A HRC 46 50-En

United Nations A/HRC/46/50
General Assembly Distr.: General

11 January 2021
Original: English
Human Rights Council

Forty-sixth session
22 February–19 March 2021
Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention
Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in

the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman
Summary
The present report provides an overview of current human rights concerns in the
Islamic Republic of Iran. In the report, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran details observations regarding trends, concerns and
progress made in the protection of human rights and puts forward recommendations to
improve the human rights situation.
GE.21-00256(E)
A/HRC/46/50
I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 43/24,
in which the Council requested the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran to submit a report at its forty-sixth session. It contains information
collected up until 3 December 2020, including from the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Iran and non-governmental and media organizations, and through interviews with victims
of alleged violations and their families and lawyers. The Special Rapporteur appreciates the
Government’s engagement and the increased response to communications from special
procedures. The Government’s dialogue with the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights is also encouraging. The Special Rapporteur regrets that
requests to visit the country have not been accepted.
2. The Special Rapporteur details the current human rights situation in the country, with
a focus on the situation of women and girls. While some steps have been taken towards
gender equality, he expresses concern that gender-based discrimination persists in law,
practice and societal attitudes. He outlines where the Government can reform and promote
gender-equal policies, including by repealing discriminatory family, criminal and
employment laws, protecting women from violence, promoting female leadership and full
participation in cultural life, and ending the targeting of women’s rights advocates.
3. The Special Rapporteur is dismayed that sanctions imposed by the United States of
America continue to have a negative impact on economic and social rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, especially during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, with
humanitarian exemptions proving unsuccessful. Notwithstanding the above, there are
concerns that the Government’s pandemic response remains inadequate and opaque,
especially relating to protecting detainees in overcrowded and unhygienic prisons. The
Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned at the high execution rate in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, expressing particular alarm at the recent implementation of the death
penalty against protesters. The Government has failed to conduct an independent and
transparent investigation into the violent State response to the November 2019 protests or
hold perpetrators accountable. While the release and pardons of some human rights defenders,
lawyers, dual and foreign nationals and labour rights activists are welcomed, State targeting
of individuals from these groups continues. Ongoing discrimination against ethnic, religious
and sexual minorities remains a serious concern.
4. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern the killing of Iranian nuclear scientist and
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps brigadier general Mohsen Fakhrizadeh while he was
travelling through Absard, Tehran Province, on 27 November 2020. The Special Rapporteur
condemns this assassination as an arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He invites the Government to share
further information to enable him to establish his views on the assassination.
II. Overview of the human rights situation in the Islamic

Republic of Iran
A. Death penalty, right to a fair trial and arbitrary detention
5. The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned at the high number of death
sentences and executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including for acts that do not
amount to the “most serious crimes” and following unfair trials. The Human Rights
Committee has consistently interpreted the most serious crimes as those involving intentional
killing. 1 Between 1 January and 1 December 2020, at least 233 people were reportedly
executed; 18 of the executions were for drug-related charges and 11 for moharebeh (taking
up arms to take lives or property or to create fear in the public) or efsad-e fel-arz (“corruption
1 General comment No. 36 (2018), paras. 5 and 35.
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on Earth”). Executions carried out in violation of international human rights law after an
unfair trial constitute arbitrary deprivation of life.
6. The Special Rapporteur is alarmed by reports of secret executions in connection with
protests, with death sentences issued in these cases following unfair trials and after the
systematic use of torture to extract forced confessions. On 12 September 2020, Navid Afkari
was secretly executed without prior notice in contravention of Iranian law. Mr. Afkari had
participated in the August 2018 protests in Shiraz, and was subsequently arrested, convicted
and given two death sentences for an alleged murder and for moharabeh.2 He denied the
accusations and stated he had been tortured to confess. The confession was later used against
him in court, 3 with the judge failing to investigate his torture claim. 4 The Government
rejected the torture allegations. On 5 August 2020, Mostafa Salehi was secretly executed for
an alleged murder, following his participation in protests that took place in December 2017
and January 2018.5 Despite denying the charges, he was reportedly held for over a year in
solitary confinement in an attempt to force a confession, 6 an allegation the Government
rejected. The main evidence reportedly used against him was a forced statement from another
individual.7 The Government claimed that Mr. Salehi had confessed and that other evidence
had supported the verdict, and that the executions of Mr. Afkari and Mr. Salehi complied
with domestic law. With regard to recommendations made during the State’s third universal
periodic review, the Government supported 1, partially supported 3, noted 2 and did not
support 16 recommendations on prohibiting torture, and partially supported 2 and did not
support 38 recommendations on death penalty reduction or elimination
(A/HRC/43/12/Add.1).
7. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that proceedings that could lead to capital
punishment have continued against protesters, including in Behbahan, Tehran and Isfahan, 8
and that the authorities may be using harsh sentences, including the death penalty, to suppress
dissent. He notes that Amir Hossein Moradi, Mohammad Rajabi and Saeed Tamjidi were
granted a retrial after earlier reports that the Supreme Court had confirmed their death
sentences in relation to their participation in protests that took place in November 2019.9 The
Government stated that torture was constitutionally prohibited and confessions under duress
were inadmissible. It claimed special fair trial rules applied in murder trials, including that a
confession could not be the sole basis for determining guilt.
Execution of child offenders

8. The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned by the continued execution of child
offenders. At least three were executed between 1 January and 1 December 2020, while over
85 child offenders are on death row. The Government’s international obligations prohibit
without exception the execution of individuals aged under 18 years at the time of the alleged
crime.10 Nevertheless, the Penal Code retains the death penalty for girls of at least 9 lunar
years and for boys of at least 15 lunar years for qisas (retribution in kind) crimes, such as
homicide, or hudud crimes, such as adultery. The Government stated that the Reconciliation
Commission and a judicial working group regularly intervened to persuade families to accept
diya (blood money) and pardon alleged child offenders.
Human rights defenders and lawyers

9. The harassment and detention of human rights defenders and lawyers for the exercise
or defence of human rights, including through prolonged detention and new convictions, is
concerning. While Golrokh Iraee was released on 8 April 2019, after being imprisoned for
2 https://iranhr.net/en/articles/4404/.
5 www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/643977/ (in Persian).
6 www.iranhr.net/en/articles/4369/.
7 Ibid.
8 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1328912020ENGLISH.PDF, p. 8;
www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1088097/ (in Persian).
9 www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53463685.
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (5).
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defending human rights,11 the appeals court in Tehran subsequently upheld new convictions
against her and Atena Daemi for condemning political prisoner executions and singing a
commemorative song.12 On 9 November 2019, Ms. Iraee was arrested in order for her to
begin her new sentence, while Ms. Daemi was kept incarcerated. Ms. Daemi was due for
release on 4 July 2020 after serving five years’ imprisonment on charges connected to her
advocacy for children’s rights and opposition to the death penalty.13 She has been sentenced
to two years’ imprisonment and 74 lashes on charges of “propaganda against the system and
disrupting prison order”.14 The release of human rights defender Narges Mohammadi on 8
October 2020 after the judiciary reduced her sentence is welcomed. Other convictions and
new charges laid in February 2020 appear to be still active, which could lead to her being
returned to prison.15 The Government stated that new charges against Ms. Mohammadi had
not yet been pursued.
10. Renewed targeting of relatives to coerce human rights defenders into stopping their
activism has been observed. On 20 October 2020, a Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced
Farangis Mazloum, mother of imprisoned human rights defender Soheil Arabi, to 18 months’
imprisonment on a national security charge for speaking out about the conditions in which
her son was being held. Mr. Arabi continues to face ill-treatment for defending prisoners’
rights. In September 2020, he was transferred to Raja’i Shahr Prison and put in a death row
cell for sending recordings to the media. The authorities denied him access to medication and
telephone calls until he was returned to Evin Prison 31 days later. 16 On 15 July 2020, it was
reported that Alireza Alinejad, brother of campaigner Masih Alinejad, had been convicted
and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment on spurious national security charges, in
reprisal against his sister’s advocacy. 17 The Government commented that a final appeals
verdict had not yet been issued. The trial judge reportedly dedicated a portion of the first
hearing to Ms. Alinejad’s activities.18
11. Iranian lawyer Mohammad Najafi remains arbitrarily detained in Arak central prison
after having received several prison sentences since 2018.19 In April 2019, an appeals court
upheld his combined 13-year prison sentence on national security-related charges. 20 The
Government stated that one of the sentences had been reduced from 10 years to 5 and a half
years of imprisonment.21 He was returned to prison on 10 May 2020 after being furloughed
under COVID-19 directives in March. Payam Derafshan has been arbitrarily detained for his
legal work and freedom of expression advocacy. On 23 July 2020, an appeals court upheld
his two-and-a-half year prison sentence and he is awaiting a Supreme Court review. The
decision came after an earlier two-year sentence for advocating against the Government ban
of the Telegram messaging application had been reduced and suspended. 22 While lawyer
Nasrin Sotoudeh was released temporarily on health grounds on 7 November 2020, 23 she was
returned, against medical recommendations, to Qarchak Prison on 2 December 2020 to
continue serving her arbitrary sentence.
11 www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/04/just-released-from-prison-golrokh-iraee-ebrahimi-faces-more-
time-behind-bars/.
12 www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/09/female-political-prisoners-to-serve-additional-two-years-for-
insulting-supreme-leader/.
13 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/09/iran-new-charges-thrown-at-political-prisoners-to-keep-them-
behind-bars/.
14 https://iranhr.net/media/files/HRD_Report_Iran_Human_Rights_Eng.pdf, p. 16.
15 www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26376&LangID=E.
16 www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/iran_-_ua_-_soheil_arabi_-_4_nov_2020.pdf.
17 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/07/activists-brother-sentenced-to-eight-years-in-prison-collective-
punishment-of-families-continues-in-iran/.
18 www.iranhumanrights.org/2020/04/masih-alinejad-my-brother-is-facing-prison-time-for-being-
related-to-me/.
19 www.iranhumanrights.org/2020/06/list-of-attorneys-imprisoned-in-iran-for-defending-human-rights/.
21 www.iranhumanrights.org/2020/06/list-of-attorneys-imprisoned-in-iran-for-defending-human-rights/.
22 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/08/imprisoned-human-rights-lawyer-in-poor-health-needs-
hospitalization/.
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Dual and foreign nationals

