MODULE A: WHAT IS THE HUMAN

BEING?
Philosophical Anthropology Università Roma Tre
Student: Claudia Fernández Villamayor

Universitá Roma Tre

Sofia Bonicalzi
MODULE A: WHAT IS THE HUMAN BEING?

Philosophical Anthropology Università Roma Tre

Student: Claudia Fernández Villamayor

INDEX:

1. Introduction
2. The Raw Human and its Subsequent Cultural Dimension
3. The Place of Man in the Cosmos
4. The Human Break from the Animal
5. Conclusion
6. Biography
 1. Introduction

Since the existence of critical thinking, philosophical reflection on the human being has
known no bounds. Where do we come from? Where are we going? What is the human
being? These questions are as ancient as philosophy itself. Even though philosophical
inquiry into human existence had been undertaken from various perspectives since the
time of the Greeks, it is not until the emergence of Philosophical Anthropology that this
type of reflection takes on a uniform and self-aware character. This sub-discipline of
philosophy takes its initial steps with Kant but also extends to authors such as Scheler and
Plessner, among others. Philosophical anthropology is not merely another way of
approaching the human being; it is the quintessential philosophical thought about the
human being, tasked with philosophically studying the nature of man to determine the
purpose of his existence and his relationship with other beings, considering him as a
distinctive being with characteristics unique to the human species.

Before delving into more complex debates about this discipline, it is essential to
determine the structural specificity that philosophical anthropology offers, namely, what
is its constitutive core of observation, or what is the image of man that shapes this
tradition. To do this, we will reconstruct the central structure of the understanding
developed about the human being, exposing the general structure that composes
philosophical anthropology through the Kantian distinction, later adopted by other
authors, between physiological anthropology and pragmatic anthropology.

While physiological anthropology focuses on a kind of natural condition of the human

being referred to as the "raw human," emphasizing more biological and bodily
characteristics, pragmatic anthropology, based on the cultural dimension, shows the
subsequent development of the human being as a subject, capable of reflection, cognitive
distancing, and action. As we will see, both dimensions are inseparable from the
perspective of philosophical anthropology. While the first shows us the natural-basal
substrate of human beings, the second shows us the cultural path through which they seek
self-realization.

In addition to Kant's thoughts on humanity, I will attempt to provide a general perspective

on Scheler's philosophy. This German philosopher, also aligned with traditional
anthropology, seeks to identify the specifically human trait and understands that this is
precisely the task of philosophy. What place does man have in the cosmos? What is the
status of the human being in nature? What condition defines humanity? What symbolic
place does the human being occupy? To answer these questions, he compares human
beings with animals, gradually differentiating and identifying their distinctive traits. To
conclude the essay, I will summarize the points discussed and, incorporating ideas from
other authors involved in this discipline, outline a conclusion that addresses the following:
What makes us human beings?

2. The Raw Human and its Subsequent Cultural Dimension

The German philosopher Kant, in his work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of
View," introduces, as we have seen, the concept of the raw human. The human being is
understood in physiological terms as a pure potentiality summarized in this concept—a
sort of natural primary state that is present whenever reference is made to the
competencies or properties of the human species as such.

In an attempt to explain this raw or crude condition in more everyday terms, we find that
this concept refers to the human being in an original condition, one that knows and
exhibits nothing more than its physiological quality where no elaboration has taken place.
When Kant speaks of the violent and intimidating character of the raw state of the raw
human, it is crucial to note that this conflict arises precisely due to the physiological-
animal constitution in which it resides. This is why this condition must always be
understood as "animality." A raw human is one who has not received any discipline, one
who, as will be further developed below, has not yet acquired "the discipline of reason"
and only possesses the technical equipment received at birth in an animal sense.

It is important to understand that the raw human is directly linked to the physiological
dimension, predetermined by nature, but also that this observation must be understood as
an ideal, that is, as a product of a theoretical hypothesis, practically nullifying empirical
observations. However, this does not diminish the value of the ideal physiological
dimension; it simply clarifies that there are no raw humans as such, reducing it to a logical
hypothesis or analytical experiment. This highlights a dimension in which, according to
Kant, nature predetermines the human being, opening the possibility of thinking about
him independently or devoid of his subsequent inclusion and participation in the cultural
world.

