Disability & Society

ISSN: 0968-7599 (Print) 1360-0508 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cdso20

Feeling disability: theories of affect and critical

disability studies

Dan Goodley, Kirsty Liddiard & Katherine Runswick-Cole

To cite this article: Dan Goodley, Kirsty Liddiard & Katherine Runswick-Cole (2018) Feeling
disability: theories of affect and critical disability studies, Disability & Society, 33:2, 197-217, DOI:
10.1080/09687599.2017.1402752

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1402752

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa

UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group

Published online: 23 Nov 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 14853

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 12 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cdso20
Disability & Society, 2018
VOL. 33, NO. 2, 197–217
https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2017.1402752

OPEN ACCESS

Feeling disability: theories of affect and critical disability

studies
Dan Goodleya , Kirsty Liddiarda and Katherine Runswick-Coleb
a
iHuman and the School of Education, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK; bSocial Change and
Community Well Being Centre, Research Institute for Health and Social Change, Manchester
Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper explores connections between affect studies and Received 11 April 2017
critical disability studies. Our interest in affect is sparked Accepted 6 November 2017
by the beginnings of a new research project that seeks to KEYWORDS
illuminate the lives, hopes and desires of young people Theory; disability; affect;
with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’ impairments. Cultural emotions; life; short lives
responses to these young people are shaped by dominant
discourses associated with lives lived well and long. Before
commencing our empirical work with young people we use
this paper to think through how we might conceptualise
affect and disability. We present three themes; ontological
invalidation in neoliberal-able times; affect aliens and crip
killjoys; disability and resistant assemblages.

Points of interest

• This article is sparked by the beginnings of a research project working with

young people with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’ impairments (LL/LTIs).
• Too often, society treats people with LL/LTIs as tragedy cases requiring pity
and sadness.
• People often respond to disability in deeply emotional ways.
• There has been a lot of research recently on emotions which is broadly
termed affect theory but disability is often ignored.
• We seek to connect affect theory and disability research with reference to
young people with LL/LTIs in ways that can capture the desires, hopes and
ambitions of these young people, their families and allies.

CONTACT Dan Goodley [email protected]

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
198  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

1. Introduction
This article explores the original offerings of affect theory to studies of disability
and, as a way of exchange, the unique contribution of critical disability studies
to theories of affect. Our interest in the latter has been elevated by the begin-
nings of a new research project, ‘Life, Death, Disability and the Human: Living
Life to the Fullest’ (ES/P001041/1) funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council, and seeks to forge new understandings of the lives, hopes, desires and
contributions of children and young people with ‘life-limiting’ or ‘life-threatening’
impairments (LL/LTIs). With children and young people as our co-researchers, the
project will be a space where disabled children and young people can tell new
stories of disability; their own stories.
There is something instantly emotive around the idea of a child or young per-
son living a short life. People are affected, often deeply, by the idea that a young
person’s life course is reduced through the presence of impairment. We know that
cultural and individual responses to young people with LL/LTIs are significantly
shaped through a plethora of dominant ideas and practices linked to idealisations
associated with quality of life, human productivity and lives lived well and long.
Young people with LL/LTIs appear to be at odds with the neoliberal imperatives of
self-sufficiency, autonomy and independence. Their presence makes society feel
for their predicament. In this article, we seek to contest these dangerous discourses
with reference to concepts emerging from the inter-disciplinary fields of affect
theory and critical disability studies. Because our project is in the early stages of
fruition and empirical work is yet to start, we use this article as an opportunity to
pause and to consider possible connections between theories of affect and critical
disability studies.

2. Introducing theories of affect

There will always be debates about the extent to which we can generalise an
intellectual space that is fraught with debate, tension and disagreement. The
study of affect broadly hails a return to emotion and feeling including (although
not exclusively) happiness, love, optimism, misery, contentment, guilt, bitterness,
envy, humiliation, fear, grief, disgust, passion, psychic pain, desire, hope, shame,
anger, imagination and optimism. Gorton (2007) observes that distinctions are
sometimes made between emotion (a sociological expression of feelings) and
affect (a physical response rooted in biology). Such a simplistic distinction is now
generally avoided and we use affect and emotion interchangeably in this article
to acknowledge that biology and society are firmly wrapped up with one another.
As Gorton (2007, 334) puts it, ‘feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and expe-
rienced through the body’.
It is a truism to suggest that we affect other people and are in turn affected by
them. Yet the return to affect in social theory is a relatively new one, predicated
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  199

upon the idea that theorists have tended to sideline the emotional. Sociologists,
for example, have always been preoccupied with discourse, culture and structure.
These are, after all, some of the big-hitting leitmotifs of the discipline. A turn to
affect asks us to consider those elements that have been ignored in favour of more
public, measurable and structural indicators. Similarly, discursive psychologists
have contested the individualisation of psychological ideas such as attitude, per-
sonality, resilience and emotion but have left the theoretical space with very little
to say about the affective or the embodied. Emotions and embodied feelings need
to be part of sociological and critical psychological thinking. The turn to affect is not
simply about addressing a missing psycho-emotional dimension in social theory.
Affect theory responds to the ways in which affects are mobilised by economic
and cultural forces. Affect theories are interested in the ways in which contempo-
rary citizens are ‘thrown into a constellation of affections – which may have the
quality of feeling necessary to our lives, but which may be both contingent and
punitive’ (Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon 2014, 224). We come not only to know
and perform ourselves (Butler 1999); we are also expected to know how to feel.
According to Wetherell (2015, 139), the humanities and psychological and social
sciences are witnessing the emergence of various theories of affect that attend to
the ways in ‘which bodies are pushed and pulled in contemporary social forma-
tions, in the “engineering” of affective responses, and in how workers and citizens
become emotionally engaged and affectively interpellated’. In their special issue
on affect in the journal Body & Society, Blackman and Venn (2010) draw attention
to the ways in which affect is felt at the level of the body but is always socially and
culturally conditioned. Affects are felt individually, materially and physiologically
but are always being reproduced by their entanglements with the social world.
In their special issue of Feminist Theory, Pedwell and Whitehead (2012) consider
the relationship between affect and feminist theory. They note that affect studies
constitute an interdisciplinary space with often contradictory and oppositional
takes upon the subject matter. What is clear, following Gorton (2007, 334), is that
there is shared interest in the way ‘feeling is negotiated in the public sphere and
experienced in the body’. Foucault often figures in the bibliographies of affect
theorists in the biopolitical constitution of the subject and subjectivity, and many
authors share ‘a concern with how power circulates through feeling and how polit-
ically salient ways of being and knowing are produced through affective relations
and discourses’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 116).
One of the most well-known affect writers, Ahmed (2004) is clear that we are
subject to various affect economies in which bodies and emotions are shaped and
stifled. We are increasingly witnessing an ‘emotionalisation of society’ (Pedwell and
Whitehead 2012). Romantic love, for example, becomes known through dominant
practices of Hollywood, psychotherapy and memes of social media. Nurture, affec-
tion and care are shaped through complex political, cultural and social economies.
Think of the John Lewis (a UK department store) Christmas television adverts as
explicit examples of the ways in which desire, care and family are played out – and
200  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

