Eminent Domain Case Digest

EMINENT DOMAIN
1. PLDT, petitioner vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COM., respondent 2
2. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA & POBRE, respondent 4
3. LAGCAO, petitioner vs. LABRA, respondent 6
4. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. CASTELLVI, et al., respondent 8
5. DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent 10
6. MODAY, petitioner vs. CA, respondent 12
7. NATIONAL POWER CORP, petitioner vs. DE LA CRUZ, respondent 14
8. ESLABAN, petitioner vs. DE ONORIO, respondent 16
9. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HENSON, respondent 18
10. CITY OF CEBU, petitioner vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO & DEDAMO, respondent 19
11. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. VICENTE LIM, respondent 21
12. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN, respondent 23
13. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner vs. FRANCISCO, respondent 25
14. MCIAA & AIR TRANSPO OFFICE, petitioner vs. LOZADA,, respondent 27
15. REYES, petitioner vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent 29
16. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. SALEM, respondent 31
17. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. SPS CAMPOS, respondent 34
Page 1 of 35
[G.R. No. 88404 October 18, 1990]
1. PLDT, petitioner vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COM., respondent
FA C T S
- Private respondent Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI) obtained from Congress
Republic Act No. 2090 a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic
telecommunications. Petitioner PLDT invoked the “prior operator” or “protection of
investment” doctrine in its opposition to ETCI’s subsequent application for Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN). The National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) granted provisional authority to ETCI subject to the condition that it shall enter into
“interconnection agreement” with PLDT. PLDT elevated the case to the Supreme Court
pointing out ETCI’s defective legislative franchise to operate telecommunications system,
among others. ETCI contends that PLDT’s special civil action must deal only on issues
whether the NTC acted without jurisdiction of with grave abuse of discretion in granting ETCI
the assailed provisional authority.
- After evaluating the consideration sought by the PLDT, the NTC, maintained its ruling that
liberally construed, applicant’s franchise carries with it the privilege to operate and maintain
a cellular mobile telephone service.Subsequently, PLDT alleged essentially that the
interconnection ordered was in violation of due process and that the grant of provisional
authority was jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm. However, NTC denied there
consideration
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (PLDT – Lost)
- Petitioner assails two (2) orders of public respondent National Telecommunications Commission
granting private respondent Express Telecommunications (ETCI) provisional authority to install,
operate andmaintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System in Metro Manila now ETCI inaccordance
with specific conditions on the following grounds:
(1) ETCI is not capacitated or qualified under its legislative franchise to operate a systemwide
telephone or network of telephone service such as the one proposed in its application;
(2) ETCI lacks the facilities needed and indispensable to the successful operation of the
proposed cellular mobile telephone system;
(3) PLDT has itself a pending application with NTC, Case No. 86-86, to install and operate a
Cellular Mobile Telephone System for domestic and international service not only in Manila
but also in the provinces and that under the "prior operator" or "protection of investment"
doctrine, PLDT has the priority or preference in the operation of such service; and
(4) the provisional authority, if granted, will result in needless, uneconomical and
harmful duplication, among others.
- Appealed to SC the decision of Respondent NTC
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (NTC and ETCI - Win)
- Respondent ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC (docketed as NTC
Case No. 87-89) for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System and an Alpha Numeric Paging System in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon
regions, with a prayer for provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal within
Metro Manila.
- Respondent NTC granted such application
ISSUE
- W/N Respondent NTC can grant to Respondent ETCI a CPCN to construct, install, establish,
operate and maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone System and an Alpha Numeric Paging
System
HELD
CONCLUSION: Respondent NTC can grant. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- There can be no question that the NTC is the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with
authority and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC
may, on its own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of a motion from an
applicant
Page 2 of 35
- The decisive consideration are public need, public interest, and the common good. Those
were the overriding factors which motivated NTC in granting provisional authority to ETCI.
Article II, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation building. It is likewise a State policy to provide the environment
for the emergence of communications structures suitable to the balanced flow of
information into, out of, and across the country (Article XVI, Section 10, Ibid.). A modern
and dependable communications network rendering efficient and reasonably priced
services is also indispensable for accelerated economic recovery and development. To
these public and national interests, public utility companies must bow and yield.
- Free competition in the industry may also provide the answer to a much-desired
improvement in the quality and delivery of this type of public utility, to improved
technology, fast and handy mobile service, and reduced user dissatisfaction. After all,
neither PLDT nor any other public utility has a constitutional right to a monopoly position in
view of the Constitutional proscription that no franchise certificate or authorization shall be
exclusive in character or shall last longer than fifty (50) years (ibid., Section 11; Article XIV
Section 5, 1973 Constitution; Article XIV, Section 8, 1935 Constitution). Additionally, the
State is empowered to decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be
regulated or prohibited (1987 Constitution. Article XII, Section 19).
- Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly FACI) "the right and privilege of constructing,
installing, establishing and operating in the entire Philippines radio stations for reception
and transmission of messages on radio stations in the foreign and domestic public fixed
point-to-point and public base, aeronautical and land mobile stations, ... with the
corresponding relay stations for the reception and transmission of wireless messages on
radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony ...."
APPLICATION:
- In this case, PLDT maintains that the scope of the franchise is limited to "radio stations"
and excludes telephone services such as the establishment of the proposed Cellular
Mobile Telephone System (CMTS). However, in its Order of 12 November 1987, the NTC
construed the technical term "radiotelephony" liberally as to include the operation of a
cellular mobile telephone system
- The foregoing is the construction given by an administrative agency possessed of the
necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience and deserves great weight and
respect (Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, et al., L-19337,
September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617). It can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law (Tupas Local Chapter No. 979 v. NLRC, et al., L-60532-33,
November 5, 1985, 139 SCRA 478). We discern none of those considerations sufficient to
warrant judicial intervention
Page 3 of 35
[G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004]
2. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA & POBRE, respondent
EMINENT DOMAIN — Whether or not Petitioner had deemed taken the 68,969 square-meter
property of Respondent and not only the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property
FA C T S
- Antonio Pobre owns 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano,
Municipality of Tiwi, Albay which he developed into a resort-subdivision, Tiwi Hot Spring
Resorts Subdivision. When theCommission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral
water and steam, which were suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or
industrial use, were present beneath the Property,National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR),
began initiating two expropriation complaints on the said Property. The first expropriation
complaint was granted by the court. During its pendency however, NPC began drilling
operations and construction of steam wells. Said procedures produced waste materials
which NPC dumped beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste
materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on
Pobre’s complaints and NPC continued with its dumping. In the meantime, the second
appropriation proceedings was filed by NPC to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of
theProperty. Disturbed by what NPC did with his property, Pobre filed a complaint for
damages. Surprisingly, Napocor withdrew its complaint for expropriation by filing a motion to
dismiss, five years after filing the second expropriation complaint, on the ground that NPC
had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within
the Property due to Pobre's opposition. The trial court granted NPC’s motion dismiss but
allowed Pobre to proceed with his complaint for damages. Despite the opposition of NPC,
the trial court ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered NPC to payP3,448,450.00 as damages. On
appeal, theCA affirmed the assailed decision. Hence the present appeal. NPC argued that
the complaint for damages filed by Pobre should bed ismissed because of the dismissal of
the second expropriation proceedings.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (NPC – Lost)
- Argued that they had not taken the 68,969 square-meter property of Respondent but only
the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property. In fact, they have desisted in pursuing
further expropriation
- Appealed to SC the decision of CA
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (CA and Pobre - Win)
- Filed a case for damages against Petitioner
- Argued that his expropriated property was constructed with steam wells and geothermal
plants by Petitioner and dumped waste materials on it which altered the topography of
some portions of his other properties making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision.
- CA promulgated a decision that Petitioner NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-
meter portion of his property but also the remaining area of the 68,969 square-meter
property. Petitioner NPC had rendered Pobre's entire Property useless as a resort-
subdivision. Petitioner NPC must therefore take Respondent Pobre's entire property and
pay for P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450 for Respondent Pobre's 68,969
square-meter property
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner had deemed taken the 68,969 square-meter property of
Respondent and not only the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of his property
HELD
- CONCLUSION: Petitioner had deemed it taken. Petitioner should pay P3,448,450 as just
compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter with legal
interest at 6% per annum. The appeal is dismissed
- RULE: Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the
expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned
over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the
only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just
compensation.
Page 4 of 35
- In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without
expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner
may demand payment of just compensation.45 This principle is in accord with the
constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation
APPLICATION:
- In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and
practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable
as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC.
Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969
square-meter Property.
- In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation proceedings.
NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute
expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the
second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just
compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
- NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre's claim
for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided
for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the
expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case,
the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all
damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case.35 The dismissal of the
complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's
right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.36 The trial court in this case
reserved Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become
final due to NPC's own fault.
Page 5 of 35
[G.R. No. 155746 October 13, 2004]
3. LAGCAO, petitioner vs. LABRA, respondent
FA C T S
- The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots,including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to
annulthe sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to
sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
- The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the
final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
- After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against
the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the
lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and
order of demolition.
- However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for
petitioners,during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA
7279.
- Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for
being unconstitutional.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Lagcao, et al. – Win)
- Argued that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of
their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.8 They allege that it will benefit
only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed
for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Hon. Labra and City of Cebu - Lost)
- Passed a resolution and Ordinance No. 1843 that identified Lot 1029, which was
registered in the name of petitioners, as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279
and initiated expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of the same
- CA promulgated a decision in their favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Ordinance No. 1843 of Respondent is unconstitutional and an invalid
exercise of the power of eminent domain
HELD
CONCLUSION: Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional. The petition is granted
RULE: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature.11 By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred
upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted
pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
- The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character.17 Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose which private property should be expropriated
Page 6 of 35
- RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban
land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall
be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which
have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not
yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
- For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive
nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable
APPLICATION:
- In this case, Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was
enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-
income residents of the City. However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most
serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
- There was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance
No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the
random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters
is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This is
depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to
the public.
- We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’
property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA
7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section
10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843,
there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’ property as required by
Section 19 of RA 7160.20 We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm
for being violative of the petitioners’ right to due process
- Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear
case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is constrained to
nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
• first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
• second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression
masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
• third, the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
• fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end
sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective
fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Page 7 of 35
[G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974]
4. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. CASTELLVI, et al., respondent
EMINENT DOMAIN — Whether or not the taking should be reckoned from the year 1947, not
1959, for purposes of assessing the just compensation
FA C T S
- After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959.
During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun.
The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and
occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Republic – Lost)
- Expropriated a parcel of land from Defendant-Appellees
- Argued that the just compensation should be less than P10 per square meter because the
"taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947, not 1959, when by virtue of a special
lease agreement between the Republic and Defendant-Appellee Castellvi, the former was
granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the
lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should
be as of the time of occupancy
- Appealed to SC the decision of the lower court
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Castellvi - Win)
- Lower court fixed the just compensation at P10 per square meter which is assessed as of
the time of taking which is during the filing of the expropriation proceedings by Plaintiff-
Appellant on 1959
- Taking of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action
ISSUE
- Whether or not the taking should be reckoned from the year 1947, not 1959, for purposes of
assessing the just compensation
HELD
- CONCLUSION: Taking should be reckoned from the year 1959. However, the just
compensation is set at fixed at P5.00 per square meter
RULE:
- The essential elements of the taking are:
(1) Expropriator must enter a private property,
(2) Entry must be more than a momentary period,
(3) Must be under warrant of legal authority,
(4) Property must be devoted for public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as
(5) The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
- Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present, therefore the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee.
- First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the
instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
possession of the property of Castellvi.
- Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
"Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English
Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
Page 8 of 35
operative or recurring at every moment." The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry
into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year
by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as
at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP.
- Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the
Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee
- Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted
to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP
- Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of
the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as
owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal
of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated.
Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the
Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until
the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, it is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of
Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner
was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
- It is Our considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of
the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In
arriving at this conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration the resolution of the
Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others,
that in the year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square
meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square
meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to this expropriations
proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated the Court
arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by the commissioners and
approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken
judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down
since the year 1959. 30 Considering that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are
adjoining each other, and are of the same nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the
same price for all these lands.
Page 9 of 35
[G.R. Nos. L-71998-99 June 2, 1993]
5. DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent
FA C T S
- Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area:
19,061 sq m)
- Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo
Cadiente, a private contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9
meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land
- Aside from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also
constructed, occupying an area of 2,906 sq m of their property
- Constructed in a zigzag manner, the creak meandered through their property
- Petitioners files two cases which were later consolidated
- Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several grounds, including that both
cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be maintained without the
State's consent
- The lower court dismissed the petition; petitioners elevated the case to the SC on certiorari,
which referred the cases back to the IAC
- IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the State
without consent
- Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Delos Santos and Spouses Padilla – Win)
- Filed a case for damages and injunction against Respondent, a private contractor and the
Provincial Engineer of Rizal, for constructing a road nine (9) meters wide and one hundred
twenty-eight meters and seventy centimeters (128.70) long occupying a total area of one
thousand one hundred sixty-five (1,165) square meters of their land
- Argued that aside from the road, the said respondents also constructed, without their
knowledge and consent, an artificial creek twenty three meters and twenty centimeters
(23.20) wide and one hundred twenty-eight meters and sixty-nine centimeters long
(128.69) occupying an area of two thousand nine hundred six (2,906) square meters of
their property. Constructed in a zig-zag manner, the creek meandered through their
property.
- Argued that it completed, the road and the creek would "serve no public profitable and
practicable purpose but for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage and
prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the same petitioners invoked their rights
under Art. IV Secs. 1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution and prayed for
the issuance of restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the construction.
They also prayed that after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered: (1) declaring
illegal the construction of the road and artificial creek which was made without their
knowledge and consent, "without due process and without just compensation and in
violation of the provision of statute law and of the Philippine Constitution;" (2) issuing a
permanent prohibition; (3) ordering respondents to pay petitioners "jointly and collectively"
P15,00.00 as attorney's fees and P600.00 for each appearance, and (4) ordering the
respondents to pay the costs of the suit.
- Appealed to SC the decision of IAC
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (IAC and Cadiente - Lost)
- Argued that he is not liable under the ground of State immunity
- IAC promulgated a decision in his favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Respondent is liable to Petitioner despite the defense of State immunity
HELD
CONCLUSION: Respondent is liable. The lower court is ordered to hear the merits of the case.
The appeal is granted
P a g e 10 o f 3 5
RULE:
- The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and
only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the
judgment. If there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in
the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the officialdom
if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government
takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit
