includes Dispatch
Data, High Resolution Data, System Security Primary Data and System Security
Secondary Data.
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
Poll An electronic request sent from a control centre or an Intervening Facility to RME to
request Status Indications, Discrete Values or Analogue Values.
System Security Telemetered data relating to:
Primary Data • all transmission network assets and dual function assets; and
• plant that is directly connected to such network assets,
but excluding Dispatch Data.
RCE Remote control equipment as defined in the NER, but not limited to power stations and
substations - Equipment used to control the operation of elements of a facility or the
provision of a service from a control centre.
Resilient Network A communication network which has back-up power supplies sufficient to sustain
operation for at least 10 hours following loss of external AC (alternating current) supply.
RME Remote monitoring equipment as defined in the NER - Equipment installed to enable
monitoring of a facility from a control centre.

2
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), available for purchase https://webstore.iec.ch/publication

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Power System Data Communication Standard

Term Definition
Scale Range The range of measurements for an Analogue Value that can be represented by a numeric
value.
System Security Telemetered data required for effective market operation and power system security that
Secondary Data is not Dispatch Data, High Resolution Data or System Security Primary Data . Examples
include data required for:
• inputs to short term forecasting systems; and
• inputs to dynamic rating systems.
Secure Network A communication network which is not accessible to third parties and meets the cyber
security requirements outlined in section 4.4.2(b) to (d).
SOCI Act The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth).
Status Indication The state of a device that has a finite number of discrete states. It includes switching and
control indications and alarm conditions.
Telecommunication A carrier as defined in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth).
Carrier
True Value True value of a measurement is a perfect measurement in an ideal world. It assumes zero
measurement error in the measurement process, from the sensor to the measurement
instrument.
WAN Wide area network

1.2.2. Interpretation

These Procedures are subject to the principles of interpretation set out in Schedule 2 of the
National Electricity Law.

1.3. Related documents

Title Location
Australian Energy Sector Cyber https://aemo.com.au/initiatives/major-programs/cyber-security/aescsf-
Security Framework framework-and-resources

Australian Signals Directorate https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advice/guidelines-

Information Security Manual, cryptography
Guidelines for Cryptography

Communication System Failure https://aemo.com.au/energy-systems/electricity/national-electricity-market-

Guidelines nem/participate-in-the-market/network-connections/victorian-transmission-
connections/stage-6-completion

Market Ancillary Service https://aemo.com.au/en/energy-systems/electricity/national-electricity-market-

Specification nem/system-operations/ancillary-services/market-ancillary-services-
specification-and-fcas-verification-tool

AEMO Policy 020113: Electricity https://www.aemo.com.au/-/media/files/electricity/nem/it-systems-and-

Market Management Systems change/2016/electricity-market-management-systems-access-policy-and-
Access Policy and Procedure procedure.pdf?la=en&hash=60D050E074048EB08563BB60906FD4A7

1.4. Requirement to provide Intervening Facilities

1.4.1. NSP obligations

(a) Each TNSP and DNSP must maintain one or more DCFs, called NSP Intervening
Facilities, to receive Operational Data from RME, HSMs and PMUs connected to its

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Power System Data Communication Standard

network (subject to section 1.4.2), and transmit Control Commands to RCE or, where
applicable, to another NSP Intervening Facility 3.
(b) For the purpose of the transmission and receipt of Operational Data between its
Intervening Facilities and an AEMO co-ordinating centre, a DNSP must either:
(i) establish a direct connection to both AEMO co-ordinating centres4;
(ii) establish a connection to the Intervening Facility maintained by its regional TNSP;
or
(iii) with the consent of the TNSP and AEMO, establish a direct connection to one
AEMO co-ordinating centres and a second connection to the Intervening Facility
maintained by its regional TNSP, so that the TNSP’s Intervening Facility then
retransmits the relevant Operational Data to and from AEMO co-ordinating
centres,
provided that the DNSP must select a communication path that allows all applicable
requirements of this Standard to be met.
(c) Each TNSP must:
(i) for the purpose of the transmission and receipt of Operational Data between its
Intervening Facilities and an AEMO co-ordinating centre, establish a direct
connection to both AEMO co-ordinating centres; and
(ii) cooperate with any DNSP in its region as reasonably required to establish a
connection between the TNSP and DNSP Intervening Facilities.
(d) AEMO provides a WAN connection for NSP Intervening Facilities, and physical or logical
interfaces are to be established in accordance with section 5.

1.4.2. Other participants

Some Registered Participants (for example aggregators) may be required by the NER to
transmit and receive Operational Data to and from AEMO that is not also required by the NSP
for its operational purposes. In such cases, where the use of an NSP Intervening Facility for the
relevant data is not provided for in a connection agreement or other arrangement, the
Registered Participant may establish a Non-NSP Intervening Facility for direct connection to
the AEMO co-ordinating centres in accordance with section 5.1.

