Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 1

Space for Notes

David Ricardo, ↓
On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
Published: London: John Murray, 1821. Third edition.
First published: 1817

Chapter 2: On Rent

It remains however to be considered, whether the appropriation of land, and the

consequent creation of rent, will occasion any variation in the relative value of
commodities, independently of the quantity of labour necessary to production. In
order to understand this part of the subject, we must enquire into the nature of rent,
and the laws by which its rise or fall is regulated.

Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for the
use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. It is often, however,
confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and, in popular language, the
term is applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two
adjoining farms of the same extent, and of the same natural fertility, one had all the
conveniences of farming buildings, and, besides, were properly drained and
manured, and advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other
had none of these advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the
use of one, than for the use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would
be called rent. But it is evident, that a portion only of the money annually to be paid
for the improved farm, would be given for the original and indestructible powers of
the soil; the other portion would be paid for the use of the capital which had been
employed in ameliorating the quality of the land, and in erecting such buildings as
were necessary to secure and preserve the produce. Adam Smith sometimes speaks
of rent, in the strict sense to which I am desirous of confining it, but more often in
the popular sense, in which the term is usually employed. He tells us, that the
demand for timber, and its consequent high price, in the more southern countries of
Europe, caused a rent to be paid for forests in Norway, which could before afford
no rent. Is it not, however, evident, that the person who paid what he thus calls rent,
paid it in consideration of the valuable commodity which was then standing on the
land, and that he actually repaid himself with a profit, by the sale of the timber? If,
indeed, after the timber was removed, any compensation were paid to the landlord
for the use of the land, for the purpose of growing timber or any other produce, with
a view to future demand, such compensation might justly be called rent, because it
would be paid for the productive powers of the land; but in the case stated by Adam
Smith, the compensation was paid for the liberty of removing and selling the
timber, and not for the liberty of growing it. He speaks also of the rent of coal
mines, and of stone quarries, to which the same observation applies—that the
compensation given for the mine or quarry, is paid for the value of the coal or stone
which can be removed from them, and has no connection with the original and
indestructible powers of the land. This is a distinction of great importance, in an
enquiry concerning rent and profits; for it is found, that the laws which regulate the
progress of rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of
profits, and seldom operate in the same direction. In all improved countries, that
which is annually paid to the landlord, partaking of both characters, rent and profit,
is sometimes kept stationary by the effects of opposing causes; at other times
advances or recedes, as one or the other of these causes preponderates. In the future
pages of this work, then, whenever I speak of the rent of land, I wish to be
understood as speaking of that compensation, which is paid to the owner of land for
the use of its original and indestructible powers.
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 2
On the first settling of a country, in which there is an abundance of rich and fertile
land, a very small proportion of which is required to be cultivated for the support of
the actual population, or indeed can be cultivated with the capital which the
population can command, there will be no rent; for no one would pay for the use of
land, when there was an abundant quantity not yet appropriated, and, therefore, at
the disposal of whosoever might choose to cultivate it.

On the common principles of supply and demand, no rent could be paid for such
land, for the reason stated why nothing is given for the use of air and water, or for
any other of the gifts of nature which exist in boundless quantity. With a given
quantity of materials, and with the assistance of the pressure of the atmosphere, and
the elasticity of steam, engines may perform work, and abridge human labour to a
very great extent; but no charge is made for the use of these natural aids, because
they are inexhaustible, and at every man's disposal. In the same manner the brewer,
the distiller, the dyer, make incessant use of the air and water for the production of
their commodities; but as the supply is boundless, they bear no price.8 If all land
had the same properties, if it were unlimited in quantity, and uniform in quality, no
charge could be made for its use, unless where it possessed peculiar advantages of
situation. It is only, then, because land is not unlimited in quantity and uniform in
quality, and because in the progress of population, land of an inferior quality, or
less advantageously situated, is called into cultivation, that rent is ever paid for the
use of it. When in the progress of society, land of the second degree of fertility is
taken into cultivation, rent immediately commences on that of the first quality, and
the amount of that rent will depend on the difference in the quality of these two
portions of land.

[8 "The earth, as we have already seen, is not the only agent of nature which has a productive
power; but it is the only one, or nearly so, that one set of men take to themselves, to the
exclusion of others; and of which, consequently, they can appropriate the benefits. The
waters of rivers, and of the sea, by the power which they have of giving movement to our
machines, carrying our boats, nourishing our fish, have also a productive power; the wind
which turns our mills, and even the heat of the sun, work for us; but happily no one has yet
been able to say, 'the wind and the sun are mine, and the service which they render must be
paid for.' " —Economie Politique, by J.B. Say, vol. ii. p. 124.]