could still be appropriately invoked
- It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet,
even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken in
expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit
cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner.
APPLICATION:
- The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an
action for payment by the owner
- The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners'
property for public use; no expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the
construction of the projects
- Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the
land to be reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking
P a g e 11 o f 3 5
[G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997]
6. MODAY, petitioner vs. CA, respondent
FA C T S
- The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passedResolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway
Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approved by Mayor Anuncio Bustillo and was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.
- The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The municipality filed a petition for
eminent domain against Percival Moday before theRTC.
- The municipality then filed a motion to take or enter upon the possession of the land upon
deposit with the municipal treasurer of the required amount. The RTC granted the motion. It
ruled that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it
effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the
ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P.
Blg.337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of
the acts enumerated in Section 19 requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
- Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. Meanwhile, the Municipality had
erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC)
Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal
Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
- In the instant petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution
of the CA and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null
and void
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Moday, et al. – Lost)
- Argued that the Resolution by Respondent is invalid for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
establishment of the government center.”
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (CA, Agusan Del Sur, and Municipality of Bunawan – Win)
- Passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Petitioner Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and
Other Government Sports Facilities.”
- Filed an expropriation case against Petitioner
- CA promulgated a decision in its favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not the expropriation by Respondent of Petitioner’s land is invalid for the
Resolution of the former was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
HELD
CONCLUSION: The expropriation by Respondent is valid. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
Page 12 of 35
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking
must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
- The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local
Government Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9
of said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent
domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the
power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue
- The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding.
- Velazco v. Blas: The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or
order is "beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president making the same."
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the
provincial board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The
provincial disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised
specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of
the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the
legislative function of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent
course of executive authority.
- As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Moday incurred the ire
of then Mayor Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor Bustillo used the
expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties
belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that
the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land,
evidenced by a sketch plan.
- The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of
the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
P a g e 13 o f 3 5
[G.R. No. 156093 February 2, 2007]
7. NATIONAL POWER CORP, petitioner vs. DE LA CRUZ, respondent
FA C T S
- NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right-of-way over portions of land within the
areas of Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and maintenance of the proposed
Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project.
- On November 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for eminent domain and expropriation
of an easement of right-of-way against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of
land sought to be expropriated.
- After respondents filed their respective answers to petitioner’s Complaint, petitioner
deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value of the land in accordance with Section
2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.5 Then, on February 25, 1999, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court granted in its
March 9, 1999 Order. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession over the lots owned by
respondents spouses de la Cruz and respondent Ferrer on March 10, 1999 and April 12,
1999, respectively.
- However, the trial court dropped the Dela Cruz spouses and their mortgagee, Metrobank, as
parties-defendants in its May 11, 1999 Order,6 in view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed ownership of the land sought to be
expropriated from respondents spouses Dela Cruz.
- As to the just compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-interest of the Dela Cruz
spouses, the trial court ordered the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise
agreement.
- The commissioners conducted an ocular inspection and based on the analysis of data
gathered and making the proper adjustments with respect to the location, area, shape,
accessibility, and the highest and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion of the
herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real properties is P10,000.00
per square meter.
- Both commissioners recommended that the property of S.K. Dynamics to be expropriated by
petitioner be valued at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter.
- Unsatisfied with the amount of just compensation pegged in the RTC, petitioner filed an
appeal before the CA but it was dismissed.
- Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision, but it
directly filed a petition for review before the SC.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (National Power Corporation – Win)
- Filed a Complaint4 for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of right-of-way
against respondents as registered owners of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated, which were covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-313327,
T-671864, and T-454278. The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 square
meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square meters for the construction and
maintenance of the proposed Dasmariñas-Zapote 230 kV Transmission Line Project
- Argued that it was deprived of due process when it was not given the opportunity to
present evidence before the commissioners
- Argued that the just compensation fixed by the lower court is exhorbitant [sic], highly
speculative and without any basis. In support thereto, [petitioner] presented before the
court a quo the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Cavite Resolution No. 08-95 x x x which
fixed the fair market value of lots located along Gen. Aguinaldo Highway, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, which incidentally includes the lots subject of this proceedings [sic], in the amount
of P3,000.00 per square meter.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Spouses Dela Cruz, et al. - Lost)
- Lower court fixed the just compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00 per
square meter
P a g e 14 o f 3 5
ISSUE
- W/N the just compensation fixed by the lower court at Php 10,000.00 per square is proper
HELD
CONCLUSION: The just compensation fixed by the lower court is not proper. The lower court is
ordered to determine the proper just compensation. The appeal is granted
RULE:
- Based on these provisions, it is clear that in addition to the ocular inspection performed
by the two (2) appointed commissioners in this case, they are also required to conduct a
hearing or hearings to determine just compensation; and to provide the parties the
following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the opportunity to attend them; (2) the
opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor during the said hearings; and (3) the
opportunity for the parties to argue their respective causes during the said hearings.
- Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation,
to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation
would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.
- To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market value of
the property, to which should be added the consequential damages after deducting
therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be
disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
- It is settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which
usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the
opportunity to present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to disregard
the commissioners’ findings. The absence of such trial or hearing constitutes reversible
error on the part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular, petitioner’s) right to
due process was violated
- It was the commissioners’ ocular inspection of the properties in question, as gleaned from
the commissioners’ October 5, 1999 report. The trial court’s reliance on the said report is a
serious error considering that the recommended compensation was highly speculative
and had no strong factual moorings. For one, the report did not indicate the fair market
value of the lots occupied by the Orchard Golf and Country Club, Golden City
Subdivision, Arcontica Sports Complex, and other business establishments cited. Also,
the report did not show how convenience facilities, public transportation, and the
residential and commercial zoning could have added value to the lots being expropriated.
- Moreover, the trial court did not amply explain the nature and application of the "highest
and best use" method to determine the just compensation in expropriation cases. No
attempt was made to justify the recommended "just price" in the subject report through
other sufficient and reliable means such as the holding of a trial or hearing at which the
parties could have had adequate opportunity to adduce their own evidence, the testimony
of realtors in the area concerned, the fair market value and tax declaration, actual sales of
lots in the vicinity of the lot being expropriated on or about the date of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the pertinent zonal valuation derived from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, among others.
- Furthermore, the commissioners’ report itself is flawed considering that its recommended
just compensation was pegged as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report
was issued, and not the just compensation as of the date of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, or as of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the filing of the
complaint (when just compensation should have been determined), and the time when the
commissioners’ report recommending the just compensation was issued (or almost one
[1] year after the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the correct amount of just
compensation.
P a g e 15 o f 3 5
[G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001]
8. ESLABAN, petitioner vs. DE ONORIO, respondent
EMINENT DOMAIN — Whether or not Respondent is entitled to the just compensation as fixed
by the lower court
FA C T S
- Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato
with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the
Registry of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project
Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the
said lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed to the
construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area
taken after the processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a
Right of-Way agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid
De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently
executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation
for damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of
a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of
P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial assistance) pursuant to Executive Order
1035, §18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA
refused to pay.
- Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of
P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the
canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA
constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De Onorio and that NIA paid a certain
landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed
the defense that: (1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used
by the NIA for its irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3)
that De Onorio was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering
that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ordering
the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned
area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used
it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA
filed the petition for review.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Eslaban – Lost)
- Expropriated, as Project Manager of the NIA, a 24,660 square meter portion of
Respondent’s property for the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA
- Argued that Respondent was not entitled to compensation for the taking of her property
considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under
C.A. No. 141.
- Argued that the just compensation shall be assessed as of the time of the finality of the
decision not at the time of taking
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (De Onorio - Win)
- Lower court fixed the amount of P107,517.60 as just compensation
ISSUE
- Whether or not Respondent is entitled to the just compensation as fixed by the lower court
HELD
- CONCLUSION: Respondent is entitled to the just compensation. The appeal is dismissed.
- RULE: With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or
"that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."8
P a g e 16 o f 3 5
Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss
- Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
- APPLICATION: In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his
capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the verification and certification against
forum-shopping were signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real
party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being duly authorized by
resolution of the board of the corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E.
Gonzales could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying the petition for
review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.
- The proper valuation for the property in question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level
for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the
provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to
make an assessment of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare
basis.
- We are inclined to give more credence to the appellee’s explanation that the waiver of rights
and fees "pertains only to improvements and crops and not to the value of the land utilized
by NIA for its main canal."
P a g e 17 o f 3 5
[G.R. No. 129998 December 29, 1998]
9. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HENSON, respondent
FA C T S
- On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation initiated with the Regional Trial Court,
Pampanga, a complaint for eminent domain for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land,
owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. The respondents, 5 couples, were the owners.
- The petitioner tried to fix the value of the land but was met of a price of 180 to 250 pesos due to the
respondents. The respondents also filed a motion to dismiss.
- In the trial court, the motion to dismiss was quashed. However, the court fixed the provisional value of
the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220 sqm. The petitioner deposited the
amount. The trial court allowed respondents a motion to withdraw P5,831,100.00, with a balance of
P690,900.00 as the purchase value.
- 3 commissioners were then authorized by the trial court to determine the provisional value of the land
for just compensation. The values were in 350, 375, and 170 per sqm from Tiglao, Atienza and Orocio.
- In May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid
by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square meter,
with legal interest from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land,
plus attorney’s fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.
- The CA merely deleted the attorney’s fees.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments ( x – Lost)
- Filed a complaint 1 for eminent domain, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land,
owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station
(b) Respondent’s Arguments ( x – Win)
- Lower fixed the just compensation at P400.00 per square meter with legal interest thereon
ISSUE
- Whether or not the just compensation at P400.00 per square meter fixed by the lower court is proper
HELD
CONCLUSION: The just compensation is not proper. It is fixed at P375.00 per square meter.
The appeal is granted
RULE:
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw
agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other
respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department
of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been re-classified as residential. The nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just
compensation to the landowner.
- The trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter,
which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo
Village Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally
agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. Unfortunately, the trial court, after
creating a board of commissioners to help it determine the market value of the land did not
conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of
subject land in an amount equal to the value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision.
This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of
anyone of the commissioners.
- On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value at P375.00 per square
meter. This appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully
developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the
price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the
taking of such raw land.
P a g e 18 o f 3 5
[G.R. No. 142971 May 7, 2002]
10. CITY OF CEBU, petitioner vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO & DEDAMO, respondent
FA C T S
- The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the Sps. Dedamo. The parties
executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they
have partially settled the case. Pursuant to the Agreement, the trial court appointed 3
Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.
The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for the lot in dispute and fixed it at P 12,
824.10 per sq. m. The assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial
court. As a result, the City of Cebu elevated the case to the SC and raised the issue that just
compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was
actually taken.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (City of Cebu – Lost)
- Filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve
as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and
the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City
- Argued that just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the
property was actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals.”
- Appealed to SC the determination of the just compensation at P20,826,339.50 by the
commissioners
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Spouses Dedano - Win)
- Argued that the property to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of
a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from
them the property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the
neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the consideration of
P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots.
Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.
- Lower court ordered that the just compensation shall be P20,826,339.50 based on the
assessment of the commissioners
ISSUE
- Whether or not the just compensation at P20,826,339.50 by the commissioners is proper
HELD
CONCLUSION: The just compensation is proper. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose.9 However, the Government must pay the owner
thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.
- The applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation
is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
- SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based
P a g e 19 o f 3 5
on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the
general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the
date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.”
- More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed
upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the
trial court. The agreement is a contract between the parties.
- Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a
serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without
violating the principle of equitable estoppels
- Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall
be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,13such law cannot
prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a substantive law.
Page 20 of 35
[G.R. No. 161656 June 29, 2005]
11. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. VICENTE LIM, respondent
FA C T S
- In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug,
Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The
said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic
deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, onMay 1940, the
CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11,
1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
- In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim
for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt.
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.
- For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons·
successors-in-interest, Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession
of the property.
- On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and
Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to
acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value”.
- On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the
Republic’s failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
- They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are
still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are not entitled to recover possession
of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.
- Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim herein
respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had
the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was issued in his name.
- On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the
petitioners herein.On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is
the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an absolute owner including
the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In itsDecision dated
September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: “…This is contrary to the rules of
fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the payment for the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered ‘just’…”
- Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain
as the owner of Lot 932
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Republic, et al. – Lost)
- Filed a special civil action for expropriation on 1938 with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar
Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for
the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while
Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.
- Argued that Respondent does not have ownership over the land but can only ask for the
just compensation
P a ge 21 o f 3 5
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Lim – Win)
- Became the lawful owner of Lot 932 pursuant to a court order on 2003 due to its
foreclosure as a mortgage by the original owners despite the expropriation done by
Petitioner
- Argued that there was no transfer of ownership to Petitioner for fifty-seven (57) years have
lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final
but Petitioner has not compensated the owner of the property for P4,062.10
- CA promulgated a decision in his favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner can compel Respondent to accept the payment of just
compensation of the subject expropriated lot despite its failure to pay for 57 years
HELD
CONCLUSION:
- Petitioner cannot compel Respondent. Ownership is vested to Respondent. Appeal is
dismissed.