risk being prescribed – through the act of consumption.1 Dan (first author), at this
juncture, feels it necessary to shamefully confess that every Christmas, no matter
how Scrooge-like he is feeling, he finds himself in bits, sobbing before his kids, as
they look on at him with disgust. What can we say? Dan’s a sucker for a bouncing
dog, a lost snowman and a forlorn rabbit. As a key player in the affect economy,
television is a successful exploiter of catchy emotions (Gorton 2007, 338); those
feelings that spread contagiously through the workings of affect economies (and
especially catchy in relationships of consumption). Ahmed’s work displays a cyn-
icism towards those social and cultural processes that threaten to affectively box
people in: to become emotionally attached to particular kinds of object and sub-
jects in the social world. The feelings we hold and express can (re)produce dom-
inant social and geopolitical hierarchies and exclusions (Pedwell and Whitehead
2012, 120). In this sense, then, affect is always relational: and these relationalities
take place between humans and non-humans, bodies and culture, individuals and
society, and organic entities and machines (Fox and Alldred 2015). How we come to
feel or emote is the consequence of our relationship with others. We affect others
and they affect us. This leads Wetherell (2015) to conclude that affect is always
distributed: we feel and emote in the relationships we have others.
The affective turn is also associated with some moves to put the psyche into
the social (hence the idea of the psychosocial in critical social psychology). But this
does not necessarily mean reinserting a pre-social psyche. For instance, Blackman
and Venn (2010, 20) are interested in the kinds of idealised images of the body that
shape affects: ‘the kinds of fantasies and desires that might propel our investments,
financial and corporeal with our bodies’. Affect is something that is performed
and it is the idea of affective practice that Wetherell (2015) prefers over a choice
of affect. Wetherell is a renowned discursive psychologist and so is interested in
the ways in which discursive practices produce the effects of their actions. This
understanding of affective practice resonates with the hugely influential work of
Hochschild’s (1983) emotional labour. This concept seeks to account for the assault
on the self that occurs in response to demanding publics. Emotions are corpo-
real thoughts, embodied processes, imbricated with social values and frequently
involved in preserving social bonds, social rules and display of behaviour (Williams
2003, 519–520). Hochschild’s concept of emotional labour refers to those times
when the self acts in ways that fit the expectations of others. This sense of the
affective register being laid out through complex social and cultural relationships
invites in the work of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), not least in their idea of biopo-
litical citizenship and immaterial labour. As Goodley and Lawthom (2011, 118)
have articulated, Hardt and Negri shine light on ‘the transformation of the labour
process which has created a new proletariat through an emphasis on knowledge
and affect (with the latter showing an increased weight of activities focused on
health, education and social care) (Rustin, 2002)’. We are increasingly made to do
work on ourselves – governance – and we do this through working the self and
our relationships with others. This immaterial labour – knowledge, information,
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  201

communication and emotional reproduction – becomes the site through which we

constitute our subjectivities, identities and ways of being with others. Increasingly,
places that were formerly the remit of the private/personal (e.g. sexual relation-
ships, families, households) are increasingly governed by public interventions,
which seek to normalise their practices and create ideal national citizens:
These areas of affective/emotional/immaterial labour – which include the service
industry, health and social welfare services, caring and maternal work – know no hours
of work (beyond the 9 to 5 working day), are always labouring and in the process of
becoming experts about themselves. (Goodley and Lawthom 2011, 118)
This centralising of subjectivity in the constitution of self and society will be all too
familiar to students of Foucault. In addition, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) push
this analysis further into a conceptualisation of affective labour as the labour of
the postmodern proletariat caught up in the globalisation of an affect economy
(or Empire as they term it; original emphases).
A turn to affect is also associated with a desire to recognise the materiality
of the body – and the material relationships between human bodies and other
non-human entities. This addresses the somatophobia that has been found in
some transformative writings in queer, feminist and disability studies. This fear of
the body can be traced back to the advent of these radical perspectives which, in
part, politically responded to biological essentialism that viewed queer, disabled
and female bodies as inherently abnormal. In contrast, recent theories of affect
have focused on the extra-discursive. A common trope within the philosophy
of materialism ultimately considers matter to be something that exists beyond
human perception (Flynn 2017). Accepting the limits of discursive analysis has
pushed many into what are now commonly known as new materialist theories
(associated often with the appeal of writers such as Rosi Braidotti, Brian Massumi,
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari). Martin (2013) offers an anthropologist’s reading
of the materialist affect theory literature. She notes, borrowing from the work of
Leys (2011, 437), that, at various times, affects are considered to be:
‘inhuman,’‘pre-subjective,’‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and
judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect
and emotion … the affects must be non-cognitive, corporeal processes or states. (Martin
2013, 465; original emphases)
Materialist affect theorists seek to tune into the human as a visceral, embodied,
emotive and corporeal creature. Too often in social theory there is an emphasis
on reason, rationality and the linguistic. A positive of such a reading of affect is
that we recognise the pre-social potentiality of a living body. A negative reading
of this is that we are straying into the dangerous theoretical lands of the pre-so-
cial biological: a terrain exploited by some forms of psychological individualism
and essentialism (see Billington’s [2016] critique). We share Martin’s (2013, S156)
concerns when she states: ‘we need to ask whether one result of seeing the affects
as biological phenomena is losing the insights that feminism can provide’. A more
positive reading of the material potentiality of the body is provided by Deleuze
202  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

and Guattari (1987) – who position the body as one full of affective potential yet
to be coded and stifled by strict cultural codes. Affect, in this sense, is a ‘material
intensity that emerges via the “in-between” spaces of embodied encounters, cir-
culating power not primarily as a mode of discursive regulation but rather as the
potential to “become otherwise”’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 116). This vague
language of DeleuzoGuattarian potentiality is given political purchase and con-
ceptual clarity through the hugely influential work of Braidotti (1994, 2002, 2003,
2005, 2006, 2013). For example, her work on nomadic affectivity represents desire
as outward bound and based on the human’s complex relations with a ­multiplicity
of others, including non-human others. This reorganisation of desire – from the
psychoanalytic desire for the things we lack to a desire for connections anew
with other humans and non-human beings – is explained in part through our
deeply technologically embedded global world which blurs ‘fundamental cate-
gorical divides between self and other; a sort of heteroglossia of the species, a
colossal hybridisation which combines cyborgs, monsters, insects and machines
into a powerfully posthuman approach to what we used to call “the embodied
subject”’ (Braidotti 2005, no page). Put simply, then, Braidotti asks us to reveal the
connections between humans, other humans and non-humans because through
these relationships we might find major rearticulations of affect, emotion and
feeling. This is the brave new world of the posthuman: a space and time where we
find ‘non-unitary, radically materialist and dynamic structure[s] of subjectivity …
[expressing each] subject’s capacity for multiple, non-linear and outward-bound
inter-connections with a number of external forces and others’ (Braidotti 2005,
no page).
The human category of modern societies (especially in Western Europe and
North America) has been one tied to the ethics and philosophy of humanism:
a speaking subject, bounded and ordered, with clear distinctions of cognition/
affect, reason/passion, rationality/irrationality or self/other. The posthuman is a
reaction and an alternative to humanism and its associated prescribed, bounded
and self-governing sovereign self. Affect is released from its binarised and othered
distinction (as the opposite of cognition) as the human category itself is opened
up as a distributed entity more in keeping with our contemporary techno-cul-
ture. Affect is not to be found inside human beings, but in the connections and
relationships between humans and non-humans. In her early writings, Braidotti
(2005, no page) was keen to emphasise a number of ways in which the posthuman
condition is created:

• ‘Mutual inter-dependences and productive mergers of forces that give rise

to creative becomings’ (here we like to think of the work of educational inclu-
sion done between and amongst a group of disabled and non-disabled chil-
dren in a classroom as they are assisted by a teacher and her assistants to
work together as a group task).
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  203

• ‘Replacing the old subject formation with a notion of the subject as a cluster
of complex and intensive forces – intensive assemblages which connect and
inter-relate with others in a variety of ways’ (the disabled child is no longer a
fixed subject but part of the assemblage already described).
• ‘An attack on identity. Not on any one identity, but on the very concept of
identity’ (consider the ways in which a child is always becoming – never a
fixed being – and use this same idea when thinking about humans more
generally).
• ‘Avoiding references to the paradigms of human nature (be it biological,
psychic or genetic essentialism) while taking fully into account the fact that
bodies have indeed become techno-cultural constructs immersed in net-
works of complex, simultaneous and potentially conflicting power-relations’
(it is no longer possible to talk of national boundaries, friendships or activist
organisations in the same way as it was 20 years ago before the advent of
social media).
• ‘A non-unitary vision of the subject that endorses a radical ethics of trans-
formation, thus running against the grain of contemporary neo-liberal con-
servatism, but it also asserts an equally strong distance from relativism or
nihilistic defeatism’ (a grounded sense of working together as an assem-
blage, impossible to pinpoint where the collective begins or ends, a celebra-
tion of many connection points, of numerous affective possibilities).

Braidotti writes that ‘a non-unitary subject proposes an enlarged sense of inter-con-

nection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” others, by
removing the obstacle of self-centred individualism’ (2005, no page). Our affects
– and what we desire – are enacted through our mutual interdependencies and
assemblages rather than as manifestations of inherent humanist emotions.
Fox and Alldred (2015) set up new materialist analyses as being interested in
social production rather than social construction; especially in relational networks
or assemblages of animate and inanimate entities. Materiality is plural, open, com-
plex, uneven and contingent especially if viewed from a DeleuzoGuattarian per-
spective (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Fox and Alldred 2015, 400). Hence:

• Bodies are always relational as are other material, social and abstract entities
with no distinct ontological status other than produced through their rela-
tionships or assemblages.
• We replace the idea of human agency with the Spinozist notion of affect:
meaning simply the capacity to affect or be affected. So affects are always
becoming and this refers to a change in the capacities of state of an entity.
• We attend to the production of assemblages, which are constantly becom-
ing as they territorialise (stabilising an assemblage) or de-territorialising
(destabilising an assemblage) (Fox and Alldred 2015, 401).
204  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that we map the assemblage and find gaps
between its rigid lines that offer lines of flight and the emergence of smooth
spaces (for moments of de-territorialisation). As Youdell and Armstrong (2011,
145) put it:
Striated space can be thought about as the binary, hierarchical, and normative mean-
ings of spaces and their possibilities and impossibilities … Striations are the deep scores
or grooves cut by the rigid lines of the assemblage, defining and constraining meaning
and practice. The smooth spaces against which these are contrasted are not distinct
spaces, but are moments and sites of possibility when and where the assemblage and its
striations might be disrupted or deterritorialized … A line of flight might allow us to trip
out of the striations in which we are caught to skate on the smooth plateaus between,
even if in doing so we slip into or begin to grind out yet another striation.
Smooth spaces are associated, then, with de-territorialising over-coded striated
assemblages. Youdell and Armstrong (2011) encourage us to think about school.
Consider the over-coding or the striations of schools. Note those un/written rules
that pervade. Think too how in these school assemblages children are sifted,
selected and coded in affirmative ways (gifted and talented) or, in other cases,
coded in limiting ways (Special Educational Needs and Disabilities). We will return
to materialist analyses of affect later.
The rise of emotion and feeling is also having huge impacts on the human and
psychological sciences, specifically neuropsychology. Billington (2017), for exam-
ple, draws in the work of the critical neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, whose focus
on affect, feeling and emotion has not only expanded conceptualisations of the
cognitive to include emotion but also emphasised the impact of the environment
on the brain. Billington (2017, 5) insists that these new affective neuroscientists
are interested not in the minute detail of neurons firing but in ‘lifting /the neuro-
logical or psychological veil to reveal the latest political challenge posed to social
and education inclusion’. Here Billington’s work is closely aligned to the work of
Ahmed and others who are interested in moving beyond ‘the “inside out” model
of psychology, and the “outside in” model proffered by sociology and anthropol-
ogy’ (Pedwell and Whitehead 2012, 123). Affect is necessarily complicating, then,
because it seeks to challenge these well-worn distinctions between interior and
exterior worlds. How we feel is closely connected to our place in the world and
many theorists of affect want to keep this dynamic relationship between self/other,
body/society and psyche/culture, developing new vocabularies for understanding
these complexes.
Thus far, in this article, we have considered some of the theoretical considera-
tions and analytical trajectories within the field of affect studies. Our sense is that
much is to be gained by critical disability studies engaging with this work and this
is especially the case from our perspective as we start a new research project that
works alongside young people with LL/LTIs and their families.
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  205