Through participation and the subsequent creation of cultural reality, the complement to
the physiological conception of the human being emerges. When analyzing the cultural
dimension, that anthropological condition that can be properly understood as historical
appears. The result of such an anthropological view is then the human being who, once
immersed in the world, is understood as a cultural being. In this condition, certain
competencies or qualities acquired since birth are no longer highlighted; instead, they are
developed only in and thanks to the cultural world. According to Kant, an understanding
of the human being that reduces him to the physiological would deny him any freedom
of movement. The human being, in addition to being a member of the animal world, is
also part of a community where he must decide and act. He cannot be unambiguously
determined by his natural conditions, as within a range of possibilities, he can and must
influence the shaping of himself as a specific human being and person. Therefore, this
dimension, complementing the physiological and basal, is understood as its unfolding, if
not even as its ultimate purpose.

Kant's anthropological distinction speaks for itself: the human being is not only the result
of what nature predetermines but also of what he does, can, or must make of himself. In
the cultural dimension, the human being chooses what type of being he wants to be, and
it is only "reason" that Kant establishes as the support. The pragmatic anthropology that
Kant proposes investigates the human being as a being endowed with reason, ceasing to
be a mere object of nature, to emerge as a consequence of what he makes of himself by
virtue of this quality. Reason would be defined as a capacity to extend the rules and
purposes of the use of all forces beyond natural instinct. The freedom that appears where
the human being co-determines his cultural life does not float in the air but is directly and
intimately connected to this faculty. To partially abandon the raw or brutal condition of
an animal, the human being must accustom himself to submit to the precepts of reason.
While rawness or brutality confronts culture, natural instinct confronts reason. Once that
moment arrives, the human being can elevate himself beyond his physiological substrate,
and humanity can unfold itself.

3. The Place of Man in the Cosmos

Scheler, also a German philosopher from the early 20th century, proposes another
perspective on understanding the nature of the human being in his work "The Place of
Man in the Cosmos." He advocates for a progressive view of natural beings in which
humans would occupy the highest rung, the most sophisticated. In nature, there are
different types of interactions with the environment, implying beings with varying
degrees of intelligence or vitality (vital impulse in plants, associative memory in some
animals, etc.). This increasingly complex scale of material organization involves
progressively more sophisticated strategies for interacting with the environment and the
psychophysical development of beings. Biologically speaking, a plant is simpler than an
animal, and the simplest animal is more complex than the human being, representing a
more sophisticated quantitative development.

This gradual psychophysical development of beings, according to Scheler, is useful for

studying the differences between a plant and an ant or between an ant and a primate, for
example. However, if we aim to comprehend the nature of the human being, we must
abandon this path of quantitative development and focus on finding that different quality
that the human being possesses. Our distinction from animals is not in the degree of
complexity (greater brain mass or higher intelligence) but in our possession of a
characteristic of another order—being qualitatively different and not just quantitatively.
This distinguishing quality is known as "spirit".

To understand the concept of "spirit", it is essential to analyze the different relationship

that human beings and animals have with the environment. On one hand, in the animal
kingdom, individuals are "embedded" in the environment, carrying their nature with
them. Animals are obligatorily bound to what they are, without the capacity to be anything
else. They exist in a homogeneous and continuous block where all elements always
occupy the same unchanging place (for example, a snail, given its nature, is herbivorous
and feeds on leaves and will never be able to become a cat predator because its unalterable
nature prohibits it). As we have seen, the nature of the animal is unmodifiable and directly
linked to it, without any escape route.

The possession of spirit in humans gives us the ability to detach ourselves, to break the
continuity, to sever that immediate relationship with the environment. We do not form a
continuous identity with any nature because the spirit allows us to take distance, making
nature an object of which we can become aware. This subject-object relationship is unique
to human beings. Humans are the only ones capable of taking distance, becoming
subjects, and recognizing themselves as different from the object, breaking that continuity
with nature.

