E-Filed Document Apr 2 2024 12:41:42 2020-DP-00440-SCT Pages: 8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2020-DP-00440-SCT

WILLIE CORY GODBOLT APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

On appeal from
Lincoln County Circuit Court
Cause No. 2018-064-LS

MOTION FOR REHEARING

Greg Spore (Lead Counsel)

Miss. Bar No. 103764
[email protected]
(601) 576-2320
Hunter Aikens
Miss. Bar No. 102195
(601) 576-4208
[email protected]
Office of the State Public Defender
Capital Defense Counsel Division
239 N. Lamar St. Suite 604
Jackson MS 39201

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

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 INTRODUCTION

In affirming Willie Cory Godbolt’s convictions, this Court erroneously overlooked or

misapprehended controlling state law and state and federal constitutional precedent on several

issues presented for review. This Motion for Rehearing, however, focuses on the most egregious

of these points. Rehearing should be granted under Miss. R. App. P. 40 to remedy a clear

departure from controlling law under the facts of this case. Re-consideration on this point

requires reversal of all of Godbolt’s convictions and his death sentences and remand for a new

trial on both guilt and sentencing.1

ARGUMENT

The Majority’s rejection of Godbolt’s impartial jury point of error overlooks or misapprehends
the requirements of its precedent and the United States Constitution.

“The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is fundamental and essential to our form of

government. It is a right guaranteed by both the federal and the state constitutions.” Johnson v.

State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1209 (Miss. 1985) (citing Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So.2d 211

(1954). “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,

...” U.S. Constitution Amendment VI. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right

to ... a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was

committed. ...” Mississippi Constitution under Article 3, § 26. “The ascertainment of impartial

justice is, or should be, the supreme object of all courts.” Johnson, 476 So. 2d at 1210 (citing

Seal v. State, 44 So. 2d 61, 67 (Miss. 1950).

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In addition to the impartial jury issue discussed in this Motion for Rehearing, Godbolt
raised numerous other points of error in his appeal from his convictions and sentences. The
Court’s opinion in this matter addresses them all. Godbolt in no way abandons his previous
claims and arguments for purposes of further review of this or any other Court’s decision on
rehearing, post-conviction, habeas corpus, or other proceedings.
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 The Majority argues that Mhoon v. State is not “applicable to the present case” (Majority

Opinion 41) because “Godbolt’s venire and seated jury [do not] not reach the level of statistical

aberration found in Mhoon.” (Id.). The Majority further argues that the jurors all said they could

be fair and impartial and that the “jury pool was not disproportionately made of inherently biased

jurors,” more specifically, jurors with law enforcement connections. (Maj. Op. 40, 41); Mhoon v.

State, 464 So. 2d 77, 81 (Miss. 1985).

The Majority refuses to see that this is not a normal case; this is not a normal distribution

of law enforcement-connected persons within a jury pool. Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 81. As the

Dissent rightly notes, the Majority’s “dismissal” of this point of error “ignores several key

similarities between Mhoon and this case.” (Dissent 67). Again, after challenges for cause the

venire yielded a pool of 45 potential jurors, 14 of whom were related in varying degrees to law

enforcement. Comparatively, and in Mhoon, following challenges for cause the venire yielded 39

prospective jurors, 12 of whom either worked in law enforcement or were related by blood or

marriage to law enforcement. Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 80. Over one-third of the jury pool in this

case represented the law enforcement community, an extreme anomaly shared with only one

case, Mhoon. In fact, Godbolt’s case is likely “more problematic” than Mhoon’s given the

percentage of law enforcement-connected persons in the venire. (Dissent 70). By example,

Mhoon could have used all 12 peremptory strikes to “rid the venire of law enforcement-

connected persons” while Godbolt, even if he exercised all his peremptory strikes on law

enforcement-connected jurors, could not have “cleared the venire” of the same. (Dissent 69).

The aberration here assumes still greater concern given that two of the victims in this

matter were law enforcement officers. The Majority seemingly ignores this fact in its analysis of

Mhoon’s application to this case, focusing instead on the number of seated jurors with law

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enforcement connections and those within the venire with “more attenuated” connections to law

enforcement. (Maj. Op. 40-41). Yes, a uniformed police officer served as foreperson in Mhoon

but the victim in Mhoon was not a law enforcement officer. It is difficult to understate the

“sympathy” a law enforcement-connected juror would likely harbor for the murder of one police

officer and the attempted murder of another. (See generally Dissent 70). And yes, Mhoon had six

law enforcement-connected seated jurors to Godbolt’s four but the real concern rests with the

percentage of law enforcement-connected persons in the venire. The number of seated jurors

connected to law enforcement merely illustrates this larger concern. Further, the 14 law

enforcement-connected persons within the venire were not the only impaired prospective jurors

the defense had to scrutinize during jury selection.

The Majority notes that the prospective jurors in question said they could be fair and

impartial (Maj. Op. 40), but the same is true of Mhoon. (Dissent 67); Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 80.