12. The Special Rapporteur is dismayed that at the time of writing, Iranian-Swedish
academic Ahmadreza Djalali remained at imminent risk of execution. 24 On 24 November
2020, reports emerged that Mr. Djalali had been put in solitary confinement in Evin prison
in preparation for transfer to Raja’i Shahr prison, where his execution could take place. While
reports stated that his execution had been temporarily postponed on 2 December 2020, he
remains at imminent risk. 25 Mr. Djalali received a death sentence in 2017 on spurious
espionage charges based on forced confessions. 26
13. The Special Rapporteur also remains seriously concerned about other dual and foreign
nationals arbitrarily detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including Nazanin Zaghari-
Ratcliffe, Kamran Ghaderi, Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz and Massud Mossaheb. While
noting that Ms. Zaghari-Ratcliffe remains on monitored temporary release, the Special
Rapporteur is concerned by attempts to press new charges against her near the end of her
current arbitrary imprisonment. On 2 November 2020, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
agents took the British-Iranian national to court on a new charge, reportedly based on the
same evidence used in 2016.27 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found in a 2016
opinion that her detention was arbitrary (A/HRC/WGAD/2016/28). The Government stated
that no further charge would be brought against Ms. Zaghari-Ratcliffe unless she committed
a crime. The 10-year prison sentence of Mr. Mossaheb, an Austrian-Iranian national,28 was
confirmed without a hearing by an appeals’ court in July 2020.29 The espionage accusations
against him are based on forced confessions made under torture, 30 which the State television
outlet broadcast on 13 August 2020.31 Despite suffering from serious medical conditions, he
has been denied adequate treatment and temporary furlough. 32 Similar concerns remain for
the health of Mr. Tahbaz, an American-British-Iranian national and conservationist, who is
reportedly in great pain in prison. The Government claimed that dual and foreign nationals
were not prosecuted without legal justification.
B. Rights to freedom of association and of peaceful assembly and to

freedom of expression
Aftermath of the November 2019 protests

14. The Special Rapporteur is dismayed that, more than one year on, the Government has
failed to conduct an impartial, independent and transparent investigation into the use of
excessive and lethal force during nationwide demonstrations in November 2019. As
documented (see A/75/213), evidence confirms security forces used firearms in a manner that
amounted to a serious violation of international human rights law, resulting in the deaths of
at least 304 people, including women and children. Impunity for those actions and a lack of
accountability prevail. The Government asserted that Parliament, the judiciary and the
President had established investigations and that it took seriously efforts to clarify the various
aspects of the protests.
15. The Special Rapporteur is concerned by reports that continue to emerge of the
violations committed during the protests and of harsh sentences ordered against participants.
While Iranian authorities have not released official figures, a Parliament spokesperson stated
on 25 November 2019 that around 7,000 people had been arrested. 33 Recent reports indicate
that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps raided homes, hospitals, schools and workplaces
in the days following the protests to arrest suspected demonstrators, including children, and
26 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22645&LangID=E.
27 www.theguardian.com/news/2020/nov/02/nazanin-zaghari-ratcliffe-avoids-being-returned-to-jail.
28 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25340.
29 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1333012020ENGLISH.pdf.
33 www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/514774/ (in Persian).
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to quash what officials qualified as a “very dangerous conspiracy”. 34 Detainees were

reportedly held in secret facilities without access to lawyers, with many placed in solitary
confinement, tortured, deprived of sufficient food and water and made to record false
confessions.35
16. A legal order from Behbahan, Khuzestan Province, dated 20 January 2020, reveals
that in that city alone, over 1,000 people had been arrested in connection with the protests,
with the vast majority subsequently released. 36 In October 2020, at least 36 Behbahan
protesters were sentenced to a combined total of 109 years’ imprisonment and 2,590 lashes
in the absence of the accused and their lawyers. 37 Prosecutors reportedly presented no
evidence for many of the charges. The Government stated that 27 sentences had been
suspended and disputed that no evidence had been presented. In Kurdistan Province, at least
16 protesters have to date been sentenced to a combined total of over 57 years’ imprisonment,
and 30 lashes in one case, in connection with the November 2019 protests. 38 Activists were
arrested in the provinces of Azarbayjan-e Sharqi and Azarbayjan-e Gharbi by plain-clothes
intelligence agents during and following the protests, despite not participating. They were
held in an intelligence ministry detention centre in Tabriz, Azarbayjan-e Sharqi Province for
over two months. Their relatives were harassed, intimidated and detained for short periods
for seeking information on their whereabouts. Interrogators reportedly tried to force detainees
to “confess”.39 They were all released on bail in February and March 2020 pending trial, with
none allowed a lawyer until days before the trial commenced. At least three have since been
sentenced to imprisonment or fines on national security-related charges.40
17. Information on further protests has been received. On 16 July 2020, security forces
used tear gas to disperse demonstrators in Behbahan41 and arrested over 30 people. On 8
October 2020, some commemorative gatherings after the death of Iranian singer Mohammad
Reza Shajarian turned into anti-government protests, with security forces reportedly using
batons against participants.42 Protests also took place on 17 October 2020 in several cities
with large Azerbaijani-Turk populations, with over 30 arrests reported. The Special
Rapporteur notes the judiciary’s announcement on 10 November 2020 to pardon 157 people
detained on security-related charges, including related to protests held over the past three
years. 43 While this is welcomed, he underlines that detention for exercising the rights to
freedom of association and peaceful assembly is arbitrary and anyone so detained should be
released.
Harassment and reprisals against victims

18. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that reprisals for raising allegations of human
rights violations committed during protests only reinforce impunity and further prevent
accountability. Manouchehr Bakhtiari, father of Pouya Bakhtiari, who was killed by security
forces during the November 2019 protests, has been subjected, together with other relatives,
to repeated arrests, interrogations and threats for publicly calling for justice. Following his
34 www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/02/iran-iranians-tortured-and-jailed-after-mass-protests-
amnesty-report-says.
35 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1328912020ENGLISH.PDF.
36 Ibid., p. 17.
37 www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-27396/ (in Persian).
38 https://hengaw.net/fa/news/%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AD%DA%A9%
D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%A8%D8%B3-%D9%88-%D8%B4%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8
%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B
9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%A8%
D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%
B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86 (in Persian).
39 www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/moyen-orient-afrique-du-nord/iran/docs/2020/nouveau-rapport-sur-la-
terrible-repression-de-novembre-2019/trampling-humanity-mass-arrests-disappearances-and-torture-
since-irans-november-2019-protests-advance-embargoed-version.pdf, p. 19.
40 Ibid., p. 20.
41 www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-idUSKCN24H31V.
42 www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-maestro/iranian-composer-and-opposition-beacon-shajarian-dies-at-
80-idUSKBN26T2SU.
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first arrest, he was charged with national security crimes, and subsequently released on bail.
In a letter dated 29 May 2020 addressed to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and others, Mr. Bakhtiari called for an international investigation into the
November 2019 crackdown.44 In July 2020, he was arrested and transferred to a prison in
Bandar Abbas. 45 On 12 August 2020, he went on hunger strike to protest the denial of
telephone contact with his ill mother.46 The Government stated that Mr. Bakhtiari had been
released on bail on 1 December after appearing before an investigation authority. There is
also concern regarding similar reports of harassment, including death threats, of relatives
seeking justice for the victims of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, shot down by the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on 8 January 2020.47 The Government denied harassing
relatives, and said it was addressing the legal aspects and the issue of compensation for
damages caused by the incident.
Freedom of expression and access to information

19. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned at the authorities’ repeated disruption of
telecommunications. He has previously detailed how the Government had implemented an
unprecedented Internet shutdown during the November 2019 protests, blocking those inside
the country from sending information abroad about the protest crackdown. During the recent
Behbahan protests and those related to the commemoration of Mr. Shajarian, Internet
monitors reported connectivity disruption in protest locations. 48 Additionally, government
online censorship of websites and social media platforms continues. Telegram, Twitter,
Facebook and YouTube are permanently blocked and inaccessible without circumvention
tools. Internet shutdowns and the blanket blocking of websites and applications represent a
violation of the right to freedom of expression. The Government stated that the Supreme
Leader had stressed that violation of privacy online was religiously forbidden.
20. The Special Rapporteur is also disturbed at the Government’s continued targeting of
journalists and writers. In June 2020, five journalists were sentenced to imprisonment on
charges connected to their reporting on topics such as corruption and COVID-19.49 On 24
August 2020, Kayvan Samimi, editor of Iran-e-Farda, reported to prison to serve a three-
year term on a national security charge for covering a Labour Day protest. 50 Three other
journalists were sentenced to imprisonment or began their prison terms in September 2020
on charges related to their reporting.51 On 26 September 2020, three current or former board
members of the Iranian Writers Association began multi-year imprisonment sentences for
publishing materials about censorship and alleged State-ordered killings of Association
members in the 1990s.52 Ruhollah Zam was sentenced to death in June 2020 and convicted
of “spreading corruption on Earth” for operating the AmadNews website from abroad.53 He
had reportedly been lured to Iraq and then forcibly returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran
in October 2019,54 with his alleged forced confession broadcast on State television.55
44 https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Manuchehr-Bakhtiari-Letter-to-UN-Iran-Pouya.pdf.
46 www.radiozamaneh.com/526675.
47 www.cbc.ca/news/politics/iran-flight-752-ukraine-international-airlines-crash-1.5521377.
48 https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-amid-regional-protests-xyMkjXAZ;
https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-disrupted-in-iran-as-thousands-gather-to-mourn-singer-
shajarian-Q8okW38n.
49 https://cpj.org/2020/06/at-least-5-journalists-sentenced-to-jail-in-iran-since-early-june/.
50 https://cpj.org/2020/08/iranian-journalist-kayvan-samimi-begins-3-year-jail-term-over-protest-
coverage/.
51 https://cpj.org/2020/09/mohammad-mosaed-cpj-2020-awardee-sentenced-to-more-than-4-years-in-
jail-in-iran/; https://cpj.org/2020/09/iranian-journalist-nada-sabouri-begins-3-5-year-jail-term-in-
2014-protest-case/; https://cpj.org/2020/09/iranian-journalist-khosrow-sadeghi-borojeni-begins-7-
year-jail-term/.
52 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/10/prominent-iranian-writers-sent-to-prison-for-peaceful-dissent/.
53 www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/30/iran-sentences-journalist-ruhollah-zam-to-death.
55 www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/iran-two-kurds-executed-amid-increasing-use-of-death-
penalty-as-weapon-of-repression/.
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Labour rights
21. The Special Rapporteur recognizes some recent positive steps concerning labour
rights, but encourages the Government to end the harassment of labour rights activists. He is
encouraged by the authorities’ increased consideration of the issues at the Haft Tappeh agro-
industrial company, including at a meeting on 5 August 2020, 56 and by the reported pardons
of some detained activists. The issues presented by worker representatives at the 5 August
meeting had reignited protests in June 2020, including over unpaid wages, which had
increased after the company’s 2016 privatization.57 The reported pardoning and release of
Haft Tappeh workers Esmail Bakhshi, Mohammad Khonifar and Ali Nejati, 58 and
independent teachers’ union representative Mohammad Habibi,59 is positive. A journalist and
four Haft Tappeh workers were arrested during July 2020 protests, 60 and the Ministry of
Education dismissed Mr. Habibi in April 2020.61 The Government claimed that charges in
the open cases against Mr. Bakhshi, Mr. Khonifar and Mr. Nejati were at the preliminary
stages and that Mr. Habibi had requested retirement.
22. A lack of independent trade unions has restricted workers’ ability to negotiate during
a time of economic recession. Several strikes took place in recent months across different
sectors,62 with reports of excessive actions against strikers. In June 2020, police reportedly
violently stopped a nurses’ protest in Mashhad63 and briefly detained 11 participants, while
seven North Khorasan Teachers’ Union members had prison and flogging sentences
confirmed for participation in privatization protests that took place in 2018. 64 The
Government stated it had made reform efforts to promote and improve worker associations
and to strengthen tripartite talks.
23. Labour rights activists continue to be imprisoned. Haft Tappeh supporter Sepideh
Qoliyan was returned to prison on 21 June 2020 after being freed on bail, as she refused to
request a pardon.65 The Government stated a pardon must be requested for it to be considered.
Jafar Azimzadeh, a leader of the Free Union of Iranian Workers, remains detained after
receiving a new 13-month prison sentence, upheld by an appeals court in August 2020. 66 He
has since been attacked by fellow prisoners, contracted COVID-19, been denied medical
treatment, transferred prisons and been put in solitary confinement. 67 The Government
claimed his general health was good and that he had denied the attack claim. Esmail Abdi,
an Iranian Teachers’ Trade Association member, was due for release in November 2020 after
serving a five-year sentence on arbitrary national security charges for advocating for teachers’
and education rights.68 However, the authorities have revived a suspended 10-year sentence
against him, also related to labour rights activism.69 Mr. Abdi reportedly contracted COVID-
56 www.ilna.news/fa/tiny/news-950367 (in Persian).

57 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/09/showdown-at-haft-tappeh-sugar-factory-minor-win-for-workers-
larger-abuses-left-unchecked/.
58 www.rfi.fr/fr/moyen-orient/20200524-iran-mesure-gr%C3%A2ce-plus-3-700-prisonniers (in French);
www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/623360 (in Persian); https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/06/sepideh-
qoliyan-refuses-to-beg-for-pardon-goes-back-to-prison/.
59 www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-27423/ (in Persian); www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/673038/.
60 https://en.radiozamaneh.com/labor/, June–July 2020 Report, p. 12.
61 https://en.radiozamaneh.com/labor/, April–May 2020 Report, p. 16.
62 https://en.radiozamaneh.com/labor/, August–September 2020 Report, pp. 10–15.
63 Ibid., p. 10.
64 https://en.radiozamaneh.com/labor/, June–July 2020 Report, pp. 13–14.
65 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/06/sepideh-qoliyan-refuses-to-beg-for-pardon-goes-back-to-prison/.
66 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/08/new-conviction-against-imprisoned-labor-leader-upheld-to-keep-
him-behind-bars/.
67 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/08/new-conviction-against-imprisoned-labour-leader-upheld-to-
keep-him-behind-bars/; https://en.radiozamaneh.com/labor/, August–September 2020 Report, pp. 18–
19.
68 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/09/iran-new-charges-thrown-at-political-prisoners-to-keep-them-
behind-bars/.
69 www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/ua_iran_abdi_and_azimzadeh_
130820_eng_intl.pdf.
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1970 and is not receiving proper treatment for other conditions. The Government claimed that
a prison clinic physician had recently examined him and had reported no specific health
problem.
C. Minorities
Ethnic and religious minorities

24. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned that discrimination against ethnic and
religious minorities persists, and is alarmed at reports of executions and enforced
disappearances of ethnic minority political prisoners. On 11 May 2020, Iranian authorities
secretly executed Hedayat Abdollahpour, a Kurd sentenced to death despite a lack of
evidence supporting his conviction for allegedly taking up arms against the State and
following torture-induced confessions. He was forcibly disappeared after being taken on 9
May to an undisclosed location. Authorities denied his execution for weeks until a death
certificate was made available on 24 June 2020.71 The Government denied he had confessed
under torture and claimed that other evidence supported his conviction. Similar reports were
received of Ahwazi Arabs and Kurds at risk of execution on national security charges despite
unfair trials and torture allegations.72 Concerns remain over the use of excessive force by
border security forces against Kurdish border couriers (kulbaran). Shootings by security
forces reportedly resulted in 44 kulbaran deaths between 1 January and 28 September 2020. 73
The Government claimed that shootings by border guards only targeted dangerous smugglers
and kulbaran who were working illegally.
25. The imprisonment of individuals from ethnic and religious minorities for practising
their culture, language or faith is an ongoing concern. In July 2020, the Supreme Court
rejected a judicial review request of the 15-year prison sentence against Azerbaijani-Turk
activist Abbas Lisani on specious national security charges. 74 Kurdish teacher Zara
Mohammadi was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on national security charges by the
Sanandaj Revolutionary Court on 12 July 2020 after an unfair trial. 75 The Government
claimed she had received a fair trial and that the verdict was being appealed. On 15 August
2020, Liza Tebyanian was arrested and sent to begin seven months’ imprisonment for
“teaching the Baha’i faith”. After an earlier acquittal, the Supreme Court had reinstated the
conviction without notifying her of the proceedings. The Government confirmed her sentence
and conviction but noted she had been released on end-of-imprisonment furlough. While the
10 November 2020 pardoning of 25 Gonabadi dervishes is welcomed, 76 many dervishes
remain in detention.
26. The Special Rapporteur is concerned at reports of forced evictions in ethnic minority
areas. On 26 August 2020, security forces raided a village in Ahwaz, Khuzestan province,
and fired tear gas at residents who resisted land confiscation and house demolitions, causing
injuries. At least 130 people were arrested, 60 of whom were reportedly released on bail.
Demolition orders by the judiciary for around 300 village homes were issued, despite
residents presenting evidence of ownership.77 The Government denied the arrests and stated
security forces had enforced the rights of the Mostaz’afan Foundation, which it claimed
owned the land. It confirmed the use of tear gas and “minor” injuries. Asieh Panahi was
reportedly killed by security officials on 19 May 2020 in Kermanshah as she attempted to
save her house from demolition. The Government stated the deputy mayor had been found
partially guilty for the “quasi-premeditated murder” of Ms. Panahi and had been sentenced
70 https://iranhumanrights.org/2020/08/political-prisoners-in-iran-contracting-covid-19-at-alarming-
rate/.
71 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26036.
73 https://kmmk-ge.org/sd/annual-report-2020/, p. 13.
76 www.mizanonline.com/fa/news/673038/ (in Persian); www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-27419/ (in
Persian).
77 http://tnews.ir/news/e20e171853876.html (in Persian).
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to 10 months’ imprisonment. On 22 November 2020, over 100 security agents undertook

raids without cause against Baha’is, reportedly demanding deeds and confiscating items.78 It
is feared this may lead to unlawful seizure of Baha’i-owned property.79
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons

27. The Special Rapporteur regrets that individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual
and transgender experience human rights violations and widespread discrimination. Senior
officials describe the community in hateful terms, including by labelling individuals as
“subhuman” and “diseased”.80
28. The death penalty can be imposed for consensual sexual activity between members of
the same sex in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its applicability dependent on the religion
and marital status of the persons involved and the nature of the acts (passive or active) while
“kissing and touching out of lust” between persons of the same sex is punishable by
flogging.81 The criminalization of same-sex consensual acts legitimizes violence by State
actors and private individuals, including the use of torture, beatings and rape by law
enforcement and vigilantes.82 Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons face regular
harassment and, if arrested, are denied the right to a fair trial. 83 Other forms of violence and
discrimination include sustained domestic abuse and bullying in educational institutions and
workplaces.84 These acts remain largely underreported due to the victims’ fear of persecution.
The Government highlighted its recognition of transgender persons and claimed it had
engaged in raising public awareness about their rights.
29. Substantial barriers are placed on lesbians and gays in accessing the health-care
system. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons are often advised that their gender
non-conformity or same-sex attraction represents so-called gender identity disorder, which
necessitates “reparative” therapies or sex reassignment surgeries, to “cure” them. 85 The
Government claimed that there were no restrictions on medical services and that any
treatment was administered with consent. The Special Rapporteur is also concerned at reports
that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender children were subjected to electric shocks and the
administration of hormones and strong psychoactive medications (CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4,
paras. 53–54). These practices amount to torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,
and violate the State’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
D. Impact of the economic crisis and sanctions
30. The Special Rapporteur is concerned by the impact of the economic crisis and
sanctions on the human rights situation. Since the start of the COVID-19 outbreak in
February 2020, the Government has faced significant difficulties in containing the virus, in
part due to the weakening of the national health-care system and the wider economy by the
cumulative effect of sanctions imposed by the United States since 2018. The International
Monetary Fund downgraded its economic growth forecast for the country to a 5 per cent
78 www.bic.org/news/home-raids-across-iran-indicate-alarming-increase-human-rights-violations-
against-bahais-says-bahai-international-community.
79 www.bic.org/news/home-raids-across-iran-indicate-alarming-increase-human-rights-violations-
against-bahais-says-bahai-international-community.
80 http://6rang.org/english/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Official-Hate-Speech-against-LGBT-People-in-
Iran.pdf.
81 Islamic Penal Code, arts. 233–240.
82 https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/OutRightLesbianReport.pdf, pp. 3 and 25;
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IRN/INT_CCPR_NGO_IRN_4231
7_E.pdf, p. 14.
83 https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/OutRightLesbianReport.pdf, pp. 14–17;
https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/OutRightTransReport.pdf, pp. 31–32.
84 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IRN/INT_CCPR_NGO_IRN_
42317_E.pdf, p. 14; https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/OutRightLesbianReport.pdf.
85 ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2019.pdf, p. 441.
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contraction of the gross domestic product in 2020.86 The Government noted that it supported
some 1.5 million to 2 million undocumented Afghans with free primary health services and
COVID-related testing and treatment, and had provided nearly 1 million refugees with
medical check-ups and hospitalization services during the pandemic.
31. Domestic criticism has been expressed regarding the government response to the
pandemic in view of the mortality rate, one of the highest globally,87 with 48,628 deaths as
at 1 December 2020.88 Inconsistency in COVID-19 figures announced by officials89 raised
concerns, including among health experts, 90 about the absence of accurate reporting and
transparency.91 While the National Organization for Civil Registration shows 36,853 excess
deaths between 21 June and 21 September 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, the
official COVID-19 death toll for this period is 14,855. The Deputy Health Minister stated
that the actual number of cases and deaths could be 1.5 to 2.2 times higher than official
reports.92 Health experts who questioned the Government’s management of the health crisis
reportedly faced prosecution or dismissal. 93 Iranian parliamentarians have raised concerns at
the lack of correct information concerning COVID-19.94
32. Government-adopted public health and social measures have not limited transmission
or reduced COVID-19-related mortality. Only partial restrictions have been imposed since
21 November 2020, against the repeated calls of health officials for stronger measures since
September,95 including full lockdowns. On 30 July 2020, the country’s medical associations
warned about the consequences of holding mass gatherings in August, including university
entrance exams96 and religious rituals. The decision to allow public gatherings against expert
advice97 has likely increased preventable mortality. On 28 October 2020, the State television
outlet announced that every three minutes a person died of COVID-19 in the Islamic Republic
of Iran.98
33. The Government has stood by its decision not to apply stringent public health
measures in order to avoid economic collapse and protests.99 The Special Rapporteur reminds
the State of its obligation to use the maximum of its available resources for the progressive
realization of the rights recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (art. 2 (1)). Responding to the crisis, the Government withdrew $1.1 billion
from the National Development Fund.100 It distributed, through its economic stimulus plan,
cash subsidies to the most vulnerable households in June 2020 101 and allocated 4.4 per cent
of its gross domestic product to loans for affected businesses and households.102 However,
the $5 billion emergency loan requested from the International Monetary Fund to respond to
86 www.imf.org/en/Countries/IRN.
87 https://covid19.who.int/table.
88 https://en.irna.ir/news/84131247/Some-382-more-Iranians-die-from-COVID-19.
89 www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/2/25/legislator-from-irans-qom-alleges-coronavirus-coverup;
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/03/an-absolute-disaster-iran-struggles-as-coronavirus-
spreads.
90 https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-iran-newspaper-idUSKCN2561SW.
91 https://cpj.org/2020/08/iran-shuts-down-economic-newspaper-over-covid-19-reporting/.
92 www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/10/iran-official-iraj-haririchi-coronavirus-death-toll.html.
93 www.tabnakardebil.ir/fa/news/838317/ (in Persian).
94 http://modara.ir/fa/news/103362/ (in Persian).
95 https://etemadonline.com/content/435227/ (in Persian); www.mizanonline.com/002p58 (in Persian);
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/21/iran-imposes-nationwide-covid-19-restrictions-but-no-
lockdown.
96 https://hamshahrionline.ir/x6zbY (in Persian).
97 Ibid.
98 www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-iran/iran-reports-covid-19-death-every-three-minutes-
speaker-tests-positive-idUSKBN27D1KZ.
99 www.irandaily.ir/News/269811.html?catid=3&title=269811;
https://fr.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-iran-rouhani/irans-president-calls-for-ban-on-
weddings-wakes-to-halt-virus-spread-idUSKCN24C0F5.
100 www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/04/07/2238296/leader-authorizes-using-1-billion-from-iran-
national-fund-for-coronavirus-fight.
101 www.irna.ir/news/83718476/ (in Persian).
102 www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19.
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the COVID-19 crisis 103 remains under consideration. The Government asserted that the
United States had blocked the loan request.
34. The Special Rapporteur shares the Secretary-General’s concerns that sanctions and
banking restrictions have had an adverse effect on the health sector (A/75/287), including
with respect to addressing shortages of pharmaceutical and medical items as witnessed
throughout the pandemic.104 However, the health sector had received only 27 per cent of the
allocated $1.1 billion as at 29 September 2020.105 The Government stated that the allocation
was being provided in stages. Health-care workers have not received wages for months,106
and had been working extra shifts and with limited protective equipment. 107 As at 7
November 2020, more than 300 doctors, nurses and health-care workers had died of COVID-
19, with many hospitals reaching maximum capacity.108 Sanctions limited the State’s access
to its foreign currency reserves to purchase medical supplies and the raw materials needed to
produce supplies locally.109 This disruption has led to issues of scarcity and affordability 110
affecting the right to health. Medication produced overseas required for the treatment of life
threatening or rare conditions remain scarce.111 Approximately 4.5 million diabetic patients,
600,000 of whom need daily shots, are reportedly affected by insulin shortages.
35. Humanitarian exemptions in place112 have provided limited assistance. The complex
regulatory process, limited access to non-sanctioned banking, foreign currency shortages and
the private sector’s cautious approach113 have combined to prevent trade, including in food
and medical items. The Government stated that some equipment it needed to fight COVID-
19 did not qualify for the general licences, 114 and for items authorized under special or general
licences, the challenge still lay in finding banking channels,115 particularly since the sanctions
imposed, on 8 October 2020, on 18 Iranian banks.116 Governments have attempted to develop
alternative financial channels, including through the Instrument in Support of Trade
Exchanges117 and the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Agreement. The channels have completed
only one transaction each since established in March 2019 and January 2020, respectively. 118
The due diligence required by the United States Department of the Treasury, coupled with
the liquidity crisis, puts into question the ability of the channels to allow for quick and reliable
purchases of medical items needed during a pandemic. 119 The Special Rapporteur echoes
103 www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/03/12/2221922/iran-applies-for-5-billion-loan-from-imf-to-
battle-coronavirus.
104 www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/04/21/2248171/sanctions-relief-not-enough-to-help-iran-stop-
coronavirus-richard-nephew; www.isna.ir/news/98050703466/ (in Persian);
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/22/middleeast/iran-medical-shortages-intl/index.html;
www.nytimes.com/2018/11/11/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions.html;
https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-business-and-markets/93564/impact-of-ussanctions-on-
irans-healthcare-sector; www.irna.ir/news/83236255/ (in Persian).
105 www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1399/07/08/2359073/ (in Persian).
106 www.mehrnews.com/xSbqH; www.ilna.news/fa/tiny/news-934461 (both in Persian).
108 www.isna.ir/news/99081409236/ (in Persian).
109 https://ifpnews.com/iran-producing-97-of-medicines-it-needs-domestically.
110 www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2020/9/30/us-weighing-iran-sanctions-to-cripple-humanitarian-
trade.
111 www.mehrnews.com/news/4688345/ (in Persian).
112 www.state.gov/remarks-to-the-media-3/.
113 www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/1906_Sanctions-and-Humanitarian-Action.pdf.
114 https://en.mehrnews.com/news/156654/Zarif-publishes-list-of-Iranian-health-ministryrequirements;
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/gtsr_gl8.pdf.
115 www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200331-us-sanctions-iran-coronavirus-problem.html.
116 https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1147.
117 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/japan/ 57475/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-
mogherini-creation-instexinstrument_en.
118 www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/instex-transaction/2329744;
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-instex-q-a-from-the-press-briefing-
31-mar-20; https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm890.
119 www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/as-iran-faces-virus-trump-admin-fails-to-use-
touted-swiss-channel-to-ease-medical-exports/.
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calls made by the Secretary-General,120 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights121 and several special procedure mandate holders122 to ease sanctions to enhance the
Government’s pandemic response and protection of the right to health.
E. Prison conditions
36. The State’s prisons have faced long-standing overcrowding and hygiene deficiencies
(see A/HRC/43/61), insurmountable obstacles for responding to COVID-19, according to the
World Health Organization. As of June 2020, prisons held 211,000 prisoners, 123 2.5 times
above official capacity.124 Overcrowding has made social distancing impossible, especially
following the return of furloughed prisoners since May 2020. The judiciary states that 95,000
prisoners were furloughed between 8 July and 25 August 2020. 125 The Government stated
that over 200,000 individuals had benefited from various temporary or permanent release
policies over the previous eight months.
37. Infrastructure deficiencies prevent the recommendation of isolation in single
accommodations, while cohort isolation is not respected in some prisons. In Borazjan and
Zanjan prisons, recovering prisoners, or those with COVID-19 symptoms, were reportedly
placed in regular wards; 126 similar situations in Valikabad prison were reported. Health
screening and quarantining upon admission to prison are inconsistently applied and court
transfer protocols to prevent transmission are not in place.127 Prisoner testing and treatment
are limited. Suspected COVID-19 cases are only transferred to prison clinics if their condition
deteriorates and to outside hospitals if in critical condition, resulting in prisoner deaths. 128
The Government disputed those claims, stating it had established comprehensive detection,
isolation and treatment measures.
38. Confidential letters sent by senior prison officials between February and July 2020
reveal serious shortages of protective equipment, disinfectant products and essential medical
devices. The authors of the letters warn that “security hazards” and “irreparable harm” will
result from inaction and note that, despite repeated appeals, the ministry of health has failed
to respond. 129 In June 2020, Orumiyeh prison clinic staff undertook two strikes after
employees contracted COVID-19.130 The Government denied those reports. Prisoners also
sent letters, 131 and conducted protests and hunger strikes due to the authorities’ failure to
address prison conditions and to release political prisoners under furlough directives.
Prisoners of conscience and political prisoners have contracted COVID-19 or experienced
symptoms, with many denied testing or treatment or suffering unnecessary delays in
receiving test results and treatment. The Government stated disinfectants were provided and
regularly used, infected prisoners were isolated and critical cases were sent to hospitals. The
Special Rapporteur reiterates concerns that only a few human rights defenders and lawyers,
labour rights activists, journalists and dual and foreign nationals were furloughed under
recent directives, in contravention of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
120 www.un.org/en/coronavirus/war-needs-war-time-plan-fight-it; www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-