3. Sparking our interest in affect: our study

Our interest in theories of affect has been generated by the beginnings of a new
research project. We can gauge the values of any society by considering how it
treats those people who are the most marginalised. Too often disabled young
people find themselves on the outskirts of society. This is especially the case for
one group of disabled young people. We know much about the deaths of young
people with life-limiting or life-threatening impairments (LL/LTIs) but relatively
little about their lived lives. This invisibility could be detrimental to their social
and emotional well-being and mental health, and that of their families/carers and
allies. Our research seeks to forge new understandings of the lives, hopes, desires
and contributions of disabled young people with LL/LTIs. This will permit us to
think differently about how society understands life and death, and will deliver
forms of co-produced knowledge that will be useful to academics and to a host of
civil society organisations, professionals and communities that are also seeking to
value short lives and respect death as part of the human condition. Our inquiry is
a flagship project of the Institute for the Study of the Human at the University of
Sheffield.2 The project began in April 2017 and finishes in April 2020.
According to the national charity Together for Short Lives, LL/LTIs considerably
shorten children and young people’s life expectancy. There are around 49,000
children and young people with LL/LTIs in the United Kingdom, and these rates
are increasing year on year. Young people with LL/LTIs are living longer than ever
before, yet we know little of their lives, particularly from their own perspectives.
This lack of knowledge is due to the marked absences of this unique group of
disabled young people from public imagination and broader culture. Young peo-
ple with LL/LTIs have been omitted from much academic research; are seldom
explicitly written into public policy; are often excluded from disability communi-
ties and disabled people’s own movements; and have their voices dominated by
professional perspectives within palliative (end-of-life) care teaching, education
and training (see Runswick-Cole, Curran, and Liddiard, 2017). Whilst there has been
work in the palliative, nursing and medical worlds on LL/LTIs, very little of this work
has included or speaks from young people’s own perspectives. Consequently, crit-
ical questions subsist around personal, relational and collective well-being. This
project is timely given that our previous research showed that disabled young
people and their families/carers and allies experience significant exclusion and
discrimination; exclusion which is currently exacerbated through severe aus-
terity in the United Kingdom. Therefore, with young people alongside us as our
co-researchers, and working in partnership with leading disability/LL/LTI organi-
sations (Purple Patch Arts, DMD Pathfinders, Good Things Foundation, Muscular
Dystrophy UK Trailblazers), we will explore the lives of young people with LL/LTIs
as they experience and understand them, with the aim of making their lives visible.
Young people with LL/LTIs and their families will tell their own stories through
multi-modal engagement with innovative art-making and narrative approaches.
206  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

Working with our Community Research Partners and Expert Impact Partners we are
co-designing impact activities which ensure that research findings are applied and
utilised in real-life settings and thus are relevant, transferable, accessible and trans-
formative outside academia. We propose that this impact serves to improve the
social, emotional and mental health and well-being of young people with LL/LTIs,
and their parents/carers and wider families, and other members of their networks
who make up the constantly shifting assemblages within which they intra-act
and affect one another, enabling them to live life to the fullest. More information
on the project – including the specificities of methodology and method – can be
found at the project website.3
Because our study is in its infancy we are starting to collect our empirical data.
However, we know that researchers never enter a project value-free or theoretically
and conceptually under-developed. In contrast, we hold the firm conviction that
researchers should always be mindful of the kinds of theoretical understandings
that they hold and the potential ways in which these theories might conceptual-
ise their subject matter. Our commitment to working collaboratively with young
people with LL/LTIs extends to our choice of theory. We seek theory that connects
with the lifeworld of these young people. More generally, we will explore how the
theoretical lexicons of affect and disability can be plundered in order to help us
understand disability in the world.

4. Feeling disability
Disability can and should be an entry point into studies of affect. We might want to
think about the ways in which affect economies draw disabled people and those
close to them into particular ways of feeling and emoting. Like Ahmed (2004) and
Pedwell and Whitehead (2012) we are wary of those affect theorists who claim
that their work constitutes a brand-new field on inquiry in relation to emotion
and feeling. Just as feminism can claim a long historical alignment with affect
through ‘the personal is political’, so critical disability studies can also point to a
body of literature that has been engaged with the affective experiences of dis-
ability (Goodley 2016). Critical disability studies is a nascent field of scholarship
and activism that explicitly engages with transformative fields of inquiry including
queer, postcolonial, indigenous and feminist studies. Theories of affect sit at the
intersections of these different spaces of theorisation. In the following, we make
some novel connections of theoretical orientations and trajectories from affect
theory and critical disability studies.

4.1. Ontological invalidation in neoliberal-able times

How come you are in a wheelchair?
What happened to you then?
I never think of you as disabled?
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  207

You are so brave, you know. (Common comments and questions made by non-disabled
people to disabled people; see Goodley 2016). It must be so difficult for you, having a
disabled child, but it’s a good job it happened to you, I don’t think I could cope. (Personal
comment made to one of the authors, no date)
A lot of people [friends] will ask, ‘Does Shaun’s willy work?’ (Hannah, non-disabled wife
of Shaun, a man with Spinal Cord Injury [SCI]; see Liddiard 2017)
The British feminist disability scholars Thomas (1999, 2001, 2002, 2007) and Reeve
(2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) have created a theoretical space for thinking
creatively about the psyche. As Goodley (2016) argues, both are sceptical about
psychologisation but share an interest in what Reeve describes as the ‘barriers
in here’ that are often ignored by radical structuralist sociologists who are more
focused on the ‘barriers out there’ (2008, 1). The psycho-emotional register is pro-
gressive because it seeks to consider what ‘disabled people can be’ rather than
what ‘disabled people can do’. But this approach is also sensitised to an exploration
of indirect and direct forms of psycho-emotional disablism.4 Direct forms can be
found in discriminatory interactions, acts of invalidation, patronising responses
of others and hate crimes such as the destruction of group symbols and hate lit-
erature (Sherry 2000). Indirect forms of psycho-emotional disablism are less overt
but just as damaging. They may emerge as side effects of structural disablism
(a feeling of dislocation in a building that is largely inaccessible) or unintended
actions, words or deeds (such as stares of curious others, patronising attitudes,
need-freak requests for assistance) (see Liddiard 2014).
How are disabled people, their partners, families and allies meant to respond
emotionally to these questions? By accommodating non-disabled people, perhaps
offering a smile, a short answer and a response that will not make the non-disabled
person even more uncomfortable. Anger, violence or rejection on the part of the
disabled person would no doubt be understood by the non-disabled inquisitor as
a rude emotional response of someone with a ‘chip on their shoulder’. Ironically, it
would at the same time serve to embody the stale ableist trope of the angry, bitter
crip. Liddiard (2014, 124) recognises both the complex management of feeling
and the relational politics inherent to responding in the right ways as forms of
skilled emotional labour, as disabled people come to take on the diverse roles of
teacher, negotiator, manager, mediator, performer and educator’ in negotiating
their reactions and responses – enacting forms of skilled inter-personal labour
desired by the very western labour markets from which they are largely excluded
(see Exley and Letherby 2001). Hochschild (1983) is clear: there are appropriate
affects to display in these moments of interaction. Families with disabled children
and disabled children themselves have described the affective labour that they are
forced to engage with to manage the emotions of others (Runswick-Cole 2013).
Disabled people have articulated the emotional work and labour required within
their loving and sexual relationships with close others, showing that such labour
can reach the most intimate spaces of life and self (Liddiard 2014).
208  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