1.5. Overview of Data Communication Facilities

The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between:

• AEMO co-ordinating centres (Control Centres 1 and 2).

• NSP Intervening Facilities.

• Non-NSP Intervening Facilities.

3
Data transmission between RME/RCE and Intervening Facilities can occur via one or more other aggregating facilities, which
are not specifically addressed in this Standard.
4
This does not affect any obligations of a DNSP under its connection and operating arrangements to provide the same or similar
data to a TNSP.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

• RME and RCE.

This conceptual schematic represents a number of possible configurations including:

• DNSP Intervening Facility (IF2) connects directly to a TNSP Intervening Facility (IF1) which
in turn provides the DNSP data to AEMO via IF1’s direct connections to both AEMO co-
ordinating centres;

• DNSP Intervening Facility (IF4) connects directly to one AEMO co-ordinating centre and
also connects directly to a TNSP Intervening Facility (IF3) which in turn provides the DNSP
data to AEMO via the TNSP’s direct connections to the other AEMO co-ordinating centre5;

• DNSP or Non-NSP Intervening Facility connects directly to both AEMO co-ordinating

centres (IF5).

Figure 1 General structure of DCF

Figure 1 is only intended to be a conceptual schematic showing potential connection paths of

various facilities. It is not a conceptual/solution architecture design for a DCP to install their
infrastructure; a DCP is expected to design its infrastructure and communication services to
meet the requirements of the Standard.

1.6. Interdependence and cooperation

(a) As illustrated in sections 1.4 and 1.5, the transmission of Operational Data from power
system equipment in the field or dispatch aggregators to AEMO co-ordinating centres
and vice versa in accordance with the requirements of this Standard often relies on
satisfactory performance by multiple DCFs.

5
If practical and agreed to by all relevant parties.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

(b) Each DCP should cooperate with, and provide reasonable assistance to, other relevant
DCPs to facilitate the overall achievement of the Standard. In doing so, a DCP is not
expected to exceed any individual performance requirement for its own DCFs.

1.7. Content overview and application

The following sections of the Standard are structured as follows:

• Section 2 specifies performance requirements for DCFs, either generally or by reference to

the type of Operational Data being transmitted. These requirements do not apply to High
Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specified in accordance with section 7.

• Section 3 specifies reliability requirements for DCFs. These requirements do not apply to the
provision of High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specified in accordance
with section 7.

• Section 4 specifies the cyber, physical and network security requirements applicable to all
DCFs (including all PMUs and HSMs) and associated communication paths.

• Section 5 deals with interfaces between DCFs and AEMO co-ordinating centres. Section 5.1
applies to PMUs and HSMs providing High Resolution Data- but section 5.2 does not,
unless specified in accordance with section 7.

• Section 6 deals with DCF maintenance, planning and testing, including coordination. These
requirements do not apply to PMUs and HSMs providing High Resolution Data unless
specified in accordance with section 7.

• Section 7 explains how performance requirements for High Resolution Data from PMUs and
HSMs are determined for the purpose of this Standard.

• Section 8 explains the framework for non-compliance with this Standard, by reference to the
NER.

• Section 9 covers transitional arrangements for compliance with additional requirements

introduced by version 3.0 of this Standard.

2. Performance
The purpose of this section is to ensure that DCFs perform effectively.

2.1. Capability to transmit and receive Operational Data

(a) DCFs must be capable of transmitting and receiving the types and quantities of
Operational Data required by AEMO for its market and power system security functions
from time to time under the NER, including, for example:
(i) quantities and signals approved in respect of plant or a service on registration and
classification under NER Chapter 2;
(ii) RME quantities requested under a performance standard for NER S5.2.6.1 or
S5.3a.4.1;
(iii) requirements for performance data from RME specified under NER 4.11.1(d);
(iv) requirements for AGC signals specified under NER 4.11.1(g);

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Power System Data Communication Standard

(v) requirements specified in an agreement or supporting arrangements for the

dispatch and monitoring of non-market ancillary services, network support, system
strength services or inertia services;
(vi) quantities and signals required for market ancillary services under the MASS.
(b) Additional quantities and types of data may be transmitted beyond AEMO’s
requirements, but this does not limit a DCP’s obligations to comply with this Standard in
respect of Operational Data.
(c) As noted in section 1.7, the references to Operational Data and High Resolution Data in
this section 2 do not apply to High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs. Requirements
for those devices are set under section 7.

2.2. Representation of data

(a) DCFs must transmit Operational Data to and from AEMO in accordance with this section
2.2.
(b) Analogue Values must be transmitted:
(i) with the sign convention nominated by the DCP from which the data originates
(see paragraph (c); and
(ii) with the resolutions specified in Table 1.