correspondents/2020-03-24/note-correspondents-letter-the-secretary-general-g-20-members.
122 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25769&LangID=E;
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26393&LangID=E;
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25761&LangID=E;
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26155&LangID=E.
123 www.irna.ir/news/83819418/ (in Persian).
125 www.ilna.news/fa/tiny/news-958995 (in Persian).
126 http://www.iranrights.org/library/document/3764, pp. 8, 9, 11 and 21.
127 Ibid., pp. 13, 20 and 25; www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-26010/ (in Persian).
128 www.iranrights.org/library/document/3764, p. 22; www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-25693/.
129 www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1328112020ENGLISH.PDF.
130 www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-25078/; www.hra-news.org/2020/hranews/a-25332/ (both in
Persian).
131 See https://www.iranrights.org/library/document/3764, p. 33.
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Cultural Rights and rule 24, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).
III. Situation of women and girls

39. The Special Rapporteur notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken some
positive steps in the realization of women’s rights. These include the nationality law
amendment, which provides for Iranian women married to non-Iranian men a right to apply
for Iranian nationality for their children aged under 18 years. 132 In November 2020, the first
national identity card under this amendment was issued.133 The Government’s efforts to draft
legislation on domestic violence and the 2019 legislation imposing tougher sentences for acid
attacks is also welcomed.134 Significant progress was also achieved in providing equal access
to education. The female literacy rate had increased by 2016 to 80.8 per cent,135 and there has
been almost no gender gap in primary or secondary school enrolment for over a decade. 136
40. Notwithstanding these improvements, the Special Rapporteur remains deeply
concerned at the persistent discrimination against women and girls in public and private life,
enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and within law and practice.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution guarantee equal protection of men and women before
the law and the State’s undertaking to secure women’s rights. However, the provision of these
rights is subject to “the Islamic criteria”, which have been implemented by the authorities in
a manner that violates and undermines women’s dignity and fundamental human rights,
including the right to equality and non-discrimination, as established in the State’s
international human rights obligations. The Government stated that the Islamic criteria were
defined and could be updated according to societal needs.
International legal framework

41. The Islamic Republic of Iran has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasize non-discrimination and gender
equality. The State has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women. It is regrettable that the Government did not support 14
recommendations, made during its third universal periodic review, regarding the ratification
of that Convention, although it partially supported or noted 4 related recommendations. The
Government stated its authorities were examining the issue of accession to international
treaties. The State’s other international human rights obligations require it to ensure gender
equality and non-discrimination.
Discrimination in family law

42. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that substantial discrimination exists against
women and girls within family law, including laws vis-à-vis marriage, divorce, custody and
guardianship. Iranian law requires a woman to receive permission from her father or paternal
grandfather for marriage if she has not married previously, although if permission is withheld
unreasonably, she can apply to a court to allow the marriage. 137 The marriage of a Muslim
woman to a non-Muslim man is unlawful138 and a marriage between an Iranian woman and a
non-Iranian man requires government permission.139 These provisions are inconsistent with
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 140
132 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-mothers-citizenship-children-new-law-latest-
a9138206.html.
133 http://irangov.ir/detail/351448.
135 http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/ir.
136 www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/03/29/Islamic-Republic-of-Iran-Selected-Issues-45768.
137 Civil Code, art. 1043.
138 Ibid., art. 1059.
139 Ibid., art. 1060.
140 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 28 (2000), para. 23.
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43. Concern is expressed that the legal age for a girl to marry in the Islamic Republic of
Iran is 13 years, with even younger girls allowed to marry with paternal and judicial
consent. 141 This is inconsistent with the State’s obligations under the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, where the Committee on the Rights of the Child has strongly
recommended an increase in the minimum age of marriage to 18, in law and in practice, for
girls and boys. 142 The National Organization for Civil Registration registered 13,054
marriages of girls under 13 between March 2018 and March 2019. The numbers continue to
be high. In December 2019, a deputy minister warned that banks offering “marriage loans”
without age restrictions increased child marriage. He stated that, from March to August 2019,
4,460 girls under 15 had received such loans. If the trend continued, 12,000 girls under 15
would have received such loans by the latter half of March 2020, representing a tripling or
quadrupling of girl-child marriages. Between March and June 2020, 7,323 marriages
involving girls aged 10 to 14 were registered.143 President Hassan Rouhani’s intervention to
introduce age restrictions for these loans is noted, but is regrettably not adhered to by
banks.144 Child marriage is considered a form of forced marriage, given that one or both
parties have not expressed full, free and informed consent. 145 Girls marrying under the age of
18 are more likely to experience domestic violence, 146 are frequently unable to continue
education and are marginalized from social activities.147 A survey found that 37.5 per cent of
those subjected to child marriage were illiterate and a significant number reported domestic
abuse.148 The Government noted that raising the marriage age may increase the number of
unregistered marriages, however it still did not recommend marriage for individuals under
18 years of age. It claimed that judicial training had led to the non-issuance of marriage
permits to underage girls. Failure to increase the marriage age undermines measures aimed
at protecting women and girls from domestic violence and negatively affects education and
employment prospects.
44. Legal provisions also maintain gender inequality between spouses. The husband has
authority over his wife, including the right to prevent her from taking up employment that he
considers incompatible with family interests or his dignity.149 The wife requires the husband’s
consent to obtain a passport and travel abroad.150 Iranian law allows polygamy, including an
unrestricted number of temporary marriages for a fixed period. 151 The Human Rights
Committee has said that polygamy and the need for a husband’s consent to obtain a passport
and travel are discriminatory.152 The Government stated that polygamy was uncommon and
that a wife must consent to a polygamous marriage. While the wife is entitled to maintenance,
this is contigent upon her fulfilling her “duties”,153 including responding to the husband’s
sexual needs. Husbands have an incontestable right to divorce,154 whereas wives can only
apply to court seeking divorce on limited grounds, including the husband’s addiction,
imprisonment or refusal to provide financially.155 Wives must prove an intolerable level of
141 Civil Code, art. 1041; https://iranhrdc.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf_en/LegalCom/