In our respective work, each of us has previously drawn on Hochschild’s work to

explain the ways in which disabled people engage in disabling forms of emotional
labour (Goodley 2016; Liddiard 2014; Runswick-Cole 2010, 2013); as disabled peo-
ple, their partners and their families find themselves caught up in interactions with
non-disabled people that are governed by a number of well-known social scripts
(Goodley 2016; Runswick-Cole 2013). These scripts invite non-disabled people
to interact with disability that permits, for example, the asking of inappropriate,
demeaning and highly personalised questions and commentaries we outlined at
the start of this section.
Affect is deeply embedded in cultural norms. Hughes (2009, 2012, 2015) points
out that disabled people are associated with a cultural history of disgust, pity and
fear. This renders disabled people as objects of ambivalent feelings from wider
non-disabled society such as resentment and hatred. Disabled people risk being
ontologically invalidated by the disabling worlds that they inhabit. Hughes (2009,
408) argues that:
The role of fear … is hugely underplayed in personal tragedy theory. So to is the role of
disgust, a mediating emotion in the relations between disabled and nondisabled peo-
ple that is in need of considerable development.
Hughes’ work builds sociologically on the psychological and psychoanalytic anal-
ysis of Marks (1999a, 1999b, 2002) that sought to probe unconscious responses to
disability. Marks powerfully argued that being subjected to the damaging pathol-
ogising projections of others risked being internalised by disabled people:
where the projections of societal norms of dependency and bodily imperfection are
internalised, only to sit ambivalently, often shamefully, with one’s psychical position in a
disabling world. (Marks 1999a; 21)
Such feelings of emotional and ontological invalidation risk self-harm and self-ha-
tred (Marks 1999b, 615, also see Hughes 2009). Goodley too has deployed social
psychoanalytic concepts to explain further the generation of fear, disgust but also
attraction in relation to disability displayed by non-disabled culture (Goodley 2011,
2014, 2016). This analysis was indebted to the writings of Marks (1999a, 1999b,
2002) and Watermeyer (2013) who as therapists trained in the psychoanalytic tra-
dition are far more skilled in deploying this theoretical language. Both were keen
to understand the ontological damage done to disabled people whilst living in
a society that veers from not recognising disabled people as valued members
of society to conceptualising disability solely in terms of deficit and lack. Marks
and Watermeyer are keen to take seriously the emotional lives of disabled peo-
ple and do so with a keen interest in the socio-cultural conditions in which one’s
psycho-emotional life thrives or fails.
Clearly, living in such a dismissive atmosphere risks causing feelings of invalida-
tion. Also, we know that a precarious sense of self becomes heightened in times of
austerity (Flynn 2017). Goodley’s (2011, 2016) interest in deploying psychoanalysis
was less with disabled people and more with non-disabled people. In particular, he
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  209

played around with the idea of the psychopathology of the normals, which con-
siders the ways in which the precarious nature of living with being non-disabled
(or able-bodied or able-minded) inevitably plunges individuals into emotional
turmoil (Goodley 2014). One easy route out of any psychic trouble is projection:
finding failings in others. We therefore might understand feelings of disgust or
fear (or attraction for that matter) as symptoms of the underlying neurosis on the
part of non-disabled people. Hence, disability becomes disavowed by norma-
tive culture: it is rejected (because it symbolises lack) and adored (because of its
association with dependency which is the human condition desired by most of
us caught in the terrors of adult autonomy). While some affect theorists consider
the field to be in part a rejection of the psychoanalytic ownership of the affective
register, psychoanalysis may be critically reappropriated to make sense of wider
cultural formations of emotion. Indeed, Gorton (2008) and Duschinsky, Greco,
and Solomon (2014) draw on related concepts of attachment and fantasy in their
interrogation of affective culture. Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon (2014, 232)
note that the idea of attachment might well be the best way to engage with a
vital question left behind by Foucault: why we emotionally invest in the cultures
and institutions which discipline our identities and limit our potential to flourish.
For Duschinsky, Greco, and Solomon (2014) this is the root of Berlant’s affective
notion of cruel optimism: ‘an optimistic attachment is cruel when the object/scene
of desire is itself an obstacle to fulfilling the very wants that bring people to it:
but its life-organising status can trump interfering with the damage it provokes’
(Berlant 2011, 227). The consequence of such cruel optimism risks causing emo-
tional distress, as one fails to match up to the labour and consumption demands
of late capitalism. One route out of such distress is to unconsciously view and
locate failure in others. This might help us explain the cultural disavowal of young
people with LL/LTIs and their families.
We might understand the broader cultural politics of emotion or affect economy
(Ahmed 2004) – against which interactions such as those already described take
place – as one being framed by ableism (Campbell 2009; Goodley 2014). Ableism
is associated with the broader cultural logics of autonomy, self-sufficiency and
independence. These logics are unquestionably and uncritically linked to psycho-
logical contentment and the affect of happiness. Ahmed ([2007] 2008) urges us
to shake up our taken-for-granted ideas around happiness. Indeed, her critique
of the pursuit of happiness, which is promulgated by psychological therapies and
the self-help industry, fits well with a critical disability studies rejection of neoliber-
al-ableism. The latter discourse similarly propels the individual citizen towards an
end of point of supposed contentment through the never-ending performances
of labour and consumption. Happiness is to be bought, and so is able-bodied and
able-mindedness. Here we can see further connections with Berlant’s (2007, 2010,
2011) cruel optimism: the mistaken desire and belief that we will reach personal
fulfilment and happiness through working and shopping hard enough. Happiness,
for Ahmed ([2007] 2008), can be understood as a promise or aspiration, a habit, a
210  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

narrative, a memory, as well as an emotion, feeling or affect.5 We would want to

consider ability (and the desire of autonomy tied up within ableism) in similar ways.
Neoliberal-ableism is the elision of individual and national economic independ-
ence with an individual and cultural celebration of autonomy (Goodley 2014). This
particular cultural economy ties individual and national progress to independence
and, by virtue of this, associates happiness with self-sufficiency. Young people
with LL/LTIs risk being threatened with what Flynn (2017, 155) describes as a ‘lived
experience of shock and disappointment’ that can further devalue their identities
as young disabled people. We would want to understand and contest the affective
consequences of neoliberal-ableism.