When land of the third quality is taken into cultivation, rent immediately
commences on the second, and it is regulated as before, by the difference in their
productive powers. At the same time, the rent of the first quality will rise, for that
must always be above the rent of the second, by the difference between the produce
which they yield with a given quantity of capital and labour. With every step in the
progress of population, which shall oblige a country to have recourse to land of a
worse quality, to enable it to raise its supply of food, rent, on all the more fertile
land, will rise.

Thus suppose land—No. 1, 2, 3,—to yield, with an equal employment of capital

and labour, a net produce of 100, 90, and 80 quarters of corn. In a new country,
where there is an abundance of fertile land compared with the population, and
where therefore it is only necessary to cultivate No. 1, the whole net produce will
belong to the cultivator, and will be the profits of the stock which he advances. As
soon as population had so far increased as to make it necessary to cultivate No. 2,
from which ninety quarters only can be obtained after supporting the labourers, rent
would commence on No. 1; for either there must be two rates of profit on
agricultural capital, or ten quarters, or the value of ten quarters must be withdrawn
from the produce of No. 1, for some other purpose. Whether the proprietor of the
land, or any other person, cultivated No. 1, these ten quarters would equally
constitute rent; for the cultivator of No. 2 would get the same result with his capital,
whether he cultivated No. 1, paying ten quarters for rent, or continued to cultivate
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 3
No. 2, paying no rent. In the same manner it might be shown that when No. 3 is
brought into cultivation, the rent of No. 2 must be ten quarters, or the value of ten
quarters, whilst the rent of No. 1 would rise to twenty quarters; for the cultivator of
No. 3 would have the same profits whether he paid twenty quarters for the rent of
No. 1, ten quarters for the rent of No. 2, or cultivated No. 3 free of all rent.

It often, and, indeed, commonly happens, that before No. 2, 3, 4, or 5, or the

inferior lands are cultivated, capital can be employed more productively on those
lands which are already in cultivation. It may perhaps be found, that by doubling
the original capital employed on No. 1, though the produce will not be doubled,
will not be increased by 100 quarters, it may be increased by eighty-five quarters,
and that this quantity exceeds what could be obtained by employing the same
capital, on land No. 3.

In such case, capital will be preferably employed on the old land, and will equally
create a rent; for rent is always the difference between the produce obtained by the
employment of two equal quantities of capital and labour. If, with a capital of
£1,000, a tenant obtain 100 quarters of wheat from his land, and by the employment
of a second capital of £1,000, he obtain a further return of eighty-five, his landlord
would have the power at the expiration of his lease, of obliging him to pay fifteen
quarters, or an equivalent value, for additional rent; for there cannot be two rates of
profit. If he is satisfied with a diminution of fifteen quarters in the return for his
second £1,000, it is because no employment more profitable can be found for it.
The common rate of profit would be in that proportion, and if the original tenant
refused, some other person would be found willing to give all which exceeded that
rate of profit to the owner of the land from which he derived it.

In this case, as well as in the other, the capital last employed pays no rent. For the
greater productive powers of the first £1,000, fifteen quarters is paid for rent, for
the employment of the second £1,000 no rent whatever is paid. If a third £1,000 be
employed on the same land, with a return of seventy-five quarters, rent will then be
paid for the second £1,000, and will be equal to the difference between the produce
of these two, or ten quarters; and at the same time the rent of the first £1,000 will
rise from fifteen to twenty-five quarters; while the last £1,000 will pay no rent
whatever.

If, then, good land existed in a quantity much more abundant than the production of
food for an increasing population required, or if capital could be indefinitely
employed without a diminished return on the old land, there could be no rise of
rent; for rent invariably proceeds from the employment of an additional quantity of
labour with a proportionally less return.

The most fertile, and most favorably situated, land will be first cultivated, and the
exchangeable value of its produce will be adjusted in the same manner as the
exchangeable value of all other commodities, by the total quantity of labour
necessary in various forms, from first to last, to produce it, and bring it to market.
When land of an inferior quality is taken into cultivation, the exchangeable value of
raw produce will rise, because more labour is required to produce it.

