Memorial For Appelant

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TEAM CODE: MARIGOLD

CHENNAI Dr. AMBEDKAR GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE, PUDUPAKKAM

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF DEEPAKALPAM

IN THE MATTER OF

ASSET OWNER’S ASSOCIATION AND ORS.…………… ……………… (Appellant)

V.

STATE OF MAHADWEEP…………………………………………………… (Defendant)

UNDER SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS


COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF DEEPAKALPAM

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


TABLE OF CONTENT

S.N TOPICS PG.NO


O

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 1

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 8

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 9

5. ISSUES RAISED 10

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 14
1. WHETHER THE STATE OF MAHADWEEP HAVE LEGISLATIVE
COMPETENCY TO ENACT THE IMPUGNED PROVISIONS OF THE
ACT?
a. THERE IS A COMPLETE VIOLATION OF PART III OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF DEEPAKALPAM
b. ACT DOES NOT SUBSERVE THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
THEREFORE NOT UNDER THE COMPETENCY OF THE STATE
c. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO OPTED THE PAGDI SYSTEM.

2. WHETHER THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 300A?


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a. THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT SHOWS
CARELESSNESS IN THE PART OF THE STATE

b. LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW


c. THE STATE’S DESPOTIC POWER KNOWN AS EMINENT DOMAIN
IS USED FOR COMPLETE ABUSE

3. WHETHER CHAPTER VIII-A OF THE ACT VIOLATES RIGHTS


GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 14 AND 19?
21
a. THE ACT VIOLATES THE CONCEPT OF THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

b. THE STATE ONCE AGAIN NEGLECTED THE LANDLORDS THROUGH

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


THE ACT

c. CONDITION OF PEOPLE WHO SUSTAINED FOR A LONGER PERIOD


IN THE SAME LOCALITY

4. WHETHER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE IMPUGNED ACT


COULD QUALIFY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 31A OF
THE CONSTITUTION?

a. WIDER INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 31A

b. THE ACT DOES NOT SUBSERVE PUBLIC INTEREST 25


c. ACT FOR COMMON GOOD DISREGARDED THE BUILDING OWNERS
AND INDIVIDUAL OWNERS

5. WHETHER THE TERM “MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE


COMMUNITY” MEANS AND INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY
ALSO?

a. ACQUIRING THE PETITIONERS’ BUILDINGS TO DISTRIBUTE DOES


NOT SEEM JUSTIFIABLE
30
b. RIGHT IS PROPERTY IS STILL A RECOGNIZED RIGHT THOUGH NOT
FUNDAMENTAL

c. STATE IS ARBITRARY

8. PRAYER 34

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS EXPANSIONS

Art. Article

Ors Others

AIR All India Reporter

Vs Versus

RFCTLARR Right to Fair Compensation and


Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

MHADA Maharashtra Housing and Area


Development Authority

IAIA The International Association for Impact


Assessment

LARR Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and


Resettlement Act

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

UOI Union of India

SC Supreme Court

UDHR The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
Hon'ble Honorable

Anr. Another

SCR Supreme Court Reports

DPSP Directive Principle of State Policy

SCC Supreme Court Case

Pvt. Ltd. Private Limited

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF CASES

NAME OF CASES
1) Balakrishnan v. UOI (2017)

2) Basanitibai v. State of Maharashtra 1986 2 SCC 516.

3) BOMBAY Vs. R.S NANJI 1956 AIR 294

4) Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and others

5) Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 2 SCC 549

6) Daulat Singh Surana And Others v. First Land Acquisition Collector And Others, 2007 SCC
1 641.

7) E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974

8) Guru Nanak Vidya Bhandar Trust Vs. Union of India and Ors (2017):

9) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai And Others, 2005 SCC 7 627

10) In Mirzapur Moti Appeal (civil) 4937-4940 of 1998

11) K.T Plantation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka, 2011

12) Keshavananda Bharathi V State of Kerala

13) Land Acquisition Officer, A.P v. Ravi Santosh Reddy

14) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

15) Neelima Misra Vs Harinder Kaur Paintal And Others (AIR 1990 SC 1402)

16) Raja Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR1954SC621

17) S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 703, at p. 7 18–19

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
18) Shantilal vs. Bhagwandas

19) State of Jharkhand vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, 2013

20) State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg) Co. Ltd. 1974 (1) SCR 671).

21) Supreme Court of India v. Union of India and Others / Aeltemesh Rein, Advocate (AIR 1988
SC 1768)

22) Union of India and others v. Indian Handcrafts Emporium and others 2003 (7) SCC 589

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
BOOKS REFERRED

S.NO NAME

1. DR. J.N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA

2. V.N. SHUKLA’S, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

3. DR. S.R. MYNENI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- 1

4. W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY

5. DR. H.O. AGARWAL, HUMAN RIGHTS.

6. KINGSLEY DAVID, HUMAN SOCIETY

7. DR. CHANDRA, HUMAN RIGHTS

8. DR.S.K. KAPOOR, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

9. SHEFALI ROY, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN INDIA

10. THE MAHARASHTRA HOUSING AND AREA DEVELOPMENT ACT,


1976

11. THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
12. MAHARASHTRA RENT CONTROL ACT 1999

13. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882

14. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
WEBSITES REFERRED

S.NO NAME

1. https://www.iaia.org/

2. https://www.thehindu.com/

3. https://indianexpress.com/

4. https://thewire.in/

5. https://www.business-standard.com/

6. https://testbook.com/

7. https://indiankanoon.org/

8. https://www.casemine.com/

9. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/

10. https://www.manupatrafast.com/

11. https://www.lawxpertsmv.com/

12. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONER, ASSET OWNER'S ASSOCIATION, HEREBY HUMBLY


SUBMITS TO THIS HON’BLE COURT’S JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 136
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF DEEPAKALPAM. IT SETS FORTH THE FACTS AND
THE LAWS ON WHICH THE CLAIMS ARE BASED.

136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court

(1) Not with standing anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,
grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in
any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.

The Memorial set forth the facts, laws, and the corresponding arguments on which the claims
are based on the instant case. The Appellant affirms that they shall accept any judgment of
this Hon'ble Court as final and binding upon itself and shall execute it in its entirety and in
good faith

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Deepakalpam, a union of States is a South Asian country that has diverse people in terms of
geography, culture, demography, etc. The country holds the lengthiest constitution with
features such as fundamental rights, DPSP, fundamental duties, etc. DPSP is considered the
fundamental principle for the governance of the country. Article 39 (b) and (c) were created
to avoid accumulation of wealth under the protection of Article 31C of the constitution of
Deepakalpam stating that any measure taken for the same with the assent of the president
cannot be held void on the ground that it violates fundamental rights.

