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W/N THE PETITION OF ANTI-DYNASTY CAN SUCCEED BASED ON THE
CURRENT STATE OF STARE-DECISIS ON THE MATTER
I. Let’s first define what is Stare Decisis Stare decisis is a legal doctrine that obligates courts to follow historical cases when making a ruling on a similar case. Stare decisis ensures that cases with similar scenarios and facts are approached in the same way. Simply put, it binds courts to follow legal precedents set by previous decisions. Now, can the Petition of Mandamus filed by the four lawyers asking the Supreme Court to compel the legislature to act on the anti-dynasty succeed?
II. Answer: No
III. Explanation: SC RULINGS BASED ON PETITION OF MANDAMUS
Alejandrino v. Quezon G.R. No. 22041 Philippine Supreme Court decisions dating back from 1924 in the famous case of Alejandrino v. Quezon states that : Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros, et.al. v. COMELEC G.R. No. 152295 In the more recent case of Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros, et.al. v. COMELEC, et.al. (G.R. No. 152295, July 2, 2002) the Supreme Court further elaborated on what the separation of powers between the Supreme Court and the Philippine Congress would mean: Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of Congress. The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. In this case, the Supreme Court resisted a similar mandamus petition to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. The Supreme Court explained why : To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of government
Penson vs COMELEC G.R. No. 211636
Penson asked the high court last to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the poll body to implement a ban on political dynasties as provided in Article II Section 26 of the Constitution, which reads: The state shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. Penson, who launched his movement, said there is a need for the high court to act on the issue since both houses of Congress have failed for a long time to perform their constitutional duty to provide a clear definition to political dynasties and implement the ban. He alleged that such a failure on the part of the Senate and House of Representatives - which he named respondents - is clear violation of right to procedural and substantive due process that deserves judicial action. But the high court ruled that it is evident from the plain wording of the provision against political dynasties that it is not self-executing but simply a statement of a general principle which further requires a law passed by Congress to define and give effect thereto. In reiterating its ruling on Biraogo, said mandamus is not applicable on the Penson petition. It noted that mandamus is applicable only to ministerial duties. Ministerial duties refer an act or duty which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority.
WHETHER STARE DECISIS ON THE ANTI-DYNASTY LAW ISSUE CAN BE
OVERTURNED BASED ON THE CASE OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY, AND THE OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO IN LAMBINO V. COMELEC
I. Opinion of Justice Puno
Justice Puno in the case of Lambino v.COMELEC contended that, “The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.” Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars.23 The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. The Petition of Mandamus to compel Congress to enact a law regarding anti- dynasty will fall under the horizontal stare decisis since the given case talks about whether the Supreme Court should be bound to its previous ruling that it cannot compel the Congress to pass a law that would enact anti-dynasty. Since this is a horizontal stare decisis, it is not the obligation of the Court to adhere to its previous ruling because its previous decisions are just mere policies. It is at the discretion of the Supreme Court whether they will overturn their previous ruling.. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them. The Court’s hesitation to order Congress to legislate is understandable as a general matter. There are, however, critical ways in which the political dynasties issue may be different, and may justify the Court adjusting its separation of powers analysis The Court could argue that intervention is justified because the system of checks and balances is itself so corrupted by the continued success of political dynasties. Political dynasties are dangerous because they elevate family ties over intra-branch loyalty, which compromises the oversight controls different co- equal branches have over one another. For example, impeachment proceedings in Congress over an executive official may be undermined if that official has a child or spouse serving in the Senate. The Framers arguably recognized this need for recalibrating checks and balances. (In relation to: It cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings) Second, the Court could say that the political dynasties issue is different because the Court would not be ordering Congress to act on the basis of what the Court believes is the appropriate subject of legislation, but what the constitution names as necessary object of legislation. Unlike in Montesclaros, where Congress had the discretion to decide whether or not it would pass any legislation at all, Congress is constitutionally mandated to prohibit political dynasties. The Court could argue that a mandate in the case of political dynasties does not constitute usurpation of legislative power by the judiciary because the Court is not imposing any legislative agenda of its own.
Remarks of Mr. Calhoun of South Carolina on the bill to prevent the interference of certain federal officers in elections: delivered in the Senate of the United States February 22, 1839