The exchangeable value of all commodities, whether they be manufactured, or the

produce of the mines, or the produce of land, is always regulated, not by the less
quantity of labour that will suffice for their production under circumstances highly
favorable, and exclusively enjoyed by those who have peculiar facilities of
production; but by the greater quantity of labour necessarily bestowed on their
production by those who have no such facilities; by those who continue to produce
them under the most unfavorable circumstances; meaning—by the most
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 4
unfavorable circumstances, the most unfavorable under which the quantity of
produce required, renders it necessary to carry on the production.

Thus, in a charitable institution, where the poor are set to work with the funds of
benefactors, the general prices of the commodities, which are the produce of such
work, will not be governed by the peculiar facilities afforded to these workmen, but
by the common, usual, and natural difficulties, which every other manufacturer will
have to encounter. The manufacturer enjoying none of these facilities might indeed
be driven altogether from the market, if the supply afforded by these favored
workmen were equal to all the wants of the community; but if he continued the
trade, it would be only on condition that he should derive from it the usual and
general rate of profits on stock; and that could only happen when his commodity
sold for a price proportioned to the quantity of labour bestowed on its production.9

[9 Has not M. Say forgotten, in the following passage, that it is the cost of production which
ultimately regulates price? "The produce of labour employed on the land has this peculiar
property, that it does not become more dear by becoming more scarce, because population
always diminishes at the same time that food diminishes, and consequently the quantity of
these products demanded, diminishes at the same time as the quantity supplied. Besides, it is
not observed that corn is more dear in those places where there is plenty of uncultivated land,
than in completely cultivated countries. England and France were much more imperfectly
cultivated in the middle ages than they are now; they produced much less raw produce:
nevertheless from all we can judge by a comparison with the value of other things, corn was
not sold at a dearer price. If the produce was less, so was the population; the weakness of the
demand compensated the feebleness of the supply." Vol. ii. 338. M. Say being impressed
with the opinion that the price of commodities is regulated by the price of labour, and justly
supposing that charitable institutions of all sorts tend to increase the population beyond what
it otherwise would be, and therefore to lower wages, says, "I suspect that the cheapness of the
goods, which come from England, is partly caused by the numerous charitable institutions
which exist in that country." Vol. ii. 277. This is a consistent opinion in one who maintains
that wages regulate price.]

It is true, that on the best land, the same produce would still be obtained with the
same labour as before, but its value would be enhanced in consequence of the
diminished returns obtained by those who employed fresh labour and stock on the
less fertile land. Notwithstanding, then, that the advantages of fertile over inferior
lands are in no case lost, but only transferred from the cultivator, or consumer, to
the landlord, yet, since more labour is required on the inferior lands, and since it is
from such land only that we are enabled to furnish ourselves with the additional
supply of raw produce, the comparative value of that produce will continue
permanently above its former level, and make it exchange for more hats, cloth,
shoes, &c. &c. in the production of which no such additional quantity of labour is
required.

The reason then, why raw produce rises in comparative value, is because more
labour is employed in the production of the last portion obtained, and not because a
rent is paid to the landlord. The value of corn is regulated by the quantity of labour
bestowed on its production on that quality of land, or with that portion of capital,
which pays no rent. Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid
because corn is high; and it has been justly observed, that no reduction would take
place in the price of corn, although landlords should forego the whole of their rent.
Such a measure would only enable some farmers to live like gentlemen, but would
not diminish the quantity of labour necessary to raise raw produce on the least
productive land in cultivation.

Nothing is more common than to hear of the advantages which the land possesses
over every other source of useful produce, on account of the surplus which it yields
in the form of rent. Yet when land is most abundant, when most productive, and
most fertile, it yields no rent; and it is only when its powers decay, and less is
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 5
yielded in return for labour, that a share of the original produce of the more fertile
portions is set apart for rent. It is singular that this quality in the land, which should
have been noticed as an imperfection, compared with the natural agents by which
manufacturers are assisted, should have been pointed out as constituting its peculiar
pre-eminence. If air, water, the elasticity of steam, and the pressure of the
atmosphere, were of various qualities; if they could be appropriated, and each
quality existed only in moderate abundance, they, as well as the land, would afford
a rent, as the successive qualities were brought into use. With every worse quality
employed, the value of the commodities in the manufacture of which they were
used, would rise, because equal quantities of labour would be less productive. Man
would do more by the sweat of his brow, and nature perform less; and the land
would be no longer pre-eminent for its limited powers.