Bhikaji, the capital of the state of Mahadweep and the commercial capital of the country has
a very limited territory and therefore the prices of houses were on the rise making it difficult
for people of lower and middle income to pay rent. As a result, the government enacted
various laws and introduced ‘standard rent’ payable as of September 1, 1940. It also protected
the tenant/lessees from wrongful eviction. The rents stood frozen at the standard fixed in
1940 which in turn made the owners of the land unable to erect buildings or maintain such
buildings. As a result of this, the buildings stood dilapidated and collapsed due to heavy
rainfall and deteriorated atmospheric conditions resulting in loss of life and dis-housing large
number of people.

The government therefore was forced to enact the Mahadweep Hosing ana Area Development
Act of 1976 under the principle specified in Article 39(b). The Act proposes that the State
would acquire private lands and develop them to provide house sites and distribute them
amongst the people. It would also reserve lands for public amnesties. The Act was later
amended in 1986 to include Chapter VIII-A with the assent of the President which stated that
cessed buildings built before 1940 would be attracted by the Act if not more than 50% of it is
used for commercial or non-residential purposes. It also provides an opportunity for the
occupier to carry out repairs and reconstruction of the buildings. Such participation is carried
out by not less than 70% of the cooperative society depositing 30% of the compensation
money to be paid to the owner for the acquisition of the land then the state would acquire,
repair, and transfer the building to the occupiers.

Being aggrieved by the amended provisions, the Asset Owner’s Association, a body of 20,000
building owners and several individual owners whose property was acquired by the
government filed a writ before the High Court u/a 226 of the constitution. The writ was
dismissed and whereby they approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of DEEPAKALPAM.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
ISSUES RAISED
[1]

WHETHER THE STATE OF MAHADWEEP HAS LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCY TO


ENACT THE IMPUGNED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT?

[2]
WHETHER THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 300A?

[3]
WHETHER CHAPTER VIII-A OF THE ACT VIOLATES RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY
ARTICLE 14 AND 19?

[4]
WHETHER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE IMPUGNED ACT COULD QUALIFY
FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 31A OF THE CONSTITUTION?

[5]
WHETHER THE TERM “MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE COMMUNITY” MEANS
AND INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY ALSO?

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE STATE OF MAHADWEEP HAS LEGISLATIVE


COMPETENCY TO ENACT THE IMPUGNED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT?

It is humbly submitted that the Asset Owners Association's right to possess the property on its
own is being infringed in the current instance. The government intends maliciously to seize
residential properties while leaving commercial ones undisturbed. The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of
India. The facts of the case exhibit that the government has main motto to take up the
property that belongs to the city of Bhikaji but not the buildings of other cities in
Mahadweep. So, it is important to protect the spheres of fundamental rights of the
constitution of Deepakalpam from the exploitation of the Executive. It is vital to underline
that the impugned act was enacted in 1976 whereas until 1978 right to property was a
fundamental right. Following that the inclusion of the pagdi system to ensure that buildings
are to be reconstructed and given to the appellant. The state of Mahadweep has just like that
taken away the property violating their fundamental rights without giving them first-hand
priority to claim their property. Here the mutual consent concept is brought and it is
eventually vitiated by the State of Mahadweep.

2. WHETHER THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 300A?

Social impact assessment should be considered one of the key elements to balancing private
and public interests. Seeing that such a concept has been in existence since the 1970s but was
made mandatory only in 2013 under the RFCTLARR Act and that the impugned Act has been
depriving the people of their rights without any research on the loss they would suffer. Due
process of law which seeks that law should be fair, just and non-arbitrary was not present in
the MHADA Act since it was not fair and reasonable to the petitioners and was arbitrary by
various discrimination. The State owns a despotic power, ‘eminent domain’ where the State
can deprive a person of his private property for public purpose. However, the State uses such
power to abuse the private owner by acquiring their land through unfair, unjust, and
unreasonable legislation. All these show that the Act violates A. 300Ashows that it is
violating A.300A

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
3. WHETHER CHAPTER VIII-A OF THE ACT VIOLATES RIGHTS
GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 14 AND 19?

But, by the enactment of such an Act, the State neglected the landlords and their contentions
and the difficulties they would face. The Act discriminates the buildings and properties and
takes the acquisition of only residential buildings of Mahadweep leaving out non-residential
and commercial buildings and buildings. Chapter VIII-A is said to be applied only to Bhikaji
thus not including the other cities. All these seem to not profess equality. The Golden
Triangle, Article 14,19, 21 is of prime importance to the concept of the rule of law as it
ensures that the government does not encroach upon these rights through arbitrariness. When
such a rule of prime importance in the constitution is being violated, it seems unreasonable
and unjust to protect such an Act. On one side when the people who were promised a new
beginning were led astray, the landlords who were dependent on their lands were stripped of
their basic requirements and necessities. Thus, the Act becomes unreasonable and unfair. The
compensation given cannot suffice all that the petitioners lose, while the other group seems to
gain from the petitioners’ loss thus making the Act violative of fundamental rights.

4. WHETHER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE IMPUGNED ACT COULD


QUALIFY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 31A OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

A wider interpretation of Article 31A should be taken to indicate that every statute must have
a clear nexus with the subject matter and not just the agrarian reforms. Also cultivating lands
should include the land or property upon which one's livelihood is dependent. Also, it must be
understood that the Act does not serve the public interest as the people are being left in the
dark after getting a hope of a new hope, new life, better future, etc., and that in terms of
‘public interest,’ the State seemed to have forgotten to include the petitioners and the grievers
in the term public as they are being deprived off. The Act set to serve the common good
disregarded the petitioners as right from the rent freeze that was set in 1947, they have been
kept in a state of helplessness and were even more abused with the enactment of the MHADA
Act which was set to take away their land leaving them with nothing but an illicit amount as

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
compensation. Such an Act being violative and not for a public purpose cannot be protected
under Article 300A.

5. WHETHER THE TERM “MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE


COMMUNITY” MEANS AND INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY ALSO?

