Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Author(s): Benjamin Mok

Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , June 2022, Vol. 14, No. 3 (June 2022), pp.
9-16
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/48676736

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Benjamin Mok

Recent events in India have highlighted the presence of an Extreme Right subculture in the
Hindutva movement, mainly within online digital ecosystems. This subculture, whose members are
known locally as ‘trads’, eschews the Hindutva mainstream in India, and instead promotes
extremist ideology within online communities on various social media platforms. These ‘trads’
regularly circulate extremist content using vulgar humour, based on themes such as denigrating
women, caste supremacy, and encouraging the genocide of minorities. ‘Trad’ communities are
identified, and distinguished from mainstream Hindutva communities, via three core traits: their
use of vulgar humour to trivialise extremism, coded language to form an ‘in-group’, and
uncompromising distrust of any ‘out-groups.’ The core traits work together to encourage
radicalisation of those exposed to extremist content, and to ensure that ‘trads’ are not beholden to
mainstream ethical norms. The growth of this subculture presents distinct extremist threats beyond
those posed by the Hindutva mainstream.

Introduction
Following its rise in the 2014 Indian general election, the right-wing Hindutva movement has been
mistaken by many observers as a monolithic entity,1 unified under the leadership of the Hindu far-
right, the Bharata Janata Party (BJP) and its para-militant wing, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS).2 Such unity is generally thought to extend into multiple issues including national
development, religious coexistence, and even socio-cultural issues such as gender and caste.3
Despite the efforts of scholars to prove that the Hindutva ‘monolith’ is a myth created by actors
within the movement,4 this misidentification remains a key facet of how the Hindutva movement is
defined from both within and without.5
However, recent events in India have shed light on the existence of Hindutva extremists who
subscribe to far-right ideology so extreme that they are unable to operate even within the BJP-
RSS mainstream. These extremists, identified by some observers as ‘trads’6, are modelled after
foreign Extreme Right online movements and often operate within the same digital ecosystems.7
While their existence had previously been largely glossed over due to narratives of Hindutva unity,
the identification of two ‘trads’ by the Indian police as the main perpetrators of the much-publicised
‘Bulli Bai’ and ‘Sulli Deals’ criminal cases in 2021, where Muslim women were subjects of mock
online ‘auctions’, have brought these extremists to the fore of Indian politics.8
Other recent events have highlighted a conflictual relationship between these extremists and the
Hindutva mainstream, such as the BJP’s November 2021 repeal of controversial farm laws in the
face of protests in Punjab, to which extremists responded by criticising the BJP for appeasing non-
Hindutva actors.9 These responses indicate a fracture within the Hindutva movement, highlighting
the existence of an extremist subculture that presents threats different from those posed by the
Hindutva mainstream.
This article highlights the existence of these ‘trad’ communities and provides a framework to
differentiate members of these communities as separate from the Hindutva mainstream. It begins
by examining the type of extremist content circulated within ‘trad’ online communities. Then, it
highlights three core traits exhibited in such content that set these communities apart from the
Hindutva mainstream. Finally, it considers the potential impact of these growing ‘trad’ communities
within India’s digital spaces on the socio-political and security landscape.10
Context
‘Trad’ subculture eschews the institutions of the BJP-RSS mainstream in favour of a decentralised
digital ecosystem that does not owe allegiance to any political party. This digital ecosystem is both

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

organic and self-sustaining, resulting in a community of extremists that operates more as a