Womens_Rights_Commentary_389929723.pdf.
142 General comment No. 4 (2003), para. 20.
143 www.iranhumanrights.org/2020/12/easy-state-loans-prompting-surge-in-child-marriages-in-iran/;
www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/474420/ (in Persian).
144 www.irna.ir/news/83824552/(in Persian); www.iranhumanrights.org/2020/12/easy-state-loans-
prompting-surge-in-child-marriages-in-iran/.
145 Joint general recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women/general comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2019), para. 20.
146 www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Girls-Not-Brides-Child-Marriage-Violence-
Against-Children-LR.pdf.
147 Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 4 (2003), para. 20.
148 https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/MRG_CFR_Iran_EN_Sept191.pdf.
150 Passport law of 1973, art. 18; www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/25/its-mens-club/discrimination-against-
women-irans-job-market.
151 https://www1.essex.ac.uk/hri/documents/legal-status-women.pdf, p. 24.
152 General comment No. 28 (2000), paras. 16 and 24.
154 Ibid., art. 1133.
155 Ibid., arts. 1119, 1129 and 1130; https://minorityrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/MRG_CFR_Iran_EN_Sept191.pdf.
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spousal abuse to successfully rely on domestic violence as a ground of divorce. 156 Women
seeking divorce usually have to forgo their monetary claims, such as payment of maintenance,
to secure their husband’s agreement.157
45. The father is the default sole legal guardian retaining primary authority over all major
decisions and financial affairs in his child’s life. In his absence, legal guardianship is
transferred to the paternal grandfather.158 The Government stated that relatives could apply
to court for the dismissal of a father as guardian if he was not fulfilling his responsibilities.
Following divorce, the mother has physical custody of the child until age 7, at which time
custody is transferred to the father.159 The Government stated that the father’s right was not
absolute; if there was a disagreement, the Family Court would decide in the best interests of
the child. Custody is automatically lost by the mother if she remarries, but the same does not
apply to the father.160
Discrimination in criminal law

46. As mentioned above, age of criminal responsibility in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
which is based on the age of maturity, applies to girls at 9 lunar years, whereas it is 15 lunar
years for boys for qisas or hudud crimes.161 Gender discrimination in age adds to the serious
violation of applying the death penalty to child offenders. It is alarming that girls who
committed offences as child offenders have been executed in recent years, including some
who had been forcibly married as children and who had suffered domestic violence. In 2018,
Mahboubeh Mofidi, who was married at the age of 13, was executed for allegedly having
murdered her husband when she was 17 (see A/HRC/40/67). Zeinab Sekaanvand, who was
married at the age of 15, allegedly murdered her husband when she was 17 and was
executed.162 She had raised domestic violence allegations against her husband.
47. The criminal justice system discriminates between men and women regarding
payment of diya (blood money). The Penal Code states that the amount of diya paid as
compensation for a female victim is half that of a male (art. 550). Notwithstanding legislative
changes and a July 2019 Supreme Court ruling instructing that the difference in diya would
be paid by a government fund, the discriminatory provision remains. By making the
perpetrator liable for only half of the diya, the State effectively devalues the worth of a
woman’s life to half that of a man, and consequently makes women more vulnerable to
crime.163 Similarly, in many legal proceedings, a woman’s testimony is half of the evidentiary
value of that of a man164. Evidence from male witnesses is usually required,165 while in most
civil cases the required evidence is that of two men, or one man and two women.166 Provisions
discriminating on the grounds of gender in the legal system are a clear violation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.167
Violence against women

48. Patriarchical values and misogynist behaviours permeate many segments of Iranian
family life, 168 with discriminatory legal provisions, outlined in the present report,
exacerbating the vulnerabilities of women to domestic abuse. Support systems for domestic
156 https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/MRG_CFR_Iran_EN_Sept191.pdf, p. 29.

157 Ibid.; www.idrc.ca/en/book/feminist-advocacy-family-law-and-violence-against-women-
international-perspectives, pp. 76 and 84.
159 Ibid., art. 1169.
160 Ibid., art. 1170.
161 Penal Code, art. 147; www1.essex.ac.uk/hri/documents/legal-status-child.pdf, pp. 24–25.
162 www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23689&LangID=E.
163 https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/blood-money-paid-for-a-woman-in-iran-is-still-half-that-paid-
for-a-man-despite-new-ruling/.
165 Penal Code, art. 199.
166 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 230.
167 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 28 (2000), para. 19; general comment No. 32
(2007), para. 65.
168 https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/11/iran-must-pass-legislation-to-protect-women-against-violence/.
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violence survivors are insufficient. Law enforcement agencies are often reluctant to intervene
in such cases, commonly using mediation to resolve them, even when a woman claims her
life is threatened.169 The 28 shelters170 established in 27 out of 31 provinces since 2014 lack
capacity to provide long-term support to victims and mostly focus on reconciling and
returning victims home.171 The Government claimed that family protection meant there was
limited demand for shelters, but necessary arrangements would be made available if needed.
A hotline and 358 social emergency units had been established across the country to respond
to social issues, including suicide attempts and domestic violence. According to the State’s
welfare organization, 8 per cent of calls to the hotline and 10 per cent of in-person social
emergency unit visits concern violence against women.172
49. It is noted that the bill for the protection, dignity and security of women against
violence, first introduced to Parliament in 2015 and currently before the Bill Committee,
would criminalize some types of violence against women. There are several deficiencies in
the current draft, including a requirement for a victim to go through a “reconciliation period”
before a dispute settlement council prior to filing a claim in court. This provision, if enforced,
exposes the victim to the risk of further violence and removes judicial scrutiny of the
perpetrator’s actions and accountability. The Government claimed that the conciliation
process would not be forced. Other problematic draft provisions include the need for three
separate convictions of violence before a wife can seek divorce and a lesser punishment for
murder through domestic violence than in other murder cases. 173
50. The Human Rights Committee has stressed that States parties are required to take
special measures of protection towards persons in vulnerable situations, including victims of
gender-based violence. 174 Sexual assault is not criminalized as a distinct crime under the
Penal Code. Rape is prosecutable as zina (illicit sexual relations), a capital offence, but the
limited definition of zina in the Penal Code excludes several coercive sexual acts that also
constitute rape. The excluded acts can only be prosecuted under article 637 of the Penal Code,
which carries a punishment of 99 lashes.175 The Special Rapporteur opposes the death penalty
and flogging, but also recommends in reforming these sentences that the definition of zina
be expanded to include other coercive sexual acts. The current draft bill on protection of
women against violence also categorizes sexual assault under the two limited categories of
zina and non-zina. Victims face obstacles in proving the crime due to high evidentiary
requirements for proving sexual assault. Since extramarital sexual relations are considered
criminal acts, reporting sexual assault may expose victims to prosecution if they cannot prove
the act was coercive. Accounts of victims indicate the authorities usually fail to investigate
such claims. 176 Additionally, during a #MeToo social media movement in the country in
August 2020, which led to one arrest,177 many victims expressed reluctance to press charges
as they disagreed with the perpetrator being punished by the death penalty. 178 The
Government stated that its legal system was one of the most serious in addressing sexual
crimes.
51. The killing of 13-year-old Romina Ashrafi by her father in 2019 was a tragic reminder
that so-called honour killings remain widespread, yet such crimes are underreported. It is
estimated that between 375 to 450 honour killings occur annually.179 The Special Rapporteur
expresses alarm at laws that exonerate perpetrators or reduce punishment for such crimes.
169 www.idrc.ca/en/book/feminist-advocacy-family-law-and-violence-against-women-international-
perspectives, p. 76.
170 A/HRC/WG.6/34/IRN/1; see also www.eghtesadonline.com/n/2GS3 (in Persian).
171 www.hamshahrionline.ir/x66FG; https://www.radiozamaneh.com/488134 (in Persian).
172 www.yjc.ir/fa/news/7250364/ (in Persian).
173 See
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25651.
175 https://iranhrdc.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Access-to-Justice-for-Victims-of-Sexual-Violence-in-Iran-
Final.pdf, seventh page.
176 Ibid.
177 www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/09/iran-having-its-metoo-moment.
178 www.trtworld.com/magazine/iran-s-metoo-opens-long-overdue-discussion-on-sexual-abuse-40107.
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There are exemptions from criminal liability and qisas for a man who witnesses his wife
commiting adultery and kills and assaults either or both parties.180 The Penal Code creates
exemptions for men who kill their children or grandchildren. Ms. Ashrafi’s father stated in
court he had murdered his daughter because the law did not carry a severe punishment. Such
incidents confirm the failure of the law to protect victims and to punish perpetrators of honour
crimes. Treaty bodies have stated that legislation which exonerates or mitigates criminal
responsibility for so-called honour crimes must be removed, and a holistic framework to
prevent their occurrence implemented. 181 The Government stated that intiatives to update
laws in this area were under consideration.
Women’s rights advocates

