Unilog 2018 Handbook

Handbook of the
6th World Congress and School

on Universal Logic
June 16–26, 2018

Vichy, France
UNILOG’2018
https://www.uni-log.org/vichy2018
Vichy University Campus

France
Edited by
Jean-Yves Beziau, Arthur Buchsbaum and Christophe Rey,
with the assistance of Alvaro Altair and Yanis Ayari.
Editors:
Jean-Yves Beziau
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro, RJ
Brazil
Arthur Buchsbaum
Federal University of Santa Catarina
Florianópolis, SC
Brazil
Christophe Rey
Université Clermont Auvergne and LIMOS
Vichy and Clermont-Ferrand
France
ISBN: 978-2-9544948-1-4
Université Clermont Auvergne, Vichy, France, 2018
Contents
I Introduction 1
1 Organizing, International Organizing

and Scientific Committees 3
Organizing Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
International Organizing Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Scientific Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 What is Universal Logic? 7
3 Aim of the event 9
4 Call for papers 11
II 6th World School on Universal Logic 13
5 Aim of the School 15

A great variety of tutorials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A School to Promote Logical Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Logic Around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6 ¿Why Study Logic? 17
7 Speakers of the 6th World School on Universal Logic 19
8 Tutorials 23
The Logic of Lying, by Franca D’Agostini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Topos theory and Caramello’s bridge technique, by Peter Arndt . . 26
Logic in the Brain, by Tal Dotan Ben-Soussan . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
The Adventures of the Turnstile ( ), by Jean-Yves Beziau . . . . 31
History of Medieval Logic, by Julie Brumberg-Chaumont . . . . . . 33
iii
Handbook of the 6th World Congress and School on Universal Logic
Lindenbaum Method, by Alex Citkin & Alexei Muravitsky . . . . . 37

Weak arithmetics and applications, by Henri-Alex Esbelin . . . . . 41
Dialectics. An Introduction, by Elena Ficara . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Stoic Logic: the dialectic of the Gods, by Jean-Baptiste Gourinat . 47
The inconsistency theory of truth and nominalistic mathematics,
by Casper Storm Hansen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction, by Jean-Louis Hudry . 52
Definite Descriptions in the Proof-Theoretic Setting,
by Andrzej Indrzejczak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Conceptual Engineering: A Systematic Unified Framework,
by Manuel Gustavo Isaac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Leśniewski’s Evolutional Logic, by Pierre Joray . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Logic of Desires, by Emiliano Lorini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
On the complexity of the model checking problem,
by Florent Madelaine and Malika More . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.S. Peirce’s Logic of Relations: Graph-theoretical and Surface-
theoretical Models, by William James McCurdy . . . . . . . . 70
Wittgenstein’s Logic, by Giovanni Mion & Erik Thomsen . . . . . . 74
Reasoning on data: the ontology-mediated query answering
problem, by Marie-Laure Mugnier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Logic and Computer Programming, by Mykola Nikitchenko . . . . 79
Analogical Reasoning, by Henri Prade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
MMT — Meta-Meta-Theory and/or Tool: A Framework
for Defining and Implementing Logics, by Florian Rabe . . . . 84
Logic-based reasoning for information integration
and data linkage, by Marie-Christine Rousset . . . . . . . . . . 85
Louis Couturat (1868–1914): Early symbolic logic and the dream
of a characteristica universalis, by Oliver Schlaudt . . . . . . . 87
Logic and Religion, by Ricardo Silvestre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Tractarian Logic and Semantic Technologies,
by Erik Thomsen and Giovanni Mion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
On Logical Modeling of the Information Fusion, by Jerzy Tomasik 95
Mathematics and Logic in Ancient Greece, by Ioannis Vandoulakis 97
Natural language argument, the fallacies and p-logic,
by Frank Zenker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Introduction to Unified Logic, by Xunwei Zhou . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
9 Poster Session for Students 107

The Logic of Public Debates, by Antsa Nasandratra Nirina Avo,
Solo Randriamahaleo & Jean Sallantin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
iv
Contents
Faithful Semantical Embedding of Dyadic Deontic Logic E

in HOL, by Christoph Benzmüller, Ali Farjami
& Xavier Parent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Some logical and algebraic aspects of C∞ -rings,
by Jean Cerqueira Berni & Hugo Luiz Mariano . . . . . . . . . 108
The Possibility Implies the Necessity: Gödel’s Proof
for the Existence of God, by Kyle Bryant . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A paraconsistent approach to da Costa’s deontic logic: beyond
contradictions and triviality, by Gregory Carneiro . . . . . . . 108
An Abstract Approach to Algebraizable Logics with Quantifiers,
by Caio de Andrade Mendes & Hugo Luiz Mariano . . . . . . 109
Efficient Protocols for Privacy and Integrity in the Cloud,
by Anca Nitulescu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Multirings, Quadratic Forms and Functors: Relationship between
axiomatizations on quadratic forms,
by Kaique Matias de Andrade Roberto & Hugo Luiz Mariano 109
10 ¿Why, what, when, where and how to publish? 111
III 6th World Congress on Universal Logic 113
11 Opening Ceremony of the 6th World Congress

on Universal Logic 115
12 Secret Speaker 117
13 Talks of Keynote Speakers 119

Argument-based logics, by Leila Amgoud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Material exclusion, contradictions and other oppositions,
by Jonas R. Becker Arenhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Analogies in Civil Law, by Matthias Armgardt . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Exploring the internal language of toposes, by Ingo Blechschmidt . 121
Peircean logic as semiotic and biosemiotics as transdisciplinary
framework, by Søren Brier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
A categorical presentation of probabilistic logic, by Pierre Cartier . 123
Quantum Theory for Kids, by Bob Coecke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A unified view of some formalisms handling incomplete
and inconsistent information, by Didier Dubois . . . . . . . . . 125
v
Importance of distinction of levels in a logical discourse:

an investigation from the perspective of a theory
of graded consequence, by Soma Dutta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Kripke and Lukasiewicz: A Synthesis, by Hartry Field . . . . . . . . 128
Logic construction and computability on algebraic abstract
structures, by Sergey Goncharov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
‘La question est précisément de l’âge’ [Rousseau, Emile]:
Natural logic and the pre-history of modern psychology,
by Christopher Goodey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
The Indispensability of Logic, by Ole Thomassen Hjortland . . . . 132
Category theory and its foundations: the role of diagrams
and other “intuitive” material, by Ralf Krömer . . . . . . . . . 133
CERES: automated deduction in proof theory, by Alexander Leitsch134
Alternating truth in argumentative dispute resolution,
by Elena Lisanyuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Diagrammatic Reasoning in Peirce and Frege, by Danielle Macbeth 137
A New Perspective for Relevance Logic, by David Makinson . . . . 138
Jan Lukasiewicz: his many-valued logic, by Grzegorz Malinowski . 138
Contradiction, triviality, inconsistency toleration
and other misunderstandings in the empirical sciences,
by Marı́a del Rosario Martı́nez-Ordaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Foundational Issues: Still Meaningful, by David McGoveran . . . . 142
Three Probabilistic Generalizations of Deducibility,
by David Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Lewis Carroll’s seven charts (and many others),
by Amirouche Moktefi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Tones and Chords: Fuzzy and Intuitionistic Approaches
to Musical Elementhood, by Thomas Noll . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Formalizing Umwelts, by Rohit Parikh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Capturing Consequence, by Alexander Paseau . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
David Hilbert’s Early Logical Notation, by Volker Peckhaus . . . . 149
Diagrammatic quantum reasoning, by Simon Perdrix . . . . . . . . 151
To Peirce Hintikka’s Thoughts, by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen . . . . . 152
Grounding as meta-linguistic relation: grounding rules
for implication, by Francesca Poggiolesi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A Compendium for Positive Logic, by Bruno Poizat . . . . . . 154
Decolonizing “Natural Logic”, by Scott L. Pratt . . . . . . . . . . . 156
It Was So Revolting I Couldn’t Take my Eyes Off It,
by Graham Priest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
vi
Contents
General principles for the design of logical notations,

by Dirk Schlimm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Place and Value of Logic at Louis Couturat,
by Anne-Françoise Schmid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Ill-Defined Attitudes, by Roy Sorensen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
The Validity of Validity, by Göran Sundholm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
The Ace of the Second Generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School,
by Kordula Świȩtorzecka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Abstract Agent Argumentation (Triple-A), by Leon van der Torre,
Ryuta Arisaka & Ken Satoh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
The logic of causation, by Sander Uijlen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Polish Contributions to Universal Logic, by Jan Woleński . . . . . . 165
On the Formal Evolution of Islamic Juridical Dialectic,
by Walter Edward Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Paraconsistency: Theory and Practice, by Anna Zamansky . . . . . 167
14 Workshops 169
Logical Geometry and its Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Logical Oppositions in Avicenna’s Hypothetical Logic,
by Saloua Chatti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
On the Interaction of Tense and Aspect — Merging Kites,
by Dany Jaspers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Squares, Cubes and Circles. Sketches of Oppositional
Geometry between Geulincx and De Morgan,
by Jens Lemanski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
End of the square?, by Fabien Schang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Category Theory and Logical Geometry — Is a commutative
diagram an Aristotelian diagram?, by Daniel Wenz . . 177
Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Logic as Subject and Method of a Logician’s Work,
by Moritz Cordes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Writing and Drawing in Logic — the Case of Aristotelian
Diagrams, by Lorenz Demey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Teaching Begriffsschrift: Frege’s Notation and the Problems
of Pedagogy, by David Dunning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic: the 14th Century
case of Thomas Manlevelt, by Alfred van der Helm . . 184
Note on Paul Hertz and the Origins of the Sequent-Notation,
by Javier Legris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
vii
Truth-tables and Tautologies in Early Logical Empiricism:

Hans Hahn as a Pioneer of Logical Pluralism,
by Alexander Linsbichler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
On the Notation of Fred Sommers’ Traditional Formal Logic,
by Daniel Lovsted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Truth Tables without Truth Values.
On 4.27 and 4.42 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,
by Tabea Rohr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Proof Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Tomographs for Substructural Display Logic,
by Michael Arndt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The Existence of Pure Proofs, by René Gazzari . . . . . . . . . 194
Extensions of Non-Monotonic and Non-Transitive Atomic Bases,
by Ulf Hlobil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Distributive Deductive Systems:
the case of the First-Order Logic,
by Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion & Szymon Chlebowski . 197
Remarks on Sequent Calculus, by Enrico Moriconi . . . . . . . 198
The mathematics of derivability,
by Gerard R. Renardel de Lavalette . . . . . . . . . . . 200
From Syntactic Proofs to Combinatorial Proofs,
by Lutz Straßburger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Logic and Music . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Outside-in or inside-out? A logic for human sensory system,
by Gaetano Albergo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Inferentialism and Music: the Art of Implication
and Negation, by Vojtěch Kolman . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Musical Activity as the Basis for the Evolution of Joint
Intentionality and Nonlinear Grammar,
by Andrius Jonas Kulikauskas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Listening and Reading: Temporalities of Musical Performance
and Notation, by Giulia Lorenzi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Is there any logic of harmony?, by Ingolf Max . . . . . . . . . 211
Musical Performance: a Composition of Monads,
by Nick Rossiter & Michael Heather . . . . . . . . . . . 212
The Logic of Social Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A Computable Model of Amartya Sen’s Social Choice
Function in the Framework of Category Theory Logic,
by Gianfranco Basti, Antonio Capolupo
& Giuseppe Vitiello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
viii
Contents
Rituals as “Social Habits”, by Raffaela Giovagnoli . . . . . . . 217

Collective Phronesis? An investigation of collective
judgement and professional knowledge,
by Jonna Lappalainen & Eva Schwarz . . . . . . . . . . 219
Bridging Habits and Cognition: Inference and Category
Learning through Neural-Dynamic Logic,
by Robert Lowe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Moral Bubbles in action: The Logic of Cognitive
Autoimmunity, by Lorenzo Magnani . . . . . . . . . . . 221
John Searle as Practice Theoretician, by Joel Patomäki . . . . 222
Polarization Dynamics in the Age of Social Media,
by Fabiana Zollo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
The Logic of preferences and a settlement of conflicts (based
on the modeling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict),
by Suren Zolyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Model Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Unification in linear multi-modal logic of knowledge
and non-transitive time, by Stepan I. Bashmakov . . . 227
Computable Modal Algebras and Contact Algebras,
by Nikolay Bazhenov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Syntactic and Semantic Presentations of Scientific Theories
in Abstract Model Theory, by Maria Dimarogkona,
Petros Stefaneas & Nicola Angius . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
On almost deterministic algebras of binary isolating formulas
for polygonometrical theories,
by Dmitry Emelyanov & Sergey Sudoplatov . . . . . . 231
Pregeometry on subsets of fragment of Jonsson set,
by Maira Kassymetova & Aibat Yeshkeyev . . . . . . . 232
On definable sets in generic structures,
by Yiannis Kiouvrekis, Petros Stefaneas
& Sergey Sudoplatov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
On lattices in generative classes, by Yiannis Kiouvrekis,
Petros Stefaneas & Sergey Sudoplatov . . . . . . . . . . 235
Preserving properties at expansions of models
of ordered theories by unary predicates,
by Beibut Sh. Kulpeshov & Sayan Baizhanov . . . . . 236
The complexity of quasivariety lattices, by Svetlana Lutsak . 237
A definition to the concept of a model-theoretic property
with applications to the expressive power of first-order
logic, by Mikhail G. Peretyat’kin . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
ix
Lattices of bounded based subvarieties of discriminator

varieties, by Aleksandr Pinus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Axiomatizability of the class of subdirectly irreducible acts
over a group, by Alena Stepanova & Denis Ptakhov . 240
On e-spectra for families of theories of Abelian groups,
by Sergey Sudoplatov & Inessa Pavlyuk . . . . . . . . . 242
Transformation and Categoricity Spectrum,
by Jamalbek A. Tussupov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
The nonforking notion for Jonsson sets,
by Olga Ulbrikht & Aibat Yeshkeyev . . . . . . . . . . 244
Similarity of definable closures of Jonsson sets,
by Gulzhan Urken & Aibat Yeshkeyev . . . . . . . . . . 246
Dimension, ranks and their applications to algebraic
structures, by Viktor Verbovskiy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Strong decidability of the classification over Gl,
by Veta F. Yun & Larisa L. Maksimova . . . . . . . . . 248
Logical Correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Computational Hermeneutics: Using Computers to Interpret
Philosophical Arguments,
by David Fuenmayor and Christoph Benzmüller . . . . 250
Logical Instrumentalism and Linear Logic,
by Teresa Kouri Kissel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Evidence and self-evidence in the foundations of logic,
by Srećko Kovač . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Identifying Logical Evidence, by Ben Martin . . . . . . . . . . 254
Around Peirce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
A dinner with Charley, by Gaetano Albergo . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Peirce and distributivity, by Rodolfo C. Ertola Biraben . . . . 259
Peirce on the Identity of Truth and Reality,
by Joshua David Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Logical Consequence in the Diagrammatic System of Assertive
Graphs, by Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen . 262
A Generic Figures Reconstruction of Peirce’s Existential Graphs
(Alpha), by Jonathan Gangle & Gianluca Caterina . . 263
A Peircean Logic of Operations, by William James McCurdy 265
Frege and Peirce on the signs of generality,
by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Francesco Bellucci . . . . 266
G. Boole, A. De Morgan and C.S. Peirce at the birth
of symbolic logic, by Cassiano Terra Rodrigues . . . . 268
The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past, Present and Future . . . . 270
x
Contents
Methodological peculiarities of the Lvov-Warsaw School,

by Marcin Bedkowski,
, Anna Brożek, Alicja Chybińska,
Stepan Ivanyk & Dominik Traczykowski . . . . . . . . 272
On Ludwik Borkowski’s philosophico-logical views,
by Bożena Czernecka-Rej . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Free Ontology as the logic for reism, by Jan Czerniawski . . . 274
From Aristotle to Lvov-Warsaw School, by Angel Garrido . . 275
Jan Lukasiewicz and Many-Valued Logic, by Angel Garrido . 278
On Grzegorczyk’s Logics of Descriptions and Descriptive
Equivalences, by Joanna Golińska-Pilarek
& Taneli Huuskonen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
On the Notion of Independence, by Joanna Grygiel . . . . . . 281
Stanislaw Jaśkowski and the first textbook based on Natural
Deduction, by Andrzej Indrzejczak . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
Methodological aspects of research on the Ukrainian branch
of the Lvov-Warsaw School, by Stepan Ivanyk . . . . . 283
Polish trends in the logic of questions,
by Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Ontology of logic and mathematics in the Lvov-Warsaw School,
by Roman Murawski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
The application of Cz. Lejewski’s Chronology in determining
mereological genidentity, by Marek Porwolik . . . . . . 286
Lvov-Warsaw School and the Artificial Intelligence,
by Dariusz Surowik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
The Axiom of Choice and the Road Paved by Sierpiński,
by Valérie Lynn Therrien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Jerzy Loś’ Juvenilia,
by Marcin Tkaczyk & Anna Maria Karczewska . . . . 289
Abstraction principles via Leśniewskian definitions:
potential infinity and arithmetic, by Rafal Urbaniak . 290
Jerzy Slupecki and the Consequence Operation,
by Jan Woleński . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
The Rasiowa-Pawlak School: From Algebra of Logic
to Algebra of Data (and Back), by Marcin Wolski . . . 292
The Lvov-Warsaw School and Indian Logic, by Piedad Yuste 293
How to reply today to the issues raised by Kazimierz
Twardowski in his Images and Concepts (1898)?,
by Urszula M. Żegleń . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Reflections on Paraconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
xi
(De)motivating Gluts, by Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

& Ederson Safra Melo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
The Role of Paraconsistency in Scientific Change,
by Hakob Barseghyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
A paraconsistent approach to da Costa’s deontic logic:
beyond contradictions and triviality,
by Gregory Carneiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
On the Possibility of Dialetheic Metaphysics,
by Ebubekir Muhammed Deniz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Paradoxes, Hypodoxes, Hypodox-paradox duality
and Hypodoxical Paradoxes, by Peter Eldridge-Smith 301
What is a Contradiction?, by Ben Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
How to Compose Programs in Belnapian Dynamic Logic?,
by Manuel A. Martins & Diana Costa . . . . . . . . . . 305
Paraconsistency meets refutation: a case of maximality,
by Adam Trybus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Reasoning about Complexity Needs Reflections
on Paraconsistency, by Max Urchs . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
On the Possibility of Metaphysical Dialetheism,
by Katherine Valde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Logic, Probability and their Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . 311
Is there any really autonomous proof for the non-existence of
probabilistic inductive support?, by Maı́ra Bittencourt 312
A generalization of Popper’s probability theory,
by Juliana Bueno-Soler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Paraconsistent autonomous probabilities, by Walter Carnielli 314
Probability Valuations, by Joachim Mueller-Theys . . . . . . . 316
On the universality of the probability concepts,
by Vladimir Reznikov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Paraconsistency, evidence and probability, by Abı́lio Rodrigues
& Walter Carnielli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318
Logical Modalities in Statistical Models,
by Julio Michael Stern, Luı́s Gustavo Esteves,
Rafael Izbicki & Rafael Bassi Stern . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Logic for Dynamic Real-World Information . . . . . . . . . . 321
Impacts of Statistical Learning Theory for Enterprise
Software, by Erik Marcade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Datalog access to real-world web services,
by John Samuel & Christophe Rey . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
xii
Contents
Singular reference, dynamic thoughts and spatial

representation, by Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa . . . . . 327
Smart, Sentient and Connected: Trends and Directions in
Information-Driven Applications, by David Stodder . . 328
Logic-Grounded Ontological Fusion of Sensor Data
and Natural Language, by Erik Thomsen . . . . . . . . 329
A Universal (?) Framework for Representing Knowledge about
Real World Phenomena, by Uwe Wolter
& Cyril Pshenichny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Naming Logics II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
In which sense symbolic logic is symbolic?,
by Jean-Yves Beziau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
In which sense informal logic is informal?, by Vedat Kamer . 334
Is logic a theory of symbolization?, by Arnaud Plagnol . . . . 335
Logic, Philosophy and Philosophical Logic,
by Ricardo Silvestre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Logics and Metalogics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Society semantics and meta-levels of many-valued logic,
by Walter Carnielli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Dialetheic Validity, by Graham Priest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Formalizing Ontological Disputes of the Systems
in Metaphysics by Augmenting First Order
Quantificational Logic: A Meta-logical Inquiry,
by Jolly Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Sociology and Anthropology of Logic: Past and Present . . 342
Pathologies of rationalities and embodied logic: Malebranche’s
conception of Madness as a case study,
by Delphine Antoine-Mahut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
Later Wittgenstein: Logic, Necessity and Social Practice,
by Sorin Bangu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
Anthropology and Sociology of Logic as a Norm in the Middle
Ages, by Julie Brumberg-Chaumont . . . . . . . . . . . 347
The Grammar of Conflict, by Kevin M. Cahill . . . . . . . . . 347
Hegel on the Naturalness of Logic, by Elena Ficara . . . . . . 349
Pathology of logical thought: Paranoia as a case study,
by Samuel Lézé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
Analyzing the Logic of the Unconscious. Notes on the Work
of Ignacio Matte Blanco and its Ramifications,
by Andreas Mayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
xiii
Learning Logic in a Department of Philosophy:

An Ethnographical Account, by Claude Rosental . . . 351
When Science Is and Isn’t Paraconsistent,
by Gregory Rupik & Hakob Barseghyan . . . . . . . . . 352
Logic-in-Action? AlphaGo, Surprise Move 37 and Interaction
Analysis, by Philippe Sormani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Hintikka’s Logical Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
World Lines Semantics and the Contingent A Priori,
by Matthieu Fontaine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
Tableau Approach to Epistemic Logic Based on Relating
Logics, by Krzysztof Krawczyk & Tomasz Jarmużek . 358
Dialogues and Strategies in Aristotle’s Logic: Furthering Hin-
tikka’s Insights, by Zoe McConaughey . . . . . . . . . . 359
Hintikka on the “Kant-Frege view”: A critical assessment,
by Giovanni Mion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
Logic for Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Community of Philosophical Inquiry, by Anne Brel Cloutier . 363
Visualization as Restructuring and thus a Source of Logical
Paradox, by Andrius Jonas Kulikauskas . . . . . . . . . 364
Elementary introduction to pasting,
by Fernando Lucatelli Nunes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
Subjectivism and inferential reasoning on teaching practice,
by Laura Rifo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Categories and Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
Proof Diagrams as Concurrent Syntax for Sequent Calculi,
by Matteo Acclavio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
κ-filter pairs and non-finitary logics, by Peter Arndt,
Hugo Luiz Mariano & Darllan Conceição Pinto . . . . 371
Beyond the categorial forms of the Axiom of Choice,
by Andreas B.M. Brunner, Darllan Conceição Pinto,
Hugo Luiz Mariano & Samuel G. da Silva . . . . . . . 372
Boole-Weyl Algebras in a Categorical Context,
by Rafael Diaz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Logical rules are fractions, by Dominique Duval . . . . . . . . 374
Makkai duality, descent and definability, by Jesse Han . . . . 375
Fibrations of contexts beget fibrations of toposes,
by Sina Hazratpour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
An Abstract Approach to Algebraizable Logics
with Quantifiers, by Caio de Andrade Mendes
& Hugo Luiz Mariano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
xiv
Contents
Interchangeable formulas and categories of logics,

by Francisco Antonio Vibrentis
& José Luis Castiglioni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
Differential Geometry in Modal Type Theory,
by Felix Wellen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
A Pierce representation theorem for varieties with BFC,
by William Zuluaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Logic, Law and Legal Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
The Interaction of Logic and Jurisprudence in the Islamic
Tradition: A Genealogy of a Long-Lasting
Antagonism, by Zidani Farid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
Ludics for modelling the role of a judge during legal debates,
by Christophe Fouqueré & Myriam Quatrini . . . . . . 383
Textual Discourse Analysis: Towards an Illocutionary-
Argumentative Model for the International Legal
Discourse, by Hális A.N. França . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
Abū Ish.āq al-Shı̄rāzı̄’s System of Co-Relational Inferences
by Indication, by Muhammad Iqbal . . . . . . . . . . . 385
A Dialogical Framework for Analogy in European Legal
Reasoning, by Hans Christian Nordtveit Kvernenes . . 386
Vagueness in the Law and the Sorites Paradox,
by Sébastien Lacroix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
Abductive Inference in Legal Reasoning: Reconceiving Res
Ipsa Loquitur, by Douglas Lind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
A Formal Analysis of (Human) Rights and (State) Duties,
by Réka Markovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Cohen’s Criticisms of the Use of Probability in the Law,
by David Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Judgement based on chance in legal ties,
by Hesam Mohamadi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
Narrations in judiciary fact-finding and the difficulty about
conjunction, by Rafal Urbaniak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395
Coping with inconsistencies in legal reasoning, by Max Urchs 397
Logic and Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
From Quantum to Cognition, by Bob Coecke . . . . . . . . . . 399
Theory of Forms: a reconstruction of ancient metaphysics
applied to the logical foundations of modern physics,
by Douglas Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Eigenlogic, by Zeno Toffano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
xv
A Categorical Reconstruction of Quantum Theory,

by Sean Tull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Negations and Truth-perspectives pertaining to Qudit based
Multi-valued Quantum Computational Logics,
by Ranjith Venkatrama, Roberto Giuntini
& Giuseppe Sergioli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
15 Sessions 407
Universal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Logics as models versus logics as proposals, by Pavel Arazim 407
Preservationist Consequence and Logical Pluralism,
by Bryson Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
?
Universal Logic = Logic of the Universal, by Laurent Dubois . 410
Characterizing Context-Independent Logical Notions Among
the Context-Dependent Ones. The Case of
Quantifiers and Inferences, by Stanislaw Krajewski . . 411
Intensionality as a unifier: Logic, Language and Philosophy,
by Marı́a Manzano, Manuel A. Martins
& Manuel C. Moreno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Modular analysis of Hilbert calculi, by Sérgio Marcelino
& Carlos Caleiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
Semantics for combined Hilbert calculi, by Sérgio Marcelino
& Carlos Caleiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
On Dissent Pluralism and Paradigm-shifts from plural
perspectives, by Tony Marmo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Disjunctive and conjunctive multiple-conclusion consequence
relations, by Marek Nowak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
S5 is a semi-bivalent logic, and so is classical logic,
by Fabien Schang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Internal Logic of the H-B topos and Universal Metalogic,
by Vladimir L. Vasyukov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Tarski: Logical Concepts as Invariants, by Jan Woleński . . . 422
Modal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Polynomial Semantics for Normal Modal Logics,
by Juan C. Agudelo-Agudelo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Divided modality for Ockhamists, by Jacob Archambault . . . 425
Hypersequential Argumentation Frameworks:
An Instantiation in the Modal Logic S5,
by AnneMarie Borg and Ofer Arieli . . . . . . . . . . . 426
xvi
Contents
Intensional: what it is about?, by Antonia Huertas,

Marı́a Manzano & Manuel C. Moreno . . . . . . . . . . 427
Topology and Measure in Logics for Point-free Space,
by Tamar Lando . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
Moving from the Opposition of Normal and Non-Normal Modal
Logics to Universal Logic: Synthesizing T, S4, Tr,
Verum and Falsum systems by the Square and Hexagon,
by Vladimir Lobovikov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
The Logic of Change LC enriched by Leibnizian modalities,
by Marcin Lyczak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Correctness and Strong Completeness for Logic of Time and
Knowledge, by Bojan Marinković, Zoran Ognjanović
& Paola Glavan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
Modal logics obtained by means of Jaśkowski’s model
of discussion, by Marek Nasieniewski,
Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska
& Andrzej Pietruszczak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
A Modal Logics Framework for the Modeling of Human
Reasoning, by Serge Robert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Modal approach to region-based theories of space:
undecidability of modal definability, by Tinko Tinchev 436
On the modal and first-order definability, by Tinko Tinchev
& Philippe Balbiani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
Non-Classical Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Abduction for Reconstructing Proto-Languages,
by Cristina Barés Gómez, Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández
& Francisco Salguero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Context-Sensitivity
and Indexicals, by Ana Cholodovskis . . . . . . . . . . 441
Universal Logic and Generalized Probability Theory,
by Huacan He & Yanquan Zhou . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
The Syllogistic System: A Paraconsistent Logic Model
for Human Reasoning, by Bora Kumova . . . . . . . . 444
A Probabilistic Interpretation for an Intuitionistic Sequent
Predicate Calculus with Strong Negation,
by François Lepage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
A basic dual intuitionistic logic, by José M. Méndez,
Gemma Robles & Francisco Salto . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
Many-Valued Decision Logic for Rough Sets,
by Yotaro Nakayama, Seiki Akama & Tetsuya Murai . 448
xvii
On a correspondence of positive and negative modalities

on the basis of some non-normal logics,
by Marek Nasieniewski
& Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
Fuzzy Logic and Communication in a Social Context,
by Rohit Parikh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Investigations on the axiomatic presentation
of ALC Description Logic and its formalization
in Lean, by Alexandre Rademaker, Edward Hermann
Haeusler & Fabricio Chalub . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Expansions of relevance logics with a quasi-Boolean negation
of intuitionistic character, by Gemma Robles . . . . . . 455
A pluralist account of relevant implication and a sequent cal-
culus for classical logic’s version, by Peter Verdée . . . 456
S-shape Transconsistent Logic System,
by Jincheng Zhang & Yanquan Zhou . . . . . . . . . . 457
Universal M-Valued logic, by Tihomir Žilić, Mario Essert,
Ivana Kuzmanović, & Juraj Benić . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Abduction in Unconceded-Preserving Dialogues,
by Matthieu Fontaine & Cristina Barés Gómez . . . . 460
Analytic Tableaux for Argumentation Frameworks,
by Fernando Tohmé & Gustavo Adrián Bodanza . . . 461
How not to aggregate reasons, by Frank Zenker . . . . . . . . 463
Language and Semiotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
How Combinatory Logic can be used to formalize meanings,
by Jean-Pierre Desclés . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
The Structural Unconcious: the Logic of Differences,
by Ricardo Jardim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
A Structural Semiotic Study of How We Use Variables
in Math and Logic, by Andrius Jonas Kulikauskas . . 468
The origin of semantics in formal languages,
by Vı́ctor Aranda Utrero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Bilingual Logic Based on the Scientific Method System,
by Xiaohui Zou & Shunpeng Zou . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
Tools and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
A second order propositional logic with subtyping,
by Nino Guallart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
xviii
Contents
The generalized probability theory and intelligent

information processing, by Huacan He
& Yanquan Zhou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
A Natural Deduction System for Leśniewski’s Protothetic,
by Pierre Joray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Tableau Systems for Epistemic Interpretations of Jerzy Loś’
R-Operator Logics, by Krzysztof Krawczyk
& Tomasz Jarmużek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Comparing Classical and Relativistic Kinematics
in First-Order Logic, by Koen Lefever
& Gergely Székely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Type Theory and the Theory of Forms, by Goran Lojkić . . . 478
Coloring Venn Diagrams, by Raja Natarajan . . . . . . . . . . 479
Some mathematical approaches for defining the notion
of quasi-topology, by Anca Christine Pascu,
Jean-Pierre Desclés & Ismaı̈l Biskri . . . . . . . . . . . 480
On Generalized Unified Boolean-Fregean Semantics,
by Sergey Pavlov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
The Rule of Explicit Substitution into (Hyper)intensional
Contexts, by Jiřı́ Raclavský . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Embodiment of some Logical, Computable and Categorical
Notions by a Logic of Operators,
by Benoı̂t Sauzay & Gaëll Guibert . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
Nested Sequents, Focusing and Synthetic Connectives,
by Lutz Straßburger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
On First-order Mereological Complementation,
by Hsing-chien Tsai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
Philosophy, Art, Science, Economy (PHASE) of self
and internal integrity, by Tal Dotan Ben-Soussan
& Patrizio Paoletti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
Is Life Logical? Application of the Peirce-Leśniewski-Tarski
Meta-Logics to the Organic Mathematics
of the Perplexity of Natural Sorts and Kinds,
by Jerry Chandler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
A Formal Representation of Reasoning for Chemistry,
by Michèle Friend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
A Common Framework for the Empirical Sciences,
by Maurı́cio Vieira Kritz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
xix
The Analytic and the Synthetic. From Homology

to Heterology, by Sylvain Lavelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
The logic of content and contentual understanding
of sentences, by Piotr Lukowski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
Stereology, by Nikolay Milkov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
What Philosophy of Logic are we Teaching?,
by Elizabeth Olsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
A Reply to Logical Revisionists: Strict Finitism, Feasibility
and Structural Rules, by Fabrice Pataut . . . . . . . . 502
On the Status of Questions in the Practice of Science,
by William Rawleigh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
Combinations of Interpretations in Universal Logical
Hermeneutics, by Elena Shulga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505
Knowledge, Behavior, and Rationality,
by Todd Stambaugh & Rohit Parikh . . . . . . . . . . . 506
Formal intensional semantics of Aczel applied to Bolzanian
substantial metaphysics,
by Kordula Świȩtorzecka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507
On the universality of the principle of determination,
by Denis Vernant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 508
Logic does not distinguish any extralogical content,
by Jan Woleński . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 510
Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate for Theory
of Computation?, by Farzad Didehvar . . . . . . . . . . 510
Methodological Principles for Program Logic Construction,
by Vitalii Gavryluk and Mykola Nikitchenko . . . . . . 511
Turing’s Fallacy of Substitution, by Timm Lampert . . . . . . 512
Extending Classical Logic with Quasiary Predicates,
by Mykola Nikitchenko & Stepan Shkilniak . . . . . . . 513
Direct Products on Computing Languages and Models:
A preliminary, by Cyrus F. Nourani
& Johannes Fähndrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
Rules versus Axioms: a Constructive View of Theories,
by Andrei Rodin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 516
Hypercomputation and Philosophy of Mathematics,
by Krzysztof Wójtowicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517
A Universal Language for First-Order Constraints,
by Uwe Wolter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
xx
Contents
Logic Functions in the Philosophy of Al-Farabi,

by Abduljaleel Kadhim Alwali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521
A New Method of Demonstration for Aristotle’s Ontological
Syllogistic, by Emre Arda Erdenk . . . . . . . . . . . . 522
Does the Metalogic that Underlies the Aristotelian Logic
Resemble what Timothy Williamson Calls
a “Folk Logic”?, by Stamatios Gerogiorgakis . . . . . . 524
Interpretations of Chance within the Dialectic,
by Paul M. Healey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
A justification for Aristotle’s Thesis on the basis of the law
of non-contradiction, by Sara Ipakchi . . . . . . . . . . 527
The Principle of Excluded Middle in Kant, by Esma Kayar . 528
Eristic and the origin of logic, by Geneviève Lachance . . . . . 529
Nondeterminism and Chinese Traditional Logic,
by Yu Li & JianMing Zhou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
Should Hegel’s theory of the syllogism be included
in the history of logic?, by Brian MacPherson . . . . . 531
Renaissance Analysis as a Solution to the Problem
of Induction, by John Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
Alsteed’s Encyclopedy, by Ruxandra Irina Vulcan . . . . . . . 533
Two Syllogisms in the Mozi: Chinese Logic and Language,
by Byeong-uk Yi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534
Algebra and Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
A Constructive Proof of Coherence Theorem for Symmetric
Monoidal Category, by Matteo Acclavio . . . . . . . . . 536
Filter pairs: A new way of presenting logics, by Peter Arndt,
Ramon Jansana, Hugo Luiz Mariano
& Darllan Conceição Pinto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
Swap Structures and non-deterministic algebraization
of logics, by Aldo Figallo-Orellano, Marcelo Esteban
Coniglio & Ana Claudia Golzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538
Analogies of meaning across logic and categories,
by Gaëll Guibert & Benoı̂t Sauzay . . . . . . . . . . . . 540
Dual Logic Concepts based on Mathematical Morphology
in Stratified Institutions: Applications to Spatial
Reasoning, by Alexandre Goy, Marc Aiguier & Is-
abelle Bloch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541
Categorical semantics for a variation of subjective logic,
by Nino Guallart & Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández . . 543
xxi
Finite Strong Standard Completeness of IUL plus t ⇔ f,

by Sándor Jenei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545
Prime and maximal filters for the free algebra
in the subvariety of BL-algebras generated
by [0, 1]MV ⊕ H, by Noemı́ Lubomirsky,
Manuela Busaniche & José Luis Castiglioni . . . . . . . 546
On Two Mutually Inverse Isomorphisms between NEmHC
and NEK4.Grz, by Alexei Muravitsky . . . . . . . . . . 547
Visualizing Geometric Morphisms, by Eduardo Ochs . . . . . 549
Semantic Construction for Hilbert’s Category,
by Eleonoura Enoque da Silva, Giovanni Silva Queiroz
& Enoaldo Enoque da Silva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
Philosophy of Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
Universality and intersubjectivity of mathematical
constructions. Toward a dialogical reading of Brouwer’s
proof of the bar theorem, by Clément Lion . . . . . . . 551
Discovery in mathematics from a heuristic perspective:
the case of the calculus and its development,
by Giulia Miotti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552
What is Law?: the perception of Category Theory,
by Nick Rossiter & Michael Heather . . . . . . . . . . . 553
Structural investigation of the categorial logic-geometrical
system, by Krzysztof Śleziński . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
Visual Images and Non-Deductive Rules in Mathematical
Discovery, by Irina Starikova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
Explanation and Existence in Mathematics,
by Krzysztof Wójtowicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
16 Contest Logic Prizes 559

A prize of Logic in every country! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
Logic Prizes around the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Newton da Costa Logic Prize, in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 561
Schotch-Jennings Logic Prize, in Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Georgius Benignus Logic Prize, in Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . 562
Vasiliev Logic Prize, in Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
Bimal Krishna Matilal Logic Prize, in India . . . . . . . . . . . 563
SILFS Italian Logic Prize, in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Aristotle Logic Prize, in Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Alfred Tarski Logic Prize, in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564
Louis Couturat Logic Prize, in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565
xxii
Contents
Talks of Contest Logic Prizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566

New logics for quantum non-individuals?,
by Jonas R. Becker Arenhart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566
Logics of variable inclusion and Plonka sums of matrices,
by Stefano Bonzio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 567
On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization,
by Zalán Gyenis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 569
Canonical Extensions and Kripke-Galois Semantics
for Non-Distributive Propositional Logics,
by Takis Hartonas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570
FDE, L3, K3, RM3, LP: Making Many-Valued Logic Work,
by Allen P. Hazen & Francis Jeffry Pelletier . . . . . . 570
Abstract logical constants, by Tin Perkov . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
Natural Deduction for Regular Three-Valued Logics
and their Four-Valued Analogues,
by Yaroslav Petrukhin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
Developing Metalogic to Formalize Ontological Disputes
of the Systems in Metaphysics by Introducing
the Notion of Functionally Isomorphic Quantifiers,
by Jolly Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574
A note on a description logic of concept and role typicality,
by Ivan Varzinczak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575
IV Publishers, Sponsors and Partners 577
17 Book Exhibition 579
18 Sponsors and Partners 581
Index of Authors 583
xxiii
Part I
Introduction
1
1 – Organizing, International Organizing
and Scientific Committees
Organizing Committee
Jean-Yves Beziau (Co-Chair), University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, and Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
Christophe Rey (Co-Chair), LIMOS* -CNRS , Université Clermont-

Auvergne, France
Farouk Toumani, Director of LIMOS-CNRS, Université Clermont-

Auvergne, France
Olivier Cavagna, Vice-Director of Vichy Communauty, France
Geneviève Chervy, Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France
Stéphanie Lavigne-Masson, Technical Manager, Vichy Communauty,

France
Hélène Peybernès, ex-Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France
Béatrice Bourdieu, Séverine Miginiac, Sébastien Salva, Bruno Bachelet,

Nestor Koueya, Henri-Alex Esbelin, Loı̈c Yon, Albert Ndoj, LIMOS-
CNRS, Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
Marie Bornard, Cyril Sodaigui, Yanis Ayari, IUT d’Allier , Université

Clermont-Auvergne, France
Catherine Roussey, Stephan Bernard, Tayeb Abderrahmani Ghorfi, TSCF

laboratory§ , IRSTEA¶ , Clermont-Ferrand, France
Arthur Buchsbaum (Editor of the Handbook), Federal University of

Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil
*
Laboratoire d’Informatique, de Modélisation et d’Optimisation des Systèmes

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie d’Allier
§
Technologies and Information Systems for Agricultural Systems
¶
Institut National de Recherche en Sciences et Technologies pour l’Environnement et
l’Agriculture
3
International Organizing Committee

Vedat Kamer, İstanbul University, Turkey
Srećko Kovač, Philosophy Institute, Zagreb, Croatia
Raja Natarajan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai,

India
Luis Estrada-González, National Autonomous University of Mexico
Patrick Blackburn, Roskilde University, Denmark
Andrzej Pietruszczak, Copernic University, Torun, Poland
Øystein Linnebo, Oslo University, Norway
Musa Akrami, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
Mihir K. Chakraborty, Kolkata Logic Circle, India
Abduljaleel Kadhim Alwali, United Arab Emirates University, United

Arab Emirates
Andrzej Indrzejczak, University of Lódź, Poland
Francisco Dionı́sio, University of Lisbon, Portugal
Christian de Ronde, CONICET* , University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
Jean Paul Van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Davide Ciucci, University of Milan, Italy
Petros Stefaneas, Technical University of Athens, Greece
Chuan Zhao, Chengdu University of Technology, China
*
Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientı́ficas y Técnicas
4
Organizing, International Organizing and Scientific Committees
Scientific Committee
Arnon Avron, University of Tel-Aviv, Israel
Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

and Stanford University, USA
Ross Brady, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
Carlos Caleiro, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, Portugal
Walter Carnielli, State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
Newton da Costa, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis,

Brazil
Michael Dunn, School of Informatics, Indiana, USA
Michèle Friend, George Washington University, USA
Dov Gabbay, King’s College, London, UK
Huacan He, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China
Gerhard Jäger, University of Bern, Switzerland
Arnold Koslow, City University of New York, USA
István Németi, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
Francesco Paoli, University of Cagliari, Italy
Vladimir L. Vasyukov, Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences,

Moscow, Russia
Heinrich Wansing, Bochum University, Germany
5
2 – What is Universal Logic?
In the same way that universal algebra is a general theory of algebraic

structures, universal logic is a general theory of logical structures. During
the 20th century, numerous logics have been created: intuitionistic logic,
deontic logic, many-valued logic, relevant logic, linear logic, non monotonic
logic, etc. Universal logic is not a new logic, it is a way of unifying this
multiplicity of logics by developing general tools and concepts that can be
applied to all logics.
One aim of universal logic is to determine the domain of validity of such
and such metatheorem (e.g. the completeness theorem) and to give general
formulations of metatheorems. This is very useful for applications and helps
to make the distinction between what is really essential to a particular logic
and what is not, and thus gives a better understanding of this particular
logic. Universal logic can also be seen as a toolkit for producing a specific
logic required for a given situation, e.g. a paraconsistent deontic temporal
logic.
Universal logic helps to clarify basic concepts explaining what is an ex-
tension and what is a deviation of a given logic, what does it mean for a logic
to be equivalent or translatable into another one. It allows to give precise
definitions of notions often discussed by philosophers: truth-functionality,
extensionality, logical form, identity, existence, negation, etc.
The idea of universal logic is not to build a monolithic system of logic
but to develop comparative study of ways of reasoning and their systemati-
zations, promoting better understanding and knowledge of the logical realm
and its connections with other fields.
7
3 – Aim of the event
This is the 6th edition of a world event dedicated to universal logic called
“UNILOG”, standing for “World Congress and School on Universal Logic”.
Here is the list of previous UNILOGs:
— 1st UNILOG, Montreux, Switzerland, 2005
— 2nd UNILOG, Xi’an, China, 2007
— 3rd UNILOG, Lisbon, Portugal, 2010
— 4th UNILOG, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013
— 5th UNILOG, İstanbul, Turkey, 2015
This event is a combination of a school and a congress. The school

offers many tutorials on a wide range of subjects. The congress will follow
with invited talks by some of the best alive logicians and a selection of
contributed talks. As in previous editions there will also be a contest and a
secret speaker.
This event is intended to be a major event in logic, providing a platform
for future research guidelines. Such an event is of interest for all people
dealing with logic in one way or another: pure logicians, mathematicians,
computer scientists, AI researchers, linguists, psychologists, philosophers,
etc.
The 6th edition of UNILOG will take place at the Campus Albert Lon-
dres, located close to the Célestins spring, near the banks of the river Allier,
in the thermal city of Vichy, in a region of France called Bourbonnais.
9
4 – Call for papers
To submit a contribution send a one page abstract to [email protected]

by December 1st, 2017.
All talks dealing with general aspects of logic are welcome, in particular
those falling into the categories below.
See also the workshops where you can submit your abstract if it is ap-
propriate and the logic prizes. Participants of the school are also strongly
encouraged to submit a contribution.
General Tools and Techniques

consequence operator
diagrams
multiple-conclusion logic
labelled deductive systems
Kripke structures
logical matrices
tableaux and trees
universal algebra and categories
abstract model theory
combination of logics
lambda calculus
games
Scope of Validity
Domain of Applications of Fundamental Theorems
completeness
compactness
cut-elimination
deduction
interpolation
definability
incompleteness
decidability
Lindenbaum lemma
algebrization
Dugundji’s theorem
11
Study of Classes of Logics

modal logics
substructural logics
linear logics
relevant logics
fuzzy logics
non-monotonic logics
paraconsistent logics
intensional logics
temporal logics
many-valued logics
high order logics
free logics
Philosophy and History

axioms and rules
truth and fallacies
identity
lingua universalis vs. calculus ratiocinator
pluralism
origin of logic
reasoning and computing
discovery and creativity
nature of metalogic
deduction and induction
definition
paradoxes
12
Part II
6th World School

on Universal Logic
13
5 – Aim of the School
A great variety of tutorials

For the 6th edition of this school there will be many tutorials on all
aspects of logic:
history of logic (Aristotle, Stoic logic, Medieval logic, Leśniewski, Cou-
turat, etc.)
relations/applications of logic to other fields (Logic and the Brain, Logic
and Religion, Conceptual Engineering, etc.)
mathematical logic and foundations (Topos theory, Lindenbaum meth-
ods, Arithmetics. etc.)
computational logic (Data linkage, semantic technologies, programming,
etc.)
Contact: [email protected].
A School to Promote Logical Research

Each tutorial will be presented in three sessions of one hour. The tu-
torials will be given by a wide range of logical scholars from all over the
world.
The idea is to promote interaction between advanced students and re-
searchers through the combination of a school and a congress. Participants
of the School are strongly encouraged to submit a paper for the congress
that will happen in June 21–26, just after the school.
The school will open with a round table “Why study logic?” and will
end with a round table on “Why, when, where and how to publish?”.
Logic Around the World

For PhD students, postdoctoral students and young researchers inter-
ested in logic, artificial intelligence, mathematics, philosophy, linguistics and
related fields, this will be a unique opportunity to get a solid background
for their future researches.
15
6 – ¿Why Study Logic?
It is the Opening Session of the 6th World School on Universal Logic,

on June 16, 2018.
This topic will be discussed by a variety of people in a round table

animated by Jean-Yves Beziau, UFRJ* and CNPq (Brazil) / Visiting
Researcher of École Normale Supérieure (Paris, France), organizer of the
School of Universal Logic since 2005:
Franca D’Agostini, Polytechnical University of Turin, Italy
Mykola Nikitchenko, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,

Ukraine
Julio Michael Stern, University of São Paulo, Brazil
Ioannis Vandoulakis, Hellenic Open University, Greece
*
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

National Council for Scientific and Technological Development
17
7 – Speakers of the 6th World School
on Universal Logic
Each tutorial will be presented in 3 sessions of 1 hour. The tutorials will

be given by a wide range of logical scholars from around the world:
Franca D’Agostini, Polytechnical University of Turin, Italy
Peter Arndt, University of Düsseldorf, Germany
Tal Dotan Ben-Soussan

Research Institute for Neuroscience, Education and Didactics,
Patrizio Paoletti Foundation, Italy
Jean-Yves Beziau
University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont
CNRS* , Paris, France
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Alex Citkin, Metropolitan Telecommunications, New York, USA
Henri-Alex Esbelin, LIMO , Clermont-Auvergne University, France
Elena Ficara
Department of Philosophy, University of Paderborn, Germany
Jean-Baptiste Gourinat
Centre Leon Robin, Paris-Sorbonne University, France
Casper Storm Hansen, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel
*

19
Jean-Louis Hudry, Independent Scholar, France
Andrzej Indrzejczak, University of Lódź, Poland
Manuel Gustavo Isaac

Postdoctoral Fellow sponsored by Swiss National Science Foundation
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Pierre Joray, University of Rennes 1, France
Emiliano Lorini, IRIT* , Paul Sabatier University, France
Florent Madelaine, GREYC , University of Caen, France
William James McCurdy, Idaho State University, USA
Giovanni Mion, İstanbul Technical University, Turkey
Malika More, LIMOS , Clermont-Auvergne University, France
Marie-Laure Mugnier, LIRMM§ , Montpellier, France
Alexei Muravitsky
Louisiana Scholars’ College, Northwestern State University,
Natchitoches, Louisiana, USA
Mykola Nikitchenko
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine
Henri Prade, IRIT¶ , France

Florian Rabe
LRI , Computer Science Course, Faculté des Sciences d’Orsay,
Université Paris-Sud, France
KWARC** group, University of Erlangen, Germany
*
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse

Groupe de REcherche en Informatique, Image, Automatique et Instrumentation de Caen
§
Laboratoire d’Informatique, de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
¶

Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique
**
Knowledge Adaptation and Reasoning for Content
20
Speakers of the 6th World School on Universal Logic
Marie-Christine Rousset, LIG* , University of Grenoble, France
Oliver Schlaudt, University of Heidelberg, Germany
Ricardo Silvestre, Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil
Erik Thomsen, CTO at Blender Logic, Cambridge, Mass, USA
Jerzy Tomasik, LIMOS , CNRS§ , University for the Creative Arts, France
Ioannis Vandoulakis, Hellenic Open University, Greece
Frank Zenker, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden
Xunwei Zhou, Beijing Union University, China
*
Laboratoire d’Informatique de Grenoble

Chief Technology Officer
§
21
8 – Tutorials
The Logic of Lying

Franca D’Agostini
Graduate School of Economic, Political and Social Sciences,
University of Milan, Italy
[email protected]
The recent literature about lying, deceiving, misleading and other forms
of deceit in philosophy of language is quite rich. The problem is also at the
centre of the public debate nowadays. (See the fortune of the concept of
“post-truth politics”, or the widespread worry concerning the circulation of
fake-news on the Internet.)
The tutorial aims at making the logic of deception clear, by stressing the
connection between the practice of deceptive processes and typically logical
issues related to the theme, such as the semantic behaviour of truth, the
inferential force of falsity and negation, and liar-like paradoxes.
I. The many ways of deception

The first lecture provides a brief introduction to the different forms
of deceit as currently studied and defined in the philosophy of language,
in semantic and pragmatic perspective. We will focus on the definitions of
‘lying’, ‘misleading’, ‘manipulating’, ‘spinning’ and their respective doxastic
force.
II. The role of truth in the practice of conveying falsity

The second lecture will deal with the notions of falsity and partial truth
in logic and in everyday interactions. We will look at the basic logical per-
spectives concerning the failure of truth: classical (truth excludes falsity),
paracomplete (‘untrue’ does not mean ‘false’), paraconsistent (there might
be true and false assertions) and gradualistic (there are degrees of truth and
degrees of falsity — in fuzzy or probabilistic sense). A systematic confronta-
tion between logic and our usual practices of assertion will be presented.
23
III. Is the Liar lying?

In the third lecture, I propose a very brief introduction to semantic
Liar-like paradoxes. The presentation will focus on some paradoxes (such
as Pinocchio Paradox or the Blushing Liar) that specifically enlighten the
nexus between Liar-like paradoxes and the effective pragmatic of lying. The
question is whether a person who says ‘I am lying’ (or similar assertions)
can be said ‘a liar’, in the strict sense of the term. Another more interest-
ing question is: can Machiavelli’s Prince lie, given that we know he will lie
(because Machiavelli told us)?
Bibliography
1. L. Dobrez, J. Lyod Jones & P. Dobrez (editors), An ABC of Lying,
Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2004.
2. F. D’Agostini, Menzogna, Bollati Boringhieri, Turin, 2012, Spanish
translation: Mentira, Adriana Hidalgo Editora.
3. P. Eldridge-Smith, “The Cretan Liar Paradox”, in An ABC of Lying,
edited by L. Dobrez, J.L. Jones & P. Dobrez, Australian Scholarly Pub-
lishing, Melbourne, 2004, pp. 71–92.
4. P. Eldridge-Smith, “Pinocchio against the dialetheists”, Analysis,
vol. 71(2), 2011, pp. 306–308.
5. P. Eldridge-Smith, “Pinocchio beards the Barber”, Analysis, vol. 72(4),
2012, pp. 749–752.
6. V. Eldridge-Smith & P. Eldridge-Smith, “The Pinocchio paradox”, Anal-
ysis, vol. 70(2), 2010, pp. 212–215.
7. H. Field, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2008.
8. I. Kant, “Theorie-Werkausgabe”, in Werke in zwölf Bänden, Bd. VIII,
Frankfurt a.M., 1968.
9. J. Lackey, Learning From Words. Testimony as a Source of Knowledge,
Oxford University Press, 2008.
10. J. Lackey, “Lies and deception: an unhappy divorce”, Analysis,
vol. 73(2), 2013.
11. J.E. Mahon, “The Definition of Lying and Deception”, in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E.N. Zalta, 2016, https://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/lying-definition.
12. N. Marsili, “Lying as a Scalar Phenomenon: Insincerity along the Cer-
tainty-Uncertainty Continuum”, in Certainty-uncertainty — and the
Attitudinal Space in Between, edited by S. Cantarini, W. Abraham &
E. Leiss, John Benjamins Publishing, 2014.
13. G. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Secker & Warburg, London, 1949.
14. J. Saul, “Did Clinton say something false?”, Analysis, vol. 60, 2000,
pp. 255–257.
24
Tutorials
15. J. Saul, Lying, Misleading, and What is Said, Oxford University Press,
2012.
16. J. Saul, “Just go ahead and lie”, Analysis, vol. 72(1), 2012.
17. R.A. Sorensen, “Permission to Cheat”, Analysis, vol. 67(295), 2007,
pp. 205–214.
18. R.A. Sorensen, “Bald-faced Lies! Lying without the intent to deceive”,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 88(2), 2007, pp. 251–264.
19. R.A. Sorensen, “Knowledge-Lies”, Analysis, vol. 70(4), 2010,
pp. 608–615.
20. J. Webber, “Liar!”, Analysis, vol. 73(4), 2013.
21. B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness. An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton
University Press, 2002.
25
Topos theory and Caramello’s bridge technique

Peter Arndt
University of Düsseldorf, Germany
[email protected]
This tutorial will offer an introduction to topos theory and geometric

logic, and to the theory of topos-theoretic bridges developed
by O. Caramello [1,2].
Grothendieck toposes can be seen as common generalization of the con-
cepts of a universe of sets and of a topological space. There is an abundance
of examples from topology, algebraic geometry, differential geometry and
logic.
A Grothendieck topos is a kind of category, in which one can interpret
the language of geometric logic, a certain infinitary first order language,
in a way that generalizes the usual set-theoretic interpretation. Geometric
logic is an intuitionistic infinitary first order logic based on that language,
which is sound and complete with respect to the topos interpretation. As
usual, for the completeness part one has to show that if a theory T does not
imply a formula ϕ, then there is a model of T in some topos where ϕ is not
satisfied. In topos theory, the completeness theorem takes a particularly
nice form: there exists a topos B[T], and a model of T in it which satisfies
only those sentences implied by T, and thus takes care of all sentences ϕ
as above simultaneously. The topos B[T] is called the classifying topos of
the theory T, and the said model of T is called the universal model. Every
model of T in some topos arises as an image of the universal model.
Like a group can be presented by generators and relations between them,
a Grothendieck topos can be presented by a site, i.e. a small category to-
gether with a specification of when a family of morphisms with common
codomain is a covering of that codomain. The inspiring example is the cat-
egory of open subsets of a topological space together with the usual notion
of covering from topology. Just as different presentations can give rise to
isomorphic groups, different sites can give rise to equivalent toposes.
Given a geometric theory, one can explicitly construct a site presenting
its classifying topos, the syntactic site of T. It can happen that two dif-
ferent theories, giving rise to two different sites, have equivalent classifying
toposes. Caramello’s bridge technique studies and exploits such situations:
one can try to translate properties of the classifying topos into properties of
the theories, and back, and thus obtain relations between the two different
theories.
26
Tutorials
In this tutorial we will introduce Grothendieck toposes, the interpreta-

tion of geometric logic in them, classifying toposes and Caramello’s bridge
technique, all with examples. The prerequisite for the course is knowledge
of the basic notions of category theory: categories, functors, natural trans-
formations, (co)limits, adjunctions and the Yoneda lemma.
Bibliography
1. O. Caramello, Theories, Sites, Toposes: Relating and studying math-
ematical theories through topos-theoretic ‘bridges’, Oxford University
Press, 2017.
2. O. Caramello, Grothendieck toposes as unifying ‘bridges’ in Mathemat-
ics, habilitation thesis, University of Paris 7, 2016.
3. S. MacLane & I. Moerdijk, Sheaves in Geometry and Logic, Springer,
1994.
4. M. Makkai & G. Reyes, First-Order Categorical Logic: Model-Theoretical
Methods in the Theory of Topoi and Related Categories, Lecture Notes
in Mathematics book series, vol. 611, Springer, 1977.
27
Logic in the Brain

Director of the Neuroscientific Research Unit,
Patrizio Paoletti Foundation for Development
and Communication
[email protected]
Recent advances in fuzzy and paraconsistent logic confirm the complex-

ity of the human brain. However, are we only logical beings? In addition,
what role do emotions play in rational processes? And how does stress ef-
fect moral decision making? In the current tutorial, we will address these
questions, taking into consideration recent studies in cognitive, affective and
contemplative neuroscience and psychology of logic, focusing on decision-
making, morality and free will and their underlying neuronal mechanisms.
Everybody who is interested in these questions is welcome to join, and there
are no specific prerequisites. The tutorial will be divided into three sessions,
as a metaphor for the journey between the current state of man and the state
he may achieve.
I. The bio-logic nature of ‘paraconsistency’ of man

Although there are contradictions inside our brain, it contains them, also
through the mind’s interpreter [3,8]. In fact, humans are a three brain being
[2,5]. We have all experienced that emotions can interfere with reason and
decision-making, and that different thoughts can simultaneously co-exist.
An additional challenge is that we are capable of having many feelings at
once. Logical and rational thinking requires that we pay attention, but
that is hard to do if we feel threatened. Thus, we may have trouble pay-
ing attention to an abstract problem when our amygdala is sending danger
signals to our logical brain. Logic and its pleasures can also suddenly seem
inconsequential when we see an attractive person. The issue here is com-
petition between different brain areas. Different sensory signals physically
compete for attention in the brain, and those that are the strongest win out
[9]. Seven features must be kept in mind when discovering the niceties of
medieval logic, many of them closely connected: the exegetical dimension
of medieval — logic a feature shared with medieval thought as a whole; the
wide range of fields included in what was called “logic” by then (epistemol-
ogy, philosophy of language, semantics, philosophy of science, etc.) and the
strong connection to sister disciplines (rhetoric, grammar, metaphysics); the
28
Tutorials
non-formality of medieval logic, even in its “formal” aspects; the philosoph-

ical and scientific orientation of logic as both an instrument for knowledge
and a part of philosophy; the non-distinction between logic and philosophy
of logic; the disputational approach to logic as a theory and a practice (the
latter is also true of medieval university in general); last but not least, the
major social and pedagogical role played by logic, before the rise of math-
ematics as a new standard in educational systems and sciences. This last
aspect probably explains the existence of a fairly stable logical culture in
the Middle Ages and pre-modern period.
II. The Sphere Model of Consciousness

The Sphere Model of Consciousness [6] suggests three axes of human
experience, pointing towards the center of the sphere as the locus of human
psychological development. Based on the Sphere Model, the consciousness
state space has been formulated, suggesting a unifying neuroscientific model
for consciousness and self [4]. In this session, we will discuss the characteris-
tics of being in the Logos in different traditions and their possible neuronal
correlates. In addition, examples of reaching similar states of being will be
compared and discussed.
III. Uniting the fragmented mind: it is logical to train

Recent neuroscientific studies have confirmed that our brain is frag-
mented, and that increased neuronal synchronization can aid in enhancing
internal integrity. Increased neuronal synchronization is related to increased
cognitive flexibility, reflectivity and attention. Several brain-based integrity
scales have been developed to measure state of consciousness, and were
found to be connected to moral judgments. These results will be shortly
discussed in connection to models of Deontic logic. Importantly, additional
research consistently demonstrate that neuronal synchronization, cognition
and consciousness can be elicited by training such as mindfulness, medi-
tation and the Quadrato Motor Training [7,1]. These results and others
suggest that training can greatly help in moral problem solving and creativ-
ity.
Bibliography
1. T.D. Ben-Soussan, J. Glicksohn & A. Berkovich-Ohana, “From cerebel-
lar activation and connectivity to cognition: a review of the Quadrato
Motor Training”, BioMed Research International, Article ID 954901,
2015, 11 pages.
29
2. P.D. MacLean, The triune brain in evolution: Role in paleocerebral func-

tions, Springer, 1990.
3. N. Marinsek, B.O. Turner, M. Gazzaniga & M.B. Miller, “Divergent
hemispheric reasoning strategies: reducing uncertainty versus resolving
inconsistency”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 8, 2014.
4. A. Berkovich-Ohana & J. Glicksohn, “The consciousness state space
(CSS) — a unifying model for consciousness and self”, Frontiers in
Psychology, vol. 5, 2014.
5. P. Paoletti, “Crescere nell’eccellenza” (Growing in Excellence), Armando
Editore, 2008.
6. P. Paoletti, Mediation, Edizioni 3P, 2011.
7. P. Paoletti, J. Glicksohn & T.D. Ben-Soussan, “Inner Design Technol-
ogy: improved affect by Quadrato Motor Training”, in The Amygdala-
Where Emotions Shape Perception, Learning and Memories, InTech,
2017.
8. G. Wolford, M.B. Miller & M. Gazzaniga, “The left hemisphere’s role
in hypothesis formation”, Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 20(6), 2000,
RC64.
9. J.E. Zull, “The art of changing the brain”, Educational Leadership,
vol. 62(1),2004, pp. 68–72.
30
Tutorials
The Adventures of the Turnstile ( )

Jean-Yves Beziau
[email protected]
“ ” is one of the most famous symbols of modern logic. It has been

introduced by Frege and for this reason is called “Frege’s stroke”. But it
is also called by other names, in particular “turnstile”, a name which has
more to do with its form than its meaning. Its meaning has considerably
evolved and variations of its original design have sprung, in particular its
most famous double: “ ”. In this workshop we will combine an analysis of
the history of this symbol and its variations with critical reflections about
their meanings and uses. This will be a way to reflect on the evolution and
central features of modern logic.
I. Origin of the symbol “ ” and its early history

In this first session we will recall the original meaning of Frege’s stroke,
when and in which circumstances it was introduced and its reception and
use or non-use by Hilbert, Whitehead-Russell, Wittgenstein and Leśniewski.
We will in particular focus on the distinction between truth and logical
truth. We will furthermore discuss the symbolic dimension of “ ” within
a general discussion on symbolism, mathematics and modern logic.
II. Syntax vs Semantics, Proof Theory vs Model Theory,

“ ” vs “ ”
In the second session we will discuss the crystallisation of the opposition
in modern logic between syntax and semantic, proof-theory and model the-
ory, typically symbolized by “ ” vs. “ ”. An opposition which makes
sense but is also overcome by the completeness theorem. We will also dis-
cuss the incompleteness theorem from the perspective of these two symbols.
We will in particular emphasize the ambiguity of the use of “ ” in sequent
calculus instead of the original symbol used by Gentzen “→”, explaining
how this confuses one of the most important results of proof theory, the
cut-elimination theorem. We will also emphasize the ambiguity of the dou-
ble use of the double “ ” in model theory: as a symbol for a semantical
consequence relation and as a symbol used for a relation between models
and formulas.
31
III. “ ” as an Abstract Consequence Relation

In the third session we will focus of the use of “ ” as a symbol for an
abstract consequence relation, beyond the dichotomy proof-theory/model-
theory. It denotes a fundamental relation for logical structures, slight vari-
ation of Tarski’s consequence operator. We will focus in particular on the
completeness theorem from this abstract perspective. We will also discuss
some related notions such as logical equivalence expressed by “ ” and
the notion of self-extensionality.
Bibliography
1. J.-Y. Beziau, “Rules, derived rules, permissible rules and the various
types of systems of deduction”, in Proof, Types and Categories, edited
by E.H. Hauesler & L.C. Pereira, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio
de Janeiro, 1999, pp. 159–184.
2. J.-Y. Beziau, “From Consequence Operator to Universal Logic: A Sur-
vey of General Abstract Logic”, in Logica Universalis: Towards a Gen-
eral Theory of Logic, Birkhäuser, Basel, 2005, pp. 3–17.
3. J.-Y. Beziau, “La Puissance du Symbole”, in La Pointure du Symbole,
edited by J.-Y. Beziau, Petra, Paris, 2014, pp. 9–34.
4. C.J. Ducasse and H.B. Curry, “Early History of the Association for
Symbolic Logic”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 27(3), 1962,
pp. 255–258.
5. V.H. Dudman, “Frege’s Judgement-Stroke”, The Philosophical Quar-
terly, vol. 20(79), 1970, pp. 150–161.
6. D. Greimann, “The Judgement-Stroke as a Truth-Operator: A New
Interpretation of the Logical Form of Sentences in Frege’s Scientific
Language”, Erkenntnis, vol. 52(2), 2000, pp. 213–238.
7. S. Leśniewski “On some questions regarding the sense of the logistic the-
ses”, in Stanislaw Leśniewski: Collected Works, edited by S.J. Surma,
J.T.J. Srzednicki, J.D. Barnett & V.F. Rickey, 2 volumes, Springer,
1992, pp. 181–196.
8. F. Rombout, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the Judgment Stroke,
MSc thesis, University of Amsterdam, 2011, https://goo.gl/k55sGg.
9. N.J.J. Smith, “Frege’s Judgement Stroke”, Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy, vol. 78(2), 2000, pp. 153–175.
10. N.J.J. Smith, “Frege’s Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as
the Study of Inference not Consequence”, Philosophy Compass,
vol. 4(4), 2009, pp. 639–665.
32
Tutorials
History of Medieval Logic

LEM* , CNRS , PSL Research University, France
[email protected]
In the same manner as medieval philosophy, medieval logic includes a

large range of cultures and languages in Byzantine, Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew
and Latin traditions. It extends from the sixth century to the fifteenth cen-
tury and beyond, as far as logic alone is concerned. Though challenged by
Renaissance logics in the sixteenth century, especially in Reformed coun-
tries, and by new logics of discovery designed for the scientific revolution,
it survived the collapse of the Aristotelian sciences up till the nineteenth
century, under labels such as “scholastic logic”, “Aristotelian logic”, or “tra-
ditional logic”. Elaborating from the late ancient legacy accessible to them,
that is few sketchy textbooks, some Neoplatonic commentaries to Aristo-
tle’s Organon and a “peripatetized” version of Stoic logic, i.e. “hypotheti-
cal syllogistic”, medieval logicians have introduced many novelties nowhere
found before and often still discussed today: a sophisticated conception of
modalities, a general theory of consequences, the notion of a (contextual)
reference, distinct from signification, a distinction between truth-bearers
and truth-factors, a focus on the semantics of proper names and indexi-
cals, a disputational, pragmatic, approach to logic, the distinction between
the “form” and the “matter” of the arguments within a rich and varied
conception of formality, etc. Even if schematic letters have been used, as
they were already in Aristotle’s tracts, medieval theories are based upon a
regimentation of already regimented natural languages, such as scholastic
Latin.
Despite the wealth of discussions and logical innovations found in Arabic
logic, the tutorials are essentially dedicated to Latin logicians. They use only
English translations and terminology. They will explain and contextualize
every reference to authors and texts. Everybody interested in the history
of logic is welcome. A drastic selection of topics has been made in a rich
history which extends over ten centuries. After a general presentation of
medieval Latin logic in context (Session I), I will present only two aspects:
theories of consequences (Session II), and theories of reference and truth
(Session III).
*
Laboratoire d’Études sur les Monothéismes

Paris Sciences & Lettres
33
I. General Presentation of Medieval Logic in Context

Medieval Latin logic can be roughly divided in five periods. They often
correspond to a “Renaissance”, that is to a “re-discovery” of ancient texts
not yet “available” (translated, circulated, taught, etc.). The High Middle
Ages see the domination of a Roman logic (and grammar); the twelfth cen-
tury witnesses a full Renaissance of logical inquiries based on Aristotle and
Boethius (c. 6th AD) and focussed on “topical inferences”; the thirteenth
century can be labelled a “Golden Age” of Aristotelian logic, with a strong
focus on the recently rediscovered Prior and the Posterior Analytics; the
fourteenth century is extremely innovative and introduces the notion of a
general theory of inference; the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries are a
transitional period when the original text of Aristotle’s Organon is rediscov-
ered, and scholastic logic reaches a (too?) high level of sophistication and
formalization. It is challenged as “barbarous” and fruitless by Renaissance
authors, and tentatively replaced by Renaissance logics.
Seven features must be kept in mind when discovering the niceties of
medieval logic, many of them closely connected: the exegetical dimension
of medieval logic — a feature shared with medieval thought as a whole; the
wide range of fields included in what was called “logic” by then (epistemol-
ogy, philosophy of language, semantics, philosophy of science, etc.) and the
strong connection to sister disciplines (rhetoric, grammar, metaphysics); the
non-formality of medieval logic, even in its “formal” aspects; the philosoph-
ical and scientific orientation of logic as both an instrument for knowledge
and a part of philosophy; the non-distinction between logic and philosophy
of logic; the disputational approach to logic as a theory and a practice (the
latter is also true of medieval university in general); last but not least, the
major social and pedagogical role played by logic, before the rise of math-
ematics as a new standard in educational systems and sciences. This last
aspect probably explains the existence of a fairly stable logical culture in
the Middle Ages and pre-modern period.
II. Theories of Consequences

This tutorial studies some aspects of the transformation of the discus-
sions about inferences (or “consequences”), deductions, syllogisms, argu-
ments and proofs, from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. All the logicians
of the Middle Ages shared an inclusive approach to logic where the study
of formal reasoning is only a (small) portion of logic, even within this part
of the logical teaching dedicated to the theory of inferences. Each period
developed original approaches, which were based not only on a distinctive
34
Tutorials
notion of what should be the basis of a successful inference, with a focus on

the problem of relevance, but also on a specific conception of the relation-
ship between inferences, deductions, syllogisms and proofs. In the twelfth
century, the notion of “topical inference” means that all inferences, even for-
mal ones, are based upon the topics and general rules derived from them,
as described by Boethius (c. 6th AD), a conception that survived long in
the thirteenth century, despite Abelard’s (c. 12th AD) fierce defence of the
idea of a purely formal inference, i.e. based only on its form regardless of
any content. In the thirteenth century, a “hylomorphic” conception of the
syllogism as the subject matter of the Prior Analytics means that syllogistic
studies as much the matter as the form of the syllogism. In the fourteenth
century, great logicians such as Walter Burleigh, William of Ockham, and
John Buridan developed general theories of consequences and were very
much divided about what can count as a definition of formal consequences.
Not before the fourteenth century (with the notable exception of William of
Ockham) was the syllogism considered a formal inference only, rather than
an argument or a proof based upon a formal inference studied regardless of
its (particular) contents, a conception recovered at the end of the fifteenth
century with the Renaissance rediscovery of Aristotle’s Organon .
III. Semantic: Reference and Truth

From the twelfth century on, two important topics were discussed in
medieval logic: the notion of reference, often contextually understood, and
a vigorous debate about the truth-bearers, the propositions and their signi-
fication as distinct from that of the terms, as well as the truth-factors, facts
and states of affairs. This last aspect underwent original reformulations in
the thirteenth century, when the idea that (necessary) universal proposi-
tions had existential import was condemned, and in the fourteenth century,
especially with Walter Burleigh, who promoted an “extreme realism” and
the idea of “propositions in reality”. The medieval theory of reference of
terms, called “supposition”, has known two canonical formulation in two
distinctive periods, in the thirteenth century “terminist logic” and the fa-
mous Tractatus by Peter of Spain, with a strong realistic flavour, and in the
fourteenth century in the new, nominalist, terminist logic, where a univer-
sal term do not have a referent distinct from the referent of each singular
terms to which it corresponds, and where universal propositions do have
existential import, though not necessarily for presently existing individuals.
The various ways in which the propositions “every man is an animal” and
“every man is white” are analysed will be taken as an example of the various
approaches to reference, signification and truth in the period.
35
Bibliography
1. Boethius, De Differentiis Topicis, translation by E. Stump, Ithaca, Lon-
don, 1978.
2. John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, translation by G. Klima, New
Haven, London, 2001.
3. John Buridan, Treatise on Consequences, translation by S. Read, Ford-
ham University Press, 2014.
4. C. Duthil Novaes & S. Read (editors), The Cambridge Companion to
Medieval Logic, edited by C. Duthil-Novaes & S. Read, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2016.
5. S. Ebbesen, Greek-Latin Philosophical Interaction, Routledge, 2008.
6. N.J. Green-Pedersen, The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages,
Philosophia, Munich and Vienna, 1984.
7. R. Kilwardby, Notule Libri Priorum, text and translation by P. Thom
& J. Scott, Oxford University Press, 2015.
8. G. Klima, John Buridan, Oxford University Press, 2009.
9. William of Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa
Logicae, translation by M.J. Loux, University of Notre Dame Press,
1974.
10. P.V. Spade (editor and translator), Five Texts on the Mediaeval Prob-
lem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham,
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1994.
Useful Links
Peter Abelard (SEP* )
Peter Abelard (IEP )
Buridan (SEP)
Ockham (SEP)
Ockham (IEP)
Consequence — Medieval (SEP)
Insolubles (SEP)
Medieval Terms (SEP)
Medieval Logic and Philosophy
Medieval Logic — Special Issue of Logica Universalis
*
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
36
Tutorials
Lindenbaum Method
Alex Citkin
Metropolitan Telecommunications, USA
[email protected]
Alexei Muravitsky
Louisiana Scholars’ College,
Northwestern State University, USA
[email protected]
During his brief life, the Polish mathematician and logician Adolf Lin-
denbaum (*1904–1941) contributed to mathematical logic, among other
things, by several significant achievements. Some results of Lindenbaum’s,
which bear his name, were published without proofs by other people from
the Lvov-Warsaw School and the proofs later were provided by some oth-
ers, though the authorship of Lindenbaum has never been challenged. Many
may have heard about Lindenbaum’s lemma, asserting the existence of Lin-
denbaum’s extension, and Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra; less known is Lin-
denbaum’s logical matrix. This tutorial is devoted to the two last concepts
rather than the first one. However, the latter can be understood in a purely
algebraic fashion, if one employs the notion of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.
In general, the notions of Lindenbaum matrix and Lindenbaum–Tarski al-
gebra have paved a way to further algebraization of logic, which had been
begun by George Boole in the 19th century, as well as to a new branch of
logic, model theory. For this reason, the present tutorial is also a gentle
introduction to algebraic logic.
A uniting idea of the aforementioned concepts is a special view on the for-
mal judgments of a formal language. It is this view we call the Lindenbaum
method. Although Lindenbaum expressed merely a starting viewpoint in
the tradition of Polish logic of the time, this viewpoint became a standard
ever since and its development goes on until this day, continuing to shape
the field of algebraic logic. Our main objective is to demonstrate how this
view gave rise to formulating the aforementioned concepts and how it opens
door to unexplored paths.
I. Lindenbaum’s logical matrix

The idea to interpret symbolic judgments in mathematical structures
goes back to George Boole. It was Lindenbaum who took for an interpreta-
tion of judgments the judgments themselves. But prior to this, he started
37
treating the entire class of judgments as an abstract algebra, nowadays

known as a formula algebra. Some experts call this Lindenbaum’s move a
milestone in the history of algebraic logic and universal algebra.
The turning point distinguishing the Boole-De Morgan-Schröder tradi-
tion in algebraic logic from modern tradition is the algebraization of formal
deduction. The first step in this direction is the introduction of the notion
of deductive system and that of consequence relation. There are a few stan-
dard ways to define a deductive system; in this part, we focus on two of them
— rules of inference and logical matrix. On the one hand, the Lindenbaum
logical matrix is just a special case, on the other, it characterizes all formal
theorems (or theses) of any deductive system (Lindenbaum theorem).
II. Characterization of deductive systems

Powerful enough to characterize any class of theses, the notion of Lin-
denbaum matrix does not suffice to determine any deductive system. This
part will address the question of characterization of deductive systems. Two
Wójcicki’s theorems will be discussed. The first deals with the notion of a
bundle of logical matrix; in terms of the latter any deductive system can be
determined. The second theorem finds conditions under which a deductive
system can be characterized by a single logical matrix.
The theorems of Lindenbaum’s and Wójcicki’s were merely first steps
towards algebraization of deduction based on sentential formal language.
Next came analysis of matrices and algebras which “separate” premises
from not derived from them sentences in deductive systems, thereby intro-
ducing the conception of separating means. This in turn has led to the
notion of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. The latter often is obtained by a
transformation of a Lindenbaum matrix with the use of a special congru-
ence. In unital deductive systems the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of such a
system is adequate for the set of its theses.
III. Effectiveness issues

The idea of effectiveness (in a broad sense of the word) and its impor-
tance had gradually established itself by the middle of the 20th century,
when the notion of cardinal number and that of effective method, that is
computability, were fully realized. The problems like the following were
raised and solved: whether a deductive system formulated in a countable
language can always have a finite logical matrix adequate for its theorems
(J.C.C. McKinsey and A. Tarski); whether it is effectively decidable that
any two finite logical matrices or any two finite bundles have the same set of
38
Tutorials
theorems (J. Kalicki for matrices, A. Citkin for bundles); whether any de-
ductive system formulated in a countable formal language can be determined
by a single denumerable matrix (A. Wrónski). Some of these problems and
related to them, as well as the finite model property of a system, will be
discussed in this part.
Bibliography
1. A. Citkin, “On an effective problem concerning mutual adequacy of
two finite truth-tables” (in Russian), in Proceedings of the Fourth Con-
ference on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Liberation of
Carpathians, Užgorod, USSR, 1975.
2. A. Citkin & A. Muravitsky, “Lindenbaum method (propositional lan-
guage)”, arXiv:1609.07379, Cornell University Library, 2016.
3. J. Czelakowski, Model-Theoretic Methods in Methodology of Proposi-
tional Calculi, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, The Polish
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1980.
4. J.-M. Font, Abstract Algebraic Logic, College Publications, London,
2016.
5. J. Kalicki, “A test for the equality of truth-tables”, The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, vol. 17(3), 1952, pp. 161–163.
6. J. Lo’s & R. Suszko, “Remarks on sentential logics”, Koninklijke Ne-
derlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Proceedings, Ser. A, vol. 61,
1958, pp. 177–183, also in Indagationes mathematicae, vol. 20, 1958,
pp. 177–183.
7. J.C.C. McKinsey & A. Tarski, “Some theorems about the sentential cal-
culi of Lewis and Heyting”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 13(1),
1948, pp. 1–15.
8. A. Muravitsky, “Beyond Rasiowan Systems: Unital Deductive Sys-
tems”, Logica Universalis, vol. 8(1), 2014, pp. 83–102.
9. W. Pogorzelski & P. Wojtylak, Completeness Theory for Propositional
Logics, Birkhäuser, 2000.
10. H. Rasiowa, An Algebraic Approach to Non-Classical Logics, North-
Holland, 1974.
11. A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Papers from 1923 to
1938, translated by J.H. Woodger, Clarendon Press, 1956.
12. R. Wójcicki, Theory of Logical Calculi: Basic Theory of Consequence
Operations, Springer, 1988.
13. A. Wrónski, “On cardinalities of matrices strongly adequate for the intu-
itionistic propositional logic”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic, vol. 3(1),
1974, pp. 67–72.
39
Useful Links
Encyclopedia of Mathematics
— Lindenbaum method (propositional language)
— Abstract algebraic logic
— Decision problem
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
— Lindenbaum
— Logical consequence
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
— Algebraic propositional logic
— Lvov-Warsaw school
— Logical consequence
— Truth values
40
Tutorials
Weak arithmetics and applications

Henri-Alex Esbelin
LIMOS* , Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
[email protected]
Proving the existence of some meta-mathematical object (e.g. a method

for solving polynomial equations of degree 3 or 4) does not need a math-
ematical definition of that object: a general agreement about the correct-
ness of each answer is achievable. Proving the inexistence of some meta-
mathematical object (e.g., a method for solving polynomial equations of
degree 5 or more) needs a mathematical definition. Among the inexistence
problems inducing the main concepts of logic, let us start with the following
two.
Problem 1 (Hilbert’s tenth problem). Prove that there is no universal

method correctly asserting wether any given diophantine equation has (at
least) a solution or has no.
Problem 2. Prove that there is some arithmetical statement that cannot

be proved or disproved.
These problems have no sense without a precise definition of an algo-

rithm and of a proof. Together with the concept of algorithm formalizing
the notion of method, it is possible to define a concept of complexity, also
to define a formal proof and a strength scale for theories. Weak arithmetics
study these statements needing a few axioms or weak rules of reasoning for
proving them. Surprisingly, numerous links with the complexity of algo-
rithms appear.
This tutorial is intended to provide an introduction to the topic, its problems

and its methods. It will avoid both technical difficulties and ambiguity. It will
be divided in the following three sessions.
I. Decidable fragments of arithmetic

Peano arithmetic admits various equivalent families of axioms formaliz-
ing the properties of the successor function (and of addition and multipli-
cation) together with a family of Induction Axioms formalizing the usual
mathematical induction. It is not possible to algorithmically determine, for
*
41
any sentence in its language, whether that sentence is provable from its ax-
ioms: the theory is undecidable. Presburger arithmetic is the well known
first-order theory of the natural numbers with addition and equality. The
axioms include the schema of induction. It is much weaker than Peano
arithmetic and has been proved to be decidable. However the algorithms
for decision require more than exponential run time. Stronger fragments
than Presburger arithmetic have been proved to be decidable, e.g. the ex-
istential theory of addition and divisibility. Decidable fragments of Peano
arithmetic are more and more involved in automatic reasoning.
II. Definability
Let us consider a set on words on a finite alphabet with k letters denoting
as digits {0, 1, 2, ..., k − 1}. There is a natural correspondence between such
words and natural numbers using base k representation. Let us now consider
the set of words recognizable by a finite automaton. It turns out that
the correspondent set of integers is definable by a formula of the language
(+, Vk ), where z = Vk (x) is the relation “z is the greatest power of k dividing
x”. The converse is true. This correspondence provides insight in the area
of complexity: a relation which is definable both in (+, Vk ) and (+, Vk′ ) for
m
which there is no n and m such that k n = k ′ is definable in Presburger
arithmetic.
Other correspondence are sources of problem or of solutions! The unary
relation “x is not prime nor 0 nor 1” is definable using the formula
∃u < x ∃v < x (x = u × v). More generally, the ∆0 -definability is essen-
tially definability with a formula in the language of arithmetic where the
quantified variables are bounded by terms. Most of the natural notions
have been proved to be ∆0 -definable, and classical diagonalization meth-
ods provide ad hoc non ∆0 -definable ones. A major open problem is to
find a “natural” arithmetical relation which is NOT ∆0 -definable. The
relation z = Card{i ≤ y ∣ i is a prime number} is not known to be ∆0 -
definable and is a candidate. An answer could provide the strict inclusion
LOGSPACE ⊊ LINSPACE.
III. Provability
Let E be a subset of Nn , for which there exists an algorithm that will
ultimately halt when a member of the set is provided as input, but may
continue indefinitely when the input is a non-member. There is a ∆0 -formula
ϕ such that E is defined by (∃y ∈ Nm ) (ϕ(x, y) = 0). This very last formula
is called a Σ1 −formula. The fundamental step of the answer to problem 1
42
Tutorials
is the following theorem of Y. Matiyasevich, J. Robinson, M. Davis and H.