If the surplus produce which land affords in the form of rent be an advantage, it is
desirable that, every year, the machinery newly constructed should be less efficient
than the old, as that would undoubtedly give a greater exchangeable value to the
goods manufactured, not only by that machinery but by all the other machinery in
the kingdom; and a rent would be paid to all those who possessed the most
productive machinery.10

[10 "In agriculture too," says Adam Smith, "nature labours along with man; and though her
labour costs no expense, its produce has its value, as well as that of the most expensive
workman." The labour of nature is paid, not because she does much, but because she does
little. In proportion as she becomes niggardly in her gifts, she exacts a greater price for her
work. Where she is munificently beneficent, she always works gratis. "The labouring cattle
employed in agriculture, not only occasion, like the workmen in manufactures, the
reproduction of a value equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs
them, together with its owner's profits, but of a much greater value. Over and above the
capital of the farmer and all its profits, they regularly occasion the reproduction of the rent of
the landlord. This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of nature, the use of
which the landlord lends to the farmer. It is greater or smaller according to the supposed
extent of those powers, or in other words, according to the supposed natural or improved
fertility of the land. It is the work of nature which remains, after deducting or compensating
every thing which can be regarded as the work of man. It is seldom less than a fourth, and
frequently more than a third of the whole produce. No equal quantity of productive labour
employed in manufactures, can ever occasion so great a reproduction. In them nature does
nothing, man does all; and the reproduction must always be in proportion to the strength of
the agents that occasion it. The capital employed in agriculture, therefore, not only puts into
motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed in
manufactures, but in proportion too, to the quantity of the productive labour which it
employs, it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways in which a capital
can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to the society." Book II, chap. v. p. 15.

Does nature nothing for man in manufactures? Are the powers of wind and water, which
move our machinery, and assist navigation, nothing? The pressure of the atmosphere and the
elasticity of steam, which enable us to work the most stupendous engines—are they not the
gifts of nature? to say nothing of the effects of the matter of heat in softening and melting
metals, of the decomposition of the atmosphere in the process of dyeing and fermentation.
There is not a manufacture which can be mentioned, in which nature does not give her
assistance to man, and give it too, generously and gratuitously.

In remarking on the passage which I have copied from Adam Smith, Mr. Buchanan observes,
"I have endeavoured to show, in the observations on productive and unproductive labour,
contained in the fourth volume, that agriculture adds no more to the national stock than any
other sort of industry. In dwelling on the reproduction of rent as so great an advantage to
society, Dr. Smith does not reflect that rent is the effect of high price, and that what the
landlord gains in this way, he gains at the expense of the community at large. There is no
absolute gain to the society by the reproduction of rent; it is only one class profiting at the
expense of another class. The notion of agriculture yielding a produce, and a rent in
consequence, because nature concurs with human industry in the process of cultivation, is a
mere fancy. It is not from the produce, but from the price at which the produce is sold, that
the rent is derived; and this price is got not because nature assists in the production, but
because it is the price which suits the consumption to the supply."]
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 6
The rise of rent is always the effect of the increasing wealth of the country, and of
the difficulty of providing food for its augmented population. It is a symptom, but it
is never a cause of wealth; for wealth often increases most rapidly while rent is
either stationary, or even falling. Rent increases most rapidly, as the disposable land
decreases in its productive powers. Wealth increases most rapidly in those countries
where the disposable land is most fertile, where importation is least restricted, and
where through agricultural improvements, productions can be multiplied without
any increase in the proportional quantity of labour, and where consequently the
progress of rent is slow.

If the high price of corn were the effect, and not the cause of rent, price would be
proportionally influenced as rents were high or low, and rent would be a component
part of price. But that corn which is produced by the greatest quantity of labour is
the regulator of the price of corn; and rent does not and cannot enter in the least
degree as a component part of its price.11 Adam Smith, therefore, cannot be correct
in supposing that the original rule which regulated the exchangeable value of
commodities, namely, the comparative quantity of labour by which they were
produced, can be at all altered by the appropriation of land and the payment of rent.
Raw material enters into the composition of most commodities, but the value of that
raw material, as well as corn, is regulated by the productiveness of the portion of
capital last employed on the land, and paying no rent; and therefore rent is not a
component part of the price of commodities.

[11 The clearly understanding this principle is, I am persuaded, of the utmost importance to
the science of political economy.]