4.2. Affect aliens and crip killjoys

About 4 years ago we submitted a research project application to work with young dis-
abled people with life limiting impairments. Eventually we got back the reviewers’ com-
ments. Of the six, four were glowing, one lukewarm and the final one dismissive. Project
funding was rejected. Our most critical reviewer wrote ‘While I accept the research team
want to work with disabled young people, the focus on life-threatening impairments
runs the risk of re-energising the personal tragedy model of disability: a perspective that
disabled people and their organisations have been trying to distance themselves from
for a number of years’. (Personal anecdote, name withheld)
So far, our discussion has outlined a rather top-down affair in relation to the cultural
reproduction of affect. Ahmed (2010) offers a more resistant politic. Ahmed has
happiness as her target when she writes that ‘the feminist killjoy spoils the happi-
ness of others; she is a spoilsport because she refuses to convene, to assemble, or
to meet up over happiness’. She is interested in critiquing happiness as the affect
reproduced by a capitalist society:
Does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out moments of sexism? Or does
she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated under public signs
of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when somebody expresses anger about things?
Or does the entry of anger simply mean that the bad feelings that circulate through
objects get brought to the surface in a certain way? The feminist subject in the room
hence brings others down, not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism
but by exposing how happiness is sustained, by erasing the signs of not getting along.
Feminists do kill joy in a certain sense: they disturb the very fantasy that happiness can
be found in certain places. To kill a fantasy can still kill a feeling. It is not just that femi-
nists might not be happily affected by the objects that are supposed to cause happiness
but that the failure to be happy is read as sabotaging the happiness of others. Feminists
might be strangers at the table of happiness. (Ahmed 2010, 582)
She goes on:
I want to think of consciousness of the un in unhappy as consciousness of being not.
Consciousness of being not or un can be consciousness of being already estranged from
happiness, of lacking the qualities or attributes required for a happy state of existence.
To be not happy is to be not in the eyes of others, in the world of whiteness, which is the
world as it coheres around right bodies, or the white bodies. Consciousness of being not
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  211

involves self-consciousness; you recognize yourself as the stranger. (Ahmed 2010, 589;
original emphases)
We can draw parallels with crip politics here. Johnson and McRuer (2014) and
Tsakiri (2016) extend the idea of the crip killjoy who resists imposed positionings
by normative society. Disabled people are similarly strangers at the neoliberal-able
table that only recognises self-sufficiency. To Ahmed’s ‘un’ and ‘not’ we can add ‘dis’.
To be or become disabled is to work against a normative ableist culture that pur-
sues its own happiness through a celebration of individuated autonomy. ‘There is
solidarity in recognizing our alienation from happiness’, Ahmed (2010, 592) argues,
‘even if we do not inhabit the same place (and we do not). There can be joy in killing
joy. And kill joy we must, and we do’. We might think of rephrasing this affective
politics thus: ‘there can be joy in dissing ability. And dis ability we must, and we
do’. We might view young people with LL/LTIs as unintentionally occupying the
position of crip killjoys because their shortened lives and limited or life-threatening
impairments sit in stark contrast to the ableist ideals of contemporary life. Indeed,
even in the potentially more liberating contexts of the disabled people’s move-
ment, normative ideas about valued lives have been articulated. The ‘Not Dead
Yet’ slogan from the United States seeks to distinguish between the pride one has
in a disabled life contrasted with the finality and tragedy of death. Young people
with LL/LTIs subvert this affective logic. They appear as what we might term affect
aliens: alienated by the ableist logics of living a standard life and, importantly,
alienating others by their presence. The shame associated with this disability–life–
death complex rears itself not in young people with LL/LTIs but in relation to those
(disabled) people who unknowingly maintain a dangerous simplistic distinction
between a standardised split of life and death.

4.3. Disability and resistant assemblages

At a recent university event showcasing robotics and human enhancement research,

a group of young disabled people who are also users of Alternative and Augmentative
Communication (AAC) were preparing for their presentation. During conversations
with the organising team of the university, one of the young people explained that
she worked closely with her family, personal assistants and technology professionals
to ensure that the AAC provided bespoke language and favoured sayings. Using the
hardware to tell her older brother to ‘fuck off’ was a key element of these discussions.
(Dan Goodley, personal anecdote, November 2014, somewhere in the United Kingdom)
Braidotti’s (2005, no page) brand of affect theory is associated with a ‘nomadic
affectivity’; an outward­bound perspective based on complex relations with a mul-
tiplicity of others, ‘including non­human others’. This perspective seeks to under-
stand affect, body and the environment as intimately connected and materialised
phenomena; raising questions about how we might relate to one another in dif-
ferent ways. According to Feely (2016, 868), Braidotti’s work has been crucial to
the ‘ontological turn’ within continental philosophy which has brought forth ‘the
212  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

emergence of new ontologies and methodologies, which seek to explore both the
material and semiotic forces which make up reality, without a return to essential-
ism’. This ontological turn has invited in new materialist analyses, thus offering us
a way out of the critical realist versus poststructuralism debate that plagues criti-
cal disability studies. Critical realists such as Shakespeare (2014) and Vehmas and
Watson (2014) lambast poststructuralist leanings within critical disability studies
for ignoring the stark realities of impairment. However, for Feely (2016), the self-de-
fined ‘critical realism’ of these scholars actually lacks criticality because it imports
simplistic essentialist ideas of impairment and the body. These interventions, he
suggests, lack a more nuanced and dynamic engagement with the materiality of
life. For Feely (2016) such an engagement is offered through bringing in the work
of Deleuze and Guattari (for example, Deleuze and Guattari 1987) and to this we
would add Deleuzian scholars, in particular the work of Braidotti (for example,
Braidotti 2003, 2013). In Feely’s (2016) beautifully accessible piece he notes that for
Deleuze reality is made up of discursive statements and material entities. Both are
active, mutually affecting and have effects in the world (Feely 2016, 869). Deleuze’s
materialism, indebted to Spinoza:
allows us to think and speak about bodies (or any entities). However, it insists that we
reject the traditional preoccupation with essentialist questions (‘What is a body?’) and
focus instead on its currently actualised, or what Deleuze calls actual, capacities (‘What
can a body do?’) as well as its potential, or what Deleuze terms virtual, capacities (‘What
else could a body do?’). (Feely 2016, 870)
A body’s capacities – the things it can and cannot do – are always contextual and
relational (think technology, material resources, communities of support). Within
Deleuzian terminology, when a body is ascribed one of these identities (e.g. ‘a
person with a profound intellectual disability’), it is ‘over-coded’ and this prevents
us from thinking creatively about the infinite number of things this body can or
could do in different contexts (Feely 2016, 872). Embodied affects (e.g. joy) and
visceral sensations (e.g. pain) can profoundly affect the discursive thoughts a body
has and the words it speaks. At the same time, discursive thoughts or statements
can trigger embodied affects and emotions.
Hence, for Feely (2016) the body is a ceaselessly becoming-body in a dynamic
relationship with the environment. In order to understand the complex relation-
ships we need to turn outwards to consider the relation of the body with other
embodied and non-embodied entities. We need to explore assemblages.
Attending to the extension of the disabled body through connections with
other humans and non-humans produces a number of affective realisations. Let us
pick out three (see Goodley, Lawthom, and Runswick-Cole [2014] for elaboration).
First, disability is affirmed as the subjective and embodied position that reaches
out for connection with others. Disability is necessarily affective: it has the poten-
tial to affect and be affected (Fox and Alldred (2015). Second, the human subject
is exploded, shifting us from a preoccupation with the original humanistic fixed
subject position (disabled person) to a recognition of the distributed machinic
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  213

assemblage of humans and non-humans (a posthuman complex). The affective

moment is found in the complex merging of wet and hardware and human rela-
tionships. Third, disability is both centralised and decentralised. Disability is centred
when it calls for assemblages and connections with others. Disability demands
interdependency. As the assemblage grows, so disability loses its importance: it
becomes decentred. The flows of connections and networks erase the original
disability subject and replace it with a complex rhizomatic web of relationships. The
AAC user is both a proud disabled person and a merging of organic and inorganic
matter: a posthuman subject. The bodies and selves of young people with LL/LTIs
are maintained through their complex integration in and through multiple tech-
nologies, caring practices and intimate labours (intimate assemblages), medical
intervention and knowledges.