RULE:
- Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia15 this Court ruled that the expropriation of
lands consists of two stages, to wit:
"x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint" x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done
by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
- It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,16 we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to
pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.
- In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26
however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)27
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment."28 To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the
government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v.
Court of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."
APPLICATION:
- In this case, it bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to
the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was rendered
conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: "It is true that plaintiffs are still
the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of
the Government."
Page 22 of 35
[G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942]
12. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN, respondent
FA C T S
- On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding
to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941,
for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
- In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original
defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
- Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic
which was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal
therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.
- Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was
transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.
- In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu,
alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand
the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or
negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot
941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NAC’s
offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the
then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled “Republic of the
Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al.” It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
- Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a
modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian,
on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon
the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for
the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written
agreement]
- Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of
the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued
in its name.
- However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its
predecessors-in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.
- The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered
to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No.
941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore
ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.
- MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was denied
hence this petition.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments ( x – Lost)
- Filed an expropriation proceeding, Civil Case No. R-1881 (Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Third Branch), on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941
owned by Respondent, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport. Transfer of
ownership was later ordered after payment of just compensation in the amount of P34,415
- Argued that the Republic of the Philippines appropriated Lot No. 941 through
expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881. The judgment rendered therein was
unconditional and did not contain a stipulation that ownership thereof would revert to
CHIONGBIAN nor did it give CHIONGBIAN the right to repurchase the same in the event
the lot was no longer used for the purpose it was expropriated. Moreover, CHIONGBIAN’s
claim that there was a repurchase agreement is not supported by documentary evidence.
The mere fact that twenty six (26) other landowners repurchased their property located at
the aforementioned Lahug airport is of no consequence considering that said landowners
were able to secure a rider in their contracts entitling them to repurchase their property.
Page 23 of 35
- Argued that assuming for the sake of argument that CHIONGBIAN has a right to
repurchase Lot No. 941, MCIAA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
right of CHIONGBIAN to purchase said lot should be under the same terms and
conditions given to the other landowners and not at the prevailing market price. Such
ruling is grossly unfair and would result in unjustly enriching CHIONGBIAN for the reason
that she received just compensation for the property at the time of its taking by the
government and that the property is now worth several hundreds of millions of pesos due
to the improvements introduced by MCIAA
(b) Respondent’s Arguments ( x – Win)
- Filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 for Lahug Airport was closed at the end of
1991 and all its airport activities were undertaken at and transferred to the Mactan
International Airport. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist. The
land was no longer used as (sic) airport for public use
- CA rendered a decision in her favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Respondent has the right to repurchase her expropriated property on the
ground that it is no longer used for public use
HELD
CONCLUSION: Respondent does not have the right to repurchase. The appeal is granted
RULE:
- In Fery vs. Municipality of Cabanatuan11 , this Court had occasion to rule on the same
issue as follows:
- "The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation
which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for
example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner,
then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner
reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a
public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only
use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public
street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the
contrary. Many other similar examples might be given. If, upon the contrary, however,
the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the
land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the State, a
province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect of
defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
- When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in
the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion
to the former owner."
APPLICATION:
- In this case, The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot
No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed
to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to
repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned
or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
- CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of
Appeals14 wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence
of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve
expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court consequently allowed the
presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the right of
repurchase based on the following ratiocination.
Page 24 of 35
[G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001]
13. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner vs. FRANCISCO, respondent
FA C T S
-
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (City of Mandaluyong – Lost)
- Adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the
City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots of
Respondents and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of
the land; Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just
compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter
- Argued that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same from expropriation in
view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within the Area for Priority
Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as
amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517.10 This
declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso facto,
regardless of the area of the land.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Francisco, et al. – Win)
- Argued that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a
public purpose; the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing;
the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal
valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As
counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million
- Argued that they are "small property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation
under Republic Act No. 7279.
- Lower court rendered a decision in their favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner can expropriate Respondent’s lots despite the fact that they are
"small property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act No.
7279.
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioner cannot expropriate. The appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government
lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle
lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal
Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which
have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6)
privately-owned lands
- Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes.
Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3)
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint
venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of
expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property
owners are exempt from such acquisition.
- While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the
"Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a limitation on the size of the
land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly exempted "small
property owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform.
- "Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property
whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square
Page 25 of 35
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that
they do not own real property other than the same.
APPLICATION:
- In this case, Petitioner did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other
modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject
lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated
purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from respondents
but the latter refused to sell.17 As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been
made. Not even Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property
states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
- Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set
in R.A. 7279. The second question, however, is whether the subject property is the only
real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small
property owners. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real property58 and
that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their
houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro Manila.59 To prove this,
they submitted certifications from the offices of the City and Municipal Assessors in Metro
Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered real property declared for taxation
purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were certified by the City Assessor of
Manila;60 Quezon City;61 Makati City;62 Pasay City;63 Paranaque;64 Caloocan City;65 Pasig
City;66 Muntinlupa;67 Marikina;68 and the then municipality of Las Piñas69 and the
municipality of San Juan del Monte70 as having no real property registered for taxation in
their individual names
Page 26 of 35
[G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010]
14. MCIAA & AIR TRANSPO OFFICE, petitioner vs. LOZADA,, respondent
FA C T S
- Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion
and improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation
proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The
trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of
the lot. However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport,
however, was not pursued. The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of
possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot. On the other hand, the
petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that
the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event
that the property would no longer be needed for airport operations. Petitioners instead
asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were,
therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or
abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners argued that the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple
to the Republic.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (MCIAA and Air Transportation Office – Lost)
- Expropriated Lot No. 88 owned by Respondent at P3.00 per square meter for the
expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport.
- Argued that: (1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase
agreement or compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee
simple to the Republic; and (3) the respondents’ claim of verbal assurances from
government officials violates the Statute of Frauds.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Lozada, et al. – Win)
- Filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership of Lot
No. 88 pursuant to a commitment that the expropriated lots would be resold at the price
they were expropriated in the event that the ATO would abandon the Lahug Airport
- Argued that the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport,
however, was not pursued. The public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the
airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was
converted into a commercial complex. Lot No. 88 became the site of a jail known as
Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Complex, while a portion thereof was occupied by
squatters. The old airport was converted into what is now known as the Ayala I.T. Park, a
commercial area
- CA promulgated a decision in their favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Respondents are entitled to recover their expropriated land for the public
purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually initiated,
realized, or implemented
HELD
CONCLUSION:
- Respondents are entitled to recover. Respondents are ordered to return to petitioners
the just compensation they received for the expropriation of Lot No. 88, plus legal interest,
in the case of default, to be computed from the time petitioners comply with their
obligation to reconvey Lot No. 88 to them. The lower court is ordered to fix the proper
amount that Respondent have to pay to Petitioners. The appeal is dismissed
Page 27 of 35
RULE:
- More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then
incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an
intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will
be devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
- In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken. Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may
seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become
improper for lack of the required factual justification
APPLICATION:
- In this case, wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated
lots was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The
condition not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former
owner should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.11
- It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon this
factual issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise agreement
was, in fact, entered into between the Government and respondents, with the former
undertaking to resell Lot No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the
Lahug Airport would not be pursued
Page 28 of 35
[G.R. No. 147511 January 20, 2003]
15. REYES, petitioner vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent
FA C T S
- National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the sugarland owned by
the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite. The purpose of the
expropriation is for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate
the squatters who were relocated from Manila. The trial court rendered judgment ordering
the expropriation of these lots with payment of just compensation. It was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
- The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme
Court order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before the RTC of Quezon
City. They also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from Manila on the expropriated
lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA be
enjoined from disposing and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be
rendered forfeiting all its rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.
- In the answer of NHA, they already paid a substantial amount to the petitioners. Thus,
several issues are already raised in the expropriation court.
- The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public purpose
because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It also entered into
a contract with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing to be sold to qualified
low income beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation
of the petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just compensation is based
on the value at the time the property was taken.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Reyes, et al. – Lost)
- Filed a complaint5 for forfeiture of rights before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 79, in Civil Case No. Q-92-12093. They alleged that respondent NHA had not
relocated squatters from the Metropolitan Manila area on the expropriated lands in
violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation and had not paid the just
compensation fixed by the court. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use
by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost
housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. They prayed that respondent NHA be enjoined from disposing
and alienating the expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its
rights and interests under the expropriation judgment.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (National Housing Authority – Win)
- Expropriated the lots particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 owned by
Petitioners for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area
- Argued that (1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have abandoned the public purpose
for which the subject properties were expropriated because the relocation of squatters
involves a long and tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA actually pursued the
public purpose of the expropriation when it entered into a contract with Arceo C. Cruz
involving the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no condition imposed in the expropriation
judgment that the subject properties shall revert back to its original owners in case the
purpose of expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the payment of just
compensation is independent of the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital gains
tax; and (4) in the payment of just compensation, the basis should be the value at the time
the property was taken
- CA promulgated a decision in its favor
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner can recover their expropriated land on the ground of failure to
attain the stated public purpose for expropriation and nonpayment of the just compensation
Page 29 of 35
HELD
CONCLUSION:
- Petitioner cannot recover. However, Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner
P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of
the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have been fully paid. The
appeal is dismissed
RULE:
- The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation
is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use
- In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,13 the Court
ruled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to
recover possession of their expropriated lots
APPLICATION:
- In this case, Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision
of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from
the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer
limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly
limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use"
has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public
welfare," and "public convenience.”
- The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate developer for the
construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low
income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.10
- It follows that the low cost housing project of respondent NHA on the expropriated lots is
compliant with the "public use" requirement.
- We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners' contention that the stated public purpose was
abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots by relocating
squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that
respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public use or
purpose of expanding the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project." The taking here is absolute,
without any condition, restriction or qualification
Page 30 of 35
[G.R. No. 137569 June 23, 2000]
16. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. SALEM, respondent
FA C T S
- On 17 February 1983, Batas Pambansa 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of
parcels of lands in the names of Maria del Carmen Roxas de Elizalde and Concepcion
Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, including a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters,
belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama covered by TCT 16913. On 14 December
1988, or 5 years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract with
Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property
covered by TCT 16213, consisting of 4,075 square meters for the amount of P11,800,000.00.
The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase
price, the balance thereof to be paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans
Bank.
- On 3 November 1989, Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for
specific performance (Civil Case 6974-P) to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the
sale. On 10 July 1990, while the case was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
case (Civil Case 7327) for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named
in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a
portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated property. Upon the deposit of
P12,970,350.00 representing 10% of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a
writ of possession was issued on 29 August 1990 in favor of the government.
- On 2 May 1991, Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had
agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on 14 December 1988 and that a case for specific
performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas.
- On 9 September 1991, the trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of
P23,976.00 per square meter for the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380 square
meters. Meanwhile, on 18 September 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in the case for
specific performance upholding the validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la
Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of
Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-35116) but their
petition was dismissed on 28 July 1992. They tried to appeal to the Supreme Court (GR
106488) but again they failed in their bid as their petition for review was denied on 7
December 1992.
- Meanwhile, on 2 October 1991, Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the just
compensation for the land be deposited in court pursuant to Rule 67, §9 of the Rules of
Court. As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved,
Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus, certiorari, and injunction
with temporary restraining order (CA-GR SP 28311) to enjoin the Republic from releasing or
paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of the expropriated
property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions.
- On 12 January 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of
mandamus. Nonetheless, the De la Ramas filed on 17 March 1993 a Motion for Authority to
Withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991, which was denied on 7 May 1993.
- On 16 June 1993, the De la Ramas filed a Motion for Execution again praying that the court's
order dated 9 September 1991, approving the recommendation of the appraisal committee,
be enforced.
- On 22 June 1993, the trial court denied the motion of the De la Ramas holding that there had
been a change in the situation of the parties, therefore, making the execution of 9 September
1991 Order inequitable, impossible, or unjust. Thus, with the decision in the action for
specific performance in Civil Case 6974-P having become final, an order of execution was
issued by the Pasay City RTC, and as a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was
executed by the Branch Clerk of Court on 8 March 1994 in favor of Guerrero upon payment
by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on 11 January 1994 and the further sum of
P1,608,900.00 on 1 February 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price
under the contract to sell. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly received by the De la