We have been hitherto considering the effects of the natural progress of wealth and
population on rent, in a country in which the land is of variously productive
powers; and we have seen, that with every portion of additional capital which it
becomes necessary to employ on the land with a less productive return, rent would
rise. It follows from the same principles, that any circumstances in the society
which should make it unnecessary to employ the same amount of capital on the
land, and which should therefore make the portion last employed more productive,
would lower rent. Any great reduction in the capital of a country, which should
materially diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of labour, would
naturally have this effect. Population regulates itself by the funds which are to
employ it, and therefore always increases or diminishes with the increase or
diminution of capital. Every reduction of capital is therefore necessarily followed
by a less effective demand for corn, by a fall of price, and by diminished
cultivation. In the reverse order to that in which the accumulation of capital raises
rent, will the diminution of it lower rent. Land of a less unproductive quality will be
in succession relinquished, the exchangeable value of produce will fall, and land of
a superior quality will be the land last cultivated, and that which will then pay no
rent.

The same effects may however be produced, when the wealth and population of a
country are increased, if that increase is accompanied by such marked
improvements in agriculture, as shall have the same effect of diminishing the
necessity of cultivating the poorer lands, or of expending the same amount of
capital on the cultivation of the more fertile portions.

If a million of quarters of corn be necessary for the support of a given population,

and it be raised on land of the qualities of No. 1, 2, 3; and if an improvement be
afterwards discovered by which it can be raised on No. 1 and 2, without employing
No. 3, it is evident that the immediate effect must be a fall of rent; for No. 2, instead
of No. 3, will then be cultivated without paying any rent; and the rent of No. 1,
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 7
instead of being the difference between the produce of No. 3 and No. 1, will be the
difference only between No. 2 and 1. With the same population, and no more, there
can be no demand for any additional quantity of corn; the capital and labour
employed on No. 3 will be devoted to the production of other commodities
desirable to the community, and can have no effect in raising rent, unless the raw
material from which they are made cannot be obtained without employing capital
less advantageously on the land, in which case No. 3 must again be cultivated.

It is undoubtedly true, that the fall in the relative price of raw produce, in
consequence of the improvement in agriculture, or rather in consequence of less
labour being bestowed on its production, would naturally lead to increased
accumulation; for the profits of stock would be greatly augmented. This
accumulation would lead to an increased demand for labour, to higher wages, to an
increased population, to a further demand for raw produce, and to an increased
cultivation. It is only, however, after the increase in the population, that rent would
be as high as before; that is to say, after No. 3 was taken into cultivation. A
considerable period would have elapsed, attended with a positive diminution of
rent.

But improvements in agriculture are of two kinds: those which increase the
productive powers of the land, and those which enable us, by improving our
machinery, to obtain its produce with less labour. They both lead to a fall in the
price of raw produce; they both affect rent, but they do not affect it equally. If they
did not occasion a fall in the price of raw produce, they would not be
improvements; for it is the essential quality of an improvement to diminish the
quantity of labour before required to produce a commodity; and this diminution
cannot take place without a fall of its price or relative value.

The improvements which increase the productive powers of the land, are such as
the more skilful rotation of crops, or the better choice of manure. These
improvements absolutely enable us to obtain the same produce from a smaller
quantity of land. If, by the introduction of a course of turnips, I can feed my sheep
besides raising my corn, the land on which the sheep were before fed becomes
unnecessary, and the same quantity of raw produce is raised by the employment of
a less quantity of land. If I discover a manure which will enable me to make a piece
of land produce 20 per cent more corn, I may withdraw at least a portion of my
capital from the most unproductive part of my farm. But, as I before observed, it is
not necessary that land should be thrown out of cultivation, in order to reduce rent:
to produce this effect, it is sufficient that successive portions of capital are
employed on the same land with different results, and that the portion which gives
the least result should be withdrawn. If, by the introduction of the turnip husbandry,
or by the use of a more invigorating manure, I can obtain the same produce with
less capital, and without disturbing the difference between the productive powers of
the successive portions of capital, I shall lower rent; for a different and more
productive portion will be that which will form the standard from which every other
will be reckoned. If, for example, the successive portions of capital yielded 100, 90,
80, 70; whilst I employed these four portions, my rent would be 60, or the
difference between

100
70 and 100 = 30 ⏐ ⏐ 90
70 and 90 = 20 ⏐ whilst the produce would be 340 ⏐ 80
70 and 80 = 10 ⏐ ⏐ 70
60 ⏐ ⏐340

and while I employed these portions, the rent would remain the same, although the
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 8
produce of each should have an equal augmentation. If, instead of 100, 90, 80, 70,
the produce should be increased to 125, 115, 105, 95, the rent would still be 60, or
the difference between