subculture than a single political entity.11 As with similar Extreme Right ‘digital hate communities’
across the world, a surface glance at this ecosystem seems to suggest that its denizens only
engage in online ‘trolling,’12 but a deeper examination reveals that it plays a key role in encouraging
political violence offline.
This digital ecosystem comprises separate online communities, whose members are drawn
together through two categories of reasons. Firstly, some of these communities are formed around
non-mainstream individuals who curate extremist content online. These individuals can range from
persons who go by their actual identities, such as activists who have amassed sizeable followings
on their social media pages,13 or those who keep their identities hidden, such as the administrators
of political ‘meme pages’ on Facebook.14 Secondly, some of these communities are formed around
forums, websites, or messaging platforms focused specifically on hosting extremist Hindutva
content. These digital spaces are fluid and often outlive their original hosted locations – they are
able to migrate to different online platforms if their original location is shut down due to their
extremist content.
These communities are varied in their reasons for existence, choice of platforms, and in most
cases do not interact with one another directly. Furthermore, it should be noted that not all
members of these online communities would identify themselves as ‘trads’. However, many
members of these communities share certain traits that identify them as part of ‘trad’ subculture:
namely, their use of vulgar humour to trivialise extremism, coded language to form an ‘in-group’,
and uncompromising distrust of any ‘out-groups’.
Online Extremist Content within ‘Trad’ Communities Online
With the worldwide growth of online Extreme Right movements over the past decade, Violent
Extremism (VE) scholarship has increasingly recognised the key role played by online content in
enabling extremist rhetoric and narratives.15
Content circulating within ‘trad’ communities often focus on affecting a humorous tone to obscure
extremist ideology as humour inherent to the subculture, usually in the form of picture-based
memes or in-jokes. Some themes covered by such content align with extremist and far-right
themes found within the Hindutva mainstream, such as Islamophobic content denigrating Islamic
religious symbols 16 , or discourse criticising liberal culture. 17 Other themes contrast with the
Hindutva mainstream’s less extreme stances, such as the mainstream’s attempts at recognising
women’s rights18 and its progressive discourse on caste supremacy.19
Some of the content, while theoretically aligned with mainstream Hindutva ideology, is simply too
extreme for mainstream consumption. Jokes about killing non-Hindus, particularly Muslims, are
commonly circulated within these communities. On heavily moderated platforms, such content is
concealed using codewords such as ‘cauliflower farming,’20 and references to past anti-Muslim
violence such as alluding to the 2002 Gujarat riots, which involved widespread violence against
the Muslim community that some observers have since labelled as a pogrom.21
Less-moderated platforms allow for open calls for genocide and killings. This is the case with the
Indiachan.io imageboard, which is part of the ‘Chan’ imageboard digital ecosystem infamous for
its extremist content.22 Here, content threads are regularly created with titles such as “KILL ALL
MUSLIMS” 23 or “Genocide appreciation” 24 and are thus structured in such a manner that
encourages the circulation of pro-genocide and neo-Nazi content. Examples include memes
depicting a cartoon Hindu soldier killing Indian minorities in a gas chamber 25 and calls for the
Hindutva movement to deploy a genocidal “final solution” against Indian Muslims.26
Finally, ‘trad’ subculture mimics foreign Extreme Right movements in its glorification of certain
extremist individuals who are shunned by the mainstream for their actions.27 Similarly, memes
glorify similar figures in Indian history, including Nathuram Godse, Mahatma Gandhi’s assassin
and a Hindu fundamentalist, 28 Gopal Chandra Mukhopadhyay, the mastermind of anti-Muslim
attacks during the 1946 Calcutta riots, 29 and Dara Singh, a Hindu fundamentalist who led the
burning of a Christian missionary in 1999.30