5. Conclusions
In this article, we have introduced a number of theoretical developments of affect
theory. We have considered the extent to which some of these concepts might
connect with disability; specifically through considering the lives of young peo-
ple with LL/LTIs and their families. While our research project is in its infancy, our
analysis suggests that young people so labelled are subjected to a whole host of
emotional responses that say more about the precarious affective state of dom-
inant culture. Critical disability studies must challenge cultural norms that risk
further pathologising disabled people. The affective register is always a cultural
and embodied register and it is here we might find moments of resistance as
young people connect with others to contest normative ideas that assume their
incompetence and emotional immaturity. New affective relationalities are made
possible through disability’s hybridisation of human and non-humans.
These dalliances with feeling disability raise some significant questions about
the future direction of critical disability studies. We have chosen three to conclude
this article. First, we wonder whether there is a place for the humanist human in
theorising when affect studies trouble individualised and interiorised versions
of emotion. Do we want to have any relationship with traditional sciences of the
individual such as psychology and psychoanalysis when these very sciences have
contributed, in part, to the pathologisation of disability? What becomes of human
rights if we give up on humanism? Second, should disability studies have any
interest in subjectivity especially when the personhoods of disabled people have
been historically marginalised? Our review of affect theory finds subjectivity to be
understood as an old-fashioned term but we recognise that it holds theoretical pur-
chase in critical disability studies especially when thinking through the emotional
impacts of oppression. For this reason we are loathe to discard it. Third, how might
disability be pushed into the foreground of contemplations about the contempo-
rary reproduction of affect? For example, when new materialist theories distribute
affect across assembled relationships of humans and non-humans then they have
214  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

the potential to connect disability studies with Science and Technology Studies.
Too often, however, disability is configured as an object or product of science and
technology rather than the starting subject for debate (Goodley, Lawthom, and
Runswick-Cole 2014). Our ambition would be for disability to provoke analysis of
human affect in a time of turbulent economic, technological and political change.

Notes
1. 
For examples of these Christmas television adverts, see 2016, Accessed June 1, 2017.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sr6lr_VRsEo; 2015, https://www.theguardian.
com/media/video/2015/nov/06/john-lewis-debuts-2015-christmas-advert-
manonthemoon-video; 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/business/video/2014/
nov/06/monty-penguin-john-lewis-christmas-advert-video; and 2013, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=NW2EmATcb6o.
2. 
See www.shef.ac.uk/ihuman.
3. 
See Accessed June 1, 2017. https://livinglifetothefullest.org/.
4. 
A point developed by Reeve and also by Carol Thomas (2007, 72).
5. 
‘Some things become good, or acquire their value as goods, insofar as they point
toward happiness. They become happiness pointers, as if to follow their point would
be to find happiness … Happiness does not reside in objects; it is promised through
proximity to certain objects. The promise of happiness takes this form: if you do this or
if you have that, then happiness is what follows’ (Ahmed 2010, 576).

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank and acknowledge the Economic and Social Research Council
for the funding of the research on which this paper is based: project ES/P001041/1, ‘Life, Death,
Disability and the Human: Living Life to the Fullest’.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/
P001041/1].

ORCID
Dan Goodley http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0660-5671

References
Ahmed, S. 2004. The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge.
Ahmed, S. (2007) 2008. “The Happiness Turn.” New Formations 63 (8): 7–14.
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  215

Ahmed, S. 2010. “Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness.” Signs 35 (3): 571–594.
Berlant, L. 2007. “Slow Death: Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency.” Critical Inquiry 33 (4): 754–780.
Berlant, L. 2010. “Cruel Optimism.” In The Affect Theory Reader, edited by M. Gregg and G. J.
Seigworth, 93–117. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.
Berlant, L. 2011. Cruel Optimism. Durham: Duke University Press.
Billington, T. 2017. “Educational Inclusion and Critical Neuroscience: Friends or Foes?” International
Journal of Inclusive Education 21 (8): 866–880. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
13603116.2017.1283717.
Blackman, L., and C. Venn, eds. 2010. “Special Issue on Affect: Editorial.” Body & Society 16 (1), 7–28.
Braidotti, R. 1994. Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist
Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
Braidotti, R. 2002. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Braidotti, R. 2003. “Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Revisited.” Theory, Culture & Society
20 (3): 43–64.
Braidotti, R. 2005. “Affirming the Affirmative: On Nomadic Affectivity.” Rhizomes (11/12)(Fall 2005/
Spring 2006). Accessed June 1 2017 and this http://www.rhizomes.net/issue11/braidotti.html.
Braidotti, R. 2006. “Posthuman, All Too Human: Towards a New Process Ontology.” Theory Culture
Society 23 (7-8): 197–208.
Braidotti, R. 2013. The Posthuman. London: Polity.
Butler, J. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 2nd ed. London and New
York: Routledge.
Campbell, F. K. 2009. Contours of Ableism: Territories, Objects, Disability and Desire. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Deleuze, G., and F. Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus. London: Continuum.
Duschinsky, R., M. Greco, and J. Solomon. 2014. “Wait up!: Attachment and Sovereign Power.”
International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society 28: 223–242.
Exley, C., and G. Letherby. 2001. “Managing a Disrupted Life Course: Issues of Identity and
Emotion Work.” Health 5 (1): 112–132.
Feely, M. 2016. “Disability Studies after the Ontological Turn: A Return to the Material World and
Material Bodies without a Return to Essentialism.” Disability & Society 31 (7): 863–883.
Flynn, S. 2017. “Engaging with Materialism and Material Reality: Critical Disability Studies and
Economic Recession.” Disability & Society 32 (2): 143–159.
Fox, N., and P. Alldred. 2015. “New Materialist Social Inquiry: Designs, Methods and the Research-
Assemblage.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 18 (4): 399–414. doi:10.1
080/13645579.2014.921458.
Goodley, D. 2011. “Social Psychoanalytic Disability Studies.” Disability & Society 26 (6): 715–728.
Goodley, D., and R. Lawthom. 2011. “Hardt and Negri and the Geo-Political Imagination: Empire,
Multitude and Critical Disability Studies.” Critical Sociology 39 (3): 369–384.
Goodley, D. 2014. Dis/Ability Studies. London: Routledge.
Goodley, D. 2016. Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction. 2nd ed. London: Sage.
Goodley, D., R. Lawthom, and K. Runswick-Cole. 2014. “Posthuman Disability Studies.” Subjectivity.
Subjectivity 7 (4): 342–361. doi:10.1057/sub.2014.15.
Gorton, K. 2007. “Theorizing Emotion and Affect Feminist Engagements.” Feminist Theory 8 (3):
333–348.
Gorton, K. 2008. “Duras, and Melancholia: Theorizing Desire after the ‘Affective Turn’.” Feminist
Review 89 (1): 16–33.
Hardt, M., and A. Negri. 2000. Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardt, M., and A. Negri. 2004. Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. London: Penguin.
216  D. GOODLEY ET AL.