Ramas. Thereafter, the De la Ramas sought the nullification of the 22 June 1993 order of the
trial by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals.
P a g e 31 o f 3 5
- This petition was, however, dismissed in a decision dated 29 July 1994 of the appellate
court. Finally, on 5 April 1995, the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared
Guerrero the rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered
payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. This decision was
subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The De la Ramas filed a petition for review.
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (Dela Rama – Lost)
- Argued that they should receive the amount of just compensation because when they
agreed to sell Lot 834 in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the portion expropriated by
the Republic since, at that time, such portion had been expropriated by the government
by virtue of B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on February 17, 1983
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Republic, Guerrero, et al. – Win)
- Filed an expropriation case on July 10, 1990 pursuant to B.P. Blg. of Lot 834 owned by
Petitioners despite the previous contract to sell by Petitioner of said lot to Respondent
Guerrero on December 14, 1988
- CA promulgated a decision that the just compensation at P20,000,000.00 should be paid
to Respondent Guerrero
- Argued that the title to the expropriated portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to the
government upon the enactment of B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just
compensation was yet to be made before ownership of the land was transferred to the
government. As a result, petitioners still owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they agreed
to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot 834, including
the 920 square meters expropriated by the government, he has the right to receive the
just compensation over the said property.
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to the just compensation of the subject expropriated
land despite their previous contract to sell to Respondent Guerrero
HELD
CONCLUSION:
- Petitioners are not entitled to the just compensation but Respondent Guerrero. Appeal is
dismissed
RULE:
- The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As explained in Municipality of Biñan v.
Garcia:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of
the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the
complaint". . . .
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. . . .
- It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the
property passes to the government.28 Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been
completed an terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with
the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an
owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State
ultimately to acquire it through expropriation.
Page 32 of 35
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the first stage of expropriation was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was
enacted providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of the land in question.
The constitutionality of this law was upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990,
the government commenced the second stage of expropriation through the filing of a
petition for the determination of just compensation. This stage was not completed,
however, because of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the expropriated property of the De la
Ramas remained with them and did not at that point pass to the government.
- The De la Ramas are mistaken in arguing that the two stages of expropriation cited above
only apply to judicial, and not to legislative, expropriation. Although Congress has the
power, to determine what land to take, it can not do so arbitrarily. Judicial determination of
the propriety of the exercise of the power, for instance, in view of allegations of partiality
and prejudice by those adversely affected, and the just compensation for the subject
property is provided in our constitutional system.
- We see no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative expropriation as far as
the two stages mentioned above are concerned. Both involve these stages and in both
the process is not completed until payment of just compensation is made. The Court of
Appeals was correct in saying that B.P. Blg. 340 did not effectively expropriate the land of
the De la Ramas. As a matter of fact, it merely commenced the expropriation of the
subject property.
- Thus, in 1988, the De la Ramas still had authority to transfer ownership of their land and
convey all rights, including the right to receive just compensation, to Guerrero.
- It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to Guerrero the subject parcel of land
described therein. However, it created an obligation on the part of the De la Ramas to
convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive conditions therein stated. The
declaration of this contract's validity, which paved the way for the subsequent execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of the Regional Trial
Court for its execution, by the Clerk of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed
ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.
- Evidently, Lot 834 was conveyed in 1994 to Guerrero by virtue of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. This contract was registered in the Register of Deeds and, accordingly, a new
transfer certificate of title was issued to Guerrero.34 Pursuant thereto, and by virtue of
subrogation, the latter became the rightful owner entitled to receive the just compensation
from the Republic.
Page 33 of 35
[G.R. No. 143643 June 27, 2003]
17. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. SPS CAMPOS, respondent
FA C T S
-
(a) Petitioner’s Arguments (National Power Corporation – Lost)
- Argued by citing Article 620 of the Civil Code that it had already acquired the easement of
right-of-way over the portion of the subject property by prescription, the said easement
having been allegedly continuous and apparent for a period of about twenty-three (23)
years, i.e., from about the middle of 1970 to the early part of 1994. The petitioner further
invokes Section 3(i) of its Charter in asserting that the respondents already waived their
right to institute any action for compensation and/or damages concerning the acquisition
of the easement of right-of-way in the subject property. Accordingly, the petitioner
concludes that the award of damages in favor of the respondents is not warranted.
(b) Respondent’s Arguments (Spouses Campos – Win)
- Filed an action for sum of money and damages against the Petitioner
- Argued Petitioners verbally requested them to grant the Petitioner a right-of-way over a
portion of the subject property. Wooden electrical posts and transmission lines were to be
installed for the electrification of Puerto Azul. The respondents acceded to this request
upon the condition that the said installation would only be temporary in nature. The
petitioner assured the respondents that the arrangement would be temporary and that the
wooden electric posts would be relocated as soon as permanent posts and transmission
lines shall have been installed. Contrary to the verbal agreement of the parties, however,
the petitioner continued to use the subject property for its wooden electrical posts and
transmission lines without compensating the respondents therefor.
- Argued that they are unaware of the petitioner’s intention to expropriate a portion of the
subject property, the respondents sold the same to Solar Resources, Inc. As a
consequence, the respondents stand to lose a substantial amount of money derived from
the proceeds of the sale of the subject property should the buyer (Solar Resources, Inc.)
decide to annul the sale because of the contemplated expropriation of the subject
property
- CA promulgated a decision in their favor ordering Petitioner to pay, among others, actual,
moral and nominal damages in the total amount of P1,980,000 to Respondents
ISSUE
- Whether or not Petitioner is liable for damages to Respondents
HELD
CONCLUSION: Petitioner is liable for damages. The appeal is dismissed.
RULE:
- Prescription as a mode of acquisition requires the existence of the following: (1) capacity
to acquire by prescription; (2) a thing capable of acquisition by prescription; (3)
possession of the thing under certain conditions; and (4) lapse of time provided by law.12
Acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary, in which case the possession must be in
good faith and with just title,13 or extraordinary, in which case there is neither good faith
nor just title. In either case, there has to be possession which must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.14 As a corollary, Article 1119 of the Civil Code
provides that:
Art. 1119. Acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or by mere
tolerance of the owner shall not be available for the purposes of possession
- Neither can the petitioner invoke Section 3(i) of its Charter (Rep. Act No. 6395, as
amended) to put up the defense of prescription against the respondents. The said
provision reads in part:
Sec. 3(i). … The Corporation or its representatives may also enter upon private
property in the lawful performance or prosecution of its business or purposes,
including the construction of transmission lines thereon; Provided, that the owner of
Page 34 of 35
such private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor in accordance
with the provisions hereinafter provided; Provided, further, that any action by any
person claiming compensation and/or damages shall be filed within five years after
the right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or other facilities shall have
been established: Provided, finally, that after the said period no suit shall be
brought to question the said right-of-way, transmission lines, substations, plants or
other facilities nor the amounts of compensation and/or damages involved;
- Two requisites must be complied before the above provision of law may be invoked:
1. The petitioner entered upon the private property in the lawful performance or
prosecution of its businesses or purposes; and
2. The owner of the private property shall be paid the just compensation therefor
APPLICATION:
- In this case, the records clearly reveal that the petitioner’s possession of that portion of the
subject property where it erected the wooden posts and transmission lines was merely
upon the tolerance of the respondents. Accordingly, this permissive use by the petitioner
of that portion of the subject property, no matter how long continued, will not create an
easement of right-of-way by prescription. Following the foregoing disquisition, the
petitioner’s claim that it had acquired the easement of right-of-way by prescription must
perforce fail. As intimated above, possession is the fundamental basis of prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. The petitioner never acquired the requisite possession
in this case. Its use of that portion of the subject property where it erected the wooden
poles and transmission lines was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the
respondents. As such, it cannot be made the basis of the acquisition of an easement of
right-of-way by prescription.
- As correctly asserted by the respondents, Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended,
presupposes that the petitioner had already taken the property through a negotiated sale
or the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and not where, as in this case, the
petitioner was merely temporarily allowed to erect wooden electrical posts and
transmission lines on the subject property. Significantly, the provision uses the term "just
compensation," implying that the power of eminent domain must first be exercised by the
petitioner in accordance with Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that
"no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation."
- Thus, the five-year period provided under Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended,
within which all claims for compensation and/or damages may be allowed against the
petitioner should be reckoned from the time that it acquired title over the private property
on which the right-of-way is sought to be established. Prior thereto, the claims for
compensation and/or damages do not prescribe
- The petitioner instituted the expropriation proceedings only on December 12, 1995.
Indisputably, the petitioner never acquired title to that portion of the subject property
where it erected the wooden electrical posts and transmission lines. Until such time, the
five-year prescriptive period within which the respondents’ right to file an action to claim
for compensation and/or damages for the petitioner’s use of their property does not even
commence to run. The CA thus correctly ruled that Section 3(i) of Rep. Act No. 6395, as
amended, finds no application in this case and that the respondents’ action against the
petitioner has not prescribed
Page 35 of 35