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Trivialisation of Extremism
An examination of extremist content shared within ‘trad’ communities indicates that its members
are intent on using vulgar humour as the vehicle for extremist themes – yet it begs the question as
to why such a strategy is preferred. Prior to the creation of the pro-Hindutva forum bakchodi.org,31
one of the creators of the website responded to a series of questions on another forum, indicating
that “if things get too extreme, then normal regular users will censor themselves by not participating
at all,” 32 or by democratically censuring such content through downvoting. 33 This approach of
moderating content according to what is normalised melds with the extreme-right’s strategy of
trivialising extremism, encouraging the radicalisation of communities.
In the ‘Daily Stormer Style Guide,’ Andrew Anglin, a prominent anti-Semitic activist who serves as
editor for a popular extreme-right online media outlet, provides insight into this strategy.34 Anglin
instructs that “the unindoctrinated should not be able to tell if we are joking or not”, as “most people
are not comfortable with material that comes across as vitriolic, raging, non-ironic hatred”.35 This
then serves as a central “ploy” allowing the Daily Stormer to function as an outreach platform for
readers “at first drawn in by curiosity or the naughty humour”, and who are then radicalised by the
normalisation of the extremist content concealed behind the humour.36
In the case of the Hindutva movement, while mainstream discourse on extremist themes generally
focuses on the need for political action tied to the Sangh Parivar, the mobilisation of these themes
by ‘trads’ instead focuses on what Baishya (2021) terms as ‘light critique’ – criticism that does not
offer direct political resistance but rather uses its nature as a ‘fun’ activity to normalise content
within a community.37 As such, the triviality of the ‘trad’ subculture’s approach allows its discourse
to push past social boundaries that the mainstream remains beholden to.
Turning back to the case of bakchodi.org, we see that this strategy thrives within platforms that
practise content moderation based on a community consensus – as extremist content is
increasingly circulated due to its humorous nature, what is permissible expands as the community
shifts further towards the extreme. This phenomenon is repeated within other similar online
platforms.
One popular meme on Indiachan warps a popular children’s cartoon in India – Chhota Beem – by
depicting an alternate narrative where one of the characters develops into a caricature of Adolf
Hitler named “Rajulf Hadler”, who then goes on to commit genocide against the religious
minorities.38 The absurdity present in this meme conceals the violent extremism inherent in such
content, and it has subsequently been normalised as a continuing in-joke rather than a serious call
for violence. Yet, the imagery used in the original joke has leaked into other memes that similarly
call for violence against minorities, normalising them as well.39 Thus, the original spread of a meme
due to its humorous nature has encouraged further production of memes sharing its extremist
theme – of Nazi Germany and genocide – all the while concealing the spread and normalisation of
these themes as a ‘fun’ trivial activity.40
Violence is normalised through the creation of narratives, which manufactures enemies, and the
dissemination of these narratives, which manufactures consent for violence.41 Furthermore, one
way iconography manufactures consent is through taking advantage of the “popular sensibilities
of people in its original context.”42 Building in turn upon this concept, the ‘trad’ strategy of trivialising
extremism creates a form of de-facto consent not built upon theoretical principles, but rather as a
shared ‘fun’ activity within the subculture – thus, as a popular sensibility within the context of ‘trad’
subculture. Having manufactured consent, extremist content creators within the subculture
normalise violence by ensuring that the narratives manufacture the relevant ‘enemy,’ an act that is
achieved via the use of in-group/out-group dynamics.43
Coded ‘In-Group’ Language
Another core trait showcased in the content circulating within ‘trad’ communities is the use of a
coded language to form an ‘in-group’. Coded language not only serves as a creative method for
extremists within these communities to bypass filters on platforms with content moderation,44 but
also acts as a ‘dog-whistle’ signalling and cohering the group identity of the community.45 In doing
so, the development of a coded language via memes and other vehicles for humorous extremist

