G.R. No. L-29900 June 28, 1974 petitioner-creditor had already prescribed.

The promissory note, dated

January 30, 1962, is worded thus: " `For value received from time to time
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUSTO PALANCA, since 1947, we [jointly and severally promise to] pay to Mr. [George Pay] at
Deceased, GEORGE PAY, petitioner-appellant, his office at the China Banking Corporation the sum of [Twenty Six Thousand
vs. Nine Hundred Pesos] (P26,900.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
SEGUNDINA CHUA VDA. DE PALANCA, oppositor-appellee. per annum upon receipt by either of the undersigned of cash payment from
the Estate of the late Don Carlos Palanca or upon demand'. . . . As stated,
this promissory note is signed by Rosa Gonzales Vda. de Carlos Palanca
Florentino B. del Rosario for petitioner-appellant.
and Justo Palanca."2 Then came this paragraph: "The Court has inquired
whether any cash payment has been received by either of the signers of this
Manuel V. San Jose for oppositor-appellee. promissory note from the Estate of the late Carlos Palanca. Petitioner
informed that he does not insist on this provision but that petitioner is only
claiming on his right under the promissory note ."3 After which, came the
ruling that the wording of the promissory note being "upon demand," the
DECISION obligation was immediately due. Since it was dated January 30, 1952, it was
clear that more "than ten (10) years has already transpired from that time
FERNANDO, J.:p until to date. The action, therefore, of the creditor has definitely
prescribed."4 The result, as above noted, was the dismissal of the petition.
There is no difficulty attending the disposition of this appeal by petitioner on questions
of law. While several points were raised, the decisive issue is whether a creditor is In an exhaustive brief prepared by Attorney Florentino B. del Rosario,
barred by prescription in his attempt to collect on a promissory note executed more petitioner did assail the correctness of the rulings of the lower court as to the
than fifteen years earlier with the debtor sued promising to pay either upon receipt by effect of the refusal of the surviving spouse of the late Justo Palanca to be
him of his share from a certain estate or upon demand, the basis for the action being appointed as administratrix, as to the property sought to be administered no
the latter alternative. The lower court held that the ten-year period of limitation of longer belonging to the debtor, the late Justo Palanca, and as to the rights of
actions did apply, the note being immediately due and demandable, the creditor petitioner-creditor having already prescribed. As noted at the outset, only the
admitting expressly that he was relying on the wording "upon demand." On the above
facts as found, and with the law being as it is, it cannot be said that its decision is
question of prescription need detain us in the disposition of this appeal.
infected with error. We affirm. Likewise, as intimated, the decision must be affirmed, considering the clear
tenor of the promissory note.
From the appealed decision, the following appears: "The parties in this case
agreed to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of their pleadings and From the manner in which the promissory note was executed, it would
annexes and their respective memoranda submitted. Petitioner George Pay appear that petitioner was hopeful that the satisfaction of his credit could he
is a creditor of the Late Justo Palanca who died in Manila on July 3, 1963. realized either through the debtor sued receiving cash payment from the
The claim of the petitioner is based on a promissory note dated January 30, estate of the late Carlos Palanca presumptively as one of the heirs, or, as
1952, whereby the late Justo Palanca and Rosa Gonzales Vda. de Carlos expressed therein, "upon demand." There is nothing in the record that would
Palanca promised to pay George Pay the amount of P26,900.00, with indicate whether or not the first alternative was fulfilled. What is undeniable is
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum. George Pay is now before this that on August 26, 1967, more than fifteen years after the execution of the
Court, asking that Segundina Chua vda. de Palanca, surviving spouse of the promissory note on January 30, 1952, this petition was filed. The defense
late Justo Palanca, he appointed as administratrix of a certain piece of interposed was prescription. Its merit is rather obvious. Article 1179 of the
property which is a residential dwelling located at 2656 Taft Avenue, Manila, Civil Code provides: "Every obligation whose performance does not depend
covered by Tax Declaration No. 3114 in the name of Justo Palanca, upon a future or uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the
assessed at P41,800.00. The idea is that once said property is brought under parties, is demandable at once." This used to be Article 1113 of the Spanish
administration, George Pay, as creditor, can file his claim against the Civil Code of 1889. As far back as Floriano v. Delgado,5 a 1908 decision, it
administratrix."1 It then stated that the petition could not prosper as there was has been applied according to its express language. The well-known Spanish
a refusal on the part of Segundina Chua Vda. de Palanca to be appointed as commentator, Manresa, on this point, states: "Dejando con acierto, el
administratrix; that the property sought to be administered no longer caracter mas teorico y grafico del acto, o sea la perfeccion de este, se fija,
belonged to the debtor, the late Justo Palanca; and that the rights of
para determinar el concepto de la obligacion pura, en el distinctive de esta, y Fidelity and Surety Co., 52 Phil. 926 (1929); Lutero Suiliong and Co., 54 Phil.
que es consecuencia de aquel: la exigibilidad immediata."6 272 (1930); De Borja v. De Borja, 58 Phil. 811 (1933); International Banking
Corp. v. Yared, 59 Phil. 72 (1933); Barretto v. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845 (1934);
The obligation being due and demandable, it would appear that the filing of Hijos de F. Escano v. Nazareno, 60 Phil. 104 (1934); Matute v. Matute, 62
the suit after fifteen years was much too late. For again, according to the Civil Phil. 676 (1935); Cunanan v. De Antepasado. L-16169. Aug 31, 1962, 5
Code, which is based on Section 43 of Act No. 190, the prescriptive period SCRA 1028; General Insurance and Surety Corp. v. Republic, L-13873, Jan.
for a written contract is that of ten years.7 This is another instance where this 31, 1963, 7 SCRA 4.
Court has consistently adhered to the express language of the applicable
norm.8 There is no necessity therefore of passing upon the other legal
questions as to whether or not it did suffice for the petition to fail just because
the surviving spouse refuses to be made administratrix, or just because the
estate was left with no other property. The decision of the lower court cannot
be overturned.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of July 24, 1968 is affirmed. Costs
against George Pay.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Decision, Record on Appeal, 46-47.

2 Ibid, 48-49.

3 Ibid, 49.

4 Ibid.

5 11 Phil. 154.

6 VIII Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Quinta edicion, 305 (1950)..

7 Article 1144 of the Civil code provides: "The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:(1) Upon a
written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law;(3) Upon a judgment."

8 Cf. Azarraga v. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637 (1908); Brillantes v. Margarejo, 36

Phil. 202 (1917); Agoncillo v. Javier, 38 Phil. 424 (1918); Sarmiento v.
Javellana, 43 Phil. 880 (1922); Ban Kiat and Co. v. Atkins, Kroll and Co., 44
Phil. 4 (1922); F. M. Yap Tico and Co. v. Lopez Vito, 49 Phil. 61 (1926);
Parks v. Province of Tarlac, 49 Phil. 142 (1926); Hospicio de San Jose v.