Against the backdrop, it seems as though the Act is supporting builders and wealthy
contractors under the garb of welfare. The lands and properties are initially gained so that
they can be redeveloped by the MHADA. However, tables turn, and much such land said to
be acquired by the State is given to private parties in the name of developers. To some extent,
it is inferred that the State is working maliciously to gain the lands and properties from the
landlords for a lesser price and sell them to wealthy contractors and developers for a larger
sum. It must be taken due diligence that though the right to property has ceased to be a
fundamental right it is still considered as a constitutional right. The Country cannot provide a
right to its citizens and at the same time allow its State to violate such rights. In such cases,
the right loses its value and becomes mere words embedded in the constitution. It seems
wrongful to add or club such private properties in terms of ‘material resources’ as private
properties hold much greater value and cannot be termed as mere material resources. The
State with its act of depriving the petitioners of their property in the most expensive city of
the country where the worth of properties is enormous, by providing an illicit amount of
compensation which does not in any way come near the loss the petitioners would face or the
value of the property, and also by it being unfair by taking only residential buildings seems to
echo arbitrariness in every possible way. Thus, to protect individuals and their properties
from such legislation, private property should not be included under ‘material resources of
the community’.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. WHETHER THE STATE OF MAHADWEEP HAVE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCY


TO ENACT THE IMPUGNED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT?

a. THERE IS A COMPLETE VIOLATION OF PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION


OF DEEPAKALPAM

In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1, 1978, it was observed that the rights are
wide-ranging and comprehensive and they fall under seven heads, namely, the right to
equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion, cultural and
educational rights, right to property and right to constitutional remedies. Articles 14 to 18
occur under the heading 'Right to, Equality', and of them, by far the most important is Article
14 which confers a fundamental right by injuncting the State not to "deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India".

The landmark judgment that spotted the virtue of non-arbitrariness in Article 14 was S.G.
Jaisinghani v. Union of India2. The Court, for the first time, held “absence of arbitrary
power” as sine qua non to the rule of law with confined and defined discretion, both of which
are essential facets of Article 14. It is clear from the precedents that the Asset Owners
Association's right to possess the property on its own is being infringed in the current
instance. Above all, the government intends maliciously to seize residential properties while
leaving commercial ones undisturbed. The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

The facts of the case exhibit that the government has main motto to take up the property that
belongs to the city of Bhikaji but not the buildings of other cities. The doctrine of Anti
Arbitrariness enlisted the scope of Article 14 and was drastically increased by the Supreme
Court by including the executive discretion under its ambit. In the case of E.P. Royappa v.
State of Tamil Nadu3, 1974, the court said that Article 14 gives a guarantee against the
arbitrary actions of the State. The Right to Equality is against arbitrariness. So, it is important
to protect the spheres of fundamental rights of the constitution of Deepakalpam from the
exploitation of the Executive.
1
AIR 1978 SC 597
2
1967 AIR 1427
3
1974 AIR 555

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
Article 19 outlines the fundamental rights that are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed
by the State in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, security, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, incitement to
an offense, or for protecting the interests of any Scheduled Tribe 4. Comparing the above
points with the facts of the case in which the eviction of the individuals notwithstanding to
their lower level of income, the government seeks to abandon their right under Art 21which
includes the right to livelihood and also the right to shelter. The right to shelter was
significantly taken away by the government by not letting the appellant enjoy the right to
occupation which is a very basic right. 5 By the facts of the case, the impugned act was
enacted in 1976 whereas until 1978 right to property was a fundamental right which prima
facie proves that the Act’s subject matter was in direct conflict with fundamental rights.

Right of residence means the right of a citizen who is a national of one Member State to
reside in any place of his choice. The State cannot force him to stay in a particular place or
vacate a particular place. According to the law, the appellant cannot be forced to leave their
property at any cost, but the Mahadweep administration has issued an order requiring them to
do so. Nonetheless, it is wise to note that the appellant's fundamental rights have been
breached overall.

b. ACT DOES NOT SUBSERVE THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC INTEREST


THEREFORE NOT UNDER THE COMPETENCY OF THE STATE

The Government in Deepakalpam has the power to acquire land for the public good. The
same was governed by legislation that was very old with several lacunae as it had not been
changed since the time of the British. Most prominently, provisions related to compensation
or rehabilitation on acquiring land were not provided for. It was also believed by the
Government of Deepakalpam, that there existed an increased public concern on issues related
to land acquisition in Deepakalpam. A public interest action benefits the whole population. It
denotes a necessary activity carried out for public benefit. In contrast, the facts of this case
show that the government is prioritizing the welfare of the nation while allowing for the
consideration of wealth inside the government. If it is true that the government upholds
equality, isn't the appellant's equality being violated?

4
INDIA CONST. art. 19.
5
Dr. J.N.Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, CLA, 59th Edition 2022

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
In the case of Balakrishnan v. UOI6 (2017):

It Addressed the concept of public purpose and its impact on common people. Additionally, it
is prudent that the appellant be included in this group of common people, and it is wrongful
that the government's primary goal in this case is to seize the property and abandon the
appellant.

In the case of Guru Nanak Vidya Bhandar Trust Vs. Union of India and Ors (2017):

It Emphasized the need for just compensation and rehabilitation. It is imperative that in this
instance, the government's reimbursement is not equitable and just, thereby violating the
public interest and not safeguarding the appellant's welfare.

Land acquisition in Deepakalpam refers to the process by which the union or a state
government in Deepakalpam acquires private land for industrialization, development of
infrastructural facilities, or urbanization of the private land, and provides compensation to the
affected land owners and their rehabilitation and resettlement. The acquisition must be
founded on a public purpose by keeping the welfare of the appellant in mind while making
such a provision.

The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation,


and Resettlement Act, 2013 is a legislation that regulates land acquisition and provides laid
down rules for granting compensation, rehabilitation, and resettlement to the affected persons
in Deepakalpam. The Act has provisions to provide fair compensation to those whose land is
taken away, brings transparency to the process of acquisition of land to set up factories or
buildings, and infrastructural projects, and assures rehabilitation of those affected. In this
instance, the state of Mahadweep has seized the appellant's property to demonstrate that it is
acting for the public good, yet it is not guaranteeing the appellant's welfare.

In the case of Land Acquisition Officer, A.P v. Ravi Santosh Reddy7

The Andhra Pradesh government in a 1987 land acquisition case dragged the landowner for
20 years, court to court, to challenge his claims of Rs. 50,000. Therefore, it was, in our view,
a sheer abuse of process on the part of the State to pursue a matter in filing a misconceived
appeal against an interim order, which we do not approve.”, further adding: “It is unfortunate
that a genuine claim of the land owner was not satisfied by the state for such a long time.” It
6
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 344/2017

7
2016 (14) SCC 238

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
is noteworthy to denote based on the precedent case that the appellants in this suit are also
deprived of their right to have fair compensation which indirectly shows the malicious motto
of not considering the appellant's claim.