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

content thus becomes a shared activity – “a form of laughing with a certain community of
ideological peers.”46
Members of the ‘trad’ communities explored in this study purposefully use the shock value
generated by the language in their shared content – such as the use of the term “mudslimes” to
indicate Muslims, or the use of the Nazi-related term “final solution” as code for genocide – as an
identifier differentiating them from even the Hindutva mainstream. Such language provokes a
strong reaction from outsiders who are not desensitised to its extremist connotations, serving as a
gatekeeping mechanism that demands outsiders either join in the shared activity – thus radicalising
themselves – or to remain an outsider.47
Lone individuals disconnected from social institutions such as those provided by the RSS are
particularly susceptible to being drawn into the subculture via these ‘in-group’ dynamics. 48
However, familiarisation with such coded language is not exclusive to such individuals. Some
political figures have demonstrated adroitness in their understanding of such language, to find
favour with these communities.
Yogi Adityanath, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, and a politician some observers have
predicted as the next Indian Prime Minister49, is a key example of this phenomenon. Yogi, who is
well-received by ‘trads’ due to his extremist position within the Sangh Parivar,50 has been idolised
by the subculture, which regularly produces memes connecting him with anti-Muslim symbology.51
Yogi, in response, has played up this symbolic connection, increasing his popularity with the
Hindutva extremists.52 Further examples of ‘trad’ influence leaking out from its digital ecosystem
and into the general political landscape of India can be expected given Yogi’s success in mobilising
such coded language into political support.
Uncompromising Distrust of ‘Out-Groups’
Conversely, those in the Hindutva movement who do not accommodate the vulgar humour and
coded language of these extremist ‘trad’ communities are demonised via an approach that
demonstrates little compromise or nuance. This has resulted in many ‘trad’ communities exhibiting
an intense distrust of ‘out-groups’ within the mainstream that support a moderate approach to
Hindutva ideology.
This hostility is best represented by popular ‘trad’ memes titling Modi as ‘Maulana Modi’ due to his
perceived appeasement of Indian Muslims. These memes not only attack Modi for what they
perceive as appeasement of minorities to gain votes in certain states53 but, at times, accuse Modi
of working with non-Hindutva interests to decrease Hindu influence within Indian society.54 For
example, the BJP’s decision in June 2022 to suspend its spokeswoman Nupur Sharma for her
controversial televised remarks against Prophet Muhammad55 has resulted in significant backlash
by ‘trads’ specifically targeting Modi, with some accusing him of enforcing the suspension in order
to gain Indian Muslim votes and others accusing him of doing so to appease Muslim countries.56
Similar allegations are also regularly levelled at pro-Hindutva communities operating within the
mainstream – members of this political demographic are labelled by ‘trads’ as ‘raitas’57 and are
generally seen as members of the Hindutva movement who lack true commitment to the ideology.58
What purpose then does such uncompromising distrust serve, especially considering that it comes
at the cost of creating fractures within the larger Hindutva movement? In considering the
motivations behind this strategy, Anglin’s “Daily Stormer Style Guide”, which contains a section
titled “100% Black and White”, is useful. Here, Anglin contends that no room for nuance must be
left within Extreme Right propaganda, and that it must deal with moderates by “portraying them as
on our side, but at the same time prodding them to do more and go further.” 59 There is thus,
consciously or otherwise, motive behind this demonisation of the Hindutva mainstream – by
targeting and ridiculing its perceived placatory tendencies, Extreme Right discourse serves to push
the mainstream towards extremism.
‘Trad’ Subculture – Isolated, Radicalised and Self-Sustaining
In the case of ‘trad’ subculture, manufactured consent for violence only matters within the isolated
‘fringe’ that comprises these communities. 60 Populist narratives succeed based on how their