Table 1 Resolution required for analogue values

Category of Analogue Value Resolution (Max % of Scale Range)

Dispatch Data and High Resolution Data6 0.1

System Security Primary Data System Security Primary Data 0.2

System Security Secondary Data 1.0

(c) DCPs must notify AEMO of their sign convention when applying to AEMO for registration
as a Registered Participant. To change the sign convention, DCPs must give 60 business
days’ notice to AEMO. This notice period does not apply to the correction of sign
convention issues remediated as part of regular maintenance, which are to be updated in
accordance with normal database procedures.
(d) Analogue Values, Status Indications and Discrete Values must be transmitted with a data
quality in accordance with the Communication Protocol.
(e) Control Commands must be transmitted in accordance with the Communication Protocol.
(f) Subject to paragraph (g), quality of data indicators (multi-state data quality flags) must be
transmitted with each data point and must indicate:
(i) whether there is a sustained communication failure (lasting 30 seconds or more)
between an Intervening Facility and RME; and
(ii) whether a value has been overridden at any RME or Intervening Facility,

6
Excludes High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specifically applied under section 7.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

and if no conditions described in (i) or (ii) apply then the data quality flag(s) must indicate
that the data is of good quality.
(g) In respect of data from an RME device installed prior to 7 September 2022 that does not
support the use of data quality flags, the DCP must artificially set the quality flag to good.

2.3. Age of data

2.3.1. General requirements

(a) Subject to section 2.3.2, Operational Data must be available for transmission to AEMO in
response to a Poll within the time intervals specified in Table 2. The time interval is
measured from the instant the data first gets converted to digital form and includes any
time within an Intervening Facility.

Table 2 End to end time for data transmission to AEMO

Category Data Type Maximum Time Interval (seconds)

High Resolution Data7 Analogue Value 2

Dispatch Data Status Indication 3

Analogue Value 6

Discrete Value 6

System Security Primary Data Status Indication 3

Analogue Value 14

Discrete Value 14

System Security Secondary Data Status Indication 12

Analogue Value 22

Discrete Value 22

(b) A Status Indication is considered converted to digital form when the digital signal
representing it is carried by circuits that are not used solely for that Status Indication.
(c) Status Indications and Discrete Values do not have to be re-transmitted for up to 5
minutes if the relevant data has not changed since the last transmission.
(d) Analogue Values do not have to be re-transmitted for up to 5 minutes if the relevant data
has not changed by the relevant deadband amount shown in Table 3.

Table 3 Deadband for transmission of analogue values

Category of Analogue Value Deadband (% of Scale Range)

Dispatch Data and High Resolution Data8 0.2

System Security Primary Data 0.5

System Security Secondary Data 0.5

7
Excludes High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specifically applied under section 7.
8
Excludes High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specifically applied under section 7.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

(e) An Intervening Facility must respond to Polls once per second with the relevant data.

2.3.2. Limited exceptions

(a) A DCP may request AEMO to approve an extended maximum time interval for end-to-
end transmission than is specified in Table 2, in respect of Status Indications for:
(i) Dispatch Data; or
(ii) System Security Primary Data.
(b) AEMO may grant or refuse the request at its discretion or subject to conditions, and will
have regard to:
(i) the significance of the type of Status Indication for the reliable operation of
AEMO’s state estimator application; and
(ii) whether it is reasonably practicable for the DCP to achieve the time specified in
Table 2 for the relevant Status Indication,
and the DCP must provide information reasonably required by AEMO to consider the
DCP’s request.
(c) Subject to any applicable conditions of approval, if AEMO approves a request under this
section the DCP must meet a maximum time interval for transmission of the relevant
Status Indications of:
(i) 7 seconds in respect of Dispatch Data; or
(ii) 9 seconds in respect of System Security Primary Data.

2.4. Control command delay

DCPs must relay Control Commands such that commands from AEMO co-ordinating centres to
RCE or responses from RCE to AEMO co-ordinating centres will not have a delay of more than
2 seconds.

2.5. Data accuracy

(a) All Analogue Values received at AEMO co-ordinating centres and transmitted from data
points that come into service on or after 1 January 2024 must be accurate within a
tolerance set out in Table 3A below. The absolute value of the difference between the
measured value and the True Value is not to exceed the amount determined under the
table for the relevant category of Operational Data.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

Table 3A Data accuracy tolerance

Data Category True Value less than 25% True Value 25-80% of True Value greater than
of Scale Range Scale Range 80% of Scale Range

High Resolution Data9 0.25% of Scale Range 1 % of true value 1% of Scale Range
Dispatch Data 0.25% of Scale Range 1 % of true value 1% of Scale Range
System Security Primary 0.5% of Scale Range 2% of true value 2% of Scale Range
Data

System Security 1.25% of Scale Range 5% of true value 5% of Scale Range

Secondary Data

(a) For data points in service prior to 1 January 2024:

(i) by 31 January 2024, the relevant DCP must advise AEMO of the current accuracy
of those data points10; and
(ii) if AEMO identifies that the inaccuracy of a particular data point is causing or
materially contributing to operational issues impacting the reliability of the state
estimator application, AEMO may request the relevant DCP to meet the accuracy
requirement in paragraph (a), and the DCP must comply with that request by the
date that is six months after the date of the request or any later date for
compliance determined under the process described in paragraph (c).
(b) If AEMO makes a request under paragraph (b)(ii), the following process applies:
(i) The relevant DCP and AEMO must use reasonable endeavours to agree an
implementation plan within one month of the request date or such longer period as
AEMO reasonably allows, and for this purpose the relevant DCP must promptly
provide AEMO with the information it reasonably requests about the nature and
cost of meeting the relevant accuracy requirement, the timeframes in which this
can be completed, resourcing requirements and limitations, and any dependencies
on third parties or (where the cost is material) regulatory approval.
(ii) The implementation plan must describe the work to be undertaken and a schedule
for completing it, including any interim milestones and the date for compliance,
having regard to:
(A) the likely implications of not meeting the increased requirement for AEMO’s
market and power system security functions;
(B) the work required to address the issue by all relevant parties (including other
DCPs or Registered Participants if applicable); and
(C) the relevant DCP’s reasonable cost and resourcing constraints.
(iii) The relevant DCP is expected to work diligently to achieve the transition plan,
including interim milestones, and must report on progress:
(A) on completion of any interim milestone; and
(B) if it appears to the DCP that the date for compliance is unlikely to be met.

9
Excludes High Resolution Data from PMUs and HSMs unless specifically applied under section 7
10
If AEMO has specified a format for the provision of this advice, the DCP should provide its advice in that format.

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Power System Data Communication Standard

(iv) If it appears to AEMO or the relevant DCP that the transition plan is not being met,
either of them can request negotiation of suitable amendments to meet the
increased requirement, and both are expected to negotiate in good faith.

3. Reliability
The purpose of this section is to ensure the reliability of data transmitted to AEMO.

3.1. Reliability requirements

(a) For the RME or RCE relating to any given plant or aggregation of plant for which
Operational Data11 must be transmitted to or from an AEMO co-ordinating centre:
(i) the total aggregate duration of Critical Outages in any rolling 12-month period; and
(ii) the duration of any individual Critical Outage,
must not exceed the relevant limit indicated in Table 4.
(b) For an Intervening Facility:
(i) the total aggregate duration of Critical Outages of an Intervening Facility over a
rolling 12-month period; and
(ii) the duration of any individual Critical Outage,
must not exceed the relevant limit indicated in Table 5.
(c) An Intervening Facility must have back-up power supplies sufficient to sustain operation
for at least 10 hours following loss of external AC (alternating current) supply, unless
AEMO approves a shorter period for a specified Non-NSP Intervening Facility.
(d) AEMO will actively monitor and report on the performance of Intervening Facilities
against the Critical Outage limits.
(e) If, in any rolling 12-month period, the total aggregate duration of Critical Outages for a
DCF exceeds a relevant limit indicated in Tables 4 and 5, the responsible DCP and the
DCP for any relevant connecting DCF must jointly take reasonable corrective action to
bring those times within the applicable limits.
(f) A DCP will not be taken to breach the Critical Outage limits to the extent that a Critical
Outage is caused or prolonged by:
(i) Force Majeure; or
(ii) loss of external AC power supply to a network or equipment that lasts longer than
the duration for which the DCP is required to ensure availability of back up power
supplies under this Standard or an applicable performance standard,
provided that the DCP must take any reasonable steps within its control to mitigate the
ongoing impact of the Force Majeure or loss of supply on the extent and duration of the
outage.

11
Excluding High Resolution Data from PMUs or HSMs.

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Table 4 Maximum critical outages for RME and RCE

Category of Operational Data Max aggregate in 12 month period Max per Critical Outage
Dispatch Data where there is no agreed 6 hours 6 hours
substitute data
Dispatch Data where there is agreed 12 hours 12 hours
substitute data
System Security Primary Data and 24 hours 24 hours
System Security Secondary Data

Table 5 Maximum critical outages for intervening facilities over a 12-month period
Category of Operational Data Max aggregate in 12 month period Max per Critical Outage

Dispatch Data 2 hours 30 minutes

System Security Primary Data and 6 hours 1 hour

System Security Secondary Data

3.2. Redundant elements

DCFs must have sufficient redundant elements to reasonably satisfy the reliability requirements
set out in section 3.1, taking into account:
(a) the likely failure rate of their elements;
(b) the likely time to repair of their elements; and
(c) the likely need for planned outages of their elements.