Putnam:
Theorem 1. For all Σ1 −formula ψ, there are two polynomials P and Q
with natural coefficients such that for all a in Nn , ψ(a) is true if and only
if there exists b in Nm such that P (a, b) = Q(a, b).
Let us consider the following question: “What axioms are really useful in
the proof of this theorem?”. We say that a set of axioms T proves the MRDP-
theorem for the following mathematical statement: For all Σ1 −formula ψ,
there are two polynomials P and Q with natural coefficients such that
T ∀x (ψ(x) ↔ (∃y ∈ Nn ) (P (x, y) = Q(x, y))).
Let I∆0 be the fragment of Peano arithmetic where the induction axioms
schema is reduced to ∆0 -formulas.
Theorem 2. If I∆0 proves MRDP, then NP = co-NP.
A much stronger theory is obtained if we add an axiom, denoted by
EXP, which guarantees the totality of the exponential function:
∀x ∀y ∃z (z = xy ).
Most of the usual arithmetic is provable in the theory I∆0 + EXP:
Theorem 3. I∆0 + EXP proves MRDP.
But EXP is not a theorem in I∆0 . A weaker axiom than EXP is the
following axiom Ω1 : ∀x ∀y ∃z (z = x⌊log2 (y)⌋ )
Theorem 4. If I∆0 + Ω1 proves the MRDP-theorem, then NP = co-NP.
We are very far from proving the premise of this theorem, but more and
more parts of the natural arithmetic turn out to be formally proved to be
in I∆0 + Ω1 . For example:
Theorem 5. I∆0 + Ω1 proves the infinity of the prime numbers.
Bibliography
1. H.-A. Esbelin & M. More, “Rudimentary relations and primitive recur-
sion: A toolbox”, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 193(1–2), 1998,
pp. 129–148.
2. Yu.V. Matiyasevich, Hilbert’s Tenth Problem, MIT Press, 1993.
Useful link
The web site of the regular conference Journées sur les Arithmétiques Faibles
(in French): http://lacl.u-pec.fr/jaf.
43
Dialectics. An Introduction
Elena Ficara
[email protected]
The philosophical historiography concerning dialectics is immense and

complex. As Hintikka [14, p. 109] writes “dialectic has the tendency to mul-
tiply itself beyond necessity”. In this context, my method is to focus on the
definitions of the term in texts from Plato to contemporary philosophy, and
on one idea that permeates the whole history of dialectics, and is defended
by authors as different as Aristotle, Hegel, Adorno, Rescher. It is the view
that dialectics is a kind of philosophical logic, more specifically the logic of
philosophy.
The first part of the tutorial is devoted to ancient dialectics, in particular

to the conception of dialectics in Plato’s Parmenides and Aristotle’s Topics.
The second examines the meaning of dialectics in Hegel’s philosophy and in
two stages of its reception (in Croce and Adorno). The third is on dialectics
and contemporary philosophical logic and focuses, more specifically, on the
nexus dialectics-dialetheism.
I. Dialectics in Plato and Aristotle

On the first day we will first analyse the difference between Zeno’s
method of reductio ad absurdum and Plato’s dialectical method [see 11,15,
5,18]. Second we will consider the relation between Plato’s dialectics in the
Parmenides and Aristotle’s Topics. In Aristotle’s Topics Plato’s dialectic
is systematized and methodically articulated as logic of our thinking about
éndoxa (the éndoxa are theses concerning controversial questions of univer-
sal interest such as: is justice the advantage of the stronger?). I will stress
the fundamental continuity between Plato and Aristotle, and the genuinely
dialectical nature of Aristotle’s philosophy. In so doing, I share the interpre-
tation of those philosophers (in particular Berti [5]) who see the continuity
between Plato and Aristotle in the idea of dialectics as the logic of philoso-
phy.
II. Hegel’s dialectics

On the second day we will first discuss the passage of the Logic in the
Encyclopaedia (at the end of the “Preliminary Considerations”) in which
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Tutorials
Hegel presents the three moments/sides of every conceptual thought (Hegel

calls conceptual thought also true thought and das Logische). The passage
is fundamental for two reasons: it contains Hegel’s own definition of the
formal structure of every dialectical and speculative inference, and presents
the idea that this dialectical structure corresponds to the behaviour and
method of every true thought. Then we will see what two 20th century
thinkers — Benedetto Croce and Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno — write
about the meaning of Hegel’s dialectic. Their concern is on two aspects: the
meaning of Hegel’s dialectic as logic of philosophy, and the role of negation
in dialectical inferences.
III. Dialectics and contemporary philosophical logic

The third lesson is focused on the relation between dialectics and para-
consistent logics, more specifically dialetheism, the theory according to
which there are true contradictions. Apostel [3] recalls that paraconsistent
logics, which were impressively growing in the 70ies, and were developed
by da Costa school in Brazil, by Jaśkowski in Poland and by Routley in
Australia, present the necessary condition and the formal basis of dialec-
tics. However, he also claims that they cannot be said to be dialectical
logics in the Hegelian sense, and, more importantly, that they need dialec-
tical logic. They allow us to see how to logically deal with contradictions
without explosion, but they do not let us see why and how we can affirm a
contradiction. Hence Apostel [3, p. 459] formulates the following task for a
dialectical foundation of paraconsistentism: “in dialectical logic we have to
show which contradictions are admissible and which ones are not”. We will
ask in what sense the Hegelian theory of dialectical contradictions can fulfil
the task envisaged by Apostel.
Bibliography
1. T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1966.
2. T.W. Adorno, Einführung in die Dialektik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 2010.
3. L. Apostel, “Logica e dialettica in Hegel”, in La formalizzazione della
dialettica, edited by D. Marconi, Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin, 1979,
pp. 85–113.
4. J. Barnes (editor), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1984.
5. E. Berti, Contraddizione e dialettica negli antichi e nei moderni, Mor-
celliana, Brescia, Italy, 1987.
6. F. Berto, Che cosa é la dialettica Hegeliana? Un’interpretazione anali-
tica del metodo, Il Poligrafo, Padua, Italy, 2005.
45
7. B. Croce, Saggio sullo Hegel. Seguito da altri scritti di storia della

filosofia, edited by A. Savorelli and C. Cesa, Bibliopolis, Naples, 2006.
8. F. D’Agostini, “Hegel’s Interpretation of Megarian Paradoxes. Between
Logic and Metaphilosophy”, in Die Begründung der Philosophie im
Deutschen Idealismus, edited by E. Ficara, Königshausen & Neumann,
Würzburg, Germany, 2011, pp. 121–140.
9. E. Ficara, “Dialectic and Dialetheism”, in History and Philosophy of
Logic, vol. 34, 2013, pp. 35–52.
10. E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (editors), Plato: The Collected Dialogues,
Princeton University Press, 1961.
11. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, English transla-
tion by E.S. Haldane & F.H. Simson, Kegan Paul, London, 1896.
12. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, English translation by A.V. Miller,
Humanity Books, New York, 1969.
13. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic. Part I of the Encyclopaedia
of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, English translation by T.F.
Geraets, W.A. Suchting & H.S. Harris, Hackett, Indianapolis, USA,
1991.
14. J. Hintikka, “On Common Factors of Dialectics”, in Konzepte der Dia-
lektik, edited by W. Becker & W.K. Essler, Klostermann, Frankfurt,
1981, pp. 109–110.
15. W. Kneale & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press,
2008, first edition in 1962.
16. D. Marconi (editor), La formalizzazione della dialettica. Hegel, Marx e
la logica contemporanea, Rosenberg & Sellier, Turin, 1979.
17. G. Priest, “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Science and Society, vol. 53(4),
pp. 388–415, 1989.
18. G. Priest & R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Department of Philoso-
phy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University,
1984.
19. R. Rescher, Dialectics, Ontos, Heusenstamm, Germany, 2008.
46
Tutorials
Stoic Logic: the dialectic of the Gods

Jean-Baptiste Gourinat
Centre Leon Robin, Paris-Sorbonne University, France
[email protected]
Stoic logic was the main alternative to Aristotelian logic in Antiquity.

Developed less than a century after Aristotle’s death by Chrysippus, the
third head of the Stoic school, it was considered the most impressive logical
system of the ancient world, up to the point that the Ancient Greeks said:
“if the Gods had a dialectic, it would be Chrysippus’ dialectic”. Chrysippus
wrote 108 books of logic in 311 volumes, almost half of his writings, and by
far the most considerable corpus ever written by a logician, including his
major work, the Logical Investigations, in 39 volumes. Unfortunately, as
the rest of the works of the first generations of the Stoic school, it is almost
completely lost: only ten pages of the Logical Investigations remain, badly
preserved in a papyrus in a poor state of conservation. For the rest, we have
to rely on short quotations, handbook accounts and hostile criticisms. As a
consequence, despite its considerable influence in Ancient and (indirectly)
in Medieval times, Stoic logic remained largely ignored or misunderstood for
centuries, until its progressive rediscovery by scholars between the end of
the ninetenth century and the second half of the twentieth century. In the
1930s, the pioneering work of Lukasiewicz defined Stoic logic, in contrast to
Aristotle’s logic, as the ancient form of propositional logic. Lukasiewicz’s
work impulsed two decades later a new trend of work on Stoic logic, which
expanded with the development of the study of Hellenistic philosophies in
the 1970s. Lukasiewicz’s interpretation has been improved and refined,
by developing aspects of Stoic logic not touched by Lukasiewicz, such as
Stoic semantics, the theory of the ’sayable’ and the proposition, the modal-
ities, and the analysis of complex syllogisms. It is probably too simple to
present Stoic logic as a propositional logic, even if its basic rules are propo-
sitional inference rules. And it remained unnoticed by Lukasiewicz that
Stoic logic anticipated three important features of modern symbolic logic:
(1) the Fregean theory of signification (Bedeutung), since Frege was prob-
ably introduced in Jena to Stoic semantics by his colleague Rudolf Hirzel
who was Frege’s tenant for many years; (2) the logical asymmetry between
function and argument expressed by the predicate/case distinction; (3) the
analysis of universal propositions as conditionals (which allowed the Stoics
to introduce a procedure rival to Aristotle’s quantifiers). However, what
one must not forget when studying Stoic logic is that the Stoics conceived it
47
as dialectic, and attached the greatest importance to the dialogical context

of its procedure and to its relationship to the other parts of philosophy,
ethics and physics. As a consequence, Stoic logic or dialectic was a science,
a part of philosophy (as opposed to the ’instrument’ or organon that defined
Aristotle’s syllogistic) and even a virtue. All these features make a quite
distinctive form of logic.
The aim of this tutorial is to present Stoic logic. Stoic logic is probably
the most important step in the history of logic between Aristotle and Frege.
Not only does it have an historical importance but it is also still worth read-
ing and studying for its fascinating insights, even if the fragmentary state
of the evidence does not allow to know all the refined details of their theory.
The tutorial will present the main sources and their alternative interpreta-
tions to give an idea as accurate as possible of the nature of Stoic logic.
Everybody interested in logic and ancient philosophy is welcome to join.
There is no specific prerequisites. The tutorial will be divided in the follow-
ing three sessions.
I. Stoic semantics
This part will be devoted to an overview of Stoic semantics: the Stoics
distinguished between the vocal sound, for instance ‘Dion’, the real object
of the world bearing the name, for instance the man called Dion, and an
intermediate incorporeal entity, which they called the ‘sayable’ (lekton) and
which they described as the signification of the vocal sound. An alternative
presentation distinguish between what is signified by a common or proper
name (‘man’, ‘horse’, ‘Dion’, ‘Socrates’), namely a quality (and not a sub-
stance as in Aristotle) and what is signified by a verb (‘walks’, ‘talks’),
namely, according to the Stoics, a predicate or ‘what happens’ to someone.
We will examine the logical and philosophical implications of these alterna-
tive presentations of Stoic semantic theory and the status of the ‘sayable’.
II. ‘Sayables’ and propositions

This part will be dedicated to the exposition of the Stoic theory of the
different sayables, namely the propositions and the non-propositional items
such as predicates, questions, orders, prayers. We will also examine the Stoic
typology of propositions, the distinction of simple propositions and the non-
simples (i.e. molecular) propositions, in particular the truth-conditions for
the conditional (including the equivalent of a debate on strict implication).
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Tutorials
III. Syllogistic (inference rules) and analysis

In this last part, we will discuss the two important aspects of Stoic syl-
logistic: (1) the inference rules known as the Stoic ‘five indemonstrables’,
including the Modus ponens and the Modus tollens; (2) the rules of analy-
sis of complex syllogisms. We will also explain how the Stoic understood
the notion of a ‘demonstration’ as a stronger requirement for an argument
than logical validity due to the epistemological nature of the propositions
involved and how they translated universal and non-universal propositions
by using simple propositions and conditionals. As a conclusion, the tutorial
will indicate the place of Stoic logic within Stoic philosophy and within the
history of logic.
Bibliography
1. H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, volume 2 of Chrysippi
fragmenta logica et physica, Teubner, Leipzig, 1905.
2. M. Frede, Die stoische Logik, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen,
Germany, 1974.
3. G. Gabriel, K. Huelser & S. Schlotter, “Zur Miete bei Frege: Rudolf
Hirzel und die Rezeption der stoischen Logik und Semantik in Jena”,
History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 30(4), 2009, pp. 369–388.
4. J.-B. Gourinat, La dialectique des stoiciens, Vrin, Paris, 2000.
5. K. Huelser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 volumes,
Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart, Germany, 1987.
6. A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambrige Uni-
7. Jan Lukasiewicz, “Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik”, Erkenntnis,
vol. 5(1), 1935, pp. 111–131.
8. B. Mates, Stoic Logic, California University Press, 1953.
49
The inconsistency theory of truth and nominalistic

mathematics
Casper Storm Hansen
The Polonsky Academy for Advanced Study in the Humanities
and Social Sciences,
The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel
casper storm [email protected]
This tutorial will bring together two subjects that are not normally dis-
cussed together, namely the inconsistency theory of truth and nominalistic
philosophies of mathematics.
Session 1
According to the inconsistency theory of truth, our conflicting intuitions
when it comes to determining the truth value(s) of the Liar Sentence and its
siblings are due to the fact that the linguistic rules for the truth predicate
are inconsistent. This was first argued by Chihara [2] and later by Eklund
[5] and Scharp [10]. I will explain this solution to the semantic paradoxes
and provide what I believe to be the best defence of it. Doing so involves
bringing in Lewis’ [8] theory of language conventions and Nagel’s [9] idea of
a view from nowhere.
Session 2
One conclusion from session 1 will be that we, as a language community,
have a high degree of freedom to decide by convention on what logic to use,
roughly in the sense of Carnap [1]. This puts the many formal theories of
truth that have been proposed in a new light: they can be evaluated on the
basis of how useful they would be as potential conventions, rather than on
the basis of whether they are correct. From this perspective, we will take
a closer look at Kripke’s theory of truth [7] and van Fraasen’s concept of
supervaluation [11]. Then we will tinker a little with the possible convention
they in effect describe until we get something that is useful for mathematics.
Session 3
The idea of a nominalistic mathematics is to give a philosophical account
of what mathematics is that does not inflate our ontology with ad-hoc ab-
stract objects. Chihara [3,4] proposed that we can do so by constructing
50
Tutorials
mathematics on possible open-sentences. Field [6] approached the same goal

by using the system of all spatial regions of the universe as his foundation. I
will argue that they both fail. Chihara assumes that there are uncountably
many open-sentences, which is to stretch the concept of language beyond the
nominalistic and into the abstract. And the spatial regions of the universe
must either be understood as abstract collections (of concrete entities) or as
collections determined by language, which means that Field’s foundation is
either not nominalistic or not sufficient for his purpose. However, using the
lesson from session 2, we can do better: by relying on a non-classical logic
convention, we can make the ontology to which we are limited as nominalists
suffice for a scientifically adequate mathematics.
Prerequisites
I will assume a basic acquaintance with the Liar Paradox and philosophy
of mathematics. Session 3 in addition presupposes knowledge of Cantor’s
theorem about the cardinality of the set of the real numbers and of mathe-
matical analysis up to and including the Fundamental Theorem of Analysis.
Bibliography
1. R. Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache, Springer, 1934.
2. C. Chihara, “The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation”,
Philosophical Review, vol. 88(4), 1979, pp. 590–618.
3. C. Chihara, Constructibility and Mathematical Existence, Oxford Uni-
4. C. Chihara, A Structural Account of Mathematics, Oxford University
Press, 2004.
5. M. Eklund, “Inconsistent languages”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, vol. 64(2), 2002, pp. 251–275.
6. H. Field, Science Without Numbers, Princeton University Press, 1980.
7. S. Kripke, “Outline of a theory of truth”, The Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 72(19), 1975, pp. 690–716.
8. D. Lewis, Conventions, Harvard University Press, 1969.
9. T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press, 1986.
10. K. Scharp, Replacing Truth, Oxford University Press, 2013.
11. B. van Fraassen, “Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic”, The
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63(17), 1966, 481–495.
51
Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction

Jean-Louis Hudry
Independent Scholar, France
[email protected]
In Metaphysics Gamma, Aristotle understands the principle of non-

contradiction (PNC) as the most certain principle of all such that it is
impossible to be mistaken about it. Yet, Aristotle is also concerned with
the fact that some people may reject this principle. In that respect, he
constructs arguments aiming to defend PNC as a true opinion. There is
then a difficult contrast to explain: on the one hand, PNC is a necessary
principle of the highest importance; on the other, it is merely justified as a
true opinion against those who challenge it. So the essential question is as
follows: if PNC is postulated as the most certain principle of all, why does
Aristotle feel the need to speak of it as a mere opinion?
Many have been puzzled by this contrast. Lukasiewicz [8] concludes

about Aristotle: “he may himself have felt the weakness of his arguments;
and that may have led him to present his Law as an ultimate axiom — an
unassailable dogma” [8, p. 62, original emphases]. Others have used Aristo-
tle’s weak and problematic arguments as a way to illustrate the failure of
PNC [9].
These reactions show that Aristotle’s defence of PNC is, at worst, not
understood or, at best, not taken seriously. The aim of this tutorial will
be to answer this concern by accounting for Aristotle’s method. We shall
explain why PNC is defendable only as a true opinion, even though it is said
to be the most certain principle of all, and we shall conclude that Aristotle’s
weak defence of PNC is perfectly compatible with the postulate of PNC as
a strong axiom.
Everybody is welcome to join, and there are no specific prerequisites.

The tutorial will be divided into three sessions.
I. Aristotle’s PNC and Lukasiewicz’s formulations

A first session will focus on Aristotle’s definition of PNC, as it is exclu-
sively based on predicates and requires two conditions, namely simultaneity
and similarity. PNC is also to be distinguished from two derived principles,
namely the excluded middle and bivalence. Finally, contradiction is more
52
Tutorials
than mere contrariness, in so far as two contraries are contradictory, if and

only if one is true and the other false. We shall then compare Aristotle’s
PNC with Lukasiewicz’s [8] interpretations of it through an ontological, a
logical, and a psychological formulation. Influenced by Frege’s logical for-
malism, Lukasiewicz then accuses Aristotle of “logicism in psychology”.
II. An Aristotelian contextualization of PNC

In a second session, we shall analyze the context in which Aristotle’s
PNC takes place. Metaphysics Gamma introduces a hierarchy of sciences:
philosophy is the universal science, which includes the particular sciences
of physics and mathematics. Aristotle assesses PNC with respect to phi-
losophy, in so far as PNC is a necessary principle only for those who know
about the general nature of things, and which goes beyond any specific
mathematical or physical nature. It is within this epistemic context that
Aristotle’s PNC has to be understood, meaning that non-philosophers ex-
press an opinion about it, without being knowledgeable about its necessity.
As such, the definition of Aristotle’s PNC is inseparable from the way PNC
is either intrinsically cognized or merely believed.
III. Aristotle on the rejection of PNC

A third session will study why Aristotle explicitly admits the possibility
of rejecting PNC. Indeed, he has to convince all non-philosophers that PNC
should not be regarded as a false opinion. According to him, there are two
ways of challenging PNC. One is for physicists to assume that things are
endlessly changing, making their meanings indefinite and thereby irrelevant
to PNC. Aristotle’s reply is that physical motion cannot be used against the
postulate that things have definite meanings. The other objection is that
any proof of PNC already uses PNC in the premises of the proof. Aristotle
acknowledges this petitio principii, and then concludes to the absence of a
direct proof. Nevertheless, he suggests an indirect refutation to this objec-
tion, aiming to show that it is impossible not to use PNC in language; thus,
even the rejection of PNC will have to rely on the use of PNC.
Bibliography
1. J. Barnes, “The Law of Contradiction”, Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. 19(77), 1969, pp. 302–309.
2. S.M. Cohen, “Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction”, Cana-
dian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 16(3), 1986, pp. 359–370.
53
3. J.-L. Hudry, “Aristotle on Meaning”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philoso-

phie, vol. 93(3), 2011, pp. 253–280.
4. J.-L. Hudry, “Aristotle on Deduction and Inferential Necessity”, Review
of Metaphysics, vol. 67(1), 2013, pp. 29–54.
5. J.-L. Hudry, “Aristotle on Modality and Predicative Necessity”, Inter-
national Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 53(1), 2013, pp. 5–21.
6. J.-L. Hudry, “Aristotle on Non-Contradiction: Philosophers vs. Non-
Philosophers”, Journal of Ancient Philosophy, vol. 7(2), 2013,
pp. 51–74.
7. C. Kirwan, Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon,
Clarendon Press, 1993.
8. J. Lukasiewicz, “Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction”, in Articles on
Aristotle: Metaphysics, edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji,
Duckworth Overlook, UK, 1910/1979.
9. G. Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford University Press, 2006.
10. M. Wedin, “Some Logical Problems in Metaphysics Gamma”, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 19, 2000, pp. 113–162.
11. W. Wians, “The Philosopher’s Knowledge of Non-Contradiction”,
Ancient Philosophy, vol. 26(2), 2006, pp. 333–353.
Useful Links
Aristotle on Non-Contradiction (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Wikipedia)
Library of Ancient Texts Online (Google)
54
Tutorials
Definite Descriptions in the Proof-Theoretic

Setting
Andrzej Indrzejczak
Department of Logic, University of Lódź, Poland
[email protected]
Definite descriptions are ubiquitous in natural languages. Phrases like

“the capital of France” or “the youngest sister of Jack” usually do not lead
to any problems in communication. However, we can easily run into troubles
when we try to provide a satisfactory logical analysis of their behavior. In
fact, proper definite descriptions having a unique designatum, are rather not
problematic, in contrast to those which fail to designate, called improper
(or unfulfilled) definite descriptions. The famous Russellian “the present
King of France”, is of this kind but even innocent-looking “the son of Jack”
may be problematic in case Jack has no son, or more than one.
History of logical and philosophical investigations devoted to the ex-

planation of definite descriptions is fascinating and illuminating. Famous
logicians like Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Bernays, Carnap, Quine, Rosser and
Hintikka — to mention only a few scholars from the earliest stage of inves-
tigation — were strongly engaged in this enterprise. We can find numerous
brilliant analyses and even complete formal theories of this apparently sim-
ple linguistic phenomenon. Yet, despite the efforts, it can be hardly agreed
that a fully satisfactory and commonly accepted theory was provided.
On the other hand, a proof-theoretic apparatus was not yet applied in

this field and we would like to explore this possibility. In particular, we
will show that the application of techniques taken from modern structural
proof theory may shed a new light on the good and bad sides of different
approaches to definite descriptions. No prerequisites are assumed. The
tutorial will be structured in the following way:
I. Survey of the most important and interesting theories of

definite descriptions
In the context of classical logic we will focus on the well known reduc-
tionist approach of Russell and the chosen object theory of Frege and its
formalization provided by Kalish and Montague. Then we describe some
of the theories developed in the framework of free logic by Lambert, Scott,
55
van Fraasen and others. We finish the presentation with three different
theories developed on the ground of modal logic by Thomason and Garson,
Goldblatt, Fitting and Mendelsohn.
II. Presentation of some elements of proof theory required for

further study
We introduce a suitable version of generic sequent calculus, discuss some
of its properties, the problem of cut elimination and extension by extra rules.
Finally we provide a sequent calculus equivalent to Kalish and Montague
version of Fregean theory and prove cut elimination theorem for it.
III. Sequent calculus for modal system based on free logic

which is equivalent to Thomason and Garson’s theory
We prove cut elimination theorem for this system and discuss some pos-
sible extensions of it taken from free logic hierarchy. We provide also a
system for Goldblatt’s theory and explain why cut rule is not eliminable for
it. Finally we consider an open problem of providing a sequent calculus for
Fitting and Mendelsohn’s theory.
Bibliography
1. R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity , University of Chicago Press, 1947.
2. M. Fitting & R.L. Mendelsohn, First-Order Modal Logic, Kluwer, 1998.
3. J.M. Garson, Modal Logic for Philosophers, Cambridge University Press,
2006.
4. R. Goldblatt, Quantifiers, Propositions and Identity, Cambridge Uni-
5. D. Kalish & R. Montague, “Remarks on Descriptions and Natural De-
duction”, Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung,
vol. 3, 1957, pp. 50–73.
6. K. Lambert, “Free Logic and Definite Descriptions”, in New Essays
in Free Logic — In Honour of Karel Lambert, edited by E. Morscher
& A. Hieke, Springer, 2001, pp. 37–47.
7. S. Negri & J. von Plato, Structural Proof Theory, Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
8. F.J. Pelletier & B. Linsky, “What is Frege Theory of Descriptions?”, in
On Denoting: 1905-2005, edited by B. Linsky & G. Imaguire, Philoso-
phia Verlag, 2005, pp. 195–250.
9. B. Russell, “On Denoting”, Mind, New Series, vol. 14(56), 1905,
pp. 479–493.
56
Tutorials
10. D. Scott, “Existence and Description in Formal Logic”, in Bertrand Rus-

sell: Philosopher of the Century: essays in his honour, edited
by R. Schoenman, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1967, pp. 181–200.
11. R. Thomason, “Some Completeness Results for Modal Predicate Cal-
culi”, in Philosophical Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments,
edited by K. Lambert, D. Reidel, 1970, pp. 56–76.
57
Conceptual Engineering:
A Systematic Unified Framework
Swiss National Science Foundation
Department of Philosophy,
[email protected]
We use concepts all the time to make sense of reality. The quality of
our cognition thereby crucially depends on that of our conceptual schemes
and repertoires, so that: the better our concepts are, the better our cognitive
activities will be. Conceptual engineering is the fast-moving research field
[3,5,6] that means to provide a method to assess, criticize, and improve any
of our concepts working as such cognitive devices [4,5,10,13] [see also 18,20],
that is: to identify conceptual deficiencies, elaborate ameliorative strategies,
and prescribe normative guidelines as to whether and how to use a concept
(vs. to describe how it works as a matter of fact) [1,4,5,19,20]. The aim
of the SUFCE tutorial is to provide a systematic overview of conceptual
engineering, to be divided into three sessions:
S1: Research Program. The first session of the tutorial will intro-
duce the overall research program of conceptual engineering: its starting
point, its main goal and objectives, along with its most pressing chal-
lenges [6]. A typology of its main variants will be presented, [e.g. 3,5,17]
and the standard objections against them will be critically analyzed,
[e.g. 12] [cf. 18,20].
S2: Theoretical Foundations. The second session of the tutorial

will then consist in laying down the foundations of conceptual engineer-
ing by developing the theories of cognition (viz. ‘cognitive engineering’)
[10,11,15] and concepts [14,16,21] that are needed to effectively imple-
ment conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cog-
nitive optimization of our conceptual devices.
S3: Methodological Framework. Finally, the third session of the

tutorial will deliver a method of conceptual engineering constructed as a
fully recast Carnapian method of explication [1] [cf. 7,8], upgraded with
other complementary template procedural methods for re-engineering
concepts (namely, that of ‘conceptual modeling’ [13], ‘levels of abstrac-
tion’ [9], and ‘reflective equilibrium’ [2]).
58
Tutorials
Basic knowledge in philosophy language, mind and cognition, as well as

interest in meta-philosophical issues are expected. Further material will be
available in due course. At least one-quarter of each session will be devoted
to discussion (Q&A).
References
1. G. Brun, “Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering”,
Erkenntnis, vol. 81(6), 2016, pp. 1211–1241.
2. G. Brun, “Conceptual re-engineering: from explication to reflective
equilibrium”, Synthese, 2017, pp. 1–30, doi:10.1007/s11229-017-
1596-4.
3. A. Burgess, H. Cappelen & D. Plunkett (editors), Conceptual Engineer-
ing and Conceptual Ethics, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
4. A. Burgess & D. Plunkett, “Conceptual ethics I/II”, Philosophy Com-
pass, vol. 8(12), 2013, pp. 1091–1101, pp. 1102–1110.
5. H. Cappelen, Fixing Language: Conceptual Engineering and the Limits
of Revision, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
6. H. Cappelen, Ø. Linnebo & C. Serck-Hanssen (editors), ConceptLab
Research Project (website), http://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/english/
research/projects/cl.
7. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, University of Chicago
Press, 1950.
8. R. Carnap, “Replies and systematic expositions”, in The Philosophy of
Rudolf Carnap, edited by P.A. Schilpp, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois,
1963, pp. 859–1113.
9. L. Floridi, “The method of levels of abstraction”, Minds and Machines,
vol. 18(3), 2008, pp. 303–329.
10. L. Floridi, “A defence of constructionism: Philosophy as conceptual
engineering”, Metaphilosophy, vol. 42(3), 2011, pp. 282–304.
11. L. Floridi, “A plea for non-naturalism as constructionism”, Minds and
Machines, vol. 27(2), 2017, pp. 269–285.
12. P. Greenough, Against Conceptual Engineering, Book manuscript.
13. B. Löwe & T. Müller, “Data and phenomena in conceptual modelling”,
Synthese, vol. 182(1), 2011, pp. 131–148.
14. E. Machery, Doing without Concepts, Oxford University Press, 2009.
15. R. Menary, Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded,
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007.
16. G. Piccinini & S. Scott, “Splitting concepts”, Philosophy of Science,
vol. 73(4), 2006, pp. 390–409.
17. D. Plunkett, “Which concepts should we use? Metalinguistic negotia-
tions and the methodology of philosophy”, Inquiry, vol. 58(7–8), 2015,
pp. 828–874.
59
18. M. Prinzing, “The revisionist’s rubric: conceptual engineering and the

discontinuity objection”, Inquiry, 2017, pp. 1–27, doi:10.1080/0020174X.
2017.1385522.
19. K. Scharp & S. Shapiro, “Revising inconsistent concepts”, in Reflections
on the Liar, edited by B. Armour-Garb, Oxford University Press, 2017,
pp. 257–280.
20. M. Simion, “The ‘should’ in conceptual engineering”, Inquiry, 2017,
pp. 1–15, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2017.1392894.
21. D. Weiskopf, “The Plurality of Concepts”, Synthese, vol. 169(1), 2009,
pp. 145–173.
60
Tutorials
Leśniewski’s Evolutional Logic

Pierre Joray
L’Unité de Formation et de Recherche de Philosophie,
Université de Rennes 1, France
[email protected]
Different in many respects from standard versions of symbolic logic,

Stanislaw Leśniewski’s systems of logic (called Protothetics, Ontology and
Mereology) present a lot of original and unusual features that continue to be
stimulating for modern logicians and thinkers, since they have been elabo-
rated in Warsaw between the two World Wars. Among these aspects, one of
the certainly most interesting is the way Leśniewski conceived definition as a
process that has to be counted among the usual inference tools, like Modus
Ponens or Universal Instanciation. This peculiarity makes Leśniewski’s sym-
bolic language quite unusual. Instead of being determined once for all with
a set of symbols and a list of rules for the specification of well formed for-
mulae, Leśniewski’s language has to remain open and able to integrate the
many novelties and evolutions that can be step by step introduced by defini-
tions. With these specific symbolic languages, Leśniewski was able to show
that very tiny systems of axioms (including for example only equivalence,
the universal quantifier and a modern sort of copula) can give rise to very
powerful systems of logic.
Leśniewski’s systems are often considered to be very interesting but tech-

nically difficult. With this tutorial my aim is to show that the main stim-
ulating aspects of this non standard logic are actually perfectly accessible,
without specific prerequisite, just an intellectual interest in general logical
matters. Everybody who has this interest is welcome to join. The tutorial
will be divided in the following three one-hour sessions.
I. An open and evolutional symbolic language

In this session, we are going to understand how to build a complete
propositional logic, resting only on the single connective “if and only if”.
The main ideas of this construction are in Leśniewski himself, in Alfred
Tarski (his unique PhD student), but also in Bertrand Russell’s early log-
ical writings. Leśniewski’s achievement in this matter was strongly based
on the new kind of formal language he elaborated: an evolutional language,
in which every part of a formula takes its symbolic status and determined
meaning from the context in which it occurs. Like in natural languages,
61
the meaning of a word or a symbol depends on the combination of words

in which it is used and the meaning of an expression (sentence or formula)
depends on the expressions (in particular definitions) that have been previ-
ously asserted. As we will see, Leśniewski discovered very nice notational
solutions in order to warrant both contextuality and logical accuracy.
II. A new Organon

This second session is devoted to the powerful logic of terms Leśniewski
conceived introducing as a single new logical constant a modern version of
the traditional copula (in the tradition, the word “est” in the Latin sentence
“homo est animal” was called a copula). As we will see, this system of logic
includes as a part the standard first order calculus, but it allows, among
a lot of other possibilities, to develop a rich system of oppositions. As an
example, we are going to examine how the definitions of different negations
allows to rebuilt in modern terms the famous system of oppositions studied
by Aristotle in the Organon.
III. Classes and paradoxes

As other logicians of his time Leśniewski developed his logical systems
with the aim to give a foundation to mathematics. In this perspective, one
of the most important issues was the status of classes or sets and the way
to prevent from Russell’s paradox. Leśniewski was not at all satisfied by
Russell’s solution. As a strong nominalist, he was also completely opposed
to any theory supposing the existence of abstract objects, like set theory.
In this session, we are going to explore the brilliant analysis he gave of Rus-
sell’s paradox. This analysis led him to conceive his famous theory devoted
to the part-whole relation: Mereology. This will be a good example to see
how Leśniewski’s logic allows formalizing an applied theory.
Short Bibliography
1. P. Joray, “Teaching Leśniewski’s Protothetic with a Natural Deduc-
tion System”, in Fourth International Conference on Tools for Teaching
Logic, TTL 2015, Rennes, France, June 9–12, 2015.
2. P. Joray, “La définition dans les systèmes logiques de Lukasiewicz,
Leśniewski et Tarski”, in La Philosophie en Pologne: 1918–1939, edited
by R. Pouivet & M. Rebuschi, Vrin, Paris, 2006, pp. 203–222.
3. P. Joray, “Axiomatiques minimales et définitions. La thèse de Tarski sur
le calcul biconditionnel”, Travaux de Logique, vol. 20, 2011, pp. 57–83.
62
Tutorials
4. S. Leśniewski, Collected Works, edited by S.J. Surma, J.T.J. Srzednicki,

J.D. Barnett & V.F. Rickey, 2 volumes, Dordrecht and Kluwer, Poland,
1992.
5. E.C. Luschei, The Logical Systems of Leśniewski, North-Holland, 1962.
6. D. Miéville, Un développement des systèmes logiques de Stanislaw Le-
śniewski. Protothétique-Ontologie-Méréologie, Peter Lang, Berne,
Switzerland, 1984.
7. S. Richard, “Leśniewski on Metalanguage and Definitions”, Synthese,
forthcoming.
8. B. Russell, “The Propositional Calculus”, in chap. II, A of Principles
of Mathematics, by B. Russell, 1903.
9. P. Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Clarendon Press, 1987.
10. P. Simons, “Stanislaw Leśniewski”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, 2015, last version.
11. B. Sobociński, “L’analyse de l’antinomie russellienne par Leśniewski”,
Methodos, vol. 1, 1949, pp. 94–107, 220–228 and 308–316, and vol. 2,
1950, pp. 237–257.
12. J.T.J. Srzednicki & V.F. Rickey (editors), Leśniewski’s Systems: On-
tology and Mereology, Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1984.
13. J.T.J. Srzednicki & Z. Stachniak (editors), Leśniewski’s Systems: Pro-
tothetic, Kluwer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1998.
14. A. Tarski, “On the Primitive Term of Logistic” (1923), in Logic, Se-
mantics, Metamathematics. Papers from 1923 to 1938, by A. Tarski,
translated by J.H. Woodger, Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 1–23.
15. R. Urbaniak, Leśniewski’s Systems of Logic and Foundations of Math-
ematics, Springer, 2014.
63
Logic of Desires
Emiliano Lorini
IRIT* , CNRS , LILaC Team,
Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France
[email protected]
An important and general distinction in philosophy of mind is between

epistemic attitudes and motivational attitudes. This distinction is in terms
of the direction of fit of mental attitudes to the world. While epistemic
attitudes aim at being true and their being true is their fitting the world,
motivational attitudes aim at realization and their realization is the world
fitting them. The philosopher John Searle calls “mind-to-world” the first
kind of direction of fit and “world- to-mind” the second one. There are dif-
ferent kinds of epistemic and motivational attitudes with different functions
and properties. Examples of epistemic attitudes are beliefs, knowledge and
opinions, while examples of motivational attitudes are desires, preferences,
moral values and intentions. The course is aimed at discussing logics for
modeling static and dynamic aspects of motivational attitudes whose most
representative example is the logic of desires.
The first session of the tutorial will devoted to discuss the logic of desires in
opposition to the logics of knowledge and belief (epistemic logic and doxastic
logic).
The second session of the tutorial will be devoted to the problems of pref-
erence generation and intention formation: (i) how preferences of agents are
determined both by her desires and by her moral values, and (ii) how beliefs and
preferences determine choices and are responsible for the formation of new in-
tentions about present actions (present-directed intentions) and future actions
(future- directed intentions).
The third session will be devoted to the dynamic aspects of desires including
desire expansion and desire revision as well as the connection between desire
and belief change, on the one hand, and preference change on the other hand.
*

Logic, Interaction, Language and Computation
64
Tutorials
Bibliography
1. D. Dubois, E. Lorini & H. Prade, “The Strength of Desires: a Logical
Approach”, Minds and Machines, forthcoming.
2. E. Lorini, “A logic for reasoning about moral agents”, Logique et Ana-
lyse , vol. 58(230), 2016, pp. 177–218.
3. E. Lorini & A. Herzig, “A logic of intention and attempt”, Synthese,
vol. 163(1), 2008, pp. 45–77.
65
On the complexity of the model checking problem

Florent Madelaine & Malika More
LIMOS* , CNRS , Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
[email protected], [email protected]
The apparently benign task of checking whether a finite structure mod-

els a given sentence from first order logic (FO) and how efficient it might be
to run this task on a computer reveals a vivid realm at the interface between
computer science and mathematics mixing numerous and diverse fields.
For example, the model checking of a primitive positive sentence (a

first-order sentence using only ∃ and ∧) is better known as the Conjunctive
Query Containment in Database theory; it can be recast as the existence of
a homomorphism between two structures which is a well studied extension
of Graph Colouring in Combinatorics; it is nothing else than a Constraint
Satisfaction Problem popular in the Artificial Intelligence community. Per-
haps more surprisingly its complexity is governed by algebraic properties of
the model from Universal Algebra studied in Clone theory.
The dichotomy conjecture first proposed by Feder and Vardi in the

early nineties stipulates that according to the model this problem is ei-
ther tractable (solvable in Polynomial time) or intractable (NP-complete).
Around January 2017 three independent proofs have been proposed for this
conjecture.
We will give a personal view of this field by focusing on fragments of first

order logic where again algebra plays a prominent role in understanding and
studying the complexity of the model checking problem. These syntactic
fragments will be defined by selecting allowed symbols among the following:
∀, ∃, ∧, ∨, ¬, = and ≠.
There are no specific prerequisites. The tutorial will be divided in three

sessions detailed hereafter.
*

66
Tutorials
I. Constraint Satisfaction Problem and the dichotomy

conjecture
We will briefly recall the context from Complexity theory (P vs NP,
Ladners’s theorem) before introducing formally the dichotomy conjecture.
So, we focus in this session on the complexity of the model checking of
a given primitive positive sentence (fragment ∃ ∧) when parameterised by
the model, a problem known as the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP).
We will in fact concentrate on the special case when the model has only
two elements, which amounts to a variant of propositional Satisfiability
(SAT) and sketch the proof of its dichotomy — this is a result know as
Schaefer’s dichotomy. Methodologically, the proof relies on a non trivial
case analysis that amounts to finding the border between tractable and in-
tractable cases on an underlying algebraic object known as Post’s lattice.
We will explain in some details why this is the case. In particular, it will be
quite illuminating to see how preservation of the model under certain well
behaved Boolean functions will make complete certain well known incom-
plete algorithms.
If times allow, we will conclude this session with glimpses of the proofs
of more general partial results supporting the dichotomy conjecture.
II. What about other fragments of FO?

Bounded model checking from verification is often reduced to the satisfi-
ability problem of quantified Boolean sentences (QBF) that is propositional
sentences with variables that are either existential or universal. Many Sat
solvers go beyond instances in conjunctive normal form (CNF) and allow
some disjunction. This motivates us to investigate fragments of FO allowing
the universal quantifier or the disjunction as a connective. Another more
prosaic motivation is that studying a fragment of FO that is very expressive
will limit the number of cases to study and one might obtain a complex-
ity classification that is still rather elusive in the case of more restricted
fragments of FO.
We will briefly recall the complexity context when one throws universal
quantifiers to the mix (Alternating Turing machines, Pspace). We will show
that some fragments of FO such as primitive positive first order logic with
disequalities (fragment ∃ ∧ ≠) can be classified as corollaries of Schaefer’s
theorem.
With the exception of these and the fragment corresponding to CSP and
its universal extension the QCSP, all other fragments can be classified and
exhibit a strange behaviour : tractability is not explained by complicated
67
algorithms but rather by very simple logical properties of the model, namely
that a type of quantifier can be relativised to a specific constant of the model.
We will discuss in particular the case of equality free positive first-order
logic (fragment ∃ ∀ ∧ ∨) a fragment for which one obtains a tetrachotomy
governed by the surjective hyper endormorphisms of the model.
III. Quantified CSP, some progress for the last remaining

open case
If one assumes that one of the recent proof proposed for the dichotomy
conjecture is correct, there is a single fragment for which the complexity is
not classified, namely positive Horn (fragment ∃ ∀ ∧). The model check-
ing problem known as the QCSP is to the CSP what QBF (or QSAT) is
to SAT. Some partial results seem to suggest that for a given model the
QCSP is either as hard as the general problem (Pspace-complete) or of the
same complexity as a hard CSP (NP-complete) or tractable (polynomial
time solvable). That is QCSP would follow a trichotomy between Pspace
complete, NP-complete and P.
The drop in complexity from Pspace to NP seems to be explained also by
a slightly more advanced form of relativisation of the universal quantifiers,
best explained in terms of restricted games and interpolation of complete
Skolem functions from families of partial ones. One natural example known
as the collapsibility property enjoyed by some models amounts to the case
when it suffices to check the cases where all universal variables of the sen-
tence but a bounded number take a constant value known in advance.
Bibliography
1. T. Feder & M.Y. Vardi, Monotone monadic SNP and constraint satis-
faction, in Proceedings of the 25th annual ACM * Symposium on Theory
of Computing, STOC, 1993.
2. Th.J. Schaefer, “The Complexity of Satisfiability Problems”, Proceed-
ings of the 10th annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
STOC 1978.
3. F.R. Madelaine & B. Martin, “On the complexity of the model checking
problem”, arXiv:1210.6893, Cornell University Library, 2012.
4. F.R. Madelaine & B. Martin, “The complexity of positive first-order
logic without equality”, ACM Transactions on Computational Logic,
vol. 13(1), article no. 5, 2012, arXiv:1003.0802.
*
Association for Computing Machinery

Symposium on Theory of Computing
68
Tutorials
5. C. Carvalho, F.R. Madelaine & B. Martin, “From complexity to algebra

and back: Digraph classes, collapsibility, and the PGP”, in Proceed-
ings of the 30th Annual ACM * /IEEE Symposium on Logic in Com-
puter Science, LICS’15, Kyoto, Japan, July 6–10, 2015, pp. 462–474,
arXiv:1501.04558.
Related Surveys
1. H. Chen, “A rendezvous of logic, complexity, and algebra”, ACM Com-
puting Surveys, vol. 42(1), article no 2, 2009, arXiv:cs/0611018.
2. H. Chen, “Meditations on Quantified Constraint Satisfaction”, in Logic
and Program Semantics: Essays Dedicated to Dexter Kozen on the Oc-
casion of His 60th Birthday, edited by R.L. Constable & A. Silva, Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 35–49, arXiv:1201.6306.
3. B. Martin, “Quantified Constraints in Twenty Seventeen”, in The Con-
straint Satisfaction Problem: Complexity and Approximability, edited
by A. Krokhin & S. Zivny, Dagstuhl, Germany, 2017, pp. 327–346,
https://goo.gl/qj6sz1.
*

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
69
C.S. Peirce’s Logic of Relations: Graph-theoretical

and Surface-theoretical Models
William James McCurdy
Department of English and Philosophy,
Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho, USA
[email protected]
Charles Sanders Peirce is, as Alfred Tarski has rightly reminded us, the
father of the logic of relations. Although Augustus de Morgan pioneered
investigation into the logic of dyadic relations as an outgrowth of his mathe-
matical study of syllogistic, it was Peirce who first developed a general logic
of relations, that is, a logic for relations of any adicity (valency) whatsoever.
The corazon de corazon of this logic is Peirce’s so-called “Reduction Thesis”,
consisting of two controversial clauses. The first of these is a necessity clause
stating that, besides monadic relations (one-place predicates) and dyadic re-
lations, a relationally complete logic must also have genuine triadic relations,
that is, three-place relations which cannot be analyzed into combinations of
relations of lesser adicity. The second clause is a sufficiency clause, specif-
ically, the claim that genuine triadic relations, together with monadic and
dyadic relations, suffice for a relationally-complete logic. The means for
composing all other (n>3)-adic relations are two logical operations, namely,
the unary operation of auto-relative multiplication and the binary operation
of relative multiplication. Peirce’s Reduction Thesis has been all but uni-
versally rejected, often even by scholars sympathetic to Peirce and his work
in logic. This tutorial explicates his contentious thesis and subsequently
presents two topological models for his logic of relations. One is a variant
of topological graph theory, called Peircean Relational Graph Theory, and
the other uses surface theory, called Peircean Relational Surface Theory.
These two models provide justification for his remarkable contribution to a
universal logic of relations including proofs of his Reduction Thesis, one in
each model.
“We homely thinkers believe that, considering the immense amount

of disputation there has always been concerning the doctrine of
logic, and especially concerning those which would otherwise be
applicable to settle disputes concerning the accuracy of reasonings
in metaphysics, the safest way is to appeal for our logical principles
to the science of mathematics, where error can only long go unex-
ploded on condition of not being suspected.”
— C.S Peirce, The Regenerated Logic
70
Tutorials
Synopses of Tutorial Sessions
I. Peirce’s Logic of Relations and Peircean Relational Graph

Theory
C.S. Peirce’s view that mathematics is the science of necessary reason-
ing about hypothetical possibilities by means diagrams will be introduced.
Further, his contention that logic requires topology will be briefly examined.
Peirce’s diagrammatic logic of relations will be explicated including his “Re-
duction Thesis,” specifically, the thesis, that a relationally complete logic
requires, but only requires monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations. The fun-
damentals of Peircean Relational Graph Theory (PRGT), a radical variant
of standard graph theory will be delineated. It will be shown that PRGT
is able to represent straightforwardly both relations of one, two, and three
adicities and the logical operations of auto-relative and relative multiplica-
tion.
II. Garnering the First Fruits of PRGT and Those of a Later

Gleaning
The representational scope and power of PRGT will be presented via
relevant combinatorial formulas as well as diagrams of relational networks.
Several key theorems will be demonstrated culminating in a proof of Peirce’s
Composability-of-Relations Theorem (The Reduction Thesis justified). A
taxonomy of general varieties of relational networks willed be tabulated. As
a preamble and a propaedeutic to the third session, surface diagrams which
are two-dimensional counterparts to the one-dimensional diagrams of PRGT
will be introduced. The gluing of surfaces with boundaries will be presented
as the means to represent auto-relative and relative multiplication.
III. Peircean Relational Surface Theory

Employing some insights of such pioneers in topology as A.F. Möbius
and Max Dehn, three surface models for Peirce’s logic of relations will be
explored, specifically:
1) a cap/sleeve/pair of pants model,
2) a model of spheres with one, two, and three discs excised,
3) a disc/annulus/bi-annulus model. While a disc, an annulus, and a bi-
annulus are homotopically distinct from each other, the above three
models are homotopically equivalent. This will be diagrammatically dis-
played and algebraically demonstrated.
71
A problem with using these surface models to represent Peirce’s logic of

relations will be discussed and then solved, involving the use of deformation
retractions of the disc, the annulus, and the bi-annulus as necessary aspects
of an adequate model Peirce’s logic of relations in two dimensions.
Selected Bibliography
1. B. Martelli, An Introduction to Geometric Topology, University of Pisa,
Italy, 2016.
2. S. & R. Piergallini, “The Complex of Pant Decompositions of a Surface”,
Topology and its Applications, vol. 156(2), 2008, pp. 399–419.
3. R. Burch, A Peircean Reduction Thesis: The Foundations of Topological
Logic, Texas Tech University Press, Lubbock, Texas, 1991.
4. M. Dehn, Papers on Group Theory and Topology, translations and in-
troduction by J. Stillwell, Springer, 1987.
5. F. Harary, Graph Theory, Addison-Wesley, 1969.
6. A. Hatcher, Algebraic Topology, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
7. K.L. Ketner, “Peirce’s “Most Lucid and Interesting Paper”: An In-
troduction to Cenopythagoreanism”, International Philosophical Quar-
terly, vol. 26(4), 1986, pp. 375–392.
8. J.M. Lee, Introduction to Topological Manifolds, Springer, 2011.
9. Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 6 volumes, 1932.
10. Charles Sanders Peirce, The Logic of Interdisciplinarity: The Monist
Series, edited by H. van Elise Bisons, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2009.
11. Charles Sanders Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things, edited by
K.L. Ketner, introduction by K.L. Ketner & H. Putnam, Harvard Uni-
12. Charles Sanders Peirce, Semiotics and Significs: The Correspondence
between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby, edited by Ch.S.
Hardwick with assistance of J. Cook, The Press of Arisbe Associates,
Elsah, Illinois, USA, 2001.
13. D.D. Roberts, Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce, Mouton & Co.,
The Hague, The Netherlands, 1973.
14. J. Stillwell, Classical Topology and Combinatorial Group Theory,
Springer, 1980.
15. F. Zalamea, The Logic of Continuity, Docent Press, Boston, 2012.
72
Tutorials
Useful Links
Charles Peirce Society
Peirce.org
Centro de Sistemática Peirceana
Grupo de Estudios Peirceano
Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism
Helsinki Peirce Research Centre
Centro de Estudos de Pragmatismo, São Paulo, Brazil
Charles Sanders Peirce: Logic, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
73
Wittgenstein’s Logic
Giovanni Mion
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Istanbul Technical University, Turkey
[email protected]
Erik Thomsen
CTO* at Blender Logic, Cambridge, Mass, USA
[email protected]
The tutorial will be focused on Wittgenstein’s logic in the Tractatus. It

is divided into three sections:
I. Quantification
In the first section, we will explore Wittgenstein’s account of quantifi-
cation. See in particular sections 5.3, 5.501 and 5.52 of the Tractatus.
II. Decidability
In the second section, we will explore Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic.
In particular, we will focus on Wittgenstein’s claim that “proof in logic is
merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recognition of tautologies in
complicated cases” (6.1262). See also section 6.1203.
III. The color exclusion problem

Finally, in the last section, we will discuss the color exclusion problem
and Wittgenstein’s later attempt to overcome the shortcomings of his logical
atomism. See in particular section 6.3751:
“For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same

place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible,
since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour. Let us think
how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows
— a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is
to say, it cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say,
particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be
identical. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary
*
74
Tutorials
propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The

statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours
at the same time is a contradiction.)”
Bibliography
1. E.B. Allaire, “Tractatus 6.3751”, Analysis, vol. 19(5), 1959,
pp. 100–105.
2. E. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Hutchinson
University Library, 1959.
3. R. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.
4. P. Frascolla, Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Routledge, 2006.
5. P.T. Geach, “Wittgenstein’s Operator N”, Analysis, vol. 41(4), 1981,
pp. 168–171.
6. P.T. Geach, “More on Wittgenstein’s Operator N”, Analysis, vol. 42(3),
1981, pp. 127–128.
7. P. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, Oxford University Press, 1972.
8. A. Kenny, Wittgenstein, Blackwell, 1973/2006.
9. F.P. Ramsey, “Critical Notice of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”,
Mind, vol. 32(128), 1923, pp. 465-478.
10. S. Soames, “Generality, Truth Functions, and Expressive Capacity in
the Tractatus”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 92(4), 1983,
pp. 573–589.
11. F. Waismann, The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, Macmillan, 1965.
75
Reasoning on data: the ontology-mediated

query answering problem
Marie-Laure Mugnier
University of Montpellier, France
[email protected]
Knowledge representation and reasoning (KR) is the field of artificial in-

telligence that studies formalisms, mostly based on logics, to represent and
do reasoning with various kinds of human knowledge. Modern information
systems often comprise a knowledge base expressed in a KR language. At
the core of a knowledge base, there is a so-called ontology, which defines the
conceptual vocabulary of the knowledge base and describes general knowl-
edge about a domain of interest. Formally, an ontology is a logical theory in
a fragment of first-order logic, which may be more or less expressive. The
simplest ontologies define hierarchies of concepts and relations, while richer
ontologies are often expressed in description logics, a prominent family of
KR languages devoted to representing and reasoning with ontologies, or
rule-based languages. Another classical component of a knowledge base is
the fact base, which contains assertions about specific individuals.
In the last decade, the increasing amounts of available data, which may
be large, complex, heterogeneous and/or incomplete, have deeply impacted
the field. How to better access data by incorporating knowledge, typically
expressed in ontologies, has become a crucial issue, at the crossroad of KR
and data management. On the KR side, the challenge was to tackle a new
reasoning task, namely querying data (whereas classical KR problems such
as consistency checking or classification can be recast as very specific query
answering problems), which required to find new languages and algorithmic
techniques offering various tradeoffs between expressivity and tractability
of reasoning. On the data management side, the challenge was rather to ex-
tend query answering techniques to take into account knowledge. The issue
of querying data while taking into account inferences enabled by an ontol-
ogy has received several names, it will be called ontology-mediated query
answering in this talk. It can also be seen as querying a knowledge base,
composed of an ontology and a (possibly virtual) fact base linked to data
sources.
The aim of this tutorial is to give an overview of ongoing research in

KR on ontology-mediated query answering. The main KR formalisms in-
76
Tutorials
vestigated in this context will be presented, and compared with respect to

expressivity, decidability and computational complexity, with a special fo-
cus on a recent family of formalisms, namely existential rules.
The tutorial will be divided in three parts:

I. I will first present the context and the main notions related to ontology-
mediated query answering: the logical view of queries and data; ontolo-
gies in computer science; knowledge bases; relevant knowledge repre-
sentation and reasoning formalisms; fundamental problems on knowl-
edge bases.
II. Then I will present in more detail the main formalisms studied in the
context of ontology-mediated query answering: Horn description log-
ics and existential rules. Description logics are decidable fragments
of first-order logic, and their Horn subset is roughly obtained by dis-
allowing any form of disjunction. Existential rules are also known
as the Datalog± family, or tuple-generating dependencies in database
theory, and they generalize both Horn description logics and Datalog,
the querying language for deductive databases. The basic algorithmic
approaches to ontology-mediated query answering will be reviewed.
III. The last part will be devoted to decidability issues in the existential
rule framework. Logical entailment with general existential rules is
not decidable, however many subclasses for which it is decidable have
been defined. I will present the landscape of decidable classes of rules
and explain the ideas behind decidability properties.
Bibliography
1. J.-F. Baget, M. Leclère, M.-L. Mugnier & E. Salvat, “On rules with ex-
istential variables: Walking the decidability line”, Artificial Intelligence,
vol. 175(9-10), 2011, pp. 1620–1654.
2. M. Bienvenu & M. Ortiz, “Ontology-Mediated Query Answering with
Data-Tractable Description Logics”, in 11th International Summer
School, Berlin, Germany, July 31–August 4, 2015, Tutorial Lectures,
Reasoning Web. Web Logic Rules, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
book series, vol. 9203, Springer, pp. 218–307.
3. D. Calvanese, G. De Giacomo, D. Lembo, M. Lenzerini & R. Rosati,
“Tractable Reasoning and Efficient Query Answering in Description
Logics: The DL-Lite Family”, Journal of Automated Reasoning,
vol. 39(3), 2007, pp. 385–429.
4. Th. Lukasiewicz, A. Cali & G. Gottlob, “A General Datalog-Based
Framework for Tractable Query Answering over Ontologies”, Journal
of Web Semantics, vol. 14, 2012, pp. 57–83.
77
5. M.-L. Mugnier & M. Thomazo, “An Introduction to Ontology-Based

Query Answering with Existential Rules”, in 10th International Sum-
mer School, Athens, Greece, September 8–13, 2014, Reasoning Web.
Reasoning on the Web in the Big Data Era, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science book series, vol. 8714, Springer, 2014, pp. 245–278.
78
Tutorials
Logic and Computer Programming

Mykola Nikitchenko
Department of Theory and Technology of Programming,
Faculty of Computer Science and Cybernetics,
[email protected]
The aim of this tutorial is to acquaint attendees with the primary models
of program semantics; to present logics based on formal program models; to
study relationship between such logics; to discuss applicability of program
logics in program analysis and verification.
Computer Programming, as well as Software Engineering in general,

is a grateful area of logic application. Logics can be used at every stage
of software development cycle, in particular, during requirement analysis,
specification, design, verification, and testing.
To be successful, such logics should adequately represent essential fea-

tures of the development stages. Among various logics, oriented on software
development, the central place belongs to logics describing main properties
of computer programs. Such logics should be based on formal program
models.
The tutorial consists of three sessions:

I. Review of program-oriented logics. Formal models of programs.
II. Program-oriented first-order logics of predicates and functions with
non-fixed arity. Their relationships with classical first-order logic.
Soundness and completeness of logics.
III. Program logics of Floyd-Hoare style of partial predicates and functions
over hierarchical data structures. New consequence relations, their
properties. Applicability of program logics.
The main questions to be discussed during the first session are a short
review of program-oriented logics and main methods of description of formal
semantics of programs:
denotational semantics in style of Scott-Strachey;
operational semantics in style of Gordon D. Plotkin;
axiomatic semantics in style of Floyd-Hoare.
Then we describe various classes of mappings used to represent program
79
semantics such as n-ary mappings, mappings with non-fixed arity (quasiary

mappings), and mappings over hierarchical data. We demonstrate that
these classes have different compositional properties that affect program
construction and investigation.
During the second session, we construct various first-order logics based

on the described classes of mappings. We demonstrate that each logic has
specific features which are not characteristic for classical logic based on n-
ary mappings. Soundness and completeness of such logics are discussed.
The last session is devoted to construction of various types of Floyd-

Hoare program logics.
We investigate classical Floyd-Hoare logic, logics with partial predicates

and functions, logics over hierarchical data. Such analysis demonstrates
that even in a case of simple programs we have to introduce new rather
complicated consequence relations and new rules of calculi.
In conclusion, we formulate the main challenging problems of program

logics construction and investigation and discuss approaches to their solu-
tion.
Bibliography
1. H.R. Nielson & F. Nielson, Semantics with Applications: A Formal
Introduction, John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
2. C.A.R. Hoare, “An axiomatic basis for computer programming”, Com-
munications of the ACM, vol. 12(1), 1969, pp. 576–580.
3. D. Sannella & A. Tarlecki, Foundations of Algebraic Specification and
Formal Software Development, Springer, 2012.
4. M. Nikitchenko & S. Shkilniak, Applied Logic (in Ukrainian), Publishing
House of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine, 2013.
5. A. Kryvolap, M. Nikitchenko & W. Schreiner, “Extending Floyd-Hoare
Logic for Partial Pre- and Postconditions”, in International Conference
on Information and Communication Technologies in Education, Re-
search, and Industrial Applications, ICTERI 2013, Springer,
pp. 355–378.
80
Tutorials
Analogical Reasoning
Henri Prade
IRIT* , CNRS , Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse, France
[email protected]
Analogical reasoning has been known as a noticeable form of plausible

and creative reasoning since Antiquity. Still it has remained apart from
logic, since its conclusions do not offer the guarantees of syllogistic and
more generally deductive reasoning. Closely related to analogical reasoning
is the notion of analogical proportions. They are statements of the form “a
is to b as c is to d”. For about two decades now, their formalization and
use have raised the interest of a number of researchers. Ten years ago, a
propositional logic modeling of these proportions has been proposed. This
logical view makes clear that analogy is as much a matter of dissimilarity
as a matter of similarity.
Moreover, an analogical proportion is a special type of logical pro-

portions, a family of quaternary operators built as a conjunction of two
equivalences linking similarity or dissimilarity indicators pertaining to pairs
(a,b) and (c,d). Homogeneous logical proportions (which include analogical
proportion) and heterogenous logical proportions are of particular interest.
These remarkable proportions play a key role in the solving of various in-
telligence quizzes. Moreover analogical proportion-based inference has been
experimentally shown to be quite good at classification tasks. Recent theo-
retical results suggest why.
The tutorial provides an introduction and a detailed discussion of the

above points and related issues. It is organized as follows:
I. The first lecture singles out analogical proportion among logical pro-
portions. Logical proportions, a family of particular quaternary Boolean
operators built from similarity or dissimilarity indicators between pairs,
are first introduced. Then, different sub-families are identified accord-
ing to their definitional structure, or some characteristic properties.
Analogical proportion appears as one of the four symmetrical logi-
cal proportions that are code independent (which means that their
truth value does not change when 0 and 1 are exchanged). Analogical
*

81
proportion is uniquely characterized among these four proportions by

satisfying reflexivity (“a is to b as a is to b”) and the central permu-
tation property (if “a is to b as c is to d” then “a is to c as b is to
d”). Other noticeable properties of analogical proportion and relations
with other proportions are presented, as well as a discussion in terms
of structures of opposition.
II. The second lecture is devoted to analogical proportion-based inference.