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

creators define the ‘majority’ to which they are meant to appeal – even if this constructed ‘majority’
is actually a ‘fringe’ community.61 The definition of majority/minority is a pretence, it is in fact closer
to the notion of ‘in-group’. Rather than seeking the approval of the Hindutva mainstream, the ‘trad’
subculture’s construction of itself as the ‘in-group’ enables it to treat the mainstream as outsiders,
who are only worthy of inclusion if they adopt the subculture’s shared language and extremist
activities.
Herein lies a core difference between the Hindutva mainstream and its ‘trad’ extremists. Those
operating within the Hindutva mainstream must navigate the perceptions of the national and global
mainstream due to the serious nature of their discourse; they are thus constrained by their struggle
with larger society over ensuring consent for their violent ideology.62 On the other hand, 'trads' are
under no such obligation to justify their open calls for genocide and violence according to
mainstream norms, due to the three core traits described in the preceding paragraphs of this article.
The ‘light critique’ presented by the extremist content circulated by ‘trads’ is immune to serious
criticism due to its trivial nature.63 At the same time, ‘trad’ subculture’s strong in-group identity and
its distrust of the out-group ensure that any serious criticism is ridiculed as stemming from
mainstream culture that does not understand the subculture.
These three core traits thus work together to form a subculture that is not only isolated and
radicalised, but also self-sustaining. It does not require the political support of any one organisation
to grow in its influence, nor is it subject to moderation by any one political actor – it is purely
beholden to the decentralised, majority influence of the subculture’s members.
Conclusion
Further research is needed to determine the actual size of this subculture in relation to the larger
Hindutva movement. Some observers claim that ‘trad’ subculture is smaller than its online
presence might suggest, as many of its members allegedly use multiple accounts to bolster its
numbers.64 On the other hand, the novelty of the internet as an ecosystem in which extremist
ideology can flourish requires that Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) scholars
examine more closely how ‘fringe’ elements interact with the Hindutva mainstream. 65 Should
enough of the subculture leak into the mainstream, it might shift the movement itself more towards
extremism. On the other hand, there is also potential that these isolated communities will lead to
an increase in alienated and radicalised individuals willing to carry out lone actor attacks.66
All these point to a need for increased vigilance within the PCVE space. Content moderation
spearheaded by government institutions and online platforms is effective to a certain extent. 67
However, the fluid and opaque nature of this subculture also highlights a need to better understand
the different aspects of its digital ecosystem and how it functions – an understanding that the
framework of identification provided in this paper seeks to encourage within our PCVE efforts.

About the author:

Benjamin Mok is a Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism
Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected].

Citations

1 Najeeb Mukarbi, “The Sangh’s Hindutva-Hindustan idea pits a monolithic majority against monolithic
Muslims,” The Economic Times, August 19, 2014,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/blogs/Ragtime/the-sangh-s-hindutva-hindustan-idea-pits-a-
monolithic-majority-against-monolithic-muslims1/.
2 Both the BJP and the RSS are a part of the Sangh Parivar, a conglomerate of Hindu nationalist

organisations that forms the backbone of the Hindutva movement. See also Sudha Ramachandran,
“Hindutva Violence in India: Trends and Implications,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol.

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

12, Issue 4, (June 2020), p.15 https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CTTA-June-

2020.pdf.
3 “Hindutva speaks for unity amongst Hindus while Hinduism divides on caste,” The Print, August 21,

2018, https://theprint.in/india/governance/hindutva-speaks-for-unity-amongst-hindus-while-hinduism-
divides-on-caste/102490/.
4 Gautam Mehta, “Myth of the Monolith: Contested Nationalisms within the Sangh Parivar,” India in

Transition, December 4, 2017, https://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/gautammehta.

5 Bhabani Shankar Nayak, “Towards monolithic society, centralized state? Imposing’ Hindi, Hindutva,

Hindustan,” Counterview, April 15, 2022, https://www.counterview.net/2022/04/towards-monolithic-

society-centralized.html.
6 While this article adopts the term ‘trad’ due to its common usage by Indian media outlets to describe

the subculture, it should be noted that the subculture can be identified as part of a larger phenomenon
termed by Julia Ebner as the “Extreme Right”, given that it exhibits at least three of the five
characteristics necessary for the label: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and strong
state advocacy. For details see, Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists
(London: Bloomsbury, 2020), p. 288.
7 Divya Arya and Vineet Khare, “Trads vs Raytas: The young Indians spreading hate online,” BBC

Hindi, February 11, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60321129.

8 Prabhash K. Dutta, “Who are Trads, the dangerous group Bulli Bai founder belongs to?” India

Today, January 11, 2022, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/trads-dangerous-group-bulli-bai-

founder-sulli-deals-1898457-2022-01-11.
9 “Protests se bills pass hoge abse,” (From now on the protest bills will pass), Reddit, November 19,

2021,
https://web.archive.org/web/20211119061032/https://www.reddit.com/r/Chodi/comments/qx9uim/prote
sts_se_bills_pass_hoge_abse/.
10 Further research is needed to fully explore the origins, motivations, and impact of ‘trad’

communities online; the modest focus of this article is to draw attention to the presence of such
communities in India, with the view of increasing vigilance considering their continued growth.
11 Alishan Jafri and Naomi Barton, “Explained: Trads vs Raitas and the Inner Workings of India's Alt-