4. Security
The purpose of this section is to ensure that cyber, physical and network security
considerations are appropriately addressed by all parties, including through robust programs
and reporting frameworks to adequately and continuously manage security risks that could
adversely impact power system communications and supporting systems and infrastructure.

4.1. Standard applies in parallel with SOCI Act

(a) All DCPs that are responsible entities for critical infrastructure assets under the SOCI Act
must comply with their obligations under that Act. This Standard does not limit the SOCI
Act obligations in any way.
(b) This Standard may:
(i) extend requirements corresponding with the SOCI Act to DCPs that are not
responsible entities or otherwise subject to the SOCI Act; or
(ii) apply additional requirements to responsible entities in relation to security risks
relating to the transmission of Operational Data.

4.2. Security risk management plans

All DCPs must have in place a risk management program that identifies and manages material
security risks. For these purposes, DCPs should, at a minimum, meet the requirements of

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Security Profile 1 (SP-1) as outlined in the Australian Energy Sector Cyber Security
Framework12 and be able to attest to this requirement being satisfied.

4.3. Security incident reporting

(a) NER 4.8.1 is a broad risk reporting obligation for all Registered Participants, which
covers relevant cyber security risks, as follows:

Registered Participants' advice

A Registered Participant must promptly advise AEMO or a relevant System

Operator at the time that the Registered Participant becomes aware, of any
circumstance which could be expected to adversely affect the secure operation of
the power system or any equipment owned or under the control of the Registered
Participant or a Network Service Provider.
(b) Registered Participants should report identified or potential cyber security incidents under
NER 4.8.1 to AEMO’s Cyber Duty Manager. The conditions and timeframes for reporting
cyber security incidents should be consistent with both NER 4.8.1 and Part 2B of the
SOCI Act.
(c) In accordance with AEMO Policy 020113: Electricity Market Management Systems
Access Policy And Procedure13, Registered Participants must provide and maintain up to
date contact details of a nominated cyber security contact. This contact should be
reachable by AEMO 24/7 to coordinate any critical cyber security matters that may arise.

4.4. Physical security and computer network security

4.4.1. General obligations

DCPs should use reasonable endeavours to:

(a) prevent unauthorised access to DCF sites, and to DCFs and Operational Data, via
computer networks;
(b) prevent unauthorised access to, or use of, AEMO's WAN via computer networks;
(c) prevent the ingress and distribution of malicious software into DCFs or AEMO's WAN;
(d) keep access information, including computer network address information, confidential 14;
(e) consult with AEMO on any matter that could reasonably be expected to adversely impact
the security of DCFs or AEMO's WAN; and
(f) ensure that adequate procedures and training are provided to persons who are
authorised to have access to DCFs and AEMO’s WAN.

12
AESCSH framework and resources available on AEMO’s website at: https://aemo.com.au/initiatives/major-programs/cyber-
security/aescsf-framework-and-resources
13
Made under NER 3.19
14
See NER glossary for definition of confidential information: In relation to a Registered Participant or AEMO, information which is
or has been provided to that Registered Participant or AEMO under or in connection with the Rules and which is stated under
the Rules, or by AEMO, the AER or the AEMC, to be confidential information or is otherwise confidential or commercially
sensitive. It also includes any information which is derived from such information.

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4.4.2. Communications between RME/RCE and Intervening Facilities

(a) The digital communications service between a DCP’s RME/RCE and an Intervening
Facility, where that service is used for the transmission of Dispatch Data or System
Security Primary Data, must be provided by means of:
(i) a Secure Network; and
(ii) A Resilient Network, unless an exemption under section (d)5.1(d) applies to the
relevant Intervening Facility.
(b) DCPs must implement protection of communications with field devices against threats as
outlined in IEC 62351 Power systems management and associated information
exchange – Data and communications security, that:
(i) authenticates communications and implement integrity measures to prevent
message tampering, replay or spoofing, person-in-the-middle and masquerade
attacks; and
(ii) where implementation is operationally and economically feasible, that the
confidentiality of communications is protected using encryption.
(c) Priority should be given to implementing security protections at the application layer, and
should also be implemented at the transport or network layer as an additional layer of
defence or when it is infeasible to implement at the application layer.
(d) The protocols and algorithms used by these security protections should preference
recommendations for approved protocols and algorithms from the Australian Signals
Directorate’s Guidelines for Cryptography15.

5. Interfacing
The purpose of this section is to ensure appropriate interfaces between Intervening Facilities
and AEMO systems.

5.1. Physical and logical interfaces with AEMO co-ordinating

centres
(a) Where AEMO agrees to extend its WAN to an Intervening Facility, the relevant DCP must
establish a physical connection to an AEMO-designated port on an AEMO router for each
AEMO co-ordinating centre, and it must use Ethernet and TCP/IP protocols.
(b) Where AEMO agrees that a DCP may establish a logical connection between its
Intervening Facility and AEMO's WAN, the DCP must do so by engaging a
Telecommunications Carrier to provide a digital communications service between the
DCP's Intervening Facility and an AEMO-designated network access facility. The
communications service must be provided by means of:
(i) a Secure Network; and

15
Information Security Manual, Guidelines for Cryptography, published 16 June 2022 and as amended from time to time.
Downloadable from: https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advice/guidelines-cryptography

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(ii) a Resilient Network, unless specifically agreed under paragraph (d).