Indeed analogical proportions are at the basis of an inference mecha-
nism (which can be related to the basic analogical reasoning pattern)
that enables us to complete or create a fourth item (described by means
of Boolean attributes) from three other items. The good results of this
inference in solving quizzes and in classification problems are then re-
ported. The fact that this inference can never be wrong in case the
classification function is an affine Boolean function is emphasized. We
also discuss the differences with case-based reasoning and case-based
decision.
III. The third lecture is devoted to extensions of analogical proportion

beyond the Boolean case on the one hand and to the use of other
logical proportions on the other hand. Multiple-valued logic extensions
enable us to handle items described with numerical attributes, while
the extension of analogical proportion to non distributive lattices make
possible to define and identify such a proportion between concepts in
a formal context, in the sense of formal concept analysis. Besides, the
four non symmetrical code independent logical proportions are also
worth of interest since they express that there is an intruder in a 4-
tuple that is not in some definite position in the tuple. Lastly we
explain how these proportions can be used as well in classification.
References
1. M. Couceiro, N. Hug, H. Prade & G. Richard, “Analogy-preserving
functions: a way to extend Boolean samples”, 26th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI’17, Melbourne, Australia,
August 19–25, 2017, pp. 1575–1581.
2. D. Dubois, H. Prade & G. Richard, “Multiple-valued extensions of
analogical proportions”, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, vol. 292(C), 2016,
pp. 193–202.
3. S. Klein, “Analogy and mysticism and the structure of culture [and
Comments and Reply]”, Current Anthropology, vol. 24(2), 1983,
pp. 151–180.
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Tutorials
4. L. Miclet, N. Barbot & H. Prade, “From analogical proportions in lat-

tices to proportional analogies in formal concepts”, in 21st European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI’14, Prague, August 18–22,
edited by T. Schaub, G. Friedrich & B. O’Sullivan, Frontiers in Ar-
tificial Intelligence and Applications book series, vol. 263, IOS Press,
2014, pp. 627–632.
5. H. Prade & G. Richard, “From analogical proportion to logical propor-
tions”, Logica Universalis, vol. 7(4), 2013, pp. 441–505.
6. H. Prade & G. Richard, “Homogenous and heterogeneous logical pro-
portions”, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 1(1), 2014, pp. 1–51.
7. H. Prade & G. Richard (editors), Computational Approaches to Analog-
ical Reasoning: Current Trends, Studies in Computational Intelligence
book series, vol. 548, Springer, 2014.
83
MMT — Meta-Meta-Theory and/or Tool:

A Framework for Defining and Implementing
Logics
Florian Rabe
LRI* , Computer Science Course, Université Paris-Sud, France
KWARC group, University of Erlangen, Germany
florian [email protected]
MMT is a framework for designing formal languages and building knowl-

edge management applications for them. It systematically avoids a com-
mitment to a representational paradigm, a particular concrete or abstract
syntax, or a particular semantics and thus naturally subsumes type theo-
ries, logics, set theories, ontology languages, etc. Despite this high degree
of generality, MMT includes generic solutions to deep problems including
IDE, web browser, module system, and type checking. Therefore, design-
ing logics and applications inside MMT can yield very strong systems at
extremely low cost.
I. Overview and demo

Optionally bring your notebooks to install MMT
II. Language Design in MMT

III. Application Development in MMT
Bibliography
1. F. Rabe, “The Future of Logic: Foundation-Independence”, Logica Uni-
versalis, vol. 10(1), 2016, pp. 1–20.
2. F. Rabe, “How to identify, translate and combine logics?”, Journal of
Logic and Computation, vol. 27(6), 2017, pp. 1753–1798.
Useful Link
MMT homepage
*
Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique

Knowledge Adaptation and Reasoning for Content
84
Tutorials
Logic-based reasoning for information integration

and data linkage
Marie-Christine Rousset
Institut Universitaire de France,
Laboratoire d’Informatique de Grenoble,
Université Grenoble Alpes, France
[email protected]
Biography: Marie-Christine Rousset is a Professor of Computer Science at

the University of Grenoble Alpes and senior member of Institut Universitaire
de France. Her areas of research are Knowledge Representation, Information
Integration, Pattern Mining and Semantic Web. She has published around
100 refereed international journal articles and conference papers, and par-
ticipated in several cooperative industry-university projects. She received
a best paper award from AAAI* in 1996, and has been nominated ECCAI
fellow in 2005. She has served in many program committees of international
conferences and workshops and in editorial boards of several journals.
Information integration and data linkage raise many difficult challenges,

because data are becoming ubiquitous, multi-form, multi-source and musti-
scale. Data semantics is probably one of the keys for attacking those chal-
lenges in a principled way. A lot of effort has been done in the Semantic Web
community for describing the semantics of information through ontologies.
In this tutorial, I will show that description logics provide a good model
for specifying ontologies over Web data (described in RDF), but that re-
strictions are necessary in order to obtain scalable algorithms for checking
data consistency and answering conjunctive queries. I will explain that the
DL-Lite family has good properties for combining ontological reasoning and
data management at large scale.
Finally, I will describe a unifying rule-based logical framework for rea-

soning on RDF ontologies and databases. The underlying rule language
allows to capture in a uniform manner OWL constraints that are useful in
practice, such as property transitivity or symmetry, but also domain-specific
rules with practical relevance for users in many domains of interest.
*
American Association for Artificial Intelligence

European Coordinating Committee for Artificial Intelligence
85
I will illustrate the expressivity of this framework for modeling Linked

Data applications and its genericity for developing inference algorithms. In
particular, I will show how it allows to model the problem of data linkage
in Linked Data as a reasoning problem on possibly decentralized data. I
will also explain how it makes possible to efficiently extract expressive mod-
ules from Semantic Web ontologies and databases with formal guarantees,
whilst effectively controlling their succinctness. Experiments conducted on
real-world datasets have demonstrated the feasibility of this approach and
its usefulness in practice for data integration and information extraction.
Everybody interested in description logics, databases and information

integration is welcome to join. There is no specific prerequisites. The tuto-
rial will be divided in the following three sessions:
I. This part will be devoted to introduce the problems of information

integration and data linkage from heterogeneous data sources, in par-
ticular in the setting of the Web of data (also called Linked Data), and
the ontology-based approach to address these problems.
II. This part will be devoted to description logics, their use for specifying
ontologies and the associated inference algorithms for reasoning on
data in presence of ontologies.
III. In this last part, we will present a unifying rule-based logical framework
for reasoning on RDF ontologies and databases, based on Datalog and
its extensions.
Bibliography
S. Abiteboul, I. Manolescu, Ph. Rigaux, M.-Ch. Rousset & P. Senellart,
Web Data Management, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Useful Link
Website of the book Web Data Management
86
Tutorials
Louis Couturat (1868–1914): Early symbolic logic

and the dream of a characteristica universalis
Oliver Schlaudt
Department of Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, Germany
[email protected]
It is known that Bertrand Russell turned to logic after having become

acquainted with the work of the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano. He
was personally introduced to the latter in 1900, at the First International
Congress of Philosophy in Paris, by a French colleague, responsible for the
Logic Section of the Congress: Louis Couturat.
Who was this French philosopher? History of logic almost completely ig-
nores him, because he didn’t contribute to the field. Nevertheless he played
an important role in the development of the discipline. He was among
the first who grasped the appeal of the new “algorithmic logic”, renewing
Leibniz’ dream of a characteristica universalis, and started very early to
integrate modern logic into the philosophy curriculum at the French uni-
versity. He wrote several introductory works on logic for the French public.
And he created a vast network of correspondents, extended from Argentina
to Russia, including among others Russell, Peano, Peirce, MacColl, Frege
and Schroeder. He devoted himself to mutually connect these scholars and
to make circulating their ideas through the scholarly world at a maximum
speed.
In this tutorial, we will try to grasp the work of Couturat in its entire
scope, ranging from his work on Leibniz to the philosophy of mathematics,
epistemology, and logic. Beyond his published work we will also consult
his correspondence and his unpublished manuscripts (e.g. on the history of
mathematical logic).
I. Louis Couturat
In the first session, I will provide an overview over the life and the
work of Louis Couturat. In particular, I will elaborate his philosophical
programme which eventually led him to study contemporary advances in
symbolic logic and to make considerable efforts for introducing symbolic
logic in France. I will also present and analyze his various activities as a
reviewer, editor, conference organizer, international “mail box”, partisan of
international auxiliary languages, and so on.
87
II. Philosophy of logic

In the second section, I will outline Couturat’s philosophy of logic, fo-
cussing on two major topics: firstly, the relation between logic and mathe-
matics and in particular the question of logicism, discussed by Couturat in
form of the alternative “algebra of logic or logic of algebra”; secondly, I will
show how Couturat’s criticisms of various systems of symbolic systems fits
into a larger semiotic approach, covering also mathematics, the algebras of
the natural sciences (e.g. chemical formulae) and even natural languages.
III. History of logic

The third and last session will focus Couturat’s construction of a “His-
tory of mathematical logic” in his unpublished series of lectures at Collège
de France in 1904/05. We will especially analyze the relation between the
contemporary discussions in logic and the kind of questions Couturat tried
to answer in his historical account.
Bibliography
Selection of Couturat’s works:
1. De l’infini mathématique, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1896, https://goo.gl/
kNzFec.
2. La Logique de Leibniz, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1901, https://goo.gl/
KQ23n4, English version: The Logic of Leibniz, translated by Donald
Rutherford, https://goo.gl/TCNyXP.
3. with Ch. Ladd-Franklin: Symbolic Logic, in Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology, edited by J.M. Baldwin, 1902.
4. Les principes des mathématiques, avec un appendice sur la philoso-
phie mathématique de Kant, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1903, https://goo.gl/
WkgFEt.
5. L’algèbre de la logique, 1905, English version: The Algebra of Logic,
translated by L.G. Robinson, The Open Court Publishing Company,
1914, https://goo.gl/is1iA1.
6. Traité de logique algorithmique, posthumous, 2010.
On Couturat:
1. M. Fichant & S. Roux (editors), Louis Couturat (1868–1914). Ma-
thématiques, langage, philosophie, Classiques Garnier, Paris, 2017.
2. L’Œuvre de Louis Couturat — de Leibniz à Russell, Actes du Col-
loque International, L’École Normale Supérieure, Éditions Rue
d’Ulm, 1977, https://goo.gl/2uoCsP.
88
Tutorials
Logic and Religion

Ricardo Silvestre
Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil
Academic Visitor, Faculty of Philosophy,
University of Oxford, UK
[email protected]
From a historical point of view, logic has been a constant companion

of philosophical reflections about religion. Arguments for and against the
existence of God have been proposed and subjected to logical analysis in
different periods of the history of philosophy. In discussions on the concept
of God too logic has played a considerable role. With the rise of modern
logic, in the beginning of twentieth century, and the analytic philosophy of
religion, in the fifties, the connection between logic and religion has become
much more established. A result of this development was the series of events
World Congress of Logic and Religion, whose first and second editions took
place, respectively, in João Pessoa, Brazil, in 2015, and in Warsaw, Poland,
in 2017; the 3rd World Congress on Logic and Religion will take place in
Varanasi, India, in 2019. The purpose of this tutorial is to introduce the
field of Logic and Religion from the perspective of philosophical inquiry;
nonetheless, something will be said about the role played by logic in world
religious traditions.
I. General perspectives on Logic and Religion

In the first part of the tutorial I will speak about the role played by
logic in religion, both from the philosophical and religious perspective. I
will point out how logical notions appear in different religious traditions
and how a good deal of logical reasoning is needed to make sense of good
part of what they say. I will also speak about two of the most traditional
philosophical undertakings related to God and religion: the construction
and appraisal of arguments for and against the existence of God and the
logical analysis of the concept of God.
II. Arguments for and against the Existence of God

In the second part of the tutorial I will deepen the issue of the construc-
tion and appraisal of arguments for and against the existence of God. After
giving a short historical background, I will explain the varieties of argu-
ments found in both religious and philosophical traditions. After that I will
89
concentrate on two instances of such arguments. On the side of theist ar-

guments, I will examine Anselm’s ontological argument found in the second
chapter of his Proslogion and some recent attempts to logically formalize
it. On the side of the atheist arguments, I will examine the role played by
logic in Hume’s exposition of the problem of evil and the response given by
Alvin Planting known as the free-will defense.
III. The Concept of God

In the last part of the tutorial I will move to the analysis of the concept
of God. I will first speak about the project inaugurated by Anselm nowa-
days called Perfect Being Theology (which consists in, from some definition
of God as a maximally perfect being, logically derive God’s properties or
perfections such as uniqueness, omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection,
omnipresence, eternality, impassibility and simplicity). After that I will look
on how this project and the logico-philosophical inquiry about divine prop-
erties has been conducted in recent philosophy of religion.
Selected Bibliography
1. R.M. Adams, “The Logical Structure of Anselm’s Arguments”, The
Philosophical Review, vol. 80(1), 1971, pp. 28–54.
2. Anselm of Canterbury, Complete Philosophical and Theological Trea-
tises of Anselm of Canterbury, edited by J. Hopkins & H. Richardson,
translated by J. Hopkins, The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis,
USA, 2000.
3. J. Barnes, The Ontological Argument, Macmillan, London, 1972.
4. J.-Y. Beziau & R. Silvestre (editors), Logic and Religion, Special Issue
of Logica Universalis, vol. 11(1), 2017.
5. J.-Y. Beziau & R. Silvestre, “Logic and Religion”, Logica Universalis,
vol. 11(1), 2017, pp. 1–12.
6. J. Bowker (editor), The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, Oxford
7. P. Oppenheimer & E. Zalta, “On the Logic of the Ontological Argu-
ment”, in Philosophical Perspectives 5: The Philosophy of Religion,
edited by J. Tomblin, Ridgeview Press, Atascadero, USA, 1991.
8. M. Palmer (editor), World Religions, HarperCollins, London, 2002.
9. A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford University Press, 1974.
10. K. Rogers, Perfect Being Theology, Edinburgh University Press, 2000.
11. R. Silvestre, “On the Logical Formalization of Anselm’s Ontological
Argument”, Revista Brasileira de Filosofia da Religião, vol. 2(2), 2015,
pp. 142–161, http://abfr.org/revista/index.php/rbfr/article/view/
19/19.
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Tutorials
12. R. Silvestre & J.-Y. Beziau (editors), Logic and Philosophy of Religion,
Special Issue of Sophia, vol. 56(2), 2017.
13. R. Silvestre & J.-Y. Beziau, “Logic and Philosophy of Religion”, Sophia,
vol. 56(2), 2017, pp. 139–145.
14. J. Sobel, Logic and Theism: Arguments for and against Beliefs in God,
Cambridge University Press, 2004.
15. C. Taliaferro, P. Draper & P. Quinn, The Blackwell Companion to the
Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2010.
16. N. Trakakis, The God Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe’s
Evidential Argument from Evil, Springer, 2007.
Useful Links
Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence, Internet Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy
World Congresses on Logic and Religion
91
Tractarian Logic and Semantic Technologies

Erik Thomsen
CTO* at Blender Logic, Cambridge, Mass, USA
[email protected]
Giovanni Mion
Istanbul Technical University, Turkey
[email protected]
From voice recognition and natural language processing, to semantic in-

teroperability and automated reasoning, semantic technologies are the latest
and quite possibly last frontier in information science. From banking to de-
fense, the modern world runs on semantic technologies. Semantic technolo-
gies find the best route, identify friends, make economic predictions, and
translate languages. Yet, they do not stand on their own. Rather they are
grounded in the more abstract world of logic which focuses on such issues
as propositional form, well formedness, substitution criteria, quantification,
logical grammars and certainty versus probability.
Early computer science pioneers were well versed in the logic models
inspired by Boole, Frege and Russell (and later by Carnap, Church, Tarski
and Quine to name but a few) — what became classical first order logic
‘FOL’. As a result, semantic technologies such as Relational Databases,
Natural Language Processing and OWL (the predominant model for se-
mantic/knowledge representations) were all grounded in FOL.
However, the intellectual lineage that became FOL was not without its
opponents, almost from the beginning. The Cambridge of pre-war England
was also home to Ludwig Wittgenstein whose Tractatus provided, in sig-
nificant respects, an alternative approach to logic from that espoused by
Russell.
The divide between Russell and Wittgenstein still lives today. And it
is of supreme relevance to both theoretical and applied logicians because
it points to unanswered foundational issues in logic AND practical conse-
quences stemming from foundational problems. Moreover, semantic tech-
*

Web Ontology Language
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Tutorials
nologies have been evolving, based on empirical feedback, in directions that

make them look less classical; rather more non-classical — specifically, Trac-
tarian.
So what was Wittgenstein’s Tractatus really about? And what makes

it relevant today? Though written in a dense and aphoristic style, the
Tractatus dealt squarely with many of the foundational issues that must be
addressed by any semantic technology including:
1. Boundaries between lexical and semantic processing
2. Boundaries between abstract typing systems and semantic types
3. The structure of knowledge
4. The interplay of formal and probabilistic reasoning
5. Meaning versus reference
6. Saying versus exemplifying/showing
The tutorial is thus divided into three sections:
I. In the first section, we describe how Wittgenstein’s logic in the Trac-

tatus (and his lectures from the early 1930s) differs from what became
absorbed into consensus first order logic FOL. Towards that end we
will revisit the Tractatus in the light of Wittgenstein’s lecture notes
from 1930 where he first rearticulated central points in the Tractatus
having had ten years to think about them. We will look in depth at
several passages in the Tractatus in this light including 2.0131, 3.314,
3.333, 3.342, 4.0312, 4.1272 and 5.
II. In the second section, we make the link to show where Wittgenstein’s
ideas about logic are relevant for the design of semantic technolo-
gies. We will focus on knowledge representation and natural lan-
guage processing. For example, we will show that for Wittgenstein,
all semantic technologies must be grounded in abstract typing sys-
tems. And logical operators link experiential (sense) propositions to
molecular/composite representations.
III. In the third section, we describe the limitations of current semantic

technologies especially in the areas of natural language and multi-
sensory (i.e., multi-modal) representation and how those limitations
can be traced to limitations in the consensus understanding of first
order logic FOL. Finally, we describe some current semantic engineer-
ing efforts in the fields of multi-domain semantic fusion and natural
language understanding that are explicitly based on Tractarian logic.
93
Bibliography
On Wittgenstein’s Logic in the Tractatus
1. E. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Hutchin-
son University Library, 1959.
2. R.J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.
3. P. Frascolla, Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Routledge,
2006.
4. S. Shanker, Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of
Mathematics, Croom Helm Publishers, London & State University
of New York Press, New York, 1987.
5. S. Toulmin & A. Janik, Wittgenstein’s Vienna, Simon and Schuster,
New York, 1973.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge,
1930–1932: From the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee,
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland, USA, 1980.
On semantic technologies
1. D.B. Lenat & R.V. Guha, Building Large Knowledge-Based Systems:
Representation and Inference in the Cyc Project, Addison-Wesley,
1990.
2. S. Nirenburg & V. Raskin, Ontological Semantics, MIT* Press, 2004.
3. J. Sowa, Knowledge Representation: Logical, Philosophical and Com-
putational Foundations, Brooks-Cole Publishing, Pacific Grove, Cal-
ifornia, USA, 2000.
4. E. Thomsen, OLAP Solutions: Building Multidimensional Informa-
tion Systems, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, New Jersey,
USA, 2002.
*
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Tutorials
On Logical Modeling of the Information Fusion

Jerzy Tomasik
LIMOS* , CNRS , Clermont-Auvergne University, France
[email protected]
Information fusion is one of the most successful theories developed since

about 20 years. However its meaning is still the subject of intense debate
[2]. Despite its interpretational problems, recently researchers started suc-
cessfully applying the apparatus of information synthesis to the economy,
finances, sensory fusion, databases integration etc. W.A. Sander in “Infor-
mation Fusion” [6] describes the domain as follows:
Information Fusion or Data Fusion is the process of acquisition, fil-

tering, correlation and integration of relevant information from var-
ious sources, like sensors, databases, knowledge bases and humans,
into one representational format that is appropriate for deriving de-
cisions regarding the interpretation of the information, system goals
(like recognition, tracking or situation assessment), sensor manage-
ment, or system control.
The aim of the tutorial is to give an overview of a few chosen models and
information synthesis formalisms. We introduce three models of the fusion
operator on theories/specifications. See e.g. [2] for other fusion models. No
previous knowledge of information fusion is assumed, but we will do assume
basic knowledge of propositional and first-order logic.
Everybody interested in logical modeling is welcome to join. The tutorial

will be divided in the following three sessions.
I. Fusion by Products
We start with a quick historical overview of the fusion problem and
we present the first fusion formalization under the generalized products of
relational structures. Fraissé-Hintika-Galvin Autonomous Systems are the
main tool for the decision synthesis of models of first-order theories under
products of models [4,7,8].
*

95
II. Los Ultrasynthesis

This lecture will be devoted to the exposition of the theory synthesis
extracted from the analysis of the celebrated Los Ultraproduct Theorem
[7,8]. A special case of such an Ultrasynthesis Operator for theories of
initial segments of a standard model of arithmetics [1], formulated by M.
Mostowski, will be the principal subject of our investigations.
III. Sensory Minimization

We conclude by the Dasarathy’s [5] Sensory Fusion Minimization ques-
tion on the minimal number of sensors necessary for the recognition of any
object. Here the formalism of the sensory fusion is based on the multi-head
finite automata recognition. Under the sensing multi-head automata model
we prove the so called ’3-sensory Theorem’ [3], saying that three sensors
only are sufficient.
Bibliography
1. M. Krynicki, J. Tomasik & K. Zdanowski, “Theories of initial segments
of standard models of arithmetics and their complete extensions”, The-
oretical Computer Science, vol. 412(31), pp. 3975–3991, 2011.
2. M. Kokar, J. Tomasik & J. Weyman, “Formalizing classes of information
fusion systems”, Information Fusion, vol. 5(3), pp. 189–202, 2004.
3. J.A. Tomasik, “Discrete dynamic approach to multisensory multitrack
fusion”, in Aerosense 2000: Signal and Image Processing, Proceed-
ings of Spie * , Orlando, Florida, USA, Proceedings, vol. 4051, 2000,
pp. 369–379.
4. J.A. Tomasik, “Synthesis theories versus semantics integration for com-
plex situation assessment”, in 8th NATO Military Sensing Symposium,
Graf-Zeppelin-Haus, Friedrichshafen, Germany, volume SET-169, RSY-
025, NATO, 2011.
5. B.V. Dasarathy, “Metric sensitivity of reciprocal relationship bonds in
the knowledge discovery process”, in Aerosense 2000: Signal and Image
Processing, Proceedings of Spie, Orlando, Florida, USA, Proceedings,
vol. 4057, Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery: Theory, Tools, and
Technology II, 2000, doi:10.1117/12.381719.
6. W.A. Sander, “Information Fusion”, in International Military and De-
fense Encyclopedia, volume 3, G–L, edited by T.N. Dupuy, F.D. Mar-
giotta, C. Johnson, J. Motley & D.L. Bongard, 1993, pp. 1259–1265.
7. C.C. Chang & H.J. Keisler, Model Theory, Elsevier, 1990.
8. W. Hodges, Model Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
*
International Society for Optical Engineering
96
Tutorials
Mathematics and Logic in Ancient Greece

Ioannis Vandoulakis
Program of Studies in Hellenic Culture,
Open University of Cyprus, Cyprus
[email protected]
The question of the relation of mathematics and logic in ancient Greece

has puzzled many historians, who viewed no connection between Euclidean
geometrical demonstration and logical reasoning as conducted within Aris-
totle’s syllogistics and Stoic propositional logic.
The aim of this tutorial is to identify logical principles and modes of

reasoning as applied in mathematics and in philosophical thinking. Logical
thinking manifests itself in mathematical and philosophical reasoning over
such fundamental questions, as the problem of the finite and the infinite
and thereby of the finitary and infinitary methods of handling the infinite
and the modes of reasoning about it, the problem of classes of finite objects
and the status of their existence, and other relevant problems.
I. The finitary arithmetic of Euclid’s Elements

(1) The “domain” of Euclid’s “Elements”, Book VI. The Euclidean number
— arithmos — has the following formal structure: A ⇌ {aE}, where E des-
ignates the unit and a is the number of times (multitude) that E is repeated
to obtain the number A, denoted by a segment.
Euclid constructs his arithmetic for the numbers-arithmoi, that is for

the numbers designated as segments, while the arithmetic of multitudes
is taken for granted. Thus, arithmetic is constructed as formal theory of
numbers-arithmoi, while the concept of multitude or iteration number has
a specific meta-theoretical character.
(2) Equality. The concepts “equal”, “less”, “greater”, to which today are
ascribed a purely quantitative meaning, in Euclid seems to be also asso-
ciated with the geometric notion of relative position, but also applied to
multitudes when Euclid compares two sets of numbers-arithmoi.
(3) Generality. Euclid sometimes uses quantificational words applied to

numbers-arithmoi, although such expressions are very rare. The most com-
mon way by which Euclid expresses generality is to speak about arithmos
97
without article. Thus, most enunciations in Euclid’s arithmetical Books

state some property about numbers, where arithmos is used without arti-
cle. However, when he proceeds to the ekthesis of a proposition, general
statements about numbers are interpreted as statements about an arbitrary
given (indicated) number. In virtue of the instantiation described above
the process of proof takes places actually with an arbitrary given number.
This “rule of specification” is considered inversible, although Euclid applies
explicitly the inverse rule very rarely in the arithmetical Books. The degree
of generality attained in this way is no higher than generality expressible
by free variables ranging over numbers.
(4) Fundamental concepts. The basic undefined concept of Euclidean arith-

metic is that of to measure (katametrein), which underlies most of the kinds
of numbers defined by Euclid. The concept “a number B measures a num-
ber A” can be interpreted as follows: B measures A ⇌ (B < A) & (A = nB),
that is A is obtained by n repetitions of B.
(5) Implicit assumptions concerning reasoning over infinite processes. In the

proofs of Proposition 1 and 2, exposing the process of anthyphairesis, Euclid
uses the following implicit assumptions:
i. The least number principle: a set of multiples nB, such that nB ≥ A

has a least element n0 , such that n0 B ≥ A, yet (n0 − 1)B < A.
ii. The infinite descent principle: the process of anthyphairesis will termi-
nate in a finite number of steps, that is the chain A > B > B1 > B2 >
. . . > Bk > . . . is finite.
iii. If X measures A and B, then X measures A ± B, that is if A = mX,

B = nX, then A ± B = (m ± n)X.
The first assumption is equivalent to the principle of mathematical in-

duction if the following axiom is added: every number (except the unit)
has a predecessor. The second assumption is equivalent to the principle of
mathematical induction and is used in Proposition 31. However, the use of
these principles has always finitary character in Euclid.
(6) Introduction of entities of higher complexity. In Propositions 20–22, Eu-

clid uses the “class” of all pairs that “have the same ratio”. Each such class
is uniquely associated with one pair of numbers, namely the least pair of
numbers that have the same ratio. Euclid gives an effective procedure for
finding such a least pair.
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Tutorials
(7) The finitary principle and the use of effective procedures. Euclidean
arithmetic is constructed from below, beginning from the unit. Further,
a number of arithmetical concepts are introduced in the Definitions of Book
VII. From these, the concepts of part, multiple, parts, proportionality, and
prime numbers are not defined effectively. However, they become effective
in virtue of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 that provide an effective procedure for
any numbers to find their common measure. In this way, the proofs of the
Propositions 4–19 should be considered as effective either. The introduc-
tion of more complex objects is realised through the comparison of these
objects and the establishment of an equality-type relation between them.
Euclid always provides an effective procedure for finding the least pair of
the objects found in equality-type relation.
Therefore all propositions that involve existence of numbers appear, in

Euclid’s arithmetic, associated with some effective procedure for finding the
required number. This kind of arithmetic is constructed without assump-
tions of axiomatic character. It lacks the concept of absolute number or any
elaborated concept of equality.
(8) Reductio ad absurdum. Nowhere Euclid makes use of the assumption

that all numbers form a fixed universe of discourse that is given beforehand.
Hence, he never postulates or proves existence of numbers having a certain
property, but always ‘constructs’ the required numbers by means of effective
procedures. Existence of numbers is never deduced by strong indirect ar-
guments. The use of reductio ad absurdum relies on a specific propositional
form of the law of excluded middle and applies to decidable arithmetical
predicates. Moreover, Euclid seems to avoid the law of excluded middle
in the arithmetical proofs. All propositions of the form P (A) ∨ ¬P (A) are
proved by consideration of each part of the disjunction separately.
(9) Underlying logic. The approach adopted by Euclid does not need any
special predicate logic. Euclid’s arithmetic can be characterised as a finitary
fragment of classical arithmetic; hence, it does not necessarily presuppose
the full force of first-order predicate logic.
99
II. Arithmetic reasoning in the Neo-Pythagorean tradition

Pythagorean number theory in the form survived in the texts of later
authors has the following distinctive features:
(1) Arithmetical reasoning is conducted over a 3-dimensional “domain” that

extends indefinitely in the direction of increase.
(2) The monas, denoted by an alpha, is taken to be a designated object (yet,

not a number), over which a (potentially infinite) iterative procedure
of attaching an alpha is admitted. Numbers are defined as finite suites
(finite instances of the natural series). Various kinds of numbers can
be defined as suites constructed according to certain rules, following a
finitary form of inductive definition.
(3) Arithmetic is then developed by genetic constructions of various finite

(plane or spatial) schematic patterns. Therefore, Pythagorean arith-
metic represents a visual theory of counting over a distinctive combina-
torial “domain”.
(4) Arithmetical reasoning is conducted in the form of mental experiments

over concrete objects of combinatorial character. Any assertion about
numbers utters a law, which can be confirmed in each case by pure
combinatorial means.
(5) Arithmetic concerns affirmative sentences stating something ‘positive’

that can be confirmed by means of the construction of the corresponding
configuration (deixis). No kind of ‘negative’ sentence is found. It is a
‘positive’ finitary fragment of classical arithmetic.
III. Self-reference in Plato and Aristotle: the Third Man

Paradox
In Plato’s Parmenides (132a–133b), the widely known Third Man Para-
dox is stated, which has special interest for the history of logical reasoning,
because of the self-reference involved. Many papers call attention to the vi-
olation of a metalogical principle — the type rules — because of the Third
Man Paradox. This view is encouraged by the linguistic difficulties which
Plato has faced in his attempt to formulate an ontology of abstract entities,
i.e. that in Greek language abstract and concrete terms are formally indistin-
guishable: to leukon (literally ‘the white’) may signify both ‘the white thing’
and ‘whiteness’. The root of this misconception stems from the fact that
in English literature the Platonic terms eidos and idea are usually rendered
100
Tutorials
by the same word: Form or Idea. However, we find a clear distinction in

Plato’s texts, that corresponds to a fundamental logical distinction between
class-as-many, distributed to its elements by predication, and class-as-one,
standing as an individual in an extended sense and capable of being an
element of a further class-as-many (Russel), or between distributive and col-
lective class (Leśniewski), etc.
The Third Man paradox is obtained, speaking in modern terms, as fol-

lows: out of all the things of an initial domain of particulars to which the
property ‘. . . is large’ (idea) applies is formed an eidos (‘the large’). Further,
this eidos is added to the initial domain of particulars and the scope of the
universal quantifier ‘all’ is extended over it, taken for individual. The con-
struction results in an impredicative generation of a (potentially) infinite
sequence of new eide (infinite regress).
Plato puts the following solution into Parmenides’ mouth. The eidos is
defined as a paradigm, which expresses the form of instances of the eidos,
considered as a singular thing ‘found’ in nature. Further, participation in
an eidos is identified with instantiation of the eidos. Further, the eidos is
compared with a fixed instance of it and the following question is posed:
can we conclude that an eidos is similar to an instance of it on the basis
that the latter is an instantiation of the eidos?
Plato defines similarity in such a way that leads to a negative answer

to the above question: entities are similar to each other if and only if they
participate in one and the same eidos. In this way, what is today called
domain of the class (the domain of ‘participants’ of the eidos is taken into
consideration. This domain consists of homogeneous things (“similar” to
each other). Therefore, neither a thing is “similar” (homogeneous) to an
eidos, nor an eidos to another thing that participates in it; otherwise, if
an eidos is “made similar” to a thing, we obtain the Third Man Paradox.
In this way, Parmenides makes a clear demarcation between two kinds of
homogeneous entities: the level of particulars and the level of eidon, and
the confusion between them is ad hoc removed.
The Peripatetic commentaries of the Third Man Paradox focus primarily

on the statement of the argument and the premises on which it is grounded,
rather than on its solution by means of the predicate of similarity. The first
scholar of antiquity who explicitly ascribes a solution to Plato is Proclus.
101
Bibliography
1. I.G. Bashmakova, “The Arithmetic Books of Euclid’s Elements” (in
Russian), Istoriko-matematičeskie issledovaniya, vol. I, 1948, p. 321.
2. J. Corcoran (editor), Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations,
D. Reidel, 1974.
3. G. Fine, On Ideas. Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms,
Clarendon Press, 1993.
4. H. Freudenttall, “Zur Geschichte der vollständigen Induktion”, Archive
Internationale d’Histoire des Sciences, vol. 6, 1953, pp. 17–37.
5. J.-L. Gardies, Le raisonnement par l’absurde, Presses Universitaires de
France, 1991.
6. A.F. Losev, History of Ancient Aesthetics (in Russian), 7 volumes,
Isskustvo, Moscow, 1963–1988.
7. I. Mueller, Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Eu-
clid’s “Elements”, MIT* Press, 1981.
8. F.J. Pelletier & E.N. Zalta, “How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man”,
Nous, vol. 34(2), 2000, pp. 165–202, https://mally.stanford.edu/
plato.pdf.
9. I. Vandoulakis, “Was Euclid’s Approach to Arithmetic Axiomatic?”,
Oriens-Occidens, Cahiers du Centre d’Histoire des Sciences et des Phi-
losophies Arabes et Médiévales, vol. 2, 1998, pp. 141–181.
10. I. Vandoulakis, “Styles of Greek arithmetic reasoning”, Study of the
History of Mathematics, RIMS Kôkyûroku, no. 1625, 2009, pp. 12–22,
https://goo.gl/dc7Fuu.
11. I. Vandoulakis, “Plato’s Third Man Paradox: its Logic and History”,
Archives Internationale d’Histoire des Sciences, vol. 59(162), 2009,
pp. 3–53.
12. I. Vandoulakis, “A Generic Interpretation of Neo-Pythagorean Arith-
metic”, Oriens-Occidens, Cahiers du Centre d’Histoire des Sciences et
des Philosophies Arabes et Médiévales, vol. 7, 2010, pp. 113–154.
13. G. Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”, Philosoph-
ical Review, vol. 63, 1954, pp. 319–349.
Useful Link
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Edward N. Zalta, “How to Say Goodbye to
the Third Man”: https://mally.stanford.edu/plato.pdf.
*
102
Tutorials
Natural language argument,

the fallacies and p-logic
Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden
[email protected]
This tutorial reviews the main contemporary approaches to natural lan-

guage argument, explains the role these approaches assign to the fallacies,
and contrasts this with applications of probability theory (aka “p-logic”) to
select fallacies.
As John Woods [19, p. 15] put it: “Formal logic is a theory of logical
forms; and informal logic is all the rest”. Informal logicians [e.g. 11,1] as
well as proponents of the Pragma-dialectical school of argumentation [4,3]
tend to view “all the rest” as shouldering the real work in the analysis and
evaluation of natural language argumentation.
Indeed, many reject formal methods. In place of the proof techniques of

the truth-functional calculus, for instance, typical resources rather include
argument diagrams, schemes, and the fallacies. Similarly, rather than en-
dorsing soundness (premise truth and deductive inferential validity) as a
standard of good argument, informal logicians speak of cogency (premise
acceptability, relevance, and inferential sufficiency).
In the 1960s, this anti-formalist stance arose in reaction to the only

widely available formal apparatus being first-order deductive logic. The
breath of formal resources available today, however, makes a continued dis-
enchantment with them at least questionable. In fact, their neglect deprives
of useful resources in appraising defeasible reasoning and argument in ways
that let formal and informal realign resources.
The tutorial starts by reviewing the informal resources. We particu-

larly study the role of the fallacies [10] in Walton’s [16,17] dialogical ap-
proach, and reconstruct the rules for critical discussion in the Pragma-
dialectical model, whose consensualism particularly epistemologists have
criticized [15,13]. This critique demarcates an import difference, and en-
tails a distinct view on what the fallacies are (not) [20,21].
Against this background, we offer a brief technical introduction to prob-
103
ability theory (p-logic), then apply it to give an analysis of argument co-

gency. This not only clarifies a core concept of informal logic. P-logic also
provides an important corrective to its usual applications. In application to
select (alleged) fallacies, indeed, formal and informal normative approaches
to natural language argumentation can align.
Building on groundwork by Oaksford and Hahn [14] and Korb [12],

among others, this contributes to a burgeoning area of research that suc-
cessfully applies probabilistic reasoning to natural language argumentation.
It also supplements recent work by Hahn and Hornikx [7], for instance, who
use p-logic to formalize argument schemes such as those proposed by Wal-
ton, Reed, and Macagno [18].
Please note: The three tutorial sessions build on each other. Rather than
pick one or two sessions, participants would do well to attend all three.
We provide learning materials in class as online resources; there is no prior
reading assignment. A background in formal logic or probability theory is
neither required nor harmful to profit from the tutorial. The main learning
outcome is the improved ability to orient oneself within the field of argu-
mentation studies, and correctly apply p-logic to such crucial notions as
argument cogency, fallacy, or argument strength, among others.
References
1. J.A. Blair, “Relevance, Acceptability and Sufficiency Today”, in Ground-
work in the Theory of Argumentation, edited by C.W. Tindale, Springer,
2012, pp. 87–100.
2. A. Corner & U. Hahn, “Normative theories of argumentation: Are some
norms better than others?”, Synthese, vol. 190(16), 2013,
pp. 3579–3610.
3. F.H. van Eemeren, Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse.
Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, John Ben-
jamins, Amsterdam, 2010.
4. F.H. van Eemeren & R. Grootendorst, A systematic theory of argumen-
tation: the pragma-dialectical approach, Cambridge University Press,
2004.
5. D. Godden & F. Zenker, “Denying antecedents and affirming conse-
quents: The state of the art”, Informal Logic, vol. 35(1), 2015,
pp. 88–134.
6. D. Godden & F. Zenker, “A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency”,
Synthese, vol. 195(4), 2018, pp. 1715–1740.
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Tutorials
7. U. Hahn & J. Hornikx, “A normative framework for argument qual-

ity: Argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation”, Synthese,
vol. 193(6), 2016, pp. 1833–1873.
8. U. Hahn & M. Oaksford, “A Bayesian Approach to Informal Argument
Fallacies”, Synthese, vol. 152(2), 2006, pp. 207–236.
9. U. Hahn & M. Oaksford, “A normative theory of argument strength”,
Informal Logic, vol. 26(1), 2006, pp. 1–24.
10. C. Hamblin, Fallacies, Methuen, London, 1970.
11. R. Johnson, Manifest rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument,
Lawrence Earbaum, Mahwah, New Jersey, USA, 2000.
12. K. Korb, “Bayesian informal logic and fallacy”, Informal Logic,
vol. 24(1), 2004, pp. 41–70.
13. C. Lumer, “Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation”,
Argumentation, vol. 24(1), 2010, pp. 41–69.
14. M. Oaksford & U. Hahn, “A Bayesian approach to the argument from
ignorance”, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 58(2),
2004, pp. 75–85.
15. H. Siegel & J. Biro, “Epistemic Normativity, Argumentation, and Fal-
lacies”, Argumentation, vol. 11(3), 1997, pp. 277–292.
16. D.N. Walton, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy, University of Alabama
Press, 1995.
17. D.N. Walton, Why Fallacies Appear to be Better Arguments Than They
Are, Informal Logic, vol. 30(2), 2010, pp. 159–184.
18. D.N. Walton, C. Reed & F. Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008.
19. J. Woods, “How philosophical is informal logic?”, Informal Logic,
vol. 20(2), 2000, pp. 139–167, https://goo.gl/aaywTt.
20. J. Woods, Errors of Reasoning: Naturalizing the Logic of Inference,
College Publications, London, 2013.
21. J. Woods, “Epistemology Mathematicized”, Informal Logic, vol. 33(2),
2013, pp. 292–331.
22. F. Zenker, “Changes in Conduct-rules and Ten Commandments:
Pragma-dialectics 1984 vs. 2004”, Proceedings of the International So-
ciety for the Study of Argumentation, edited by F.H. van Eemeren, hold
in Amsterdam, 2006, Sic Sat* , Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 1581–1589.
23. F. Zenker, “The polysemy of ‘fallacy’ — or ‘bias’, for that matter”,
in Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias, Proceedings of the 11th Con-
ference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, edited
by P. Bondy & L. Benaquista, 2016, Windsor, Ontario, Canada,
pp. 1–14.
*
International Centre for the Study of Argumentation
105
Introduction to Unified Logic

Xunwei Zhou
Beijing Union University, China
[email protected]
Unified logic, also called mutually-inversistic logic, is constructed by the

author. It unifies Aristotelian logic, classical logic, relevance logic, modal
logic, dialectical logic, ancient Chinese logic, Boolean algebra and lattice,
natural deduction, fuzzy logic, rough set, non-monotonic logic and para-
consistent logic. It is also a unification of extensional logic and intensional
logic, a unification of inductive logic and deductive logic and a unification
of two-valued logic and many-valued logic.
Session 1
— Material implication vs. mutually inverse implication
— Composition operators vs. connection operators
— Formations of terms and propositions
— Truth tables for composition operators
— Inductive compositions vs. decompositions
— Truth tables of connection operators
— Mutually inverse diagrams for connection operators
— The principle of meaningfulness and meaninglessness duality for distin-
guished propositions
Session 2
— First-level single quasi-predicate calculus
— Second-level single quasi-predicate calculus
Session 3
— Unified logics unify more than a dozen logics.
Bibliography
1. Xunwei Zhou, Mutually-Inversistic Logic, Mathematics, and Their Ap-
plications, Central Compilation & Translation Press, Beijing, China,
2013.
106
9 – Poster Session for Students
During the school part of UNILOG’2018, in June 16–20, we are orga-

nizing a poster session for students and young researchers (Post-docs). A
good opportunity to interact. It is a way to:
present what you are doing and/or what you want to do
to receive feedback and counseling from advanced researchers
to know what other people are doing
If your poster is selected for presentation at the Universal Logic School
you should register at the school, but we will waive for you the fee for the
congress. Moreover the three best posters will be selected for presentation
during the congress, in June 21–26.
If you are interested, send your poster before March 15 to vichy@uni-
log.org.
The size of the poster should be: 100 cm x 140 cm / 40 inches x 55
inches.
The Logic of Public Debates

Antsa Nasandratra Nirina Avo
LRAM* , Doctoral School of Modeling and Computing,
University of Fianarantsoa, Madagascar
nirhina [email protected]
Solo Randriamahaleo
Faculty of Science, University of Fianarantsoa, Madagascar
[email protected]
Jean Sallantin
CNRS , Microrobotic Laboratory, LIRMM ,
Montpellier, France
[email protected]
*
Laboratoire de Recherche Appliqué et Multidisciplinaires

Laboratoire d’Informatique, de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier
107
Faithful Semantical Embedding

of Dyadic Deontic Logic E in HOL
Christoph Benzmüller, Ali Farjami & Xavier Parent
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[email protected], [email protected],
[email protected]
Some logical and algebraic aspects of C∞ -rings*

Jean Cerqueira Berni & Hugo Luiz Mariano
Institute of Mathematics and Statistics,
University of São Paulo, Brazil
The Possibility Implies the Necessity:

Gödel’s Proof for the Existence of God
Kyle Bryant
Louisina Scholar’s College,
Northwestern State University, USA
[email protected]
A paraconsistent approach to da Costa’s deontic

logic: beyond contradictions and triviality
Gregory Carneiro
Department of Philosophy, University of Brası́lia, Brazil
[email protected]
*
Supported by Coordination of Improvement of Higher Level Personnel (CAPES), Brazil.
108
Poster Session for Students

with Quantifiers
Caio de Andrade Mendes & Hugo Luiz Mariano
Efficient Protocols for Privacy and Integrity

in the Cloud
Anca Nitulescu
École Normale Supérieure, Paris France
[email protected]
Multirings, Quadratic Forms and Functors:

Relationship between axiomatizations
on quadratic forms
Kaique Matias de Andrade Roberto & Hugo Luiz Mariano
109
10 – ¿Why, what, when, where
and how to publish?
At the end of the school part of UNILOG’2018, June 20 at 18h-19h,

there will be a round table about publication, a central activity of research
it is worth to reflect on. The participants are:
Jean-Yves Beziau, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, founder

and Editor-in-Chief of the journals Logica Universalis and South Amer-
ican Journal of Logic, the book series Studies in Universal Logic and
Logic PhDs, Editor of the Logic Area of the Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
Pierre Cartier, IHES* , Bures-sur-Yvette, France, Bourbaki Member and

Editor (1955-1983)
Didier Dubois, IRIT , France, Editor of Fuzzy Sets and Systems
Clemens Heine, Executive Editor of Mathematics and Applied Sciences

at Birkhäuser/Springer, Basel, Switzerland
Rohit Parikh, City University of New York, USA, Former Editor of

International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science (1990–1995)
and Journal of Philosophical Logic (2000–2003)
*
Institut des Hautes Études Scientifiques

Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique
111
Part III
6th World Congress

on Universal Logic
113
11 – Opening Ceremony of the
6th World Congress
on Universal Logic
It will take place on June 21, 2018, 11–12h, at Vichy University Campus.
The following authorities and professors have already confirmed they

will come:
Charlotte Benoit, Elected of the Regional Council and Deputy Mayor

of the City of Vichy, France
Jean-Yves Beziau, Professor of Logic, University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro,

co-chair of UNILOG’2018
Olivier Cavagna, Vice-Director of Vichy Community, France
Cécile Charasse, Associate Professor of Management Sciences, Head

of the Allier Institute of Technology, Université Clermont-Auvergne,
France
Vedat Kamer, Professor of Logics, University of İstanbul, Turkey, co-

chair of UNILOG’2015
Christophe Rey, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Université

Clermont-Auvergne, France, co-chair of UNILOG’2018
Farouk Toumani, Professor of Computer Science, Head of the LIMOS

laboratory* , CNRS & Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
*

115
12 – Secret Speaker
The secret speaker is a speaker whose identity is revealed only at the

time of her/its/his speech. The presence of the secret speaker gives a dra-
matic touch to the UNILOG event since the first edition in Montreux in
2005.
Previous secret speakers at UNILOG include Saul Kripke, Jaakko

Hintikka, Grigori Mints, Benedikt Löwe and exclude Brigitte Bardot, Kurt
Gödel, Aristotle Schwarzenegger, Saharon Shelah. . .
The talk of the secret speaker will be at a secret time in a secret place.
Keep your eyes open!
Guess who she/it/he is and win a free banquet dinner!
Send your guess before June 15 midnight to [email protected].
The happy winner will be the first to send the right answer. All partic-
ipants of UNILOG are welcome to play, except the secret speaker.
Hint: “What I tell you three times is true.” (The Hunting of the Snark,
Lewis Carroll)
117
13 – Talks of Keynote Speakers
Argument-based logics
Leila Amgoud*
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse, France
[email protected]
Argumentation is an alternative approach for handling inconsistency,

which justifies conclusions by arguments. Starting from a knowledge base
encoded in a particular logical language, an argumentation logic builds ar-
guments and attack relations between them using a consequence operator
associated with the language, then it evaluates the arguments using a se-
mantics. Finally, it draws conclusions that are supported by “strong” argu-
ments.
In this talk, I present two families of such logics: the family using exten-
sion semantics defined in [1] and the one using ranking semantics introduced
in [2]. I discuss the outcomes of both families and compare them. I also
compare the argumentation approach with other well-known paraconsistent
logics.
References
1. P. Dung, “On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental
Role in Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person
Games”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 88, 1995, pp. 321–357.
2. L. Amgoud & J. Ben-Naim, “Axiomatic foundations of acceptability
semantics”, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 2016, pp. 2–11.
*
Keynote speaker at the session “Argumentation” (page 460).
119
Material exclusion, contradictions

and other oppositions
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart*
Department of Philosophy
Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil
[email protected]
It is notoriously difficult to argue against the dialetheist: one cannot

easily lead her to revise her beliefs by pointing to a contradiction, given
that dialetheists do accept some contradictions as being true. As a result, it
seems that there is very little for the dialetheist to fear. Recently, Francesco
Berto (for instance, in [1]) has argued that there is a sense of contradiction
that even a dialetheist should concede is unacceptable: a sense involving
material exclusion. Roughly, if one sentence represents a state of affairs A
that materially excludes a state B, then, A and B cannot both be the case.
This would be non-question begging, given that it does not involve seman-
tical notions such as truth and falsity, the core notions that are in question
for the dialetheist. However, we shall argue that in most cases the notion
of material incompatibility gives us only a weaker kind of opposition, the
one known from the square of opposition as contrariety. As a result, that is
not the kind of contradiction that the dialetheist has in mind. However, the
dialetheist is not on better grounds. In claiming that some contradictions
are true, the negation employed represents a weaker kind of opposition,
also known from the square of opposition: subcontrariety. In fact, both
approaches fail to grant the target notion of contradiction, the one present
in the square. That concept of contradiction, we shall argue, allows for no
exception. We shall provide for evidence that what has been conflated in
these and related discussions is the notion of contradiction present in the
square of oppositions and a version of the law of non-contradiction (LNC),
¬(α ∧ ¬α), which is valid for negations representing contrariety and vio-
lated by negations representing subcontrariety. Validating the LNC is not
enough to grant a contradiction in the target sense; violating LNC is enough
to grant that we are no longer having a contradiction in the target sense.
Reference
1. F. Berto “How to rule out things with words: strong paraconsistency
and the algebra of exclusion”, in New waves in philosophical logic, edited
by G. Restall & G.K. Russell, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 169–189, 2012.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Reflections on Paraconsistency” (page 295).
120
Talks of Keynote Speakers
Analogies in Civil Law

Matthias Armgardt*
Konstanz University, Germany
[email protected]
Whereas in Common Law legal reasoning is based on analogical reason-

ing, in Civil Law analogies are only exceptions. We will discuss the existing
logical approaches for analogies in Civil Law and try to develop a new one.
Analogies are based on similarities. The talk will deal with two issues
concerning similarity. Firstly, it will be discussed whether the legal prereq-
uisites or the interests behind the rule are the adequate point of reference
for the similarity. Secondly, we will deal with the question of the adequate
degree of similarity. We will define a necessary (but not sufficient) minimum
standard for the overweighing of interests. Based on the minimum standard
we will develop a more adequate model.
Exploring the internal language of toposes

Ingo Blechschmidt
Institute for Mathematics, University of Augsburg, Germany
[email protected]
Since the work of the early pioneers in the 1970s, it’s known that any
topos supports an internal language, which allows to speak and reason about
its objects and morphisms in a naive element-based language: From the
internal perspective, objects of the topos look like sets, morphisms look like
maps between sets, epimorphisms look like surjective maps, group objects
look like plain groups and so on; and any theorem which has an intuitionistic
proof also holds in the internal universe of a topos.
With recent discoveries of new applications of the internal language in
algebra, geometry, homotopy theory, mathematical physics and measure
theory, the study of the internal language of toposes is currently experienc-
ing a resurgence. Our goal is give an introduction to this topic and illustrate
the usefulness of the internal language with two specific examples.
Firstly, the internal language of the “little Zariski topos” allows us to
assume without loss of generality that any reduced ring is Noetherian and in
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic, Law and Legal Reasoning” (page 381).

Keynote speaker at the workshop “Categories and Logic” (page 368).
121
fact a field, as long as we restrict to intuitionistic reasoning. This technique

yields for instance a simple one-paragraph proof of Grothendieck’s generic
freeness lemma, because it is trivial for fields. We thereby improve on the
substantially longer and somewhat convoluted previously known proofs.
Secondly, the internal language of the “big Zariski topos” can be used to
develop a synthetic account of algebraic geometry, in which schemes appear
as plain sets and morphisms of schemes appear as maps between these sets.
Fundamental to this account is the notion of “synthetic quasicoherence”,
which doesn’t have a counterpart in synthetic differential geometry and
which endows the internal universe with a distinctive algebraic flavor.
Somewhat surprisingly, the work on synthetic algebraic geometry is re-
lated to an age-old question in the study of classifying toposes. The talk
closes with an invitation to the many open problems of the field.
Peircean logic as semiotic and biosemiotics

as transdisciplinary framework
Søren Brier*
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark
[email protected]
Peircean pragmaticism is close to Poppers critical rationalism in its fal-

libilism and evolutionary thinking. Peirce’s synechistic continuity thinking
includes a biosemiotics that has been develop over the last 30 years [2] rep-
resents a form of postmodern semiotic realism attempting to encompass
qualitative and quantitative methods. Herby it represents a unity of science
that the logical positivist could not produce and offers an alternative to con-
structivist postmodernism’s many incommensurable small stories. So what
is the ontology that makes such a common framework for quantitative and
qualitative sciences possible? Peirce produces a transdisciplinary process
philosophy through his triadic pragmaticist semiotic realism [1]. For Bar-
bieri — and many other well-established researchers in the natural sciences
— to be scientific is to be able to give mechanistic model explanations
and eventually extend them with dualist theories of codes and informa-
tion. In [3] I have argued that this foundation is not enough. It does not
even embrace a systems and cybernetic foundation making self-organization
possible. Peirce is inspired by German idealism, Especially Shelling and ex-
changes Hegel spirit and dialectics with his triadic semiotic logic. It is based
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “The Logic of Social Practices” (page 214).
122
on his three phaneroscopic (phenomenological) categories and views logic as

semiotic and as a normative science for right thinking. He integrates this
with empirical quantitative science, since he was educated as a chemist and
did empirical work in physics [4]. This integration of a phenomenological
and hermeneutical aspect at the foundation of his semiotic view of logic
and empirical science is possible because of a changed view on reality and
science [5]. The talk explains this construction.
References
1. K.-O. Apel, Charles Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism,
Prometheus Books, New York, 1995.
2. S. Brier, Cybersemiotics: why information is not enough, Toronto
University Press, 2008/13.
3. S. Brier, “Can Biosemiotics be a “Science” if its Purpose is to be a
Bridge between the Natural, Social and Human Sciences?”, Progress in
Biophysics and Molecular Biology, vol. 119(3), 2015, pp. 576–587.
4. S. Brier, “How to Produce a Transdisciplinary Information Concept for
a Universal Theory of Information?”, in Information Studies and the
Quest for Transdisciplinarity: Unity through Diversity, vol. 9, edited
by M. Burgin & W. Hofkirchner, World Scientific Series in Informa-
tion Studies, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 2017, pp. 11–58,
doi:10.1142/9789813109001 0002.
5. V. Romanini & E. Fernandez (editors), Peirce and Biosemiotics:
A Guess at the Riddle of Life, Biosemiotics series, vol. 1, Springer,
2014.
A categorical presentation of probabilistic logic

Pierre Cartier*
University of Paris-Saclay
[email protected]
Since the invention of categories by Eilenberg and MacLane (a logician

by training), in 1948, most of the mathematical theories have been reformu-
lated using the new paradigm. It is a common opinion that measure theory
and probability theory don’t fit in this paradigm. Going back to Boole and
Tarski, I plan to sketch a development of measure theory (and probability)
putting categories in the heart of the matter.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Categories and Logic” (page 368).
123
Quantum Theory for Kids

Bob Coecke*
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK
[email protected]
In [1] we present an entirely diagrammatic presentation of quantum the-

ory with applications in quantum foundations and quantum information.
This was the result of many years of work by many, and started of as a
category-theoretic axiomatisation motivated by computer science as well as
axiomatic physics. However, I have always felt that the diagrammatic pre-
sentation is of great use in its own right, be it to bridge disciplines, make
quantum theory more easy to grasp, or, for educational purposes, in [2] we
made the bolt claim that using diagrams high-school kids could even out-
perform their teachers, or university students. Now, we will put this claim
to the test. To do so, we have written two tutorials [3,4], covering exactly
the same material, but one only using diagrams, while the other contains
the standard Hilbert space presentation. There are corresponding sets of
examples too. We will present the pictorial tutorial, as well as provide the
logical underpinning of this material.
References
1. B. Coecke & A. Kissinger, Picturing Quantum Processes: A First Course
in Quantum Theory and Diagrammatic Reasoning, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2017.
2. B. Coecke, “Quantum picturalism”, Contemporary Physics, vol. 51(1),
2010, pp. 59–83.
3. B. Coecke & S. Gogioso, “Quantum theory in Pictures”, Top Secret.
4. B. Coecke & S. Gogioso, “Quantum theory in Hilbert space”, a bit less
top Secret.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic for Children” (page 361).
124
A unified view of some formalisms handling

incomplete and inconsistent information
Didier Dubois*
IRIT , CNRS , University of Toulouse, France
[email protected]
Sets of formulas in classical logic are often called knowledge or belief

bases, as containing explicit information held by an agent. This framework
does not allow for reasoning about ignorance. The issue of reasoning about
incomplete information or ignorance has been addressed independently in
three communities:
in uncertainty management, scholars have for a long time used addi-
tive set-functions to represent belief often using numerical measure-
ment methods like in subjective probability theory, and more recently
using non-additive monotonic set functions like possibility and necessity
measures, Shafer’s belief and plausibility functions, Walley’s upper and
lower previsions.
in logic there has been two main trends. Very early in the XXth century,
some logicians have tried to handle the notion of ignorance by means
of an additional truth-value, like Kleene and Lukasiewicz for instance.
More recently, the full power of modal logic has been exploited to de-
velop epistemic or doxastic logics, especially using extensions of system
KD45.
This paper proposes a formal framework in the form of a two-tiered
propositional logic, which can capture the three approaches in the setting
of possibility theory. We recall a simplified version of epistemic logic that
can be extended to graded beliefs and can capture three-valued logics of in-
complete information. The graded version of this minimal epistemic logic is
an expressive generalization of possibilistic logic. Then we propose a general
framework where any set function representing uncertainty can be accom-
modated. It can account for multiple conflicting sources of information, and
in particular, Belnap logic can be encoded in this formalism.
*
Keynote speaker at the session “Non-Classical Logics” (page 439).

125
References
1. D. Dubois, J. Lang & H. Prade, “Possibilistic logic”, in Handbook of
Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, vol. 3, edited
by D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, J.A. Robinson & D. Nute, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1994, pp. 439–513.
2. D. Ciucci & D. Dubois, “A modal theorem-preserving translation of
a class of three-valued logics of incomplete information”, Journal of
Applied Non-Classical Logics, vol. 23(4), 2013, pp. 321–352.
3. M. Banerjee & D. Dubois, “A simple logic for reasoning about in-
complete knowledge”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning,
vol. 55, 2014, pp. 639–653.
4. D. Ciucci & D. Dubois, “A Two-Tiered Propositional Framework for
Handling Multisource Inconsistent Information”, in European Confer-
ence on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning and Un-
certainty, Lugano, Switzerland, 2017, pp. 398–408.
5. D. Dubois, H. Prade & S. Schockaert, “Generalized possibilistic logic:
Foundations and applications to qualitative reasoning about uncertainty”,
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 252, 2017, pp. 139–174.
Importance of distinction of levels in a logical

discourse: an investigation from the perspective
of a theory of graded consequence
Soma Dutta*
Department of Computer Engineering,
Vistula University, Warsaw, Poland
[email protected]
In order to follow the objective of the title, let us list some quotations by
Alonzo Church. These quotations are well enough to give a good account
of the ideas we shall be venturing in. Our attempt in this presentation
would be to bring to the fore the usual practice of the logical systems,
where some of the following requirements are lacking. The theory of graded
consequence (GCT) [2], in contrast, would be presented as a formal set-up
where the following prescriptions are preserved.
In order to set up a formalized language we must of course make

use of a language already known to us. . . Whenever we employ a
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logics and Metalogics” (page 337).
126
language to in order to talk about some language. . . we shall call the

latter language the object language, and we shall call the former the
meta-language.
— [3], p. 47
In defining a logistic system. . . , we employ as meta-language the

restricted portion of English. . .
— [3], p. 50
After setting up the logistic system as described, we still do not

have a formalized language until an interpretation is provided. This
will require a more extensive meta-language than the restricted por-
tion of English. . . However, it will proceed not by translations of the
well-formed formulas into English phrases but rather by semantical
rules. . .
— [3], p. 54
The semantical rule must in the first instance be stated in a pre-

supposed and therefore unformalized meta-language. . . Subsequently,
for their more exact study, we may formalize the meta-language
(using a presupposed meta-meta-language and following the method
already described for formalizing the objet language). . . As a condi-
tion of rigor, we require that the proof of a theorem (of the object
language) shall make no reference to or use of any interpretation. . .
— [3], p. 55
The study of the purely formal part of a formalized language in

abstraction from the interpretation, i.e., of the logistic system, is
called . . . logical syntax. The meta-language used in order to study
the logistic system in this way is called the syntax language.
— [3], p. 58
. . . the reader must always understand that syntactical discussions

are carried out in a syntax language whose formalization is ulti-
mately contemplated, and distinctions based upon such formaliza-
tion may be relevant to the discussion. . . In such informal develop-
ment of syntax, we shall think of the syntax language as being a
different language from the object language.
— [3], p. 59
Following. . . Quine, we may distinguish between use and mention of

a word or symbol. . . As a precaution against univocation, we shall
127
hereafter avoid the practice. . . of borrowing formulas of the object

language for use in the syntax language (or other meta-language)
with the same meaning that they have in the object language.
— [3], pp. 61–63
These issues are also addressed in some other works [1,4,5,6,7]. Our aim
is to briefly touch on others’ perspectives, keeping the focus on the treat-
ment offered by GCT.
References
1. A. Bacon, “Non-classical Metatheory for Non-classical Logics”, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, vol. 42, 2012, pp. 335–355.
2. M.K. Chakraborty, “Graded consequence: further studies”, Journal of
Applied Non-Classical Logics, vol. 5, 1995, pp. 227–237.
3. A. Church, “Introduction to Mathematical Logic”, vol. 1, Princeton
4. G. Malinowski, “Inferential many-valuedness”, Philosophical Logic in
Poland, edited by J. Woleński, Kluwer, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 75–84.
5. R. Parikh, “The Problem of Vague Predicates”, in Language, Logic, and
Method, edited by R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky, D. Ridel Publishing
Company, 1983, pp. 241–261.
6. C. Pelta, “Wide sets, deep many-valuedness and sorites arguments”,
Mathware & Soft Computing, vol. 11, 2004, pp. 5–11.
7. T. Vetterlein, F. Esteva & L. Godo, “Logics for Approximate Entail-
ment in ordered universes of discourse”, International Journal of Ap-
proximate Reasoning, vol. 71, 2016, pp. 50–63.
Kripke and Lukasiewicz: A Synthesis

Hartry Field*
Department of Philosophy, New York University, USA
[email protected]
In classical logic the naı̈ve theory of truth and satisfaction is inconsistent.

Kripke provided a well-known partial solution to the paradoxes in a non-
classical logic. But it has a big limitation: it doesn’t work for logics with
serious conditionals, or restricted universal quantification.
Another partial non-classical solution is given by Lukasiewicz continuum-
valued logic. It allows naı̈ve truth for sentences containing a rather natural
*
Keynote speaker at the session “Philosophy” (page 488).
128
conditional. But it has a different limitation: it doesn’t work for sentences

containing even unrestricted quantifiers. (Kripke’s partial solution handled
those.)
So neither result handles restricted quantifiers. It would be nice to syn-
thesis the two: to have an account which handled both unrestricted quanti-
fiers and a Lukasiewicz-like conditional. (And to do so in “essentially” the
way that Lukasiewicz and Kripke did.) It will thereby also handle restricted
universal quantification, which is interdefinable with the conditional given
unrestricted quantification.
I’ll show how to do so in this talk. The synthesized approach improves
on my previous work on conditionals and restricted quantifiers, in essen-
tially preserving the attractive features of the Lukasiewicz resolution of the
quantifier-free semantic paradoxes, including the easy calculation of solu-
tions.
Logic construction and computability on algebraic

abstract structures
Sergey Goncharov*
Sobolev Institute of Mathematics,
Novosibirsk State University, Russia
[email protected]
The construction of Computability on abstract structures was founded

in the theory of semantic programming in [1–6]. We will discuss some prob-
lems in this approach connected with computability and definability. The
main idea of this constructions was created on the base of restricted quan-
tifiers. In [1–4], a construction of a programming language of logical type
was proposed for creating the programming systems that provide control
of complex systems in which control under different conditions depends on
the type of the input data represented by formalisms of logical type on the
basis of logical structures. For constructing an enrichment of the language
with restricted quantifiers, we extend the construction of conditional terms.
We show that the so-obtained extension of the language of formulas with
restricted quantifiers over structures with hereditary finite lists is a conserva-
tive enrichment. For constructing some computability theory over abstract
structures, in [6,7], Yu.L. Ershov considered a superstructure of hereditarily
finite sets. From the problems in Computer Science the superstructure of
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Model Theory” (page 226).
129
hereditarily finite lists was constructed in [3], and the computability the-
ory was developed in terms of Σ-definability in this superstructure. From
the standpoint of constructing a programming language, such an approach
seems more natural for accompanying logical programs since for a specific
implementation of a language of logical type on sets, we must externally
define the sequence of an efficient exhaustion of their elements. In choosing
a list of elements, the order is already contained in the model, and we have
a definition in the model of operations that explicitly defines the work with
the list items. However, from the viewpoint of the construction of programs,
taking into account the complexity of their implementation, it is preferable
to consider their constructions based on the ∆0 -construction while retaining
sufficiently broad logical means of definitions, and on the other hand, ensur-
ing more imperative constructions in the required estimates of performance
complexity.
In this talk, we consider the questions of definability on the basis of
the ∆0 -formulas whose verification of truth has bounded complexity with
respect to the basic terms and relations in the basic model, as well as the
implementation of the list operations in the superstructure. From the stand-
point of specific applications of this logical programming system, the two
types of problems we solve can be distinguished: (1) the local problems
of constructing specific computations with data from the domain under in-
vestigation and searching for fast ways of computing these characteristics
from making operative decisions in real time; (2) the strategic multipurpose
problems that use large data for solving them and require search and defi-
nition already in a language allowing unrestricted existence quantifiers. To
solve problems of the first type, we propose to extend the class of terms
of our language by conditional terms which can be determined using only
∆0 -formulas and by recursive terms which can be determined using only
∆-formulas.
References
1. S.S. Goncharov & D.I. Sviridenko, “Σ-Programming”, American Math-
ematical Society Translations: Series 2, vol. 142, 1989, pp. 101–121.
2. S.S. Goncharov & D.I. Sviridenko, “Theoretical aspects of Σ-program-
ming”, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 215, 1986, pp. 169–179.
3. Yu.L. Ershov, S.S. Goncharov & D.I. Sviridenko, “Semantic program-
ming”, in Information Processing 86: Proceedings of the IFIP 10th
World Computer Congress, IFIP* Congress Series, vol. 10, Elsevier Sci-
ence, Dublin, 1986, pp. 1093–1100.
*
International Federation for Information Processing
130
4. S.S. Goncharov & D.I. Sviridenko, “Mathematical bases of semantic pro-

gramming”, Soviet Mathematics Doklady, vol. 31(6), 1986,
pp. 608–610.
5. Yu.L. Ershov , S.S. Goncharov & D.I. Sviridenko, “Semantic founda-
tions of programming”, in Fundamentals of Computation Theory: Pro-
ceedings of International Conference on FCT 87, Kazan, USSR, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 278, 1987, pp. 116–122.
6. Yu.L. Ershov, “The principle of Σ-enumeration”, Soviet Mathematics
Doklady, vol. 27, 1983, pp. 670–672.
7. Yu.L. Ershov, Definability and Computability, Siberian School of Alge-
bra and Logic, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1996.
8. S.S. Goncharov, “Conditional Terms in Semantic Programming”, Siberian
Mathematical Journal, vol. 58, 2017.
‘La question est précisément de l’âge’ [Rousseau,

Emile]: Natural logic and the pre-history of modern
psychology
Christopher Goodey*
Centre for Medical Humanities, University of Leicester, UK
[email protected]
The history of logic is inextricably linked to the history of the human

sciences. Approaches derived from sociology and anthropology can help us
to stand outside logic as an objective system, not by relativising or decon-
structing it but by way of historical reconstruction. What about psychol-
ogy, though? Even assuming it to be a ‘human’ rather than a ‘hard’ science,
we can hardly speak about ‘approaches’ to logic derived from psychology.
Rather than an approach, we must speak about a relationship, and an in-
cestuous one. The idea of ‘natural logic’, as a capability embedded in the
human mind, was a precursor to modern psychological concepts of intelli-
gence and cognitive ability, along precise historical pathways many of which
have not yet been traced in detail.
In my book A History of Intelligence and ‘Intellectual Disability’: The
Shaping of Psychology in Early Modern Europe, I argued that the idea of
a ‘subjective’ logic is rooted in the beginnings of Christianity and Empire.
Only a hindsighted misreading of Aristotle can turn him into the source of
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Sociology and Anthropology of Logic: Past and
Present” (page 342).
131
this essentially modern picture of the human being as a natural logician.

Such a misreading supports psychology’s hard-science claims by implying
the universality of that picture across historical eras, thus promoting too
the modern ethical acceptance of cognitive ability (at the expense of all else)
as the essence of what it is to be human.
My paper reprises some of the argument in that book, and ends with a
critique of today’s absolute presupposition that psychological ‘development’
is a natural kind. Developmentalism in its broadest form sees the human
being as an essentially cognitive interiority, structured by linear time and
tending towards the goal of perfection (‘normality’). From its roots among
the early Christian fathers, this idea has blossomed in abundance in today’s
psychological disciplines.
From the early modern period there is the notion of l’ordre in Pascal,
Malebranche and Rousseau and its echoes in Piaget. This has had a major
impact on modern reconceptualisations of childhood and on the invention of
the category known as ‘developmental disability’ in adults. In short, I ask:
how did the sense of order in natural logic stop being spatial and become
temporal?
The Indispensability of Logic

Ole Thomassen Hjortland*
Philosophy Department, University of Bergen, Norway
[email protected]
The Putnam-Quine indispensability argument is a well-known attempt

at establishing the existence of mathematical objects. Very roughly, the line
of argument is that since mathematical claims play an indispensable role in
our best scientific theories, the mathematical claims receive indirect confir-
mation. This in turn gives us a reason to believe that objects quantified
over in mathematical claims exist. In this paper I formulate a number of
corresponding indispensability arguments for logical laws. The thought is
that if a logical law plays an indispensable role in our best scientific theo-
ries, then it receives indirect confirmation. I compare and assess a variety
of indispensability arguments, and I argue that none of the arguments tell
conclusively in favour of the laws of classical logic.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logical Correctness” (page 249).
132
Category theory and its foundations: the role of

diagrams and other “intuitive” material
Ralf Krömer*
Working Group of Didactics and History of Mathematics,
University of Wuppertal, Germany
[email protected]
When analyzing, in Tool and object [1], the historical development of cat-
egory theory and the early debate on its foundations, I was led to discuss
some general philosophical aspects of the formation of new mathematical
concepts (in learners and in a community as a whole) and of mathematical
research programmes; motivating examples were discussed under the head-
ings of “intended models” and “technical common sense”. It turned out to
be crucial to focus on the respective background of the people involved in
these processes, in particular, the attitude of “people without expertise in
a certain area” was shown to play a role.
This observation lends itself to discussion within the perspective of the
workshop (which speaks about such groups of people as “children in a wider
sense of the term”); therefore, the talk will review this issue to some extent.
A special focus will be laid on the role of diagrams in the debates on category
theory. On the one hand, I intend to compare the role of diagrams played
in proofs of category theory with the role of diagrams played in proofs of
classical Euclidean geometry (as analyzed by Manders [2], among others).
In both cases, one should focus on the ways in which a diagram is used to
prove a proposition, on the one hand, or to display a proposition, on the
other. And there is a tension playing an eminent role, in my opinion, in
the foundational debate, namely the tension between diagrams as display-
ing propositions about finite sets of objects of a category on the one hand
and the consideration of a category as an infinite diagram (or graph) on the
other.
References
1. R. Krömer, Tool and object. A history and philosophy of category theory,
Birkhäuser, 2007.
2. K. Manders, “Diagram-Based Geometric Practice” and “The Euclidean
Diagram” (1995), in The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, edited
by P. Mancosu, Oxford University Press, 2008, chapters 3 and 4, pp. 65–
79, pp. 80–133.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic for Children” (page 361).
133
CERES: automated deduction in proof theory

Alexander Leitsch*
Institute of Logic and Computation,
Vienna University of Technology, Austria
[email protected]
CERES (cut-elimination by resolution) (see [1]) is a method of cut-

elimination which strongly differs from cut-elimination a la Gentzen. In-
stead of reducing a proof ϕ stepwise (and thereby simplifying the cuts)
CERES computes a formula CL(ϕ) represented as so-called characteristic
clause set. CL(ϕ) encodes the structure of the derivations of cuts in ϕ
and is always unsatisfiable. In classical logic any resolution refutation ρ of
CL(ϕ) can be taken as a skeleton of a CERES normal form ϕ∗ of ϕ (in
ϕ∗ all cuts are atomic). CERES was mainly designed as a computational
tool for proof analysis and for performing cut-elimination in long and com-
plex proofs; an implementation of the method was successfully applied to
Fürstenberg’s proof of the infinitude of primes [2].
There is, however, also an interesting theoretical aspect of the CERES
method: reductive cut-elimination based on the rules of Gentzen can be
shown to be “redundant” with respect to CERES in the following sense: if
ϕ reduces to ϕ′ then CL(ϕ) subsumes CL(ϕ′ ) (subsumption is a principle of
redundancy-elimination in automated deduction). This redundancy prop-
erty can be used to prove that reductive methods (of a specific type) can
never outperform CERES. Moreover, subsumption also plays a major role in
proving the completeness of intuitionistic CERES (CERES-i) [3]. CERES-i
is based on the concept of proof resolution, a generalization of clausal res-
olution to resolution of cut-free proofs. The completeness of CERES-i can
then be proven via a subsumption property for cut-free proofs and a sub-
sumption property for proof projections under reductive cut-elimination.
The results demonstrate that principles invented in the area of automated
deduction can be fruitfully applied to proof theory.
References
1. M. Baaz & A. Leitsch, “Cut-elimination and redundancy-elimination by
resolution, Journal of Symbolic Computation, vol. 29, 2000, pp. 149–
176.
2. M. Baaz, S. Hetzl, A. Leitsch, C. Richter & H. Spohr, “CERES: an
analysis of Fürstenberg’s proof of the infinity of primes”, Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 403, 2008, pp. 160–175.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Proof Theory” (page 192).
134
3. D. Cerna, A. Leitsch, G. Reis & S. Wolfsteiner, “Ceres in intuitionistic

logic”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 168, 2017, pp. 1783–1836.
Alternating truth in argumentative

dispute resolution
Elena Lisanyuk*
Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy,
Saint Petersburg State University, Russia
[email protected]
In my talk I propose a three-component arguments evaluation procedure

as an essential part of an algorithm for the argumentative dispute resolu-
tion. The core idea of the resolution algorithm is to provide a coherent
reply to the question whether a certain dispute contains a nonempty set of
defensible arguments. The algorithm will be based on the Dung-style ab-
stract argumentation approach [1] and on its further developments towards
creating formalisms with structured arguments, as outlined by H. Prakken
and G. Vreeswijk [2], including their practical application to modelling argu-
mentation [3]. Implementing the structured arguments into the Dung-style
argumentation framework opens a perspective for creating expressively rich
formalisms, which are able to capture the following three important dispute
properties: combining rigor and plausible arguments based on defeasible and
indefeasible rules, reinstating attacked arguments by counterattacks and es-
timating arguments defensibility in the skeptical or credulous way. However,
any of these properties may generate an aggregation problem putting the
formalism at a risk of collapse, as the rationality postulates by L. Amgoud
and M. Caminada demonstrate [4].
The three-component evaluation of arguments solves the aggregation
problem by means of first discriminating among the three levels of argumen-
tative dispute and then combining the evaluation outcomes on each level in
a special order. It discriminates truth-based and logic-centered evaluation of
the structured arguments’ validity from the inside, evaluation of arguments’
subsets expressing the disputants’ positions which is coherency-based with
respect to the set inclusion and Dung-style abstract approach-based eval-
uation of the dispute arguments’ set on top of the first two levels. The
level-wise aggregation of those evaluations leads to a non-standard ordering
of truth-values inside arguments. The idea of the non-standard ordering of
*
135
the truth-values is borrowed from the many-valued logic of Dmitry Bochvar

[5] and Victor Finn [6]. The non-standard ordering of truth-values expresses
the idea of alternating truth-values in justifying, rebutting and reinstating
arguments from diverse standpoints, as it often happens in disputes and
glimmers the post-truth. On the one hand, such ordering enables us to
identify the propositions in arguments, which the disputants evaluate alter-
natively, although it does so at the cost of losing some standard properties
of propositional connectives. To show why it may be considered a rea-
sonable price I reconstruct Karamazov’s and Raskolnikov’s cases from F.
Dostoyevsky’s ‘The Karamazov’s brothers’ and ‘Crime and Punishment’ as
examples.
References
1. P.M. Dung, ‘On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role
in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, and n-person games’,
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 77, 1995, pp. 321–357.
2. H. Prakken & G. Vreeswijk, ‘Logic for Defeasible Argumentation’, in
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by D. Gabbay and F. Guenth-
ner, vol. 4, 2nd edition, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, 2002, pp. 218–
319.
3. E. Lisanyuk, “Argumentation, R. Pavilionis’s Meaning Continuum and
the Kitchen Debate”, Problemos, vol. 88, Faculty of Philosophy, Vilnius
University, 2015, pp. 218–319, http://www.journals.vu.lt/problemos/
article/view/8481.
4. M. Caminada & L. Amgoud, ‘On the evaluation of argumentative for-
malisms’, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 171(5–6), 2007, pp. 286–310.
5. V. Finn, ‘On a logic of argumentation’, Research and technology infor-
mation, series 2: Information processes and systems, vols. 5–6, 1996,
pp. 3–19 (in Russian).
6. D. Bochvar, “On a three-valued calculus and its application to the para-
doxes of the extended classical functional calculus”, Mathematical Col-
lection, vol. 4(2), 1938 (in Russian).
136
Diagrammatic Reasoning in Peirce and Frege

Danielle Macbeth*
Department of Philosophy, Haverford College, USA
[email protected]
The ancient paradigm of mathematical reasoning is diagrammatic, the

sort of reasoning one finds, for example, in Euclid’s Elements. In the seven-
teenth century this practice gave way to the constructive algebraic problem
solving characteristic of, for instance, Euler. And in the nineteenth century,
mathematical practice was again transformed to become, as it remains to-
day, a practice of deductive reasoning from the contents of concepts as set
out in definitions. Both Peirce and Frege, knowing nothing of each other’s
work, took this mathematical development to show (pace Kant) that, as
Peirce thinks of it, even deductive reasoning involves constructions, in par-
ticular, the construction of diagrams, among which Peirce includes algebraic
formulae. As Frege puts what is essentially the same point, even deductive
reasoning can be ampliative, a real extension of our knowledge. And both
devised two-dimensional logical languages aimed at showing how this works,
how through the construction and manipulation of diagrams (in a broad
sense) one can make discoveries in mathematics. There are, nonetheless,
very significant differences in the notations each devised for this purpose.
My aim is to understand salient differences in the logical languages of Peirce
and Frege in light of the similarities in their overall outlooks.
References
1. G. Frege, “Conceptual Notation: A Formula Language of Pure Thought
Modeled upon the Formula Language of Arithmetic”, in Begriffsschrift,
first published in 1879, English version: Conceptual Notation and Re-
lated Articles, translated by T. Bynum, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.
2. G. Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, first published in 1884, En-
glish version: Foundations of Arithmetic, translated by J. Austin, North-
western University Press, Evanston, 1980.
3. C. Peirce, “The Logic of Mathematics in Relation to Education”, first
published in 1898, in Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Writings,
edited by M. Moore, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2010.
4. C. Peirce, “The Simplest Mathematics”, written in 1902, in Philoso-
phy of Mathematics: Selected Writings, edited by M. Moore, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, 2010.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Around Peirce” (page 257).
137
A New Perspective for Relevance Logic

David Makinson*
Philosophy Department, London School of Economics, UK
[email protected]
Over the years, relevance logics have been generated in many ways.
Among them may be mentioned syntactic generation by Hilbertian axiom
systems, natural deduction rules, and Gentzen consecution calculi; and se-
mantic production via Meyer-Routley relational structures and semi-lattice
semantics. Each approach has brought valuable insights and techniques,
but it seems fair to say that none has been really satisfying. That, perhaps,
is the main reason for the gradual decline of interest in the subject since
the turn of the century. In this talk, we will discuss a fresh perspective that
has recently been developed. It suitably adapts the procedure of semantic
decomposition trees, well-known for their usefulness in classical and modal
contexts, to give a ‘syntactically monitored semantics’ for relevance logic.
The semantics is perfectly classical, the syntactic monitoring is not.
Jan Lukasiewicz: his many-valued logic

Grzegorz Malinowski
[email protected]
The roots of many-valued logics can be traced back to 4th century BC.
In Chapter IX of De Interpretatione Aristotle considers the timely honoured
sentence “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”. Since the battle-sentence
refers to not actually determined events, it is a future contingent. Accord-
ingly, the Philosopher from Stagira suggests the existence of the “third”
logical status of propositions.
In 1920 Lukasiewicz and Post successfully formulated many-valued sys-
tems. Their constructions were possible in the result of an adaptation of
the truth-table method used to the classical logic by Frege and Peirce (in
1879 and 1885, respectively). Incidentally, the priority lies on the side of the
Polish scholar, who presented his three-valued logic already in his official
university lecture in 1918.
*