Right,” The Wire, January 11, 2022, https://thewire.in/communalism/genocide-as-pop-culture-inside-

the-hindutva-world-of-trads-and-raitas.
12 Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir define the act of ‘trolling’ as the “practice of writing deliberately

inflammatory comments designed to elicit outrage from one’s targets” in order to deliberately offend
targets. For details see, Edwin Hodge and Helga Hallgrimsdottir, “Networks of Hate: The Alt-right,
Troll Culture, and the Cultural Geography of Social Movement Spaces Online,” Journal of Borderlands
Studies, Vol. 35, Number 4, (February 2019), p.576,
https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2019.1571935.
13 Anshul Saxena, “Home,” Facebook, July 2, 2018, https://www.facebook.com/AskAnshul, accessed

April 12, 2022.

14 K. Bhattacharjee, “Hindutva is here to stay, say the creators of Dharmic Memes for Hindu Teens,”

OpIndia, August 20, 2018, https://www.opindia.com/2018/08/hindutva-is-here-to-stay-say-the-

creators-of-dharmic-memes-for-hindu-teens/.
15 Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed, “It’s not funny anymore. Far-right extremists’ use of humour,”

Radicalisation Awareness Network, February 15, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-

affairs/system/files/2021-03/ran_ad-hoc_pap_fre_humor_20210215_en.pdf.
16 “Picture depicting the Kaaba as a toiletbowl,” Indiachan.io, accessed April 27, 2022,

https://imgur.com/a/1Snloml.
17 Pratyush Ranjan, “Adarsh Liberal vs Adarsh Bhakt: Hashtag war on Twitter,” Hindustan Times,

March 11, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/adarsh-liberal-vs-adarsh-bhakt-hashtag-war-

on-twitter/story-YNYDAwu4nUwdwE4D5LXejM.html.
18, “Picture listing various sexist statements encouraging rape of women,” Indiachan.io, accessed April

27, 2002, https://imgur.com/a/9V2UszU. In contrast with content such as that shown in this source,
Hindutva mainstream ideology has generally adopted a progressive stance that is at least overly non-
sexist and respectful of women. For details see, EPW Engage, “How Has Women’s Participation in
the Hindutva Movement Expanded Its Reach?” Economic & Political Weekly, February 10, 2021,
https://www.epw.in/engage/article/how-has-womens-participation-hindutva-movement.
19 “Birth based Brāhmaṇas have always proved themselves to be top notch bureaucrats, statesman,

scientists, warriors,” Indiachan.io, April 19, 2022, https://indiachan.io/pol/res/2354.html.

20 ‘Cauliflower farming’ and related terms reference an incident during the 1989 anti-Muslim riots in

Bhagalpur, during which 116 Indian Muslims were killed and their bodies buried in a cauliflower patch.

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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

For details see, “Court convicts Hindus for killing 116 Muslims in Bhagalpur,” Reuters, July 13, 2007,
https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-30362020070618.
21 “What they Want,” Twitter, November 20, 2021,

https://twitter.com/pj77in/status/1462041257820110855. For details on the 2002 Gujarat riots see,

Ashutosh Varshney, “Gujarat 2002 was independent India’s first full-blooded pogrom. Delhi 1984 was
a semi-pogrom,” The Print, February 26, 2020, https://theprint.in/opinion/gujarat-2002-was-
independent-indias-first-full-blooded-pogrom-delhi-1984-was-a-semi-pogrom/371684/.
22 Blythe Crawford and Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and the

Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures,” Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats,
December 2020,
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic-irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-
cultures/.
23 “Kill all Muslims,” Indiachan.io, April 17, 2022, https://archive.ph/KnFDu.
24 “Genocide appreciator,” Indiachan.io, April 14, 2022, https://archive.ph/PxSv5.
25 “Picture depicting Muslims being killed in a gas chamber by cartoon soldier wearing Hindu

symbols,” Indiachan.io, accessed April 27, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/qHDEfQQ.