As we have seen, the animal lives in an "environment" understood as a set of interrelated

elements that always interact in the same way as a unity (nature). However, human beings
have a "world" (understanding "world" as something specifically human). Humans find
themselves in a "meaningful environment," in a framework of people and things that
coexist and relate, distant from the natural and fixed world of animals. Objects and beings
do not have a specific place; instead, they acquire different meanings that define different
worlds (a book does not have the same value and meaning in the academic world as it
does in the printing world) (A specific person can be a doctor in a hospital and a family
father at home). Values and meanings permeate things and people, varying according to
the world in which they are found, subject to changes and modifications. While, for a
bird, the branch on the ground always has the same value and occupies the same place
(material resource for building a nest), for humans, the same object can assume different
values and places (an animal can be food, clothing, or companionship, giving it meaning).
Human beings can imbue objects with meaning based on the world, thanks to their spirit
and detachment from nature.

Another characteristic unique to human beings, according to Scheler, is time. Precisely

because we have this characteristic that separates us from nature, that distances us from
what was, what is, and what will be, nothing ultimately determines what we are. What
does humanity do with all this? Humans create culture. By being able to position
ourselves as subjects, objects are imbued with meaning and value. Through objects, we
can unveil a web of meanings that cultural anthropology would handle.

4. The Human Break from the Animal

The fundamental break of the human being from its animal nature, triggered in this
cultural dimension and expressed by Kant through the concept of reason, is also
observable in other representatives of 20th-century philosophical anthropology. Upon
analyzing their main theoretical cores, we certainly observe elements similar to Kant's
idea of "reason." As seen in Scheler, this particular opposition to the vital principle is
easily apparent: What is uniquely human in the human being lies outside everything we
can designate as life, as it is not a new stage of life but rather a principle opposed to each
and every form of life, including life in the human being—a new essential fact that cannot
be attributed in any way to the natural evolution of life.

As we've seen, the first pole of balance is marked by corporeality or the vital impulse in
general, while the second takes a cultural form analogous to reason. This form, exposed
in the concept of spirit in Scheler, like in Kant, aims to guide the physiological condition,
making it possible for humans to rise above the animal world. Unlike animals, whose
perspectives are always inseparable from the surrounding world, humans have the
capacity to transcend that barrier. Through the idea of spirit (or reason), a being is
distinguished that, in contrast to the animal, is no longer bound by its impulses or
surroundings but is free and open to the world. This idea of openness to the world, made
possible by spirit (or reason), precisely points to the human ability to generate a
consideration or observation with distance and separation, a contemplation that even
includes the potential for denial. The being with a world is capable of consciously
distancing itself from its surroundings and impulses, even adopting a disruptive attitude
and, if necessary, denying them. The complete idea of spirit in a being capable of denial
(able to say no) thus accounts for properties or general competencies that deepen along
with the concept of the subject, including distancing, objectivity, self-awareness, and a
way of life.

Another author who aligns with the same line as the previous ones is the German
philosopher and sociologist Plessner. Through his thinking, he distinguishes between
humans and animals based on their position in the world and their relationship with
themselves. The physiological dimension of the double aspect of the human being is
experienced, like in animals, in and through the centrally positioned body. In more
colloquial terms, the position of animals with respect to the world and themselves is
central because their biological equipment is naturally instinctive. This centrality is
unconscious as well as unreflective, making it stable and unproblematic. This position
provides a fixed horizon of familiarity centered around the animal itself. However, like
the eye that cannot observe itself, the animal is unable to be conscious of its own condition
or self-recognize. The most evident break from this animal sphere is given by its cultural
transcendence. The ability to move away from its center and be able to observe itself is
exclusively characteristic of the human being, with its position being eccentric. For
Plessner, eccentricity is the characteristic form that humans have to confront the
environment. This circumstance confirms the fact that the human body itself is capable
of becoming a possible object of reflection. The animal is not in a position to distance
itself from its own body. Only the human being can go beyond its own center. The human
being lives, experiences, but also has the ability to experience its own experiencing,
surpassing itself. And it is precisely this distance from oneself that is identified as having
a cultural body in contrast to the physiological body. Plessner takes two different ways of
understanding the body, the first being the body that exists, while the second consolidates
the center around which reflection is exercised. Due to human eccentricity, individuals
are bifurcated into a kind of "inhabitant of the inner world" constituted by the individual
self that turns towards its own interiority, and an "inhabitant of the external world," which
is the generic self, capable of being both inside and outside.