Keynote speaker at the workshop “The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past, Present and Future”
(page 270).
138
Our first aim is to present the rationale, a philosophical background and

some technical issues of Jan Lukasiewicz ingenious logical construction in
which logical values were multiplied. I also outline further research, develop-
ment of original ideas, impact of Lukasiewicz settings and their applications.
References
1. J. Lukasiewicz, “O logice trójwartościowej”, Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. 5,
1920, pp. 170–171, English version: “On three-valued logic”, in [2],
pp. 87–88.
2. J. Lukasiewicz, Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, North-Holland,
Amsterdam and PWN, Warsaw, 1970.
3. G. Malinowski, “Many–valued logic and its philosophy”, in Handbook
of the History of Logic, vol. 8: The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic
Turn in Logic, edited by D.M. Gabbay & J. Woods, North-Holland,
Amsterdam and Oxford, 2007, pp. 13–94.
Contradiction, triviality, inconsistency toleration

and other misunderstandings in the empirical
sciences
Marı́a del Rosario Martı́nez-Ordaz*
National Autonomous University of Mexico
[email protected]
A prevalent view during the last decades in the logic and the philosophy
of science submits the thesis that — contrary to what the traditional view
might suggest [1,2] — inconsistent theories do not always have to be rejected,
as history of science has shown that inconsistencies are often present and
tolerated in scientific practice [3,4,5,6]. But, while the coherence of this
view has nowadays been widely defended, there is still no consensus on how
this toleration takes place, and more precisely, on why are inconsistencies
tolerable to begin with. My aim here is to address two important questions
concerning this view, namely: how do we usually characterize ‘inconsistency
toleration’ in empirical sciences? and how should we characterize it?
The first question has already been answered by the defenders of two
different approaches to inconsistency toleration, namely, (a) the ‘handling
inconsistency’ projects [7,8,9,5] and (b) and the ‘avoiding triviality’ projects
[10,11,12,13,14]. Projects of the first type often assume that inconsistencies
*
139
are falsities that, while most of the time are problematic for the scientific
endeavor, almost never, are an actual risk for scientific reasoning. In con-
trast, the defenders of the ‘avoiding triviality’ approaches assume that when
faced with a case of inconsistent science, one needs to explain how Explosion
is avoided in that very case, as Explosion has always been thought of as a
danger when talking about contradictions in science. With that in mind,
the ‘avoiding triviality’ approach has characterized inconsistency toleration
as the avoidance of triviality when facing a contradiction.
To finally provide an answer to the second question, I will claim that
the second approach is unsuccessful for the following reasons. First, while
cases of inconsistent and trivial formal theories are well documented in the
literature, the same does not happen with inconsistent and trivial empirical
theories. This has prevented philosophers and logicians of science from
grasping how triviality looks like in the context of empirical sciences. In
contrast, in the latest decades, much understanding has been gained on how
to handle contradictions in science; different strategies have been proposed,
explained and extended, and, as a matter of fact, many of the handling
inconsistencies maneuvers have been explicative of the cases of inconsistency
toleration in empirical sciences.
Furthermore, I will conclude that in order to provide a better under-
standing of inconsistency toleration in empirical sciences, we should modify
the way in which contradictions are often understood (as a risk of explo-
sion), the way in which triviality is often characterized and, of course the
way in which inconsistency toleration is often defined. All these modi-
fications should be done in such a way that these concepts are sensibly
explanatory for the actual scientific activity when facing contradictions
in empirical sciences.
References
1. K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Routledge, 1959.
2. C. Hempel, Selected Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press,
2000.
3. I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes”, in Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the
Philosophy of Science: Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, vol. 4,
edited by I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1970,
pp. 91–196.
4. L. Laudan, Progress and its problems: Towards a theory of scientific
growth, University of California Press, 1977.
5. J. Smith, “Inconsistencies and scientific reasoning”, Studies in History
and Philosophy of Science, vol. 4(19), 1988, pp. 429–445.
140
6. J. Meheus, “How to reason sensibly yet naturally from inconsisten-

cies”, in Inconsistency in science , edited by J. Meheus, Springer, 2010,
pp. 151–164.
7. N. Rescher & R. Manor, “On inference from inconsistent premises”,
Theory and decision, vol. 1(2), 1970, pp. 179–217.
8. D. Batens, “Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mecha-
nisms”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 8, 2000, pp. 5–31.
9. D. Batens, “Pluralism in Scientific Problem Solving. Why Inconsis-
tency is No Big Deal”, Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies,
vol. 32, 2017, pp. 149–177.
10. B. Brown & G. Priest, “Chunk and Permeate, a Paraconsistent Infer-
ence Strategy. Part I: The Infinitesimal Calculus”, Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, vol. 33(4), 2004, pp. 379–388.
11. B. Brown & G. Priest, “Chunk and permeate II: Bohr’s hydrogen atom”,
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 5(3), 2015,
pp. 297–314.
12. B. Brown, “On the Preservation of Reliability”, in Logical Studies of
Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics, Trends in Logic,
Springer, 2016, pp. 65–80.
13. B. Brown, “Pluralistic Models and Reasoning in Climate Science”,
Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 32, 2017,
pp. 179–194.
14. O. Bueno, “Scientific Pluralism, Consistency Preservation, and Incon-
sistency Toleration”, Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies,
vol. 32, 2017, pp. 229–245.
141
Foundational Issues: Still Meaningful

David McGoveran*
Alternative Technologies, Deerfield Beach, USA
[email protected]
Keywords: formal systems, first-order logic (FOL), consistency, complete-

ness, decidability, relational, machine learning.
Dominant computing practice relies upon assumptions, perspectives and

conclusions that arose primarily from the philosophical investigations of the
19th and 20th centuries. We struggle with the relationship between syn-
tax and semantics; deduction and interpretation; and data and knowledge,
with no consensus on these matters. When we put powerful application
platforms in the hands of the uninitiated, we risk not merely inappropriate
uses but the introduction of subtle errors, both deductive and interpretive.
Lacking a common formal foundation and common semantic framework, we
may blindly integrate systems that are fundamentally inconsistent. Our use
of formal systems to represent some aspect of the physical world is more
than an abstract game: there are consequences if “the game” is not an
appropriate interpretation (i.e., a semantic model) of the formalism. Most
often, the first indications of negative consequences are the frustrations and
dissatisfactions of end users. For reasons we don’t really comprehend, in-
consistencies in the underlying formal foundations of computer applications
usually result in a “soft fail”. For example, the analytics that consume de-
rived data depend on possibly complex chains of logical inference, logic of
which most users are simply unaware and so cannot be expected to reason
about consistently.
We have been fortunate that catastrophic failures are not more com-
mon. Yet the catastrophic failures that occur in terms of scalability, secu-
rity, statistical models, and even predictive analytics are arguably related to
unresolved issues within or among the underlying logical systems. More wor-
risome than catastrophic failures having deep roots in foundational issues,
our world embraces rapid data accumulation and integration. Integration
principles for ensuring semantic consistency remain an open issue. Coupled
with minimal attention to semantics, both logical validity and semantic con-
sistency should be suspect. Despite reassuring ourselves by measuring the
statistical correlation of predictions with historical results, how should we
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic for Dynamic Real-World Information”
(page 321).
142
respond to a computational result interpreted as requiring or suggesting a

decision in the real world? Can any confidence be placed in the next query
results, analytic conclusions, machine learning, or our interpretations?
As we develop new methods of reasoning, algorithms, and representa-
tions of knowledge, we must reassess the foundations on which we have
relied. We must go beyond superficial assignments of “meaning” and ques-
tion the completeness, consistency, and decidability of the formal deductive
system we are implicitly relying upon, identifying the axioms we have unwit-
tingly embraced and their consequences. (For example, we usually embrace
ZF and ZFC set theories, but fail to recognize that they make no provi-
sion for individual objects — every “thing” is a set, possibly empty. At
the same time, FOL does not permit quantification over empty sets and
assumes that sets have individuals.) We must also be very clear about the
universe of discourse, and what it means to assert that data or information
are “missing”.
In this survey talk, I argue the importance of foundational issues, briefly
mentioning examples in database theory and practice, financial predictive
analytics, machine learning, and computational semantics (linguistic logic).
Three Probabilistic Generalizations of Deducibility

David Miller*
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
[email protected]
It is not so much a commonplace as an unstudied presumption that the

natural way to generalize the relation of deducibility is by means of a logical
(epistemic, judgemental) probability measure: the probability p(c ∣ a) takes
the value 1 when the inference from the premise or assumption a to the
conclusion c is classically valid, and generally a lower non-negative value
when it is invalid. This presumption needs to be contested, since there
are several other functions, defined in terms of a probability measure p,
that provide tenable necessary conditions for classical deducibility. Indeed,
there exist essentially eight distinguishable pairs of truth functions ⟨Z, X⟩
of a and c such that Z is deducible from X if and only if c is deducible
from a, and in consequence there exist eight distinct functions f such that
f(c ∣ a) = p(Z ∣ X) = 1 when c is deducible from a (and conversely too if p is
regular).
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic, Probability and their Generalizations”
(page 311).
143
Of particular interest, in addition to the pair ⟨c, a⟩, are the pair ⟨a′ , c′ ⟩
(where the prime represents negation) and the pair ⟨c, a △ c⟩ (where the
triangle represents exclusive disjunction or symmetric difference). Since c
is deducible from a if and only if a′ is deducible from c′ , and also if and
only if c is deducible from a △ c, the three functions c(c ∣ a) = p(c ∣ a)
(usually called credence), q(c ∣ a) = p(a′ ∣ c′ ) (called deductive dependence in
[2]), and n(c ∣ a) = p(c ∣ a △ c) (which may be called nearness) all take the
value 1 when c is deducible from a. They generalize deducibility in diverse
ways: provided that c is not deducible from a, c(c ∣ a) = 0 when a and c
are contraries, q(c ∣ a) = 0 when a and c are subcontraries, and n(c ∣ a) = 0
when a is deducible from c (and conversely too if p is regular).
c(c ∣ a) is almost universally understood to measure the degree of belief of
the hypothesis c given the evidence a (or the appropriate betting quotient).
q(c ∣ a) measures the extent to which the content of c is included within the
content of a, the deductive dependence of c on a. It is often a good substitute
for c(c ∣ a), for example as a measure of degree of confirmation. In [1] it
is shown how the replacement of c (or p) by q resolves some outstanding
problems besetting the interpretation of indicative conditionals.
The present paper will consider whether there is any illuminating inter-
pretation of the function n. It will also seek to demystify the surprising fact
that the three functions c, q, n, though demonstrably distinct functions, can
be transformed into one another by means of simple linguistic translations.
References
1. D.W. Miller, “Reconditioning the Conditional”, in Conceptual Clarifica-
tions. Tributes to Patrick Suppes (1922–2014), edited by J.-Y. Beziau,
D. Krause & J.R.B. Arenhart, College Publications, London, 2015,
pp. 205–215, reprinted in Princı́pios, vol. 23(40), Natal, Brazil, 2016,
pp. 9–27.
2. D.W. Miller & K.R. Popper, “Deductive Dependence”, in Actes IV
Congrés Català de Lògica, Barcelona, Universitat Politècnica de Cata-
lunya and Universitat de Barcelona, 1986, pp. 21–29.
144
Lewis Carroll’s seven charts (and many others)

Amirouche Moktefi*
Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance,
Talinn University of Technology, Estonia
[email protected]
It is well known that Lewis Carroll designed a diagrammatic method to

solve syllogisms and more complex problems. These diagrams have received
growing attention in recent years among scholars who acknowledged their
merits and limitations [1]. It is less known that Carroll has also left a se-
ries of seven diagrams, known as the seven charts, of a rather different kind.
These figures depict different propositions, represented in various notations,
interconnected by lines or double-lines. These charts have been printed by
Carroll himself around 1887, presumably, to collect the opinion of his log-
ical friends. However, one has to wait 1977 for their (first) publication in
William W. Bartley’s reconstruction of Carroll’s lost logic fragments (new
edition in 1986 [2]). They have also been reproduced in 2010 by Francine
Abeles in her edition of Carroll’s logic pamphlets [3]. Both Bartley and
Abeles reproduced additional charts that have not been printed by Carroll
but were found in his logic notebook and among his manuscripts. Further
(unpublished) charts are known to exist. Interpretations of these charts
have been provided by Bartley himself and Mark Richards (both are re-
ported in [2]) and more recently by Alessio Moretti [4]. The aim of this talk
is to make sense of these charts and inquire how they stand within a long
tradition of Aristotelian diagrams in logic. For the purpose, we provide an
overview of Carroll’s charts. Then, we assess the interpretations that were
made of them. Finally, we investigate what they might teach us on Carroll’s
logical project and on the place of Aristotelian diagrams in it.
References
1. A. Moktefi, “Beyond syllogisms: Carroll’s (marked) quadriliteral dia-
gram”, in Visual Reasoning with Diagrams, Birkhäuser, Basel, 2013,
pp. 55–71.
2. L. Carroll, Lewis Carroll’s Symbolic Logic, edited by W.W. Bartley III,
Clarkson N. Potter, New York, 1986.
3. F. Abeles, The Logic Pamphlets of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and Re-
lated Pieces, Lewis Carroll Society of North America, New York, 2010.
4. A. Moretti, “Was Lewis Carroll an amazing oppositional geometer?”,
History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 35, 2014, pp. 383–409.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logical Geometry and its Applications” (page 169).
145
Tones and Chords: Fuzzy and Intuitionistic

Approaches to Musical Elementhood
Thomas Noll*
Escola Superior de Música de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
[email protected]
Rudolph Carnap in his famous book The Logical Structure of the World
instances musical chords in order to illustrate his concept of quasi analysis.
And he sets the bar high, when he characterizes chords as “uniform totali-
ties, which are not composed of constituents”. On the basis of similarity cir-
cles Carnap suggests the possibility of regaining tones as quasi-constituents
of chords. So it is interesting to ask: what are the contributions of present
day working music theorists to the identification of chord-constituents (or
quasi-constituents)?
The prevalent study of musical chords as subsets X ⊆ Z12 of the chro-
matic 12-tone system provides a quite restricted and abstract level of de-
scription. Nevertheless it plays a quite productive role for the generation of
new ideas and for the reconsideration of old ones. It provides insights into
aspects of musical actuality and constitutes a manageable playground for
theoretical explorations. Therefore it serves as a good starting point for the
lecture.
Linchpin and point of departure in two directions of study is the con-
version of a chord X ⊆ Z12 into a characteristic function χX ∶ Z12 → {0, 1}:
1. The interpretation of χX ∶ Z12 → {0, 1} ⊂ C as a function into the com-

plex numbers offers a fruitful transfer into Fourier space. Furthermore
it can be easily extended to the study of fuzzy chords or pitch class pro-
files χX ∶ Z12 → [0, 1] ⊂ C, which play a central role in cognitive studies
and statistical music theory.
2. The study of the subsets X ⊂ Z12 through their affine stabilizisers, i.e
affine endomorphisms f ∶ Z12 → Z12 , satisfying f (X) ⊆ X leads to an
intuitionistic interpretation of elementhood, where a refined character-
istic function χX ∶ Z12 → Ω takes values in the subobject classifier (truth
value object) Ω of a topos SetM of monoid actions. The special case of
the 8-element triadic monoid M and a 6-element truth value object Ω
is music-theoretically illuminating and moreover it provides a nice vade
mecum into topos theory and Lawvere-Tierney topologies.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic and Music” (page 204).
146
There are remarkable parallels between prominent objects in the two

approaches: in particular between the Fourier prototypes (chords, for which
one of the Fourier coefficients of χX takes a maximal magnitude among
all non-empty subsets X ⊊ Z12 ) and the Lawvere-Tierney-extensions of the
triad (i.e. chords, which are classified by the concatenation j ○ χX of the
characteristic function of a triad and a Lawvere-Tierney topology j∶ Ω → Ω).
If time allows I will report on some explorations in the direction of a synthe-
sis of both approaches. The interpretation of the subobject classifier Ω in
terms of suitable maps κ∶ Ω → C allows to study the characteristic functions
χX ∶ Z12 → Ω in terms of the discrete Fourier transforms κ̂ ○ χX ∶ Z12 → C.
References
1. E. Amiot, Music Through Fourier Space: Discrete Fourier Transform
in Music Theory, Springer, 2016.
2. R. Carnap, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Felix Meiner Verlag, Leipzig,
1928, English version: The Logical Structure of the World. Pseudoprob-
lems in Philosophy, translated by R.A. George, University of California
Press, 1967.
3. T. Noll, “The Topos of Triads”, Colloquium on Mathematical Music
Theory, Grazer Mathematische Berichte, vol. 347, University of Graz,
2005, pp. 1–26.
Formalizing Umwelts
Rohit Parikh*
City University of New York, USA
[email protected]
The Umwelt is a notion suggested by Jakob von Uexküll, a German

Baltic biologist in the early XXth century [2]. The umwelt is his (Kantian)
notion of how an animal or any living being like a child, “sees” the world, and
how it can act in it. This notion carries a potential for developing a language
to talk about the “subjective world” so that certain commonsense notions
can be talked about more precisely. While the notion is old, it ties up with
contemporary research in animal psychology. Also, von Uexküll anticipated
many computer science ideas, particularly in the field of robotics, some 25
years before these were invented. Thus Uexküll’s ideas overlap with the
discussion of the Wumpus world, a common example in [1], p. 27.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logics and Metalogics” (page 337).
147
We will offer a formalism for the umwelt of an agent consisting of a set W

of worlds, a partition P of the world corresponding to the agent’s perception,
a set E of “effectors” which allow the agent to alter its environment, i.e.,
to move from one world to another, and finally a utility function U which
corresponds to what the agent currently wants. The effectors are (possibly
non-deterministic) maps from W to itself and U is a map from W ×W to the
real numbers. U (u, v) represents an agent’s utility of v when the agent is at
u. The agent’s goal is to choose its actions, using its current information,
so as to maximize its overall utility.
Can we now think of the logic of an animal? Obviously not in the sense
in which we use the word logic. But if logic is thought of as a motivated
internal process from one internal state to another then such a thing does
become feasible. Ditto for the notion of communication where communica-
tion between two agents must be in terms of their common partition.
Two agents can combine their umwelts so that the resulting umwelt is a
sort of least upper bound to the two individual umwelts. The partition is a
common refinement of the two individual partitions and the set of effectors
is a union of the two individual sets. The utility function for the pair is no
longer linearly ordered, but a notion of Pareto optimality will still apply. If
the utilities are even partially aligned then the two agents can cooperate.
This model can then be used to explain how two species of animals can be
in symbiosis.
References
1. S. Russell & P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach,
Prentice-Hall, Egnlewood Cliffs, 1995.
2. J. von Uexküll, “A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A
Picture Book of Invisible Worlds”, in Instinctive Behavior: The Devel-
opment of a Modern Concept, edited and translated by C.H. Schiller,
International Universities Press, New York, 1957, pp. 5–80.
148
Capturing Consequence
Alexander Paseau*
Philosophy Faculty, University of Oxford, UK
[email protected]
The ability to capture implicational structure is a significant virtue in a

logic. First-order formalisations are for instance often preferred to propo-
sitional ones because they are thought to underwrite the validity of more
natural-language arguments than the latter.
My talk will compare and contrast the ability of some well-known logics
— propositional and first-order in particular — to capture the implicational
structure of natural language. I show that there is a precise and important
sense in which first-order logic does not improve on propositional logic as far
as respecting natural-language validity is concerned. One moral concerns
the correct way to state first-order logic’s superiority vis-à-vis propositional
logic. The second moral concerns semantic theory, and the third the use of
logic as a tool for discovery. A fourth and final moral is that second-order
logic’s transcendence of first-order logic is greater than first-order logic’s
transcendence of propositional logic.
David Hilbert’s Early Logical Notation

Volker Peckhaus
Department of Philosophy, Institute of Human Sciences,
University of Paderborn, Germany
[email protected]
In David Hilbert’s early axiomatic programme as presented in his “Grund-

lagen der Geometrie” (1899) logic and, with this, logical notation became
relevant around the turn to the 20th century. Hilbert style axiomatic sys-
tems are based on sets of axioms which are independent from intuition or
any extra-mathematical reality. They are justified by meta-axiomatical in-
vestigations of independence, completeness and consistency.
The tool used for proving consistency were relative consistency proofs.
The consistency of the axioms of Euclidean geometry was proved, e.g., un-
der the presupposition of the consistency of arithmetic. This required the
*
Keynote speaker at the session “Universal” (page 407).

Keynote speaker at the workshop “Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic” (page 179).
149
axiomatization of arithmetic and the proof of its consistency. Hilbert de-

manded a logicistic solution, i.e. proving the consistency of arithmetic un-
der the presupposition of the consistency of logic. Logic became part of the
program. It had to be reformulated in an axiomatic form. A relative con-
sistency proof was impossible for logic, so Hilbert unspecifically demanded
a “direct” proof.
Subsequently the constitution of a suitable logical system became a task
within Göttingen research on the foundations of mathematics. Hilbert and
his colleagues were looking for a logical system more feasible for mathemat-
ical means than the systems on the market, in particular Gottlob Frege’s
Begriffsschrift and Ernst Schröder’s Algebra of Logic.
Notational features were instrumental for the practicability of logic for
mathematical means. The early ideas can be drawn from Hilbert’s 1905
lecture course “Logical Principles of Mathematical Reasoning”. They may
have influenced some idiosyncratic features of the logical notation later used
in the textbook by David Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann Grundzüge der
Theoretischen Logik of 1928.
References
1. D. Hilbert, “Grundlagen der Geometrie”, in Festschrift zur Feier der
Enthüllung des Gauss-Weber-Denkmals in Göttingen, edited by the Fest-
Comitee, Teubner, Leipzig, 1899.
2. D. Hilbert, Logische Principien des mathematischen Denkens, lecture
summer semester, 1905, notes by E. Hellinger, Library of the Mathe-
matical Seminar, University of Göttingen.
3. D. Hilbert & W. Ackermann, Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, Julius
Springer, Berlin, 1928.
150
Diagrammatic quantum reasoning

Simon Perdrix*
CNRS , LORIA , INRIA§ -Mocqua¶ ,
University of Lorraine, France
[email protected]
The ZX-Calculus is a powerful graphical language for quantum reason-

ing and quantum computing introduced by Bob Coecke and Ross Duncan.
The language is universal: any pure qubit quantum evolution can be rep-
resented, and it comes with a strong equational theory which provides an
axiomatisation of some fundamental quantum properties like the comple-
mentary quantum observables within a general framework of dagger sym-
metric monoidal categories.
ZX-calculus has multiple applications in foundations of Physics but also
in quantum computing (e.g. quantum error correcting codes, measurement-
based quantum computation), and can be used through the interactive theo-
rem prover Quantomatic. The main obstacle to wider use of the ZX-calculus
was the absence of a completeness result for a universal fragment of quan-
tum mechanics, in order to guarantee that any true property is provable
using the ZX-calculus.
In this talk, we present the first complete and approximatively universal
diagrammatic language for quantum mechanics. We make the ZX-Calculus
complete for the so-called Clifford+T quantum mechanics by adding two
new axioms to the language.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic and Physics” (page 398).

Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
§
¶
Research Team on Proofs and Verification
151
To Peirce Hintikka’s Thoughts

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen*
Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
We compare Peirce’s and Hintikka’s logical philosophies, especially their

“action-first” (“knowledge-last”) epistemologies. We identity a number of
close similarities on the following fronts:
A. Epistemology: Both developed a Socratic theory of the method of dis-
covery, which resulted in fallible epistemology and included abductive
moves in the interrogative model of inquiry.
B. Meaning: Both were proponents of subjunctive (pragmaticist) formula-
tion of meaning, rejecting sense-data and taking justification of reason-
ing grounded on observational facts.
C. Philosophy of Science: Both Peirce and Hintikka emphasized the im-
portance of the theory of the economy of research: Peirce in terms of
methodeutic scientific values and the cost-benefit analysis, Hintikka in
terms of strategic aspects of inquiry and the question-answer structures
in scientific reasoning. In both, the decisions to select/omit data and
hypothesis are considered under a realist methodology.
D. Philosophy of Logic: Both Peirce’s and Hintikka’s thoughts are charac-
terized by algebraic and relational thinking, meta-theoretical ideas, cen-
trality of epistemic modalities, and taking syntax, semantics and prag-
matics as a unity. Their respective philosophies of logic were guided by
viewing logic as a model-building activity, not inferentialism, and taking
possibilities as real.
Moreover, the origins of epistemic logic, KK-thesis and cross-identification
date back to Peirce’s writings on graphical logic, which Hintikka studied
when he was doing research for his Knowledge and Belief.
I conclude that Hintikka’s version of nominalism that he took to result
from IF logic might be the only version of nominalism acceptable to Peirce,
given the “extreme scholastic realism” of the latter and the fact that his
theory of quantification was aimed at capturing what is going on in actual
mathematical practices.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Hintikka’s Logical Thought” (page 355).
152
Grounding as meta-linguistic relation:

grounding rules for implication
Francesca Poggiolesi*
CNRS , ENS , IHPST§ , Pantheon-Sorbonne University, France
[email protected]
The concept of grounding has a long and venerable history that starts
with Aristotle and continue through philosophers such as Ockham or Bolzano.
Quite recently we assist to an impressively flourishing and increasing inter-
est for the notion of grounding, which is studied and analyzed from many
different angles. Amongst them, scholars have been trying to capture the
structural and formal properties of the concept in question by proposing
several logics of grounding [e.g. see 1,2,3,4]. In these logics grounding is for-
malized either as an operator or as a predicate. The main aim of this talk is
to present a different approach to the logic of grounding, where grounding
is formalized as a meta-linguistic relation, just like the notion of derivability
or that of logical consequence. Let me call such an approach LG. The central
characteristics of LG can be resumed in the following list:
— LG allows a rigorous account of ground-theoretic equivalence.
— In LG grounding rules are unique; in particular it is possible to formulate
an unique grounding rule for negation.
— In LG it is also possible to formulate grounding rules for implication
which are quite different from everything that has been proposed so far
and that seem to better reflect our intuitions on the issue.
— Finally LG allows to prove important results such as the soundness and
completeness theorems, but also the deduction theorem.
The main aim of this talk is to present a different approach to the logic
of grounding, where grounding is formalized as a meta-linguistic relation,
just like the notion of derivability or that of logical consequence [see 4,5].
References
1. F. Correia,“Logical Grounds”, Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 7, 2014,
pp. 31–59.
2. K. Fine,“The pure logic of ground”, Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 25,
2012, pp. 1–25.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Proof Theory” (page 192).

École Normale Supérieure
§
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
153
3. J. Korbmacher,“Axiomatic Theories of Partial Grounds”, Journal of

Philosophical Logic, vol. 35, 2017, pp. 1–31.
4. F. Poggiolesi, “On defining the notion of complete and immediate formal
grounding”, Synthese, vol. 193(10), 2016, pp. 3147–3167.
5. F. Poggiolesi, “On constructing a logic for the notion of complete and
immediate formal grounding”, Synthese, vol. 195(3), 2018,
pp. 1231–1254.
6. B. Schnieder,“A logic for ‘Because’ ”, Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4,
2011, pp. 445–465.
A Compendium for Positive Logic

Bruno Poizat*
University of Lyon I, France
[email protected]
Formulae, in a fixed language L:

General formulae are obtained from atomic formulae by iteration of ∧, ∨, ∃
and ¬ (no ∀, to be replaced by ¬∃¬).
Positive formula: no negation, use only ∧, ∨ and ∃. Its prenex form is
(∃x)ϕ(x), where ϕ is boolean positive.
Truth = Satisfaction in a L-structure (Tarski, defined by induction):

Atomic formula: basic fact.
ϕ(a) ∧ ψ(b) is true ⇔ ϕ(a) and ψ(b) are true.
ϕ(a) ∨ ψ(b) is true ⇔ ϕ(a) or ψ(b) are true.
(∃y)ϕ(a, y) is true ⇔ for some b in M, ϕ(a, b) is true.
¬ϕ(a) is true ⇔ ϕ(a) is not true.
Forcing (Cohen, and then Robinson, defined by induction):

Atomic formula: basic fact.
ϕ(a) ∧ ψ(b) is forced ⇔ ϕ(a) and ψ(b) are forced.
ϕ(a) ∨ ψ(b) is forced ⇔ ϕ(a) or ψ(b) are forced.
(∃y)ϕ(a, y) is forced ⇔ for some b in M, ϕ(a, b) is forced.
¬ϕ(a) is forced ⇔ in no continuation of M ϕ(a) is forced.
All depends of the meaning that we give to the word “continuation”!
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Model Theory” (page 226).
154
Homomorphism:
Definition. A map f from M to N , such that if the atomic formula ϕ(a) is
true in M , then ϕ(f.a) is true in N .
Observation. If ϕ(a) is positive and true in M , then ϕ(f.a) is true in N .
N is a continuation of M ⇔ there is an homomorphism from M to N .
Therefore: ¬ϕ(a) is forced in M ⇔ for no homomorphism f from M into
another L-structure N , ϕ(f.a) is forced in N .
Coherence of forcing:
Preservation Lemma. If ϕ(a) is forced in M , it is forced in any continuation
of M .
Definition. M is generic if truth in M coincides with forcing in M .
Lemma. M is generic iff one of the following holds, for every ϕ(a), a ∈ M :
(i) If ϕ(a) is true in M , then it is forced in M .
(ii) ϕ(a) is forced or ¬ϕ(a) is forced.
(iii) If ϕ(a) is forced in some continuation of M , then it is forced in M .
Existence Lemma. Every model of T can be continued into a generic one.
Observation. A model M of T is generic iff every homomorphism from M
into a generic model of T is an elementary embedding. Because of the JCP,
all the generic models satisfy the same sentences.
Conclusion (weak forcing). M forces ¬¬ϕ(a) iff ϕ(f.a) is true in every
generic continuation of M .
Positively closed models:

Definition. M is positively closed if, for any homomorphism f into a model
N of T and positive ϕ(a), ϕ(a) is true in M iff ϕ(f.a) is true in N .
If M is pc, and if a tuple a in M does not satisfy a positive formula ϕ, then
it satisfies another positive formula ψ which is contradictory to it, that is T
entails ¬(∃x)ϕ(x) ∧ ψ(x).
Every generic model is positively closed.
Definition. A pc model M is positively ω-saturated if, for any tuple a
of elements of M , any consistent set ϕi (a, x) of positive formulae has a
realisation in M .
Positively ω-saturated pc models are generic. All the pc ω-saturated models
have the same h-inductive theory.
Types:
Definition. A type in n variables x = (x1 , ...xn ) is a maximal set of positive
formulae ϕi (x) which is consistent with T .
155
We topologize the set Sn (T ) of types by declaring that the positive formulae

define closed sets. We obtain a precompact set which does not necessarily
satisfy Hausdorff separation condition.
The sets of types are Hausdorff if and only if the h-inductive theory of its
generic models has the Amalgamation Property for homomorphisms.
Model theory:
Tarski: we consider the class of models of a (complete) theory, and elemen-
tary embeddings between them.
Robinson: we consider the class of existentially closed models of an induc-
tive theory (with the Joint Embedding Property), and embeddings between
them.
Ben-Yaacov: we consider the class of positively closed models of an h-
inductive theory (with the Joint Continuation Property), and homomor-
phisms between them.
Morleyisation interprets Tarski in Robinson and Robinson in Ben-Yaacov.
The universal domains, that is, the ω-saturated models, are more general in
Ben-Yaacov setting than in Robinson setting, and more general in Robinson
setting than in Tarski setting.
Ben-Yaacov observed that Positive Logic gives the most general Model
Theory if we want to preserve Compacity, and that the classical manipu-
lations that were done in Tarski’s setting can be extended to the positive
(and Robinson’s!) frame provided that Hausdorff separation is assumed.
Decolonizing “Natural Logic”

Scott L. Pratt*
Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, USA
[email protected]
“Natural logic” was proposed by Henry Lewis Morgan (1818–1881) [5] as

the engine of cultural evolution, concluding that the “course and manner” of
cultural development “was predetermined, as well as restricted within nar-
row limits of divergence, by the natural logic of the human mind”. Inherited
from Kant [2] as the logic of common sense, late 19th century philosophers
and anthropologists accepted “natural logic” as the common ground of ra-
tionality that ensured that human differences were ultimately tied together
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Sociology and Anthropology of Logic: Past and
Present” (page 342).
156
by a shared system of order. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl [4] recognized natural logic,

but argued as well for a pre-logical stage of human development. Others in-
cluding Franz Boas, Benjamin Whorf, and Claude Lévi-Strauss [1,7,3] took
the Kantian distinction between natural logic and scientific logic as mark-
ing the difference between “savage” and “civilized” cultures. In this case,
natural logic is the foundation upon which the latter is built, and which
serves as the basis for the survival of so-called primitive peoples through
their assimilation to its “civilized” system of order. Even as “natural logic”
shaped the 20th century response to such peoples, American logician Josiah
Royce (1855–1916) [6] proposed an alternative “primary logic” or system of
order that, like natural logic, was foundational to human agency, but also
rejected natural logic’s inherent reductionist and assimilating power. In this
discussion, I will examine the emergence of natural logic in anthropology
and its trajectory in support of the dominant colonizing system of order. I
will conclude by arguing that the primary logic of Royce provides a critical
tool that can support the work of decolonization in the present world.
References
1. F. Boas, The Mind of Primitive Man, Macmillan, New York, 1911.
2. I. Kant, Logic, translated by R.S. Hartman & W. Schwarz, Dover, New
York, 1974, 1988.
3. C. Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, The University of Chicago Press,
1966.
4. L. Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, translated by L.A. Clare, A.A.
Knopf, New York, 1925.
5. H.L. Morgan, Ancient Society, Henry Holt, New York, 1877.
6. J. Royce, “The Principles of Logic”, in Royce’s Logical Essays: Collected
Logical Essays of Josiah Royce, edited by D.S. Robinson, William C.
Brown, Dubuque, Iowa.
7. B. Whorf, “Science and Linguistics”, Technology Review, vol. 44, 1940,
pp. 229–231, pp. 247–248.
157
It Was So Revolting I Couldn’t Take

my Eyes Off It
Graham Priest*
Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA
[email protected]
Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. One might
naturally ask for examples. This paper offers a new one. There is a well
known psychological phenomenon (noted, for example, by Plato in The
Republic) in which something is so repulsive that one is compelled to look
at it. One is attracted and repelled. Prima facie, that is a contradiction,
and, given the context, a true one. I argue that is exactly what it is. A
brief discussion of dialetheism frames the topic.
General principles for the design

of logical notations
Dirk Schlimm
McGill University, Montreal, Canada
[email protected]
The context of this talk are two mathematical traditions in the 19th
century, namely those of symbolical algebra and the algebra of logic, which
were both very sensitive to the development and use of good notations.
On the one hand, Peacock, Herschel and Babbage explicitly advocated
the replacement of the fluxional notation and geometric methods in Eng-
land by the notations employed on the continent. On the other hand, many
of the disagreements between Boole, Jevons, MacColl and others frequently
concerned the notational variants that they used in their respective systems
of logic. This general interest in notations is also reflected in many com-
ments and remarks about this subject in the writings of the above mentioned
authors. In my talk, I will focus in particular on the reflections of Charles
Babbage [1,2,3] and Hugh MacColl [4,5], because they also formulated and
discussed a number of general principles that characterize a good notation.
These principles, which are not always compatible with each other, will be
used to assess and discuss various notations for logic.
*

Keynote speaker at the workshop “Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic” (page 179).
158
References
1. C. Babbage, “Observations on the notation employed in the calculus of
functions”, Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. I,
1821, pp. 63–76.
2. C. Babbage, “On the influence of signs in mathematical reasoning”,
Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, vol. II, 1827,
pp. 325–377.
3. C. Babbage, “On notations”, in Edinburgh Encyclopedia, vol. 15, 1830,
pp. 394–399.
4. H. MacColl, “The calculus of equivalent statements II”, in Proceedings
of the London Mathematical Society, vol. 9, 1878, pp. 177–186.
5. H. MacColl, “On the diagrammatic and mechanical representation of
propositions and reasoning”, The London, Edinburgh and Dublin Philo-
sophical Magazine and Journal of Science, vol. 10, 1880, pp. 168–171,
reprinted in [6], pp. 276–279.
6. S. Rahman & J. Redmond (editors), Hugh MacColl: An overview of his
logical work with anthology, College Publications, 2007.
Place and Value of Logic at Louis Couturat

Anne-Françoise Schmid*
École des Mines, Paris, France
[email protected]
Louis Couturat is known for having made known and defended the works
of logic which were contemporary to him, especially those of Russell and the
Italian school. It is a well-deserved reputation, the work of conceptual anal-
ysis and which, different, of putting in relation the mathematicians of his
time are exceptional. But if you take a closer look at it along its work,
you realize that the place and value of logic are not simple problems for
Couturat. The logic is no longer the one taught in Greek studies, and yet it
has no place in mathematics, unlike the algebra of logic to which Couturat
always returns. On the other hand, he discovers the logic of Russell as a
novelty and invention, to which he gives, in agreement with Lalande and
Itelson, the old name of Logistics. But later, in his unpublished Manuel de
Logistique (1905), he will present it as an ancient science to which symbols
have been added, yet we know he does not like the use of symbols as Peano
instituted. Couturat is therefore in a complex relationship with the logic of
his time, and we will try, in this presentation, to unfold the causes.
*
Keynote speaker at the session “History” (page 521).
159
References
1. Louis Couturat, references given by Oliver Schlaudt (page 87).
2. M. Fichant & S. Roux (editors), Louis Couturat (1868–1914). Mathé-
matiques, langage, philosophie, Classiques Garnier, Paris, 2017.
3. Bertrand Russell, Correspondance avec Louis Couturat sur la Philoso-
phie, la Logique et la Politique (1897–1913), Edition and notes by Anne-
Françoise Schmid, Kimé, 2001, 735 pages.
4. A.-F. Schmid, “La Controverse entre Bertrand Russell et Henri
Poincaré”, in Dimensions of Logical Concepts, Coleção CLE book se-
ries, vol. 54, edited by J.-Y. Béziau & A. Costa-Leite, State University
of Campinas, Brazil, 2009.
5. A.-F. Schmid, “Méditation sur la clause finale”, in Construction: Fest-
schrift for Gerhard Heinzmann, edited by L. Rollet, P.-E. Bour
& Ph. Nabonnand, Archives Henri-Poincaré series, Presses de l’Université
de Nancy, 2010, pp. 75–84.
6. A.-F. Schmid, “Couturat’s Reception of Leibniz”, in New Essays on
Leibniz Reception in Science and Philosophy of Science 1800–2000,
edited by R. Krömer & Y. Chin-Drian, Birkhäuser, 2011, pp. 65–84.
7. A.-F. Schmid, “La notion de critique chez Couturat et ses effets dans
sa philosophie des mathématiques”, in [2], pp. 65–85.
8. A.-F. Schmid & O. Schlaudt, “Annexe II — Sur le projet d’édition de
la correspondance de Couturat”, in [2], pp. 335–339.
Ill-Defined Attitudes
Roy Sorensen*
Washington University, St. Louis, USA
[email protected]
A classical logician, such as A.J. Ayer, regards the law of identity,

(x)(x = x), as trivially true [1]. He has trouble understanding an agnos-
tic who cautiously withholds assent to the sweeping generalization. Ayer
is more puzzled by Hegelians and Marxists who propose counterexamples.
But his most puzzling adversary says the law is not even false. Peter Geach
([2], p. 241) dismisses (x)(x = x) as ill-defined on the grounds that there is
no absolute identity.
*
160
When the topic changes ‘God exists’, Ayer ([1], pp. 115–116) and Geach
[2] reverse roles. Now, it is Geach who must make sense of Ayer’s attribution
of nonsense. He will receive little help from standard models of belief.
Nevertheless, Geach poses the deeper enigma because he is a non-cognitivist
about a simple logical tautology. In “The Deviant Logician’s Dilemma”,
W.V. Quine ([3], pp. 80–83) says that any attempt to deny a logical law
just changes the subject. But Geach only denies that ‘(x)(x = x)’ is well-
defined.
References
1. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Dover, New York, 1946.
2. P. Geach, Logic Matters, Blackwell, Oxford, 1972.
3. W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1970.
The Validity of Validity

Göran Sundholm*
University of Leiden, The Netherlands
[email protected]
VALIDITY, in many guises and shapes, is an omnipresent notion within
modern logic.
However, is the current practice with respect to validity a valid one?
I shall argue that it is not; in particular the customary conflation be-
tween inferential validity and the logical holding of consequence will be dis-
cussed and the role (need?) for a completeness theorem will be discussed.
Some consequences for epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics are
also noted.
Five notions that are all known as “validity” will be unscrambled, to
wit:
1) Validity of a proof (demonstration);
2) Validity of an inference;
3) (Logical) Validity of a wff (proposition);
4) (Logical) Validity of a consequence among wff’s (propositions);
5) (Prawitz-)Validity of derivations in the sense of Proof-Theoretical Se-
mantics.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Naming Logics II” (page 332).
161
Here the common conflation of 1) and 2), as well as the almost universal
reduction of 2) to 4), will be given special attention at the hand of writings
of Frege and Tarski.
References
1. G. Frege, “Gefankengefüge” (Compound Thoughts), Beiträge zur Philoso-
phie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 3(1), 1923, pp. 36–51.
2. P. Schroeder-Heister, “Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics”,
Synthese, vol. 148(3), 2006, pp. 525–571.
3. G. Sundholm, ““Inference versus consequence” revisited: Inference,
consequence, conditional, implication”, Synthese, vol. 187(3), 2012,
pp. 943–956.
4. G. Sundholm, “The Neglect of Epistemic Considerations in Logic.
The Case of Epistemic Assumptions”, forthcoming in TOPOI, 2017,
http://goo.gl/YKJMpe.
5. A. Tarski, “On the Concept of Following Logically”, History and Phi-
losophy of Logic, vol. 23(3), 2002, pp. 155–196.
The Ace of the Second Generation

of the Lvov-Warsaw School.
Boleslaw Sobociński and some
of his unknown philosophical views
Kordula Świȩtorzecka*
Department of Logic and Methodology of Science,
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, Poland
[email protected]
Boleslaw Sobociński (1906–1980) was a pupil of Jan Lukasiewicz and

Stanislaw Leśniewski. He was one of the main representatives of the second
generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School, a member of the Warsaw School
of Logic. He is known as the most influential popularizer of Leśniewski’s
prothotetics, ontology and mereology, as well as the author of many achieve-
ments in set theory, theory of algebras, and symbolic logic (including many-
valued logics, modal logics). The international scientific community knows
Sobociński as the founder and for many years editor of the prestigious sci-
entific periodical Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. In this lecture we
present an overview of his scientific biography. We also aim to highlight the
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past, Present and Future”
(page 270).
162
lesser known side of Sobociński — that is, his philosophical formation fol-
lowing in the footsteps of his two great teachers. Sobociński combined the
philosophical acumen and ‘mathematical’ preciseness of Lukasiewicz with
Leśniewski’s deep philosophical interests expressed in his general and sys-
tematic framework. His early philosophical interests are known because of
his collaboration with the Cracow Circle — the Catholic ‘branch’ of the
Lvov-Warsaw School. Sobociński did not publish any papers concerning
the topics researched by the school, having a merely ‘advisory’ role on the
subject of logic. However, as evidenced by his unpublished correspondence
with Father Bocheński, Sobociński had his own, original philosophical views
on the topics addressed by the Circle. In his letters he discussed the issue
of the existence of universals and developed his original metaconceptualistic
point of view; he considered the possibility to formalise the concept of the
Universe on mereological grounds, and outlined the applications of mereo-
logical concepts to theological issues. This lecture will survey his views in to
the original manuscripts and suggest an modern formulation of their main
tenets.
Abstract Agent Argumentation (Triple-A)

Leon van der Torre*
Computer Science and Communication Lab,
[email protected]
Ryuta Arisaka
University of Perugia, Italy
a [email protected]
Ken Satoh
National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan
[email protected]
Triple-A is an abstract argumentation model, distinguishing the global

argumentation of judges from the local argumentation of accused, prose-
cutors, witnesses, lawyers, and experts. In Triple-A, agents have partial
knowledge of the arguments and attacks of other agents, and they decide
autonomously whether to accept or reject their own arguments, and whether
*
163
to bring their arguments forward in court. The arguments accepted by the

judge are based on a game-theoretic equilibrium among the argumentation
of the other agents. The Triple-A theory can be used to distinguish various
direct and indirect ways in which the arguments of an agent can be used
against his or her other arguments.
The logic of causation

Sander Uijlen*
Institute for Computing and Information Sciences,
Radboud University, The Netherlands
[email protected]
The notion of cause and effect underpin our understanding of reality.

Indeed the whole business of experimental science is attempting to predict
whether a certain (actual or hypothetical) intervention at a given point in
space and time will affect what happens at another, typically later point. To
abstractly capture which such points can affect each other, we can employ
causal structures. Broadly, a causal structure is one of a family of graph-
like structures, where the presence or absence of connections capture which
events could, in principal, have causal affects on each other. A natural
example is the causal structure coming from relativistic spacetime, where
connections appear whenever one point in spacetime each reachable from
another without exceeding the speed of light.
In this talk, I will describe a new framework for expressing and reasoning
about causal structures, based on categorical logic. It operates by first fixing
a universe of ‘raw materials’ from which a category of causal and higher-
order causal processes is constructed. The internal logic of this category
is multiplicative linear logic, and I will show how the interplay between
this logic and the fundamentally graphical structure of process composition
yields a means of reasoning about causality, which applies to traditional
statistical causal inference, as well as reasoning about more exotic situations,
such as indefinite and quantum causal structures.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic and Physics” (page 398).
164
Polish Contributions to Universal Logic

Jan Woleński*
University of Information, Technology and Management,
Rzeszów, Poland
[email protected]
More precisely speaking, the paper concerns those ideas developed in

Warsaw School of Logic which could be considered as contributions to uni-
versal logic. The term ‘universal logic’ was not used by Warsaw logicians.
In fact, it seems that they would have reservations with respect to the view
that universal logic is something analogous to universal algebra. Warsaw
School considered logic as autonomous field, entirely independent of mathe-
matics and philosophy. Thus, any algebraization of logic was considered as
being at odds with the priority of logic as ars artium scientia scientiarum ad
omniam aliarum scientiarum methodorum principiam viam habent (Petrus
Hispanus).
Roughly speaking, the analysis of logic as such it, according to Warsaw
logicians, the business of metalogic, considered as a part of logic itself.
Perhaps Leśniewski’s attempts to embed metalogic into his logical systems,
more precisely into protothetic, can be considered as the purest attempt
to unify logic and metalogic. Later views, instantiated mostly by Tarski’s
approach, located metalogic in metamathematics. Consequently, metalogic
consisted in mathematical analysis of logical systems. According to Tarski,
all methods accepted as mathematically standard can be and should be used
in metalogic, independently whether they are constructive or not, finitary
or not, etc. This ideology allowed to analyze logic regardless of various
philosophical orientations in the foundations of mathematics.
More special investigations, which can be eventually subsumed under
the label ‘universal logic’ include (the list is incomplete):
1. The relation between classical logic and non-classical systems;
2. The methodology of propositional calculus;
3. The theory of consequence operation;
4. The calculus of systems;
5. The Lindenbaum algebra;
6. The relations between logic and topology;
7. Various studies on the nature of logical concepts as the most universal.
*
Keynote Speaker at the workshop “The Lvov-Warsaw School: Past, Present and Future”
(page 270).
165
On the Formal Evolution

of Islamic Juridical Dialectic
Walter Edward Young*
Institute of Islamic Studies,
McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
[email protected]
The practice of dialectical disputation among Muslim jurists may be

nearly as old as the Islamic juristic enterprise itself. But just as Islami-
cate intellectual projects (law, philosophy, theology, etc.) are marked by
a rich pluralism of opinion (khilāf/ikhtilāf), so too is the development of
Islamicate dialectical theory (jadal/munāz.ara) pluralistic (and nonlinear),
even within the juridical domain itself. Still, there are deeper trends which
may be noted, perhaps the most important being the general infusion of
post-Avicennan syllogistic into legal theoretical and dialectical argument,
commonly understood to have begun in the 11th century CE. This trend to
greater logical formalism culminated in methods developed in a little-known
school of juristic dialectic in Transoxiana in the 12th and 13th centuries,
gaining momentum and moving westward in step with the Mongol expan-
sion. This more rigorously syllogistic juridical dialectic in turn gave birth
to a new, universal dialectical method: the ādāb al-bah.th wa’l-munāz.ara,
or “protocol for dialectical inquiry and disputation”, equally applicable in
theology, philosophy, and law; and this streamlined system quickly grew
into a core discipline in the Islamic Sciences, generating a massive commen-
tary tradition. In this talk, I will present a small number of vignettes —
snapshots from various moments in variant streams of Islamic juridical di-
alectic — marking certain key features at each stage. Special focus will be
maintained on the formative dynamic of dialectical disputation in shaping
both legal theory and dialectical theory itself.
*
Keynote speaker at the workshop “Logic, Law and Legal Reasoning” (page 381).
166
Paraconsistency: Theory and Practice

Anna Zamansky*
Information Systems Department, University of Haifa, Israel
[email protected]
The first part of this talk will be concerned with theory of paraconsistent
logics. Namely, a new upcoming book titled ‘Effective Propositional Para-
consistent Logics’ (joint work with Arnon Avron and Ofer Arieli) will be
introduced and discussed. The purpose of this book is to provide a compre-
hensive methodological presentation of the rich mathematical theory that
exists by now concerning what is the heart of paraconsistent reasoning:
paraconsistent propositional logics. Among those logics it mainly concen-
trates on those which are effective (in the sense that they are decidable, have
a concrete semantics, and can be equipped with implementable analytic
proof systems). We will start by defining basic notions related to paracon-
sistency, considering some important approaches to paraconsistency, such
as multi-valued logics (both truth functional and non-deterministic); logics
of formal inconsistency; paraconsistent logics which are based on modal log-
ics. Each logic in the book is studied from both a semantical and a proof
theoretical points of view.
The second part of this talk will focus on practical aspects of paracon-
sistency in the context of requirement engineering, one of the fundamental
stages of software development. The problem of inconsistency in require-
ments specifications has been in the spotlight of the software engineering
community for many years. While in the previous decades, it was perceived
as a problem that needs to be eliminated on sight, recently, it has been more
widely recognized that maintaining consistency at all times is not only in-
feasible but even counterproductive. Over the last decades, a more tolerant
approach toward inconsistency has emerged [1], along with tools supporting
inconsistency management (e.g., [2,3]). However, their adoption in practice
has remained quite modest. I will describe an empirical study (joint work
with Irit Hadar and Daniel Berry [4,5,6]), which investigated practition-
ers’ perceptions and attitudes towards inconsistency management, aiming
to better understand the practical barriers of the adoption of inconsistency
management tools in practice.
*
167
References
1. B. Nuseibeh, S. Easterbrook & A. Russo, “Making Inconsistency Re-
spectable in Software Development”, Journal of Systems and Software,
vol. 58(2), 2001, pp. 171–180.
2. N. Ernst, A. Borgida, J. Mylopoulos & I. Jureta, “Agile Requirements
Evolution via Paraconsistent Reasoning”, in Proceedings of the 24th
International CAiSE* , 2012, pp. 382–397.
3. A. Finkelstein, D. Gabbay, A. Hunter, J. Kramer & B. Nuseibeh, “In-
consistency Handling in Multiperspective Specifications”, in IEEE Trans-
actions on Software Engineering, vol. 20(8), 1994, pp. 569–578.
4. I. Hadar & A. Zamansky, “When a Paradigm is Inconsistent with In-
tuition: The Case of Inconsistency Management”, in Proceedings of 3rd
International Workshop on COGNISE , Lecture Notes in Business In-
formation Processing, vol. 215, 2015, pp. 107–113.
5. I. Hadar & A. Zamansky, “Cognitive Factors in Inconsistency Manage-
ment”, in Proceedings of 23rd IEEE§ International Requirements Engi-
neering Conference, 2015, pp. 226–229.
6. A. Zamansky, I. Hadar & D. Berry, “Reasoning about Inconsistency in
RE¶ : Separating the Wheat from the Chaff”, in Proceedings of the 11th
International Conference on ENASE , 2016, pp. 377–382.
*
Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering

Cognitive Aspects of Information Systems Engineering
§
¶
Requirements Engineering

Evaluation of Novel Software Approaches to Software Engineering
168
14 – Workshops
Logical Geometry and its Applications

This workshop is organized by
Lorenz Demey
Center for Logic and Analytic Philosophy,
KU Leuven, Belgium
[email protected]
Hans Smessaert
Department of Linguistics, KU Leuven, Belgium
[email protected]
Aristotelian diagrams are compact visual representations of the elements

of some logical, lexical or conceptual field, and various logical relations hold-
ing between them (e.g. contradiction and contrariety). These diagrams have
a rich history in philosophical logic, which can ultimately be traced back
to the works of Aristotle and Apuleius. Without a doubt, the oldest and
most widely known example is the so-called ‘square of opposition’ for syl-
logistics, but throughout history, authors have also developed larger, more
complex diagrams, such as hexagons, octagons, and even three-dimensional
diagrams. In contemporary research, Aristotelian diagrams have been used
in nearly all subbranches of logic, such as modal logic, various families of
non-classical logics, probabilistic and fuzzy logic, consequential logic, and
logics of rational agency. Furthermore, because of the ubiquity of the re-
lations that they visualize, Aristotelian diagrams are also frequently used
outside of logic, in disciplines such as philosophy, linguistics, computer sci-
ence, law, cognitive science, and natural language processing.
In recent years, Aristotelian diagrams have also begun to be studied as
objects of independent logical and diagrammatic interest, giving rise to the
burgeoning field of logical geometry. Rather than focusing on the specific
details of any given application, logical geometry aims to develop a system-
atic theory of Aristotelian diagrams in general. On the logical side, it studies
topics such as information level, logic-sensitivity and the interplay between
Aristotelian, duality and Boolean structure; on the visual/geometrical side,
it is concerned with informational vs. computational equivalence in Aris-
169
totelian diagrams, and with analyzing these diagrams as purely geometrical

entities (in terms of symmetry, Euclidean distance, polyhedral duality, etc.).
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Amirouche Moktefi (page 145).
Call for papers

The Workshop on Logical Geometry and its Applications (WoLGA) at
UNILOG’2018 aims to deepen our theoretical understanding of the logical
and diagrammatic behavior of Aristotelian diagrams, as well as to broaden
our perspective on their (historical and contemporary) applications. Rele-
vant topics include (but are not restricted to):
Aristotelian diagrams for non-classical logics
Aristotelian diagrams and metalogical considerations
the interplay between Aristotelian and duality relations
the interplay between the Aristotelian relations and Boolean structure
probabilistic interpretations of the Aristotelian relations
relations between (families of) Aristotelian diagrams
Aristotelian diagrams from the perspective of diagram design
various kinds of symmetry in Aristotelian diagrams
logical and geometrical distance in Aristotelian diagrams
case studies on Aristotelian diagrams used in medieval logic (Western
and Arabic)
case studies on Aristotelian diagrams used by Modern logicians (e.g.
Keynes, Carroll)
case studies on contemporary uses of Aristotelian diagrams in logic
case studies on contemporary uses of Aristotelian diagrams in other
disciplines (e.g. computer science, linguistics)
A one-page abstract should be sent via email before October 5th, 2017
(extended deadline!) to [email protected] and hans.smessaert@
kuleuven.be.
Notifications will be sent out by November 15th, 2017.
170
Workshops
Logical Oppositions in Avicenna’s Hypothetical Logic

Saloua Chatti
University of Tunis, Tunisia
[email protected]
In his hypothetical logic, Avicenna introduces new kinds of hypothetical

propositions by using quantifications ranging over situations (or times) and
distinguishing between universal and particular, affirmative and negative,
conditionals or disjunctives. For instance, the conditionals are expressed
thus:
A-hypothetical conditional: “Whenever A is B, then C is D”;
I-hypothetical conditional: “Maybe when A is B, then C is D”;
E-hypothetical conditional: “Never if A is B then C is D”;
O-hypothetical conditional: “Not whenever A is B, then C is D”.
In these propositions the elements are predicative but simple. However,
in section 7 of al-Qiyās [1], pp. 361–384, he goes further by considering hypo-
thetical propositions, where the elements are themselves quantified proposi-
tions of the form A, E, I and O. These propositions have structures like the
following ones: “Whenever every A is B, then every C is D” (“whenever
A1 then A2 ” for short) or “Never when every A is B, then Some C is D”
(“Never if A1 then I2 ” for short), and so on. In [1], chapter 1 of section 7,
pp. 361–372, he provides sixteen different A-hypothetical conditional propo-
sitions by combining their A, E, I or O elements in all possible ways. In the
same way, he provides 16 E-hypothetical conditionals, 16 I-hypothetical con-
ditionals and 16 O-hypothetical conditionals by combining their quantified
elements in all possible ways, and, in [1], chapter 2, pp. 373–384, he makes
the same thing with the disjunctive hypothetical propositions. He also says
that the logical relations of contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety and
subalternation hold between all these propositions.
In this contribution, I will consider only the hypothetical conditional
propositions listed in chapter 1 of section 7, and will analyse the logical
relations between all of them. Now, in Avicenna’s frame, all A-conditional
and I-conditional propositions, whether categorical or hypothetical have an
import (i.e. they require the truth of their antecedents to be true), while all
E-conditional and O-conditional propositions, whether categorical or hypo-
thetical do not have an import. As a result, the 16 A-hypothetical condition-
als are different from the 16 E-hypothetical ones, while the 16 I-hypothetical
conditionals are different from the sixteen O-hypothetical ones. So the to-
tal number of distinct propositions is 64. This gives rise at first sight to 8
171
octagons, each containing two A-hypotheticals and two I-hypotheticals and

their contradictories. These octagons are not necessarily of Buridan’s kind,
for we find some octagons of Johnson-Hacker’s kind plus another new kind
of octagons, different from them both. The octagons can also be grouped
two by two, which gives rise to several figures containing 16 vertices and
allows for more relations between the propositions. This shows the richness
of the theory.
References
1. Avicenna, al-Shifā“, al-Mant.iq 4: al-Qiyās, edited by S. Zayed, revision
and introduction by I. Madkour, Cairo, 1964.
2. E.A. Hacker, “The octagon of opposition”, Notre Dame Journal of For-
mal Logic, vol. 16(3), 1975, pp. 352–353.
On the Interaction of Tense and Aspect — Merging Kites

Dany Jaspers
KU Leuven, Brussels, Belgium
[email protected]
As illustrated in [1, p. 333], a past-oriented binary choice [±R(etroject)]

followed by a future-oriented binary choice [±P (roject)] suffices to distin-
guish the four basic finite tense types of English: present [−R, −P ], future
[−R, +P ], past [+R, −P ], conditional [+R, +P ].
name example Tense1 Tense2 Aspect1 Aspect2

past(±R) fut(±P ) perf prog
simple pres works − − − −
simple fut will work − + − −
simple past worked + − − −
simple cond would work + + − −
In our talk, we shall first review the evidence that these two choices
form an asymmetric ordered pair ⟨±R, ±P ⟩, with the past oriented binary
choice ±R linearly before and vertically higher in the syntactic structure
than the future oriented binary choice ±P . This state of affairs parallels the
asymmetrical earlier to later iconicity that characterizes path expressions
such as spatial from Brussels to Paris or temporal from 2 to 5, where the
172
Workshops
temporally prior source expression precedes — and its phrase structurally

arguably includes — the temporally later goal expression.
That the ⟨±R, ±P ⟩-asymmetry might well be relatable to the source-
goal asymmetry of path expressions is reinforced by the equally and sim-
ilarly fixed relation between the two aspectual binary features [±perfect]
and [±progressive]. The perfective aspect restricts the situation expressed
by the root verb work to a finite past-oriented time-segment starting before
and leading up to the point P. The progressive (or continuous) aspect, for its
part, restricts the situation expressed by the root verb to a future-oriented
time-segment that includes P, but is longer and stretches to some finitely
distant point after P. This is what creates the still-going-on effect in John
is working.
And here too, what is involved is an ordered pair: ⟨±perf, ±prog⟩. Though
the two aspectual choices involve finite time-segments rather than jumps to
tense reference points, they are characterised by the same source-goal or
before-after-asymmetry as ⟨±R, ±P ⟩, witness the only possible order of the
perfective and progressive auxiliaries in the tense forms below.
name example past(R) fut(P ) perf prog
pres perf prog has been working − − + +
fut perf prog will have been working − + + +
past perf prog had been working + − + +
cond perf prog would have been working + + + +
While the tense-pair ⟨±R, ±P ⟩ has been analysed in terms of a connected

pair of Jacoby-Sesmat-Blanché-hexagons, the aspectual pair will be shown
to involve a similar connected double-kite grafted onto each of the four basic
173
tense vertices in the kite-representation provided in [1, p. 135, fig. 12], more
specifically the A- and Y-corners of each of the two connected kites.
Reference
1. D. Jaspers, “The English Tenses, Blanché and the Logical Kite”, in The
Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves
Béziau, Volume II, edited by A. Koslow & A. Buchsbaum, Birkhäuser,
2015, pp. 319–337.
Squares, Cubes and Circles. Sketches of Oppositional

Geometry between Geulincx and De Morgan
Jens Lemanski
Fern University, Hagen, Germany
[email protected]
Normally the history of oppositional logic and especially “oppositional

geometry” is focused on squares of opposition in the middle ages and the
20th century: Aristotle has used terms of “oppositional geometry” such as
“contrariety” and “contradiction” [1] which were elaborated by (Ps-)Lucius
Apuleius Madaurensis in form of a “quadrata formula” [2]. This square of
opposition became popular by scholastic philosophers. The oldest document
of this geometrical form was found in a church in Gotland [3]. Finally, in
the 20th century, the square of opposition was transformed in a “logical
hexagon” and a “logical tetrahexahedron” ([1] and [4, ch. 7]) by Augustin
Sesmat (1951) and Robert Blanché (1953).
In addition to that history, my talk brings up a discussion on the ge-
ometry of logical opposition between the 17th and the 19th century. A few
examples can be mentioned to show the diversity of topics: at first, I will
argue that Arnold Geulincx has invented a logical cube in which a square
of opposition is integrated [cf. 5, ch. 7]. But another more sophisticated
form of the logical cube was provided in Johann Christian Lange’s Inven-
tum novum quadrati logici universalis, published in 1714. This cube (see
the frontispiece) combines Eulerian diagrams (by using cubes in a vertical
order) with oppositional geometry (by using arrows). In the last part of my
talk, I will show the connection between the early modern forms of opposi-
tional geometry with modern logic, especially the analysis of Augustus De
Morgan [6].
174
Workshops
Cube of Johann Christian Lange
References
1. A. Moretti, “Arrow Hexagons”, in The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift
for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau, Volume II, edited by A. Koslow
& A. Buchsbaum, Birkhäuser, 2015, pp. 417–489.
2. H. Schepers, “Logisches Quadrat”, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philoso-
phie, volume 7, edited by H.J. Ritter, K. Gründer et al., Schwabe, Basel,
Switzerland, 1971ff, pp. 1733–1736.
3. U. O’Meadhra, “Medieval Logic Diagrams in Bro Church, Gotland, Swe-
den”, Acta Archaeologica, vol. 83(1), 2012, pp. 287–316.
4. A. Moretti, The Geometry of Logical Opposition, PhD thesis, University
of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, 2009.
5. A. Geulincx, “De Cubo Logico”, in Methodus inveniendi argumenta,
quae solertia quibusdam dicitur, Lugdunum Batavorum, 1675.
6. A. De Morgan, “Logical Bibliography”, Notes and Queries, vol. 3(6),
1864, pp. 101–104.
175
End of the square?

Fabien Schang
Federal University of Goiás, Brazil
[email protected]
It has been recently argued that the well-known square of opposition is

a useless gathering that can be reduced to a one-dimensional figure, viz. an
ordered line segment of positive and negative integers [1]. However, one-
dimensionality leads to some difficulties once the structure of opposed terms
goes beyond categorical statements, including logical hexagons.
An alternative structure is proposed in the present talk, relying upon a
semantics of bitstrings and leading to a systematic gathering for any length
n of the bitstrings [3]: the structure is a rectangle whenever n is odd; it is
a square whenever n is even, although the latter are not structured like the
Aristotelian square [2].
176
Workshops
References
1. A. Costa-Leite, “Opposition in a line segment”, arXiv:1604.03054,
Cornell University Library, 2016.
2. F. Schang, “An Arithmetization of Logical Oppositions”, in The Square
of Opposition: A Cornerstone of Thought, edited by J.-Y. Béziau
& G. Basti, Birkhäuser, 2017, pp. 215–237.
3. H. Smessaert & L. Demey, “Logical Geometries and Information in the
Square of Oppositions”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information,
vol. 23(4), 2014, pp. 527–565.
Category Theory and Logical Geometry — Is a commutative

diagram an Aristotelian diagram?
Daniel Wenz
Rheinish-Westphalian Technical University, Aachen, Germany
[email protected]
Category theory is concerned with structural equivalence between dif-

ferent objects in the same and between different formal frameworks (cat-
egories). Its most important tool are commutative diagrams (structure-
preserving arrow-diagrams), which serve (as the drawings in classical ge-
ometry) as the foundation for a special kind of diagraphical reasoning. In
its form of topos theory it is powerful enough to provide an analysis and a
reconstruction of classical-mathematical and intuitionist logic. My presen-
tation revolves around the question “Are the diagrams of category theory a
kind of Aristotelian diagram?”.
One of the main selling points of category theory is that it provides a
macro view on formal structures and their inter-relations that would not be
possible by any “direct” comparison of these structures. The same is true of
Aristotelian diagrams. Both provide an overview by representing structures
and their relations by a picture. In both cases, this picture can, according
to a special kind of grammar, get a step-by-step interpretation. But this
pictorial mode of representing is itself not sequential and the information
it contains cannot be reduced to one sequential reading. Furthermore, the
geometrical features of the diagrams can “show” new ways how to read (or
sometimes to rearrange) it.
In my presentation, I will give a short introduction into the way diagrams
are utilized in category theory. I will — by using a simple example — show
how the contemplation of such a diagram can trigger the discovery of new
inter-structural features and point in a way how to prove it. I will compare
177
this to simple examples of classical Aristotelian diagrams and the way they
are utilized. In this comparison the focus will be on the function of the
geometrical property of symmetry.
178
Workshops
Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic

Anna-Sophie Heinemann
University of Paderborn, Germany
[email protected]
Amirouche Moktefi
[email protected]
A great deal of the working logician’s job is to write and read. This
holds in at least two senses:
First, in order to tackle a task in logic, it is necessary to apply the rules
for transformation or deduction as stated relative to a given logical system.
In order to apply these rules correctly, you may produce certain inscriptions
and watch a sequence of transformations of an initially given formula, i.e.,
you may write down the consecutive steps and eventually read off the result.
But secondly, there is a broader sense in which writing and reading
are relevant to logic. Communicating logical problems (and solutions) in-
evitably requires activities of writing for an audience, and most commonly
at least some bits of prose. Then, participating in the ‘logical community’
will typically require to disseminate your outcomes. But participating in
the ‘logical community’ also requires to work through others’ contributions.
Hence activities of reading are necessary to assess received input — which
may then again be commented on, corrected or disproved. Moreover, the
range of available input may depend on individual or collective activities of
selecting and systematizing items of logical work which is deemed as rele-
vant. Hence what there is for you to read may to great extent depend not
only on what has been written, but also on what has been read by others.
The presently announced workshop aims at an account of logic as con-
strued from logicians’ practices of writing and reading in both respects.
Further interests are activities of commenting or reviewing, and of publish-
ing and collecting. In order to take an interdisciplinary stance, the workshop
will allow for a variety of approaches.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Dirk Schlimm (page 158) and
Volker Peckhaus (page 149).
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Call for papers

Topics for contributions may include, but are not restricted to:
Questions of notation in logicians’ formalizations
Questions of literary style in logicians’ prose
Tools for collaborative research in logic
Bibliometrical research on logic publications
The role(s) of logic journals
The role(s) of reviewing sections in logic journals
Translations of logical literature
Logicians’ publishing activities
Logicians’ reviewing activities
Logicians’ perusal of public or research libraries
Logicians’ private libraries and collections
Correspondence among logicians
Correspondence among logicians and publishers
Contributed talks should not exceed a duration of 30 minutes including
discussion. To submit a contribution, please send a one-page abstract by
November 15, 2017 to [email protected].
Logic as Subject and Method of a Logician’s Work

Moritz Cordes
Department of Philosophy, University of Greifswald, Germany
[email protected]
A good book on logic or mathematics usually has a transparent and

detailed overall structure, takes care to state its definitions and theorems in a
well-marked fashion and routinely draws its inferences without commenting
on each of them. — Notably in formal logic there does not seem to be one
strand that managed to put these three features into one object-language
system. In addition, most of the common systems have none of the three
features. The features vaguely alluded to in that sentence are these:
(A) representation of super-argumentative structures
(B) consistent signalling of discursive functions of what is being said
(C) confinement to the borders of one language
The main part of the talk will consist in outlining a formal system
which has all three features while not diverging too much from <mainstream
logic> before describing how such a system may guide logicians in devel-
oping their thoughts in writing. Said system is most intuitively presented
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as a modification of standard first-order logic in three respects. First, the

atomic category of performators is added, object-language indicators of the
discursive functions. Second, the resulting language gets a natural deduc-
tion calculus allowing one to shed all commentary devices (like rule com-
mentary). Third, different kinds of sentence sequences are acknowledged
leading to a corpus logic, meaning a logic that allows one to arrange for-
mal texts of thetic, argumentative, inquisitive or other character in a linear
fashion. These three measures together fulfill the features (A–C).
References
1. P. Hinst, “Pragmatische Regeln des logischen Argumentierens”, in Logik
und Pragmatik. Zum Rechtfertigungsproblem logischer Sprachregeln,
edited by C.F. Gethmann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1982, pp. 199–215.
2. F. Reinmuth, Logische Rekonstruktion. Ein hermeneutischer Traktat,
Dissertation, Institute of Philosophy, University of Greifswald, 2014,
http://ub-ed.ub.uni-greifswald.de/opus/volltexte/2014/1996.
3. F. Reinmuth & M. Cordes, “Commentary and Illocutionary Expressions
in Linear Calculi of Natural Deduction”, Logic and Logical Philosophy,
vol. 26(2), 2017, pp. 163–196, doi.org:10.12775/LLP.2017.002.
Writing and Drawing in Logic — the Case

of Aristotelian Diagrams
Lorenz Demey
Center for Logic and Analytic Philosophy,
KU Leuven, Belgium
[email protected]
When communicating their research, logicians not only write words and
formulas, but they also draw various kinds of diagrams. The use of diagrams
has a very long history in logic, including diagrams such as the Porphyrian
tree and the pons asinorum in medieval logic, and Euler diagrams, Venn
diagrams and Peirce graphs in more recent times [2]. In this contribution,
however, I will focus on yet another broad category of diagrams used in logic,
viz. Aristotelian diagrams. These diagrams visually represent the elements
of some logical, lexical or conceptual field, and the logical relations hold-
ing between them (in particular, the relations of contradiction, contrariety,
subcontrariety and subalternation). Without a doubt, the oldest and most
well-known example is the ‘square of opposition’ for the categorical state-
ments from syllogistics; however, throughout history, several larger, more
181
complex Aristotelian diagrams have also been devised, such as hexagons,

octagons, cubes and rhombic dodecahedra.
The central question of this contribution is: what exactly is the role of
Aristotelian diagrams in the practice of logicians? Given their widespread
use, it seems obvious that these diagrams indeed do have an important
methodological role to play, but it is unclear what that role consists in pre-
cisely. Previous work has tried to address this issue from a highly theoretical
perspective. For example, Smessaert and Demey [3] develop a sophisticated
mathematical account of the information contents of Aristotelian diagrams;
based on this account, they then argue that the widespread use of Aris-
totelian diagrams is due to their informational optimality. In this con-
tribution, these theoretical approaches will be complemented with a more
practice-based perspective [1]. In particular, I will present a detailed ex-
amination of the writings of logicians regarding Aristotelian diagrams. In
other words: which reasons do logicians themselves offer for their use of
Aristotelian diagrams? I will distinguish four broad views on the use of
Aristotelian diagrams.
First of all, the received view holds that Aristotelian diagrams primarily
serve as mnemonic devices, used mainly when introducing novice students
to the abstract discipline of logic. However, this view has become untenable,
because today, most Aristotelian diagrams are no longer found in logic text-
books, but rather in research-level papers/monographs from a wide variety
of reasoning-related disciplines (logic itself, but also linguistics, psychology,
computer science, etc.).
A second view focuses on the cognitive advantages that Aristotelian
diagrams have in virtue of their multimodal nature (symbolic/textual +
visual). This second view is related to the first one, but it is still funda-
mentally different: whereas the first view focuses exclusively on the use of
Aristotelian diagrams in pedagogical contexts, the second one accommo-
dates both teaching and research-level contexts. However, this account has
difficulties to explain the use of larger, more visually complex diagrams,
such as octagons and, especially, three-dimensional diagrams.
Thirdly, certain authors motivate their use of Aristotelian diagrams by
emphasizing their rich and respectable tradition within the broader history
of logic. In this way, the tradition of using Aristotelian diagrams gets en-
dowed with a certain degree of (implicit) normativity. This view is, at best,
incomplete, because it cannot offer an explanation as to why the tradition
of using Aristotelian diagrams came about in the first place.
The fourth, and in my opinion most plausible view, holds that Aris-
totelian diagrams have a powerful heuristic potential. They function as a
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new layer of abstraction that enables researchers to draw high-level analo-

gies between seemingly unrelated frameworks, and to introduce new con-
cepts (by transferring them across frameworks). On this view, Aristotelian
diagrams primarily function as a unifying language for a broad interdisci-
plinary research community working on logical reasoning.
References
1. C. Dutilh Novaes, “Toward a Practice-Based Philosophy of Logic:
Formal Languages as a Case Study”, Philosophia Scientiae,
vol. 16(1), 2012, pp. 71–102, https://journals.openedition.org/
philosophiascientiae/719.
2. A. Moktefi & S.-J. Shin, “A History of Logic Diagrams”, in Handbook
of the History of Logic, volume 11: Logic: A History of its Central
Concepts, edited by D.M. Gabbay, F.J. Pelletier & J. Woods, Elsevier,
2012, pp. 611–682.
3. H. Smessaert & L. Demey, “Logical Geometries and Information in the
Square of Oppositions”, Journal of Logic, Language and Information,
vol. 23(4), 2014, pp. 527–565.
Teaching Begriffsschrift: Frege’s Notation and the Problems

of Pedagogy
David Dunning
Ph.D. Program in the History of Science,
Princeton University, USA
[email protected]
Logical concepts become legible in the medium of written notation.