(c) To ensure resilience in Operational Data communications, all Intervening Facilities must
establish a physical or logical connection to both AEMO co-ordinating centres unless
another connection configuration is established for a DNSP Intervening Facility under
section 1.4.1.
(d) A DCP wishing to establish a connection to AEMO’s WAN from a Non-NSP Intervening
Facility may request AEMO to exempt it from the requirement to provide a Resilient
Network and instead utilise a public internet service to provide a Secure Network. AEMO
may grant or refuse the request at its discretion, and will have regard to:
(i) the capacity and operation of the related plant;
(ii) the quantities and significance of Operational Data to be transmitted;
(iii) the aggregate capacity of plant in the same region for which Operational Data is
transmitted via public internet; and
(iv) any other factors AEMO considers relevant.
AEMO may publish guidance from time to time on how AEMO applies these
considerations.

5.2. Communication protocols

5.2.1. NSP Intervening Facilities

The Communication Protocol to be used for any communication of Operational Data (other than
High Resolution Data from PMUs or HSMs) through a physical or logical interface between an
NSP Intervening Facility and an AEMO co-ordinating centre is ICCP IEC60870-6 TASE.2 and
its extensions (secure ICCP).

5.2.2. Non-NSP Intervening Facilities

(a) The Communication Protocol to be used for any communication of Operational Data
(other than High Resolution Data from PMUs or HSMs) through a physical or logical
interface between a Non-NSP Intervening Facility and an AEMO co-ordinating centre is
either:
(i) ICCP IEC60870-6 TASE.2 and its extensions (secure ICCP); or
(ii) where the Intervening Facility equipment is not suitable for secure ICCP, an
alternative secure protocol supported by AEMO as specified under paragraph (b).
(b) Alternative secure protocols are:
(i) from a date determined by AEMO and published on its website16, DNP3; or
(ii) another secure protocol specified by AEMO on its website from time to time for use
for Non-NSP Intervening Facilities,

16 https://aemo.com.au/energy-systems/market-it-systems/electricity-system-guides/power-systems

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and the configuration of any alternative protocol must be consistent with

recommendations for approved protocols and algorithms from the Australian Signals
Directorate’s Guidelines for Cryptography.

6. Maintenance, planning and testing

The purpose of this section is to minimise the impact of outages of DCFs on central dispatch or
power system security.

6.1. Governance and reporting on availability

(a) AEMO will at regular intervals make available a report on the availability and
performance of Intervening Facilities, including:
(i) link up time to AEMO co-ordinating centres; and
(ii) data quality measures,
and for the purposes of this reporting a DCP must provide information about its DCFs
reasonably requested by AEMO within a reasonable timeframe.
(b) The DCP for each Intervening Facility must maintain current phone and email contacts
for communicating outages and data issues.
(c) Routine maintenance activities affecting the transmission of data are to be communicated
via email contact at the start and finish of each activity.

6.2. Response to failures

In response to a DCF failure, including a failure to transmit Operational Data17 in accordance
with the requirements of this Standard, a DCP must:
(a) rectify the DCF promptly, and as far as practicable to ensure Critical Outages do not
exceed the limits specified in Tables 4 and 5 in section 3;
(b) in respect of inaccurate Operational Data measurements, rectify the inaccuracy within 30
days after the DCP becomes aware of it;
(c) inform AEMO18 of the progress of related rectification works, if a failure is causing a
Critical Outage or in relation to data inaccuracy; and
(d) consult with AEMO about the priority of related rectification works, if a failure is causing
or likely to cause a Critical Outage; and
(e) provide reasonable assistance to other DCPs in responding to DCF failures.

6.3. Planned outage co-ordination

(a) A DCP must give AEMO 5 business days’ notice, subject to paragraph (d), of a planned
outage of any of its DCFs affecting, or likely to affect:

17
Excludes High Resolution Data from PMUs or HSMs unless specifically applied under section 7.
18
By telephone to an AEMO co-ordinating centre.

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(i) Dispatch Data or High Resolution Data; or

(ii) the majority of System Security Primary Data or System Security Secondary Data
transmitted by the DCF.
(b) If 5 business days’ notice cannot be given, subject to paragraph (d), AEMO may defer
the outage.
(c) AEMO may defer or cancel outages and require DCFs on outage to be returned to
service if AEMO considers that a planned outage would:
(i) adversely affect power system security;
(ii) occur when power system security is adversely affected by other events; or
(iii) occur when AEMO has issued, or is likely to issue, a lack of reserve notice.
(d) If plant related to the DCF is out of service at that time, and will not return to service while
the DCF is out of service, the outage notice may be reduced to 24 hours.