In the case of Balakrishnan v. UOI8

The Kerala State government proceeded to acquire about 27 acres of agricultural land
for the extension of a Technopark in South Kerala. In light of that, the transaction was not a
“voluntary sale” but a “compulsory acquisition”. Thus, in the above-mentioned case, it is
evident that the government of Mahadweep is taking up the property forcefully from the
appellant by not hearing on both sides.

b. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO OPTED THE PAGDI SYSTEM.

The 'pagdi' system is a form of tenancy in India, where the tenant is also part-owner of the
property. This system is common in parts of Mahadweep, Delhi, and Kolkata. The
government could have opted for a mutual agreement with the petitioners to obtain their
dilapidated buildings, re-develop them, and return them to the petitioners so that they could
carry on with their livelihood and the tenants would have a place to live. This would have
benefitted both the tenants and landlords. Instead, the government by opting for the Pagdi
system directly approaches the tenants who are not the parent owners asking them to give a
certain percentage of money and in return giving them ownership of the lands seems a biased
nature of the State which makes it incompetent to legislate.

In the case of Shantilal vs. Bhagwandas9

The landlord sought to undertake the redevelopment of a Pagdi property without obtaining
the required consent from the tenants. The tenants filed a petition in the Rent Control Court,
and the court ruled in their favor, stating that the landlord must comply with the provisions of
the Mahadweep Rent Control Act before proceeding with the redevelopment. The defendant
did not obtain the consent of the appellant. The state of Mahadweep has just like that taken
away the property violating their fundamental rights without giving importance to them to
claim their buildings. The defendant did not obtain the consent of the appellant. The state of
Mahadweep has just like that taken away the property violating their fundamental rights

8
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 344/2017
9
C. R. No. 385 of 1983 (G)

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
without giving them first-hand priority to claim their property. Here the mutual consent
concept is brought and it is eventually vitiated by the defendant i.e. state of Mahadweep.

2. WHETHER THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 300A?

a. THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT SHOWS CARELESSNESS IN


THE PART OF THE STATE
The International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) defines "Social Impact
Assessment"(SIA) as a process that combines the analysis, monitoring, and management of
planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes
they may trigger, with an emphasis on both positive and negative social consequences. Its
main goal is to create a biophysical and human environment that is more egalitarian and
sustainable10.

The SIA process specified under Chapter II of the LARR Act seeks to gather and compile
data to determine issues such as assessment as to whether the proposed acquisition serves a
public purpose; estimation of affected families and the number of families likely to be
displaced; extent of lands, public and private, houses, settlements, and other common
properties likely to be affected by the proposed acquisition; etc11

As mentioned in Chapter II of the present 2013 Act it can be seen that such assessment of the
consequences of an Act, policy, initiative, etc. should be assessed. However, such an
assessment came to the mind of the State only in 2013 and was made mandatory though such
a concept was present during 1970’s whereas such an acquisition was commanded in 1976.
For more than 30 years the State has justified its actions and ignored the fact that a larger
group of people categorized as building owners and individual owners were being stripped of
their livelihood. This in turn shows that the State has been careless when enacting and
implementing such laws which results in violation of various fundamental rights. Such an Act
by the State would make the people lose their trust in the body that is supposed to protect
them. therefore, the distrust would automatically prove that the State is violating Article
300A.
10
International Association for Impact Assessment, https://www.iaia.org/
11
The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act,
2013, Chapter II, Act of Parliament, 2013

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
b. LACK OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW

In the case of State of Jharkhand vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, 201312, the SC held that
a property cannot be taken away without complying with due process of law. The due process
of law theory examines whether a law is fair, just, and not arbitrary in addition to determining
if it has the potential to take away someone's livelihood or personal freedom. The SC will be
forced to declare a statute invalid if it determines that it is not fair. It is the legal mandate that
the state upholds every individual's legal right and that any legislation it enacts must be
compliant with national laws, including those pertaining to justice, liberty, and basic rights.
Additionally, it grants judicial access to any legislation's basic justice, fairness, and liberty.
Before taking away someone's life, liberty, or property, the government must adhere to fair
and reasonable procedures.

The MHADA Act is found to be against the morals of the process of law by being arbitrary in
terms of discrimination among beneficiaries, inadequate compensation, stripping of
livelihood of landlords, etc. in the case of K.T Plantation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka,
201113, the SC held that public purpose is a pre-condition ought to be present for deprivation
of a person of his property under Article 300A of the Constitution and the right to claim
compensation was also integral in the Article. It was also stated that “The requirement of
public purpose is invariably the rule for depriving a person of his property, violation of
which is amenable to judicial review”

It can be inferred by 'Res Ipsa Loquitur’ that the facts of the case prove that while looking at
the public good the petitioners were not considered by the state under the category of public
and their interests have been ignored. It seems that the State has only seen the landlords as the
opposition from whose hands the property has to be taken and forgot the very fact that they
are people also with the same rights to whom the State owns the same duty. The
compensation given was also inadequate making the State unjust and unreasonable. This
angered the petitioners and there are possibilities of a cold war between the petitioners and
the beneficiaries of the Act. This in turn implies that the legislature was unwise, oppressive,

12
2013 AIR SCW 4749
13
2011 (9) SCC 146

19
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
and mindless in enacting the law, and thus being arbitrary it does not qualify for protection
under Article 300A.

c. THE STATES DESPOTIC POWER KNOWN AS EMINENT DOMAIN IS USED


FOR COMPLETE ABUSE.
The essential elements of the eminent domain concept are public purpose and compensation
contained in Article 300A. The Article does not embrace just any law, but rather "just, fair,
and reasonable" legislation. This proves that the public purpose and the compensation must
be justifiable. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai And Others 14,
held that pertaining to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State
with its power of “eminent domain” may acquire property but the same must be for a public
purpose and reasonable compensation must be paid.

Daulat Singh Surana And Others v. First Land Acquisition Collector And Others 15, held
that the power of compulsory acquisition as described by the term “eminent domain” can be
exercised only in the interest and for the welfare of the people. The notion of public purpose
needs to encompass issues like community or public welfare, prosperity, safety, security, and
health.

The Bombay High Court recognized the twin demands of public policy and compensation as
inherent in the idea of eminent domain and tried to construe Article 300A in favor of property
owners in the case of Basanitibai v. State of Maharashtra16. The court could not believe
that Parliament meant for the government to have total authority to take away someone's
property only by passing a law, without first requiring that the acquisition serve a public
interest and be paid for with money that isn't illusory.