Logic’s celebrated metamorphosis into a mathematical discipline in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended upon systems of writ-
ing that transformed no less dramatically than the ideas they expressed.
Perhaps the most striking notational novelty of that period was Gottlob
Frege’s two-dimensional Begriffsschrift, or “concept-script”, introduced in
[1]. Frege’s contemporaries criticized his notation, and its reputation as a
strange, difficult system persisted. But Frege himself always defended his
Begriffsschrift, and recently scholars have argued that it is far more perspic-
uous than Frege’s peers appreciated [2,3,4].
Alongside these welcome discussions of the Begriffsschrift’s philosophical
value in the present, I focus here on Frege’s notation in its historical con-
nection with his teaching. A logician who introduces a new notation does
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so with the hope that a community of researchers will actually use it; in
this sense notation is a social project. Frege had little success on the social
side of notation-building, but he understood its importance. His sustained
efforts to teach students in Jena to use Begriffsschrift spanned decades. As
Frege drew and explicated his sprawling symbolism on the blackboard, how-
ever, he did not invite students into any sort of dialogue. I argue that by
conducting his lectures without interaction, Frege performed in practice his
theoretical position that logic was already there to be observed, not sub-
ject to human intervention or manipulation. Just as Frege promoted his
notation as an observational technology for arraying logic on the page, so
was attending his lectures a passive, observational experience. By explor-
ing Frege’s concept of notation as he enacted it in the classroom, I aim to
reveal the enmeshed social and theoretical layers of the ultimately practical
question of how people write logic down.
References
1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formel-
sprache des reinen Denkens, L. Nebert, Halle, Germany, 1879.
2. G. Landini, Frege’s Notations: What They Are and How They Mean,
Palgrave, New York, 2012.
3. D. Macbeth, Frege’s Logic, Harvard University Press, 2005.
4. D. Schlimm, “Frege’s Begriffsschrift Notation for Propositional Logic:
Design Principles and Trade-Offs”, History and Philosophy of Logic,
vol. 39(1): History and Philosophy of Logical Notation, 2018,
pp. 53–79, doi:10.1080/01445340.2017.1317429.
Practices of Writing and Reading in Logic: the 14th Century

case of Thomas Manlevelt
Alfred van der Helm
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies,
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
[email protected]
Not much is known about the fourteenth-century logician Thomas Man-

levelt, but his work is remarkable enough. His fame rests chiefly on a series
of short treatises on the then newly-developed terminist logic, comprising
De suppositionibus, De confusionibus and De consequentiis. Widely popu-
lar in the fourteen hundreds, they were in use as textbooks and commented
upon at universities all over the continent.
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In this paper I will rather concentrate on his extensive commentaries

on the so-called Old Logic: the Isagoge by Porphyry and the Categories by
Aristotle. Manlevelt’s commentary on the Isagoge, the Questiones libri Por-
phirii, is edited in full, with introduction and indices, by the presenter of this
paper, as volume 113 in the series Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters (STGM), Brill, 2014. An edition of Thomas Manlevelt’s
commentary on the Categories is currently in preparation.
Following in the footsteps of William of Ockham, Manlevelt stresses the
individual nature of all things existing in the outside world. In his com-
mentaries on the Isagoge and the Categories, Manlevelt radically challenges
our conceptual framework, by extending Ockhamist tenures and insights to
any logical, and if need be metaphysical or theological subject matter. We
are confronted with a radical variety of nominalism, outdoing Ockham in
a number of ways. With Manlevelt, early Ockhamism is being pushed to
its extremes. He applies Ockham’s razor in an unscrupulous manner to do
away with all entities not deemed necessary for preservation. In the end,
Manlevelt even maintains that substance does not exist.
In relation to Thomas Manlevelt’s 14th century commentary (and my
21st century edition of it) most if not all of the topics mentioned in your
call for papers will be cursorily or thoroughly dealt with — from either the
medieval or the medievalist perspective.
Thus, on the topic of notation in logicians’ formalizations, I will take a
look at Manlevelt’s rudimentary use of the letters of the alphabet to stand
not only for people and things, or their accidental properties, but also for
propositions — which may be looked upon as a token of liked-mindedness
among a certain school of logicians, as well as a tools for collaborative re-
search in logic. On the topic of literary style in this particular logicians’
prose, I will have a stern verdict to make over Manlevelt’s arid prose style,
combined with a highly sophisticated modeling of the argumentation: the
questio in optima forma. Of course, hard data on any kind of correspon-
dence between medieval logicians are hard to find, but a keen reader of any
of these logician’s texts may well try and establish which other logicians’
works may have been at his elbow while composing his own tracts or com-
mentaries. And at whose elbow his own works came to be lying in their
turn. Review activities in our present day sense of the term are not be ex-
pected from Manlevelt, if only because of the lack of logic journals in those
days. But implicitly and sometimes quite explicitly he does praise some of
his colleagues and predecessors, and harshly blames others.
From a more medievalist and to some extent bibliometrical perspective I
will spend some words on Manlevelt’s afterlife (following a seven centuries’
185
slumbering) in his present days editions, mentionings in logic journals, et

cetera. The only thing to be said about translations of logical literature
in the vein of Manlevelt and logicians like him, is that to a large extent
translations are unnecessary. Everyone interested in this branch of logic
reads the works in Latin. Translations will only become an issue when the
philosophical community at large gets wind of this extraordinary thinker.
The day we are all eagerly looking forward to.
Note on Paul Hertz and the Origins of the Sequent-Notation

Javier Legris
CONICET* , Interdisciplinary Institute of Political Economy,
University of Buenos Aires, Argentina
[email protected]
In his PhD Dissertation [1], Gerhard Gentzen (1909–1945) made use of

the sequent notation in order to develop a structural framework for logic
systems that combined features of axiomatic systems and Natural Deduc-
tion. This notation enabled him to prove the famous Hauptsatz, regarded
as a landmark in the history of mathematical logic and essential in the de-
velopment of (ordinal) proof-theory. Gentzen adopted this sequent-notation
from the “Systems of propositions” (German: Satzsysteme) of Paul Hertz
(1881–1940), previously studied by him in [2]. Hertz developed in the sec-
ond decade of 20th Century these systems as an original approach to the
formalization of logic, on the basis of a sole logical concept, represented by
the arrow ‘→’. In Hertz’s sense, a “proposition” is an expression of the
forms:
(1) a → b,
(2) a1 , a2 , . . . , an → b,
where a, a1 , a2 , . . . , an are called the antecedents of the propositions and
b their succedent. In [3], examples of relations between propositions in a
system are represented geometrically. In this context, the notion of “ideal
element” is introduced, whose function consists in the reduction of relations
between the propositions. Hertz considered the rules for these proposi-
tions as the “essence of logic” [4]. The very idea of sequent calculi and of
structural rules was conceived in Hertz’s systems. Their goal consisted in
achieving reduction methods for axiomatic systems from which some sort
of “minimal” and independent system could be obtained, that is, a system
where proofs should be as elemental as possible. Hertz’s proposal was quite
*
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Workshops
idiosyncratic at this time (dominated by the notation of Principia Mathe-

matica) and can be compared with previous ideas by others logicians.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate Hertz’s ideas from the point of view
of their notational innovation and to analyze Gentzen’s interpretation of
this innovation in order to determine Hertz’s specific influence in Gentzen’s
work. In the paper its place in the context of the development of symbolic
logic will be also discussed.
References
1. G. Gentzen, “Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen”, Mathema-
tische Zeitschrift, vol. 39, 1935, pp. 176–210 and pp. 405–431.
2. G. Gentzen, “Über die Existenz unabhängiger Axiomensystem zu un-
endlichen Satzsystemen”, Mathematische Annalen, vol. 107, 1933,
pp. 329–350.
3. P. Hertz, “Über Axiomensysteme für beliebige Satzsysteme. I Teil.
Sätze ersten Grades”, Mathematische Annalen, vol. 87, 1923, pp. 246–
269.
4. P. Hertz, “Über das Wesen der Logik und der logischen Urteilsfor-
men”, Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule. Neue Folge, vol. 6, 1935,
pp. 227–272.
Truth-tables and Tautologies in Early Logical Empiricism:

Hans Hahn as a Pioneer of Logical Pluralism
Alexander Linsbichler
University of Vienna, Austria
[email protected]
Outlines of the history or philosophy of logical empiricism mention Hans

Hahn in passing, if at all. He is usually characterized as a typical proponent
of the Vienna Circle, embracing both empiricism and modern logic, de-
fending logicism, and rejecting synthetic judgements a priori. However, by
taking the specific audience of his few philosophical writings into considera-
tion, this paper argues that a second look reveals momentous idiosyncrasies
in Hahn’s positions.
Goldfarb, Ricketts, Uebel and others [1,2,3,4,5,6] have meticulously re-
constructed how early logical empiricists appropriated Russell’s logicism
and Wittgenstein’s notion of tautology in different ways. Particularly, in
contrast to Schlick, Carnap used truth-tables in order to characterize tau-
tologies. This notation facilitated his development towards the principle of
187
tolerance and logical pluralism. Compared with this, Hahn’s role as a pio-
neer of logical pluralism has not been sufficiently acknowledged yet, partly
due to the informal style of his few philosophical writings, which were di-
rected towards a broad public. It is only transcripts of Hahn’s courses at
the University of Vienna which document his use of truth-tables. Along
with hitherto barely discussed remarks in the meetings of the Vienna Cir-
cle, Hahn’s more technical lectures to students and experts corroborate the
claim that he indeed systematically adopted logical pluralism prior to Car-
nap and Menger.
As a consequence of the more nuanced reading proposed in this paper,
Hahn’s logicist and nominalist philosophy of mathematics is not subject to
the otherwise fatal critique brought forward by Gödel [7].
References
1. W. Goldfarb, “The Philosophy of Mathematics in Early Positivism”, in
Origins of Logical Empiricism, edited by R.N. Giere et al., volume 16
of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series, University of
Minnesota Press, 1996, pp. 213–230.
2. W. Goldfarb, “On Gödel’s Way in: The Influence of Rudolf Carnap”,
The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 11(2), 2005, pp. 185–193.
3. W. Goldfarb & T. Ricketts, “Carnap and the Philosophy of Mathemat-
ics”, in Wissenschaft und Subjektivität — Der Wiener Kreis und die
Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by D. Bell & R. Vossenkuhl,
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 61–78.
4. T. Ricketts, “Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance, Empiricism, and Conven-
tionalism”, in Reading Putnam, edited by P. Clark & B. Hale, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1992, pp. 176–200.
5. T. Uebel, “Learning Logical Tolerance: Hans Hahn on the Foundations
of Mathematics”, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 26(3), 2007,
pp. 175–209.
6. T. Uebel, “Carnap’s Logical Syntax in the Context of the Vienna Cir-
cle”, in Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language, edited by P. Wagner,
Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2009, pp. 53–78.
7. K. Gödel (1953), “Is mathematics syntax of language?”, in Collected
Works: Volume III: Unpublished essays and lectures, edited by S. Fe-
ferman et al., Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 334–363.
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Workshops
On the Notation of Fred Sommers’ Traditional Formal Logic

Daniel Lovsted
Departments of Philosophy and Computer Science,
McGill University, Canada
[email protected]
This talk will be about the notational choices made by American philoso-
pher Fred Sommers in the design of his system of formal logic, called Tra-
ditional Formal Logic (TFL). Starting in the 1960s, Sommers objected to
the mainstream practice in formal logic, rooted in the work of Frege: in
particular, Sommers criticized the quantifier-variable rendering of general
statements, because this practice produces formal sentences which are of-
ten syntactically distant from their natural language equivalents. Sommers
instead proposed that a logic like Aristotle’s, that takes sentences of the
form “[Some/All] X [are/are not] Y” to be primitive, could be formalized to
achieve the same inferential power as the mainstream Fregean logic, while
maintaining the ease for users and learners that comes with syntactic close-
ness to natural language. Thus, in developing TFL, Sommers paid close
attention to how his logic would be used, an important aspect of which
is its notational design: Sommers revised TFL’s notation many times over
three decades, as he invented new notational devices and his design princi-
ples changed.
At the beginning, Sommers’ desiderata for his notation were ease of use
and extendibility to sentences of arbitrarily high complexity, but over time
these evolved to include psychological realism, i.e., the belief that a logical
notation can and should mirror the actual cognitive processes of reasoning.
These desiderata sometimes came into conflict, and in later versions of TFL
concerns with psychological realism seem to take precedence over ease of
use. Ease of use, moreover, is difficult to characterize, in part because it
depends on the examples on which the logic is employed — in particular,
the frequent choice of Lewis Carroll’s logic puzzles as in-text examples by
Sommers and his followers shows the ease of using TFL for those puzzles,
but that easiness may not extend to more “everyday” situations of infer-
ence. Sommers’ notational choices can also be fruitfully compared to those
of historical designers of formal logical systems. For instance, like Boole,
Sommers chose to exploit analogies of logic to arithmetic and algebra in
his notational design, despite important and potentially confusing disanalo-
gies. Also, contra Frege, Sommers uses mathematical symbols in his logical
notation, reflecting his vision of TFL as a tool for philosophers, to aid in
natural-language reasoning, rather than as a tool for mathematicians, to
organize proofs.
189
This talk will present TFL’s notation at several stages of development,

and assess to what extent the notation realizes Sommers’ design principles
at that stage, making comparisons to past developments of logical systems
to illuminate the assessments.
References
1. F. Sommers, “The Calculus of Terms”, Mind, New Series, vol. 79(313),
1970, pp. 1–39.
2. F. Sommers, The Logic of Natural Language, Clarendon Press, 1982.
Truth Tables without Truth Values.

On 4.27 and 4.42 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Tabea Rohr
Institute of Philosophy, University of Jena, Germany
[email protected]
In 4.27 Wittgenstein [2] presents a formula, which calculates the possible

combinations “with regard to the existence of n atomic facts”:
n
n
Kn = ∑ ( ) (WF)
ν=0 ν
This formula is much more complicated than 2n , which, as Max Black

pointed out [1], is equivalent to (WF). However, I will argue that Wittgen-
stein actually has good reasons to present (WF) instead of 2n : In (WF)
Wittgenstein doesn’t need to assume truth values, which he refutes to as-
sume as independent objects, but only atomic facts.
While 2n calculates the amount of possibilities to assign 2 truth values
to n atomic facts, (WF) calculates the sum of the number of possibilities
to chose ν from n atomic fact for all ν from 0 to n. Thus, truth values are
nor considered in (WK), but only the existence and non-existence of atomic
facts.
When Wittgenstein presents a truth table for the conditional in 4.442 he
only marks the possible combinations of atomic facts with “W” and leaves a
blanket for the impossible combination. Thus, Wittgenstein uses “W” not
in order to assign a truth value, but to mark the combinations of atomic
facts. I will present a notation, which consequently puts Wittgenstein’s idea
forward by replacing this kind of truth tables by pure tables of atomic facts
or, to put it in other words, truth tables without truth values.
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References
1. M. Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Cornell University
Press, 1964.
2. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by
C.K. Ogden, Routledge, 2005.
191
Proof Theory
Peter Schroeder-Heister & Thomas Piecha

Department of Computer Science,
University of Tübingen, Germany
Proof theory is one of the core disciplines of mathematical and philo-

sophical logic and needs no further explanation or advertising.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Francesca Poggiolesi (page 153)
and Alexander Leitsch (page 134).
Call for papers

We invite contributions on all aspects of proof theory, philosophical or
technical. Topics include:
general proof theory
categorial proof theory
type theory (including foundations)
computational aspects of proofs
consistency
proof systems for non-classical logics
proof editing
ordinal analysis
structural and substructural proof theory
proof-theoretic treatment of paradoxes
historical aspects of proof theory
proof-theoretic semantics
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by October 5, 2017 via e-mail to
[email protected].
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Tomographs for Substructural Display Logic

Michael Arndt
[email protected]
The central feature of Belnap’s Display Logic [1] is the possibility of

displaying every formula occurring in any given sequent as the only formula
in either the antecedent or succedent. This is accomplished by means of
structural connectives that retain the positional information of the contex-
tual formulae as they are moved aside. Goré accommodates substructural,
intuitionistic and dual intuitionistic logic families by building upon a ba-
sic display calculus for Bi-Lambek logic. His version uses two nullary, two
unary, and three binary structural connectives. Since the structural connec-
tives are not independent of one another, display equivalences are required
to mediate between the binary structural connectives.
I propose an alternative approach in which two graph-like ternary struc-
tural connectives express one set of three structural connectives each. Each
of these new connectives represents all three sequents making up one of the
two display equivalences. The notion of sequent disappears and is replaced
by that of a structure tomograph consisting of systems of ternary connec-
tives in which nodes mark the linking of the connectives and of formulae
to those connectives. The turnstile of a sequent is represented by the high-
lighting of a single node linking connectives.
Reference
1. R. Goré, “Substructural logics on display”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * ,
vol. 6(3), 1998, pp. 451–504.
*
Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics
193
The Existence of Pure Proofs

René Gazzari
[email protected]
Topic of our talk is the notion of pure proofs from a proof theoretical
point of view. In a first step, we explain how to deal with this informal
philosophical notion in a formal way. We identify formal counterparts to the
relevant philosophical concepts and notions and provide a formal definition
of pure proofs, this means a definition of pure derivations (in the calculus
of Natural Deduction).
The main goal of our talk is to show that every derivation can be trans-
formed into a pure derivation, namely into a derivation satisfying the follow-
ing condition: every non-logical symbol (the counterparts of mathematical
notions) occurring in the derivation already occur in an essential assumption
or in the conclusion of this derivation.
Partial results are easily obtained via well-known results: it is a technical
lemma that we may replace unnecessary constant symbols by variables.
Pureness with respect to relation symbols is a consequence of the existence
of the Prawitz normal form and of the subformula property. The crucial
aspect is the treatment of function symbols: to prove the existence of a pure
derivation, we have to replace some (only the unnecessary) occurrences of
terms in a derivation by variables, and to show that the resulting derivation
satisfies our demands.
In the course of our argumentation, we overcome some technical difficul-
ties: we introduce a formal notion of occurrences of terms in a derivation.
We identify congruent occurrences of terms in a derivation, namely those
occurrences which have to be of the same shape due to the inference rules
according to which the derivation under discussion is generated. Finally, we
show under which conditions such congruent occurrences can be replaced
by variables (or other suitable terms). Applying this substitution theorem
to derivations in Prawitz normal form, we obtain pure derivations.
Our result also sheds light on the problem of the identity of proofs, an-
other philosophically relevant problem of proof theory. When transforming
a derivation into its pure version, we do not change its normal form, but
an essential property of this derivation. This seems to be a good reason to
reconsider, whether we should identify derivations having the same normal
form.
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Extensions of Non-Monotonic and Non-Transitive

Atomic Bases
Ulf Hlobil
Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, Canada
[email protected]
The paper presents a proof-theoretic approach to nonmonotonic logics

that are in line with inferentialism and logical expressivism [3,2,1,7]. Thus,
the paper remedies the problem that previous attempts to capture logical
expressivism in a formal system [3,5] have been criticized for being mono-
tonic [6], and that a recent attempt to provide a nonmonotonic system
doesn’t include logical constants [9].
According to logical expressivism, it is the characteristic job of logical vo-
cabulary to make explicit (i.e. to put into the form of something assertable)
inferential relations among atomic sentences, i.e., a material consequence
relation over atomic sentences. According to the kind of semantic inferen-
tialism that goes naturally with logical expressivism, the meanings of atomic
sentences are determined by this atomic consequence relation. This suggests
that logical expressivists should introduce logical vocabulary by extending
atomic bases, i.e. atomic languages plus consequence relation over them.
Material atomic consequence relations are plausibly nonmonotonic, and
they plausibly obey Containment (Γ ∣∼ p if p ∈ Γ). Nonmonotonic con-
sequence relations that obey Containment cannot obey multiplicative Cut
(since it allows us to go from Γ ∣∼ p and Γ, p, q ∣∼ p to Γ, q ∣∼ p). Hence, the
logical expressivist needs logics that (conservatively) extend atomic bases
without allowing Weakening or multiplicative Cut.
I provide a sequent calculus for such non-monotonic, non-transitive base
extensions. I take the sequents in the base consequence relation as axioms
in a tweaked version of G3cp. The extensions are supraclassical, and the
Ketonen-style rules I am using are invertible. This allows us to give the
connectives an expressivist interpretation. I show how this sequent calculus
can be turned into a natural deduction system by subscripting sentences
to keep track of the assumptions we used in a way familiar from natural
deduction systems for relevance logics.
Along the way, I compare and contrast my expressivist base extensions
to work on base extensions in the tradition of proof-theoretic semantics.
Most work on extensions of atomic bases focuses on monotonic and transi-
tive bases [10,11(pp. 313–328)]. Sometimes the assumption of transitivity is
motivated by an interest in what Schroeder-Heister calls “definitional reflec-
tion” [4,12,13]. Piecha and Schroeder- Heister [8] have noted that a certain
195
kind of monotonicity isn’t plausible if we take atomic bases to be mean-

ing determining. I go further and argue we should also reject transitivity
(multiplicative Cut) and definitional reflection as constraints on meaning
determining bases.
References
1. R.B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Dis-
cursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, 1994.
2. R.B. Brandom, Articulating reasons: an introduction to inferentialism,
Harvard University Press, 2000.
3. R.B. Brandom, Between saying and doing: towards an analytic prag-
matism, Oxford University Press, 2008.
4. W. de Campos Sanz & T. Piecha, “Inversion by definitional reflec-
tion and the admissibility of logical rules”, Review of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 2(3), 2009, pp. 550–569.
5. M.N. Lance & P. Kremer, “The logical structure of linguistic commit-
ment 1: Four systems of non-relevant commitment entailment”, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, vol. 23(4), 1994, pp. 369–400.
6. B. Nickel, “Dynamics, Brandom-style”, Philosophical Studies,
vol. 162(2), 2013, pp. 333–354.
7. J. Peregrin, Inferentialism: why rules matter, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
8. T. Piecha & P. Schroeder-Heister, “Atomic systems in proof-theoretic
semantics: Two approaches”, in Epistemology, Knowledge and the Im-
pact of Interaction, edited by J. Redmond, O.P. Martins & Á.N. Fer-
nández, Springer, 2016, pp. 47–62.
9. P. Piwek, “Towards a computational account of inferentialist meaning”,
in Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Convention of the AISB * , 2014,
https://goo.gl/zyrMJR.
10. T. Sandqvist, “Base-extension semantics for intuitionistic sentential
logic”, Logic Journal of the IGPL , vol. 23(5), 2015, pp. 719–731.
11. T. Sandqvist, Hypothesis-Discharging Rules in Atomic Bases, Springer,
2015.
12. P. Schroeder-Heister, “Generalized definitional reflection and the inver-
sion principle”, Logica Universalis, vol. 1(2), 2007, pp. 355–376.
13. P. Schroeder-Heister, “Definitional reflection and basic logic”, Annals
of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 164(4), 2013, pp. 491–501.
*
Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour

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Distributive Deductive Systems:

the case of the First-Order Logic
Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion & Szymon Chlebowski
Department of Logic and Cognitive Science,
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
[email protected],
[email protected]
The objective of our research is a modern reflection on the notion of

proof and on the effectiveness of its construction. In the project we take
advantage of the fact that various proof systems can generate the same
or closely related solutions for the same problem (a formula) with various
complexity (understood both in terms of the time complexity and in terms of
the size of the derivation tree). Therefore it seems like a lot can be achieved
in the field of complexity of proof-search by dividing the initial problem into
“subproblems” and assigning to each subproblem a “proof module” which
is computationally optimal for the given subproblem.
A distributive deductive system (DDS, for short) for a given logic L
consists of two layers: the module-layer of proof systems and the meta-layer.
Proof systems of the first layer are understood as sets of rules enriched with
procedures and/or heuristics of their use. The rules act on finite sequences
of sequents. Each such proof system — called a module — simulates a proof
method (or proof methods) to the effect of computational characteristics of
the method. For example:
Module A stores rules acting on finite sequences of left-sided sequents.
The rules simulate the method of analytic tableaux in the original ac-
count and system KE with the rule of cut.
Module D enhances the method of resolution. The rules act upon finite
sequences of right-sided reversed sequents.
Module E stores rules acting on finite sequences of right-sided sequents,
the rules are of synthesizing character.
Hence the different modules of a DDS represent (and characterize) a
rich collection of various proof methods. The task of the meta-layer is to
distribute parts of a derivation among different modules. Consequently, the
meta-layer will distribute the computational costs of conducting a derivation
among the modules. More specifically, the meta-layer analyses the input
data (such as a single formula) using simple functions, such as the length of
a formula, the number of distinct variables in a formula, but also the pattern
of connectives nested in the scope of other connectives; then, taking into
197
account the procedures and/or heuristics available, the meta-layer chooses

the form of a sequent used for the input and hence also the module (modules)
from the module-layer that will be used at the start. In case of big inputs,
the obtained sequents may be analysed by the tools of the meta-layer many
times. For example, the initial input is analysed to a collection of sequents
and the meta-layer indicates that while part of the sequents can be efficiently
treated with the rules of analytic tableaux (module A), for the other part
it is more convenient to decide its inconsistency with resolution system in
module D.
The aim of our talk is to present the idea of distributive deductive sys-
tems and the results obtained so far for the case of the First-Order Logic.
Remarks on Sequent Calculus

Enrico Moriconi
Department of Civilization and Forms of Knowledge,
University of Pisa, Italy
[email protected]
In the last section V of his thesis, after the proof of the Hauptsatz,
Gentzen proved the equivalence between the main three types of formal-
ization of the logical inference: the Hilbert-Ackermann system (H.A.), the
Natural Deduction Calculus (N.D.), and the Sequent Calculus (S.C.). In this
proof we can see, so to say, the birth of the same formalism of S.C., which is
maybe the most important formalization of logical deduction ever provided.
Also the handwritten version of the thesis, let’s say Ms.ULS, contains a sim-
ilar proof of equivalence, as we have learnt from the important researches
made by Jan von Plato on the newly found Gentzen’s texts. Admittedly, the
last section of the thesis is normally rated “less important” than the other
sections, but nonetheless it casts some important light on the emergence of
the S.C., and more generally on some structural features of Gentzen’s work.
In the Thesis the equivalence proof proceeds through the following sequence
of steps: i) a proof that every derivation within the H.A.-axiomatization can
be transformed in an equivalent derivation of N.D.-calculus; ii) a proof that
every N.D.-derivation can be transformed into an equivalent S.C.-derivation;
iii) a proof that every S.C.-derivation can be transformed into an equivalent
H.A.-derivation. The proof is conducted first for Intuitionistic logic and
afterward for Classical logic. In this way, of course, the goal to prove the
equivalence of all three calculi is accomplished. However, the main single
component showing the origin of S.C. is the translation of derivations built
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Workshops
within N.D.-formalism into derivations built within the axiomatic logical

calculus of Hilbert and Ackermann’s book. And it is interesting to note that
in the pertinent part of Ms.ULS Gentzen provided a proof of the equiva-
lence between N.D.-calculi and the H.A.-formalism by showing the possi-
bility to translate every (classical) N.D.-derivation into an equivalent H.A.-
derivation; in this way it is explicitly supplied a missing link which is only
implicitly present, as a by-product of previous steps i)-iii), in the published
version of the thesis. Gentzen proceeds as follows: given an N.D.-proof of,
say A, one first lists all those assumptions which are not already discharged
before the accomplishing of the inference leading to A. Let us indicate them
by Γ. Then one substitutes A by Γ → A. If A is an assumption, A → A
takes its place. The steps of inference of N.D. are accordingly translated:
A B Γ→A ∆→B
I& ;
A&B Γ, ∆ → A & B
Paired with the occurrence of the figure of sequent, here we see, probably
for the first time, the disentangling of two meanings often conflated in the
notion of implication: the propositional (object-language) connective, say
⊃, and the (meta-level) notation for the formal derivability relation, say →.
Of course, in this step Gentzen was greatly helped by his work on Hertz-
systems from the summer of 1931, which output his first published paper
of 1932.
Beside trying to retrace the intricate threads leading to the proof of
the equivalence, I mean to focus on the emergence of two paradigms in
the conception of Cut. The paradigm of structural reasoning, which was
preserved in the intermediate calculus LDK of Ms.ULS , where the Cut
rule continues to play a fundamental role, and the analytic paradigm. In
the latter paradigm analytic proofs were the new goal, and Gentzen was
able to attain it thanks to the Hauptsatz proved for that “evolution” of
LDK-calculi which is constituted by the LK-calculi. In the latter calculi,
structural reasoning was sharply separated from logical meaning, and the
general setting was purely inferential.
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The mathematics of derivability

Gerard R. Renardel de Lavalette
Faculty of Science and Engineering,
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
[email protected]
Traditionally, the notion of derivability (or provability) in proof theory is

defined in terms of derivations: sequences or tree-like structures consisting
of formulae or sequents, satisfying certain conditions involving proof rules.
The ‘driving force’ of derivations usually consists of conditional statements:
implications in the object language (ϕ → ψ), entailments in the metalan-
guage (ϕ, ψ ϕ ∧ ψ), or proof rules involving sequents (if Γ ϕ and
Γ, ψ χ then Γ, ϕ → ψ χ).
I propose an alternative definition of derivability, capitalizing on the dy-
namic character of conditional statements. It is based on set-valued func-
tions F∶ ℘(EXP) → ℘(EXP), where EXP denotes a collection of expressions,
with the intended meaning: for all E ⊆ EXP, E entails the expressions in
F(E). So when EXP is a collection of atomic formulae, then F represents
the Horn sentence
⋀ ⋀ (⋀ Γ → ϕ) .
Γ⊆EXP ϕ∈F(Γ)
When EXP is a collection of formulae of some logical language, then F

represents the collection of sequents Γ ϕ for all Γ ⊆ EXP and all ϕ ∈ F(Γ).
And when EXP is a collection of sequents, then F represents the proof rule
from S infer Γ ϕ, for all collections of sequents
S = {Γi ϕi ∣ i ∈ I} ⊆ EXP
and all sequents Γ ϕ in F(S).

In [1], I experimented with this idea in the context of propositional Horn
logic. This led to several results on uniform and polynomial interpolation.
Along the way, a characterization of validity was established: F G iff
G ⊑ F , i.e. G(P ) ⊆ F (P ) for all sets P of atoms. In other words: (the
* *
Horn formula represented by) F entails (the Horn formula represented by)
G if and only if G is contained in the reflexive transitive closure F* of F.
Moreover, it appeared that the set-valued functions form a weak lazy Kleene
algebra (a notion inspired by [2]), governed by axioms like:
(F ⊔ G) ○ H = (F ○ H) ⊔ (G ○ H),
I ⊔ F ○ F* ⊑ F*,
if F ○ G ⊑ G then F* ○ G ⊑ G.
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Workshops
Here I is the identity function, and ⊔ is defined by
(F ⊔ G)(P ) = F(P ) ∪ G(P ).
The left distributive version
F ○ (G ⊔ H) = (F ○ G) ⊔ (F ○ H)
of the first axiom does not hold, and neither do the variants
I ⊔ F* ○ F ⊑ F*
and
if F ○ G ⊑ F then F ○ G* ⊑ F
of the second and third axiom.

In the paper abstracted here, the notions and results sketched above are
extended to full Horn logic, where the atomic formulae contain terms and
variables and where all formulae have implicit universal quantification at
the outermost level for all occurring variables. For this purpose, the theory
of set-valued functions is extended with substitutions σ∶ EXP → EXP. The
characterization of validity now reads
*
F G iff G ⊑ ( ⊔ (σ ⋅ F)) ,
σ∈SUB
where SUB denotes the set of all substitutions and where σ ⋅ F is defined by
(σ ⋅ F)(X) = {σ(ϕ) ∣ ∃Y ⊆ EXP(X = {σ(ψ) ∣ ψ ∈ Y } & ϕ ∈ F(Y ))}.
With the proper establishment of notions and results for the combi-
nation of set-valued functions with substitutions, we can scale up to the
investigation of proof systems for algebraic theories and propositional log-
ics, involving sequents. The next step to first-order logic requires another
extension to deal with variable binders (like quantifiers). All in all, it is my
goal to substantiate the claim that set-valued functions are a core ingredient
for the proper mathematical analysis of derivability.
References
1. G.R. Renardel de Lavalette, “Interpolation in propositional Horn logic”,
Journal of Logic and Computation, doi:10.1093/logcom/exx042.
2. B. Möller, “Kleene getting lazy”, Science of Computer Programming,
vol. 65(2), 2007, pp. 195–214.
201
From Syntactic Proofs to Combinatorial Proofs

Lutz Straßburger
INRIA* Saclay Île-de-France Research Centre,
LIX , École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
Proof theory is a central area of theoretical computer science, as it can

provide the foundations not only for logic programming and functional pro-
gramming, but also for the formal verification of software. Yet, despite the
crucial role played by formal proofs, we have no proper notion of proof iden-
tity telling us when two proofs are “the same”. This is very different from
other areas of mathematics, like group theory, where two groups are “the
same” if they are isomorphic, or topology, where two spaces are “the same”
if they are homeomorphic.
The problem is that proofs are usually presented by syntactic means,
and depending on the chosen syntactic formalism, “the same” proof can
look very different. In fact, one can say that at the current state of art, proof
theory is not a theory of proofs but a theory of proof systems. This means
that the first step must be to find ways to describe proofs independent from
the proof systems. In other words, we need a “syntax-free” presentation of
proofs.
Combinatorial proofs form such a canonical proof presentation that (1)
comes with a polynomial correctness criterion, (2) is independent of the
syntax of proof formalisms (like sequent calculi, tableaux systems, resolu-
tion, Frege systems, or deep inference systems), and (3) can handle cut and
substitution, and their elimination. Below is an example showing how a
combinatorial proof can be extracted from a deep inference derivation:
c̄ ^ b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq c̄ ^ b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq
awÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ awÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´
b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq c̄ ^ b ^ pa _ cq, c̄ _ a
acÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ acÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´
b b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq
^ b b ^ pa _ cq ^ pc̄ _ aq
^
2 ¨ s ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ 2 ¨ s ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ ‚, ‚, ‚ _ ‚, ‚ _ ‚
b ^ b ^ pa _ pc ^ c̄q _ aq b ^ b ^ pa _ pc ^ c̄q _ aq
aiÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ → aiÒ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ →
b ^ b ^ pa _ aq b ^ b ^ pa _ aq
2 ¨ s ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ 2 ¨ s ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ ‚ ^ ‚, ‚ ^ ‚
pb ^ aq _ pb ^ aq pb ^ aq _ pb ^ aq
m ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ m ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´
pb _ bq ^ pa _ aq pb _ bq ^ pa _ aq pb _ bq ^ a
acÓ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´ acÓ ´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´´
pb _ bq ^ a pb _ bq ^ a
In a nutshell, a combinatorial proof consists of a purely linear part (de-
picted above in blue/bold) and a part that corresponds to contraction and
*

Laboratoire d’Informatique de l’École Polytechnique
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weakening (depicted above in purple/regular). Combinatorial proofs can

be composed horizontally and vertically, and can be substituted into each
other.
In this presentation, I will discuss the basic definition of combinatorial
proofs, how they can be normalized, and how we can transform syntactic
proofs into combinatorial proofs and back.
References
1. D.J.D. Hughes, “Proofs without Syntax”, Annals of Mathematics,
vol. 164(3), 2006, pp. 1065–1076.
2. D.J.D. Hughes, “Towards Hilbert’s 24th problem: Combinatorial Proof
Invariants: (preliminary version)”, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Com-
puter Science, vol. 165, 2006, pp. 37–63.
3. L. Straßburger, Combinatorial Flows and Proof Compression, Research
Report RR-9048, Inria Saclay, 2017, https://hal.inria.fr/hal-
01498468.
4. L. Straßburger, “Combinatorial Flows and Their Normalisation”, in
Conference on Formal Structures for Computation and Deduction,
LIPIcs * book series, vol. 84, edited by D.W. Miller, 2017, also published
in Schloss Dagstuhl, vol. 31, Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2017,
pp. 1–31.
*
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
203
Logic and Music

Ingolf Max
University of Leipzig, Germany
[email protected]
This workshop shall represent a privileged platform to make an impor-

tant step forward to new universal approaches to logic(s) of music. The story
goes back at least to the ancient Greeks: Aristotle invented his logic as a
formal theory of syllogisms of categorical sentences. Pythagoreans brought
mathematics and music into a very general and close contact (harmony of
spheres). It depends from our understanding of the relation between logic
and mathematics whether there is a direct connection between them with
respect to music. In the 16th century we find an intensive use of several
aspects of syllogistic forms in the context of cantus (composition). Leibniz
looked on logic as “ars inviendi” on the basis of his new understanding of
syllogistic forms. But he also develops his “algebra of thought”. Algebraic
investigations of different aspects of music can be seen as purely mathemat-
ical or as autonomously logical (model-theoretical) paradigms.
The workshop focuses on the relatively autonomous approaches to logic(s)
of music and musical logic, i.e. logic in pieces of musical compositions. We
invite composers, conductors, musicians and musicologists interested in the
interplay between logic and music to submit a paper or just active partici-
pation. Another objective is to bring together researchers from all over the
world into closer contact. The organizer of this workshop plans to edit a
special issue of a journal (e.g. Logica Universalis).
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Thomas Noll (page 146).
Call for papers

Topics may include:
syllogistic forms in musical patterns
Leibniz’s logic of music
axiomatic and model-theoretic music theory*
*
This research topic was initiated by Susanne K. Langer, “A Set of Postulates for the
Logical Structure of Music”, The Monist, vol. 39(4), Oxford University Press, 1929,
pp. 561–570.
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Workshops
music in the context of non-classical logics like intuitionistic logic, many-

valued logic, modal-tense logic etc.
logical vs. mathematical approaches to music
rules and syntax in logic and music
recursiveness and compositionality in logic and music
logic of melodies
logic of scales, intervals and chords
chord operators
logic of musical harmony
logic of cadence
logic of rhythm
logical spaces of music
logic of music vs. musical logic
logic of (violation of) musical expectation
applications of a logic of music: analysis of pieces of composition, (au-
tomatic) pattern recognition, creation of new pieces of music
discussion. Abstracts (500 words maximum) should be sent via e-mail,
before October 5, 2017, to [email protected].
Outside-in or inside-out? A logic for human sensory system

Gaetano Albergo
University of Catania, Italy
[email protected]
According to [2] there is a transfer of structure from waveforms to audi-

tory experiences. Colour experience is completely different in this respect.
The causal connections here are outside-in, but not inside-out; the experi-
ence of colour gives us information that enables us to undertake epistemic
activities concerning external things, but it is not innately associated with
the ability to produce or adjust the colour values of the things one sees. If
colour experience is useful for influencing the world, it is so only by the in-
termediary of acquired generalizations. An artist can reproduce her colour
experiences in paint. But she has to go to Art School to learn enough about
paints to do so. When we identify the external properties correlated with
the experience of colour, we go beyond untutored vision, reconstructing the
external reality of colour with the help of information additional to that
which is available in colour-experience alone.
If we follow [2], the component incompatibility of red and green would,
205
however, seem to be an artifact of the human red-green visual opponent

processing system. We hear sounds and smell smells, but we do not as
a rule hear and smell the objects that are their causal source as qualified
particulars. But, if it is just a question of causal source Matthen’s thesis is
trivial. Paradoxically, visual imagery a priori would be more reliable than
visual perception.
Furthermore, I think that if Matthen aims to demonstrate that the logic
of determinable and determinate implicit in the function of human sen-
sory system is not conceptual, he reintroduces the same logic when he talks
about musical harmony. Quoting [3], we could say that the musician not
only thinks about sound, but also ‘in sound’. Thinking about sound, it
might be admitted, can be construed on a linguistic model — an ‘inner
speech’ using the vocabulary of auditory qualities and relations. Indeed
much of the thinking that a composer does is conceptual thinking about the
relationships of sound patterns, and since the notion of conceptual thinking
as analogous to language leaves open the question of how precise the anal-
ogy is, it is surely not too far-fetched to take a linguistic approach to this
aspect of the composer’s activity. With the aspect I referred to above as
‘thinking in sound’, a more intimate relationship between composition and
sound, the ‘linguistic model’ begins to look far too narrow and specialized,
a limit for Matthen’s model.
References
1. W.E. Johnson, Logic: Part 1, Dover, New York, 1921.
2. M. Matthen, Seeing, Doing and Knowing. A Philosophical Theory of
Sense Perception, Oxford University Press, 2005.
3. W. Sellars, “The Structure of Knowledge* ”, in Action, Knowledge and
Reality: Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, edited by H.-N. Castañeda,
Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, USA, 1975, pp. 295–347.
*
Lecture I: Perception; Lecture II: Minds; Lecture III: Epistemic Principles.
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Workshops
Inferentialism and Music: the Art of Implication

and Negation
Vojtěch Kolman
Institute of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Faculty of Arts,
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
[email protected]
The aim of my paper is to establish link between musical experience and

Brandom’s “space of reasons” in its role of the linguistic proxy for Hegel’s
System of Spirit. My proposal goes like this: First, one takes the basic
connectives of formal logic — implication and negation — and gives them a
more general meaning of (materially good) inference and conceptual incom-
patibility. Since these can be found in every reasoning, the foundations of
“the System” are set with formal logic adopting a more general, dialectical
function. Accordingly, Brandom tracks the concepts of inference and in-
compatibility back to Hegel’s notions of mediation (modeled on the middle
term of a syllogism) and negation (in the specific sense of differentiation).
This framework is broad enough to allow the musical experience to fit in.
In this final step, I am drawing on the work of Leonard Meyer who, in his
theory of musical understanding, combines Peirce’s consequential theory of
meaning (according to which the meaning of some event consist in the sum
of its consequences) with Dewey’s conflict theory of emotions (according to
which emotions are adjustments of some conflicting changes in our body).
Just notice the joint presence of both, implication and negation here.
Now, according to Meyer’s theory, the emotions employed in music are
aroused when an expectations, a tendency to respond, is skillfully suspended
or permanently blocked. The basic expectational tendencies are those trace-
able to the regular functions of organism such as breath and pulse. So, e.g.,
the strong emotional reaction typically results from the conflict between
the expected regular succession of strong and weak beats and its inhibition
by means of syncopation. These immediate emotions are adjusted by those
concerning general matters of style, such as the existing keys in which the
piece can be played or the ways one usually closes the phrase, to be negated
by means such as an unexpected modulation or a deceptive cadence.
On the one hand, establishing link between musical space and space of
reasons is easy now, since the expectations are obviously inferentially artic-
ulated. On the other hand, the suggested link is complicated one because
in musical space the self-consciousness is at work from the very beginning:
one of the musical effects is achieved by composers deliberate evoking ex-
pectations that are negated later. I will close my argument by means of an
207
example, sketching a line in which the emotional reactions might be devel-

oped from relatively basic, transitive ones to those that are more complex
and intransitive, and in which the self-conscious interplay of “implication”
and “negation” is entertained in a transparent way.
References
1. D. Huron, Sweet Anticipation: Music and the Psychology of Expectation,
MIT* Press, 2006.
2. P.N. Juslin & J.A. Sloboda (editors), Handbook of Music and Emotion,
3. V. Kolman, “Emotions and Understanding in Music”, Idealistic Studies,
vol. 44(1), 2014, pp. 83–100.
4. V. Kolman, “Normative Pragmatism and the Language Game of Mu-
sic”, Contemporary Pragmatism, vol. 11(2), 2014, pp. 147–163.
5. V. Kolman, “Hegel’s ‘Bad Infinity’ as a Logical Problem”, Hegel Bul-
letin, vol. 37(2), 2016, pp. 258–280.
6. L. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music, University of Chicago Press,
1956.
Musical Activity as the Basis for the Evolution of Joint

Intentionality and Nonlinear Grammar
Andrius Jonas Kulikauskas
Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies,
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Lithuania
[email protected]
The perfection of singing, drumming and dancing, performed in unison,

may have driven our evolutionary ancestors to develop joint intentionality,
nonlinear grammar, and additional traits which distinguish us, as humans,
from the other great apes.
As Tomasello has persuasively argued, what seems to distinguish us
from the great apes is our joint intentionality. Chimpanzees play different
roles in hunting a monkey. But each will abandon the team if distracted
by something more rewarding. One-year-old human infants, on the other
hand, persist until everyone on their team receives their reward. Our ability
to be an ad hoc “we” makes us human.
Humans typically manifest this solidarity physically through body lan-
guage. We exhibit a “sixth sense” by which we unconsciously orient our-
*
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selves towards those present around us. We synchronize all of our move-
ments. When we slow down a video of people, they seem to be dancing.
Other great apes may lack this joint synchronicity.
Musical activity could have fostered such joint synchronicity. It may
have started with identical twins. Rhythmic unison — singing, drumming
and dancing together — may have attracted mates, and engendered a vir-
tuous cycle of rapid evolutionary change. This would have fostered that
“sixth sense” but also improved vocal chord control. For the group, musical
activity could have heightened the sense of “we” before and after a shared
activity, such as a hunt. Work songs fostered a sense of shared work. As
the repertoire of songs grew, they could influence language.
In linguistics, Jackendoff has noted that syntax must have arisen after a
protolanguage with a linear grammar which was quite robust. Such a linear
grammar is used by sailors speaking pidgin; second language users who
never develop fluency; people with certain brain injuries; deaf children who
develop their own gestures; but also the great apes. It consists of strings
of words for which there are no rules. Word order is simply determined
pragmatically in context.
Joint musical activity demands a perfection of all and at all times. It
thus legislates rules. Sounds or words must be annunciated exactly. Rituals
develop. Words and concepts become categorized, as Levi-Strauss observed.
People develop a sense of right or wrong, in-tune or out-of-tune, grammatical
or ungrammatical. Rules must be followed in creating new words. Syntax
arises as rules which may not be broken, and is distinct from pragmatic
constraints.
Language arises from pragmatic activity. Nonlinear grammar arises with
the division of labor such that we can perform a task that we do not com-
pletely understand, as when using a new word, or playing our own part in a
greater musical whole. This fosters our ability to hear what others are say-
ing as well as what we ourselves are thinking. Whereas perhaps other apes
can only think one perspective at a time. Thus they can answer questions
but they never ask them. Musical activity teaches us to be “I” and “you”
and “they” and “we”, in parallel.
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Listening and Reading: Temporalities of Musical Performance

and Notation
Giulia Lorenzi
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, Italy
[email protected]
Since McTaggart’s ground-breaking article of 1908, most philosophers of

time have recognised the distinction he draws between dynamic (“A-Series”)
and static (“B-Series”) orderings of temporal sequences. Though there is
much debate about the moral(s) to be drawn for the metaphysics of time,
the distinction itself is firmly established and well understood (Harrington
2013). The aim of this talk is to exploit the distinction to draw out some
structural differences between various modes of access to musical sources.
On the one hand, the experience of listening to music forms an ordered
sequence (from start to finish), has fairly determinate extension in time (not
too fast, not too slow), and requires attention from moment to moment (not
just overheard). These features can be captured by an “A-Series” analysis
and point to some essential characteristics of the enjoyment of music. On
the other hand, the analysis of a score permits us to examine structural
features (such as symmetries), to linger or skip, and to break off at will.
The notation is spread out in space, not unlike the time-lines deployed by
theorists of the “B-Series” to conceptualise the relations of “earlier than”
and “later than”.
The question arises — but can hardly be settled other than by stipula-
tion — of the possible senses in which a reading of a score can be a source
of properly musical enjoyment, and a disanalogy is suggested between the
priorities here and those we find, for instance, between the spoken and the
silently read in the reception of poetry: the notes on the stave represent
sounds, where the words of a poem are words.
References
1. J. Harrington, Time: A Philosophical Introduction, Bloomsbury, Lon-
don, 2015.
2. J.E. McTaggart, “The unreality of time”, Mind, vol. 17(68), 1908,
pp. 457–474.
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Workshops
Is there any logic of harmony?

Ingolf Max
Section of Logic and Theory of Science,
Department of Philosophy, University of Leipzig, Germany
[email protected]
A logic can be understood as the fixation of a set of constitutive rules

(a codex, a formal game). I.e., we fix the internal meaning of all symbols
(figures, players) involved in this game. We define inference relations and
prove theorems in the object language as well as in the meta language.
Harmony as a context-free relation between chords can be understood as
the internal meaning of music.
The minimum assumptions of a logic of harmony are:
1. Fixation of logical space: Our logical space is the chromatic scale of tone
pitches explicated by a discrete scale of integers. Each integer can be used to
represent exactly one single tone. Tone intervals are ordered pairs of pitches
and will be represented by ordered pairs of integers of the form ⟨xi , xj ⟩
with xi > xj . Each interval has a characteristic positive length l (l > 0):
L(⟨xi , xj ⟩) = l. The chromatic scale — like the scale of integers — is to be
thought as open in both directions and, therefore, infinite. Independently
from our hearing capacities we have an infinite number of tones, intervals
and chords.
2. Declaration of chords as our basic (minimal) expressions context-freely
identifiable by its inner structure: A key feature of the logic of chords is
that this formal theory is not an atomistic one. The basic elements are
chords consisting of at least three tones, two basic intervals and one reference
interval. A basic interval is the relation between directly adjacent tones in
a chord. The reference interval is the relation between the sharpest and the
deepest tone of any chord. If we consider chords with more than 3 tones
we have at least one level of intermediate intervals. A chord is a molecular
expression characterized not only by its tones but mainly by its matrix of
interval lengths. Each chord can be uniquely identified solely by its inner
structure. A class of (partially or totally tone-different) chords — e.g., the
class of 3-tone-major-chords in root position — can be identified simply by
knowing its characteristic matrix of interval lengths common to all of its
elements. Chords are logically independent of each other in the sense that
any sequence of chords is allowed without any restriction.
3. Chord operators: Chords are harmonically dependent in the sense that
each pair of chords constitutes internal harmony which can be described by
211
using chord operators. Internal harmony is nothing else than the relation
between two or more chords based solely on the inner structure of these
chords. In this sense “chord” as well as “harmony” are formal concepts.
Euphony is not necessary. E.g., we have of course chords and harmony
in twelve-tone music (dodecaphony) and free jazz in a chromatic space.
A unary chord operator takes a chord as its input and yields a chord as
its output. There are operators permuting the lengths of basic intervals.
Examples are complete inversions of basic interval lengths relative to tone-
related or interval-related fixed points (among them a kind of non-classical
negation of chords) and cyclic permutation operators. There are tone-related
operators like barré operators (outputs with identical matrices of interval
lengths. An n-ary chord operator (n ≤ 2) takes an n-tuple of chords as input
and yields a chord as its output. If it comes to more complex harmonic
constructions like sequences consisting of tonic, subdominant and dominant
(cadences) it can be useful to have at least binary operators to create them.
4. Inference relations: Characterization of types of tone-related inference re-
lations as well as inference relations with respect to interval lengths: Tonal-
ity can be understood as rule-governed restrictions on the inner structure
of chords as well as restrictions on the sequences of chords (e.g., creating
cadences) accompanied by special inference properties.
If total this means that we will show that there is a partial positive
answer to our initial question but the jury is still out.
Musical Performance: a Composition of Monads

Nick Rossiter
Northumbria University, UK
[email protected]
Michael Heather
University of Cambridge, UK
[email protected]
Much work has been done on computer representations of music at the

physical level. Developments such as K-nets by Klumpenhouwer and Lewin
provide a way for representing transformations from one pitch-class to an-
other. Category theory should facilitate the development of a logical ap-
proach to music, which can be mapped into one of the physical approaches
for implementation. Towards this aim Mazzola and Andreatta developed
the idea of a category of directed graphs (objects = notes or chords, edges
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= music operations such as transposition), as a topos-based approach for a

description of the music, ultimately delivering the generalised PK-net with
the concepts of form and support. PK-nets enable heterogeneous collections
of musical objects to be naturally compared and manipulated as described
by Popoff, Andreatta and Ehresmann [1].
The work to be presented builds on that developed for information sys-
tems, taking up the challenge of a testing application for the Cartesian
monad approach to universal design [2]. A principal aim is to capture the
performance of music as a communication between the musicians and the
audience using the categorial construction of a monad. In this respect the
monad, a term originally used by Leibniz, presents a musical performance
as a composition over time signatures, with adjointness between each step:
the monad looking backwards and then forwards and its associated comonad
looking forwards and then backwards. The physical characteristics of the
notes in each time-frame are complex, so it is necessary to use a strong
Cartesian monad, facilitating the representation of each time-frame as a
product. The monad is process, handling dynamic aspects. The category
upon which the monad operates is a topos holding relatively static infor-
mation such as the players, the score and the venue, together with the
relationships between them. The topos is far from totally static with its ar-
rows facilitating flexibility in all information held, including relationships;
the topos is also searchable through the subobject classifier. There is no as-
sumption of any particular musical genre. Such a categorial framework could
be implemented in a functional programming language such as Haskell, un-
der the control of a scripting language such as Forth, as employed in the
Blockchain method.
References
1. A. Popoff, M. Andreatta & A. Ehresmann, “A Categorical Generaliza-
tion of Klumpenhouwer Networks”, in Mathematics and Computation
in Music: 5th International Conference, 2015, pp. 303–314.
2. N. Rossiter, M. Heather & M. Brockway, “Monadic Design for Universal
Systems”, ANPA * Proceedings 37 & 38, edited by A.L. Vrba, 2018,
pp. 369–399, https://goo.gl/YXxy43.
*
Alternative Natural Philosophy Association
213
The Logic of Social Practices

Raffaela Giovagnoli
Faculty of Philosophy,
Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City
[email protected]
Robert Lowe
Division of Cognition and Communication,
Department of Applied Information Technology,
University of Gothenburg, Sweden
[email protected]
Social Practices refer to everyday practices which are routinely per-

formed. They integrate different types of elements such as bodily and mental
activities, material artifacts, knowledge, emotions, skills, etc.
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Søren Brier (page 122).
Call for papers

We invite submissions on the following topics:
Philosophy of Social Practices (Semiotics, Pragmatism, Analytic Prag-
matism, Collective Intentionality)
Practice Theory (Bordieau, Giddens, Foucault, Schatzki) and applica-
tions
Role of material artifacts and material resources (Warde, Schatzki,
Reckwitz and Shove, among others)
Routine behavior as formation of habits
Simulation models to investigate the emergence of social practices
Routine behavior (habits) vs. socially shared behavior (rituals)
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by November 15, 2017 via e-mail
to [email protected].
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A Computable Model of Amartya Sen’s Social Choice

Function in the Framework of the Category Theory Logic
Gianfranco Basti
Pontifical Lateran University, Rome, Italy
[email protected]
Antonio Capolupo & Giuseppe Vitiello
Department of Physics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
A significant part of the short history of the mathematical theory of so-
cial, political, and economical sciences, specifically in the context of welfare
politics and economy, is related with the development of the notion and the
theory of the so-called “social welfare function (SWF)”. This theory started
with the pioneering contributions of A. Bergson and of the Nobel Prize P.
Samuelson leading to the “Bergson-Samuelson SWF” [1,2], but received a
substantial improvement by the contribution of another Nobel Prize, K. Ar-
row [3]. Arrow’s SWF is intended as a function ranking social states as less,
more, or indifferently desirable, for every pair of them, with respect to indi-
vidual welfare measures and/or preferences. One of the main uses of SWF
is aimed, indeed, at representing coherent patterns (effectively, structures)
of collective and social choices/preferences as to alternative social states.
The essential limitation of SWF’s is that they are defined in the frame-
work of an approach to the study of social and economic systems stable
at equilibrium like in statistical mechanics. They are all inspired, indeed,
by Samuelson’s general approach to mathematical economics in his seminal
handbook [2], based on Gibbs’ statistical thermodynamics of gases, to which
the first two chapters of the book are significantly dedicated, because natu-
rally consistent with the liberal individualistic vision of economy and society.
Unfortunately, a fundamental unexpected and undesired consequence of Ar-
row’s mathematical theory is the famous “Arrow’s impossibility theorem”,
demonstrating the mathematical inconsistency for democratic systems of
social choices based on the majority decisions. The main contribution of A.
Sen’s theory of social choice functions (SCF) [4], for which he was awarded
with the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998, was the formal demonstration
that the only way for avoiding Arrow’s impossibility results is introducing
in the model the interpersonal comparison of utilities — and generally the
information exchange among persons constituting homogeneous groups, on
the contrary considered as irrelevant in the classical economic theory. This
allows also to introduce into the mathematical modeling of SCF Theory
215
distributive principles of social and economical justice, such as, for instance,
the famous J. Rawl’s maxmin principle, which gives priority to the interests
of worst-off persons. This transforms SCF Theory into a normative theory
of social choices. On this regard, Sen demonstrated that an effective math-
ematical modeling of ethical constraints in economy cannot be based on
abstract and not-computable optimal choices defined on the complete (to-
tal) ordering of social/economical states in a society, but on concrete criteria
of maximal choices relative to the different contexts, and then defined on
partial orderings, not necessarily satisfying a transitive relation among the
different social aggregates (sets) of persons so defined, and between groups
and the whole society. All this means that the physical paradigm under-
lying Sen’s mathematical theory of economy and society is no longer the
gas thermodynamics stable at equilibrium of the liberalism mathematical
models, but the fluid thermodynamics of condensed matter systems, stable
in far from equilibrium conditions, characterizing a “liquid society” such
as ours. The real-time information exchange among communication agents
determines the fast aggregation/dissolution of interest groups in a world-
wide environment — think, for instance, at the stock-exchange market and
at the infinite flow of data streams it produces. Unfortunately, this con-
dition makes unrealistic a SCF/SWF Theory based on finite [5], and then
Turing-computable sets, because, on infinite sets, Sen’s maximal partial or-
ders correspond to as many ultrafilters requiring higher order functions to
be calculated [6]. We propose in this contribution an original solution of
this problem in the formal framework of the Category Theory, based on the
categorical dual equivalence (anti-isomorphism) between co-algebras (en-
vironment) and algebras (system), originally applied to the mathematical
modelling of condensed matter thermodynamic systems, stable in far from
equilibrium conditions, in the context of quantum field theory of dissipa-
tive systems, human brains included [7,8,9]. The same categorical duality
co-algebras/algebras is used also in theoretical computer science, for for-
malizing the effectiveness of dynamic computations on infinite data streams
with always changing inner correlations — i.e., on infinite data sets just
it is the case of Sen’s SCFs. This approach is inside the paradigm of the
Algebraic/Co-algebraic Universality in computations [10,11], which is wider
than the classic Turing Universality, “probabilistic”, “quantum” Turing Ma-
chines included.
References
1. A. Bergson, “A reformulation of certain aspects of welfare economics”,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 52(2), 1938, pp. 310–334.
2. P.A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University
Press, 1947.
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Workshops
3. K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York,
1951.
4. A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, expanded edition, Penguin
Random House, London, 2017.
5. A. Sen, “The informational basis of social choices”, in Arrow Impos-
sibility Theorem, edited by E. Maskin & A. Sen, Columbia University
Press, 2014, pp. 67–100.
6. H.R. Mihara, “Arrow’s theory and Turing computability”, Economic
Theory, vol. 10(2), 1997, pp. 257–266.
7. M. Blasone, P. Jizba & G. Vitiello, Quantum field theory and its macro-
scopic manifestations. Boson condensation, ordered patterns and topo-
logical defects, Imperial College Press, London, 2011.
8. W.J. Freeman & G. Vitiello, “Dissipation and spontaneous symmetry
breaking in brain dynamics”, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and
Theoretical, vol. 41(30), 2008, p. 304042.
9. G. Basti, A. Capolupo & G. Vitiello, “Quantum field theory and coal-
gebraic logic in theoretical computer science”, Progress in Biophysics
and Molecular Biology, vol. 130, 2017, pp. 39–52.
10. J.J.M. Rutten, “Universal coalgebra: a theory of systems”, Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 249(1), 2000, pp. 3–80.
11. Y. Venema, “Algebras and co-algebras”, in Handbook of Modal Logic,
edited by P. Blackburn, F.J.F. van Benthem & F. Wolter, Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 2007, pp. 331–426.
Rituals as “Social Habits”

Raffaela Giovagnoli
Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City
[email protected]
Rituals can be considered as social practices or habits in an “institu-

tionalized” We-mode. They have the important function to create social
spaces in which individuals can share emotions, experiences, values, norms
and knowledge. They need human cooperation as a kind of intersubjec-
tivity typical of human beings who, differently from apes, are able to have
“Collective Intentionality” [11,7], i.e. the basic intention to cooperate and
therefore to reach together a certain goal. There is a contemporary lively
debate on the nature and structure of Collective Intentionality, as necessary
notion to researches in the field of social ontology (the pioneers in this area
are John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, Margareth Gilbert, Michael Bratman and
Philip Pettit).
217
Our aim is to try to isolate a process that is common to habits and rituals
and this process is related to a reduction of complexity (in the Aristotelian
sense it entails habitus and consuetudo), that characterizes individual and
social ordinary life. But, to share habits in a larger environment where
ritual can become public, with specific rules of behavior, that make it rec-
ognizable from people inside and out side the community, we need a third
level of behavior, i.e. the process of institutionalization of them. The set of
acts which characterizes human habits can be institutionalized to form the
cultural rituals that belong to human life-forms. What we must clarify here
is how this institutionalization is possible and actually works. In this sense
what can seem merely shared habits become “social” in a strong sense, and
reinforce their function in establishing solidarity and social identity.
We can observe that human beings (but also other species) have the
capacity to impose a function to an object so that the object acquires a
function dependent on the peculiar scope of the agent. The continuity be-
tween individual habits and rituals (social habits) is thus showed by the fact
that humans create these “agentive functions” (in Searle’s terminology) in
a wide variety of situations. Also non human animals have their form of
creating functions for objects but there is a fundamental difference in the
concept of “function” in the human case.
References
1. R. Giovagnoli, “Life-world, Language and Religion. Habermas’ Per-
spective”, Aquinas, vol. 58(1–2), 2015, pp. 253–260.
2. R. Giovagnoli, “Communicative Life-world and Religion”, Asian Re-
search Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, vol. 1(3), 2016, pp. 1–7.
3. R. Giovagnoli, “Habits and Rituals”, in Proceedings of the IS4SI * ,
Gothenburg, Sweden, 2017.
4. R. Giovagnoli, “Lifeworld, We-Intentionality and Rituals”, in Mind,
Collective Agency, Norms. Essays on Social Ontology, edited by P. Salis
& G. Seddone, Shaker Verlag, Aachen, Germany, 2017, pp. 22–32.
5. R. Giovagnoli, “The Function of Language for the problem of Represen-
tation”, in Representation and Reality. Humans, Other Living Beings
and Intelligent Machines, edited by G. Dodig-Crnkovic & R. Giovagnoli,
Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2017, pp. 235–246.
6. A. Graybiel, “Habits, Rituals and the Evaluative Brain”, Annual Review
of Neuroscience, vol. 31, 2008, pp. 359–387.
7. J. Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken II: Aufsätze und Repliken,
Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt, 2012.
*
International Society for the Study of Information
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8. J.A. Lombo & J.M. Gimenez-Amaya, “The unity and stability of hu-
man behavior. An interdisciplinary approach to habits between philoso-
phy and neuroscience”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 8, 2014,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4127468.
9. K. Schilbrak, Thinking through Rituals: Philosophical Perspectives, Rout-
ledge, London, 2004.
10. J. Searle, Making the Social World, Oxford University Press, 2010.
11. M. Tomasello, Why We Cooperate, MIT* Press, 2009.
Collective Phronesis? An investigation of collective

judgement and professional knowledge
Jonna Lappalainen & Eva Schwarz
Center for Studies in Practical Knowledge,
Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden
In the proposed paper we will discuss whether, and if so how profes-

sional action can be understood as a collective capability, and in what way
this capacity can be understood in terms of Practical wisdom, Phronesis
[see 1,4]. We will investigate the idea of “collective phronesis” by use of two
examples from different professional practices, such as teaching and polic-
ing. Professional action, e.g. in the role of a teacher or police officer, seems
— by definition — to transcend the individual horizon of an agent. The
professional identity implies that the individual (implicitly and/or explic-
itly) takes a representational stance regarding the profession as a collective.
The question is how this can be understood.
In the contemporary debate within social epistemology on the possibility
of collective agency, one often speaks of two distinct cases/forms of collective
judgement [2,3]. In the first case an individual (here: professional) has to
judge upon a situation that requires social evidence, i.e. the judgments of
others e.g. colleagues or on routines and informal rules. The second case is
about situations where a group of individuals (here: professionals) act/judge
together. Looking at the everyday practice of professionals, such as police
officers or teachers, one can see that professional practices often have to
deal with conflicts between these two cases. This is e.g. the case when it is
not clear whether the judgement of the group is based on social evidence or
informal rules.
In our presentation we will in a first part present two examples from
*
219
the everyday practice of teachers and police officers where two options pre-
sented above turn out to conflict with each other. In the second part of our
presentation we will provide a critical analysis of the Aristotelian concept
of “phronesis”, that is traditionally discussed within the framework of indi-
vidual agents and judgement [5], and discuss it in relation to the question
of the possibility of collective judgment. In a third part we discuss in what
way a professional judgement or action could be understood as an expres-
sion of “collective phronesis”.
References
1. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Harvard University Press, 1975.
2. H. Collins, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, University of Chicago Press,
2012.
3. A. Goldman, “Experts. Which ones should you trust?”, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, vol. 63(1), 2011, pp. 85–110.
4. E.A. Kinsella & A. Pitman (editors), Phronesis as Professional Knowl-
edge: Practical Wisdom in the Professions, Sense Publishers, 2012.
5. M. van Manen, Phenomenology of Practice: Meaning-Giving Methods
in Phenomenological Research and Writing, Routledge, 2014.
Bridging Habits and Cognition: Inference and Category

Learning through Neural-Dynamic Logic
Robert Lowe
Department of Applied Information Technology,
Division of Cognition and Communication,
University of Gothenburg, Sweden
[email protected]
The link between, on the one hand, habits and goal-directed learning
within a dual-process structure, and, on the other hand, the learning of
cognitive capacities has a tradition within animal (and human) learning
paradigms. Neural network models of animal learning have been used to
learn associative relations between stimuli or/and processes and provide new
hypotheses as to the nature of learning and relationships between learn-
ing systems. However, more biologically realistic models that account for
the continuous (spatiotemporal) dynamics of the learning/decision making
problems that such theorized animal learning processes are tested on may
suffer from the challenge of finding an appropriate and cognitively intuitive
parameterization. As a consequence, the modelled processes in learning
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may not be easily tuned to each other. Following recent interest in integrat-
ing principles of logic into neural computational modelling, in this article,
by way of an example concerning the Associative Two-Process theory, we
suggest a neural-dynamic logic approach to understanding the nature of the
interaction between the two (habitual and goal-directed) learning processes.
We attempt to describe how the cognitive phenomena of categorization by
common outcomes, and transitive inference, can be grounded in the learning
and interactions of habits with goal-directed systems.
Moral Bubbles in Action

The Logic of Cognitive Autoimmunity
Lorenzo Magnani
Department of Humanities, Philosophy Section,
University of Pavia, Italy
[email protected]
In [1], Woods described the “epistemic bubble” as an immunized state of

human cognition [2] that compromises the awareness of the agent about her
beliefs and knowledge. In my presentation I will introduce a symmetrical
view on the agent immunization, focused on the agent’s missing awareness
of her potential or actual violence, also highlighting the importance of con-
sidering the actual agent as cogently moral.
A basic aspect of the human fallacious use of language in social settings,
as far as its effects are concerned, I call “military”, is the softness and gen-
tleness granted by the constitutive capacity of fallacies to conceal errors.
Being constitutively and easily unaware of our errors is very often inter-
twined with the self-conviction that we are not at all violent and aggressive
in the argumentation we perform (and in our eventual related actions). In
this last case we are dealing with what I have called a moral bubble [3]. I
believe that the issue of the violence embedded in morality provides us with
a significant clue about the existence of something akin to a moral bubble,
that is very homomorphic with the epistemic bubble, in which an agent is
“trapped”. One should never forget how:
unawareness of our error is often accompanied by lack of awareness
regarding the deceptive/aggressive character of our speech (and behav-
ior).
After all when we act morally we “want” to believe we are acting in a
non violent way a priori, and we “want” to preserve the moral bubble we
are in, which permits us to erase the possible violence we are dealing with.
In this perspective morality is strictly intertwined with violence.
221
Finally, I will contend that moral bubble is also a necessary condition

to the social survival of morality itself: its scope is to avoid the cognitive
breakdown that would be triggered by the constant appraisal of the major
or minor inconsistency of our conduct with respect to our convictions.
References
1. J. Woods, Errors of Reasoning. Naturalizing the Logic of Inference,
College Publications, London, 2013.
2. S. Arfini & L. Magnani, “An eco-cognitive model of ignorance immu-
nization”, in Philosophy and Cognitive Science II. Western & Eastern
Studies, edited by L. Magnani, P. Li & W. Park, Springer, 2015.
3. L. Magnani, Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality,
Religion and Violence: A Philosophical Stance, Springer, 2011.
John Searle as Practice Theoretician

Joel Patomäki
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy,
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
[email protected]
I will research John Searle’s [1] idea of social causation as collective inten-
tionality and (according to my understanding) the more important notion of
background. I will compare Searle’s notions of collective intentionality and
background of the social to Maurizio Ferraris’s [2] notions of text as replace-
ment of collective intentionality. The problems that Ferraris addresses are
understood here in terms of practises. In this article I will look into more
contemporary debates in social ontology and in practise approach Theodore
Schatzki [3] is a kind of pioneer in this approach. My viewpoint to Searle
comes from two ordinary language philosophers: John Austin and Ludwig
Wittgenstein. I will interpret Searle as an analytic version of the practise
approach. By this I mean that Searle has analytically distinguished social
practise to have three components, which are performative, background,
and collective intentionality. These notions, combined with the Practice
approach of Schatzki, will help me to formulate a constructive critique of
Searle’s theory. mostly in terms of Practise Approach of Schatzki, even
though many theories are used. I will concentrate. The main focus will be
in the understanding of background as the collective intentionality of being
part of the practise in general.
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Workshops
References
1. J.R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Penguin Books, 1995.
2. M. Ferraris, Documentality: Why it is Necessary to Leave Traces,
Fordham University Press, 2013.
3. T.R. Schatzki Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human
Activity and the Social, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Polarization Dynamics in the Age of Social Media

Fabiana Zollo
Department of Environmental Sciences, Informatics
and Statistics, Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy
[email protected]
Information, rumors, and debates may shape the perception of reality

and heavily impact public opinion. On online social networks users tend
to select information that is coherent to their system of beliefs and to form
polarized groups of like-minded people — i.e., echo chambers — where they
reinforce and polarize their pre-existing opinions. Such a context exacer-
bates misinformation, which has traditionally represented a political, social,
and economic risk. Indeed, since 2013 the World Economic Forum has been
listing massive digital misinformation at the core of other geopolitical risks,
such as terrorism or cyberattacks. In this talk we explore how we can un-
derstand social dynamics by analyzing massive data on online social media.
We provide the empirical existence of echo chambers, showing that confir-
mation bias is the main driver behind content consumption [1]. Moreover,
we address the emotional dynamics inside and between different narratives,
and investigate users’ response to both confirmatory and contrasting infor-
mation [2,3]. Moving beyond misinformation, we show that similar patterns
may be observed around both the Brexit — the British referendum to leave
the European Union — and the Italian Constitutional Referendum debates,
where we observe the spontaneous emergence of well-segregated and polar-
ized groups of users around news sources [4]. Finally, we characterize the
anatomy of news consumption on a global scale. By means of a tight, quan-
titative analysis on 376 millions users and 920 news outlets, we show the
natural tendency of users to focus on a limited set of pages (selective expo-
sure) eliciting a sharp and polarized community structure [5]. Our findings
provide interesting insights about the determinants of polarization and the
evolution of core narratives on online debating, and highlight the crucial role
of data science techniques to understand and map the information space on
online social media.
223
References
1. M. Del Vicario, A. Bessi, F. Zollo et al., “The spreading of misinforma-
tion online”, in PNAS * , vol. 113(3), 2016, pp. 554–559.
2. F. Zollo, P.K. Novak, M. Del Vicario et al., “Emotional dynamics in
the age of misinformation”, PLoS ONE, vol. 10(9), 2015, doi:10.1371/
journal.pone.0138740.
3. F. Zollo, A. Bessi, M. Del Vicario et al., “Debunking in a world of
tribes”, PLoS ONE, vol. 12(7), 2017, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0181821.
4. M. Del Vicario, F. Zollo, G. Caldarelli et al., “Mapping social dynam-
ics on Facebook: The Brexit debate”, Social Newtorks, vol. 50, 2017,
pp. 6–16, doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2017.02.002.
5. A.L. Schmidt, F. Zollo, M. Del Vicario et al., “Anatomy of news con-
sumption on Facebook”, in PNAS, vol. 114(12), 2017, pp. 3035–3039,
doi:10.1073/pnas.1617052114.
The Logic of preferences and a settlement of conflicts (based

on the modeling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)
Suren Zolyan
Institute for Humanities,
Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad, Russia
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law,
National Academy of Sciences, Armenia
[email protected]
Political processes can be described by means of modal logic and modal

semantics (semantics of possible worlds). The suggested model for the de-
scription of conflict and its possible settlement (resolution) is based on the
logic of preference, developed by von Wright [1], and complemented with
some elements of temporal logic [2]. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict we suggest to use its substantial interpretation, this makes possi-
ble to compare different state of affairs and find the compatible models of
common future, where the state of peace or the state of absence of military
actions are possible. This means that the preferable state of affairs is the
situation which is not the best for any of the participants, but at the same
time it is not the worst for any of them (there is no winner, who “takes all”,
but there is no explicit looser).
*
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Public Library of Science
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However, the existing political language does not provide opportunity

for such descriptions From logical and semiotic point of view it implies that
the language based on binary oppositions should be abandoned and replaced
by the multivalent semantics and enriched by some ambivalent complicate
concepts:
war & peace, war & ∼peace, ∼war & ∼peace, ∼war & peace.
With respect to the existing conflict-settlement practice there is a strong

need to change conceptual framework in such a way that will make possi-
ble to reach a true compromise, instead of alternatives which actually are
acceptable only to one side. The suggested approach and the procedure of
the substantial interpretation of logical pattern of preferences can be ap-
plied to the all types of conflict, if initial stands of conflicting parties can be
explicated as some system of basic propositions and propositional attitudes.
References
1. G.H. von Wright, The Logic of Preference, Edinburgh University Press,
1963.
2. A.N. Prior, “Tense-logic and the continuity of time”, Studia Logica,
vol. 13(1), 1962, pp. 133–151.
225
Model Theory
Petros Stefaneas
National Technical University of Athens, Greece
[email protected]
Sergey Sudoplatov
Novosibirsk State Technical University,
Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk, Russia
Institute of Mathematics and Mathematical Modeling,
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Model theory is the branch of mathematical logic dealing with the con-
nection between a formal language and its interpretations, or models, i.e.,
it represents links between syntactic and semantic objects. These objects
can be used to classify each others producing structural classifications of
theories and their models. Solving classification questions valuable char-
acteristics arise (dimensions, ranks, complexities, spectra etc.) for various
classes of structures and their theories.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Bruno Poizat (page 154) and
Sergey Goncharov (page 129).
Call for papers

We invite contributions on all aspects of Model Theory. Topics include:
Equational classes, universal algebra
Basic properties of first-order languages and structures
Quantifier elimination, model completeness
Finite structures
Countable structures
Uncountable structures
Model-theoretic constructions
Categoricity and completeness of theories
Interpolation, preservation, definability
Classification theory, stability and related concepts
Abstract elementary classes and related topics
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Workshops
Models with special properties

Properties of classes of models
Effective and recursion-theoretic model theory
Model-theoretic algebra
Model theory of ordered structures; o-minimality and their variations
Logic on admissible sets
Second and higher-order model theory
Nonclassical models
Abstract model theory
Jonsson theories
Topologies on classes of theories and their models
Applications of model theory
Unification in linear multi-modal logic of knowledge

and non-transitive time*
Stepan I. Bashmakov
Siberian Federal University, Krasnoyarsk, Russia
[email protected]
Unification problem in the field of non-classical logics often formulated

as the possibility of a formula to become a theorem after the replacing of
variables. In the late 90’s [1] S. Ghilardi proposed an important approach to
the unification using the projective formulas that allowed to get the solution
of constructing finite complete sets of unifiers for a lot of logics. A number
of remarkable consequences were found from the projective unification (e.g.
unitary type of unification, in dealing with bases of admissible rules [2],
almost structural completeness [3]).
In [4] we investigate logic, based on the idea of non-transitive time [5],
which suggests that the available in the past data may not be transferred
to the present. Here we consider the multi-agent case of this logic with the
universal modality.
Let, in our notation, LITK be the logic characterized by the temporal
Kripke frame F = ⟨W, R1 , . . . , Rk , Re , Next⟩, where W is the disjoint union
of the clots (tense moments) Ct , t ∈ N; R1 , . . . , Rk are some equivalence
relations within each clot; Re is S5-equivalence relation in clots; and Next
*
This study was supported in part by the Moebius Contest Foundation for Young Scien-
tists.
227
is the relation such that
∀a, b ∈ W ∶ a Next b ⇔ a ∈ Ct & b ∈ Ct+1 .
We extend the language of LITK by adding the operator of universal

modality 2U and define the truth values of formulas containing 2U on the
model M = ⟨F, V ⟩:
∀x ∈ F, ⟨F, x⟩ V 2U ϕ ⇔ [∀y ∈ F, ⟨F, y⟩ V ϕ] .
The logic LITK, which language LLITK containing 2U is called the lin-
ear multi-agent logic based on non-transitive time with universal modality
(ULITK for short).
Theorem 1. Unifiability of any formula ϕ(p1 , . . . , ps ) in ULITK can be

effectively checked using the substitution σ(ϕ) of the following form:
∀pi ∈ Var(ϕ) σ(pi ) ∈ {⊺, }.
Theorem 2. Any unifiable in ULITK formula is projective.
An algorithm for constructing most general unifier is proposed: it suffices

to write out the following substitution σ(pi ) instead of all variables pi of a
given unifiable formula ϕ:
σ(pi ) ∶= (2U ϕ ∧ pi ) ∨ (¬2U ϕ ∧ gu(pi )).
References
1. S. Ghilardi, “Unification Through Projectivity”, Journal of Logic and
Computation, vol. 7(6), 1997, pp. 733–752.
2. R. Iemhoff, “On the admissible rules of intuitionistic propositional logic”,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 66(1), 2001, pp. 281–294.
3. W. Dzik, “Remarks on projective unifiers”, Bulletin of the Section of
Logic, vol. 40(1), 2011, pp. 37–45.
4. S.I. Bashmakov, “Unification in linear modal logic on non-transitive
time with the universal modality”, Journal of Siberian Federal Univer-
sity. Mathematics & Physics, vol. 11(1), 2018, forthcoming.
5. V.V. Rybakov, “Nontransitive temporal multiagent logic, information
and knowledge, deciding algorithms”, Siberian Mathematical Journal,
vol. 58(5), 2017, pp. 875–886.
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Workshops
Computable Modal Algebras and Contact Algebras

Nikolay Bazhenov
[email protected]
It is well-known that the class of Boolean algebras is not universal

from the computability-theoretic point of view: In particular, a computable
Boolean algebra is computably categorical iff it is relatively computably
categorical [1]. On the other hand, in general structures, the notions of
computable categoricity and relative computable categoricity do not coin-
cide.
Khoussainov and Kowalski [2] initiated the line of research that aims
to answer the following question: How does expanding the language of
Boolean algebras affect computability-theoretic properties of the class? One
of the methods to investigate this problem involves using the approach of
Hirschfeldt, Khoussainov, Shore and Slinko [3]. They introduced the notion
of an HKSS-complete class of structures. The informal idea is the following:
If a countable structure has some interesting computability-theoretic prop-
erty, then for any HKSS-complete class K, one can find a structure S from
K possessing the same property (see [3] for details). In [2], it was shown
that the class of Boolean algebras with operators is HKSS-complete.
Let B be a Boolean algebra. A function f ∶ ∣B∣ → ∣B∣ is a modality if it
satisfies the following two properties: f (0B ) = 0B , and f (a ∨ b) = f (a) ∨ f (b)
for all a, b ∈ B. In [4], it was proven that the class of Boolean algebras
with four distinguished modalities is HKSS-complete. A modal algebra is a
Boolean algebra with one distinguished modality.
Theorem. The class of modal algebras is HKSS-complete.
A similar result is obtained for the class of contact algebras introduced

by Dimov and Vakarelov [5] for the study of the region-based theory of space.
References
1. S.S. Goncharov & V.D. Dzgoev, “Autostability of models”, Algebra and
Logic, vol. 19(1), 1980, pp. 28–37.
2. B. Khoussainov & T. Kowalski, “Computable isomorphisms of Boolean
algebras with operators”, Studia Logica, vol. 100(3), 2012, pp. 481–496.
3. D.R. Hirschfeldt, B. Khoussainov, R.A. Shore & A.M. Slinko, “Degree
spectra and computable dimensions in algebraic structures”, Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 115(1–3), 2002, pp. 71–113.
229
4. N. Bazhenov, “Categoricity spectra for polymodal algebras”, Studia

Logica, vol. 104(6), 2016, pp. 1083–1097.
5. G. Dimov & D. Vakarelov, “Contact Algebras and Region-based The-
ory of Space: A Proximity Approach — I”, Fundamenta Informaticae,
vol. 74(2–3), 2006, pp. 209–249.
Syntactic and Semantic Presentations of Scientific Theories

in Abstract Model Theory
Maria Dimarogkona & Petros Stefaneas
Department of Mathematics, School of Applied Mathematical
and Physical Sciences,
Nicola Angius
Department of History, Human Sciences and Education,
University of Sassari, Italy
[email protected]
This paper focuses on the logic relations holding between syntactic and
semantic presentations of empirical theories. Two problems advanced in [2]
are extensively examined here: first, the problem of defining a notion of
equivalence such that the theoretical equivalence of two syntactic theories
implies the model-theoretic equivalence of the two corresponding semantic
theories. Secondly, the problem of establishing whether language transla-
tions of a syntactic theory are in a many-to-one or many-to-many relation
with the corresponding semantic theory(ies). This paper introduces the
theory of institutions [1] to show the logical duality holding between syntac-
tic and semantic presentations of a given theory in a language-independent
context and for any-order and multi-sorted logics.
First, syntactic and semantic presentations of scientific theories are for-
malized in the theory of institutions framework. The notions of theoretic
and model-theoretic equivalence are then defined as isomorphisms in the
categories Th and Vth of, respectively, syntactic and semantic theories. Sec-
ondly, it is proven that given an institution I, two syntactic theories over
I are equivalent if and only if the corresponding semantic theories over I
are equivalent. Finally, the many-to-many logic relations holding between
language translations of a syntactic theory and the corresponding semantic
theories are shown in terms of functors mapping syntactic theory morphisms
in Th to semantic theory morphisms in Vth.
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Workshops
References
1. J.A. Goguen & R.M. Burstall, “Institutions: Abstract model theory
for specification and programming”, Journal of the ACM * , vol. 39(1),
pp. 95–146.
2. H. Halvorson, “What Scientific Theories Could Not Be”, Philosophy of
Science, vol. 79(2), pp. 183–206.
On almost deterministic algebras of binary isolating formulas

for polygonometrical theories
Dmitry Emelyanov
[email protected]
Sergey Sudoplatov
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
We consider (almost) deterministic possibilities of algebras A of binary
isolating formulas [1] for polygonometrical theories [2]. Recall [1] that A is
said to be (almost) deterministic if for any labels u and v the set u ⋅ v is a
singleton (respectively finite).
Proposition. If P is a plane and G1 is finite then the algebra A, for the

theory T (pm), is (∣G1 ∣ + 1)-almost deterministic.
This proposition can be generalized, producing almost deterministic al-

gebras A, if G1 is finite and P is an almost plane, i.e., for any side parameters
g1 , g1′ ∈ G1 there are cofinitely many angle parameters g2 ∈ G2 such that the
triple (g1 , g2 , g1′ ) is extensible till a tuple for parameters of a triangle. The
following theorem shows that almost deterministic A can be obtained by
extensions of polygonometries.
Theorem. For any polygonometry pm = pm(G1 , G2 , P), with a finite group

G1 and without polygons inhibiting the projectivity, there is an extension
pm′ = pm(G1 , G′2 , P′ ) of pm on a plane P′ such that the algebra A of binary
isolating formulas for T (pm′ ) is almost deterministic.
*
231
References
1. S.V. Sudoplatov, Classification of Countable Models of Complete The-
ories, Novosibirsk State Technical University, 2014.
2. S.V. Sudoplatov, Group Polygonometries, Novosibirsk State Technical
University, 2013.
3. D.Yu. Emelyanov & S.V. Sudoplatov, “On Deterministic and Absorb-
ing Algebras of Binary Formulas of Polygonometrical Theories”, Re-
ports of Irkutsk State University, Series “Mathematics”, vol. 20, 2017,
pp. 32–44.
Pregeometry on subsets of fragment of Jonsson set

Maira Kassymetova & Aibat Yeshkeyev
Faculty of Mathematics and Information Technology,
E.A. Buketov Karaganda State University, Kazakhstan
We have deal with some J-ω-stable theory [1] and its semantic model.
This thesis introduced and discussed the concepts of minimal Jonsson sub-
sets and respectively strongly minimal Jonsson subsets of this semantic
model.
We want to each Jonsson subset X of the semantic model assign ordinal
number (or, perhaps, −1 or ∞) and it is the rank Morley of this set, denoted
by MR(X).
Let T is a fragment of some Jonsson set and it is a perfect Jonsson
theory, C will be its semantic model. X is a definable subset of C.
Definition 1. MR(X) ≥ 0 if and only if X is nonempty; MR(X) ≥ λ if and

only if MR(X) ≥ α for all α < λ ( λ is the limit ordinal); MR(X) ≥ α + 1 if
and only if in X exists an infinite family (Xi ) disjoint ∃-definable subsets,
such that MR(Xi ) ≥ α for all i.
Then Morley rank of set X is MR(X) = sup{α ∣ MR(X) ≥ α}.