26 “Genocide appreciator razario,” Indiachan.io, April 16, 2022, https://archive.ph/OZwyf.
27 Stephane J. Baele and Lewys Brace and Travis G. Coan, “The tarrant effect: what impact did far-

right attacks have on the 8chan forum?” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,
(December 2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2020.1862274
28 “Picture depicting Mahatma Gandhi with caption titled ‘Shot by Nathuram Godse,” Bakchodi Discord

Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/Sswwbwx.

29 “Picture depicting Gopal Chandra Mukhopadhyay in a heroic fashion,” Bakchodi Discord Channel,

accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/nhPskZ9.

30 “Picture depicting Dara Singh with caption implying that readers should burn those arguing with

them,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022, https://imgur.com/a/0q1Il6w.

31 An online forum originating from the Reddit digital ecosystem, bakchodi.org migrated in early 2022

to a private hosting server when its predecessor – r/Chodi – was banned by Reddit for hate speech.
The forum is known for its content characteristic of the ‘trad’ subculture, consisting of vulgar, trivial
humour mixed with extremist themes – as hinted at by the name of the website, which is an offensive
term that roughly translates to ‘pointless talking’.
32 “Let’s not get divided,” communities.win, March 26, 2022,

https://communities.win/c/bakchodi/p/15HIAdoYP2/.
33 “Dhamma-The Community Etiquette of bakchodi.org,” bakchodi.org, April 1, 2022,

https://bakchodi.org/post/787.
34 Andrew Anglin, “Daily Stormer Style Guide,”

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4325810/Writers.pdf
35 Ibid, p.11.
36 Ibid, p.10. This strategy can thus be construed as an attempt to shift the Overton Window – what is

considered as acceptable political discourse – via changing social norms regarding humour online.
For further examples of how the Extreme Right attempts to shift the Overton Window, see, Daniel L.
Byman, “How hateful rhetoric connects to real-world violence,” Brookings, April 9, 2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/09/how-hateful-rhetoric-connects-to-real-
world-violence/.
37 Anirban K. Baishya, “The conquest of the world as meme: memetic visuality and political humor in

critiques of the Hindu right wing in India,” Media, Culture & Society, Vol. 43, Issue 6, (September
2021), p.1132, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0163443720986039.
38 “The Lore of Chotta Bheem Universe: RAJULF HALDER,” Indiachan.com, June 8, 2021,

https://web.archive.org/web/20210807004133/https://indiachan.com/pol/res/266914.html.
39 “Picture depicting a character from the ‘Rajulf Hadler’ meme assaulting a Muslim individual in a

context outside of the original meme,” Bakchodi Discord Channel, accessed April 16, 2022,
https://imgur.com/a/hcPwGck.
40 For further examples on how extremist memes use humour to normalise the spread of extremist

themes, see Blythe Crawford and Florence Keen and Guillermo Suarez de-Tangil, “Memetic Irony and
the Promotion of Violence within Chan Cultures,” p.16.
41 Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” in Normalization of Violence: Conceptual Analysis and

Reflections from Asia, ed. Irm Haleem (Oxon: Routledge, 2020), p.8.
42 Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” p.24.
43 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Blyth Crawford and Valentin Wutke, “Rise of the Reactionaries:

Comparing the Ideologies of Salafi-Jihadism and White Supremacist Extremism,” The Program on

15
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 Exploring Hindutva Online Subculture

Extremism at George Washington University, December 2021, p.5-6,

https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Rise%20of%20the%20Reactionaries.pdf.
44 Gabriel Weimann and Ari Ben Am, “Digital Dog Whistles: The New Online Language of Extremism,”

International Journal of Security Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (February 2020),

https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=ijoss.
45 Mathilda Åkerlund, “Dog whistling far-right code words: the case of culture enricher on the Swedish

web,” Information, Community & Society, Vol. 1, Issue 18, (February 2021)
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2021.1889639.
46 Anirban K. Baishya, “The conquest of the world as meme,” p.1132.
47 Jason Wilson, “Hiding in plain sight: how the 'alt-right' is weaponizing irony to spread fascism,” The

Guardian, May 23, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-

humor-as-a-weapon-facism.
48 Luke Munn, “Alt-right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online,” First Monday, Volume 24,

Issue 6, (June 2019), http://dx.doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i6.10108.