Eminent Domain Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Eminent Domain Case Digest

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Eminent Domain Case Digest

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EMINENT DOMAIN

1. PLDT, petitioner vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COM., respondent 2

2. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA & POBRE, respondent 4

3. LAGCAO, petitioner vs. LABRA, respondent 6

4. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. CASTELLVI, et al., respondent 8

5. DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent 10

6. MODAY, petitioner vs. CA, respondent 12

7. NATIONAL POWER CORP, petitioner vs. DE LA CRUZ, respondent 14

8. ESLABAN, petitioner vs. DE ONORIO, respondent 16

9. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HENSON, respondent 18

11. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. VICENTE LIM, respondent 21

12. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner vs. COURT OF

13. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner vs. FRANCISCO, respondent 25

15. REYES, petitioner vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent 29

16. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. SALEM, respondent 31

17. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. SPS CAMPOS, respondent 34

1. PLDT, petitioner vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COM., respondent

2. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. CA & POBRE, respondent

3. LAGCAO, petitioner vs. LABRA, respondent

4. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. CASTELLVI, et al., respondent

5. DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondent

6. MODAY, petitioner vs. CA, respondent

7. NATIONAL POWER CORP, petitioner vs. DE LA CRUZ, respondent

8. ESLABAN, petitioner vs. DE ONORIO, respondent

9. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HENSON, respondent

11. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. VICENTE LIM, respondent

12. MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner

13. CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner vs. FRANCISCO, respondent

15. REYES, petitioner vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent

16. REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. SALEM, respondent

17. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner vs. SPS CAMPOS, respondent

You might also like