Moreover, we assume that MR(∅) = −1 and MR(X) = ∞ if MR(X) ≥ α
for all α (in the latter case we say that X has not rank).
Definition 2. The degree of Morley dM (X) of Jonsson set X is the maxi-

mum length n of its decomposition X = X1 ∪. . .∪Xn into disjoint existentially
definable subsets of rank Morley α.
Next, we standardly define pregeometry on the set of all subsets of the

semantic model and the concept of strongly minimal Jonsson sets.
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On this basis, it introduces the concept of the independence in the frame

of special pregeometry under subsets of some existentially closed submodel.
The notion of independence leads to the concept of basis and then we have
an analogue of the theorem on uncountable categoricity for fragments of
Jonsson set.
In this abstract, we collect the necessary facts and notions about prege-
ometries, existence of bases and hence a well-defined dimension, modularity
laws, etc. (like in [2]) in the frame of Jonsson sets studying.
All concepts that are not defined in this thesis can be extracted from [1].
References
1. A.R. Yeshkeev & M.T. Kassymetova, Jonsson theory and its classes of
models, monograph, E.A. Buketov Karaganda State University, 2016.
2. B. Zilber, Zariski geometries: geometry from the logician’s point of view,
On definable sets in generic structures

Yiannis Kiouvrekis
University of Nicosia, Cyprus
[email protected]
Petros Stefaneas
[email protected]
Sergey Sudoplatov
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
In this talk we will present our joint work on definable sets and generic
structures [1]. First of all we will present an analysis of the diagrams which
forming generative classes to describe definable sets and their links in generic
structures as well as cardinality bounds for these definable sets, finite or
infinite.
233
We will present the basic characteristics definable sets in generic struc-

tures and will compare them each other and with cardinalities of these sets.
The notion of definable set is one of the basic notions in Model Theory.
Studying definable sets one can observe what properties can be described
by formulas. In this presentation we will present the basic characteristics
for definable sets in generic structures.
In the first section we will present several preliminary notions and nec-
essary results of generic structures. After that we will introduce some frag-
ments of definable sets in generic structures, characterize finite and cofinite
definable sets, and describe bounds for finite definable sets and their cov-
ers, and in the final section we will show the basic characteristics and their
bounds for infinite definable sets. The topics will be covered through several
examples.
Theorem 1. For a definable set X the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) X is finite;
(2) X = XΦ(A) for some Φ(A) ∈ D0 ;
(3) there is Φ(A) ∈ D0 such that XΦ(A) = XΨ(B)
for any Ψ(B) with M Ψ(B) and Φ(A) ⩽ Ψ(B).
Theorem 2. For a definable set X the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) X is cofinite;
(2) M ∖ X = (M ∖ X)Φ(A) for some Φ(A) ∈ D0 ;
(3) M ∖ X ⊆ YΦ(A) for some Φ(A) ∈ D0 and a definable set Y ;
(4) there is Φ(A) ∈ D0 such that (M ∖ X)Φ(A) = (M ∖ X)Ψ(B)
for any Ψ(B) with M Ψ(B) and Φ(A) ⩽ Ψ(B).
Theorem 3. A covering set U of diagrams Φ(A) for X (with M Φ(A))
is minimal if and only if for each Φ(A) ∈ U there is a coordinate ai for a
tuple ā in X such that ai belongs to A and does not belong to universes B
of other diagrams Ψ(B) ∈ U .
Theorem 4. For any definable set Y ⊇ X in the generic structure M,
ω ≤ d(D0 , X) ≤ d(D0 , Y ) ≤ d(D0 ) ≤ 2max{∣Σ∣,ω} .
Theorem 5. For any definable set Y ⊇ X in the generic structure M,
∣X∣ ≤ d(D0 , X) ⋅ sc(X) ≤ d(D0 , Y ) ⋅ sc(Y ) ≤ ∣M ∣ = d(D0 ) ⋅ sc(M).
Reference
1. Y. Kiouvrekis, P. Stefaneas & S.V. Sudoplatov, “Definable sets in generic
structures and their cardinalities”, Siberian Advances in Mathematics,
vol. 28, 2018, pp. 39–52.
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Workshops
On lattices in generative classes

Yiannis Kiouvrekis
University of Nicosia, Cyprus
[email protected]
Petros Stefaneas
[email protected]
Sergey Sudoplatov
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
In this presentation will show the study of lattices in generative classes

associated with generic structures [1–5]. We will show that these lattices
can be non-distributive and, moreover, arbitrary enough, also heights and
wights of the lattices are described. A model-theoretic criterion for the
linear ordering is proved and these linear orders are described.
We will investigate the connection of generative classes with several
classes of algebras as Boolean algebras, for example the first result is that
in a Boolean algebras generated by the considered lattices are described.
Theorem 1. For any self-sufficient class (D0 , ⩽) and a (D0 , ⩽)-generic struc-
ture M, the structure ⟨L(M, D0 , ⩽), ∧, ∨⟩ is a lattice which can be non-
distributive.
Theorem 2. For any self-sufficient class (D0 , ⩽) and a (D0 , ⩽)-generic struc-
ture M, the lattice L = ⟨L(M, D0 , ⩽), ∧, ∨⟩ has the following characteristics:
(1) 1 < h(L) ≤ ∣M ∣ + 1 if M is finite, and h(L) = ω if M is infinite;
(2) 1 ≤ w(L) ≤ ∣M ∣ if M is at most countable, and h(L) = ∣M ∣ if M is
uncountable.
All values in the described intervals can be realized in appropriate generic

structures.
235
References
1. S.V. Sudoplatov, “Syntactic approach to constructions of generic mod-
els”, Algebra and Logic, vol. 46, 2007, pp. 134–146.
2. S.V. Sudoplatov, Classification of Countable Models of Complete The-
ories, Novosibirsk State Technical University, 2018.
3. S.V. Sudoplatov, “Generative classes generated by sets of diagrams”,
Algebra and Model Theory, vol. 10, Novosibirsk State Technical Uni-
versity, 2015, pp. 163–174.
4. S.V. Sudoplatov, “Classes of structures and their generic limits”, Loba-
chevskii Journal of Mathematics, vol. 36, 2015, pp. 426–433.
5. Y. Kiouvrekis, P. Stefaneas & S.V. Sudoplatov, “Definable sets in generic
structures and their cardinalities”, Siberian Advances in Mathematics,
vol. 28, 2018, pp. 39–52.
Preserving properties at expansions of models

of ordered theories by unary predicates
Beibut Sh. Kulpeshov*
International Information Technology University,
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Sayan Baizhanov
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Keywords: weak o-minimality, ℵ0 -categoricity, convexity rank, expansion
of a model.
The present lecture deals with the notion of weak o-minimality, which
initially was deeply studied by D. Macpherson, D. Marker and C. Steinhorn
in [1]. A subset A of a linearly ordered structure M is convex if for any
a, b ∈ A and c ∈ M whenever a < c < b we have c ∈ A. A weakly o-minimal
structure is a linearly ordered structure M = ⟨M, =, <, . . .⟩ such that any
definable (with parameters) subset of the structure M is a finite union of
convex sets in M . Real closed fields with a proper convex valuation ring
provide an important example of weakly o-minimal structures.
Here we discuss properties that are preserved at expanding models of an
ℵ0 -categorical weakly o-minimal theory by a convex unary predicate. By
*
This author was supported by the grant no. 0830/GF4 of the Ministry of Education and
Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
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Workshops
[2] any expansion of a model of a weakly o-minimal theory by an arbitrary

family of convex unary predicates is a model of a weakly o-minimal theory.
We prove that the following properties as ℵ0 -categoricity and convexity rank
[3] are preserved under such expansions.
Theorem. Let M be a model of an ℵ0 -categorical weakly o-minimal theory,
M ′ be an expansion of M by an arbitrary finite family of convex unary
predicates. Then M ′ is a model of an ℵ0 -categorical weakly o-minimal
theory of the same convexity rank.
References
1. H.D. Macpherson, D. Marker & C. Steinhorn, “Weakly o-minimal struc-
tures and real closed fields”, Transactions of The American Mathemat-
ical Society, vol. 352(12), 2000, pp. 5435–5483.
2. B.S. Baizhanov, “Expansion of a model of a weakly o-minimal the-
ory by a family of unary predicates”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 66(3), 2001, pp. 1382–1414.
3. B.Sh. Kulpeshov, “Weakly o-minimal structures and some of their prop-
erties”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 63(4), 1998, pp. 1511–1528.
The complexity of quasivariety lattices

Svetlana Lutsak
M. Kozybayev North-Kazakhstan State University,
Petropavlovsk, Kazakhstan
sveta [email protected], [email protected]
We consider two complexity measures of (relative) quasivariety lattices:

the Q-universality and the Nurakunov non-computability property. The
concept of Q-universality was introduced by M.V. Sapir [1] in 1985. A
quasivariety K is Q-universal if, for any quasivariety R of a finite type, the
quasivariety lattice Lq(R) is a homomorphic image of a sublattice of the
quasivariety lattice Lq(K). The second complexity measure was suggested
by A. M. Nurakunov [2] in 2012. We say that a class K of algebraic structures
of a fixed type has the Nurakunov non-computability property if the set of
all (isomorphism types of) finite sublattices of the quasivariety lattice Lq(K)
is not computable.
In [3], it was proved that a class K is Q-universal if and only if it contains
a subclass which has the Nurakunov non-computability property. In this
regard, the following questions arose [cf. 3,4]:
Does any Q-universal class K contain a subclass which has the Nu-
rakunov non-computability property?
237
Is there a class of algebraic structures which is not Q-universal but

which has the Nurakunov non-computability property?
A positive answer to the first question was given by M. V. Schwidefsky
[4] for almost all the known Q-universal quasivarieties. The author gives a
positive answer to the second question, cf. Theorems 1 and 2 and [5].
Theorem 1. If a class K of algebraic structures of finite type contains

an AD-class then it contains continuum many proper subclasses K′ ⊂ K
which have the Nurakunov non-computability property but which are not
Q-universal.
Theorem 2. For the following classes K of algebraic structures, there

are continuum many subclasses K′ ⊂ K which have the Nurakunov non-
computability property but which are nevertheless not Q-universal:
1. the variety of all unars;
2. the variety of all pointed Abelian groups;
3. the quasivariety of all [directed] graphs;
4. the variety of all differential groupoids;
5. the variety of all commutative rings with unit;
6. any finite-to-finite universal quasivariety;
7. the variety of M V -algebras;
8. the variety of Cantor algebras;
9. the variety of modular (0, 1)-lattices;
10. the Sapir quasivariety which is generated by a single semigroup.
In case (1), the classes K′ can be chosen as quasivarieties.

Theorem 1 can be applied to almost all known Q-universal quasivarieties.
In theorem 2, we list just some examples, where theorem 1 applies; this list
is however not exhaustive.
References
1. M.V. Sapir, “The lattice of quasivarieties of semigroups”, Algebra Uni-
versalis, vol. 21, 1985, pp. 172–180.
2. A.M. Nurakunov, “Unreasonable lattices of quasivarieties”, Interna-
tional Journal of Algebra and Computation, vol. 22(3), 2012, pp. 1–17.
3. M. Schwidefsky & A. Zamojska-Dzienio, “Lattices of subclasses. II”,
International Journal of Algebra and Computation, vol. 24(8), 2014,
pp. 1099–1126.
4. M. Schwidefsky, “Complexity of quasivariety lattices”, Algebra Logika,
vol. 54(3), 2015, pp. 381–398.
5. S. Lutsak, “The Complexity of quasivariety lattices”, Siberian Elec-
tronic Mathematical Reports, vol. 14, 2017, pp. 92–97, https://goo.gl/
AePbNk.
238
Workshops
A definition to the concept of a model-theoretic property

with applications to the expressive power of first-order logic
Mikhail G. Peretyat’kin
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
The work [1] describes a normal version of the universal construction
of finitely axiomatizable theories showing great expressive possibilities of
separate formulas of first-order logic. In the subsequent, it became clear that
for the solution of the general question on expressive power of predicate logic
cannot do without an exact definition to the concept of a model-theoretic
property. Within the framework of a new combinatorial approach [2,3],
intended to characterize expressive power of formulas of first-order logic
a version of definition to the concept of a model-theoretic property was
found [3,4], that is adequate to the common practice of investigations in
model theory. At the same time, it is well applicable to the solution of
various problems in this direction. Notice that, although the definition to
the concept of a model-theoretic property contains some informal parts,
nevertheless, it provides exact mathematical statements. For instance:
(a) a standard version of the finite signature reduction procedure preserves
all available model-theoretic properties;
(b) there is a computable isomorphism between the Tarski-Lindenbaum al-
gebras of predicate calculi of finite rich (undecidable) signatures pre-
serving all available model-theoretic properties, etc.
From the point of view of the suggested definition of a model-theoretic
property, a new perspective approach arises to a solution of the common
problem on expressive possibilities of first-order logic [4]. This definition also
has applications in model theory. It makes it possible to bring some popular
classes of complete theories (e.g. the class of all o-minimal theories) to some
canonical form so that they become realistic model-theoretic properties.
References
1. M.G. Peretyat’kin, Finitely Axiomatizable Theories, Springer, 1997.
2. M.G. Peretyat’kin, “Introduction in first-order combinatorics provid-
ing a conceptual framework for computation in predicate logic”, in The
Fourth International Conference on Computational Logics, Algebras,
Programming, Tools, and Benchmarking, Computation Tools 2013,
IARIA* , 2013, pp. 31–36, https://goo.gl/TWJrJ2.
*
International Academy, Research, and Industry Association
239
3. M.G. Peretyat’kin, “First-order combinatorics and model-theoretical

properties that can be distinct for mutually interpretable theories”,
Siberian Advances in Mathematics, vol. 26(3), 2016, pp. 196–214.
4. M.G. Peretyat’kin, “Fundamental significance of the finitary and in-
finitary semantic layers and characterization of the expressive power of
first-order logic”, Mathematical Journal, vol. 17(3), 2017, pp. 91–116.
Lattices of bounded based subvarieties

of discriminator varieties
Aleksandr Pinus
Novosibirsk State Technical University, Russia
[email protected]
A subvariety W of some variety V of universal algebras is bounded based

in V , if W is axiomatizable in V by some system of equations with variables
x1 , . . . , xn for some natural n. The family of all bounded axiomatizable
V relative the relation ⊆. This
subvarieties of the variety V is the lattice Lrb
lattice can be not some sublattice of the lattice LV of all subvarieties of the
variety V . Above for the discriminator varieties V the lattice Lrb V is some
sublattice of the lattice LV .
We have:
Theorem. For any discriminator variety V the lattice Lrb

V is universal (in
the model-theoretical sense) to the lattice LV .
Axiomatizability of the class of subdirectly irreducible acts

over a group*
Alena Stepanova & Denis Ptakhov
School of Natural Sciences, Far Eastern Federal University,
Vladivostok, Russia
In this work we consider the questions of axiomatizability for the classes

of subdirectly irreducible acts over a group. The same questions for the
classes of regular, free, projective and (strongly, weakly) flat acts were con-
sidered in [1-4]. More precisely, in this works there is the description of
monoids classes of regular, free, projective and (strongly, weakly) flat acts
over which are axiomatizable.
*
This work was supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Grant 17-01-00531).
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Workshops
Let S be a monoid. A (left) S-act S A is a set A on which S acts unitarily

from the left in usual way. If G is a group and H is subgroup of G then
the set G/H = {gH ∣ g ∈ G} with the operation g1 (g2 H) = (g1 g2 )H where
g1 , g2 ∈ G is G-act. Elements x, y of a left S–act A are connected (denoted
by x ∼ y) if there exist n ∈ ω, a0 , . . . , an ∈ A, s1 , . . . , sn ∈ S such that x = a0 ,
y = an , and ai = si ai−1 or ai−1 = si ai for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. An S-act S A is
a connected if we have x ∼ y for any x, y ∈ B. It known that a connected
G-act G A over a group G isomorphic to G-act G (G/H) for a some subgroup
H of a group G.
Recall that S-act S A is subdirectly irreducible if ∩{ρi ∣ i ∈ I} ≠ ∆ for
every family of congruences ρi on A with ρi ≠ ∆ where ∆ is zero congruences
on A. From this definition immediately follows the proposition.
Proposition. Let G be a group and G (G/H) be a connected G-act. Then

G (G/H) is subdirectly irreducible if and only if the intersection of all sub-
groups of the group G containing the group H is not equal to H.
Corollary. Let G be the group. Then all connected G-acts are subdirectly
irreducible if and only if the set of all subgroups of the group G is linearly
ordered.
A class of L-structures K for a first order language L is axiomatizable

if there is a set of sentences Π in L such that an L-structure A lies in K if
and only if every sentence in Π is true in A.
Theorem. Let G be the group. A class K of subdirectly irreducible G-acts

is axiomatizable if and only if K is a finite class.
References
1. V. Gould, “Axiomatisability problems for S-systems”, Journal of the
London Mathematical Society, vol. s2-35(2), 1987, pp. 193–201.
2. A.A. Stepanova, “Axiomatizability and completeness of some classes of
s-polygons”, Algebra and Logic, vol. 30(5), 1991, pp. 379–388.
3. A.A. Stepanova, “Axiomatizability and model completeness of classes
of regular polygons”, Siberian Mathematical Journal, vol. 35(1), 1994,
pp. 181–193.
4. S. Bulman-Fleming & V. Gould, “Axiomatisability of weakly flat, flat
and projective acts”, Communications in Algebra, vol. 30(11), 2002,
pp. 5575–5593.
241
On e-spectra for families of theories of Abelian groups

Sergey Sudoplatov
Almaty, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Inessa Pavlyuk
Novosibirsk State Pedagogical University, Novosibirsk, Russia
[email protected]
We consider e-spectra for families of theories of Abelian groups [1]. By
A, B, Γ, E we denote the classes of all theories of Abelian groups, whose
positive Szmielew invariants are exhausted by αp,n , βp , γp , ε, respectively.
For X, Y, Z, U ∈ {A, B, Γ, E} we denote by XY, XYZ, XYZU, respectively, the
set of all theories of Abelian groups whose positive Szmielew invariants are
exhausted by corresponding αp,n , βp , γp , ε for X, Y, Z, U. By F we denote the
set of all theories of Abelian groups with finite Szmielew invariants. Choose
an infinite set P0 of prime numbers and take a countable set D ⊂ P(P0 )
such that ⟨D, ⊆⟩ is a dense linearly ordered set isomorphic to ⟨Q, ≤⟩ and
without cuts (A, A′ ) having ⋃ A ≠ ⋂ A′ . Denote by ClE (A)D the family
{Th (⊕p∈X Zp ) ∣ X ∈ D} .
(ω)
Theorem.
(1) For any λ ∈ ω ∪ {ω, 2ω } there is an E-combination T of theories of
finite Abelian groups (in A ∩ F and with least generating set) such that
e-Sp(T ) = λ.
(2) There are 2ω families in ClE (A)D whose E-closures do not have least
generating sets and whose E-combinations T satisfy e-Sp(T ) = 2ω .
(3) For any λ ∈ ω ∪ {ω, 2ω } there is an E-combination T of theories in BE
(respectively, ΓE, AΓE, BΓE) and with least generating set such that
e-Sp(T ) = λ.
(4) There are 2ω families ClE (BE)D (respectively, ClE (ΓE)D , ClE (AΓE)D ,
ClE (BΓE)D ) whose E-closures do not have least generating sets and
whose E-combinations T satisfy e-Sp(T ) = 2ω .
Reference
1. In.I. Pavlyuk & S.V. Sudoplatov, “On families of theories of Abelian
groups and their closures”, in 11th Panhellenic Logic Symposium, Del-
phi, Greece, 2017, pp. 45–49.
242
Workshops
Transformation and Categoricity Spectrum*

Jamalbek A. Tussupov
L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University,
Astana, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Definition 1. Structure A0 of signature σ0 is called a transformation of a

structure A of signature σ = ⟨P1 , . . . , Pk ⟩, where predicates Pi of mi -arity,
1 < i < k, if structure A0 constructed from the structure A by some algorithm
and exist formulas
ϕ0 ((x, y), ϕ1 (x, y 0 ), y1 ), . . . , θi (x, y 0 ), y1 , . . . , ymi ,
x = (x1 , . . . , xn ), y = (y1 , . . . , ym ), yi = (y1i , . . . , ym

i
), 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
of signature σ0 , parameters c1 , . . . , cn from A0 and the following conditions
hold:
0 , A0 ∣ = ϕ0 (c, b)};
(1) B = {b ∶ b ∈ ∣Am
(2) the formula ϕ1 (x, y0 , y1 ) defines a congruence η on the structure
B = ⟨B, Qmi ⟩, where predicates Qi correspond to formulas
i mi
θi (x, y 0 ), y1 , . . . , ymi , 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
(3) the structure B/η is isomorphic to the structure A.
Definition 2. For a computable structure A0 , the categoricity spectrum

is the set of all Turing degrees capable of computing isomorphisms among
arbitrary computable copies of A0 . If the spectrum has a least degree, this
degree is called the degree of categoricity of A0 .
Let Ai is a transformation of a structure A where i = 0, . . . , 8.

We consider structures of the following signatures:
σ the signature of a partial order (an oriented graph);
σ0 the signature of an irreflexive symmetric graph;
σ1 the signature of a nilpotent group of class 2 and prime exponent;
σ2 the signature of a lattice;
σ3 the signature of a ring;
σ4 the signature of an integral domain;
σ5 the signature of a commutative semigroup;
*
Supported by the grant “Computability, interpretability and algebraic structure” of Min-
istry of Education and Science of Republic of Kazakhstan.
243
σ6 the signature of a bipartite graph;

σ7 the signature with two equivalences;
σ8 the signature of algebraic fields.
For i = 0, . . . , 8, we have the following theorem:
Theorem. For any signature σi , i = 0, . . . , 8, there exist transformation Ai

of the structure A of the signature σ such that the categoricity spectrums
coincide.
References
1. S.S. Goncharov, Isomorphisms and Definable Relations on Computable
Models, in 2005 Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic,
Logic Colloquium ’05, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 12(2), 2006),
pp. 310–361.
2. A.H. Mekler, “Stability of Nilpotent Groups of Class 2 and Prime Ex-
ponent”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 46(4), 1981, pp. 781–788.
3. D.R. Hirschfeldt, B. Khoussainov, R.A. Shore & A.M. Slinko, “Degree
spectra and computable dimensions in algebraic structures”, Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 115(1–3), 2002, pp. 71–113.
4. D.A. Tussupov, “Isomorphisms and Algorithmic Properties of Struc-
tures with Two Equivalences”, Algebra and Logic, vol. 55(1), 2016,
pp. 50–57.
5. J. Johnson, J.F. Knight, V. Ocasio, J. Tussupov & S. VanDenDriessche,
“Preserving Categoricity and Complexity of Relations”, Algebra and
Logic, vol. 54(2), 2015, pp. 140–154.
6. E. Fokina, A. Frolov & I. Kalimullin, “Categoricity Spectra for Rigid
Structures”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 57(1), 2016,
pp. 45–57.
The nonforking notion for Jonsson sets

Olga Ulbrikht & Aibat Yeshkeyev
We consider countable language L and complete for existential sentences

perfect Jonsson theory T in language L and its semantic models C. Let X be
the Jonsson set in T and M is existentially closed submodel of the semantic
model C, where dcl(X) = M . Then let Th∀∃ (M ) = Fr(X), Fr(X) is the
Jonsson fragment of Jonsson set X.
244
Workshops
With the help of the nonforking notion we will give the notion of in-
dependence for Jonsson sets. Let M ∃-saturated existentially closed model
power k (k enough big cardinal) of Jonsson theory T . Let A be the class
of all Jonsson subsets of M and P is the class of all ∃-types (not necessar-
ily complete), let JNF (Jonsson nonforking) ⊆ P × A be a binary relation.
There is the list of the axioms 1–7 which defined Jonsson nonforking notion
JNF and we have result for fragment Fr(X) of the Jonsson set X.
Theorem. The following conditions are equivalent:

1) the relation JNF satisfies the axioms 1–7 relative to the fragment Fr(X);
2) Fr(X)* is stable and, for all p ∈ P ,
A ∈ A((p, A) ∈ JNF ⇔ p does not fork over A)
(in the classical meaning of S. Shelah [1]), where Fr(X)* is the center of
the fragment Fr(X).
Independence. The nonforking extensions will be the “free” ones.

Forking as in this theorem can be used to give a notion of independence
in J-ω-stable theories [2].
Definition. We say that ā is independent from B over A if tp(ā/A) does

not fork over A ∪ B. We will denote this fact through ā A B.
This notion of independence for above mentioned Jonsson sets has many
desirable properties: monotonicity, transitivity, finite basis, symmetry, etc.
References
1. S. Shelah, Classification Theory and the Number of Non-Isomorphic
Models , North-Holland, 1990.
2. A.R. Yeshkeev & M.T. Kassymetova, Jonsson theory and its classes of
models, monograph, E.A. Buketov Karaganda State University, 2016.
245
Similarity of definable closures of Jonsson sets

Gulzhan Urken & Aibat Yeshkeyev
guli [email protected], [email protected]
Let L be a countable first-order language and T be some inductive theory

in this language, ET and APT are denoting correspondingly the following
classes of this theory: class of all existentially closed models and class of all
algebraically prime models.
Definition 1. An inductive theory T is called existential-prime (EP) if it

has an algebraically prime model and APT ∩ ET ≠ ∅.
Definition 2. A theory T is called convex (C) if, for any model A and
any family {Bi ∣ i ∈ I} of its substructures, which are models of the theory
T , the intersection ⋂i∈I Bi is a model theory T . It is assumed that this
intersection is not empty. If this intersection is never empty, then the theory
is called strongly convex (SC). An inductive theory is called an existentially
prime strongly convex theory (EPSC) if it satisfies the above definitions
simultaneously.
Let X be a Jonsson set in the theory T and M be an existentially

closed submodel of a semantic model C, where dcl(X) = M . Then let
Th∀∃ (M ) = Fr(X), where Fr(X) is the Jonsson fragment of the Jonsson set
X. Let A1 and A2 be Jonsson subsets of a semantic model of some Jonsson
EPSC-theory, where F r(A1 ) and F r(A2 ) are fragments of Jonsson sets A1
and A2 .
Then we have the following result:
Theorem. Let Fr(A1 ) and Fr(A2 ) be ∃-complete perfect Jonsson theories.

Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1) Fr(A1 ) and Fr(A2 ) are J-syntactically similar as Jonsson theories [1];
2) Fr(A1 )* and Fr(A2 )* are syntactically similar to the complete theories
[1], where Fr(A1 )* and Fr(A2 )* are respectively the centers of fragments
of the considered sets A1 , A2 .
246
Workshops
References
1. T.G. Mustafin, “On similarities of complete theories”, Logic Colloquium
’90: Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the Asso-
ciation for Symbolic Logic, Finland, 1990, pp. 259–265.
2. A.R. Yeshkeev & M.T. Kassymetova, Jonsson theory and its classes
of models, monograph, E.A. Buketov Karaganda State University, 2016.
Dimension, ranks and their applications

to algebraic structures
Viktor Verbovskiy
Suleyman Demirel University, Kaskelen, Kazakhstan
[email protected]
Dimension is one of the most important notions of geometry. It is well

known that a space of an infinite dimension is more complicated than an-
other one of a finite dimension. In Model Theory, M. Morley [2] suggested
a new rank as a variant of notion of dimension, which is called Morley rank,
and started to investigate theories whose Morley rank is not infinite. Later
S. Shelah suggested a localization of Morley rank, he suggested to use not
all formulas, but just some of them, say, from the set ∆. This rank is called
∆-rank, or ϕ-rank, if ∆ consists of one formula ϕ. If ϕ-rank of the whole
structure is finite for each formula ϕ, such structure is called stable.
I suggest a localization of ϕ-rank in the following way, which is quite
natural for totally ordered structure. I define (ϕ, (C, D))-rank inside a cut
(C, D) of a given totally ordered structure. If (ϕ, (C, D))-rank is finite for
any formula ϕ and for any cut (C, D) such a structure is called o-stable.
This notion is fruitful for investigating such natural algebraic structures
as ordered groups and fields.
It has been proved that an o-stable ordered group is Abelian, the even-
tual stabilizer of an unbounded definable subset is not a zero-subgroup and
an o-ω-stable ordered field is real closed and its infinite definable subset has
a non-zero interior.
References
1. B. Baizhanov & V. Verbovskiy, “O-stable theories”, Algebra and Logic,
vol. 50(3), 2011, pp. 211–225.
2. M. Morley, “Categoricity in power”, Transactions of the American Math-
ematical Society, vol. 114(2), 1965, pp. 514–538, https://goo.gl/
gbAXPv.
3. S. Shelah, “Stable theories”, Israel Journal of Mathematics, vol. 7(3),
1969, pp. 187–202.
247
4. V. Verbovskiy, “O-stable ordered groups”, Siberian Advances in Math-

ematics, vol. 22(1), 2012, pp. 50–74.
5. V. Verbovskiy, “On a classification of theories without the indepen-
dence property”, Mathematical Logic Quarterly, vol. 59(1–2), 2013,
pp. 119–124.
Strong decidability of the classification over Gl

Veta F. Yun & Larisa L. Maksimova
The classification of extensions of the minimal logic J using slices was

introduced in [1]. It extends the classification of superintuitionistic logics
proposed by T. Hosoi [2].
In [1] the decidability of the classification was proved, i.e. for every finite
set Ax of axiom schemes it is possible to efficiently calculate the slice number
of calculi obtained by adding Ax as new axioms to J.
We will consider extensions of the logic Gl = J + (p ∨ ¬p). In [3], it is
established that the logic Gl is strongly recognizable over J. A logic L is
strongly recognizable over J if there is an algorithm which decides, for every
finite system Rul of axiom schemes and rules of inference, if the logic J+Rul
coincides with L. A family S of logics is strongly decidable over J if there is
an algorithm which decides, for every finite system Rul of axiom schemes
and rules of inference, whether the logic J+Rul is included in S. It is proved
that the family of extensions of the logic Gl is strongly decidable over J [3].
In this work we prove strong decidability of the classification over Gl:
Theorem. For every finite set Rul of axiom schemes and rules of inference,
it is possible to efficiently calculate the slice number of calculi obtained by
adding Rul as new axioms and rules to Gl.
References
1. L. Maksimova & V. Yun, “Slices over minimal logic”, Algebra i Logica,
vol. 55(4), 2016, pp. 449–464.
2. T. Hosoi, “On intermediate logics I”, Journal of the Faculty of Science,
University of Tokyo, Section Ia, vol. 14, 1967, pp. 293–312.
3. L. Maksimova & V. Yun, “Strong decidability and strong recognizabil-
ity”, Algebra i Logica, vol. 56(5), 2017.
248
Workshops
Logical Correctness
Fabien Schang
[email protected]
James Trafford
University of Creative Arts, Surrey, UK
[email protected]
Typically, logical correctness is taken to concern whether or not an ar-

gument or proof follows a logical path from premises to conclusions. In
recent years, however, such a view has been complicated by the prolifer-
ation of logics, approaches to logic, and uses of logic. In this workshop,
we intend to discuss the philosophical and logical consequences of these
changes with regard to how, or if, there is any sort of criteria by which a
logical structure could be deemed correct, and whether or not those criteria
are context-relevant in some specifiable manner.
In a broader sense of the word, correctness can also be understood in at
least three different senses:
— meta-logical: a logical system or calculus is correct iff all provable state-
ments in it are true (Related word: soundness.)
— logical: a statement is correct iff it refers to an implicitly or explicitly
rule system. (Related word: accuracy)
— moral: an action is correct iff it obeys given norms of behavior. (Related
word: political correctness)
There seems to be connections between all these three readings of cor-
rectness, to be centered around the criterion of a norm. But, while in the
metalogical concept of correctness-as-soundness truth is something that is
attributed or denied to sentences, with the logical concept of correctness-as-
accuracy it deals with actions (also verbal actings) and allows gradations.
As to the moral correctness, it refers to social norms and departs from the
criterion of truth. A special emphasis is to be made on Dummett’s inferen-
tialist explication of the concept “Boche”, in this respect: does such a logical
explanation succeed in affording the meaning of such non-logical concepts?
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Ole Thomassen Hjortland

(page 132).
249
Call for papers

We invite abstracts for papers dealing with any of the below topics
(though not necessarily limited to them):
Anti-exceptionalism about logic
A priorism about logic
Logical foundationalism
The connection between logic and reasoning
Logic and argumentation
Different uses for logic (argument / computer science / scientific rea-
soning etc.)
Contextual logics
Logical pluralism
Political correctness (semantics of slurs / norms of language and com-
mon decency)
Contributed talks should not exceed a duration of 30 minutes, including
November 15, 2017 to [email protected].
Computational Hermeneutics: Using Computers to Interpret

Philosophical Arguments
David Fuenmayor
Free University of Berlin, Germany
[email protected]
Christoph Benzmüller
[email protected]
We introduce a method named computational hermeneutics aimed at
improving the tasks of logical analysis and interpretation of arguments.
This method has been developed as a result of reflecting upon previous
work on the application of Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) for the
formalization and assessment of arguments in metaphysics [e.g. 2,3,5] and
is specially suited to the utilization of different kinds of logics (intensional,
modal, higher-order, etc.) through the technique of semantic embeddings
[1].
Computational hermeneutics has been inspired by Donald Davidson’s
theory of radical interpretation [4] and can be seen as an instance of the
hypothetico-deductive method which exploits the computing power and us-
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ability of modern theorem provers: We work iteratively on an argument by

temporarily choosing a logic for formalization; fixing truth-values and infer-
ential relations among its sentences; and then working back and forth on the
formalization of its axioms and theorems, by making gradual adjustments
while getting real-time feedback about the suitability of our speculations.
In this fashion, by engaging in a dialectic process of questions and answers
— of conjectures and refutations — we work our way towards an adequate
logical analysis and interpretation of an argument by circular movements
between its parts and the whole (cf. hermeneutic circle).
References
1. C. Benzmüller & L. Paulson, “Quantified multimodal logics in simple
type theory”, Logica Universalis, vol. 7(1), 2013, pp. 7–20.
2. C. Benzmüller, L. Weber & B. Woltzenlogel Paleo, “Computer-assisted
analysis of the Anderson-Hájek controversy”, Logica Universalis,
vol. 11(1), 2017, pp. 139–151.
3. C. Benzmüller & B. Woltzenlogel Paleo, “The inconsistency in Gödel’s
ontological argument: a success story for AI in metaphysics”, in
IJCAI’16, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Joint Con-
ference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by S. Kambhampati, 2016,
pp. 936–942.
4. D. Davidson, “Radical interpretation”, in Inquiries into Truth and In-
terpretation, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 125.
5. D. Fuenmayor & C. Benzmüller, “Automating emendations of the onto-
logical argument in intensional higher-order modal logic”, in KI * 2017:
Advances in Artificial Intelligence, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 10505, edited by G. Kern-Isberner, J. Fúrnkranz & M. Thimm,
Springer, 2017, pp. 114–127.
*
‘KI’ is the shorthand for ‘Künstliche Intelligenz’ (Artificial Intelligence). KI is the Ger-
man Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
251
Logical Instrumentalism and Linear Logic

Teresa Kouri Kissel
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies,
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA
[email protected]
Logical instrumentalism is the view that norms for deductive reasoning

should be evaluated based on one’s aims and goals in reasoning and the
domain of investigation [see 1]. This means two things. First, as long as
there are two domains of investigation which are best served by different
norms for deductive reasoning, this will be a logical pluralism: logical in-
strumentalism will license more than one “correct” logic. Second, should a
domain of reasoning call for a particular logic, then logical instrumentalism
must license that logic as one of the correct logics.
The bulk of what I will show in this paper is that linear logic is ideal
for analyzing sentence syntax. Once this is established, using work from
Michael Moortgat on categorial grammar [see 2,3], we must concede that
the logical instrumentalist must accept linear logic as a legitimate logic.
This has interesting implications for the meanings of the logical connec-
tives. Since the particular linear system in question has a multitude of
connectives which are not found in more orthodox logical systems, the log-
ical instrumentalist must license a wider range of logical connectives than
we might have originally thought.
One might think that given the information about linear logic and what
its applicability requires the instrumentalist to license, this is a mark against
instrumentalism. I conclude my paper by suggesting that licensing linear
logic as a correct logic is a benefit rather than a burden.
References
1. T. Kouri Kissel, “Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
2. M. Moortgat, “Multimodal Linguistic Inference”, Journal of Logic, Lan-
guage and Information, vol. 5(3–4), 1996, pp. 349–385.
3. M. Moortgat, “Symmetric Categorial Grammar”, Journal of Philosoph-
ical Logic, vol. 38(6), 2009, pp. 681–710.
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Evidence and self-evidence in the foundations of logic

Srećko Kovač
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
[email protected]
We relate the question of the correctness of proofs and of a possible

foundation of a logical system to a general, computational, concept of a for-
mal system as a mechanical procedure, in the sense of a Turing machine, for
producing provable formulas [3]. By means of justification logic tools, the
question about the evidence in a given system is united with the question
of an abstract causal structure of a mechanical decision procedure. After
introducing a translation procedure of the work of a Turing equivalent reg-
ister machine into a suitable justification logic language, it is easy to show
that, for each translated register program, the reason (evidence and cause,
not necessarily by a register routine) could be proved for the program’s
halting/non-halting. The evidence of justification logic reasons exceeds the
limits of a given formal axiomatic system (since not obeying the constrains
of the incompleteness theorems [4]). Further, justification logic (includ-
ing its axiomatic description of reason operators) does not satisfy Gödel’s
constructivity requirements [4]. Thus, as a foundational question and the
question of the criteria of the correctness of reasoning, we discuss a possi-
ble “meta-justification” of the axioms about reasons by analyzing the work
of a register (Turing) machine in causal terms in comparison with general
self-evident structures of a human agent’s reasoning. This includes a sort
of abstract pragmatic considerations of the use of concepts by an abstract
reasoner (attention to our own acts in using concepts [5]).
References
1. M. Fitting, “Possible world semantics for first order LP”, Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic, vol. 165, 2014, pp. 225–240.
2. K. Gödel, Collected Works: Volume III: Unpublished essays and lec-
tures, edited by S. Feferman et al., Oxford University Press, 2001.
3. K. Gödel, “On undecidable propositions of formal mathematical sys-
tems” (1934–1964), in Collected Works: Volume I: Publications 1929–
1936, edited by S. Feferman et al., Oxford University Press, 2001.
4. K. Gödel, “Vortrag bei Zilsel” (1938), in [2].
5. K. Gödel, “The modern development of the foundations of mathematics
in the light of philosophy” (1961), in [2].
6. S. Kovač, “Causal interpretation of Gödel’s ontological proof”, in Gödel’s
ontological argument, edited by K. Świetorzecka,
, Semper, Warsaw, 2015.
253
Identifying Logical Evidence

Ben Martin
Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
[email protected]
We take ourselves to know certain logical claims, for example that
Socrates is wise and just only if he’s wise. However, we currently fail to
have a viable account of how we possess logical knowledge. Historical at-
tempts to explain this knowledge, such as appeals to intuition and linguistic
proficiency, have been found to be ultimately unsatisfactory, either because
they are metaphysically obscure or fail to explain logical disagreements [6].
Yet, it’s imperative that we have a complete understanding of logical knowl-
edge. While we use logic to form beliefs in all areas of life, such as when
testing scientific theories and engaging in rational debate, we now have many
competing logics at our disposal to do so, all of which lead us to reasoning
differently in certain situations. Yet, in order to make informed decisions
about which logics we should use, we require suitable criteria to adjudicate
between them, which can only be developed with a full understanding of
what constitutes logical evidence. Without such an account of logical evi-
dence, we lack the resources to make principled and holistic decisions about
the correct logic to use. Consequently, a new, more complete, explanation
of logical knowledge is needed.
In order to supply such an explanation, prominent figures such as Tim-
othy Williamson [7], Graham Priest [5] and Ole Hjortland [2], have recently
argued for a new account of logical knowledge, logical anti-exceptionalism,
which emphasises that such knowledge isn’t special in any sense, and that
logic’s method is akin to that of the natural sciences. Just as science pro-
ceeds by advancing theories attempting to best explain the relevant data,
by a process known as abduction, so logic proposes theories to explain its
own domain of data as lucidly and coherently as possible. Thus, we come
to be justified in our logical beliefs by recognising which available logical
theory best explains the relevant data.
Unfortunately, however, there is little agreement between proponents
of logical anti-exceptionalism over what constitute these relevant data that
logical theories must explain, and no clear indication yet of how we should
settle the matter of which data are relevant. But, without a detailed account
of what these data are, logical anti-exceptionalism cannot hope to provide
the means to adjudicate between competing logics, a major motivation for
any modern theory of logical epistemology. Thus, we need to know what
type of data, exactly, logical theories must explain.
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This talk argues that we can look to logical practice for help in both pro-
viding support for logical anti-exceptionalism and pinpointing the types of
data logical theories must explain. While using the practice of researchers
has proven a useful method to study how knowledge is acquired in the
natural sciences [1] and mathematics [3], the same method has yet to be ex-
tensively used in the study of logic. Yet, just as philosophers of science have
used historical scientific experiments and disputes as their data to infer how
we come to know empirical claims, so we can use a practice based method
in studying logical knowledge. By taking logical arguments as our data, we
can infer from these arguments the methodological principles that logicians
rely upon, and the data their theories attempt to explain. The rationale
for using practice to inform an epistemology of logic is the presumption
that generally, as with scientists, logicians provide suitable reasons for their
claims even if, ultimately, they are not wholly satisfactory. Thus, we should
expect logicians’ arguments to provide insight into how we can come to
know logical truths, and the data logical theories must accommodate.
To show the fruitfulness of this practice-based approach, the talk con-
siders as a case study arguments from one of the most significant debates in
the modern logic, the dispute between classical logic and dialetheism over
the truth of inconsistent theories. Concentrating particularly on Priest’s [4]
initial arguments for dialetheism from the liar and Russell-set paradoxes,
and classical replies to the arguments, it’s proposed that both Priest and
his classical opponents rely upon at least three methodological principles:
Firstly, that linguistic and mathematical puzzles, such as the liar sentence
and Russell set, can form part of a logical theory’s explanandum; secondly,
that linguistic norms form part of logical evidence, for example in admit-
ting the need to take the meaningfulness of the liar sentences seriously;
and thirdly, that mathematical concepts and findings form part of logical
evidence, for example by suggesting that only classical logic can underpin
mathematical results.
The talk concludes that these initial results from the practice-based ap-
proach provide both support for logical antiexceptionalism, and details on
the types of evidence a logical theory should accommodate. To offer support
for their logical views, rather than attempting to settle disputes on purely
definitional or intuitional grounds, logicians appeal to their logic’s ability
to explain certain relevant phenomena, including linguistic norms and find-
ings from mathematics. We suggest that with yet further consideration of
important logical disputes, we can hope to build an even fuller picture of
logical epistemology and evidence.
255
References
1. R.M. Burian, “The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of
Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science”, Perspec-
tives on Science, vol. 9(4), 2001, pp. 383–404.
2. O.T. Hjortland, “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic”, Philosophical Stud-
ies, vol. 174(3), 2017, pp. 631–658.
3. P. Mancosu, The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008.
4. G. Priest, In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent, 2nd edi-
tion, Clarendon Press, 2006.
5. G. Priest, “Revising logic”, in The Metaphysics of Logic, edited by P.
Rush, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 211–223.
6. T. Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Blackwell, 2007.
7. T. Williamson, “Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality”, Erkenntnis, vol. 79,
supplement 2, 2014, pp. 211–231.
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Around Peirce
Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoit Gaultier

Groupe de Recherche en Epistémologie,
Collège de France, Paris
Peirce’s 2014 Centennial Congress suggested many ways for “invigorat-

ing philosophy for the 21st century”. One may expect Charles S. Peirce’s
findings to invigorate logic in particular. Not only did Peirce improve
Boole’s algebra, develop a logic of relatives and invent logical quantifica-
tion, but he drew a whole system of diagrammatic reasoning which may not
have born all its fruit yet. He also developed new prospects on informal
logic and the theories of induction and abduction. While his inspiration
roots in Boole, De Morgan and Schröder, his writings were very influential
on Skolem, Hintikka and Polish logic among many, and will probably be on
the future of logic.
The keynote speaker is this workshop is Danielle Macbeth (page 137).
Call for papers

Relevant topics include (but are not restricted to):
Peirce’s place in the history of logic
The influence of Peirce’s writings on current logical trends
Peirce’s version of pragmaticism
Logic and semiotics
Implications of Peirce’s logic for the future of logic
Peirce’s conception of probabilities
Alpha, Beta and Gamma graphs
The use of Peircean diagrams as a pedagogical tool
Peirce’s logic of continuity
The logic of abduction
Peircean epistemology
discussion. A one-page abstract should be sent via email before November
15, 2017 to [email protected] and/or [email protected].
257
A dinner with Charley

Gaetano Albergo
Department of Philosophy, University of Catania, Italy
[email protected]
I think we should reconsider the value and content of the Lecture V

of the Cambridge Conferences [4]. Hilary Putnam, in his magnificent in-
troduction to the volume [2], preferred to concentrate on the theme of the
continuum in mathematics, defining the whole lesson in a funny way ‘A din-
ner with Charley’. The problem of observation as access to higher cognitive
processes certainly has a long history. In this work Peirce argues that the
fundamental condition for the development of good reasoning skills is pre-
cisely the ability to discriminate proximal phenomena through observation.
The theme, today, is at the center of great attentions. From the hidden
object tracking processes studied by Baillargeon [1], to the researches on
the deferred imitation conducted by Mandler [3], only to make two exam-
ples, it emerges the importance of a phenomenon often underestimated be-
cause often considered a mere proto-ability that can not be analyzed as true
cognitive processes. Observational learning studies have emphasized non-
modular processes, those particularly related to categorization and recall
capabilities, where attention and awareness during pattern analysis would
not be negotiable. In general, within the recent literature on metaphysics of
intentionality, the Kantian distinction between receptivity and spontaneity,
at least in relation to the topic of perceptual judgment based on observa-
tion, would be at most only functional for the argumentation of the analysis
of certain cognitive processes, that is, it would be deprived of any ontolog-
ical and epistemological status. Peirce, on the other hand, believed that
the distinction should not only be respected but also taken into account
more than Kant suggested, because not necessarily, in his view, passivity
and spontaneity should have been considered to be speculatively functional
to one another. After having attributed to the first part, a kind of uncon-
scious induction, a great fineness, and to the other part, the conscious one,
the main role to form a theory of the object of observation, Peirce clearly
states that it is the first to represent ‘the very most important of all the
constituents of practical reasoning’.
A broadly Kantian strategy wants that there must be non-inferential
knowledge if there is empirical knowledge at all. According to the Brandom-
Sellars model, it is only because we bring to experience a full rule-governed
conceptual framework of reason’s own making that it is possible for us
to produce appropriate observation responses to the world. Starting from
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Peirce’s works, the aim of this paper is to answer the question: is the ob-
server’s response contentful just insofar as it occupies a node in a web of
inferential relations? In addition, what is the right kind of content for a
basic observation?
References
1. R. Baillargeon, “Object permanence in 3 21 - and 4 12 - months-old in-
fants”, in Developmental Psychology, vol. 23(5), 1987, pp. 655–664,
doi:10.1037/
0012-1649.23.5.655.
2. K.L. Ketner (editor), Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cam-
bridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, Introduction by H. Putnam, Har-
vard University Press, 1992.
3. J.M. Mandler, The Foundations of Mind: Origins of Conceptual
Thought, Oxford University Press, 2006.
4. C.S. Peirce, “Training in Reasoning” (1898), in Reasoning and the Logic
of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, edited by K.L.
Ketner, Harvard University Press, 1992.
Peirce and distributivity

Rodolfo C. Ertola Biraben
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science,
State University of Campinas, Brazil
[email protected]
In 1880, Peirce stated the following [see 3, p. 33]:
“E. (a + b) × c = (a × c) + (b × c) (a × b) + c = (a + c) × (b + c).
These are cases of the distributive principle. They are easily proved
by [4] and [2], but the proof is too tedious to give”,
where [2] and [4] state that × and + behave as the usual infimum and
supremum in a lattice. So, Peirce seems to be saying that every lattice is
distributive!
Now, it is very well known that there are non-distributive lattices. The
usual examples are the pentagon and the diamond. So, how can we explain
Peirce’s statement?
In 1890, regarding Peirce’s statement that every lattice is distributive,
Schröder observed that he could prove that the following hold in any lattice
[see 4, p. 280]:
Theorem 25× ) ab + ac ≤ a(b + c) and Theorem 25+ ) a + bc ≤ (a + b)(a + c).
259
However, he stated that the given inequalities did not hold the other
way round. So, it seems that Schröder has proved Peirce to be wrong.
However, he gave an example with 990 equalities! He also stated a restricted
version of distributivity for lattices with bottom (Prinzip III) and used it,
together with some form of negation, in order to prove usual distributivity
[see 4, p. 310].
Many years afterwards, Huntington presented a proof of distributiv-
ity for “lattices” “borrowed, almost verbatim, from a letter of Mr. C.S.
Peirce, dated December 24, 1903”. The given proof was very indirect (see
[1, pp. 300–302] proving 22a).
In our talk we give many details concerning the question at issue. In
particular, we give a very direct proof of 22a, we state an open question re-
garding arguments by Schröder, and comment on Korselt’s counterexample
for distributivity presented in [2].
References
1. E. Huntington, “Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of
Logic”, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 5(3),
1904, pp. 288–309.
2. A. Korselt, “Bemerkung zur Algebra der Logik”, Mathematische An-
nalen, vol. 44, 1894, pp. 156–157.
3. C.S. Peirce, “On the algebra of logic”, American Journal of Mathemat-
ics, vol. 3(1), 1880, pp. 15–57.
4. E. Schröder, Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, volume 1, Teubner,
Leipzig, Germany, 1890.
Peirce on the Identity of Truth and Reality

Joshua David Black
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, UK
[email protected]
In [1] (1904), Peirce claims that ‘the purpose of every sign is to express
“fact”, and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as pos-
sible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the
absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be
the very Universe’ [2, vol. 2, p. 304]. He adds that this “entelechy’ or ‘ideal
sign’ would be ‘quite perfect, and so identical — in such identity as a sign
may have — with the very matter denoted united with the very form sig-
nified by it’ [2, vol. 2, p. 304]. In this paper, I articulate the account of the
identity of truth and reality that Peirce defends in this text.
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I will restrict my attention in this paper to propositional signs, namely,

ones which can be true of false. Given that, we can say that this account of
truth is not concerned with the relationship between any proposition and
objects or states of affairs, but rather, with an idealisation of the devel-
opment of propositions in inquiry. That is, it is a way of making sense of
the notion of the truth as the ideal ‘end of inquiry’. On the interpretation
developed in this paper, this notion of truth can only apply to one propo-
sition. This proposition is a identical with ‘the Universe’ insofar as the
latter is a token (or ‘replica’) of the former. The ideal proposition cannot
leave anything out, in Peirce’s words, it is ‘is not abstracted but complete’
[2, vol. 2, p. 304].
I defend this interpretation by means of a close reading of ‘New Ele-
ments’, along with the closely related ‘Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics’
(c. 1903). I introduce Peirce’s use of the three Aristotelian concepts of form,
matter, and entelechy [cf. 1, vol. 4, pp. 293–295] along with his account of
‘facts’. I then develop Peirce’s distinction between the mode of being of
a sign and that of individual objects. I argue that this account is what
requires the identity to hold between a replica of the ideal proposition and
reality.
I conclude by briefly considering the consequences of taking on this ac-
count as a notion of the ‘end of inquiry’. One traditional objection to the
‘end of inquiry’ is to point out the difficulty of using the notion as a test
for truth. How, for instance, are we to determine what future inquirers will
think about a given question? That is, it is difficult to see how we could
have any access to the end of inquiry. However, if the end of inquiry is
identical with the reality then it is already present. The test for the truth
of a given proposition is simply to apply whatever the relevant methods of
inquiry are. I argue that, rather than offering a test for the truth of proposi-
tions, the identity account of truth and reality defended in ‘New Elements’
and related writings is intended to show what it means to take reality to be
intelligible.
References
1. The New Elements of Mathematics, 4 volumes, edited by C. Eisele,
Mouton, The Hague, 1976.
2. C.S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 2
volumes, 1st volume edited by N. Houser & C. Kloesel, 2nd volume
edited by The Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, 1992
and 1998.
261
Logical Consequence in the Diagrammatic System

of Assertive Graphs
Daniele Chiffi
New University of Lisbon, Portugal
[email protected]
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
[email protected]
The notion of assertion plays an essential role in logic. It is a key ingre-

dient in most logical systems, either implicitly or explicitly. For instance,
Frege’s ideographical language of the Begriffsschrift introduced a specific
sign designating assertion, “ ”, which expresses the acknowledgement of
the truth of the content of the assertion. In Peirce’s graphical logic of Ex-
istential Graphs (EGs), there is no specific sign for assertion, although the
notion of assertion is used virtually everywhere in his logical writings. The
reason is that making an assertion signals the responsibility that the utterer
of the logical statement bears on the truth of the proposition [1]. Indeed
Peirce has assertion as a sign that is embedded in the Sheet of Assertion
(SA) [2], while SA represents both the logical truth as well as the assertoric
nature of those graphical logical formulas that are scribed upon it. In intu-
itionistic logic, on the other hand, an explicit notion of assertion has been
used in order to analyse inference and proof, to explicate the meaning of
logical constants, and so on [3].
The idea of the notion of assertion thus appears robustly invariant across
a range of logical theories, logical methods, and logical notations. In the
light of the existence of such a common and shared character of assertions,
we present a new system of graphs that makes the embedded or implicit
nature of assertions in logical graphs explicit. We develop a graphical logic
of assertions (called “Assertive Graphs”, AGs). We will show that it is pos-
sible to extend this intuitionistic logic of AGs into a classical graphical logic
(ClAG) without a need to introduce polarities. We compare the advantages
of these two approaches and point out the nature of a deep inference of
their transformation rules. Finally, we discuss implications of AGs to logi-
cal consequence. We will point out that logical consequence in AGs is based
on some standard aspects of model theory, related to the notion of truth,
as well as on the (antirealist) notions of proof and assertion, related to the
epistemic acknowledgement of truth.
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References
1. F. Bellucci & A-V. Pietarinen, “Assertion and Denial: A Contribution
from Logical Notation”, Journal of Applied Logic, 2017, to appear.
2. C.S. Peirce, Manuscripts in the Houghton Library of Harvard Uni-
versity, identified by R. Robin, Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of
Charles S. Peirce, University of Massachusetts Press, 1967, “The Peirce
Papers: A supplementary catalogue”, Transactions of the Charles S.
Peirce Society, 1971, vol. 7, pp. 37–57.
3. M. Carrara, D. Chiffi & C. De Florio, “Assertions and Hypotheses: A
Logical Framework for their Opposition Relations”, Logic Journal of
the IGPL * , vol. 25(2), 2017, pp. 131–144.
A Generic Figures Reconstruction of Peirce’s

Existential Graphs (Alpha)
Jonathan Gangle
Department of Philosophy, Endicott College, USA
[email protected]
Gianluca Caterina
Department of Mathematics, Endicott College, USA
[email protected]
The powerful mathematical tools of category theory and, particularly,

the techniques within topos theory for representing and investigating the
deep relationships between logic and topology are especially well-suited for
examining the iconic and diagrammatic properties of Peirce’s system of Ex-
istential Graphs. The Existential Graphs remain at once one of the most
important contributions of Peirce to modern logic and one of the least stud-
ied and most underappreciated aspects of his overall philosophy. The inte-
gration of Peirce’s graphical system with the contemporary mathematical
methods of category theory promises to make Peirce’s innovative logical
notation accessible to a broader audience of researchers and to open new
avenues of inquiry into the Existential Graphs themselves. Furthermore,
placing the Existential Graphs in a categorical and topos-theoretical set-
ting may help to suggest new applications and creative extensions of the
Existential Graphs at alpha, beta and gamma levels.
*
263
We show in particular how Peirce’s alpha level of the Existential Graphs

may be faithfully reconstructed within the presheaf category of forests, that
is, the category of contravariant functors from the category of natural num-
bers (with morphisms corresponding to the usual ≤ ordering) into Set, the
category of sets and functions. The reconstruction proceeds in three stages:
first, it is shown how the fragment of Peirce’s EG alpha system involving
only variable-free “cuts-only” graphs corresponds naturally to finite forests,
where the branchings of such forests represent the nestings of EG alpha
cuts; secondly, variable-tokens are introduced by treating pairs of cuts-only
graphs, one of which is a subobject of the other, in terms of the lattice of
intermediate subobjects they induce; finally, individual variable tokens are
shown to be representable as tokens of common types through a natural con-
struction via groupoids. Once these graphical syntactic constructions are
made, it is straightforward to show how Peirce’s logical semantics for the
graphs are derivable naturally from the iconic (i.e. structural) properties of
the graphs themselves.
Our approach throughout makes use of the generic figures techniques de-
veloped by Reyes, Reyes and Zolfaghari in Generic Figures and Their Glue-
ings: A Constructive Approach to Functor Categories (Polimetrica, 2008).
This way of treating functor categories lends itself naturally to diagrammatic
systems of various kinds including directed graphs (in the usual mathemat-
ical sense), dynamical systems and other constructions. Thus, this quite
general mathematical setting allows for the comparison of the Existential
Graphs with a variety of other diagrammatic logical and mathematical sys-
tems and provides a milieu for investigating the interplay of iconic syntax
and logical semantics in multiple contexts. This approach has not previ-
ously been applied to Peirce’s Existential Graphs and may be contrasted
with alternate analyses of the Existential Graphs that make use of cate-
gory theory such as that of Brady and Trimble. We conclude by sketching
out several paths for future development of this approach to the Existential
Graphs, including the adjunction of infinitely nested graphs to EG alpha
and the extension of the generic figures approach to EG beta and gamma.
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A Peircean Logic of Operations

William James McCurdy
Department of English and Philosophy,
Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho, USA
[email protected]
“. . . De Morgan’s Open Sesame, the Aladdin matmûrah of relative

logic. . . ”
— C.S. Peirce
Charles Sanders Peirce was the first philosophical logician to develop the
mathematics for a comprehensive logic of relations; that is, a logic for the
modelling, combining, and manipulating relations of any adicity (valency)
whatsoever. The corazon de corazon of his logic of relations is a thesis which
he characterized as a “remarkable theorem”, specifically, the claim that a
relationally complete logic requires, but only requires monadic, dyadic, and
triadic relations. One of the immediate consequences of this theorem is that
there are genuine triadic relations, relations of three relata which cannot be
analyzed into combinations of either monadic or dyadic relations. All other
n-adic relations can be composed out of combinations of the three elemen-
tary species of relations by two elementary logical operations of relative
and auto-relative multiplication. Peirce also recognized that binary mathe-
matical operations are special cases of triadic relations; that is, any binary
operation X ○ Y = Z is equivalent to some triadic relation t○ (X, Y, Z). He
argued that such operations cannot be analyzed into operations of arity less
than two. This realization provides additional grounds for his contention
that there are genuine triadic relations.
Peirce’s insights are the seeds for a logic of operations as a branch of his
logic of relations — seeds he never nurtured to fruition. This essay presents
the rudiments of that field of inquiry consonant with his logic of relations.
Binary operations in simple algebras such as magmas, semigroups, loops,
and groups will be represented by Peirce-inspired directed wye diagrams.
These can be grafted together by (auto-)relative multiplication to generate
both acyclic (tree) and cyclic graphs to model n-ary operations. This ap-
proach can be further applied to rings, fields, bi-algebras, categories, partial
orders, lattices and other algebraical systems. This work, when married to
Waclaw Sierpinski’s theorem that every n-ary operation (n > 2) can be ana-
lyzed into a compound operation consisting exclusively of binary operations,
provides a Peircean framework for Universal Algebra.
265
Frege and Peirce on the signs of generality

[email protected]
Francesco Bellucci
Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies,
University of Bologna, Italy
[email protected]
According to Michael Dummett, Frege’s discovery of a notation for quan-

tifiers and variables for the expression of generality was one of the most
important discoveries in the history of logic, certainly the most important
since Aristotle. It was by means of this discovery that Frege solved a prob-
lem that had blocked the progress of logic for centuries: the problem of
how to treat multiply quantified sentences of the kind of “Everybody loves
somebody”. Frege’s discovery allowed him to treat such sentences (and in-
deed, every sentence in which signs of generality occur) as being constructed
in stages corresponding to the signs of generality occurring in it. Thus
the sentence “everybody loves somebody”, in which the sign of generality
“somebody” occurs within the scope of the sign of generality “everybody”,
is not obtained by the simultaneous combination of the three components
“everybody”, “somebody”, and “x loves y”. Rather, it is obtained in two
stages, i.e., by first combining “x loves y” with “somebody”, thus obtaining
“x loves somebody”, and then by combining this with “everybody”, thus
obtaining the complete sentence. Only under this mode of analysis, Dum-
mett explained, the truth-conditions of a multiply quantified sentence can
be satisfactorily determined.
In fact, the discovery is independent of the specific notation that Frege
devised. A symptom of this is the fact that Dummett feels no need to
present Frege’s Begriffsschrift in order to expound Frege’s discovery. Frege’s
insight that sentences are constructed in stages corresponding to the signs
of generality occurring in them might equally be represented in notations
other than the Begriffsschrift, and in point of fact it has become part and
parcel of modern quantificational logic in the guise of the Peanian/Russellian
linear notation. The relations of dependence of the signs of generality is
represented in this latter notation by the linear ordering of those signs, and
this manner is no less effective than the manner in which it is represented
in Frege’s Begriffsschrift.
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Workshops
By 1882, on the other side of the ocean, Peirce had made the same
discovery as Frege. But unlike Frege, Peirce spent the rest of his logical life
to experiment with different and alternative notations for the representation
of quantification theory. The first, complete version of the theory is what
Peirce would later call the General Algebra of Logic. In the General Algebra,
the above multiply quantified sentence would be represented as “Πi Σj li,j ”,
of which the contemporary “∀x ∃y Lxy” is a mere notational variant. But
in parallel to the General Algebra, in 1882 Peirce created a system of logical
graphs in which the sentence in question would be represented thus:
where the crossed line at the left of the predicate term “l” is the sign of
the universal quantifier, the plain line at the right of it the sign of the
existential quantifier. But since the sheet on which these graphs are scribed
is symmetric and thus unordered, not only the system can only express
symmetric predicates, but also, the relations of dependence of the signs of
generality cannot be represented, as in the General Algebra, by exploiting
the linear ordering. The first solution that Peirce found for this problem
was to add to the vocabulary: numerical indices are attached to the lines
to indicate the order of selection.
The graph on the left would thus represent “Πi Σj li,j ” (“everybody loves
somebody”), while that on the right would represent “Σj Πi li,j ” (“somebody
is loved by everybody”).
This must have been highly unsatisfactory to Peirce. In 1896 he invented
two systems of graphs, later termed Entitative and Existential Graphs, re-
spectively. The 1896 graphs adopt the 1882 substructure of spots and lines
of identity but add to that substructure the “oval”. By means of the ovals,
the compositional (“endoporeutic”) structure of the formulas is immediately
represented, and thus also the relations of dependence of the quantifiers.
In the Existential graphs on the left, the first line is less enclosed than
the second, and thus its corresponding quantifier has logical precedence; in
267
the graph on the right, the dependence relation is reversed. By means of

the endoporeutic structure expressed by the nesting of the ovals, Peirce’s
logical graphs show in a very perspicuous way how sentences are constructed
in stages corresponding to the signs of generality occurring in them.
G. Boole, A. De Morgan and C.S. Peirce at the birth

of symbolic logic
Cassiano Terra Rodrigues
Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, Brazil
[email protected]
The presentation will show how C.S. Peirce developed his symbolic logic
from the works of G. Boole and A. De Morgan. Boole devised a calculus
for what he called the algebra of logic to overcome syllogistic. Interpreting
categorical propositions as algebraic equations, Boole showed an isomor-
phism between the calculus of classes and of propositions, being indeed the
first to mathematize logic. With a different purport, De Morgan tried to
improve on syllogistic, taking it as object of study. With a very unusual
system of symbols of his own, De Morgan develops the study of logical re-
lations that are defined by the very operation of signs. Although his logic
is not a Boolean algebra of logic, De Morgan defined the central notion of
a universe of discourse. Peirce takes a critical and decisive step forward.
First, claiming Boole had exaggeratedly submitted logic to mathematics,
thus mistaking the nature and the purpose of each discipline to the point of
erasing their characteristic differences to the impairment of the first, Peirce
emphasizes the normative purport of logic. Second, identifying De Morgan’s
limitations as a rigid restraint of logic to the study of relations, thus hin-
dering compositions of relations with classes, Peirce develops his own logic
of relative terms. Peirce’s originalities to be highlighted in the presentation
are:
(a) a theory of multiple quantification,
(b) the development of the logic of relatives from it (and not vice-versa),
(c) the calculus for multi-saturated expressions (arity superior to 2),
(d) the contrast between mathematics and logic by their distinct ends and
degrees of generality.
In the end, brief considerations on Peirce’s relation to Tarski’s interpre-
tation of the logic of relatives will be hinted at.
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References
1. George Boole, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on which are
founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities, Walton
and Maberly (London) & Macmillan and Co. (Cambridge), 1854.
2. Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic: Or, the Calculus of Inference,
Necessary and Probable, Taylor and Walton, London, 1847.
3. Charles Sanders Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological
Edition, 7 volumes, Indiana University Press, 1982–2006.
4. Alfred Tarski, Conferências na Unicamp em 1975 — Lectures at Uni-
camp in 1975, CLE * & Editora Unicamp , Campinas, SP, Brazil, 2016 .
*
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science

State University of Campinas
In 1975, Alfred Tarski, invited by Ayda Arruda and Newton da Costa, visited the Insti-
tute of Mathematics, Statistics and Scientific Computing at Unicamp. In this bilingual
text, it is presented an inedited transcription of the two lectures delivered by him on re-
lation algebras, preceded by a brief introduction, with an update on some open problems
mentioned by Tarski.
269
The Lvov-Warsaw School:

Past, Present and Future
This workshop is organized* by
Angel Garrido
Faculty of Sciences, Department of Fundamental Mathematics,
National Distance Education University, Madrid, Spain
[email protected]
Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska
[email protected]
Grzegorz Malinowski
[email protected]
The beginnings of the Lvov School, later on called the Lvov-Warsaw

School, are connected with the person of Kazimierz Twardowski, a disciple
of Franz Brentano, and his taking the post of Head of the Chair of Phi-
losophy at Lvov University. It was thanks to Twardowski that a modern
school of philosophy was established, which was where a host of outstanding
philosophers, logicians, psychologists, university professors and organizers
of scholarly life in independent Poland came from. Owing to the activity of
the School, multiplicity of attitudes and a variety of represented views, not
only philosophical, it was also possible to develop formal logic and mathe-
matics, and the accomplishments of representatives of these disciplines are
often included into pioneering and seminal on the global scale.
J. Lukasiewicz and S. Leśniewski were the founders of the world-famous
Warsaw School of Logic. The former propagated the idea of applying logical
tools to the classical metaphysics. The latter built three systems of logic
(protothetic, ontology and mereology), which showed formal values and ap-
plications in the spirit of nominalism. Their disciples were, among others, A.
Tarski — the author of a pioneering dissertation on semantic theory of truth
(1933) and, following World War 2, the founder of the Californian School
at Berkeley, S. Jaśkowski, A. Lindenbaum, Cz. Lejewski, B. Sobociński, J.
Slupecki and M. Wajsberg.
*
The first two organizers are editors of the forthcoming book “The Lvov-Warsaw School:
Past and Present”.
270
Workshops
The works by the following disciples of K. Twardowski can also be con-

sidered seminal: K. Ajdukiewicz — in the field of logical theory of lan-
guage (significant for the so-called mathematical linguistics; Y. Bar-Hillel,
N. Chomsky), and also in the area of logical analysis of epistemology;
T. Kotarbiński — the founder of reism (nominalistic philosophical concep-
tion) as well as praxeology — science of effective action.
Logical theory of science was the subject matter successfully dealt with
by T. Czeżowski, Z. Zawirski, I. Dambska,
, M. Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa,
J. Hosiassion-Lindenbaumowa, J. Kotarbińska and H. Mehleberg.
The flourishing of the Polish school of logic and philosophy before the
outbreak of WW2 received a lot of attention worldwide. After the War, the
Lvov-Warsaw School ceased to exist. Its representatives, who had managed
to survive the turmoil of war, went to live in different parts of Poland and
all over the world, having left the output, which — despite the commu-
nist regime — was able to revive and develop a new Polish logic, owing
to continuation of its traditions and strong connections with multiple dis-
ciplines: philosophy, mathematics, computer science, linguistics, semiotics
and others.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Jan Woleński (page 165),
Kordula Świȩtorzecka (page 162) and Grzegorz Malinowski (page 138).
Call for papers