6.4. Data management and co-ordination

(a) DCPs must keep AEMO informed of planned and unplanned changes to Status
Indications, Discrete Values and Analogue Values transmitted to AEMO and Control
Commands received from AEMO.
(b) DCPs must notify AEMO of planned changes to DCFs, subject to paragraph (c), with
sufficient details to allow AEMO to implement the corresponding changes to its own
control centre facilities. AEMO must be notified:
(i) at least 15 business days before the planned implementation date for a minor
augmentation of an existing DCF; and
(ii) at least 30 business days before the planned implementation date for a new DCF
or major augmentation of an existing DCF.
(c) The periods of 15 and 30 business days in paragraph (b) may be reduced by agreement
between the DCP and AEMO if the DCP:
(i) includes AEMO's corresponding implementation tasks in its project schedules, with
task durations agreed with AEMO; and
(ii) provides the major part of the detailed information in an electronic format suitable
for AEMO to automatically populate its relevant databases.
(d) For an unplanned change to DCFs the DCP must:
(i) promptly notify AEMO before the change is implemented;
(ii) coordinate with AEMO by phone before the change is implemented; and
(iii) confirm the change in writing within 14 days of the change.
(e) An augmentation is taken as implemented when the relevant primary plant is first
electrically connected to the power system, or when the relevant secondary plant is
commissioned.
(f) Unless AEMO agrees otherwise, a major augmentation includes the installation of:

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(i) a busbar, transmission line or transformer intended to operate at more than 100
kV; and
(ii) a scheduled generating unit, semi-scheduled generating unit, scheduled network
service or scheduled load.
(g) A minor augmentation is any other project.
(h) A planned change is one that could reasonably have been foreseen in sufficient time to
give prior written notice under paragraph (b).

6.5. Testing to confirm compliance

(a) A DCP installing, upgrading or replacing RME or RCE must test a representative sample
of each category of Operational Data transmitted from or to that RME or RCE. These
tests must:
(i) confirm that each sample of Operational Data is correctly identified;
(ii) determine at least 5 measurements (not synchronous with scanning of the data)
within a single period of at least 5 minutes;
(iii) verify compliance with each applicable requirement in section 2; and
(iv) identify any issues requiring remediation.
(b) A test under paragraph (a) must be carried out either prior to, or within 60 business days
after, the relevant RME or RCE is placed into service, and otherwise in accordance with
any applicable performance standard compliance assessment or test plan under Chapter
5 of the NER.
(c) Prior to a test, the DCP installing, upgrading or replacing the RME or RCE must:
(i) coordinate with the provider(s) of Intervening Facility(ies) relaying the Operational
Data to be tested;
(ii) prepare and provide to AEMO the test procedure;
(iii) amend the test procedure if AEMO reasonably considers it inadequate to assess
compliance; and
(iv) consult and agree with AEMO with regards to the RME or RCE and the associated
Operational Data to be tested.
(d) A DCP that provides an Intervening Facility for another DCP must cooperate with that
DCP and AEMO in planning and conducting the tests.
(e) The DCP providing the RME or RCE must submit a report to AEMO within a reasonable
time after the test. The report must summarise the results of the test and any remedial
action necessary as identified in paragraph (a).

7. Near real time data from PMU and HSM devices

Where AEMO requires High Resolution Data to be transmitted to AEMO co-ordinating centres
from a PMU or HSM, the minimum requirements to apply to that data for the purposes of this
Standard will be:

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(a) specified in a notice issued to the relevant Registered Participant under NER 4.11.1(d),
as may be subsequently amended by agreement between AEMO and the Registered
Participant; or
(b) recorded in an operational protocol, procedure or similar document agreed or approved
by AEMO and the relevant Registered Participant.
Unless otherwise specified, those requirements will apply in addition to any provisions in this
Standard that are apply to the transmission of High Resolution data from PMU and HSM
devices, as indicated in section 1.7.

8. Management of non-compliance
The purpose of this section is to provide information relevant to the reporting and remediation of
non-compliances with this Standard, consistent with the NER.

8.1. Consequences of non-compliance

Compliance by a DCP with this Standard is a requirement of NER 4.11 and, to the extent
incorporated in a performance standard, NER 4.15. Failure to comply, or remedy a non-
compliance, with a requirement of the Standard could result in a range of potential
consequences for a DCP under the NER, including:
(a) enforcement action by the AER;
(b) in relation to a new facility, a determination by AEMO not to approve an application for
registration;
(c) restrictions on output of generating systems; or
(d) incorrect inputs to dispatch targets and incorrect measurement of ancillary services.
Compliance by one DCP may rely on the combined efforts of multiple DCPs, who are each
expected to perform their obligations in accordance with section 1.6.