49 Unnati Sharma, “Talk about Yogi Adityanath as a future PM candidate is ‘natural, Amit Shah says,”

The Print, March 1, 2022, https://theprint.in/politics/talk-about-yogi-adityanath-as-a-future-pm-

candidate-is-natural-amit-shah-says/853246/.
50 “ELECT BALD BOI FROM UP TO PM,” Indiachan.io, April 18, 2022,

https://indiachan.io/pol/res/1404.html#q2342.
51 “Modified image showing Yogi alongside a bulldozer with text encouraging violence,” Twitter, March

31, 2022, https://mobile.twitter.com/jimmyjvyas/status/1509406409624289286.

52 Manish Sahu, “Explained: Not just bulls, how bulldozers made it to election lexicon in UP,” Indian

Express, March 8, 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-not-just-bulls-how-

bulldozers-made-it-to-election-lexicon-in-up-7804167/.
53 “Tweet discussing Modi,” Twitter, February 27, 2022,

https://twitter.com/Erlogical21/status/1497620846285705218.
54 “Tweet alleging Modi is part of a conspiracy,” Twitter, December 24, 2021,

https://twitter.com/HinduResponse/status/1474378325573668866.
55 “BJP suspends Nupur Sharma, expels Naveen Kumar Jindal over inflammatory remarks,” Times of

India, June 5, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kanpur-clash-bjp-suspends-nupur-

sharma-and-naveen-kumar-from-partys-primary-membership/articleshow/92019088.cms.
56 “Tweet attacking Modi as ‘maulana’ for his perceived appeasement towards Muslim countries,”

June 6, 2022, https://twitter.com/Koenraad_Elst/status/1533508985080397826.

57 Rahul Roushan, “Who are Trads and Raitas and what is the supposed internal strife in the Right

Wing?” OPIndia, January 7, 2022, https://www.opindia.com/2022/01/trads-vs-raitas-and-rw-fights/.

58 “CMV: Raita wingers have no love for Hinduism,” Reddit, October 7, 2019,

https://www.reddit.com/r/bakchodi/comments/dee80e/cmv_raita_wingers_have_no_love_for_hinduis
m/.
59 Andrew Anglin, “Daily Stormer Style Guide,” p.12.
60 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Blyth Crawford and Valentin Wutke, “Rise of the

Reactionaries,” p. 32.
61 Irm Haleem, “How violence is normalized,” p.20.
62 Sudha Ramachandran, p.17.
63 Rob May and Matthew Feldman, “Understanding the Alt-Right: Ideologues, Lulz and Hiding in Plain

Sight,” in Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe
and the US, Maik Fielitz and Nick Thurston (eds.,) (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2018), p.35.
64 Archis Chowdhury, “In The Dark World Of Edgelord Trads, Genocide And Rape Memes Are Fun,

Boom, January 11, 2022, https://www.boomlive.in/decode/impact/bulli-bai-sulli-deals-trads-rayta-

right-wing-nationalists-bjp-modi-arrest-16338.
65 Edward Anderson and Arkotong Longkumer, “Neo-Hindutva: evolving forms, spaces, and

expressions of Hindu nationalism,” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 26, Issue 4, (December 2018)
p.376, https://doi.org/10.1080/09584935.2018.1548576.
66 Cathrine Thorleifsson and Joey Düker, “Lone Actors in Digital Environments,” Radicalisation

Awareness Network, October, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-

10/ran_paper_lone_actors_in_digital_environments_en.pdf.
67 Maik Fielitz and Reem Ahmed, p.13.

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