In the plight of the petitioners, it can be seen that they are being stripped of their livelihood
without providing them reasonable circumstances to rectify the concerns raised and are also
paid illicit amounts as compensation which does not suffice all that they are being deprived
off. This does not seem to echo the concepts of just, fair, and reasonable legislation. Such

14
2005 SCC 7 627
15
2007 SCC 1 641
16
1986 2 SCC 516

20
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
unreasonable law cannot be said to serve the public purpose since the petitioners are not
benefitting from such laws but are being abused by the same thus violating A. 300A.

3. WHETHER CHAPTER VIII-A OF THE ACT VIOLATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED


BY ARTICLES 14 AND 19?

a. THE ACT VIOLATES THE CONCEPT OF THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

The Golden Triangle in law refers to the three elements of the Deepakalpam Constitution that
are Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 19 (Right to Freedom), and Article 21 (Right to Life
and Personal Liberty). well. The Golden Triangle is of prime importance to the concept of the
rule of law as it ensures that the government does not encroach upon these rights through
arbitrariness. The golden triangle in the suit plays a very vital role in protecting the
constitutionality of the nation. In the suit, the State of Mahadweep in the facts has enlisted
that the state is protecting the constitutionality as said in the preamble. the preamble of the
constitution says that it is the people of Deepakalpam who are the authors of the constitution.
Thus, the words “We, the people of Deepakalpam” declare in unambiguous terms that the
Constitution has been adopted, enacted, and given to themselves by the people of
Deepakalpam17. Thus, the state of Mahadweep has not adhered to the words given in the
preamble of the constitution of Deepakalpam. For instance, the main objective of the
Constitution is that “it is made for us” and “it is made by us”. The question that arises here is
how the state can infringe on the rights of the person and take away the rights of the appellant
which are inherited in them.

In the case of Keshavananda Bharathi V State of Kerala18 (1973) The basic structural
theory was created by this ruling, according to which the Parliament cannot change some
essential Constitutional elements, such as the right to equality. This ensured that the
government could not curtail the fundamental liberties provided by the Constitution. Based
on the above facts the golden triangle concept is to enlist and protect the fundamental rights
of the people. It is wrongful when the state itself abridges the fundamental rights imposed,
which could even lead to the destruction of basic structure doctrine. The state of Mahadweep
must act by the law but in this suit, it pervades to infringe the rights of the appellant.

17
Dr. S.R.Myneni, Constitution Law-1
18
AIR 1973 SC 1461

21
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)19 The freedom to travel abroad is an essential
component of the right to personal liberty, according to this ruling, which broadened the
application of Article 14. Additionally, it introduced the natural justice concept, which states
that all government actions must be rational, fair, and just. The accumulation of wealth and
not giving fair and just compensation is also an infringement of the golden triangle. By means
of taking away the property without concern will also amount to the adding value of the
issue.

Furthermore, the golden triangle is a significant rule that acts as a pivotal point for the
constitution, when it comes to the violation of the golden triangle by the legislature of the
state itself then eventually the entire judicial system ought to be questioned. When it comes to
rectifying the error committed by the state, either it must abolish the act itself or amend it in
such a way that acts upon the protection of the golden triangle for he benefit of the appellants
also.

b. THE STATE ONCE AGAIN NEGLECTED THE LANDLORDS THROUGH THE


ACT

The State in the name of Abolishing the Zamindari system so that wealth is not accumulated
in one hand introduced a ceiling limit and took away the right to property from the ambit of
fundamental rights and included it as only a constitutional right. With this, the ceiling limit
was introduced taking away surplus lands in the hands of individuals. Landlords who were
using properties to earn a living out of it lost their lands which brought a massive loss to
them. later on, to protect the tenants the State imposed a rent freeze where the rent was frozen
at the standard rate during 1940. This further deteriorated the situation of the landlords
because as the petitioners contended, they only received 1 to 2 % profits. Such a rent freeze
was not taken out until 1999.

For about 60 years the standard rent did not change though there has been a massive growth
in the State. Bhikaji is the economic hub and commercial and financial center of
Deepakalpam. Its economic composition in some respects mirrors Deepakalpam’s unique
19
AIR 1978 SC 597

22
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
mosaic of prosperity and technological achievement. In such presidential towns, the rent has
been fixed as the same it was in 1940. This further weakened the landlords where they were
not allowed to grow along with the city. In 1999, Mahadweep Rent Control Act was enacted
where the owners of real estate that is rented out for whatever reason have the right to raise
the rent by only 4% annually. If the landlord has to pay higher taxes levied by the
government, he is also entitled to raise the yearly rent. In this instance, the amount of the rent
increase shouldn't be greater than the tax rise. Penalties were also set where imprisonment for
three months and a fine of five thousand was to be paid.

While such restriction of rent freeze was laid down, even before the 1999 Act was passed the
1976 MHADA Act was passed asking the owners to give up their buildings if they are
dilapidated. The owners were given only a few months to develop and repair their buildings
failing which the state was to acquire them by giving compensation. This led the landlords to
a suffocating position where they were not gaining enough profits from their buildings to
suffice their livelihood and were now expected to repair the buildings. The State should have
taken out the rent freeze and then asked them to repair the buildings with the profits earned.
Such a step could have been said as reasonable. But, by the enactment of such an Act, the
State furthermore neglected the landlords and their contentions and the difficulties they
would face. The Act also discriminates the buildings and properties and takes the acquisition
of only residential buildings of Mahadweep leaving out non-residential and commercial
buildings and buildings. Chapter VIII-A is said to be applied only to Bhikaji thus not
including the other cities. All these seem to not profess equality. Such an Act which becomes
a burden to the people is violative of fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14 and 19.

c. CONDITION OF PEOPLE WHO SUSTAINED FOR A LONGER PERIOD IN THE


SAME LOCALITY.
The government with the hope of giving a better future takes away the lands of people. But
instead of a better future or a new beginning, the people are led astray. Many lands are taken
for redevelopment and are not being developed and given to the rightful owners back. Some
reports to take note would be:

23
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
 Since his childhood, Shabir Ansari had heard his parents saying the decrepit building
in Vikhroli where they lived was a temporary home. They told him they would move
into their own home in south Bhikaji as soon as it was rebuilt. It’s been 40 years. His
father is no more and his current house has weakened further. For Ansari, life has
been permanently in transit.
Ansari’s family is just one of the 20,000-odd families housed in 60 such transit camps
set up by the Mahadweep Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA)
across the city. Since the 1970s, the MHADA started shifting people from its
dilapidated buildings in south Bhikaji into transit camps. They were to move back
once the old structures were rebuilt. But promises remain unfulfilled20.