Hochschild, A. R. 1983. The Managed Heart. Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley/ Los
Angeles: University of California Press.
Hughes, B. 2009. “Wounded/Monstrous/Abject: A Critique of the Disabled Body in the Sociological
Imaginary.” Disability & Society 24 (4): 399–410. doi:10.1080/09687590902876144.
Hughes, B. 2012. “Fear, Pity and Disgust: Emotions and the Non-Disabled Imaginary.” In Routledge
Handbook of Disability Studies, edited by N. Watson, A. Roulstone and C. Thomas, 67–78.
London: Routledge.
Hughes, B. 2015. “Disabled People as Counterfeit Citizens: The Politics of Resentment past and
Present.” Disability and Society 30 (7): 991–1004 10.1080/09687599.2015.1066664.
Johnson, M. L., and R. McRuer. 2014. “Cripistemologies: Introduction.” Journal of Literary & Cultural
Disability Studies 8 (2): 127–148.
Leys, R. 2011. “The Turn to Affect: A Critique.” Critical Inquiry 37 (3): 434–472.
Liddiard, K. 2014. “The Work of Disabled Identities in Intimate Relationships.” Disability and Society
29 (1): 115–128. doi:10.1080/09687599.2013.776486.
Liddiard, K. 2017. The Intimate Lives of Disabled People. Routledge, ISBN 978-1-4094-6090-9
Marks, D. 1999a. Disability: Controversial Debates and Psychosocial Perspectives. London:
Routledge.
Marks, D. 1999b. “Dimensions of Oppression: Theorizing the Embodied Subject.” Disability &
Society 14 (5): 611–626.
Marks, D. 2002. “Some Concluding Notes. Healing the Split between Psyche and Social:
Constructions and Experiences of Disability.” Disability Studies Quarterly 22 (3): 46–52.
Martin, E. 2013. “The Potentiality of Ethnography and the Limits of Affect Theory.” Current
Anthropology 54, no. S7 (October 2013): S149–S158.
Pedwell, C., and A. Whitehead. 2012. “Affecting Feminism: Questions of Feeling in Feminist
Theory.” Feminist Theory 13 (2): 115–129.
Reeve, D. 2002. “Negotiating Psycho-Emotional Dimensions of Disability and Their Influence on
Identity Constructions.” Disability & Society 17 (5): 493–508.
Reeve, D. 2004. “Counselling and Disabled People: Help or Hindrance?” In Disabling Barriers,
Enabling Environments, edited by J. Swain, S. French, C. Barnes and C. Thomas 2nd Edition,
233–238. London: Sage.
Reeve, D. 2005. “Towards a Psychology of Disability: The Emotional Effects of Living in a Disabling
Society.” In Disability and Psychology: Critical Introductions and Reflections, edited by D. Goodley
and R. Lawthom, 94–108. London: Palgrave.
Reeve, D. 2006. Am I a Real Disabled Person or Someone with a Dodgy Arm? A Discussion of Psycho-
Emotional Disablism and Its Contribution to Identity Constructions. Paper presented at the British
Disability Studies Association 3rd Annual Conference, Lancaster, 18 – 21 September 2006.
Reeve, D. 2007. Homo Sacer and Zones of Exception: Metaphors for the Contemporary Experience
of Disablism? Paper presented at The Nordic Network of Disability Research conference,
Stockholm, April 2007.
Reeve, D. 2008. Negotiating Disability in Everyday Life: The Experience of Psycho-Emotional
Disablism. Lancaster: Unpublished PhD thesis.
Runswick-Cole, K. 2010. “Living with Dying and Disablism: Death and Disabled Children.” Disability
and Society 25 (7): 813–826.
Runswick-Cole, K. 2013. “Wearing It All with a Smile:’ Emotional Labour in the Lives of Mothers
of Disabled Children.” In (2013) Disabled Children’s Childhood Studies: Critical Approaches in
a Global Context, edited by T. Curran and K. Runswick-Cole, 105–118. Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Runswick-Cole, K., T. Curran, and K. Liddiard, eds. 2017. Building Understandings: Child, Youth,
Family and Disability. Basingstoke: Palgrave Ltd.
 DISABILITY & SOCIETY  217

Rustin, M. 2002. “Empire: A Postmodern Theory of revolution.” New Political Economy 7 (3):
451–462.
Shakespeare, T. 2014. Disability Right and Wrongs Revisited. London: Routledge.
Sherry, M. 2000. “Hate Crimes Against Disabled People.” Social alternatives 19 (4): 23–30.
Thomas, C. 1999. Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability. Buckingham: The
Open University Press.
Thomas, C. 2001. “Feminism and Disability: The Theoretical and Political Significance of the
Personal and the Experiential.” In Disability, Politics and the Struggle for Change, edited by L.
Barton, 48–58. London: David Fulton.
Thomas, C. 2002. “The ‘Disabled’ Body.” In Real Bodies, edited by M. Evans and E. Lee, 64–78.
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Thomas, C. 2007. Sociologies of Disability, ‘Impairment’, and Chronic Illness: Ideas in Disability Studies
and Medical Sociology. London: Palgrave.
Tsakiri, M. 2016. What Are You Looking at? Representations of Disability in Documentary Films.
Unpublished Phd thesis., University of Stirling.
Vehmas, S., and N. Watson. 2014. “Moral Wrongs, Disadvantages, and Disability: A Critique of
Critical Disability Studies.” Disability & Society 29 (4): 638–650.
Watermeyer, B. 2013. Towards a Contextual Psychology of Disablism. Abingdon: Routledge.
Wetherell, M. S. 2015. “Trends in the Turn to Affect: A Social Psychological Critique.” Body and
Society 21 (2): 139–166.
Williams, C. 2003. “Sky Service: The Demands on Emotional Labor in the Airline Industry.” Gender,
Work and Organisation 10 (5): 513–551.
Youdell, D., and F. Armstrong. 2011. “A Politics beyond Subjects: The Affective Choreographies
and Smooth Spaces of Schooling.” Emotion, Space, Society 4 (3): 144–150.