Plessner argues that the relationship with other generic selves is embodied in individual
selves. In the end, the relationship between bodies becomes relationships between people.
The world in which we live and share arises precisely from this intertwining of
surrounding environments that form eccentric subjects. This makes our particular position
relative to others, whose positions are also relative to mine. This brings with it the need
to interpret others, ourselves, and to be exposed to interpretation.

Starting from the basis of reason (Kant), spirit (Scheler), and eccentric positionality
(Plessner), it is clear that the human being cannot be simply understood in physiological
terms. Born with natural conditions, the human being is included in a cultural
environment where there is the possibility of self-development. Impulses, affections, and
reactions of the human being, originally open and unadapted, are transformed through the
assimilation of cultural elements (norms, values, language, symbols, etc.). The weakness
of instincts, the excess of impulses, and the deficiency of organic equipment are all
compensated through a development that, taking the form of spirit, reason, or eccentric
positionality, can be understood in general terms based on incorporation into the cultural
world.
Despite certain explanatory shortcomings inherent in philosophical anthropology, it is
clear that the aforementioned physiological observation is not in sufficient condition to
elucidate the human being in a pure sense without the contribution of its cultural
condition.

5. Conclusion

The already described raw human would have at their disposal a series of physiological
competencies that, through their participation in the cultural world, would be
complemented by new faculties allowing them to partially overcome that primary
condition. It is not until reason, spirit, or eccentric positionality appears that it becomes
possible to go beyond that natural state, beyond the refinement of their original brutality.
This elevation of the human being above their natural condition, above their animality,
takes place through civilization and the culture it brings, transforming the human into a
civilized being with reason and freedom. Only the raw human, with its deficiencies and
vital impulse, when immersed in the cultural world, would have their animality
completely subordinated and surrendered to reason, thus becoming a subject.

The collective of raw humans or the human species as a whole is transformed, thanks to
the effect of the cultural world, into a unity of subjects, transcending their physiological
raw materials. Based on the above and beyond specific distinctions, it is then understood
that for philosophical anthropology in general, the process of full humanization, of
subjectivization itself, is determined as a sort of transition towards the human's openness
to the world through reason (Kant), "spirit" (Scheler), or eccentric positionality
(Plessner). Therefore, this process of subjectivization would then be nothing more than a
process of "rationalization" (Kant), "spiritualization" (Scheler), or "excentralization"
(Plessner) of nature or life itself, through which the raw human becomes a subject. With
their introduction to the cultural world, the raw human could begin, as Kant and
subsequent representatives of philosophical anthropology argue, to internalize additional
abilities and capacities such as self-awareness, distancing, objectivity, and action.

In this regard, the category of subject would point to a human capable of self-
determination, rooted in their eccentric self-awareness, able to objectively distance
themselves and act rationally, where this action is with consciousness and intentionality.
To be a subject means nothing more than actively participating or being able to actively
participate in the reproduction of cultural reality through those categories that, according
to philosophical anthropology, have emerged thanks to it, namely: reason, spirit, and/or
eccentric positionality.

6. Bibliography

- Blanché, A. (2019). M. Scheler. El puesto del hombre en el cosmos. Pensamiento.

Revista De Investigación E Información Filosófica, 75(284), 787–790.

- Lévi-Strauss, C., & Bastard, N. (1970). Tristes trópicos. Eudeba

- Menegazzi, T. (2010). Helmuth Plessner: Antropología y Bio-filosofía a

comienzos del siglo XX. Thémata, 43, 289-315.

- Saldarriaga Madrigal, A. (2015). Lo que el hombre hace, o puede y debe hacer, de

sí mismo. Antropología pragmática y filosofía moral en Kant. Estudios de
filosofía, (52), 63-93.

- Scheler, M., & Carrillo, R. (1940). El puesto del hombre en el cosmos.

- Kant, I. (2014). Antropología en sentido pragmático (1.ª ed.). Universidad

Autónoma Metropolitana.