 Over 12 acres of land purchased for the MHADA housing project in Chiplun has not
seen the light of the day in the last 40 years. The project commenced in 1982, with
land purchased from 23 farmers. The farmers have now moved the HC, demanding
that the land be given back if the project doesn't start.

Zaheer Kundlik, one of the grandsons of a farmer who lost a large share of his land,
said, "Our family has lost about 2 acres of land with MHADA stamp imposed on the
7/12 land extracts. Alternative land for farmers not be provided. The farmers or their
family members have no land for farming or job and now depend on public
distribution shops for subsidized grains etc"21

 Twelve years after the Lower Parel chawl where she resided was demolished, a 97-
year-old woman was handed over keys to her 300-sq-ft flat in a redeveloped high-rise
by the BhikajiHC, reports Rosy Sequeira.

Though the redeveloped building was ready nearly five years ago, Kamlabai Khamkar was
not given a flat in Green Field, Lower Parel, mainly because she had filed complaints against
the builder over non-payment of rent in lieu of transit accommodation. She refused to
withdraw the complaint unless she received 8.5 lakhs rent arrears and she was denied the flat
though 71 other tenants were given possession. The HC then ordered May 2022 to give her
20
SUKHADA TATKE, Will they continue to live in transit camps forever? Promises by authorities to rebuild
dilapidated structures remain unfulfilled September 02, 2013 01:25 am | Updated June 02, 2016 08:37 am IST
Mumbai, https://www.thehindu.com/
21
Umesh K Updated: 196 PTS Feb 10, 2023, https://indianexpress.com/

24
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
the keys.22 This shows how unreasonable the board performs and the injustices people have to
face of legislation brought by the State promising it was for their benefit.

On one side when the people who were promised a new beginning were led astray, the
landlords who were dependent on their lands were stripped of their basic requirements and
necessities. The facts of the case mention that the government enacted various laws to suit the
needs of the people. But then, there comes a question of what happens to the needs of the
landlords. Why has there been only neglect and deprivation of their needs and rights? They
are taken off of their livelihood as the rents from such property were their source of income,
this restricted their trade, and such restriction to give up a land is permanent.

In Mirzapur Moti Appeal23, the ban on slaughter was permanent. Even if the ban was on the
slaughter of certain cattle only, however, it was permanent. It will lead to the displacement of
many butchers, who trade specifically in that category and will throw them out of business. It
violates their Fundamental Right to trade under Article 19(1)(g), and the complete ban on
slaughter cannot be held as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6). In the same way,
restricting the landlords to not hold property but give it to the State is also a permanent ban
and will lead to the displacement of many landlords. Thus, the Act becomes unreasonable and
unfair. The compensation given cannot suffice all that the petitioners lose, while the other
group seems to gain from their loss thus making the Act violative of fundamental rights.24

4. WHETHER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE IMPUGNED ACT COULD


QUALIFY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 31A OF THE CONSTITUTION?

a. WIDER INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 31A


The Zamindari system was widely used before independence. The peasants' financial
circumstances deteriorated while the zamindars became extremely affluent with several
landholdings as a result of this arrangement. When Congress took over power, it was
determined to eliminate it by removing the zamindars' property and distributing it to the
impoverished. However, because Article 31's definition of "compensation" is so arbitrary,
they faced the challenge of having to offer compensation. Subsequently, the government
22
Rosy Sequeira/TNN/MAY 10,2022, https://indianexpress.com/
23
(civil) 4937-4940 of 1998
24
Suhrith Parthasarathy, 05/JUN/2017, Modi Government's Cattle Slaughter Ban Is Brazenly Unconstitutional
https://thewire.in/

25
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
retracted this motion, and the First Amendment of 1951 inserted Article 31A into the
Deepakalpam Constitution25. Within its five articles, this legislation stipulates that no law on
the government's purchase of any estate or right, or to the administration of any property,
shall be deemed unlawful or null until the President has given his or her assent26.

The State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg) Co. Ltd. 1974 (1) SCR 671). case
established that the subject matter acquired and its application to agrarian reforms must be
directly related. Without taking the scope of the section narrowly, the wider connotation of it
must considered. For the benefit of every person, it must be understood that every statute
must have a clear nexus with the subject matter not just in agrarian reforms but in every other
statute also. However, the lands and buildings acquired were not for a new reform or a new
purpose instead the State is just taking the business from the hands of the landlords and
carrying it out themselves. Public good seems to play a very little role here thus breaking the
nexus between the purpose of the Act and the subject matter.

In the case of Raja Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR1954SC621, The Supreme Court
ruled that no provision protecting Article 31A may force a person who individually cultivates
property and depends on it for a living to give it up unless reasonable compensation at market
value was provided. The purpose of compensation is to make up for the losses, and it ought to
be determined by justice and equivalency standards. The forced purchase shouldn't result in
either wealth or poverty for the impacted owners and tenants. But, unusually, monetary
compensation based only on the value of lost land accomplishes the goal of returning
impacted parties to their pre-acquisition status. The petitioners have contended that they only
received an illicit amount as compensation. 27 Taking into consideration the wider
interpretations of Article 31A, the Act or the steps taken by the State does not seem to comply
with the intention of the Article thus making it ineligible under its protection.

b. THE ACT DOES NOT SUBSERVE PUBLIC INTEREST

25
V.N.Shukla’s, Constitution of India, 14th Edition, 2022.
26
India Const. art. 31A.
27
Compulsory acquisition of land and compensation, S. Keith, P. McAuslan, R. Knight, J. Lindsay, P. Munro-
Faure, D. Palmer and L. Spannenberg, land reform / réforme agraire / reforma agraria 2008/1.

26
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
In the case of the State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai M. Khetan28, it was held that the
content of an Act determines whether or not it was meant to fulfill the goals outlined in art.
39(b), not the legislature's proclamation. The court must look at the statute as a whole to
determine this. In R.S NANJI V. STATE OF BOMBAY, it was held that “In each case, all
the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a
'public purpose' has been established Prima facie the Government is the best judge as to
whether 'public purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge.
The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a
question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a public purpose”

RFCTLARR of 2013, defines "impacted families," as the individuals who would be impacted
by land acquisition are described. Section 3(c) states that the following types of families are
considered "affected families:" (i) families whose land or other immovable property has been
acquired; (ii) families without any land but whose members may be agricultural laborers,
tenants (including those under any type of tenancy or holding usufruct rights), sharecroppers,
artisans, or who may have been employed in the affected area for three years before the
acquisition of the land, whose primary source of livelihood stands affected by the acquisition
of land, etc.29

The land is bought for a variety of public purposes, but whether it is appropriate to buy land
is the key concern. A variety of public projects, including government, commercial, and
public-private partnership initiatives, need the acquisition of land. In section 103B of the
MHADA Act, the State gives an option that if about 70 percent of the occupiers put together
30 percent of the money for the acquisition of the land then the State would acquire, re-
develop, rebuild, and give the property back to them for accommodation and housing
facilities. However, such a process seems to take decades for its completion.