52. Iranian women play a prominent role in defending human rights. The Special
Rapporteur remains alarmed at the continuing harrassment, arrest and imprisonment of
women’s rights advocates, both women and men, including those campaigning against
compulsory veiling laws. Under the Penal Code (art. 638), women who do not wear a hijab
may be imprisoned for up to two months or fined up to 500,000 rials ($12). In practice,
however, women’s rights advocates have been convicted under morality and national security
offences that carry harsher sentences.182 The Human Rights Committee has stressed that laws
regulating what women can wear in public can violate several rights guaranteed by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the rights to non-
discrimination, to freedom of expression, and to liberty and freedom of movement, where
breaching such laws results in arrest or detention.183 The right to freedom of religion cannot
be relied upon to justify discrimination against women.184
53. The police, Basij militia and vigilante morality police enforce compulsory veiling
laws, with vigilante justice reportedly resulting in violence against women, including acid
attacks and deaths. An emblematic case concerns acid attacks in October 2014 against at least
six women in Isfahan, with concerns that the attacks were linked to Parliament’s approval of
a morality-related plan (A/HRC/28/26, para. 31). In 2018, the judiciary closed the case
without finding the perpetrators. 185 Some official statements encourage attacks against
women. In October 2020, two Friday prayers leaders, including an Assembly of Experts
member, called on society to make the surroundings unsafe for women who did not observe
veiling laws.186 Data gathered between 2003 and 2013 indicated that 30,000 women had faced
arrest and 4,358 cases had been referred to the judiciary for breaching the compulsory veiling
law.187
54. The authorities continue to arrest and imprison women’s rights advocates who have
challenged compulsory veiling. In April 2019, Yasaman Aryani, Monireh Arabshahi and
Mojgan Keshavarz were arrested after publicly protesting compulsory veiling laws on
International Women’s Day (A/74/273, para. 37). They were sentenced to prison in July 2019
on national security and morality-based charges.188 On 5 February 2020, an appeals court
reduced their sentences, but still confirmed prison sentences of over 9 years for Ms. Aryani
and Ms. Arabshahi and over 12 years for Ms. Keshavarz.189 The Government stated all three
had been sentenced to five-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. On 21 October 2020, Ms. Aryani
and Ms. Arabshahi were transferred to Kachuei Prison in Alborz Province.190 The authorities
180 Penal Code, art. 630.

181 Joint general recommendation No. 31/general comment No. 18 (2019), paras. 33 and 55 (c), general
comment No. 28 (2000), para. 31.
182 https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/08/three-women-issued-lengthy-prison-sentences-for-peacefully-
protesting-irans-mandatory-hijab-law/.
184 Ibid., para. 21.
185 https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/07/iranian-judiciary-closes-acid-attack-cases-with-no-convictions-
but-promises-victims-compensation/.
186 https://aftabnews.ir/fa/news/674214/ (in Persian).
187 https://justice4iran.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Hejab-Report-JFI-English.pdf, pp. 18–19.
188 www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/06/iranian-women-rebel-against-dress-code.
189 https://iranhr.net/media/files/HRD_Report_Iran_Human_Rights_Eng.pdf, pp. 44–46.
190 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
18
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arrested Saba Kord Afshari on 1 June 2019 for participating in a campaign against
compulsory veiling 191 and for sending a video to women’s rights campaigner Masih
Alinejad’s social media account. Ms. Afshari was interrogated and then held in solitary
confinement for 11 days. She was reportedly told that her father would be killed and her
mother arrested, and that all private photographs on her telephone would be released, if she
did not confess. In August 2019, she was convicted of three national security-related and
morality charges and sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. Although the Government
affirmed that an appeals court had later acquitted her on some charges and reduced her
sentence, in May 2020, her lawyer announced this had been extrajudicially reversed. 192 On 9
November 2020, the Supreme Court rejected her retrial request. 193 In July 2019, the judiciary
announced that sharing videos of women removing headscarves would result in sentences of
up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 194 Farhad Meysami, a women’s rights activist, has been
arbitrarily imprisoned since 2018 on charges related to his gender equality campaigning.
Discrimination in political and judicial position

55. Gender discrimination is pervasive in political and judicial appointments, with the
Islamic Republic of Iran ranking 181 of 193 countries in 2020 for women’s representation.195
Almost no women are represented in senior decision-making positions, with the positions of
Supreme Leader, President, Head of the Judiciary, the Attorney General and the Head of the
Supreme Court never being held by a woman, and no woman has been named to the 12-
member Guardian Council. While there are no legal limits on the right to vote or to stand as
municipal or parliamentary candidates, female representation is poor. The Guardian Council
disqualified 60 per cent of all female candidates for the February 2020 parliamentary
elections, with only 16 of the 290 seats in Parliament being won by women, 196 as confirmed
by the Government.
56. The Government has taken steps to increase female representation in executive
positions. In 2017, it adopted a decision to allocate 30 per cent of public sector managerial
positions to young people and women, increasing by 36 per cent the appointment of women
between 2017 to 2019. Despite these advances, the decision was annuled by the Court of
Administrative Justice in October 2020.197 The Government stated that the decision had been
reversed as the measure had been found to be unfair and discriminatory. In addition, it is
regrettable that women are ineligible to become judges. While women can be appointed as
legal advisers, oversee proceedings and sit on three-member appeal panels, Iranian law
prohibits them from rendering a final judgment.198
Discrimination in employment
57. Women’s access to formal employment is restricted, with 29.7 per cent of women
between the ages of 18 and 35 being unemployed in 2019. Despite major advances in
education, female labour force participation in the country is 17 per cent. 199 The majority of
working women are employed in the informal sector with minimal labour law protection; 200
female university graduates make up 67.5 per cent of all unemployed individuals.201 Women
191 www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/iran-sentencing-of-mses-saba-kord-afshari-yassman-
aryani-monireh.
193 www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/womens-rights-defender-saba-kord-afshari-sentenced-15-years-
prison.
194 www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-headscarf-protest-women-prison-white-
wednesdays-masih-alinejad-a9025431.html.
195 www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/03/women-in-politics-map-2020.
196 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IRN/INT_CCPR_
NGO_IRN_42317_E.pdf, p. 19.
197 www.radiozamaneh.com/552383 (in Persian).
198 https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/90547 (in Persian);
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/IRN/INT_CCPR_NGO_IRN_4231
7_E.pdf, p. 20.
199 www.amar.org.ir/Portals/1/releases/lfs/LFS-1398.pdf, table 1.
200 www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iran0517_web_11.pdf, pp. 20–21.
201 www.amar.org.ir/Portals/1/releases/lfs/LFS-1398.pdf, table 1.
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from minority backgrounds face intersectional discrimination, with the highest

unemployment rates found in provinces where the majority of the population are from ethnic
and religious minorities.202 The Government stated it had initiated numerous programmes to
strengthen women’s employability and entrepreneurship.
58. The Labour Code grants equal protection and free choice of profession to men and
women as long as it is not inconsistent with Islamic values, the public interest or the rights
of others (art. 6). However, the Code forbids female employment in dangerous, ardous and
harmful work (art. 75). Cultural and social norms, as well as adminstrative practices, point to
a widespread preference for men in employment. In July 2014, the Tehran municipality
announced that all women secretaries and office managers would be replaced by men; in the
same year, the head of the Public Buildings Office of the Iranian police announced that
women would be prohibited from working in coffee shops and traditional restaurants. Similar
exclusions have been applied to the civil service, reducing the number of women working in
that sector.203
59. As mentioned above, the Civil Code grants husbands the right to stop wives from
work they consider against family values or their reputation. Some employers require married
women to provide a statement of permission from their husband in order to be hired. The
requirement that women need permission to travel abroad means employers with overseas-
based work are reluctant to employ them.204 According to a law adopted in January 2017,
women are entitled to nine months’ maternity leave, but many have been dismissed upon
their return to work.205 The Labour Code states employers are to pay equal wages to both men
and women for equal work (art. 38). However, in practice, women receive lower salaries for
the same level of work.
Sport and culture

60. Restrictions on the participation of women and girls in sport and cultural life remain.
In January 2020, Kimia Alizadeh, the country’s first female Olympic medal winner,
announced she had permanently left the Islamic Republic of Iran, citing sexism of officials
as her main reason. 206 Most women’s sports are banned from being broadcast on State
television.207 Women’s participation in recreational activities has also been restricted. On 14
May 2019, the prosecutor for Isfahan stated women were prohibited from riding bicycles,
which the Government claimed was for safety reasons.208 The Government stated that there
were dozens of sports federations and that over 100,000 Iranian women athletes participated
in domestic and international sport competitions.
61. A prohibition on women attending sporting events, while not written into law, has
effectively been enforced since 1981. A few exceptions have occurred in recent years, 209 most
recently in October 2019, when more than 3,000 women were allowed to attend a football
match. However, tickets available to women were restricted210 and the Government did not
indicate a permanent change of policy. Women have frequently challenged the restriction on
their ability to enter stadiums, through peaceful demonstrations or by entering incognito, with
many consequently having been arrested. The authorization for women to attend the October
2019 match followed the outcry over the death of Sahar Khodayari. Ms. Khodayari had been
arrested for dressing as a man to attend a football match. She died in September 2019, having
202 Ibid., table 3.