95 and 125 = 30 ⏐ ⏐ 125

95 and 115 = 20 ⏐ whilst the produce would be increased ⏐ 115
95 and 105 = 10 ⏐ to 440 ⏐ 105
60 ⏐ ⏐ 95
440

But with such an increase of produce, without an increase of demand,12 there could
be no motive for employing so much capital on the land; one portion would be
withdrawn, and consequently the last portion of capital would yield 105 instead of
95, and rent would fall to 30, or the difference between

105 and 125 = 20 ⏐ ⏐ 125

105 and 115 = 10 ⏐ whilst the produce will be adequate ⏐ 115
⏐ to the wants of the population ⏐ 105
60 ⏐ for it would be 345 ⏐ 345

the demand being only for 340 quarters.—But there are improvements which may
lower the relative value of produce without lowering the corn rent, though they will
lower the money rent of land. Such improvements do not increase the productive
powers of the land; but they enable us to obtain its produce with less labour. They
are rather directed to the formation of the capital applied to the land, than to the
cultivation of the land itself. Improvements in agricultural implements, such as the
plough and the thrashing machine, economy in the use of horses employed in
husbandry, and a better knowledge of the veterinary art, are of this nature. Less
capital, which is the same thing as less labour, will be employed on the land; but to
obtain the same produce, less land cannot be cultivated. Whether improvements of
this kind, however, affect corn rent, must depend on the question, whether the
difference between the produce obtained by the employment of different portions of
capital be increased, stationary, or diminished. If four portions of capital, 50, 60,
70, 80, be employed on the land, giving each the same results, and any
improvement in the formation of such capital should enable me to withdraw 5 from
each, so that they should be 45, 55, 65, and 75, no alteration would take place in the
corn rent; but if the improvements were such as to enable me to make the whole
saving on that portion of capital, which is least productively employed, corn rent
would immediately fall, because the difference between the capital most
productive, and the capital least productive, would be diminished; and it is this
difference which constitutes rent.

[12 I hope I am not understood as undervaluing the importance of all sorts of improvements
in agriculture to landlords—their immediate effect is to lower rent; but as they give a great
stimulus to population, and at the same time enable us to cultivate poorer lands, with less
labour, they are ultimately of immense advantage to landlords. A period however must
elapse, during which they are positively injurious to him.]

Without multiplying instances, I hope enough has been said to show, that whatever
diminishes the inequality in the produce obtained from successive portions of
capital employed on the same or on new land, tends to lower rent; and that
whatever increases that inequality, necessarily produces an opposite effect, and
tends to raise it.

In speaking of the rent of the landlord, we have rather considered it as the

proportion of the produce, obtained with a given capital on any given farm, without
Ricardo, Principles, Chapter 2: On Rent 9
any reference to its exchangeable value; but since the same cause, the difficulty of
production, raises the exchangeable value of raw produce, and raises also the
proportion of raw produce paid to the landlord for rent, it is obvious that the
landlord is doubly benefited by difficulty of production. First, he obtains a greater
share, and secondly the commodity in which he is paid is of greater value.13

[13
To make this obvious, and to show the degrees in which corn and money rent will vary, let
us suppose that the labour of ten men will, on land of a certain quality, obtain 180 quarters of
wheat, and its value to be £4 per quarter, or £720; and that the labour of ten additional men
will, on the same or any other land, produce only 170 quarters in addition; wheat would rise
from £4 to £4 4s. 8d. for 170: 180: £4 4s. 8d.; or, as in the production of 170 quarters, the
labour of ten men is necessary in one case, and only of 9.44 in the other, the rise would be as
9.44 to 10, or as £4 to £4 4s. 8d. If 10 men be further employed, and the return be

160, the price will rise to £4 10s. 0d.

150, the price will rise to £4 16s. 0d.
140, the price will rise to £5 2s. 10d.

Now if no rent was paid for the land which yielded 180 quarters, when corn was at £4 per
quarter, the value of 10 quarters would be paid as rent when only 170 could be procured,
which at £4 4s. 8d. would be £42 7s. 6d.

20 qrs. when 160 were produced, which at £4 10s. 0d. would be £90 0s. 0d.
30 qrs. ... 150 .... 4 16s. 0d. ... 144 0s. 0d.
40 qrs. ... 140 .... 5 2s. 10d. ... 205 13s. 4d.

Corn rent would 100 100

and money
increase 200 212
rent in the
in the proportion 300 340
proportion of
of 400 485