Looking at the case of the Dharavi slum development project, “We welcome the offer made
by Adani Group but we would like faster construction and bigger 400 square feet houses,”
said Ramakant Gupta, president of Dharavi Redevelopment Committee. “We have been
waiting for our tenements since 2004 when the first development plan for Dharavi was
approved by the Maharashtra government. Some of the residents are waiting for decades to
28
1986 2 SCC 516
29
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013.

27
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
get into a concrete house,” he said. Since his childhood, Shabir Ansari had heard his parents
saying the decrepit building in Vikhroli where they lived was a temporary home. They told
him they would move into their own home in south Bhikaji as soon as it was rebuilt. It’s been
40 years. His father is no more and his current house has weakened further. For Ansari, life
has been permanently in transit.

Ansari’s family is just one of the 20,000-odd families housed in 60 such transit camps set up
by the Mahadweep Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) across the city.
Since the 1970s, the MHADA started shifting people from its dilapidated buildings in south
Bhikaji into transit camps. They were to move back once the old structures were rebuilt. But
promises remain unfulfilled. This shows that by giving hope of a new home, new life, and a
better future, the people have been left in the dark for decades. An Act set to serve public
interest must show it in action. However, when people are only given hope and not the
benefit, they begin to lose trust in the State30.

Also, the real question should be what happens to the building owners, landlords, the
occupants who did not consent to such acquisition. The act which is said to be in the public
interest seems to be prejudiced because, in addition to the 20,000 petitioners’ association, a
huge number of occupants also seem to be abused and deprived of by the Act. Such an act
would therefore cannot be justified under the umbrella of ‘public interest’ unless it has made
amends with such deprived state of the petitioners and the other affected people.

c. ACT FOR COMMON GOOD DISREGARDED THE BUILDING OWNERS AND


INDIVIDUAL OWNERS

Article 31A does not explicitly mention that it protects laws that are made in furtherance of
DPSP, however when a State does an act in furtherance of public interest it can be tested
under Article 39(b) and (c) based on the circumstances of the case. Article 39(b) of the
constitution states that the ownership and management of the community’s material resources
are distributed in such a way as to best achieve the common good. Article 39(c) of the

30
Dev Chatterjee, Dharavi residents seek bigger flats, faster construction and redevelopment,
https://www.business-standard.com/

28
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
constitution states that the functionality of the economic structure does not result in the
accumulation of wealth in the hands to the detriment of the common good. The Act in
controversy here has been enacted in furtherance of both these articles. According to the case
of Maharashtra State v. Basantibai M. Khetan31 it was held that the content of an act
determines whether or not it was meant to fulfill the goals outlined in art. 39(b), rather than
the legislature's proclamation. The court must look at the statute as a whole to determine this.
Only if it complies with its allegation, it can be protected under the protection articles 31A,
31B, and 31C.

Taking a look at rent freeze history the first rent control law in the Bhikaji Presidency, the
Bhikaji Rent (War Restrictions No.1) Act, the 1918 Act curtailed a landlord's power to
remove tenants and established a uniform rent. After the 1918 Act expired on December 31,
1928, there was no longer any restriction on rent or tenant evictions until the 1939 Act, also
known as the Bhikaji Rent Restriction Act, was enacted. Following its repeal, the 1939 Act
was superseded and replaced by the Bhikaji Rents, Hotel, and Lodging House Rates Control
Act, 1947 (1947 Act), which brought together the laws governing evictions, hotel and lodging
house rates, and rent control. The rent that was due for the relevant premises as of September
1, 1940, with allowed increases, was the standard rate.

Up until the Mahadweep Rent Control Act, 1999 (1999 Act) the rent freeze was not taken
down32. The genesis of the rent freeze is mentioned to show that the landlords have always
been in a state of helplessness and abuse. The facts of the case also give us the plight of such
landlords and building owners who were not able to erect or maintain their buildings. Their
profits were only 1 or 2 percent. They were not able to take their property for their own,
neither were they allowed to increase rent for their benefit nor were they able to maintain
their buildings which provided them livelihood.

Being in already such a helpless state the State introduced the MHADA Act of 1976, which
gave the owners and landlords only months to repair their building. This is unreasonable as
the rent freeze has not yet been taken down, and to ask the owners to repair the dilapidated
buildings with the 1 or 2 percent profits they earn is not fair as the profits which already
insufficient to have a basic living in the commercial capital of the Country. The petitioners
31
1956 AIR 294
32
By Justin Bharucha, Managing Partner, and Jaidhara Shah, Associate. Edited by Ayesha Bharucha, Managing
Associate. Genesis of rent freeze, 7 February 2023

29
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
were kept in a state of helplessness by the rent freeze and were even more abused with the
enactment of the MHADA Act which was set to take away their land leaving them with
nothing but an illicit amount as compensation.

When an Act newly introduced Act becomes a burden for a significantly large amount of
people where is the justification of the common good? Article 39(b) imposes the distribution
of wealth for the common good of the people but the State seems to have forgotten the
common good of the petitioners. The acquisition of only residential buildings would result in
the accumulation of wealth in the commercial realm of the country as their properties are not
acquired thus not complying with A.39(c).

In addition, the Supreme Court ruled in Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar33 that the right to
shelter is a fundamental freedom that all people are entitled to, and that the right to shelter is
included in Article 21 of the Deepakalpam Constitution as a means of enhancing the
significance of the right to life. But the Act does not include ‘all people’ and takes away such
a right to shelter from the petitioners and displaces them stripping them of their home and
livelihood. Such an Act cannot be said to have protection under A.31A.