204 www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iran0517_web_11.pdf, p. 3.
206 https://apnews.com/article/1211a66e166b79e032386dea8109d659.
207 https://observers.france24.com/en/20181002-iran-doesnt-broadcast-women-sports-fans-create-own-
coverage-social-media.
208 https://iranhumanrights.org/2019/05/isfahan-prosecutor-bans-sinful-act-of-women-riding-bicycles/.
209 www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/10/iranian-women-attend-mens-soccer-game-standing-firm-against-
state-ban-and-hardline-threats/; www.iranhumanrights.org/2018/06/iran-spain-match-aftermath-will-
irans-ban-on-women-in-sports-stadiums-finally-be-lifted; www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/06/
some-female-sports-fans-allowed-to-watch-mens-volleyball-match-in-tehran-but-ban-persists/.
210 www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/iran-limited-allocation-of-football-tickets-for-women-a-
cynical-publicity-stunt/.
20
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set herself on fire after learning she would be imprisoned for her actions. 211 In March 2018,
as many as 35 women were reportedly arrested for seeking to attend a match 212 and in August
2019 at least 4 women were arrested and held for several days after attempting to enter a
stadium dressed as men.213
62. Women continue to face restrictions in cultural activities, including singing. 214
Women are allowed to perform publicly but only as part of a choir or to an all-female
audience. According to reports, artists have faced restrictions and arrest for having
performances with women singers. Negar Moazzam was reportedly summoned to court in
May 2019 after singing solo for tourists in Isfahan.215 The Government stated she had been
sentenced to one year of imprisonment but was later acquitted and released. Musician Ali
Ghamsari was banned from performing after featuring a female singer in a 7 January 2020
concert performance.216 In August 2020, musician Mehdi Rajabian was arrested on a morality
charge after featuring women dancers and singers in his work.217 The Government stated he
had been fined 500,000 tomans. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
has stated that the right to take part in cultural life requires that all legal, institutional and
customary restrictions on female participation in such activities be eliminated. 218
IV. Recommendations
A. Human rights situation
63. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government, the judiciary and/or
Parliament:
(a) Introduce an immediate moratorium on the death penalty, prohibit the
execution of child offenders in all circumstances and commute their sentences;
(b) Repeal laws authorizing torture and ill-treatment as a form of punishment,
establish mechanisms for investigating torture claims and deaths in detention consistent
with international standards, and ratify the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
(c) Ensure that all persons accused of any crime have access to a lawyer of
their choosing during all stages of the judicial process, including during the initial
investigation and interrogation stage, and are provided with legal aid;
(d) Ensure that human rights defenders, including women human rights
defenders, lawyers, journalists and dual and foreign nationals, and their families, are
not threatened with or subjected to intimidation, arbitrary arrest, deprivation of liberty
or life or other arbitrary sanctions; release all those arbitrarily detained; and extend
the COVID-19 policy for the temporary release of prisoners to those individuals and
other detainees posing no threat to public safety;
(e) Conduct an independent, impartial and transparent inquiry consistent
with international standards concerning the use of excessive and lethal force by security
forces during the November 2019 protests and hold accountable all perpetrators of
human rights violations during those protests;
(f) Ensure that all individuals arrested for the exercise of their rights to
freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly are released and that
211 www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/09/woman-banned-stadiums-iran-attempts-suicide.
212 www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43243414.
213 www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/16/iran-women-detained-accused-flouting-stadium-ban.
214 https://iranhumanrights.org/2018/01/iranian-female-vocalist-we-never-get-a-chance-to-practice-our-
art-in-a-professional-setting/.
215 www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-48366149.
216 www.iranhumanrights.org/2019/01/musician-ali-ghamsari-banned-from-performing-in-iran-after-
refusing-to-remove-female-singer/.
217 www.abc.net.au/news/2020-08-24/iranian-artist-arrested-featuring-women-sing-and-dance/12573412.
218 General comment No. 21 (2009), paras. 13, 16 (a), 25 and 60.
21
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the detaining authorities promptly report the whereabouts and situation of detainees to
their families;
(g) Ensure that the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful
assembly and association are respected in law and in practice, and that any limitation
to these rights is in accordance with the criteria for permissible restrictions under
international law;
(h) Recognize independent trade unions and ratify all fundamental
International Labour Organization conventions;
(i) Protect the rights of all persons belonging to ethnic, religious and sexual
minorities, eliminate all forms of discrimination against them and release all those
imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of religion or belief, for exercising their
culture or for using their language;
(j) Take all measures necessary to mitigate the effects of sanctions, meet the
Government’s economic and social rights obligations, including regarding the
protection of vulnerable groups, and establish transparent financial mechanisms to
ensure that trade in medicine and other essential humanitarian items continues;
(k) Make substantial investments in all prisons to reduce overcrowding,
improve hygiene and ensure that prisoners receive prompt access to medical treatment,
especially during the COVID-19 pandemic;
(l) Continue to engage with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by permitting him to conduct country
missions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
64. The Special Rapporteur urges States imposing sanctions on the Islamic Republic
of Iran to ensure that measures such as humanitarian exemptions are given broad and
practical effect and are promptly and effectively implemented to minimize the adverse
consequences of sanctions on human rights, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
B. Women and girls
65. The Special Rapporteur recommends that the Government, the judiciary and/or
Parliament:
(a) Ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women without reservations and ensure that legislation and policies are
consistent with its obligations;
(b) End discrimination against women and girls within all aspects of family
law;
(c) Implement measures to end child marriage, including by increasing the
minimum age of marriage to 18 years;
(d) Ensure gender equality within the criminal justice system, including by
increasing the age of criminal responsibility for men and women to 18 years;
(e) Repeal legislation that mitigates, or exonerates perpetrators of, violence
against women and girls, including for so-called honour killings and criminal acts
within marriage, and ensure accountability for perpetrators;
(f) Introduce effective legislation and policies to help prevent violence against
women and girls and hold perpetrators accountable;
(g) Increase support services for victims of violence, including by providing
more shelters and financial assistance, and provide necessary training to the police,
judiciary and social workers;
(h) Repeal all laws and regulations that impose mandatory dress codes;
22
A/HRC/46/50
(i) Amend the Constitution and legislation to expressly state that all political
and judicial positions are open to women and men, and introduce legislation and
policies to promote increased participation of women in public affairs;
(j) End gender discrimination in employment and introduce effective
legislation and mechanisms to combat workplace discrimination;
(k) Remove all obstacles that prevent the full enjoyment of women to the right
to culture.
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United Nations A/HRC/46/50

General Assembly Distr.: General

Human Rights Council

Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in

II. Overview of the human rights situation in the Islamic

A. Death penalty, right to a fair trial and arbitrary detention

1 General comment No. 36 (2018), paras. 5 and 35.

Execution of child offenders

Human rights defenders and lawyers

Dual and foreign nationals

B. Rights to freedom of association and of peaceful assembly and to

Aftermath of the November 2019 protests

to quash what officials qualified as a “very dangerous conspiracy”. 34 Detainees were

Harassment and reprisals against victims

Freedom of expression and access to information

56 www.ilna.news/fa/tiny/news-950367 (in Persian).

Ethnic and religious minorities

to 10 months’ imprisonment. On 22 November 2020, over 100 security agents undertook

Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons

D. Impact of the economic crisis and sanctions

120 www.un.org/en/coronavirus/war-needs-war-time-plan-fight-it; www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-

III. Situation of women and girls

International legal framework

Discrimination in family law

141 Civil Code, art. 1041; https://iranhrdc.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf_en/LegalCom/

Discrimination in criminal law

Violence against women

156 https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/MRG_CFR_Iran_EN_Sept191.pdf, p. 29.

Women’s rights advocates

180 Penal Code, art. 630.

Discrimination in political and judicial position

from minority backgrounds face intersectional discrimination, with the highest

Sport and culture

202 Ibid., table 3.

A. Human rights situation

B. Women and girls

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