Affirmations of fairness do not and cannot remove ties to law enforcement. Nor does an assertion

of fairness and impartiality remove a prospective juror’s feelings and sympathies for law

enforcement. Despite a law enforcement-connected juror’s certainty that he/she can be impartial,

that same juror may find it challenging to return a verdict against the interests of law

enforcement. This challenge is amplified when the victims in the case are law enforcement

officers. Mhoon notes, “… in the normal case—with a normal distribution of law enforcement

officers and their relatives in the jury pool—there is no reason why, if left unchallenged

peremptorily, an officer or an officer's relative should not serve on a jury if otherwise qualified to

follow the law and the evidence.” Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 81. The concern in Mhoon was “the

sheer number of law enforcement-connected persons in the jury pool…” and the “opportunity for

undue influence over the opinions of other jurors.” Id. at 81, 82. The appearance of partiality is

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self-evident in this case. Given the statistical aberration⸻an aberration more pronounced than

the same in Mhoon⸻it cannot be said, with confidence, that the prospective jurors did not harbor

partisan sympathies for law enforcement.

As the Dissent notes, State policy dictates that “all persons selected for jury service be

selected at random from a fair cross-section of the population of the area served by the court.”

(Dissent 69, fn. 8); Miss. Code Ann. 13-5-2 (Rev. 2019). Here, approximately 31.1 percent of a

45-person jury pool had connections to law enforcement. (Dissent 67). “Respect for the sanctity

of an impartial trial requires that courts guard against even the appearance of unfairness for

‘public confidence in the fairness of jury trials is essential to the existence of our legal system.

Whatever tends to threaten public confidence in the fairness of jury trials, tends to threaten one

of our sacred legal institutions.’” Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 81 (citing Lee v. State, 83 So.2d 818

(1955)) (emphasis added). An essential guarantee of the right to an impartial jury is the selection

of a jury from a representative cross-section of the community. Adams v. State, 537 So. 2d 891

(Miss. 1989) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). “Restricting jury service to

only special groups … cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.” Taylor,

419 U.S at 530. If we agree that courts must “guard against even the appearance of unfairness,”

Mhoon at 81, and that the fair cross-section requirement is an essential guarantee of the right to

an impartial jury, then a jury pool skewed toward law enforcement-connected jurors surely

offends “public confidence in the fairness of jury trials.” Id.

Further, the Majority’s endorsement of a jury pool disproportionately comprised of a

“special class” of potential jurors, Id. at 527 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86

(1942), cannot be reconciled with the Court’s obligation to accord this matter the highest level of

scrutiny. Blakeney v. State, 236 So. 3d 11, 19 (Miss. 2017) (reversing capital murder conviction

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and death sentence and noting that “[i]n such matters, we employ a higher level of scrutiny,

Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686, 690 (Miss. 1984), [because] the penalty of death is totally

irrevocable.”) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).

Employing the highest level of scrutiny means “ensur[ing] that all cognizable groups are

represented ... in a fair and reasonable relationship to the number of such persons in the

community.” Mhoon, 464 So. 2d at 81 (citing ABA Standards Relating to Juror Use and

Management (1983) Standard 3(c) at 36, 38). The highest level of scrutiny further recognizes

that the death of one law enforcement officer and the attempted murder of another heightens the

already existing risks of a jury pool rife with law enforcement-connected persons. When 31.1

percent of a jury pool is comprised of law enforcement-connected persons, this same degree of

scrutiny does not dismiss the aberration simply because these jurors said they could be fair and

impartial. Indeed, “[t]here will be no shortcuts to the execution chamber…” Pinkton v. State, 481

So. 2d 306, 310 (Miss. 1985).

The Majority’s opinion in this matter is “inconsistent with [this Court’s] established

policy emphasizing the tremendous gravity of any matter involving the death penalty.” Id. Both

the trial court and the Majority lost sight of this obligation effectively sanctioning a jury pool

steeped in sympathy for law enforcement. Two of the victims in this case were law enforcement

officers. Thirty-one percent of the venire was connected to law enforcement. And when seen

through the lens of heightened scrutiny, the appearance of unfairness and partiality becomes even

more stark. Godbolt’s right to an impartial jury was violated. The only available remedy is a

retrial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and all the reasons cited as error by Appellant in his Brief and

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Reply Brief, Willie Cory Godbolt respectfully submits that the decision of this Court affirming

his convictions and sentences, including his death sentences on the four convictions for capital

murder, overlooks and misapprehends the record and controlling law. Godbolt therefore

respectfully urges this Court to grant rehearing, and upon rehearing to reverse his convictions,

vacate his death sentences, and remand this matter for a new trial.

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Greg Spore, Counsel for the Appellant, do hereby certify that on this day I have electronically
filed the foregoing MOTION FOR REHEARING with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC
system which sent notification of such filing to the following:

Honorable Allison K. Hartman

Attorney General Office
Post Office Box 220
Jackson, MS 39205-0220

Hon. David H. Strong, Jr.

Circuit Judge
Post Drawer 1387
McComb, MS 39649

Brendon Adams
District Attorney
223 W. Bay Street
Magnolia, MS 39652

This the 2d day of April 2024.

/s/ Greg Spore

Greg Spore, Appellant Counsel