5. WHETHER THE TERM “MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE COMMUNITY”


MEANS AND INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY ALSO?

a. ACQUIRING THE PETITIONERS’ BUILDINGS TO DISTRIBUTE DOES


NOT SEEM JUSTIFIABLE
In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai M. Khetan34 held that the content of an
act determines whether or not it was meant to fulfill the goals outlined in art. 39(b), rather
than the legislature's proclamation. The court must look at the statute as a whole to determine
this. Looking at this legislature, seems to serve the public to give them a house for a living.
But in the backdrop, it seems as though the Act is supporting builders and wealthy contractors
under the garb of welfare. The lands and properties are initially gained so that they can be
redeveloped by the MHADA. However, tables turn, and much such land said to be acquired
by the State is given to private parties in the name of developers. These developers or wealthy
contractors seemed to gain the land but are not developing the same. Thus, to some extent, it

33
Pradesh (1996) 2 SCC 549
34
1956 AIR 294

30
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
is inferred that the State is working maliciously to gain the lands and properties from the
landlords for a lesser price and sell them to wealthy contractors and developers for a larger
sum. This conclusion has been brought because the State is not acquiring cessed buildings
from any other cities but only from the city of Bikaji, which is the commercial capital of the
State. Thus, it becomes a well-known fact that properties in such a city go for a huge market
value and that through the years their value to even more. The State seems to conveniently
take away such properties under the garb of public interest protected by legislation.

Also, depriving around 20,000 building owners and individual owners of their livelihood,
source of income, and property, and leaving them with nothing but just illicit amounts to
compensation which does not suffice the value of the land they have lost or the rights they
have lost along with it. Every sovereign has the intrinsic right to confiscate private property
owned by any citizen for public use without the owner's permission, a process known as
"eminent domain."35 Clause (2) of Article 31 places restrictions on the acquisition or taking of
private property, stating that it must be done so for public use. The other requirement is that
no property may be appropriated unless the legislation authorizing it includes a clause
requiring compensation to be paid. Acquiring private property is said to be necessary to
construct a welfare society by the State. But how can a welfare society be formed when a
significant group of around 20,000 people are affected by it? Thus, it seems unreasonable and
unnecessary to take away such private lands already owned by people when it seems to affect
them. On these contentions, private lands should not be included with the term ‘material
resources of the community’.
b. RIGHT IS PROPERTY IS STILL A RECOGNIZED RIGHT THOUGH NOT
FUNDAMENTAL
It must be taken due diligence that though the right to property has ceased to be a
fundamental right it is still considered as a constitutional right. The same was held in Union
of India and others v. Indian Handcrafts Emporium and others 36 where the Court
determined that although the right to own, acquire, and dispose of property is no longer
protected by the Deepakalpam Constitution as a basic right, it is nevertheless a legal or
constitutional right that cannot be taken away from a person unless authorized by law. Such
constitutional rights should also be protected. The Country cannot provide a right to its

35
Understanding the Doctrine of Eminent Domain, https://testbook.com/
36
2003 (7) SCC 589

31
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
citizens and at the same time allow its State to violate such rights. In such cases, the right
loses its value and becomes mere words embedded in the constitution.

It should also be seen that the property right is also a human right. In the case of Chairman,
Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and others 37, it was
decided that property rights are now regarded as human rights in addition to constitutional
rights. According to the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man, "property is an
inviolable and sacred right."38

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees everyone's inherent right
to property, as stated in the Virginia Declaration of Rights from 1776, which served as the
model for the U.S. Bill of Rights.39 Everyone has the right to possess property, both
individually and jointly, as stated in UDHR Article 1740. No one’s property may be taken
from them arbitrarily.

It must be incurred that this international convention should have had a purpose for adding
such a right to hold property as inherent and inviolable. It cannot be said that they did not
apply their mind to it or had no vision by adding such rights. Though international rights are
not binding on us, it must be understood that property rights hold a much bigger value and
only therefore it has been stated in all these international conventions. Therefore, it seems
wrongful to add or club such private properties in terms of ‘material resources’ as private
properties hold much greater value and cannot be termed as mere material resources.

c. STATE IS ARBITRARY
Every Action of State Is Required to Be Guided by Non-arbitrariness, Reasonableness &
Rationality: Supreme Court41

Since reason must underpin every State activity, an act taken without reason is arbitrary. The
test of arbitrariness and the traps to be avoided in all State actions to prevent that vice were
laid out by this Court nearly 25 years ago in S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors 42.
37
(2007) 8 SCC 705
38
Dr. U. Chandra, Human Rights, Allahabad Law Agency publications, 2022
39
Dr. S.K.Kapoor, International Law and Human Rights, 22nd edition, 2022.
40
Dr. H.O. Agarwal, Human Rights, 17th Edition, Central Law Publication, 2022.
41
Sohini Chowdhury 3 Feb 2022, https://www.livelaw.in/
42
[1967] 2 SCR 703, at p. 7 18–19.

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MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
The passage reads as follows: "In this context, it is important to emphasize that the absence of
arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional
system is based”. When an act is arbitrary, it implicitly violates Article 14 since it is unfair in
light of both political reasoning and constitutional law. "43

However, to fulfill the goal for which it is granted, an authority must behave appropriately. It
must not be led by unimportant or superfluous factors, and shouldn’t behave in an unlawful,
illogical, or random manner. Any such unlawful, illogical, or capricious action or judgment,
whether pertaining to the legislative, executive, or quasi-judicial branches of government,
may be overturned for violating Article 14 of the Constitution44

Hence, it should be ascertained that there are possibilities for a State to act arbitrarily and that
adding private laws in the ambit of ‘material resources of the community’ might be a way of
paving the way for the legislatures to fulfill its ulterior motives. The State with its act of
depriving the petitioners of their property in the most expensive city of the country where the
worth of properties is enormous, by providing an illicit amount of compensation which does
not in any way come near the loss the petitioners would face or the value of the property, and
also by it being unfair by taking only residential buildings seems to echo arbitrariness in
every possible way. Thus, to protect individuals and their properties from such legislation,
private property should not be included under ‘material resources of the community’.

PRAYER

43
Supreme Court of India v. Union of India and Others / Aeltemesh Rein, Advocate (AIR 1988 SC 1768)
44
In Neelima Misra Vs Harinder Kaur Paintal And Others (AIR 1990 SC 1402).

33
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
In the light of the facts stated, the cases cited, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is more humbly prayed and implored before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
DEEPAKALPAM, that it may graciously please adjudge and declare that:

1. To declare that the impugned Act or Chapter VIII-A is constitutionally invalid.


2. To mandate the Central and State governments to take necessary action.

Also, pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the interest
of equity, justice, and good conscience.
For this Act of kindness, the Petitioner shall duty bound forever pray.

Respectfully Submitted
The Appellant

34
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

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