We invite submissions on the following topics:
Historical analyses on what the L-WS phenomenon was
Philosophical motivations for creation of logical research by representa-
tives of the L-WS
L-WS, the Vienna Circle and the Berlin circle
Achievements of the main representatives of the L-WS and their devel-
opment or continuation
Influence of results of the L-WS on the development of new fields of
knowledge
Influence of creatively-developing Polish logic (by, among others, S.
Jaśkowski, A. Mostowski, J. Slupecki, A. Grzegorczyk, J. Loś, R. Suszko,
L. Borkowski, R. Sikorski, H. Rasiowa, Z. Pawlak and R. Wójcicki) on
the level of contemporary philosophy and other domains of science
Alfred Tarski and L-WS
Polish Logic in the world today
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by November 15, 2017 via email
to [email protected] and/or [email protected].
271
Methodological peculiarities of the Lvov-Warsaw School

Marcin Bedkowski,
, Anna Brożek, Alicja Chybińska,
Stepan Ivanyk & Dominik Traczykowski
Department of Methodology of Humanities,
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland
[email protected]
The Lvov-Warsaw School is considered as a branch of the twentieth-

century analytical movement. Among characteristic features of analytic
philosophy, there are: focus on detailed analyses of small problems instead
of creating all-embracing general syntheses, the use of logical methods in
philosophizing, and the respect for the results of science. The Lvov-Warsaw
School had some methodological peculiarities that differentiate it from En-
glish analytical school on the one hand, and the Vienna Circle on the other.
In the present paper, we indicate these peculiarities.
We will discuss namely the following particular methodological issues:
(1) Kazimierz Twardowski’s and his descriptive psychology, originating from
Franz Brentano and developed in the direction indicated by the analysis
of language;
(2) Jan Lukasiewicz’s early conception of analysis and construction of con-
cepts as well as his program of logicism in philosophy;
(3) Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s semantic reism as a tool of clarifying definitions
and theses;
(4) Tadeusz Czeżowski’s concept of analytic description as a paradigmatic
analytical procedure of the Lvov-Warsaw School;
(5) Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s so-called method of paraphrases and his appli-
cation of categorical grammar to the analysis of the structure of philo-
sophical theses.
These examples certify some distinctive elements of Polish analytical
philosophy. Firstly, the conception of analysis in the Lvov-Warsaw School
was constructive and did not fall under the paradox of analysis. Secondly,
there was a conviction that by the use of broadly understood logical tools
the real progress in philosophy may occur. Thirdly, the language analysis
was considered as a tool to reach reality and resolve real problems.
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On Ludwik Borkowski’s philosophico-logical views

Bożena Czernecka-Rej
The John Paul II Catholic University, Lublin, Poland
[email protected]
Ludwik Borkowski’s vast knowledge of philosophy allowed him to put
his logical studies in a philosophical context. As a logician he was one of
the Lvov-Warsaw school followers. He dealt with the basic issues of the
widely understood logic as well as with those having strong philosophical
implications (e.g. non-classical logics, the theory of truth, natural deduc-
tion, the theory of consequence). He also worked on the theory of definition
and the intuitive interpretation of logical results. For Borkowski logic was
an autonomous science which can be used for other service. Although he
did not create any philosophical logic works, his whole life research was ac-
companied with investigating philosophical sources, inspirations and logical
consequences.
References
1. L. Borkowski, “Autobiogram”, Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. 41(1), 1984,
pp. 78–82.
2. L. Borkowski, “Deductive Foundation and Analytic Propositions”,
Studia Logica, vol. 19(1), 1966, pp. 59–74.
3. L. Borkowski, “Dowód równoważności dwóch sformulowań klasycznej
definicji prawdy”, Roczniki Filozoficzne, vol. 35(1), 1987, pp. 87–99.
4. L. Borkowski, “Kilka uwag o zasadzie dwuwartościowości i logikach wie-
lowartościowych”, Studia logiczne, TN KUL* , Lublin, 1990, pp. 469–
475.
5. L. Borkowski, “O definicji prawdy za pomoca, pojecia
, stanu rzeczy opisy-
wanego przez zdanie”, Roczniki Filozoficzne, vol. 41(1),1993, pp. 23–25.
6. L. Borkowski, “O matrycowych regulach rachunku zdań”, Studia lo-
giczne, TN KUL, Lublin, 1990, pp. 303–312.
7. L. Borkowski, “O pewnym systemie logicznym opartym na regulach
i jego zastosowaniu przy nauczaniu logiki matematycznej”, Studia lo-
giczne, TN KUL, Lublin, 1990, pp. 174–183.
8. L. Borkowski, “O terminach modalnych”, Studia logiczne, TN KUL,
Lublin, 1990, pp. 138–173.
9. L. Borkowski, “O twierdzeniu Gödla”, Filozofia , vol. 7, 1981, pp. 5–10.
10. L. Borkowski, “Pewna wersja definicji klasycznego pojecia , prawdy”,
Roczniki Filozoficzne, vol. 28(1), 1980, pp. 119–131.
*
Scientific Society of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

Journal of the Student Philosophical Circle of the Catholic University of Lublin.
273
11. L. Borkowski, Pisma o prawdzie i stanach rzeczy, Maria Curie-Sklodow-

ska University, Lublin, 1995.
12. L. Borkowski, “W sprawie intuicyjnej interpretacji logiki trójwartościo-
wej Lukasiewicza”, Studia logiczne, TN KUL* , Lublin, 1990,
pp. 426–433.
Free Ontology as the logic for reism

Jan Czerniawski
Institute of Philosophy,
Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
[email protected]
Although strong arguments speak for ontological reism, its original ver-
sion formulated by Kotarbiński encounters serious problems related to the
ontology of the domain of mathematics and its set-theoretical foundations.
Still worse, the positive thesis of reism is endangered by triviality, and its
negative theses with contradiction. It is argued that the problems of the
first kind may be overcome by combining reism not with classical nomi-
nalism, but with the so-called theory of the respectus. Unfortunately, the
latter is not expressible in any extensive logic, in particular, in Leśniewski’s
Ontology, chosen by Kotarbiński as the logical background for reism.
Next, in order to avoid triviality of the positive thesis of reism, one must
express it not in the reistic language, but rather in some multicategorial
language. However, in the framework of Leśniewski’s Ontology, this implies
commitment to the existence of individuals of categories other than the
category of things. This, in turn, would make negative theses of reism
contradictory.
A remedy for the problems of the first kind is choosing as the logical
background for reism, instead of Leśniewski’s Ontology, a weaker calculus
that may be called Weak Ontology, obtained from it by disabling the rule
of extensionality and appropriate weakening of its axiom. A further weak-
ening of the calculus by modifying the quantifier rules in the spirit of free
logics results in what may be called Free Ontology, which enables avoiding
both kinds of problems. Thus, Free Ontology is preferable to Leśniewski’s
Ontology as the logical background for reism.
*
Scientific Society of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
274
Workshops
From Aristotle to Lvov-Warsaw School*

Angel Garrido
[email protected]
As we know, logic is the study of the structure and principles of correct

reasoning, and more specifically, attempts to establish the principles that
guarantee the validity of deductive arguments. The central concept of va-
lidity is for logic, because when we affirm the validity of an argument are
saying that it is impossible that its conclusion is false if its premises are
true.
Propositions are descriptions of the world, that is, are affirmations or
denials of events in various possible worlds, of which the “real world” is
just one of them. There is a long philosophical tradition of distinguishing
between truth necessary (a priori or “logical”) and facts “contingent” (a
posteriori or “factual”).
Both have really led the two concepts of logical truth, without being
opposed to each other, are quite different: the conception of truth as co-
herence, and the conception of truth as correspondence. According to the
point of view of consistency, a proposition is true or false depending on their
relationship with respect to a given set of propositions, because of the rules
of that system. Under the terms of correspondence, a proposition is true or
false, if it agrees with reality.
To further enhance the complexity of the problem, not only analyze
trueness or falsity of propositions, but also of theories, ideas and models.
And so, we allow new and different conception of truth.
The basic idea underlying all these approaches is that of an intrinsic
dichotomy between true and false. This opposition implies the validity of
two fundamental laws of classical logic:
— Principle of excluded middle: Every proposition is true or false, and
there is no another possibility.
— Principle of non-contradiction: No statement is true and false simulta-
neously.
Such fundamental ideas produce some series of paradoxes and dissatis-
faction that is based on the need to overcome this strict truth-bivalence of
classical logic.
*
To the memory of Marcin Mostowski, who has recently passed away.
275
Searching for the origins could lead too far and eventually disperse,
which, as we know is not very convenient for a job pretending to be research.
So we will refer to these first signs that appear in the East (China, India,. . . ),
and then we may analyze the problem of “future contingents”, treated by
Aristotle in Peri Hermeneias.
About Future Contingent Propositions, we must remember that they are
statements about states of affairs in the future that are neither necessarily
true nor necessarily false. Suppose that a sea-battle will not be fought
tomorrow. Then it was also true yesterday (and the week before, and last
year) that it will not be fought, since any true statement about the case
that will be was also true in the past. But all past truths are now necessary
truths; therefore it is now necessarily true that the battle will not be fought,
and thus the statement that it will be fought is necessarily false. Therefore
it is not possible that the battle will be fought. In general, if something will
not be the case, it is not possible for it to be the case.
As we know, although the starting point of Leibniz’s “calculus univer-
salis” were Stagirite’s theories, Leibniz ends to be dependent from the ideas
of Aristotle, to finally develop its own axiomatic system, a more general
type, based on applying the Combinatorial Instrument to syllogistic. That
issue (Future Contingent’s problem, with variations) would be then crucial
in medieval times, as during the Scholasticism, with William of Ockham,
and Duns Scotus, looked at from different point of views, for its relationships
with Determinism and ‘Divine Foreknowledge’. Then, this issue is taken up
by Spanish Jesuit F. Luis de Molina (and the famous controversy ‘De Aux-
iliis’ maintained with the Dominican Fray Domingo Báñez), or Francisco
Suarez, and even the great polymath G.W. Leibniz dedicated his time.
At first, Lukasiewicz introduced the three-valued logic and then general-
ized to the infinite-valued. That possibility modulation can be expressed by
a membership function, which is to come all the unit interval [0,1], instead
of being reduced to the dichotomy of classical logic: True vs. False, 0 vs. 1,
White vs. Black, etc., allowing the treatment of uncertainty and vagueness,
important not only from the theoretical point of view, but also for applica-
tions. The deep and far connection from Leibniz to Lukasiewicz, and then to
Zadeh, crossing through Bernhard Bolzano, Franz Brentano and Kazimierz
Twardowski has its progressive justification by Jan Woleński, Roman Mu-
rawski, Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska and Roger Pouivet, among others.
References
1. Aristotle, Tratados de Lógica I y II (Organon), Biblioteca Clásica,
Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 2000.
2. J. Lukasiewicz, Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1970.
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Workshops
3. P.D. Prieto, Indeterminación y Verdad. La polivalencia lógica en la

Escuela de Lvov-Varsovia, Nossa y Jara Editores, Móstoles, Spain, 1995.
4. A. Garrido, “Searching the arcane origins of Fuzzy Logic”, BRAIN* ,
vol. 2(2), 2011, pp. 51–57.
5. A. Garrido, Lógicas de Nuestro Tiempo, Dykinson, Madrid, 2014.
6. A. Garrido, Lógica Aplicada. Vaguedad e Incertidumbre, Dykinson,
Madrid, 2014.
7. A. Garrido, Lógica Matemática e Inteligencia Artificial, Dykinson,
Madrid, 2015.
8. A. Garrido, Filosofı́a y Computación, Dykinson, Madrid, 2017.
9. S.C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, North-Holland, Ams-
terdam, 1952.
10. S. Gottwald, A Treatise on Many-Valued Logics, Wiley-Blackwell, 2001.
11. R. Murawski, “Cracow Circle and Its Philosophy of Logic and Mathe-
matics”, Axiomathes, vol. 25(3), 2015, pp. 359–376.
12. H. Rasiowa, An Algebraic Approach to Non-Classical Logics, Elsevier
Science, 1st edition, 1974.
13. B. Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Brentano, Open Court,
Chicago, 1994.
14. A. Szaniawski (editor), The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School,
Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, Springer, 1989.
15. J. Woleński, L’École de Lvov-Varsovie. Philosophie et Logique en Po-
logne (1895-1939), J. Vrin, Paris, 2012.
16. J. Woleński, “Józef M. Bocheński and the Cracow Circle”, Studies in
East European Thought, vol. 65(1–2), 2013, pp. 5–15.
17. J. Woleński, Historico-Philosophical Essays, vol. 1, Copernicus Center
Press, Cracow, Poland, 2013.
18. U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, “On Polish Logic from a historical perspec-
tive”, Stanford University, 2009, http://www-logic.stanford.edu/
on-polish-logic.pdf.
19. U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, “Zdzislaw Pawlak: Man, Creator and Inno-
vator of Computer Science — Personal Memories”, in Proceedings of
IJCRS , Part I, 2017, pp. 3–12.
20. A. Zinoviev, Philosophical Problems of Many-Valued Logic, D. Reidel,
1963.
21. L.A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Sets”, Information and Control, vol. 8(3), 1965,
pp. 338–353.
22. L.A. Zadeh, “Fuzzy Logic and approximate reasoning”, Synthese,
vol. 30(3–4), 1975, pp. 407–428.
*
Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience

International Joint Conference on Rough Sets
277
Jan Lukasiewicz and Many-Valued Logic*

Angel Garrido
[email protected]
The roots of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS, by acronym) can be traced

back to Aristotle himself. But in later times we better put them into think-
ing G.W. Leibniz and who somehow inherited many of these ways of think-
ing, such as the philosopher and mathematician Bernhard Bolzano. Since
he would pass the key figure of Franz Brentano, who had as one of his disci-
ples to Kazimierz Twardowski, which starts with the brilliant Polish school
of mathematics and philosophy dealt with. Among them, one of the most
interesting thinkers must be Jan Lukasiewicz, the father of many-valued
logic.
Jan Lukasiewicz (1878–1956) began teaching at the University of Lvov
(now Lwiw, former Lemberg, but also Leópolis), and then at Warsaw, but
after World War II must to continue in Dublin. Some questions may be very
astonishing in the CV of Lukasiewicz. For instance, that a firstly Polish
Minister of Education in Paderewski cabinet, into the new Polish Republic,
and also Rector for two times at Warsaw University, was awarded with a
Doctorate ‘Honoris Causa’ in spring 1936, at University of Münster, into the
maximum of effervescence of Nazism in Germany. The explanation must be
their good relation with a very good friend, the former theologian, and then
logician, Heinrich Schölz, which was the first Chairman of Mathematical
Logic in German universities.
Lukasiewicz firstly studied Law, and then Mathematics and Philosophy
in Lvov (then Lemberg). His doctoral supervisor was Kazimierz Twar-
dowski, and in 1902 he obtain his Ph.D. title with a very special mention:
‘sub auspiciis Imperatoris’ (i.e., under the auspices of the Kaiser). Also
he received a doctorate ring with diamonds from the Kaiser of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, Franz Joseph I.
From 1902, Lukasiewicz was employed as a private teacher, and also as
a desk in the Universitary Library of Lvov. So it was until 1904 when he
obtained a scholarship to study abroad. He defends his ‘Habilitationschrift’
*
This work was supported by the MICINN’s Research Project FFI2016-77574-P, and the
Investigation Group of our Spanish University (UNED), from which we belong, into a
section about ‘Science and Technique’, which is part of the Project entitled Estudio sis-
temático de las lecturas heideggerianas de Jacques Derrida. Confluencias y divergencias,
being its Principal Researcher (IP) Prof. Cristina De Peretti.
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in 1906, entitled “Analysis and construction of the concept of cause”. This

permits to give university courses. His first lectures were on the Algebra
of Logic, according to the recent translation to Polish of this book of the
French logician Louis Couturat.
Between 1902 and 1906, Lukasiewicz continued his studies in the univer-
sities of Berlin and Leuwen (Lovaina). In 1906, by his ‘Habilitationschrift’,
he obtain the qualification as university professor at Lvov. And, in 1911,
he was appointed as associate professor in his ‘alma mater’ (Lemberg).
Jan Lukasiewicz was also very active in historical research on logic, giv-
ing a new and up-to-date interpretation of Aristotle’s syllogism and of the
Stoics’ propositional calculus. According to Scholz, the better pages on
history of logic are due to him. And also, as Arianna Betti says, “Jan
Lukasiewicz is first and foremost associated with the rejection of the Prin-
ciple of Bivalence and the discovery of Many-Valued Logic.”
The discovery of MVL by Lukasiewicz was in 1918, a little earlier than
Emil Leon Post. According to Jan Woleński, “although Post’s remarks were
parenthetical and extremely condensed, Lukasiewicz explained his intuitions
and motivations carefully and at length. He was guided by considerations
about future contingents and the concept of possibility”. So, he introduces,
firstly, three-valued logic, then four-valued logic, generalized to logics with
an arbitrary finite number of veritative values, and finally, to logics with a
countably infinite-valued number of such values.
Very noteworthy is his treatment of the history of logic in the light of
the new formal logic (then called Logistics). Thus, not only he addressed
the issue of future contingents departing from Aristotle, but also put in
value logic of the Stoics, at least so far taken. In fact, Heinrich Scholz said,
rightly, that Lukasiewicz had written the most lucid pages on the history of
logic.
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On Grzegorczyk’s Logics of Descriptions

and Descriptive Equivalences
Joanna Golińska-Pilarek
[email protected]
Taneli Huuskonen
Independent Scholar
[email protected]
In 2011 Andrzej Grzegorczyk gave birth to Logic of Descriptions (LD),

a new logical system in which the classical equivalence has been replaced
with the descriptive equivalence which produces a new compound sentence
out of two simpler ones asserting that they describe the same.
The main philosophical assumption of Grzegorczyk’s standpoint was
that in the human description of the cognised world’s phenomena, the roles
of negation, conjunction, and disjunction differ significantly from those of
implication and equivalence. Negation, conjunction, and disjunction are
very primitive and have clear intuitive descriptive meanings, while the clas-
sical implication and equivalence are derivative and have no intuitively plau-
sible sense. Furthermore, it is exactly implication and equivalence that are
responsible for some paradoxical laws of classical logic, such as “false im-
plies everything”, “truth is implied by anything” and “all true sentences are
logically equivalent to each other”.
As a consequence, states Grzegorczyk, we are forced to accept that
among all the logical connectives exactly negation, conjunction, and disjunc-
tion, together with the equimeaning connective (or descriptive equivalence)
expressing the assertion that two descriptions have the same meaning, are
well suited as the primitive concepts of a new logic. As descriptions and
descriptive equivalences among them have became crucial for Grzegorczyk’s
approach, he called his new logical system the Logic of Descriptions, or LD
for short.
The first exposition of Grzegorczyk’s new logic, its philosophical moti-
vations, and assumptions was published in 2011 in [1], where Grzegorczyk
proposed a number of axioms and rules that the equimeaning connective
(descriptive equivalence), should satisfy. He also posed a number of open
problems, in particular whether the new connective is different than the
classical equivalence. This problem was solved in [2] by showing that the
descriptive equivalence connective is essentially different than the classical
one and the logic itself is indeed new. In [2] many other peculiar properties
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of LD were proved. Further results on LD and some of its extensions and

modifications are presented in [3].
In this talk we will present the basics of Grzegorczyk’s logic LD and
then we survey the recent results on LD.
References
1. A. Grzegorczyk, “Filozofia logiki i formalna logika niesymplifikacyjna”
(Philosophy of Logic and Perceptive Equivalence), Zagadnienia Nauko-
znawstwa, vol. 4(190), 2011, pp. 445–450.
2. J. Golińska-Pilarek & T. Huuskonen, “Logic of descriptions. A new
approach to the foundations of mathematics and science”, Studies in
Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, vol. 27(40), 2012, pp. 63–94.
3. J. Golińska-Pilarek & T. Huuskonen, “Grzegorczyk’s non-Fregean logics
and their formal properties”, in Applications of Formal Philosophy. The
Road Less Traveled, edited by R. Urbaniak & G. Payette, series Logic,
Argumentation and Reasoning, vol. 14, 2017, pp. 243–263.
On the Notion of Independence

Joanna Grygiel
Jan Dlugosz University, Czestochowa,
, Poland
[email protected]
The notion of independence is closely related to the notion of provability.

A formula α is meant to be independent from a set A of formulae if it is
impossible to prove α from A. A set A is independent if each formula in A
is independent from the set of remaining formulae in A.
Independence is usually investigated in the context of to the set of axioms
of a theory; an independent set of axioms is regarded as clear and elegant,
because it doesn’t contain any dependent axioms (or rules) which, in fact,
are redundant. This notion of logical independence, seen as a formalization
of the notion of simplicity, was one of four pillars of Hilbert’s project. From
the theoretical point of view, looking for independent axiomatizations is
not crucial, however, it has played an important role in the development of
formal logic and universal algebra.
The first formal solution to the problem of independent axiomatization
was given by Tarski, who proved that every countable set of formulae is
independently axiomatizable. But, in general, proving the independence of
a system of axioms is not an easy task. It is usually done by constructing
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appropriate models, as for example in the case of the proof of independency

of the Axiom of Choice, by means of forcing technique, or Lukasiewicz’s
proof of independency of the system of his axioms of three-valued logic, by
means of matrices.
Let us notice that sometimes we consider more general notion of in-
dependence; for example, the Axiom of Choice can neither be proved nor
refuted from ZFC. This is a special case of a general notion of algebraic
independence introduced by Marczewski. In this sense, a set X of elements
of an algebra A is independent if the subalgebra generated by X is free in
the variety generated by A. This notion was thoroughly investigated by
Marczewski, Mycielski, Œwierczkowski, Glazek and many others.
References
1. J. Lukasiewicz, Elementy logiki matematycznej, Państwowe Wydawn,
Warsaw, 1929.
2. E. Marczewski, “A general scheme of the notions of independence in
mathematics”, Bulletin de l’Académie Polonaise des Sciences. Série
des Sciences Mathématiques, Astronomiques et Physiques, vol. 6, 1958,
pp. 731–736.
3. A. Tarski, “Fundamentale Begriffe der Methodologie der deductiven
Wissenshaften I”, Montshefte für Mathematik und Physik, vol. 37, 1930,
pp. 361–404.
Stanislaw Jaśkowski and the first textbook based

on Natural Deduction
Andrzej Indrzejczak
[email protected]
In the history of natural deduction (ND) one may distinguish two prob-
lems: when the method was invented and when it started to be practically
applied in textbooks as a tool for teaching logic. Stanislaw Jaśkowski was
one of the founders of ND although his work is not as well recognized as the
work of Gerhard Gentzen. However, in the talk we are not going to focus
on his role as the inventor of ND but rather on his priority in the field of
the application of this new approach to logic.
Quine in “Methods of Logic” claims that the first textbook applying
ND is Cooley’s “A Primer of Logic” printed in 1942, then reprinted in 1946.
In fact, Cooley applies a variety of inference rules, however it is doubtful
if there is ND system in his book. Conditional proofs are only briefly de-
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scribed on few pages but not widely used in the text. Moreover, Cooley did
not apply any devices for separating subproofs and his rule for elimination
of existential quantifier is stated without sufficient restrictions. In Quine’s
“Methods of Logic” from 1950, ND system is correctly defined but also intro-
duced only in three sections as an illustration rather, not as the main proof
system. Quine mentioned also some earlier mimeographed notes of himself
and of Rosser which applied ND but I had no possibility to check them and
in the light of known textbooks of these logicians it is also doubtful. For
example, a well known Rosser”s textbook “Logic for Mathematicians” from
1953 is using axiomatic system and introduces additional ND-like rules only
as a metalogical devices for simplification of axiomatic proofs. Undoubtedly,
the first widely known textbook which consequently applies ND as the way
of doing logic is “Symbolic Logic” of Fitch published in 1952.
However, in 1947, Jaśkowski published in mimeographed form his lec-
ture notes “Elements of Mathematical Logic and Methodology of Deductive
Sciences” in Polish. The book consists of 105 pages and is of great impor-
tance since it is perhaps the first logic textbook where natural deduction is
uniformly used as a method for presentation of logic. It is used from the
beginning for proving theorems of logic without any reference to axiomatic
systems. Moreover, it is applied also in proofs of metalogical results and
even truth-functional semantics is introduced via analysis of ND proofs of
selected theses. In the talk I will briefly characterize the main features of
ND introduced in this textbook and make a comparison with his original
version from the paper published in 1934.
Methodological aspects of research on the Ukrainian branch

of the Lvov-Warsaw School
Stepan Ivanyk
Department of Methodology of Humanities,
[email protected]
For many years, Kazimierz Twardowski’s philosophical school was con-
sidered as a purely Polish formation. However, in the first part of the 20th
century, Lvov was a multinational and multicultural city. It was, among
others, the biggest center for Ukrainian culture and science. So, the ques-
tion arises whether there exist an Ukrainian branch of the Lvov-Warsaw
School. Recent research gives many evidences for positive answer to this
question. Firstly, there were many Ukrainians among direct and indirect
students of Twardowski. Secondly, some Ukrainians consciously referred to
the results of Twardowski and his school.
283
In the paper, I will focus on methodological problems connected with

the procedure of distinguishing a philosophical school or a branch of it.
This methodological approach stems from the definition of the Lvov-Warsaw
School, according to which, he term “Twardowski’s student” refers to a per-
son related to the founder of the School twofold: institutionally (i.e. through
the relationship with the institutional School’s center, i.e., University of
Lvov, University of Warsaw and Polish Philosophical Association in Lvov)
and ideologically (i.e. through the use of theoretical ideas of the Master in
their own work).
Hence, I will focus on the exhibition of the institutional and ideological
bond between Twardowski and his Ukrainian students.
Polish trends in the logic of questions

Dorota Leszczyńska-Jasion
[email protected]
There is no doubt that the Lvov-Warsaw School contributed substan-

tially to the development of logic in the 20th century. As in the case of
many other logical theories, the heritage of the School gave birth to some
vital trends in the logic of questions.
The problems of logical analysis of questions, initiated by Kazimierz
Twardowski, were considered already by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz [1,2]. But
the systematic reflection and substantial work on the matter (in the 60s
and 70s) was mainly due to Tadeusz Kubiński and Leon Koj. Kubiński’s
monograph [4] was probably the first in the world such an extensive ac-
count of the logical theory of questions; however, it appeared in Polish,
and the English language monograph [5] was published few years after the
monograph by Belnap and Steel. Finally, Kubiński and Koj influenced An-
drzej Wiśniewski. Inferential Erotetic Logic [8,9] developed by Wiśniewski
is nowadays one of the most important paradigms in the field of the logic
of questions (next to the paradigm of inquisitive semantics and epistemic
approaches to questions). There is also a rich semiotic tradition of erotetics
represented today by Jacek Jadacki and Anna Brożek [3].
There are many issues undertaken by the logic of questions conducted
by Polish logicians and philosophers. However, one of the distinguishing
features of the Polish tradition is the focus on the analysis of relations
between questions and/or declaratives. This kind of approach, started by
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Kubiński and extended by Wiśniewski, is nowadays used extensively in such

diverse areas as the formal analysis and modelling of erotetic reasoning [9],
analysis of natural language dialogues [7] and proof theory [6].
The aim of my presentation is to bring the listeners closer to this part
of the Polish tradition and its latest achievements.
References
1. K. Ajdukiewicz, “O intencji pytania”(in Polish), Ruch Filozoficzny,
vol. 8, 1923, pp. 152–153.
2. K. Ajdukiewicz, “Zdanie pytajne” (in Polish), Jezyk
, i poznanie, vol. 1,
*
PWN , Warsaw, 1960, pp. 278–286.
3. A. Brożek, Theory of Questions: Erotetics Through the Prism of Its
Philosophical Background and Practical Applications, Rodopi, 2012.
4. T. Kubiński, Wstep, do logicznej teorii pytań, PWN, Warsaw, 1971.
5. T. Kubiński, An Outline of the Logical Theory of Questions, Akademie-
Verlag, Berlin, 1980.
6. D. Leszczyńska-Jasion, From Questions to Proofs. Beyond Logic of
Questions and Proof Theory, in preparation.
7. P. Lupkowski, Logic of Questions in the Wild. Inferential Erotetic Logic
in Information Seeking Dialogue Modelling, College Publications, Lon-
don, 2016.
8. A. Wiśniewski, The Posing of Questions: Logical Foundations of Erotetic
Inferences, Kluwer, 1995.
9. A. Wiśniewski, Questions, Inferences, Scenarios, College Publications,
London, 2013.
Ontology of logic and mathematics in the Lvov-Warsaw School

Roman Murawski
Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science,
[email protected]
The aim of the talk is to present views of representatives of Lvov-Warsaw

School concerning the ontological status of objects of mathematics and of
logic. In particular views of Jan Lukasiewicz, Stanislaw Leśniewski, Alfred
Tarski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz will be considered.
Additionally views of Andrzej Mostowski (who belonged to the second gen-
eration of the School) as well as of Leon Chwistek (who did not belong
*
Polish Scientific Publishers, formerly Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
285
directly to the School but whose views are interesting) will be presented.
The problem whether those philosophical views did influence the technical
investigations and results will be discussed.
The application of Cz. Lejewski’s Chronology in determining

mereological genidentity
Marek Porwolik
[email protected]
Identity of objects that are subject to changes is called genidentity. The

term was introduced to the language of science by Kurt Lewin in 1922 [1],
although the problem of continuity and change has been present in philos-
ophy since its inception. Among the various kinds of genidentity there is
mereological genidentity, which is connected to the part-whole relationship.
The key notion used to describe that kind of genidentity is the notion of
temporal part. It is determined by referring to the notions that describe
the persistence of objects and their mereological relationships [2,3]. The
attempt to describe them using Czeslaw Lejewski’s Chronology seems to
be particularly interesting. He built his theory on Stanislaw Leśniewski’s
Mereology [4]. As a young man, Lejewski was a student of Jan Lukasiewicz
and Stanislaw Leśniewski at the University of Warsaw. A number of his
later works were devoted to Leśniewski’s systems. In the views of its au-
thor, Chronology was supposed to serve as a tool for describing temporal
relationships among objects as understood in Leśniewski’s Ontology. It was
supposed to be a general theory of objects as ordered and extended in time.
Lejewski wanted also to construct a theory of objects as distributed and
extended in space, which he named Stereology. Together with Protothetic,
Ontology and Mereology were supposed to constitute a reist’s systematic
presentation of the science of being. Chronology itself, although presented
in 1986, has not been subject to any in-depth analysis yet, not to mention
its application in philosophical investigations. The aim of the present paper
is to discuss the possibility of applying it in the description of temporal
parts and the mereological genidentity of objects.
References
1. K. Lewin, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und Entwicklungs-
geschichte, Springer, Berlin, 1992.
2. D.W. Zimmerman, “Persistence and Presentism”, Philosophical Papers,
vol. 25(2), 1996, pp. 115–126, doi:10.1080/05568649609506542.
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3. T. Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001.

4. Cz. Lejewski, “Logic, Ontology and Metaphysics”, in Philosophy in
Britain Today, edited by S.G. Shanker & C. Wright, State University
of New York Press, 1986, pp. 171–197.
Lvov-Warsaw School and the Artificial Intelligence

Dariusz Surowik
Lomża State University of Applied Sciences, Lomża, Poland
[email protected]
Many ideas and achievements of he contemporary Artificial Intelligence

have its roots in the achievements of the Polish mathematicians of the War-
saw School and the logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw School. In my talk I would
like to consider some of them.
Jan Lukasiewicz is best known for his concept of multi-valued logic.
Application in AI seems to be the most promising of all the possible ap-
plications of multi-valued logics. This kind of logic form the basis for the
description of vague concepts, which are characteristic of natural language
and non-formal reasoning. A many-valued approach to vague notions and
commonsense reasoning is the method of expert systems, databases and
knowledge-based systems, as well as data and knowledge mining. In the
AI the conception of fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets are used. The conception
of fuzzy sets was developed in the 1960s by Lofti A. Zadeh. He applied
Lukasiewicz’s logic to elements of a set, thereby creating an algebra of fuzzy
sets. A similar solution in connection with the research on expert systems
was worked out in Poland by Z. Pawlak. The theories of fuzzy and rough
sets are applied in artificial intelligence and expert systems. They are used
for the automation of data and knowledge exploration. Jan Lukasiewicz
invented also the parenthesis-free notation known as PN (Polish Notation)
and RPN (Reverse Polish Notation). The idea of the notation which avoids
the use of parentheses appeared in connection with examining formal sys-
tems.
In a contemporary informatics, natural logic is applied first of all in
broadly understood issues relating to artificial intelligence. Jaśkowski, in-
dependently from Gentzen, created a system of natural deduction which is
the basis of systems regarding automatic deduction and theorem proving.
From the point of view some of researches Jaśkowski’s system is more useful
in computer-assisted proof verification, while Gentzen’s system is better in
computer-assisted proving. Jaśkowski also created a system of paraconsis-
tent logic. Such logics are used in AI.
287
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, with his categorial grammar, participated in the

development of formal grammars, the field significant for programming lan-
guages. The first attempts of computer translation from English to Russian
were based upon the notion of syntactic coherence of a sentence introduced
by Ajdukiewicz. These ideas have been developed and used as theoretical
foundation for the first translations.
Alfred Tarski is the most famous member of the Lvov-Warsaw School.
His works were essential to the foundations of Artificial Intelligence. He
created and described a theory of reference and truth value relationships.
Modern computer scientist have related this theory to programming lan-
guages and other specifications for computing.
Helena Rasiowa was deeply interested in computer science and its appli-
cations. Rasiowa initiated intensive investigations on methods of inference
under incomplete information, which she called approximate reasoning. At
present approximation logics are one of the central topics of research in
artificial intelligence.
The Axiom of Choice and the Road Paved by Sierpiński

Valérie Lynn Therrien
Western University, London, Ontario, Canada
[email protected]
Ernst Zermelo used the disastrous reception to his 1904 Well-Ordering

Proof as a catalyst for serious inquiry into the requirements of a proper for-
mal axiomatic system for set theory. Presented in 1908, Zermelo’s attempt
was without doubt inspired by Hilbert’s 1899 Grundlagen der Geometrie.
Of Hilbert’s deductive system, Zermelo would retain: (i) the use of a do-
main of objects with a primitive relation; (ii) the explicitation of implicit
assumption and transfiguration into axioms; and (iii) the emphasis on the
independence and consistency of these axioms. But, given the overwhelm-
ingly negative immediate reception of both his 1904 and 1908, how did this
abstract view of sets come to be canonical by the mid-1930s? Particularly,
how did the contentious “general postulate of choice” come to be the widely
accepted “axiom of choice” of modern set theory and classical mathematics?
The acceptance of AC can be seen as “a turning point for mathematics
(. . . ) symptomatic of a conceptual shift in mathematics” (Kanamori 2012,
p. 14). Whilst Western Europe remained quite hostile to this new vision of
logic and mathematics, it was in Eastern Europe, at the Warsaw and Lwów
Schools of Mathematics (1918–1939) that the seeds of this conceptual shift
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briefly landed and yielded a cultivar that was to supplant and overtake the
Western world. From 1908 until 1916, articles supporting AC or exploring
some of its consequences were scant and scarcely concerted. The situation
changed dramatically in 1916 when Waclaw Sierpiński, a young professor at
the Lwów University published a series of articles on AC and revived the
dormant debate surrounding AC — albeit on completely different grounds.
Eschewing theoretical concerns about the nature and methodology of math-
ematical practice, he paid little attention to the dominant question as to
whether Zermelo’s existence postulate could be accepted as a mathematical
construction.
Instead, he recentred the discussion towards practical matters (viz.,
its consequences, its interrelations and degree of necessity within various
proofs, as well as its role in obtaining various basically trivial mathemat-
ical theorems). Starting in 1918, Sierpiński also rallied the newly formed
Polish schools of mathematics around a common programme of research
which was to include an in-depth exploration of AC’s role in a few select
branches of mathematics. Originally adopting an objective stance vis-à-
vis AC, his programme was to eventually completely supplant the previous
philosophical and methodological debates — and Sierpiński was to become
AC’s biggest champion since Zermelo. The posterity of AC as we know it
would be unimaginable without Sierpiński’s efforts: “Since the labours of
Mr. Sierpiński and of the Polish School, a revolution has been produced. A
certain number of mathematicians have fruitfully used the axiom of choice;
things are no longer in the same place” (Lebesgue 1941, p. 109).
Jerzy Loś’ Juvenilia

Marcin Tkaczyk & Anna Maria Karczewska
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland
Jerzy Loś (*1920–1998) is best known for his works in foundations of
mathematics, abstract algebra, probability theory and mathematical eco-
nomics. Yet, in our talk we will address his two, not sufficiently acknowl-
edged, early works “Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonów Milla”
(Foundations of methodological analysis of Mill’s method) and “Logiki wie-
lowartościowe a formalizacja funkcji intensjonalnych” (Many-valued logics
and the formalization of intensional functions). Both papers incorporate
pioneering research in positional logics with temporal (the former) or epis-
temic (the latter) interpretation. We will present Loś’s novel formal solu-
tions and their philosophical assumptions tracing back to the tradition of
Lvov-Warsaw School of philosophy.
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References
1. K. Ajdukiewicz, Jezyk, i poznanie, PWN* , Warsaw, 1960.
2. M. Lechniak, “Logika epistemiczna Jerzego Losia a teoria racjonalnego
zachowania”, Roczniki Filozoficzne, vol. 36(1), 1988, pp. 77–89.
3. M. Lechniak, “Wielowartościowość a pojecia, epistemiczne”, Roczniki
Filozoficzne, vol. 54(2), 2006, pp. 375–390.
4. J. Loś, “Logiki wielowartościowe a formalizacja funkcji intensjonalnych”,
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, vol. 17(1–2), 1948, pp. 59–78.
5. J. Loś, “Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonów Milla”, Annates
Universitatis Mariae Curie-Shlodowska, Section F, vol. 2(5), 1948,
pp. 269–301.
6. N. Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1968.
7. N. Rescher & A. Urquhart, Temporal Logic, Springer, 1971.
8. M. Tkaczyk, “Logika temporalna”, in Metodologiczne i teoretyczne prob-
lemy kognitywistyki, edited by J. Woleński & A. Dabrowski,
, Copernicus
Center Press, Cracow, 2014.
9. M. Tkaczyk, Futura Contingentia, Wydawnictwo KUL , Lublin, 2015.
10. M. Tkaczyk & T. Jarmużek, Normalne logiki pozycyjne, Wydawnictwo
KUL, Lublin, 2015.
11. K. Twardowski, “O tak zwanych prawdach wzglednych”, , in Wybrane
pisma filozoficzne, PWN, Warsaw, 1956.
Abstraction principles via Leśniewskian definitions:

potential infinity and arithmetic
Rafal Urbaniak
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science,
Ghent University, Belgium
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism,
University of Gdansk, Poland
[email protected]
This paper starts with an explanation of how the logicist research pro-
gram can be approached within the framework of Leśniewski’s systems. One
nice feature of the system is that Hume’s Principle is derivable in it from
an explicit definition of natural numbers. I generalize this result to show
that all predicative abstraction principles corresponding to second-level rela-
tions, which are provably equivalence relations, are provable. However, the
*

KUL Publisher. KUL is a shorthand for John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.
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system fails, despite being much neater than the construction of Principia
Mathematica (PM). One of the key reasons is that, just as in the case of the
system of PM, without the assumption that infinitely many objects exist,
(renderings of) most of the standard axioms of Peano Arithmetic are not
derivable in the system. I prove that introducing modal quantifiers meant
to capture the intuitions behind potential infinity results in the (renderings
of) axioms of Peano Arithmetic (PA) being valid in all relational models
(i.e. Kripke-style models, to be defined later on) of the extended language.
The second, historical part of the paper contains a user-friendly description
of Leśniewski’s own arithmetic and a brief investigation into its properties.
Jerzy Slupecki and the Consequence Operation

Jan Woleński
Rzeszów, Poland
[email protected]
Consider a denumerably infinite language L. Every mapping f ∶ 2L → 2L

can be considered as a consequence operation. The set of such mappings
has the power ℵ1 . General conditions (idempotency, monotonicity, etc.)
introduced in Tarski’s axiomatization of Cn radically reduce the number
of consequences. If we add special axioms determining a logic, we obtain
a singular mapping f . Tarski’s axiomatization of Cn was governed by the
idea that Cn is associated with inference preserving truth.
Slupecki, following Lukasiewicz’s rejection function, introduced the op-
eration Cn−1 (the rejection logical consequence). The main heuristic idea
consists in considering Cn−1 as related to the process of rejection of a propo-
sition on the base of other propositions. Hence, Cn−1 preserves falsity as
the distinguished value. Cn−1 has the same general properties as Cn with
exception of the fact that Cn−1 ∅ = ∅, although Cn ∅ ≠ ∅ (more precisely,
Cn ∅ = LOGIC). On the other hand, Cn−1 , supplemented by special axioms,
generates concrete rules of rejection, for instance, if A ∨ B is rejected, then
A is rejected.
Yet is possible to introduce (it was done by Ryszard Wójcicki) other
rejection consequence operation, namely dCn (the dual consequence oper-
ation), which has all general properties of Cn, including dCn ∅ ≠ ∅ (more
precisely, dCn ∅ = dLOGIC), and generates the specific rules of rejection, the
same as in the cases of Cn−1 .
291
The rejection consequences suggest some formal as well as philosophical

issues. For instance, we can ask whether there are mixed consequence oper-
ations, that A is asserted relatively to the set of sentences X, if A ∈ Cn X,
assuming that all elements of X are asserted, and rejected, if A ∈ Cn−1 Y
(dCn Y ), provided that Y ⊆ X and sentences in Y are rejected. Perhaps this
could reduce non-monotonic logic to monotonic one. Other formal problem
consists in defining rejection consequences for non-classical logic. In general,
the category CONSEQUENCES might do have some relevance for the idea of
universal logic. Philosophically speaking, the issue “Why Cn and assertion
look as the most natural accounts of inferences?” seems interesting from
the epistemological point of view.
The Rasiowa-Pawlak School: From Algebra of Logic

to Algebra of Data (and Back)
Marcin Wolski
Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin, Poland
[email protected]
The Rasiowa-Pawlak School (formed during the 70s and 80s of the 20th
century in Warsaw) may be considered as the contemporary branch of
the Lvov-Warsaw School (established by Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov
in 1895), which extends this old methodological tradition on Polish modern
computer science.
The most important step towards the Rasiowa-Pawlak school was made
in the middle 1980s. In this time Helena Rasiowa started her work in cooper-
ation with Victor Marek and Andrzej Skowron on logics related to rough set
theory — the mathematical method of data analysis founded by Zdzislaw
Pawlak. In the same time, Cecylia Rauszer (the student of Helena Ra-
siowa) cooperated with Zdzislaw Pawlak, Victor Marek, Andrzej Skowron,
and Andrzej Jankowski. Intensive investigations conducted by this group
led to important research results and to merging two conceptual frameworks
and scientific circles created around Helena Rasiowa and Zdzislaw Pawlak
into a school: the Rasiowa-Pawlak school.
In the talk I would like to return to the theoretical results of Cecylia
Rauszer obtained in the 1970s about semi-boolean algebras [1,2], and discuss
them against the background of rough set theory and formal concept analy-
sis. Although formal concept analysis can be traced back to almost the same
time as rough set theory (in the 1980s Zdzislaw Pawlak even met Rudolf
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Wille, the founder of formal concept analysis), due to different semantics

staying behind the data in these two theories, it seemed that no significant
relationships might exist. However, using algebraic methods popularised
by Helena Rasiowa, one can merge both theories by means of the results
obtained by Cecylia Rauszer in her Ph.D. thesis and the articles published
in the 1970s [1,2]. One can even extend these result upon modern exten-
sions of rough set theory as, e.g., dominance based rough sets. It shows,
indeed, how fruitful were, or better still have been, logical investigations (in
the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw School), and how they — even today — are
important for the leading theories of data analysis and knowledge discovery.
References
1. C. Rauszer, “Representation theorem for semi-Boolean algebras I”,
Bulletin de l’Académie Polonaise des Scienses, vol. 19(10), 1971,
pp. 881–887.
2. C. Rauszer, “Semi-Boolean algebras and their applications to intuition-
istic logic with dual operations”, Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 83,
1974, pp. 81–87.
The Lvov-Warsaw School and Indian Logic

Piedad Yuste
Departament of Philosophy,
National Distance Education University, Spain
[email protected]
In his seminal work [1], J.M. Bocheński warned that some currents of
thought that support opposing ontologies could nevertheless embrace simi-
lar logical postulates. And he gave as an example the doctrines developed by
the Nyāya and Buddhist schools, both originally from ancient India. This
being so, we nonetheless find certain aspects of Buddhist ontology that gen-
erate important differences in the field of logic; we refer to the absence of
paradoxes and antinomies, alluded to by the Megaric sages and that the
Nyāya philosophers also knew how to detect. The purpose of this paper is
to analyze why these paradoxes did not appear in the Buddhist ontology
and if the Alfred Tarski hypotheses carried out in [2] can explain this sin-
gularity in some way.
References
1. J.M. Bocheński, “Logic and Ontology”, Philosophy East and West,
vol. 24(3), 1974, pp. 21–55.
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2. A. Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages”, in Logic,

Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938, 2nd edition,
Hackett Publishing Company, 1983.
How to reply today to the issues raised by Kazimierz

Twardowski in his Images and Concepts (1898)?
Urszula M. Żegleń
Department of Cognitive Science and Epistemology,
Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland
[email protected]
Images and Concepts, written by Kazimierz Twardowski, was originally

published in Polish as a small book in Lviv in 1898. It is a significant work
for epistemology and psychology, both for the methodological studies and
for the research on concepts and imagining processes. At the methodological
level, Twardowski sees the need for making an agreement between episte-
mology and psychology in such a way that the requirements of epistemology
become consistent with the results of psychological research. According to
these requirements (in opposition to some classical theories), he develops his
own approach to inquiry into cognitive processes. The aim of his research
presented in Images and Concepts is the search for the general theory of
concepts which would include all particular theories of different kinds of
concepts. The result of his research is the theory according to which the na-
ture of concepts lies in imagining judgments. This means that concepts have
their foundations in images which in some cases can be very complicated.
This thesis sounds up-to-date for cognitive linguists and psychologists, al-
though it was put forward within quite a different conceptual framework.
Nevertheless, the aim of my paper is to seek some connections between
Twardowski’s approach and those of contemporary cognitive scientists.
Following Wundt, Twardowski maintains that image (or better to say
‘imagery’) is a synthesis of impressions (the relation between imageries and
impressions is that of a whole to its parts). But asking the question “how do
impressions synthesize to create imagery?” he maintains that “psychology
has not yet and probably never will answer this question”. I intend to
discuss the issues raised by Twardowski in the light of current controversies.
This will be done by appealing to Stephen Kosslyn’s research on the origin
of imageries, on the one hand, and to the theory of double coding on the
other. In appealing to the current debates, I try to show Twardowski’s
approach in a new light which can also enrich the philosophical background
of cognitive science.
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Reflections on Paraconsistency
Franca D’Agostini
Department of Political and Social Sciences,
University of Milan, Italy
[email protected]
Elena Ficara
[email protected]
Paraconsistent logics form a lively sector of the discipline we call Philo-

sophical Logic. The idea that contradictions are — in some cases or in some
way — acceptable without “explosion” of our rational systems has been de-
veloped by paraconsistent logicians also with reference to epistemological
and metaphysical implications, and there is a wide literature on the theme.
However, the arising of contradictions, and the need of coming to terms with
them, has also ethical, political and more generally practical implications
that sometimes fade into the background.
Not only that, one of the main problems of the philosophy of inconsis-
tency (but this is true also of other fields) is that there are philosophically
oriented works with a weak or no technical part and vice versa: some tech-
nical paraconsistent works do not take into consideration the philosophical
aspects and implications of logical choices.
One aim of our workshop is thus to promote interaction between tech-
nical and non-technical works in the field. A second but not secondary aim
is to enlarge the view, involving people interested in contradictions, but not
exclusively as militant logicians.
We thus encourage contributions able to suggest and treat preliminary
questions, sometimes underrated or not extensively studied by logicians,
such as:
1. In metaphysical and truth-theoretic perspective:
— Are there contradictory truthmakers? If there are, are they to be
intended as two overlapping facts, or only one fact?
— If the acceptance of contradictions is ruled by truth (as dialetheists
hold), can we really renounce the classical exclusive notion of ‘T’, in
virtue of which if ‘p’ is true then ‘not p’ must be false?
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2. In epistemological perspective:
— Do we really believe the unbelievable?
— What kinds of epistemic gluts are rationally acceptable?
3. In ethical and generally practical perspective:
— Disagreements and dilemmas are typical contexts in which the occur-
ring of contradictions has political and practical consequences: can
the theories of paraconsistent logicians be used to deal with these
occurrences?
4. In meta-theoretical perspective:
— Why do we study contradictions?
— What can we learn from the history of paraconsistency?
— Is ‘philosophy’ as such the enterprise that aims at solving or inter-
preting contradictions, as many authors in the tradition held (see
Hegel or Wittgenstein)?
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

(page 120), Graham Priest (page 158), Marı́a del Rosario Martı́nez-Ordaz
(page 139) and Roy Sorensen (page 160).
Call for papers

We invite contributions on all aspects of paraconsistency and contradic-
tion. Topics include:
paraconsistent systems: respective costs and benefits
gaps, gluts, and other truth values
what’s so bad about trivialism?
contradictory truthmakers
the unbelievable: its role and believability
contradictions, discussive conflicts and dilemmas
paradoxes in logic and elsewhere
what can the historical treatments of contradictions (in Aristotle, Pas-
cal, Hegel, Bergson, etc.) still teach us?
was Hegel paraconsistentist?
what was really Aristotle’s attitude toward contradictions?
old and new theories about the square of oppositions
the philosophical relevance of dialetheism and of other paraconsistent
views
the political relevance of the philosophy of contradiction
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(De)motivating Gluts
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart
Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil
[email protected]
Ederson Safra Melo
Federal University of Maranhão, Brazil
[email protected]
Semantic paradoxes, like the Liar Paradox, are one of the best-known
motivations for the dialetheists’ claim that there are true contradictions
(dialetheias). Liar-like arguments arise in natural language and dialetheists
argue that the Liar sentence is true and false, i.e., a glut. In order to advo-
cate this approach to the paradoxes, some dialetheists, like Graham Priest,
advance a dilemma: a semantic theory of English is either inconsistent
(glutty) or else incomplete (with respect to its expressive power). Usually,
dialetheists choose expressive completeness and urge that glut theory is the
only approach able to achieve this ideal without triviality. However, recently
in [1] JC Beall argued that, by parallel reasoning, one should also be led
from expressive completeness to triviality by validity paradoxes (Curry-style
paradoxes involving not a conditional, but the notion of validity). The re-
sulting dilemma produced by Beall is: a semantic theory of English is either
trivial or else incomplete. So, according to Beall, the demand for complete
expressive power leads directly to triviality. Validity paradoxes are not dealt
with by the adoption of gluts, but rather by other means typically associate
with approaches to Curry-style paradoxes, which are not paradoxes directly
involving negation and contradiction. In face of these difficulties, Beall have
suggested, that “the glutty treatment arises from aesthetic considerations:
such target liars simply look like gluts” [1, p. 583]. We shall argue that
not even that may be available. Priest in [2] answers Beall’s challenge with
one typical move against Curry paradoxes: we avoid triviality by avoiding
one of the rules involved in the derivation of triviality, which is the rule of
absorption. Now, while that move may help one to block Beall’s argument
from expressive power to triviality, it also seems to pose troubles for the
motivation for gluts: some approaches to the semantic paradoxes also bar
the derivation of the liar with such restrictions on absorption. As a result, in
order to avoid triviality, one may end up having also no gluts. In this talk,
we present this dilemma for dialetheists and discuss the resulting trouble
for dialetheism and for the adoption of gluts.
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References
1. J.C. Beall, “Trivializing sentences and the promise of semantic com-
pleteness”, Analysis, vol. 75(4), pp. 573–584, 2015.
2. G. Priest, “Old wine in (somewhat leaky) new bottles. Some com-
ments on Beall”, The Australasian Journal of Logic, vol. 13(5), 2016,
doi:10.26686/ajl.v13i5.3934.
The Role of Paraconsistency in Scientific Change

Hakob Barseghyan
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science
and Technology, University of Toronto, Canada
[email protected]
According to the zeroth law of scientific change [1], at any particular

moment, the elements of a given mosaic of theories accepted by a specific
epistemic community are compatible with each other. Importantly, the law
distinguishes the concept of compatibility from the logical concept of con-
sistency. Two propositions are said to be compatible if they can be part of
the same mosaic; they may or may not be mutually consistent in the logical
sense. Thus, by the zeroth law, it is possible for two theories to contradict
each other and yet be simultaneously accepted by the same community. The
compatibility or incompatibility of a given pair of theories within a certain
community’s mosaic is determined by the criteria of compatibility employed
by that specific community at that specific time. Naturally, the criteria of
compatibility employed by different epistemic communities may or may not
be the same: while some communities might be tolerant towards inconsis-
tencies in their mosaics, other communities may impose stricter criteria of
compatibility and ban open inconsistencies. Additionally, it is important to
appreciate that the criteria of compatibility can change through time: the
same epistemic community that was once intolerant towards inconsistencies
may at some point alter their compatibility criteria and become tolerant to-
wards inconsistencies. This suggests that a paraconsistent logic can, at least
at times, play an important role in the process of scientific change. Multiple
historical instances of inconsistency-tolerance in different epistemic commu-
nities are the best evidence for this: the history of science knows many
epistemic communities that have knowingly accepted contradictions [2].
The goal of this paper is to explain why some epistemic communities
are inconsistency-tolerant while others are inconsistency-intolerant. On the
one hand, by the zeroth law, a community’s attitude towards contradic-
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tions depends on its criteria of compatibility. On the other hand, by the

third law of scientific change [3], a community’s criteria are deductive con-
sequences of their accepted theories. Therefore, it follows that a commu-
nity’s attitude towards contradictions ultimately depends on the specific
theories accepted by that community. I show why fallibilist communities
are normally inconsistency-tolerant, while infallibilist communities are nor-
mally inconsistency-intolerant. The phenomenon of inconsistency-tolerance
is illustrated by means of several examples from the history of the empirical
sciences, including the attitude of Newtonian physicists of the 18th and 19th
centuries towards anomalous observations, and the attitude of our contem-
porary physics community towards general relativity and quantum physics.
The phenomenon of inconsistency-intolerance is illustrated by several ex-
amples from the history of mathematics.
By clarifying the internal mechanism that shapes different communal
attitudes towards contradictions, this paper suggests two important ques-
tions for future logico-historical research. First, what were the compatibility
criteria employed by different epistemic communities throughout history?
Second, which specific paraconsistent logics can be said to have been at
play in inconsistency-tolerant communities at different times?
References
1. H. Barseghyan, The Laws of Scientific Change, Springer, New York,
2015.
2. M.R. Martı́nez-Ordaz, “Holism, Inconsistency Toleration and Inconsis-
tencies between Theory and Observation”, Humana.Mente Journal of
Philosophical Studies, vol. 32, 2017, pp. 117–147.
3. Z. Sebastien, “The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of
Scientific Change”, Scientonomy, vol. 1, 2017, pp. 1–9.
A paraconsistent approach to da Costa’s deontic logic:

beyond contradictions and triviality
Gregory Carneiro
Department of Philosophy, University of Brası́lia, Brazil
[email protected]
Chisholm’s paradox, Ross’s paradox and Sartre’s dilemma are good ex-
amples of problems that are still “alive and kicking” [1] inside most of deon-
tic logic systems. Despite many good proposals that claimed to have solved
one or another of those problems, the fact is that most of them seemed just
299
too shy to save the deontic logic from that high dose of pessimism towards
any use in philosophical debate. How can the logician of normative concepts
get around this is the real challenge.
Considering Newton da Costa’s example in [2], it was interesting to see
that, despite the logic presented being very strong, the attempt to represent
incomplete actions, like a failed murder, led immediately to a contradiction.
In our proposal, a very simple procedure of switching the classical basis
for a paraconsistent one showed to be a successful tool to fix the inconsis-
tency. Important to note, however, that providing a paraconsistent view of
da Costa’s deontic system not only represented a way to get rid of trivial-
ity, but almost a mandatory adaptation to extend the language towards a
more intuitive and reliable representation of any moral philosophy or legal
code. It is shown that non-classical reasoning should be the starting point
of any discussion about deontic logic, not just a backup plan when things
don’t work in the classical field. This particular approach, once accepted,
should lead the deontic logic community to change completely the analysis
of paradoxes, dilemmas and gluts inside deontic logic.
References
1. J. Hansen, “The Paradoxes of Deontic Logic: Alive and Kicking”,
Theoria, vol. 72(3), 2006, pp. 221–232.
2. N.C.A. da Costa, “New Systems of Predicate Deontic Logic”, The Jour-
nal of Non-Classical Logic, vol. 5(2), 1988, pp. 75–80, https://www.cle.
unicamp.br/eprints/index.php/jancl/article/view/1088/902.
On the Possibility of Dialetheic Metaphysics

Ebubekİr Muhammed Denİz
İstanbul 29 Mayıs University, İstanbul, Turkey
[email protected]
Paraconsistent logics that have arisen during the 20th century claim that
the law of contradiction is not applicable to certain circumstances. The most
radical paraconsistent logic is the dialetheic logic, which argues that some
contradictions arising within the limits of thought are true and even real.
Dialetheic logic — as Graham Priest and Richard Routley developed —
proves to be academically efficient by its metaphysical implications within
both at the level of logic and at the level of metaphysics. Priest, claims
that some contradictions which are realized in the states of change, motion
and time are real. These real contradictions are the subject of metaphysical
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investigation.
This paper aims to examine the possibility of doing metaphysics based
on dialetheic logic. Firstly, after sharing Priest’s view on metaphysics of
change, motion and time, I will demonstrate that dialetheic logic embodies
some important potentials — especially on metaphysics of time, but it does
not yet realize these potentials. In the final part, I will argue that the shift
from dialethic logic to metaphysics is not sufficiently prepared by Priest and
dialetheic metaphysics requires a transcendental point of view.
Paradoxes, Hypodoxes, Hypodox-paradox duality

and Hypodoxical Paradoxes
Peter Eldridge-Smith
School of Humanities, Australian National University,
IMIA* Centre for Strategic Business Studies, Australia
[email protected]
Paradoxes are a kind of conundrum with more than one good answer [7],
but I distinguish among such conundrums: paradoxes, hypodoxes and hy-
podoxical paradoxes. Paradoxes, like the Liar, are overdetermined, whereas
hypodoxes, like the Truth-teller, are underdetermined [2,4]. Being under-
determined explains the Truth-teller phenomenon, which Mackie [6] char-
acterised as consistent but undecidable. Notice that being consistent but
undecidable does not explain being underdetermined. The concept of hy-
podox is a more general concept than Mackie’s conception of a Truth-teller
counterpart, as I will demonstrate in this paper. While not all paradoxes
have hypodoxes, hypodoxes are almost as common. There are hypodoxes of
naı̈ve truth, set theory, and time travel to give but a few examples. Only a
few types of the ungrounded and ill-founded paradoxes do not have closely
associated hypodoxes. With respect to the converse relation, I conjecture
that all hypodoxes can be paired with paradoxes by a kind of duality, and
demonstrate this for ungrounded or ill-founded hypodoxes [2,3]. Surpris-
ingly, the concepts of paradox and hypodox are not exclusive; I analyse
antinomies such as Bertrand’s chord paradox and the Ship of Theseus as
hypodoxical paradoxes. This explains why it is natural to think of these as
paradoxical dilemmas, as Clark [1] does. Hypodoxes are proto-paradoxes
in that adding certain principles to a hypodox will generate a paradox [4].
Moreover, many hypodoxes, such as the Truth-teller and the set of all self-
membered sets do not use the principles characteristic of their related para-
*
International Marketing Institute of Australia
301
doxes, in particular the T-schema and Set Abstraction [4,5]. Finally, I argue
that an intermediate resolution of the Liar paradox may reduce it from an
apparent dialetheia to a kind of hypodox, a kind that is still distinct from
a Truth-teller.
References
1. M. Clark, Paradoxes from A to Z, 3rd edition, Routledge, 2012.
2. P. Eldridge-Smith, “Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel”, in Art
and Time, edited by J.L. Jones, P. Campbell & P. Wylie, Australian
Scholarly Publishing, 2007, pp. 172–189.
3. P. Eldridge-Smith, The Liar Paradox and its Relatives, PhD Thesis,
Australian National University, 2008.
4. P. Eldridge-Smith, “A Hypodox! A Hypodox! A Disingenuous Hypo-
dox!”, The Reasoner, vol. 6(7), 2012, pp. 118–119.
5. P. Eldridge-Smith, “Two Paradoxes of Satisfaction”, Mind, vol. 124(493),
2015, pp. 85–119.
6. J.L. Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical
Logic, Oxford University Press, 1973.
7. R. Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox: Philosophy and the Labyrinths
of the Mind, Oxford University Press, 2003.
What is a Contradiction?
Ben Martin
Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
[email protected]
Paraconsistent logics are often characterized as being contradictory tol-

erant, and dialetheism defined as the thesis that contradictions are true.
But what, exactly, are contradictions? Given the important role they play
in philosophy and logic, with many believing they form the ultimate black
against a theory, it’s surprising so little time has been spent considering
and evaluating the available definitions of ‘contradiction’ in the literature.
Indeed, with some, such as [6], suggesting that paraconsistent logics and di-
aletheism are guilty of distorting the meaning of ‘contradictories’, it is even
more important we come to a clear understanding of the concept. This talk
shows that many prominent definitions in the literature are non-equivalent,
and that this non-equivalence counts against several of the definitions’ plau-
sibility.
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There are at least four categories of definitions of ‘contradiction’ avail-

able in the literature: Semantic, which define contradictions in terms of
semantic properties, such as truth-conditions; syntactic, which define con-
tradictions in formal terms, such as formulae of a certain logical form; prag-
matic, which define contradictions in terms of types of speech-acts, such
as assertion and denial; and ontological, defining contradictions in terms
of physical properties. It is clear, however, that not all instances of these
four general categories are equivalent, and thus as equally plausible. After
all, each of the categories define contradictions in terms of different entities:
semantic in terms of propositions, syntactic in terms of formulae, pragmatic
in terms of speech-acts, and ontological in terms of states of affairs.
Nor it is simple to translate between these types of objects to identify
the definitions with one another. For example, take a semantic definition of
‘contradiction’ in terms of truth-conditions, “A proposition is said to be a
contradiction when it is logically impossible that it be true”, [2, pp. 27–28],
and the syntactic definition of contradictions as “wff (well-formed formulae)
of the form ‘A∧¬A’ ” [4, p. 244]. While Detlefsen et al.’s semantic definition
[2] proposes that contradictions are logically false propositions, the syntac-
tic definition in [4] mentions not propositions but formulae. Now, given
that formulae are not true in themselves, but only true-within-a-valuation-
within-a-logic, it doesn’t even make sense to apply the property of being
(logically) false to Haack’s contradictions. Consequently, both accounts fail
to pick out the same objects as contradictions, and given that it makes sense
at least to say that ‘Contradictions are false’, this consequence should count
against the plausibility of Haack’s definition.
Having shown that definitions across the four categories are non-equivalent,
and consequently not equally plausible, we move on to demonstrate an even
more interesting point — that prevalent definitions within one of the cate-
gories of definitions are non-equivalent. We achieve this by looking at three
semantic definitions of ‘contradiction’ dominant in the contemporary liter-
ature, which it’s not unusual to find cited together as though they were
equivalent [1]:
Truth-Conditional: Contradictions are logically false propositions.
[2, pp. 27–28]
Structured: Contradictions are conjunctions of propositions and their
respective negations. [5, p. 224]
Explosion: Contradictions are sets of propositions that imply every
proposition. [3, p. 24]
We argue that while the set of structured contradictions is a subset of
both the set of truth-conditional and explosion contradictions, the inverse
303
isn’t true, and that this divergence between the definitions demonstrations
the structured account’s superiority. Firstly, we show that there are many
explosion contradictions that are neither truth-conditional nor structured
contradictions. Particularly important are those explosive sets of propo-
sitions, such as those of the form {B, A → ¬B, A}, which the explosion
account contains as contradictions. Including these explosive sets as con-
tradictions must count against the definition’s plausibility, as they ensure
the explosion account cannot effectively distinguish between sets containing
contradictions, sets containing contradictory pairs, and sets of propositions
that entail contradictions, which are particularly important distinctions to
make when discussing theories and beliefs.
Secondly, we show that there are truth-conditional contradictions, such
as propositions of the form ¬(A → A), which though logically false in clas-
sical logic, are not structured contradictions. Again, we argue that this di-
vergence from the structured account counts against the truth-conditional
account’s plausibility, as propositions of the form ¬(A → A) fail to have two
important properties we expect of contradictions: i) While contradictions
are formed of contradictories, such propositions have no clear constituents
identifiable as contradictories; ii) We are able to derive the negation of an
assumption from a contradiction when constructing a formal reductio. How-
ever, we are not able within our formal systems to complete a reductio from
propositions of the form ¬(A → A). Thus, to admit propositions of this form
as contradictions would be to admit our formal systems fail to recognise cer-
tain contradictions as such. The talk, therefore, concludes that not only are
three prominent semantic definitions of ‘contradiction’ non-equivalent, but
that in future discussions of paraconsistency and dialetheism, it is the struc-
tured account of contradiction we should use.
References
1. R.T. Cook, A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic, Edinburgh University
Press, 2009.
2. M. Detlefsen, D.C. McCarty & J.B. Bacon (editors) (1999), Logic from
A to Z, Routledge, London, 1999.
3. H. Field, “Is the Liar Sentence Both True and False?”, in Deflationism
and Paradox, edited by Jc Beall & B. Armour-Garb, Clarendon Press,
2005, pp. 23–40.
4. S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, 1978.
5. H. Price, “Why ‘Not’ ?”, Mind, vol. 99(394), 1990, pp. 221–238.
6. H. Slater, “Paraconsistent Logics?”, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 24(4), 1995, pp. 451–454.
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How to Compose Programs in Belnapian Dynamic Logic?

Manuel A. Martins & Diana Costa
CIDMA* , Department of Mathematics,
University of Aveiro, Portugal
Consistency is not something we can guarantee all the time, but incon-
sistency, when dealt with properly, has its advantages. In our intellectual
activities, if we were to ignore some aspects we would thought of as unim-
portant, impossible, inconsistent, we would risk losing something new.
This is why paraconsistency is around and has been getting so much
attention lately. In the words of João Marcos in [7], “paraconsistentists
have very often flirted with modalities”, and the works [1,3,2,8], among
others, seem to prove him right.
Our curiosity has been sharpened when we decided to equip hybrid logic
with a paraconsistent reasoning at the level of propositions [4], thus being
able to define a measure for inconsistency that allows the comparison be-
tween two theories that support the information in a certain set. The next
step would be to incorporate the ability of dealing with inconsistent in-
formation at the level of the accessibility relation; and why not grabbing
dynamic logics and view transitions as the execution of programs [5]? Riv-
ieccio, Jung and Jansana [8] introduce a modal logic with Belnapian values
for transitions in [8]; Sedlár presents a dynamic logic with Belnapian truth
values in [9]. To us, it makes sense to join both of the ideas together.
We aim to discuss the interpretation of the composition of programs,
whose associated transitions are four-valued functions, for example the pro-
gram of choice between α and β, usually denoted by α ∪ β, or what comes
out of a sequence between α and β, for α and β Belnapian programs. If we
consider relations as functions in B4, as in [8], then the program of choice
between α and β may not correspond to the union of Rα and Rβ in B4.
We should investigate this issue also in the context of the work in [6], by
Madeira et al., where a method to generate dynamic logics is presented.
References
1. P. Besnard & P. Wong, “Modal (Logic) Paraconsistency”, in Euro-
pean Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning
with Uncertainty, ECSQARU 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 2711, Springer, 2003, pp. 540–551, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45062-
7 44.
*
Center for Research and Development in Mathematics and Applications
305
2. J.-Y. Béziau, “Paraconsistent logic from a modal viewpoint”, Journal

of Applied Logic, vol. 3(1), 2005, pp. 7–14.
3. J. Bueno-Soler, “Two semantical approaches to paraconsistent modali-
ties”, Logica Universalis, vol. 4(1), 2010, pp. 137–160.
4. D. Costa & M.A. Martins, “Paraconsistency in hybrid logic”, Journal
of Logic and Computation, vol. 27(6), 2017, pp. 1825–1852.
5. D. Harel, J. Tiuryn & D. Kozen, Dynamic Logic, MIT* Press, 2000.
6. A. Madeira, R. Neves & M.A. Martins, “An exercise on the generation of
many-valued dynamic logics”, Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods
in Programming, vol. 85(5), 2016, pp. 1011–1037, doi:10.1016/j.jlamp.
2016.03.004.
7. J. Marcos, “Modality and Paraconsistency”, The Logica Yearbook 2004,
edited by M. Bilkova & L. Behounek, 2005, pp. 213–222.
8. U. Rivieccio, A. Jung & R. Jansana, “Four-valued modal logic: Kripke
semantics and duality”, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 27(1),
2017, pp. 155–199.
9. I. Sedlár, “Propositional Dynamic Logic with Belnapian Truth Values”,
in Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 11, edited by L. Beklemishev, S. Demri
& A. Máté, College Publications, London, 2016, pp. 503–519.
Paraconsistency meets refutation: a case of maximality

Adam Trybus
Institute of Philosophy, University of Zielona Góra, Poland
[email protected]
Generally speaking, paraconsistent logics are used for the formal treat-
ment of the inconsistent theories outside the classical approach. The defin-
ing feature of all paraconsistent logics is that the so-called explosion law,
which holds true in classical logic, is rejected. Arising from the critique of
how classical formal logic deals with contradictions, paraconsistent logics
form a wide array of systems with these paraconsistent logics that retain as
many classical laws as possible being of special interest to the researchers.
The maximal paraconsistent logics, as they are known, can also be ad-
equately described in terms of what they reject from classical logic, rather
than what they retain. There are many ways, in which such maximality
can be defined. We focus on two ways of doing so: maximality of theory
and maximality of consequence and consider logics that have both maximal
theory and consequence relation. This shift in focus from what is valid to
*
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Workshops
what is not, allows one to use the methods from the so-called refutation
calculus in order to analyse such systems. Traditionally, refutation dealt
with designing anti-axiom systems with rules preserving non-validity (this
has been initiated in the context of Aristotle’s syllogistic by Lukasiewicz in
his seminal [1]).
However, we view refutation in a somehow broader way: it is not the
task of designing such systems as such but the change in approaching logical
systems that is important here. We describe a specific method used in the
past in this context to show maximality of certain (mostly) three-valued
paraconsistent logics. Here, logics are described using matrix semantics
and certain refutation-related conditions are defined that ensure maximality.
The conditions, first described in [2] mean that the problem of maximality
is reduced to finding specific substitutions. Our main contribution is to
show how this method generalises, allowing one to prove maximality of a
number of such logics in one fell swoop, thus providing a simple and unifying
account. We also present parts of the work in progress on extending this
method even further to cover classes of n-valued paraconsistent logics for
n > 3, and the results of an initial computational analysis confirming the
theoretical results in case n = 3.
Surely, maximality of paraconsistent logics has been the topic of research
from the very beginning. However, early results were related to showing
maximality of specific systems, using a variety of methods. More recently,
there were attempts at a more general approach [3], mostly limited to the
case of three-valued logics. The approach we propose has the benefit of
being arguably the simplest one and thus having a potential to be further
generalised to values greater than three (which we attempt to do). And
this, according to our knowledge, has not been accomplished yet.
References
1. J. Lukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern
Formal Logic, Oxford University Press, 1957.
2. T. Skura & R. Tuziak, “Three-valued Maximal Paraconsistent Logics”,
Logika, vol. 23, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, Wroclaw,
Poland, 2005.
3. O. Arieli, A. Avron & A. Zamansky, “Maximally Paraconsistent Three-
Valued Logics”, Twelfth International Conference on the Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Toronto, AAAI* Publica-
tions, 2010.
*
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
307
Reasoning about Complexity Needs Reflections

on Paraconsistency
Max Urchs
EBS* University of Business and Law, Wiesbaden, Germany
[email protected]
It is always possible to give complex phenomena a representation which

is consistent, simple and false, i.e. non-descriptive. Modeling the “bloom-
ing, buzzing confusion” therefore means simplification up to [but not cross-
ing!] the limits of descriptiveness. In many cases this requires pluralism of
perspectives, pragmatic coping with various levels of abstraction and with
multiple partial explanations. Next all these aspects of our knowledge need
to be integrated.
Usually, this will lead us through inconsistent stages of description. As
in physics, they may persistently resist all efforts to remove them. So we
better care for a methodology ready to cope with inconsistencies [2].
Jaśkowski’s so-called discussive logic D2 is a promising candidate [1]. It
was originally designed for controlling inconsistent arguments in law, but
the scope of application can be extended to other areas of rational discourse.
The core idea of this non-adjunctive approach is to keep the ex contra-
dictione quodlibet-principle, but avoid the ex falso quodlibet. Technically, it
can be done by blocking adjunction:
H, F H ∧ F.
Complexity is the great frontier to be explored by contemporary science.