8.2. Reporting and remediation

(a) DCPs required to comply with this Standard for the purpose of a performance standard
are expected to observe the requirements of NER 4.15 in respect of the monitoring,
assurance, reporting and remediation of any failure of a DCF to meet the Standard
requirements.
(b) All DCPs are expected to observe any applicable reporting requirements established
under NER 8.7.2.

9. Transitional arrangements for 2023 Standard

Update
This section provides a mechanism by which DCPs can have additional time to implement any
changes to their existing DCFs and related systems, that are necessary to meet any increased
requirements introduced in version 3.0 of the Standard (effective from 3 April 2023).

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Power System Data Communication Standard

9.1. Definitions, application and maximum timeframes

(a) In this section 9:
effective date means 3 April 2023.
increased requirement means a requirement introduced or amended in section 2 of
version 3.0 of this Standard that is applicable to a DCF established prior to 7 September
2022 and is a new or more onerous requirement than any corresponding requirement
that applied to the DCF under the old Standard. An increased requirement excludes a
requirement that the DCF is obliged to meet under a separate legal requirement (not
implemented through the Standard).
implementation changes means the work, upgrades or other changes to a DCF or
related systems that are necessary to meet an increased requirement.
old Standard means the version of the Standard in effect immediately prior to the
effective date.
relevant DCP means the DCP that has given an advice to AEMO under paragraph (b) in
respect of one or more of its DCFs.
transition date means the date agreed for the DCF to achieve compliance with an
increased requirement as agreed or amended under section 9.2, which must not be later
than:
(i) for a TNSP or a DNSP, 12 months after the start of the first regulatory control
period for which the AER made a final distribution determination or transmission
determination (as applicable) after the effective date; or
(ii) for any other DCP, 2 years after the effective date or, if compliance with the
increased requirement depends on implementation of changes by an NSP, 12
months after implementation of those changes.
transition plan means the plan approved for completing and commissioning the
implementation changes by the transition date, as approved and amended under section
9.2.
(b) This section applies to a DCP in respect of a DCF if, prior to the effective date, the DCP
has advised AEMO in writing that it is not reasonably able to comply with an increased
requirement in respect of a DCF by the effective date, and the reasons why.

9.2. Transition plan

(a) A relevant DCP and AEMO must use reasonable endeavours to agree a transition plan
within 3 months after the effective date or such longer period as AEMO reasonably
allows, and for this purpose the relevant DCP must promptly provide AEMO with the
information it reasonably requests about the nature and cost of proposed implementation
changes, the timeframes in which they can be completed, resourcing requirements and
limitations, and any dependencies on third parties or (where the cost is material)
regulatory approval.
(b) A transition plan must describe the implementation changes and set out a schedule for
completing them, including any interim milestones and the transition date. The schedule
must be set with regard to:

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(i) the likely implications of not meeting the increased requirement for AEMO’s market
and power system security functions;
(ii) the work required to address the issue by all relevant parties (including other DCPs
or Registered Participants if applicable); and
(iii) the relevant DCP’s reasonable cost and resourcing constraints.
(c) The relevant DCP is expected to work diligently to achieve the transition plan, including
interim milestones, and must report on progress:
(i) on completion of any interim milestone;
(ii) when it appears to the DCP that a target date in the transition plan is unlikely to be
met; and
(iii) otherwise, at least every 6 months unless AEMO otherwise agrees.
(d) If it appears to AEMO or the relevant DCP that the transition plan is not being met, either
of them can request negotiation of suitable amendments to meet the increased
requirement, provided that the transition date must not be later than defined in section
9.1(a).
(e) AEMO and the relevant DCP are expected to negotiate in good faith in respect of any
amendments requested under paragraph (d).

9.3. Deemed compliance between effective date and transition

date
(a) A relevant DCP is taken to be compliant with an increased requirement in respect of its
relevant DCF between the effective date and the transition date, if and for as long as the
following conditions are satisfied:
(i) all requirements applicable to the DCF under the old Standard are being met;
(ii) the relevant DCP is actively working in a timely manner to establish, implement or
negotiate amendments to the transition plan in accordance with section 9.2.
(b) If AEMO considers that those conditions are not being met, AEMO may notify the
relevant DCP and the AER that the relevant DCP is considered non-compliant with the
increased requirement. Where compliance with the increased requirement is part of a
performance standard, NER 4.15 will apply to the non-compliance.

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Version release history

Version Effective date Summary of changes
3.0 3 April 2023 Revised following complete review
2.0 1 December 2017 Updated following review of the standard
1.2 7 April 2005 Revised to make consistent with National Electricity Rules
1.1 24 June 2004 Revised to correct a typographical error in the definition of data concentrator
1.0 1 January 2004

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