Inconsistency-tolerant reasoning engines seem indispensable for the enter-
prise.
References
1. S. Jaśkowski, “A propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Sys-
tems” (in Polish), Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sectio A,
vol. 1(5), 1948, pp. 57–77, English version: “Propositional calculus
for contradictory deductive systems”, Studia Logica, vol. 24(1), 1969,
pp. 143–157, other English version: “A propositional Calculus for incon-
sistent deductive systems”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, 1999,
pp. 35–56.
2. M. Urchs, “Just Complexity”, in New Directions in the Philosophy of
Science, edited by M.C. Galavotti et al., Springer, 2014, pp. 203–219.
*
European Business School
308
Workshops
On the Possibility of Metaphysical Dialetheism

Katherine Valde
Department of Philosophy, Boston University, USA
[email protected]
All forms of dialetheism share a belief in “dialethas” (i.e. true contradic-
tions). Metaphysical dialetheism is the belief that there are contradictions
in the world. I will argue that metaphysical dialetheism is, rightfully under-
stood, the most (and possibly only) controversial form of dialetheism, and
further that it remains an open possibility.
I begin by explaining how dialetheism is seen as conflicting with the law
of non-contradiction (LNC) and how, despite the widespread acceptance of
LNC, there is no universally accepted form of the law. There is potential
to define contradictions semantically, syntactically, pragmatically, or meta-
physically. Depending on how we define contradiction and LNC, we will
develop correspondingly different conceptions of dialetheism. I focus on
the two most prevalent forms of dialetheism: semantic and metaphysical.
In order to be a semantic dialetheist one only needs to deny a version of
LNC based on a syntactic definition of contradiction, but they could accept
a version of LNC based on a metaphysical LNC. While few authors have
considered the possibility of metaphysical dialetheism, there are some im-
portant arguments against it to consider. Frederick Kroon argued in [1] that
in so far as we find arguments for dialetheism persuasive, we also have good
reason to reject realism. Tuomas Tahko [2] argued against the possibility of
metaphysical dialetheism by explicitly arguing for a metaphysical definition
of contradiction, and a metaphysical version of LNC. This paper will take
up both of these challenges, and defend the possibility of a metaphysical
dialetheist position.
I must mention one important caveat of this discussion. Graham Priest
rightly points out at the very beginning of his discussion of these metaphys-
ical matters that there is a certain difficulty in speaking of things as being
“consistent”. He writes “Consistency is a property of sentences (statements,
or whatever), not tables, chairs, and people.” [3] And he is certainly cor-
rect. It may be that the talk of consistency in metaphysics is a category
mistake. However, this is a difficulty faced equally by the proponent of a
metaphysical LNC or by their opponent.
References
1. F. Kroon, “Realism and Dialetheism”, in The Law of Non-Contradiction:
New Philosophical Essays, edited by G. Priest, J.C. Beall & B. Armour-
Garb, Clarendon Press, 2004, pp. 245–263.
309
2. T.E. Tahko, “The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Princi-

ple”, Australasian Journal of Logic, vol. 7, 2009, pp. 32–47.
tion, Clarendon Press, 2006.
310
Workshops
Logic, Probability and their Generalizations

Walter Carnielli
[email protected]
Juliana Bueno-Soler
School of Technology,
State University of Campinas, Limeira, Brazil
[email protected]
Logic and Probability have a long partnership, having survived together

as a legacy from Leibniz, Bernoulli, De Morgan, Boole, Bolzano, Peirce,
Keynes, Carnap, Popper and several other contemporary thinkers. Ac-
cording to this tradition, the problem of generalizing logical consequence
relations raises questions that transcend both logic and probability, as a
consequence of modern logical pluralism. This also leads to a probability
pluralism, represented by non-standard theories of probability (i.e., theories
of probability based on non-classical logics) that open new avenues and pose
novel challenges to theory and to applications.
All such tendencies and areas of investigation are naturally generalized to
possibility logics, necessity logics and other credal calculi that extend prob-
ability, considering that belief can be regarded as generalized probability
or as evidence. This workshop intends to contribute to the state-of-the-art
of such research topics, emphasizing the connections between all such topics.
The keynote speaker at this workshop is David Miller (page 143).
Call for papers

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor
be under consideration for publication elsewhere. All manuscripts will be
refereed through a peer-review process. Manuscripts should be submitted
in agreement with the UNILOG’2018 guidelines. Papers are invited in the
following (non-exclusive) topics:
Probabilistic generalizations of logic, including non-classical logics
Generalizations of probability measures (as credal calculi and others)
311
Interpretations of probability
Philosophy of probability
Probabilistic argumentation and inference, and their generalizations
Questions on foundations of probability, including conditional probabil-
ities
Is there any really autonomous proof for the non-existence

of probabilistic inductive support?
Maı́ra Bittencourt
[email protected]
In a 2013 interview for the Royal Statistical Society [2], D.V. Lindley
pointed out that, in his 2000 article [1], none of the reviewers of his pa-
per made any kind of comment about the presented axioms of subjective
probability. Lindley’s axioms of subjective probability are equivalent to the
relative probability functions for LI presented in [7] — which are equivalent
to the axiomatic system of Miller and Popper [4,5]. Lindley viewed statistics
as the study of uncertainty, combined with the rules of the probability calcu-
lus. There seems to be little disagreement, thus, between subjectivists and
others concerning the nature of the probabilistic reasoning. Bayes Theorem
is true, Popper admits, although warning that such a ’triviality’ cannot be
claimed to support inductive generalization, or predictions about the fu-
ture. Using a minimum of propositional logic and the elementary calculus
of probability, Popper [6] revisits Miller and Popper [3], a short paper in
which they proved that probabilistic support in the sense of the calculus of
probability can never be inductive support. Miller and Popper’s paper [3]
has received a wide audience, with more than hundred other papers directly
referring to it, many of them with harsh criticisms. Good part of such crit-
icisms is directed towards the logic contents of [3]. It is interesting to note,
however, that Miller and Popper dispose of a powerful autonomous axiom
system for relative probability which assumes neither the propositional cal-
culus nor Boolean algebra (albeit allows their derivation). An interesting
question would be to know whether the main argument of [3] can be made
entirely autonomous, independent of propositional calculus and Boolean al-
gebra. If so, the argument would be much stronger than it seems. If not,
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Workshops
however, the argument could be sensible to change of logic, a movement

that Pooper and Miller themselves do not dismiss. I intend to discuss this
question based on the diverse proofs available for this important result.
References
1. D.V. Lindley, “The Philosophy of Statistics”, Journal of the Royal Sta-
tistical Society. Series D (The Statistician), vol. 49(3), 2000,
pp. 293–337, doi:10.1111/1467-9884.00238.
2. D.V. Lindley, interview by Tony O’Hagan, in Bayes 250 Conference * ,
Royal Statistical Society, 2013, https://youtu.be/cgclGi8yEu4.
3. D.W. Miller & K.R. Popper, “A proof of the impossibility of inductive
probability”, Nature, vol. 302, 1983, pp. 687–688, doi:10.1038/302687a0.
4. D.W. Miller & K.R. Popper, “Deductive Dependence”, in Actes IV
Congrès Català de Lógica, Universitat Politécnica de Catalunya & Uni-
versitat de Barcelona, 1986, pp. 21–29.
5. D.W. Miller & K.R. Popper, “Deductive Dependence”, digitally re-
mastered version from [4] and later versions of 1989 and 2011, done by
D.W. Miller, Klagenfurt University Library, 2015.
6. K.R. Popper, “The Non-existence of Probabilistic Inductive Support”,
in Foundations of Logic and Linguistics, edited by G. Dorn
& P. Weingartner, Springer, 1985, pp. 303–318.
7. P. Roeper & H. Leblanc, Probability Theory and Probability Logic, Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, 1999.
A generalization of Popper’s probability theory

Juliana Bueno-Soler
School of Technology,
State University of Campinas, Limeira, Brazil
[email protected]
Part of Popper’s philosophical program is intended to find a common

general theory capable of generalizing both notions of logic and probability
theory. Such a program involves a study of the logic of probability judg-
ments as well as the logical relations among probability judgments. We
refer to it as Popper’s Probability Theory. According to Miller in [2] Pop-
per aims at introducing an alternative interpretation of physical probability,
*
2013 marks the 250th anniversary of the publication in December 1763 of “An Essay
towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances” in the Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society of London, based on notes by Thomas Bayes and edited by Richard
Price who submitted the Essay posthumously.
313
the propensity interpretation, and to elicit its significance both for quan-
tum theory and for a new metaphysics of nature. In [3] the autonomous
probability functions play a central role in the development of the Popper’s
theory, since they are independent of semantic notions. There are two ways
to define autonomous probability functions: in absolute (given by unary
functions) and in relative (given by binary functions) sense.
In this approach the connection between logic and probability is guar-
anteed by the result that shows that absolute probability theory is a gener-
alization (in some sense) of two-valued propositional logic.
In this paper we intend to extend Popper’s Probability Theory by en-
larging the scope of the theory so as to include a class of paraconsistent
logics based upon the Logics of Formal Inconsistency introduced in [1]. Our
strategy is to generalize the autonomous probability functions (in absolute
and relative sense) to a class of paraconsistent autonomous probability func-
tions and show some technical results which ensure that these functions are
indeed autonomous and satisfy the paraconsistent requirements.
References
1. W.A. Carnielli, M.E. Coniglio & J. Marcos, “Logics of Formal Inconsis-
tency”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by D. Gabbay and
F. Guenthner, 2nd edition, Springer, 2007.
2. D.W. Miller, “Popper’s contributions to the theory of probability and
its interpretation”, in The Cambridge Companion to Popper, edited
by J.F.G. Shearmur & G. Stokes, Cambridge University Press, 2016,
pp. 230–268.
3. K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson & Co., Lon-
don, 1959.
Paraconsistent autonomous probabilities

Walter Carnielli
[email protected]
Since one of his earlier papers [3], Popper championed an autonomous
characterization of probability functions, independent of any semantic no-
tion. I call such characterizations semantically autonomous, while a more
radical characterization, independent of any syntactic property of conse-
quence relations of a logic would be said to be syntactically autonomous.
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Workshops
In [1] a semantically (but not syntactically) autonomous characterization of

paraconsistent probability is investigated, based upon Ci, a paraconsistent
logic member of the family of Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs).
Absolute and relative probabilities are presented by Popper as an ab-
stract calculus, independent of any kind of semantics. Popper and Miller
[4, p. 19] have at their side formidable mathematical tools, such as semi-
lattices, distributive lattices and Boolean algebras, which provides them a
completely autonomous approach to probability. Such tools, strictly con-
nected to classical logic, are not available for the non-classical logicians, or
are very incipient on what regards other logics. Devising autonomous char-
acterizations of probability functions for non-classical logics seems quite a
challenging task, therefore. I intend to offer a first step to this task, defin-
ing semantically autonomous probability functions for a famous three-valued
paraconsistent logic, which has appeared in the literature in various guises,
the maximal logic known as J3, LFI 1, MPT or LPT0 [see 2, section 4.4.7],
while discussing the obstacles for a syntactically autonomous probability
functions for such logics.
References
1. J. Bueno-Soler & W.A. Carnielli, “Paraconsistent Probabilities: Consis-
tency, Contradictions and Bayes’ Theorem”, Entropy, vol. 18(9), 2016,
http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/18/9/325/htm.
2. W.A. Carnielli & M.E. Coniglio, Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency,
Contradiction and Negation, volume 40 of Logic, Epistemology, and the
Unity of Science book series, Springer, 2016.
3. K.R. Popper, “A Note on Probability”, Mind, N.S. 47, pp. 275–279,
1938, also in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, by K.R. Popper, Basic
Books, New York, 1959, Appendix ii, pp. 318–322.
4. K.R. Popper & D.W. Miller, “Contributions to the Formal Theory
of Probability”, in Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, volume 1,
edited by P.W. Humphreys, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994,
pp. 3–23.
315
Probability Valuations*
Joachim Mueller-Theys
Independent Scholar, Heidelberg, Germany
[email protected]
It is well-known how to extend a truth-value assignment V (p) ∈ {0, 1}

to the classical valuation V ′ (φ) ∈ {0, 1} for all PL-formulae. Is there a
possibility to generalise this approach to the unit interval? Multi-valued or
probability assignments can be defined by P (p) ∈ [0, 1] indeed. However,
P ′ (φ ∧ ψ), P ′ (φ ∨ ψ) = ? There is a royal road to extend P suitably if the
∃
literals in question are independent, as discovered by Wilfried Buchholz.

Let φ be such that at(φ) ⊆ {p1 , . . . , pn }. Then there is the full disjunc-
tive normal form δ = ⋁ K such that φ δ, whereby K is some (possibly
empty) set of κ = ⋀ Λ and each Λ = {λ1 , . . . , λn } for some λk ∈ {pk , ¬pk }.
P ′ can now be calculated as follows:
P ′ (¬pk ) ∶= 1 − P (pk ),
P ′ (κ) ∶= ∏λ∈Λ P ′ (λ),
P ′ (φ) ∶= P ′ (δ) ∶= ∑κ∈K P ′ (κ).
An example is logical probability: Plog (p) ∶= 1
2,
′
whence Plog (¬p) = 1
2,
(κ) = 21n , Plog (δ) = 2n , which equals Wittgenstein-Wajsberg probability.
′ ′ ∣K∣
Plog
We remark that e.g. P ′ (φ ∧ ψ) ≠ min{P ′ (φ), P ′ (ψ)}. This questions
basic definitions of “many-valued logic”.
Continuous truth-functions can be defined in analogy, whence corre-
sponding analog switching can be derived.
Usually, π ≥ 0 is called a probability function if φ implies π(φ) = 1
and φ ψ implies π(φ ∨ ψ) = π(φ) + π(ψ), whence the properties used for
the definition of P ′ can be derived — except for the literal axiom:
π(⋀ Λ) = ∏λ∈Λ π(λ) for all Λ.
Consequently, for all literal-independent probability functions, there ex-
ists P such that π = P ′ , as can be shown for P (p) ∶= π(p) via the build-up
of δφ for any φ. Conversely, demonstrably all P ′ are probability functions,
fulfilling the literal axiom.
How far do the P ′ reach? Is their (tentative) name suitable? Is the
literal axiom true in general? We had to recognise π(p1 ∧ p2 ) ≠ π(p1 ) ⋅ π(p2 )
for p1 ∶= head, p2 ∶= tail. However, this contains the additional information
π(p1 ∧ p2 ) = 0, which logic itself cannot not provide — unless axiomatically.
*
Acknowledgments to Walter Carnielli, Juliana Bueno-Soler, Luis Estrada-González,
Tamar Lando, Hanti Lin, Schafag Kerimova, Arthur Buchsbaum, Andreas Haltenhoff.
316
Workshops
On the universality of the probability concepts

Vladimir Reznikov
Institute of Philosophy and Law,
[email protected]
It is known that R. von Mises’ frequency interpretation was strongly
criticized. In a well-reasoned study, M. Lambalgen has demonstrated that
the critical analysis was not related to formal shortcomings, but to the
rejection of the foundations of the frequency interpretation, since its critics
for example E. Borel and P. Levy, were subjectivists. Less known is the
criticism of A. Kolmogorov’s requirements for probabilities in the context of
their application [1]. For example, Borel and Levy criticized Kolmogorov’s
requirement that the probability of event and its frequency characteristics
should be close, since, in their opinion, it is redundant, because it is the
conclusion of Bernoulli’s theorem.
We show that Kolmogorov’s condition is correct in frequency interpre-
tation. Firstly we introduce a metrological concept, which is an informal
finite version of von Mises’ frequency interpretation [2]. On the basis of
the empirical interpretation of Bernoulli’s theorem, we have shown that
Kolmogorov’s informal requirement is not described by the conclusion of
the theorem. This condition determines the geometric proximity of the
probability and frequencies. In turn, it is a consequence of the stability
of frequencies; this stability is a primary, ontological characteristic of the
world to which Bernoulli theorem is applicable.
It is shown that criticism by the subjectivists of Kolmogorov’s condition
on the basis of Bernoulli’s theorem falls short of goal. Is a fruitful synthetic
concept possible based on different interpretations? We consider critical
arguments by N. Cartwright [3] against the universal character of G. Shafer’s
approach.
References
1. G. Shafer & V. Vovk, “The Sources of Kolmogorov’s Grundbegriffe”,
Statistical Science, vol. 21(1), 2006, pp. 70–98.
2. Yu.I. Alimov, An Alternative to the Method of Mathematical Statistics
(in Russian), Znanie Moskva, Moscow, Russia, 1980, English version in
Studies in the History of Statistics and Probability. Collected Transla-
tions, vol. 2: On Applied Mathematical Statistics, edited by V.N. Tu-
tubalin & Yu.I. Alimov, compiled and translated by O. Sheynin, 2011,
pp. 122–133, http://www.sheynin.de/download/vlad.pdf.
3. N. Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Sci-
ence, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
317
Paraconsistency, evidence and probability

Abı́lio Rodrigues
Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil
[email protected]
Walter Carnielli
[email protected]
An epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic in terms of non-

conclusive evidence was proposed in [1]. The basic idea is that a logic that is
both paraconsistent and paracomplete can represent argumentative contexts
where not only truth but also (non-conclusive) evidence is at stake. Evi-
dence may be incomplete and contradictory: in the former case there is no
evidence at all for A, nor for ¬A; in the latter, there is conflicting evidence,
i.e. evidence for both A and ¬A. Two formal systems have been proposed in
[1], the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and the Logic of Evidence and Truth
(LETJ ). BLE is a paracomplete and paraconsistent logic designed to express
inferences that preserve evidence, instead of truth. Neither excluded middle
nor explosion hold in BLE. LETJ is an extension of BLE that has been con-
ceived to deal simultaneously with evidence and truth. LETJ is equipped
with a recovery operator that recovers classical logic, thus preservation of
truth, for propositions for which there is conclusive evidence available. Ad-
equate valuation semantics and decision procedures have been presented for
both BLE and LETJ . In these semantics, the attribution of the semantic
value 1 and 0 to a proposition A that does not behave classically means,
respectively, that there is and there is not evidence for A. Thus, only the
existence and absence of evidence for a given proposition can be expressed.
However, the idea of formalizing preservation of evidence would be rather
improved if the degree of evidence enjoyed by a given proposition could
be quantified. In this talk we analyze the prospect of providing a proba-
bilistic semantics that could be able to quantify the evidence enjoyed by a
proposition in BLE and LETJ .
Reference
1. W.A. Carnielli & A. Rodrigues, “An epistemic approach to paracon-
sistency: a logic of evidence and truth”, Synthese, 2017, doi:10.1007/
s11229-017-1621-7, also available in https://goo.gl/jU1XmE.
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Workshops
Logical Modalities in Statistical Models

Julio Michael Stern & Luı́s Gustavo Esteves
Rafael Izbicki & Rafael Bassi Stern

Federal University of São Carlos, Brazil
Hexagon of Opposition for Statistical Modalities
In previous work the authors have explored logical conditions for con-
sistent and coherent statistical test of hypothesis, using these conditions to
derive the GFBST — Generalized Full Bayesian Significance Test. [1,3,6]
explore in detail the mathematical statistics and logical properties of the
GFBST. The GFBST generalizes the previously defined non-agnostic ver-
sion of the test, see [2,4,5]. However, these articles do not provide specific
methodologies and concrete examples on how to construct an extended non-
sharp version of a sharp hypothesis, a necessary step to apply the GFBST
theory in some real statistical modelling situations.
319
In this paper we explore a method for constructing non-sharp versions

of sharp hypotheses, using two simple statistical models as concrete exam-
ples, namely, the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium hypothesis and the constant
coefficient of variation hypothesis, as presented in [5]. Such extensions are
constructed using techniques of perturbation analysis, based on engineer-
ing, instrumentation, observational and another implementation informa-
tion about the pertinent statistical trial or experimental setting [see 7].
References
1. R. Blanché, Structures Intellectuelles. Essai sur l’Organisation Systé-
matique des Concepts, J. Vrin, Paris, 1966.
2. W. Borges & J.M. Stern, “The Rules of Logic Composition for the
Bayesian Epistemic e-values”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * ,
vol. 15(5–6), 2007, pp. 401–420.
3. L.G. Esteves, R. Izbicki, J.M. Stern & R.B. Stern, The Logical Con-
sistency of Simultaneous Agnostic Hypothesis Tests, Entropy Journal,
vol. 18(7), 2016, doi:10.3390/e18070256.
4. R. Izbicki & L.G. Esteves, “Logical Consistency in Simultaneous Sta-
tistical Test Procedures”, Logic Journal of IGPL, vol. 23(5), 2015,
pp. 732–758.
5. C.A.B. Pereira & J.M. Stern, “Evidence and Credibility: Full Bayesian
Signicance Test for Precise Hypotheses”, Entropy Journal, vol. 1(4),
1999, pp. 99–110, doi:10.3390/e1040099.
6. J.M. Stern, R. Izbicki, L.G. Esteves & R.B. Stern (2017), “Logically-
Consistent Hypothesis Testing and the Hexagon of Oppositions”, Logic
Journal of IGPL, vol. 25(5), 2017, pp. 741–757.
7. J.M. Stern, “Paraconsistent Sensitivity Analysis for Bayesian Signifi-
cance Tests”, in Brazilian Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, SBIA
2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series, vol. 3171, 2004,
pp. 134–143.
*
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Logic for Dynamic Real-World Information

Erik Thomsen
CTO* at Blender Logic, Cambridge, USA
[email protected]
In constructing symbolic logic, Frege, Peano and Russell always had

their eye on its application to mathematics alone, and they never
gave any thought to the representation of real states of affairs.
— Wittgenstein’s conversation with Waismann, 1929
Over the past fifty years, the fabric of our society has been radically
transformed by successful logic-based applications. In today’s world, logic
chips (i.e., CPUs) and the logic-grounded software that controls them sup-
port nearly all socio-economic infrastructure, from banking to defense.
Semantic Information Systems (SIS) are software that process infor-
mation based on some formal (i.e., logical) understanding of the meaning
of that information. SIS typically provide interpretation, representation
and/or reasoning capabilities. They include:
1. Data-knowledge bases (or languages) that represent and support query-
ing and calculations over an internal canonical form. For example: Ora-
cle (2016), Teradata (2016), DB2 (2016), CYC (2016), OWL (2016) and
RDF (2014).
2. Natural Language Processing (NLP) that converts text into an internal
canonical form that expresses facts, rules and definitions. For example:
OpenNLP (2016), Stanford parser (2016) and Berkley parser (2016).
Overwhelmingly, SIS are grounded in some (possibly restricted variant
of) First Order Logic (FOL). For example, Relational (or, more properly,
SQL) databases, which are still the predominant form of data management
for organizations around the world, are varyingly faithful implementations
of Codd’s Relational Model [3,13,11], which itself was explicitly grounded
in FOL. NLP also uses FOL as its predominant target representation [5,10].
In this sense, logic provides the abstract material technology from which
SIS are engineered. SIS where the semantics are pre-defined and the do-
main knowledge is static within any particular transaction (e.g., banking
and e-commerce applications), form the information backbone of our global
economy. They are incredibly reliable. FOL has proven to be an extremely
successful abstract material technology for these sorts of software applica-
tions.
*
321
However, for other SIS where the semantics are hard to predefine, or
where domain knowledge may need to change within a transaction, what we
call “Dynamic Real-World Information Domains”, FOL-based SIS’s exhibit
real world problems. Sometimes the problem is that the software generates
incorrect inferences based on the information entered into the system. This
happens, for example, when the assertions made represent only some of the
domain that needs to be reasoned over and bivalency, tout court, is insuf-
ficient [14]. Sometimes the problem is that the software cannot compose
a formal representation to interpret what a normal adult can speak or un-
derstand [18]. Sometimes the problem is that the software assumes certain
attributes of the objects it is representing, and performs analysis based on
those assumptions even though there was information ingested about the
objects that a human would have understood as signaling that background
assumptions about the domain were false [1].
The goal of this workshop is to explore:
Where and how real-world SIS problems (e.g., those that occur in the
analytical information systems of large corporations and governments)
can be traced to specific characteristics of the logic (e.g., FOL) upon
which they are constructed.
Modifications to FOL (e.g., the alternative views espoused by Wittgen-
stein in the Tractatus or by Peirce) that would enable the construction
of SIS that can operate more successfully in dynamic information do-
mains.
The keynote speaker at this workshop is David McGoveran (page 142).
References, Links and Suggested Readings
1. S. Al-Fedaghi, “Context-aware software systems: Toward a diagram-
matic modeling foundation”, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Infor-
mation Technology, vol. 95(4), 2017, pp. 936–947.
2. J. Barwise & J. Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic, Seven Bridges
Press, New York, 1999.
3. E.F. Codd, “A relational model of data for large shared data banks”,
Communications of the ACM * , vol. 13(6), 1970, pp. 377–387.
4. E.F. Codd, The Relational Model for Database Management: Version
2, Addison-Wesley, 1990.
5. M. Collins, Head-driven Statistical Models for Natural Language Pars-
ing, PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1999.
6. W. Croft, Syntactic Categories and Grammatical Relations: The Cog-
nitive Organization of Information, The University of Chicago Press,
1991.
*
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Workshops
7. C.J. Date, An Introduction to Database Systems, 8th edition, Pearson,

2003.
8. C.J. Date & H. Darwen, Foundation for Future Database Systems: The
Third Manifesto, 2nd edition, Addison-Wesley, 2000.
9. P. Domingos, S. Kok, H. Poon, M. Richardson & P. Singla, “Unifying
logical and statistical AI”, in AAAI’06 * Proceedings of the 21st National
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1, 2006, pp. 2–7.
10. T. Kwiatkowski, E. Choi, Y. Artzi & L. Zettlemoyer, “Scaling semantic
parsers with on-the-fly ontology matching”, Proceedings of 2013 Con-
ference on EMNLP , Association for Computational Linguistics, 2013,
pp. 1545–1556.
11. L. Libkin, “Incomplete data: what went wrong, and how to fix it”, in
PODS’14 Proceedings of the 33rd ACM § SIGMOD ¶ -SIGACT
-SIGART ** Symposium on Principles of Database Systems, Associa-
tion for Computing Machinery, 2014, pp. 1–13.
12. J. Lukasiewicz, “Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of propo-
sitional logic” (1930), in Selected Works by Jan Lukasiewicz, edited by
L. Borkowski, translated by O. Wojtasiewicz, North-Holland, 1970.
13. W. Mallede, F. Marir & V. Vassiles, “Algorithms for mapping RDB
schema to RDF for facilitating access to deep web”, Proceedings of WEB
2013: The First International Conference on Building and Exploring
Web Based Environments, Seville, Spain, 2013, pp. 32–41.
14. D. McGoveran, “Nothing from Nothing” (in four parts), in Relational
Database Writings 1994–1997, Addison-Wesley, 1998.
15. S. Russell & P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 2nd
edition, Pearson , 2003.
16. S. Shavel & E. Thomsen, “A Tractarian Approach to Information Mod-
eling”, in Wittgenstein Toward a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th
International Witgenstein-Symposium Centenary Celebration, Kluwer
Academic Publishing, 1992.
17. M. Steedman, The Syntactic Process, The MIT Press, 2000.
18. G.P. Zarri, “Using the Formal Representations of “Elementary Events”
to Set Up Computational Models of Full “Narratives””, in Data An-
alytics in Digital Humanities, edited by S. Hai-Jew, Springer, 2017,
pp. 39–64.
*
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing
Principles Of Database Systems
§
¶
Special Interest Group on Management Of Data

Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
**
Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence

Massachusetts Institute of Technology 323
Semantic softwares
Berkley Parser (2016)
CYC (2016)
Db2 (2016)
OpenNLP (2016)
Oracle (2016)
OWL (2016)
RDF (2014)
Semeval (2015)
Stanford Parser (2016)
Style Syntax (2012)
TAC (2015)
Teradata (2016)
Call for papers

Topics of interest to the workshop include but are not limited to:
Real world information system problems that can be traced to the logic
upon which the information system is built:
○ Missing data
○ Non-applicable data
○ Nulls
○ Inaccessible data
○ Word sense disambiguation
○ Semi-autonomous representational layers
○ Autonomous systems
○ Application contexts
○ Data-driven schema updates
○ Multi-agent planning systems with imperfect information
The justification for specific non-classical logic (features) to solve spe-

cific classes of real world information problems such as the representa-
tion of missing and meaningless data:
○ Temporal logics
○ Spatial logics
○ Relevance logics
○ Dialetheist logics
○ Mereological/Mereo-topological logics
○ Modal logics
○ Higher order logics
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Workshops
○ Sub-structural logics
○ Tractarian logics
○ Peircean logics
Principled approaches to specializing/extending logics (constraints, op-

erators) for new domains:
○ Merging specialized features into a new/enhanced multi featured logic
○ Specialized logic blades (akin to specialized RDB blades)
○ Upper ontology (e.g., BFO* ) logics
○ Cascading constraint-based processing
Principled approaches to determining the computational properties of

semantic representations:
○ Data-driven approaches
○ Definitional and reasoning-based approaches
Principled approaches to defining computational properties (e.g., atomic

operators) that can be used to support semantic information systems:
○ Well formed types/domains
○ Lambda calculus
○ Types as propositions
○ Martin-Löf (or intuitionistic) inspired type approaches
The proposed papers/talks should keep an eye on both theoretical and

real world practical aspects. Abstracts (one page) should be sent by De-
cember 1st, 2017 via email to [email protected].
Impacts of Statistical Learning Theory

for Enterprise Software
Erik Marcade
Vice President of Advanced Analytics at SAP
*
Basic Formal Ontology
325
Datalog access to real-world web services

John Samuel
CPE Lyon* , Université de Lyon, France
[email protected]
Christophe Rey
LIMOS , Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
[email protected]
Web services now play an important role in our lives. Both our per-
sonal and enterprise related data can now be found in some remote data
centers accessible only through third party application programming inter-
faces (API). This shift from self-controlled database systems to third-party
managed database systems has brought forward many research challenges,
one of which is the ability to integrate such multiple heterogeneous and au-
tonomous web service API in a transparent manner. Mediation-based data
integration approach when extended to web service API on one hand helped
to achieve a declarative approach to the problem of extracting desired in-
formation from the web services, but on the other hand led to several new
open challenges.
Data providing operations of web service API can be considered as rela-
tion with access patterns [1], i.e., a relation that takes as input one or more
values and returns associated tuple of values. Several currently available
web service documentations are only human readable. Hence, one major
goal is to reduce the human programming effort of the process of extract-
ing information from web services. Datalog program, including conjunctive
queries help to describe API operations as well as query them using query
rewriting algorithms like inverse-rules algorithm. However, there are sev-
eral practical challenges [2] especially considering the strict certain answer
semantics of such algorithms that fail to address the problem of incomplete
information as well as a large number of spurious calls that need to be made
for API operations involving more than one input arguments. These two
cases were studied by us while building DaWeS [1], a data warehouse fed
with web services.
References
1. J. Samuel & C. Rey, “DaWeS: Data Warehouse fed with Web Services”,
in Actes du XXXIIème Congrès INFORSID , 2014, pp. 329–344.
*
École Supérieure de Chimie, Physique, Életronique de Lyon

INFormatique des ORganisations et Systèmes d’Information et de Décision
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Workshops
2. J. Samuel & C. Rey, “Integration of Multiple Heterogeneous and Au-

tonomous Web Services using Mediation Approach: Open Challenges”,
Journal on Advances in Theoretical and Applied Informatics, vol. 2(2),
2016, pp. 38–46, doi:10.26729/jadi.v2i2.2097.
Singular reference, dynamic thoughts

and spatial representation
Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa
Postdoctoral Researcher,
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
PhD in Philosophy, National University of Colombia
[email protected]
Keywords: singular reference, spatial representation, dynamic thoughts,

situated cognition.
Evans attributes to Frege the intuition that it is not possible to cap-

ture the thought “this is now Ψ” without a propensity to capture the same
thought in the series “this was Ψ a few moments ago”, “this will be Ψ in a
moment”, etc. Here lies the nucleus of a situated and dynamic conception
of cognition: to capture modes of presentation of objects located space-
temporally requires the exercise of the dynamic ability to follow the trace
of the object. Evans develops the point by showing how the understanding
of sentences containing singular terms referring to objects requires locating
the object through the synthesis between travel-based representations and
map-based representations of space. The purpose of this paper is, first, to
argue in favor of the Evansian dynamic conception of singular reference.
Second, to develop an explanation that accounts on how it is possible to
articulate local travel-based representations with global map-based repre-
sentations, which provide an understanding of space and the possibility of
using referential expressions. Third, to extend the explanation on how to
identify indexical’s and demonstrative’s senses to the individuation of senses
of proper names and predicates, showing that it is possible to explain the
phenomena of semantic flexibility, semantic under-determination and con-
textual dependence by the same principles.
References
1. A. Cussins, “Subjectivity, Objectivity and Frames of References in
Evan’s Theory of Thought”, Electronic Journal for Analytic Philoso-
phy, 1999, https://mind.ucsd.edu/misc/ejap/ejap 6 5 cussins.html.
327
2. N. Eilan, R. McCarthy & B. Brewer (editors), Spatial Representation:

Problems in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press, 1999.
3. G. Evans, Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, 1982.
4. G. Evans, Collected Papers, Clarendon Press, 1996.
5. G. Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, Mind, New Series,
vol. 65(259), 1956, pp. 289–311, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251513.
6. M. Luntley, “Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds”, European Review
of Philosophy, vol. 2, 1997, pp. 77–103.
7. H. Poincaré (1905), The value of science, Dover, 1958.
8. P.F. Strawson, Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics,
Routledge, 1991.
Smart, Sentient and Connected: Trends and Directions

in Information-Driven Applications
David Stodder
Senior Director, TDWI* Research for Business Intelligence
[email protected]
The development and implementation of universal logic is essential to

the direction of software applications and services, and to addressing chal-
lenges companies face in using these systems to make informed decisions
and take smarter actions. As organizations move toward automated sys-
tems with analytics and AI embedded in them and expect to use standard
application programming interfaces to flow data and connect disparate an-
alytics components, they are likely to encounter problems that stem from a
lack of universal logic.
This talk will offer an industry perspective on directions in applications
and data architecture toward the goal of smarter, “sentient” (that is, highly
aware and responsive), and connected systems across a disparate, heteroge-
neous data platforms. It will look what is happening as software and data
management technology providers incorporate AI, machine learning, auto-
mated analytics, and more into their solutions. It will discuss industry re-
search into the challenges organizations are facing with current applications
and data management and how these trends will either help them overcome
the challenges or make their problems more difficult to solve, especially if
there is no universal logic.
*
The Data Warehousing Institute
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Workshops
Logic-Grounded Ontological Fusion of Sensor Data

and Natural Language
Erik Thomsen
CTO* at Blender Logic, Cambridge, USA
[email protected]
Keywords: ontology, ontology-driven information system (ODIS), portion

of reality (POR), fusion, sensor data, natural language understanding, the-
matic roles, reasoning, intelligence analysis, Basic Formal Ontology (BFO).
We describe an approach that is being realized in the construction of

a prototype ontology-driven information system (ODIS) that exploits what
we call Portion of Reality (POR) representations. The system takes both
sensor data and natural language text as inputs and, on this basis, composes
logically structured POR assertions that support computational reasoning.
Our goal is to represent both natural language and sensor data within a sin-
gle logic-grounded ontology-based framework that is capable of discovering
and representing new kinds of situations (e.g., new kinds of processes and
roles) based on new compositions of existing representations. To achieve
this goal, all representational elements in the ontological framework must
be embedded in a broader, logical computing language that allows for the
composition of assertions. This (logical and) ontological grounding applies
not just to objects, processes, and attributes, but also thematic roles (such
as agent, patient, instrument). We applied our prototype in an intelligence
analysis use case to test the hypothesis that a framework of this sort can
produce structured information from combined natural language and sen-
sor data inputs. We further tested our hypothesis by adding an enhanced
US Air Force ontology framework to our ODIS to: (1) process a collection
of sensor data, intel reports, and mission plans; (2) build composite POR
representations from these data; and (3) machine analyze the fused results
to infer mission threats.
*
329
A Universal (?) Framework for Representing Knowledge

about Real World Phenomena
Uwe Wolter
Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, Norway
[email protected]
Cyril Pshenichny
Geognosis Project, ITMO University* , Russia
[email protected]
The research, presented in the talk, is driven by the necessity to represent

knowledge about geological phenomena in a formal and computerizable way
(the second author is essentially volcanologist) where as well the static as the
dynamic aspects of those phenomena should be covered. Our framework has
not reached its final stage yet, but seems to be matured enough to present
it to a broader audience and to find out to what extent it may serve as a
general framework for representing knowledge about real world phenomena.
A highly common experience is that first-order predicate logic and set
theory are not adequate to formalize the meaning of sentences like the fol-
lowing, that make quite sense for experts:
Sandstones may equally well disintegrate in case of tectonic uplift,

or, on the contrary, if downsagging occurs, be fused at depth and
become crustal magmatic melt of silicic composition. Similar stuff
may originate from melting of granites if they are driven down by
tectonic downsagging. The silicic melt, even in crustal conditions,
once appeared, unlikely will immediately crystallize back.
We developed a set of rules to parse those statements. As result of

parsing a statement we obtain the context of the statement identifying the
predmet’s (subjects, things), the primeta’s (properties) and their relation-
ships. The analogue of a context in first-order predicate logic would be a
many-sorted signature Σ where sorts correspond to predmet’s and unary
predicates to primeta’s. Deviating from set theory we allow predmet’s to
be “inhabited” by different kinds of “substance”: grainy (elements, atoms),
lump, or field [1]. Water, lava and sandstone, for example, are considered
as substances of kind lump. Inhabited contexts are called environments and
are the analogue to Σ-structures in first-order logic.
*
Saint-Petersburg National Research University of Information Technologies, Mechanics
and Optics
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Workshops
The dynamic of a phenomenon is formalized by changes of environments

in perfect in analogy to Petri nets, for example, where markings are chang-
ing, and evolving algebras (abstract state machines), where algebras are
changing. To describe the allowed/observed behaviour of a phenomenon
different kinds of formalisms, like activity diagrams for example, can be
adapted. The second author developed for this purpose the Event Bush
method [2,3,4] that has been applied in various case studies in Geology
[2,5].
In the talk we will present the different parts of our framework covering
syntax and semantics as well as statics and dynamics. Especially, we intend
to discuss similarities and differences to first-order predicate logic and set
theory, respectively.
References
1. C. Pshenichny, “Qualitative and quantitative calculi in the theory of
multitudes”, in Dynamic Knowledge Representation in Scientific Do-
mains, IGI Global* , 2018, in preparation.
2. C.A. Pshenichny, S.I. Nikolenko, R. Carniel, P.A. Vaganov,
Z.V. Khrabrykh, V.P. Moukhachov, V.L. Akimova-Shterkhun & A.A.
Rezyapkin, “The event bush as a semantic-based numerical approach
to natural hazard assessment (exemplified by volcanology)”, Computers
and Geosciences, vol. 35(5), 2009, pp. 1017–1034.
3. C.A. Pshenichny & O.M. Kanzheleva, “Theoretical foundations of the
event bush method”, GSA Special Papers, vol. 482, 2011, pp. 139–164,
doi:10.1130/2011.2482(12).
4. U. Wolter, “Scenarios in event bushes — a formal proposal”, in Dynamic
Knowledge Representation in Scientific Domains, IGI Global, 2018, in
preparation.
5. P. Diviacco, C. Pshenichny, R. Carniel, Z. Khrabrykh, V. Shterkhun,
D. Mouromtsev, S. Guzmán & P. Pascolo, “Organization of a geophysi-
cal information space by using an event-bush-based collaborative tool”,
Earth Science Informatics, vol. 8(3), 2015, pp. 677–695.
*
IGI Global (formerly Idea Group Publishing) is an international academic publishing
company, specialized in research publications covering the fields of computer science and
IT management.

Geological Society of America
331
Naming Logics II
Jean-Yves Beziau
[email protected]

Swiss National Science Foundation
[email protected]
Blaise Pascal famously claimed in Les Provinciales: “Je ne dispute ja-

mais du nom pourvu qu’on m’avertisse du sens qu’on lui donne” (I never
quarrel about a name, provided I am apprised of the sense in which it is
understood). However to find the right word for the right thing is a sophis-
ticated art.
Modern logic has been qualified by various expressions: “symbolic logic”,
“formal logic”, “mathematical logic”, “metamathematics”. What does all
this mean? For example “mathematical logic” is typically an ambiguous ex-
pression since it can mean both logic treated in a mathematical way or/and
the logic of mathematics. “Symbolic logic” is also a mixture of different
things, it can make reference to the use of some formal mathematical signs,
or some true symbols, like Venn’s diagrams. “Formal logic” is an expression
put forward by Kant but ironically it has been often used to denote modern
mathematical logic by opposition to traditional logic. “Metamathematics”
was coined by Hilbert and he used it as synonymous to “Proof theory” (Be-
weistheorie) for him. Although it has been quite popular (cf. the classical
book of Kleene, “Introduction to Metamathematics”), it is not much used
today, probably because too much related with a specific approach to logic.
Concerning the names of systems of logic, there is also a lot of ambiguity.
In which sense “classical logic” is classical, “intuitionistic logic” is intuitive,
“linear logic” is linear, “relevant logic” is relevant, “free logic” is free, “in-
tensional logic” is intensional? “Modal logic” encompasses many different
systems, in which sense are they all dealing with modalities and what is
a modality? “First-order logic” and “second order logic” are expressions
which are often used. What do they mean exactly, are the involved qual-
ifiers appropriate? Do they make sense in relation to “third-order logic”?
The expression “zero-order logic” is not much used. Does it make sense to
use it to qualify propositional logic, or does it correspond to something else?
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Workshops
A careful analysis of names used in logic can provide a fresh look at

the different logical systems and/or the concepts and methodologies used
to study and develop them. It can clarify what has been done and give
some clues for new developments. This is a follow up of the workshop
Naming Logic(s) organized at the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology and
Philosophy of Science (Helsinki, August 3–8, 2015).
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Göran Sundholm (page 161).
Call for papers

We invite contributions discussing logical terminology:
in which sense symbolic logic is symbolical?
in which sense mathematical logic is mathematical?
in which sense formal logic is formal?
in which sense classical negation is classical?
in which sense intensional logic is intensional?
in which sense minimal logic is minimal?
in which sense free logic is free?
in which sense relevant logic is relevant?
are there many truth values for truth?
can we put truth in a table?
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by December 1st, 2017 via email
In which sense symbolic logic is symbolic?

Jean-Yves Beziau
Department of Philosophy, University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro
[email protected]
Modern logic was at some point canonized through the expression “sym-
bolic logic”, originally due to John Venn, but later on promoted by the
Association for Symbolic Logic in a different way. This expression has been
used in a ambiguous way and the result quite misleading, in particular
through the promotion of a line of excessive formalism, and the use of con-
voluted notations, despite Paul Hamos’s warning: “The best notation is no
notation”.
It is important to recall that the expression “symbolic logic” was in-
spired by the British School of symbolic algebra. And the related field was
developed in the same spirit, even going further in abstraction: a sign having
any interpretation. Tarski pushed this to the limit with Model Theory.
333
In this talk I will discuss these issues, on the basis of a semiotical anayl-
sis and a critical study of notations in logic from Boole to Tarski, via Frege
and Peirce.
References
1. C.J. Ducasse & H.B. Curry, “Early History of the Association for Sym-
bolic Logic”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 27(3), 1962,
pp. 255–258.
2. J.-Y. Beziau (editor), The arbitrariness of the sign in question, College
Publication, London, 2018.
3. P. Halmos, “How to write mathematics”, L’enseignement mathématique,
vol. 16(2), 1970, pp. 123–152.
4. J. Venn, Symbolic Logic, MacMillan, London, 1881.
5. A. Tarski, “Contributions to the theory of models. I, II, III”, Indiga-
tiones Mathematicae, vol. 16, 1954, pp. 572–581, pp. 582–588, vol. 17,
1955, pp. 56–64.
In which sense informal logic is informal?

Vedat Kamer
İstanbul University, İstanbul, Turkey
[email protected]
In spite of the fact that Informal Logic, as a discipline, has been founded
in 1978, its roots go back to the Ancient Philosophy. The primal aim of this
paper is to try to identify the place of informal logic in the history of logic
while taking the concept of reasoning into consideration. Our second aim
is to discuss the relation between informal logic and formal logic through
the concepts of form and deductivism. Based especially on their names,
a relation of opposition is established between formal and informal logic.
We, however, aimed to show the aforementioned relation can be established
through unity rather than opposition, intending the concept of reasoning to
be the common denominator of that relation.
References
1. M.E. Barth & E.C. Krabbe, From Axiom to Dialogue: A Philosophical
Study of Logics and Argumentation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982.
2. J.A. Blair, “The ’Logic’ of Informal Logic”, in Groundwork in The The-
ory of Argumentation: Selected Papers of J. Anthony Blair, Springer,
2012.
3. A. Dumitriu, History of Logic, 3 volumes, Abacus Press, Kent, UK,
1977.
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Workshops
Is logic a theory of symbolization?

Arnaud Plagnol
LPN* , IHPST , University of Paris VIII, France
[email protected]
Symbolization in logic can have several meanings:

1. development of a formal language, as a system of entities allowing to
convey some contents in a faithful, coherent and complete way;
2. use of signs that completely determine the referred entities, allowing for
a wholly analyzed construction of the intended objects/structures (like
in mathematics);
3. uses of signs to express inferences abstracting from any specified entities
to which the signs refer;
4. use of signs that can be substituted by any other signs of the same
classes in a proposition.
These different meanings hinge on two crucial ideas:
representation: an entity R (“representation”) can present an entity
(“content”) which, in the non-trivial case, is different from R;
abstraction: an entity can be used abstracting from some of its features.
However, there are some logical puzzles that need to be solved in order
to achieve a better understanding of the role of symbols in modern logic:
what type of representation is a symbol? In particular, what is the logi-
cal root of the well-known duality between iconic (analogical/depicting)
representations and symbolic (digital) representations ?
how an entity can present another entity than itself?
what is the representational function of a symbol?
what is the logical status of an operation of abstraction that seems to
be not represented itself in a logical proposition?
how the scope of an operation of abstraction can be warranted?
In this contribution, we outline a theory of representation to solve these
puzzles. More specifically, we shall propose a definition of symbolic com-
ponents of representation and show that the basic function of a symbolic
system is to access to an universe that extend the immediate presence by
acquaintance [1]. The operation of abstraction will also be defined within
this framework and we will show that the use of variables can be inter-
preted as the representation of abstraction [2]. In this framework, functions
*
Laboratoire de Psychopathologie et Neuropsychologie

Institute for History and Philosophy of Sciences and Technology
335
of the traditional propositional connectives can be described as mechanisms

of extension of presence; in particular, the symbol of implication can be un-
derstood as representing representation. Finally, logical inferences will be
interpreted as some abstract laws of representation. Logic itself will appear
as the abstract theory of representation, including theory of symbolization
but not limited to it.
References
1. A. Plagnol, “Logic and theory of representation”, in Logic in question
— 7, edited by J.-Y. Beziau & A. Moktefi, Springer, to be published.
2. A. Plagnol, La Fondation analogique des représentations, Phd Thesis,
Department of Philosophy, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, 2005.
Logic, Philosophy and Philosophical Logic

Ricardo Silvestre
Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil
Academic Visitor, Faculty of Philosophy,
[email protected]
Among the many field-naming terms used in contemporary logic, some
are well established, others are more tentative; some are universal, others
are known just in restricted logical circles; some look arbitrary, others seem
to be conceptually relevant. “Philosophical Logic” is a term which seems to
belong to the second categories just mentioned. While well established in
philosophical literature, it is not quite so in computer science and mathe-
matical circles. It provocatively invokes philosophy, the birth-field of logic.
From a practical viewpoint, it covers a great deal of subfields and issues in
contemporary logic: modal logic in many of its varieties (epistemic logic,
temporal logic, deontic, logic of action, for example), many of the so-called
non-classical logics (such as paraconsistent logic, relevant logic and intu-
itionist logic) as well as issues pertaining to the philosophy of logic and
metalogic. While it is not difficult to extensively characterize philosophical
logic — one has just to take a look at the content of the many textbooks,
guides and handbooks available — it is not easy to say what philosophical
logic effectively is. First, does it mean something at all? How can a logic,
or a logical system, say, be philosophical? Given the concepts traditionally
dealt with by logic, does it not seem that all logics (or even all logical is-
sues) are in some sense philosophical? But what is this sense? Or, more
generally, in which sense is logic philosophical? My purpose in this talk is
to shed some light on these and other related questions pertaining to the
meaning and contemporary import of the term “philosophical logic”.
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Workshops
Logics and Metalogics

Mihir K. Chakraborty
Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India
[email protected]
The focus of the workshop lies in emphasizing the fact that, in the study
of logics, there always takes place an interplay between items belonging to
object level, meta-level and metameta-level. Making a clear distinction of
levels is crucial in logics, particularly in those systems where non-classical
views are incorporated in the object language by denying bi-valence and/or
denying some classical laws of reasoning. Many-valued logics, fuzzy logics,
theory of graded consequence, and similarity based reasoning are a few
to name. We shall base greatly on the prescription proposed by Alonzo
Church in his book “Introduction to Mathematical Logic”, vol. 1, Princeton
One of our attempts would be to draw attention to the fact that logic-
studies do not usually pay due attention in distinguishing levels, due to
which there do arise misconceptions, and even mistakes. Carnap’s remark
after Tarski’s lecture at Vienna Circle meeting in the year 1930 may be
recalled: “Of special interest to me was his emphasis that certain concepts
used in logical investigations, e.g. consistency of axioms, the provability
of theorems in a deductive system and the like are to be expressed not
in the language of the axioms (later called the object language), but in
metamathematical language (later called meta-language)”.
However, in recent times this issue is being raised by some researchers,
and, in some cases, though it has not been explicitly mentioned, researchers
introduced different languages for different levels of a logic discourse.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Soma Dutta (page 126) and
Rohit Parikh (page 147).
Below we mention a few references.
References
1. A. Bacon, “Non-classical Metatheory for Non-classical Logics”, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, vol. 42(2), 2013, pp. 335–355.
2. M.K. Chakraborty, “Graded consequence: further studies”, Journal of
Applied Non-Classical Logics, vol. 5(2), 1995, pp. 227–238.
3. M.K. Chakraborty & S. Basu, “Graded Consequence and Some Meta-
logical Notions Generalized”, Fundamenta Informaticae, vol. 32(3–4),
1997, pp. 299–311.
337
4. M.K. Chakraborty & S. Dutta, “Graded consequence revisited”, Fuzzy

Sets and Systems, vol. 161(14), 2010, pp. 1885–1905.
5. S. Dutta & M.K. Chakraborty, “The role of metalanguage in graded
logical approaches”, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, vol. 298, 2016,
pp. 238–250.
6. G. Malinowski, “Q-consequence operation”, Reports on Mathematical
Logic, vol. 24, 1990, pp. 49–59.
7. G. Malinowski, “Inferential Many-Valuedness”, in Philosophical Logic
in Poland, edited by J. Woleński, Kluwer, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 75–84.
8. H. Marraud, “Razonamiento Approximado y Grados De Consecuencia”,
Endoxa, vol. 10, Facultad de Filosofı́a, Universidad Nacional de Edu-
cación a Distancia, 1998, pp. 55–70.
9. D.P. Muino, “A Graded Inference Approach Based on Infinite-Valued
Lukasiewicz Semantics”, in Proceedings of The International Sympo-
sium on Multiple-Valued Logic, 2010, pp. 252–257.
10. D.P. Muino, “A Consequence Relation for Graded Inference within the
Frame of Infinite-valued Lukasiewicz Logic”, Fundamenta Informaticae,
vol. 123(1), 2013, pp. 77–95.
11. R. Parikh, “The Problem of Vague Predicates”, in Language, Logic and
Method, edited by R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky, D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1983, pp. 241–261.
12. C. Pelta, “Wide sets, deep many-valuedness and sorites arguments”,
Mathware & Soft Computing, vol. 11(1), 2004, pp. 5–11.
13. Y. She, “On the rough consistency measures of logic theories and ap-
proximate reasoning in rough logic”, International Journal of Approxi-
mate Reasoning, vol. 55(1), part 4, 2014, pp. 486–499.
14. T. Vetterlein, F. Esteva & L. Godo, “Logics for Approximate Entail-
ment in ordered universes of discourse”, International Journal of Ap-
proximate Reasoning, vol. 71, 2016, pp. 50–63.
Call for papers

Relevant topics include (but are not restricted to):
the importance and essentiality of making level-distinction in logic
focusing current researches maintaining this distinction
scrutinizing logics that ignore this distinction
the ongoing debate on this issue
discussion. A one-page abstract should be sent via email before December
1st, 2017 to [email protected].
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Workshops
Society semantics and meta-levels of many-valued logic

Walter Carnielli
[email protected]
Collective intelligence is now a buzzword, with several examples and

tendencies in many areas. I will briefly survey some relevant aspects of col-
lective intelligence in several formats, such as social software, crowdfunding
and convergence, and show that a formal version of this paradigm can also
be posed to logic systems, by employing the notion of logic societies and
their correlate. group semantics. The paradigm of logical societies has
lead to a new notion of distributed semantics, the society semantics, with
theoretical advances in defining new forms of n-valued semantics in terms
of k-valued semantics, for k < n. I summarise the main advances of soci-
ety semantics, commenting on their general case, the possible-translations
semantics pointing to some conceptual points and to some problems and
directions still to be explored.
Dialetheic Validity
Graham Priest
Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA
[email protected]
I assume for the purposes of this talk that a dialetheic solution to para-
doxes of self-reference, such as the liar paradox and Russell’s paradox, is
correct. In particular, given a language, one should reject the move of el-
evating its metatheoretic notions to a distinct “metalanguage”. This does
not mean that one should eschew reasoning about such notions. It means
that one should reason about such notions in the language to which those
notions apply. And given that the logic of such a language must be a para-
consistent one, this means that we must reason about metatheoretic notions
paraconsistently.
A prime metatheoretic notion is truth (simpliciter). Much thought has
been put into paraconsistent theories for languages which contain their own
truth predicate. How to produce inconsistent but non-trivial theories which
contain the T-Schema for sentences of the language of the theory is well
known.
339
Another paradigm metatheoretic notion is the model-theoretic notion of

validity. The question of what a paraconsistent theory for a language which
contains its own validity predicate is like has received much less attention.
The issue runs immediately into difficult questions. The notion of model-
theoretic validity (unlike the notion of truth), has to be defined within a
set theory. So we face the question of an appropriate paraconsistent theory
of sets. Once this has been determined, we can then address a number of
important questions concerning validity. Is it itself dialetheic? That is, are
some inferences valid and invalid? If so, how widely does this dialetheism
spread? Are all valid inferences also invalid? And what is the philosophical
import of such inconsistency?
In this talk, I will discuss these issues. Whilst I do not expect to provide
definitive answers, I do hope to advance the discussion of such matters.
Formalizing Ontological Disputes of the Systems

in Metaphysics by Augmenting First Order Quantificational
Logic: A Meta-logical Inquiry
Jolly Thomas
Centre for Exact Humanities,
International Institute of Information Technology,
Hyderabad, India
[email protected]
The objective of this research is to formalize the ontological dispute of

the systems in metaphysics. Such formalization is developed by specifying
a suitable augmentation of First-Order-Quantificational-Logic (FOQL) by
combining it (FOQL) with a criterion of ontological commitment from meta-
ontology. Characterization of ontological dispute of the systems in meta-
physics happens at meta-level. Hence, the enquiry is meta-logical. This
meta-logical enquiry uses techniques from both FOQL and meta-ontology.
From meta-ontology Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment (QCOC)
is used: to be is to be the value of bound variable. QCOC is considered since
this criterion takes into account both existential quantifier and the variables
bound by the existential quantifier of the FOQL. In order to accommodate
the concerns that run across the ontologically disagreeing systems, FOQL
is augmented. Method of developing augmented FOQL is dependent on
the technique of the creation of the paradox within a metaphysical system.
Creation of the paradox within a metaphysical system is used to gener-
ate system specific quantifier which are called as Functionally Isomorphic
340
Workshops
Quantifier (FIQ). FIQ will be used to formalize the ontological dispute of

the systems in metaphysics. Method of developing augmented FOQL is
dependent on the technique of the creation of the paradox within a meta-
physical system. Creation of the paradox within a system in metaphysics is
proposed as a technique which is accomplished by introducing independent-
dependent variable distinction in the meta-logic. Following are the questions
with regard to the independent variable (IV) and dependent variable (DV)
in relation to metaphysical systems.
What is the IV and what is DV in a metaphysical system?
Why certain varieties are regarded as IV and some other varieties are
regarded as DV?
How the introduction of IV-DV distinction would be useful in formalizing
the ontological disputes?
341
Sociology and Anthropology of Logic:

Past and Present
Claude Rosental
CEMS* , IMM , CNRS , EHESS§ ,
PSL¶ Research University, France
[email protected]
LEM , CNRS, PSL Research University, France
[email protected]
The workshop “Sociology and Anthropology of Logic: Past and Present”

intends to explore the various ways in which logic can be approached from a
sociological or anthropological point of view. We will look into how various
actors and peoples concretely define and practice logic. Logic will not be
apprehended according to a fixed definition of what it is or what it should
be in order to assess their various definitions and practices. Instead, we will
analyze their possible plurality.
We will focus on both past and present definitions and practices of logic.
Historical investigations are welcome. In particular, we will discuss how
philosophy and history of logic might benefit from various methodological
approaches developed by historians and sociologists of mathematics and
science over the past 40 years.
The organizers have contributed to this endeavor in various ways. In par-
ticular, Claude Rosental has been studying contemporary logical demonstra-
tions from a sociological point of point. As for Julie Brumberg-Chaumont,
she launched a program called “Homo Logicus, Logic at the Edges of Hu-
manity: Anthropological, Philosophical and Historical Approaches” with
Antonella Romano at EHESS** in Paris in 2016, and another program called
“Social History of Logic in the Middle Ages” with John Marenbon (Trinity
College, Cambridge) in 2017.
*
Centre d’Étude des Mouvements Sociaux

Institut Marcel Mauss
§
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
¶

**
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Workshops
The anthropological dimension of logic may be observed, for example,

in the debates that Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of “pre-logical mentality” of indige-
nous peoples has generated for more than a century. Anthropologists and
other actors have often referred to logical skills to define the boundaries of
humanity. Depending on their more or less open definitions of logic, they
have included a limited or a large number of humans within these bound-
aries. Testing codified logical skills — Aristotelian and traditional logic in
the past, thinking skill assessment (TSA) today — has been used since the
Middle Ages as a way to select individuals in higher education institutions
and/or as a means for excluding “logically disabled” groups in relationship
to their so-called “social or racial inferiority”. A sociological approach to the
history of logic implies that logic is not only a set of theories and doctrines,
but also a tool for action that individuals use in different institutional, po-
litical, and social settings.
Several authors have contributed to approaching logic this way. For in-
stance, David Bloor’s work inspired Irving Anellis and Ivo Grattan-Guiness’
criticisms of the notion of “Fregean revolution”. The “social history of logic”
program developed by Volker Peckaus and Christian Thiel in the 1980s also
illustrates this trend.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Scott L. Pratt (page 156)
and Christopher Goodey (page 131).
Call for papers

Papers are expected to cover one of the following topics:
Logic and the Boundaries of Humanity
Social Studies of Logic
Anthropological History of Logic
Selecting Humans Based on their Logical Skills
Ethnology and Ethnomathematics
History of Logic and History of Anthropology
343
Pathologies of rationalities and embodied logic:

Malebranche’s conception of Madness as a case study
Delphine Antoine-Mahut
École Normale Supérieure, Lyon, France
[email protected]
Studies in Early Modern Philosophy take now for granted that the Age
of Reason is also the Age of Passions. But the full consequences of that idea
are not yet explored for Logic seen as the highest manifestation of Human
Rationality.
This link between Reason and Passions is particulary striking in philoso-
phies considering the overthrow of values since the original sin. I aim at
analyzing conceptions of Logic within this kind of rationalism and its con-
sequences to understand Boundaries of Humanity. For that purpose, Nicolas
Malebranche is a relevant Case Study.
My main finding is a typology of three Pathologies of Rationality:
(i) The fool who is immediately and truly identified as such by every
fallen man. This one pronounces incoherent discourses; or discourses
obviously contradictory or inadequate to reality;
(ii) The fool who is falsely regarded as the highest expression of rationality
by every fallen man. The Stoic Sage, for instance, coherently considers
himself and is considered by others, as a God within Men. But this
true expression of Monstrousness truly lies on the passions of Glory
and Self Esteem;
(iii) The fool who is falsely regarded as fool by every fallen man. Yet this
rare Man truly tries to reach the highest Rationality by seing in God’s
Rationality itself.
In Conclusion, the logical criteria of Coherence in Early Modern Phi-
losophy can’t be understood without Anthropological criteria (i.e. a theory
of passions) and concrete Reality (i.e. the logical coherence could be mere
imagination).
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Workshops
Later Wittgenstein: Logic, Necessity and Social Practice

Sorin Bangu
Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway
[email protected]
The aim of the paper is to sketch a novel philosophical position, at the

crossroads of the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of social science. It
builds on an overlooked Wittgensteinean insight, namely the idea to regard
logic as a special social practice, constitutive to the human form of life. The
central goal is to develop a social conception of logic, within a naturalist-
anthropological framework. A convincing argument in its favor marks a
significant progress in understanding what we actually do when we reason.
This is so because it enables us to advance a new approach to the three
perennial puzzles about logic, for which there is no agreed-upon solution:
what does it mean to say, for instance, that the proposition ‘the apple is
green’ if it can be green or red, but it’s not red — is (i) necessary, (ii) certain
and (iii) universally applicable (ie., it holds not only for apples)?
The aim is to show that this conception is not only credible in and of
itself, but also more plausible when compared to its rivals, the two most in-
fluential traditional views according to which logic either is about ethereal
conceptual relations holding in a Platonic heaven, or consists in a conven-
tional manipulation of otherwise meaningless signs.
The articulation of this Wittgensteinean conception of logic as a special
social practice lays the groundwork for further developments: articulating
models of naturalized social practice appropriate for approaching problems
in other areas of philosophy, such as the philosophy of social science, aes-
thetics, and ethics.
The key idea is to argue that it is social aspects that ground the formal-
symbolic characteristics of logic. In other words, it is not the case that
we first engage in various human activities, and then subsequently discover
that some necessary logical truths (which we cannot doubt) apply to them
from the outside, as it were, or externally. Rather, logic is intrinsic, already
incorporated, silently, within all fundamental human activities; it is how we
speak, in most human contexts, that already constitute, at the fundamental
level, what later on receives the label ‘logic’. To stress, this social aspect is
not a consequence of the specialness of logic, but what constitutes it. In a
word, we are logical beings — and this is what summarizes the naturalist-
anthropological orientation mentioned above. (I here adapt a recent phrase
by Hacking [1], who speaks about the “mathematical animal”.) It is later
Wittgenstein’s original ideas about logic that constitutes the starting point
345
of this paper. One promising way to begin explicating the central features of
this naturalized social conception of logic is by drawing a contrast between
his position and two of the most appealing, traditional views of this dis-
cipline mentioned above, Platonism and Formalism. Neither is naturalist,
and neither has any place for the social element, but both are still dom-
inant today. The key thought is threefold. Logic is (i) a special type of
social practice, which (ii) is inextricably embedded into the human form of
life, and thus is natural, immanent, not an historical accident. It is (iii)
a way of regulating social interaction, as opposed to a solitary manipula-
tion of abstractions taking place in the heads of individuals. Moreover, if
Wittgenstein is right, and the symbols have meaning only in use, then the
conception of mathematics as a mere formalism, a conventional manipula-
tion of signs on paper, is extremely problematic too. What accounts for the
necessity, certainty and generality of logical propositions is a key — social
component, encapsulated within the idea that social interaction is not pos-
sible among those who doubt (the universal applicability of) logical truths.
Necessity is social, and derived from the commonness of our natural, prim-
itive reactions. Certainty is public, not private. The generality of logic is
intrinsic, not conventional.
References
1. I. Hacking, Why is There Philosophy of Mathematics at All, Cambridge
2. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, edited by G.E.M.
Anscombe & R. Rhees, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1953.
3. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, edited
by G. von Wright, R. Rhees & GEM Anscombe, translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 1956.
4. L. Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cam-
bridge, 1939, edited by C. Diamond, University of Chicago Press, 1976.
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Workshops
Anthropology and Sociology of Logic as a Norm

in the Middle Ages
LEM* , CNRS , PSL Research University, France
[email protected]
The second half of the 13th century witnessed two phenomena I would
like to bring together: the definition of a strong anthropological ideal, the
“philosopher” as the sole “complete human being”, where logic is seen as
an anthropological norm according to which a “logical scale” of humanity
is defined and a (large) group of “logically disable people” is discriminated,
and the rise of logic as a social norm for the scholarly worlds, within the
newly-born universities as well as outside of them. Logic became then, for
the first time, part of the basic European education system for young peo-
ple, together with grammar. The social history of the practices and theories
of concept of logic as a “discipline”, in every senses of the term, means that
a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ program for the sociology of philosophical knowledge
can be fruitfully combined, and the debates between internalist and exter-
nalist approaches to the history of philosophy can be happily overcome. The
method followed could be termed a non-normative historical study of the
normativity of logic as embedded in practices and theories.
The Grammar of Conflict

Kevin M. Cahill
University of Bergen, Norway
[email protected]
In three recent papers [2,4,5], Cora Diamond has criticized Peter Winch’s
1964 paper [10], in which Winch attacked E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s classic
book [8] for European ethnocentrism. Diamond, in turn, attack’s Winch’s
arguments for, in effect, trying to (use the later Wittgenstein to [11]) lay
down what she calls “supergrammatical” laws for what can and can’t be
done with language, in particular with reference to criticisms of social sys-
tems of thought and practice in which one is not a participant. Diamond
argues that this kind of argument is not necessarily to be found in the later
Wittgenstein’s work [11] and, moreover, that it is wrong. While I basically
*

347
agree with Diamond’s criticisms [2,4,5], both of Winch’s own philosophical

positions [9,10] as well as his way of reading Wittgenstein, in what follows I
will briefly discuss three implications of her discussions which I suspect may
not sit altogether comfortably with her overall views on objectivity. The first
is that, while her argument that the mere idea of criticizing from “outside”
is logically in order, there nevertheless remains something pragmatically
fishy about the result of the argument. My next reservation concerns the
fact that according to Diamond’s own reasoning, what is internal to our
grammar is not that a particular view on a particular question is actually
correct. Rather, the grammar contains the bare formal concept of getting
things right. Individual claimants in a dispute might gain some solace from
this feature of our grammar, but it won’t warrant much else in the way of
choosing specifics. Finally, the fact that the feature of our grammar that
makes criticism from outside possible for us is not a mere given, but rather,
as Diamond herself points out, has an historical dimension to it, would sug-
gest that there is no super-grammatical argument showing that this feature
of our grammar is immune to change. And this in turn raises the normative
question as to whether this feature is worthy of continued support. The
very fact of its existence in our grammar now can’t by itself be used in any
non-circular way to justify our continued reliance on it.
References
1. J. Conant, “The search for logically alien thought: Descartes, Kant,
Frege, and the Tractatus”, Philosophical Topics, vol. 20(1), 1992,
pp. 115–180.
2. C. Diamond, “Criticising from “Outside””, Philosophical Investigations,
vol. 36(2), 2013, pp. 114–132.
3. C. Diamond, “How Old Are These Bones? Wittgenstein, Putnam and
Verification”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volumes, vol. 73, 1999, pp. 99–150.
4. C. Diamond, “Putnam and Wittgensteinian Baby-Throwing: Varia-
tions on a Theme”, in The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam, edited by
R.E. Auxier, D.R. Anderson & L.E. Hahn, Open Court Publishing Com-
pany, LaSalle, Illinois, USA, 2015, pp. 603–639.
5. C. Diamond, “The Skies of Dante and Our Skies: A Response to Ilham
Dilman”, Philosophical Investigations, vol. 35(3–4), 2012, pp. 187–204,
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9205.2012.01478.x.
6. C. Diamond, “Truth: Defenders, Debunkers, Despisers”, in Commit-
ment in Reflection: Essays in Literature and Moral Philosophy, edited
by L. Toker, Garland, New York, 1994, pp. 195–222.
7. I. Dilman, Wittgenstein’s Copernican Revolution: The Question of Lin-
guistic Idealism, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2002.
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Workshops
8. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande,

9. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy,
Routledge, London, 1958.
10. P. Winch, “Understanding a Primitive Society”, American Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. 1(4), 1964, pp. 307–324.
11. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F.
Pears & B.F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974.
Hegel on the Naturalness of Logic

Elena Ficara
[email protected]
In several passages of his works, Hegel claims that logic is natural and
that the forms of thought are the natural element in which human beings
live, act and interact. My paper has two parts. In the first I present Hegel’s
view on the naturalness of logic. I explore his use of the concept of “logic”,
focusing on the meaning of the expression das Logische, coined by Hegel
himself, and on Hegel’s distinction between das Logische, natürliche Logik
and die Logik. In the second I show that Hegel’s views on logic’s naturalness
could profitably join current debates about the sociology and anthropology
of logic.
References
1. G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe, new
edition on basis of the works of 1832–1845, edited by E. Moldenhauer
& K.M. Michel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany, 1969ff * .
2. G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, English translation by A. Miller,
Humanity Books, New York, USA, 1969.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, Part I of Encyclopaedia of
Philosophical Sciences with Additions, English translation by
T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting & H.S. Harris, Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, Indianapolis, USA, 1991.
4. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik (Heidelberg,
1817), edited by K. Gloy, Meiner, Hamburg, Germany, 1992.
*
“ff”, in this context, is a shorthand for “and following years”.
349
Pathology of logical thought: Paranoia as a case study

Samuel Lézé
École Normale Supérieure, Lyon, France
[email protected]
Logic of psychopathologies is widely studied today from an epistemo-

logical and phenomenological perspective in philosophy of psychiatry. How
reason could treat apparent unreason? But, only one case of pathology is
considered as very problematic with this issue [1]: paranoia as a pathology of
logic. How reason could treat apparent reason? Indeed, this rare pathology
is a paradoxical “case of a systematic chronic delusion, logically sustained”
which challenge the clinical demarcation between the normal and the patho-
logical, neurosis and psychosis [2], but also between the logic and the logical
(systematization, autonomy, coherence of interpretation, evidence based).
So, how can we establish that the logical reasoning (delusional system with-
out weird delusion or hallucinations, mood disorder, maladjustment) is not
consistent with the logic? And what about the logic: a pathological obses-
sion of systematization? More difficult is the moral issue linking respon-
sibility and logical reasoning for forensic evaluation of paranoid persons in
case of premeditated murder: how can we establish exemption from criminal
responsibility?
References
1. A. Lewis, “Paranoia and paranoid: a historical perspective”, Psychologi-
cal Medicine, vol. 1(1), 1970, pp. 2–12, doi:10.1017/S0033291700039969.
2. A. Fried & J. Agassi, Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis, Springer, 1976.
Analyzing the Logic of the Unconscious. Notes on the Work

of Ignacio Matte Blanco and its Ramifications
Andreas Mayer
CNRS* , PSL Research University, CAK , EHESS§ , Paris, France
[email protected]
This contribution aims to discuss the work of the Chilean psychoana-
lyst Ignacio Matte Blanco. In his work “The Unconscious as Infinite Sets”
he proposed an ambitious theoretical reformulation of Freud’s metapsychol-
ogy in order to base an explanation for the operations of the unconscious
*

Centre Alexandre Koyré
§
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and non-logical aspects of experience on mathematical logic (the principle

of symmetry and the principle of generalization). Whereas his work has
had important ramifications in clinical work, especially in Italy and Great
Britain, the consequences for an articulation of his theory with human and
social sciences have received less attention. After an exposition of Matte
Blanco’s theory in its context, we will discuss its uses, to be found notably
in the work of the literary theorist Francesco Orlando and historian Carlo
Ginzburg.
References
1. I.M. Blanco, The Unconscious as Infinite Sets: An Essay in Bi-logic,
Karnac, London, 1980, first published in 1975.
2. C. Ginzburg, Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches’ Sabbath, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1990, first published in 1989, second Italian
edition in 2017.
3. Francesco Orlando, L’intimità e la storia: lettura del “Gattopardo”,
Einaudi, Turin, Italy, 1998.
Learning Logic in a Department of Philosophy:

An Ethnographical Account
Claude Rosental
CEMS* , IMM , CNRS , EHESS§ ,
PSL¶ Research University, France
[email protected]
I will give an ethnographical account of the way logic is taught in the
philosophy department of a major university located in the United States.
More particularly, I will analyze how logic is constituted as holding by itself,
or self-sustaining. I will show how an “artificial” and autonomous language
is created around a few isolated words, through several strategies of differ-
entiation. I will analyze in particular how a dichotomy between formal and
informal knowledge is formed, and how the categories of logical language,
ordinary language and intuition are established. I will then argue that this
process of differentiation is supported by an elaborate technology of show-
ing, and that this technology is also used to build demonstrations. Finally,
I will examine how doubt is managed, targeted and controlled in front of
demonstrations, and how radical doubt is limited by temporal constraints.
*

Institut Marcel Mauss
§
¶
351
When Science Is and Isn’t Paraconsistent

Gregory Rupik
Margherita von Brentano Center,
[email protected]
Hakob Barseghyan
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science
[email protected]
A reflection on the actual practice of science reveals a seeming paradox:

while the rules of classical logic are customarily used by scientists in their
everyday practice, at times scientists seem to be tolerant towards inconsis-
tencies in their mosaic of accepted theories. The goal of this paper is to
explain why in some cases epistemic communities are inconsistency-tolerant
and why they are inconsistency-intolerant in other cases.
To address this question, we utilize the zeroth law of scientific change cur-
rently accepted in scientonomy. The law stipulates that at any moment of
time, the theories accepted by a certain epistemic community are compatible
with each other. Importantly, the law distinguishes the concept of compat-
ibility from the concept of consistency of classical logic. Two propositions
are said to be compatible if they can be part of the same mosaic of theories;
they may or may not be mutually consistent in the logical sense. Thus, by
the zeroth law, it is possible for two theories to contradict each other and
yet be simultaneously accepted by the same community. The compatibility
or incompatibility of a given pair of theories within a certain community’s
mosaic is determined by the criteria (method) of compatibility employed by
that specific community at that specific time; the criteria of compatibility
may differ significantly across different epistemic communities and different
time periods. By the third law of scientific change a community’s crite-
ria (methods) are deductive consequences of the theories accepted by that
community. We show that a community’s attitude towards an inconsistency
between two theories ultimately depends on whether the community accepts
these theories as absolutely true descriptions of their domains, or whether
these theories are only accepted as approximately true. An epistemic com-
munity is tolerant towards an inconsistency, if the theories in question are
taken as approximations. The phenomenon of inconsistency-tolerance is
illustrated by means of several examples from the history of empirical sci-
ences, including 18–19th century attitude of Newtonian physicists towards
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Workshops
anomalous observations, and our contemporary attitude towards general

relativity and quantum physics. In contrast, an epistemic community is in-
tolerant towards an inconsistency between two theories when it takes these
theories to be absolutely true. The phenomenon of inconsistency-intolerance
is illustrated by several examples from the history of mathematics.
By clarifying the internal mechanism that shapes different communal at-
titudes towards inconsistencies, this paper suggests two important questions
for future logico-historical research. First, what were the compatibility cri-
teria employed by different epistemic communities throughout the history?
Second, which specific paraconsistent logics can be said to have been at play
in inconsistency-tolerant communities at different times?
Logic-in-Action? AlphaGo, Surprise Move 37

and Interaction Analysis
Philippe Sormani
Science and Technology Studies Lab,
University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Institut Marcel Mauss, CEMS* , EHESS , Paris, France
[email protected]
For decades, playing Go at a professional level has counted among those

things that “computers still can’t do” [cf. 3]. As it seems, this changed dra-
matically in early March 2016, at the Five-Star Four Seasons Hotel in Seoul,
South Korea, when AlphaGo, the most sophisticated computer program in
Go to date, beat Lee Sedol, an internationally top-ranked Go professional,
by four games to one. A recent documentary movie has captured the unfold-
ing drama [cf. 7]. In turn, this contribution offers a video-based interaction
analysis of the second game’s “move 37”, its surprise delivery by AlphaGo,
and the subsequent line of commentary by the attending experts. What
kind(s) of mediated expertise happened to be played out and commented
upon in situ? What type(s) of “logic-in-action” happened to be achieved
and articulated, in and as this particular situation of human-computer in-
teraction? Drawing upon the detailed video analysis of the broadcasted
episode, the contribution answers raised questions from an ethnomethod-
ological and conversation analytic perspective [e.g. 1,2,5,8]. In so doing,
the contribution offers an empirical analysis of situated logic(s) as a visual
production and interactional achievement and, by the same token, reopens
*

353
the conceptual reflection on different notions of logic [e.g. 6] and contrasting

pictures of intelligent agency, “artificial” or embodied [e.g. 4]. The outlined
contribution is part of a paper series that has charted the implications of
Go game analysis for science and technology studies [9] and its “material
semiotics” [10], on the one hand, and will do so for alternative approaches
in the form of interaction analysis and “artificial intelligence” [11], on the
other.
References
1. J. Coulter, “Logic: Ethnomethodology and the Logic of Language”,
in Ethnomethodology and the Human Sciences, edited by G. Button,
Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 20–50.
2. J. Coulter, “Chance, cause and conduct: probability theory and the ex-
planation of human action”, in Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 9:
Philosophy of Science, Logic and Mathematics in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, edited by S.G. Shanker, Routledge, 1996, pp. 266–291.
3. H. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial
Reason, revised edition, MIT* Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA,
1992.
4. H. Dreyfus & C. Taylor, Retrieving Realism, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2015.
5. N.J. Enfield & J. Sidnell, “On the concept of action in the study of
interaction”, Discourse Studies, vol. 19(5), 2017, pp. 515–535.
6. C. Greiffenhagen & W. Sharrock, “Logical Relativism: Logic, Gram-
mar, and Arithmetic in Cultural Comparison”, Configurations, vol. 14(3),
2008, pp. 275–301.
7. G. Kohs, AlphaGo, Moxie Pictures, https://www.alphagomovie.com,
2017.
8. E. Livingston, “Ethnomethodological Studies of Mediated Interaction
and Mundane Expertise”, The Sociological Review, vol. 54(3), 2006,
pp. 405–425, doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.2006.00623.x.
9. Ph. Sormani, “Fun in Go: The Timely Delivery of a Monkey Jump and
Its Lingering Relevance to Science Studies”, Human Studies, vol. 38(2),
2015, pp. 281–308.
10. Ph. Sormani, “Power in Go: Material Practice, a Perspicuous Setting,
and Its Praxeological Implications”, in Ethnomethodology and Conver-
sation Analysis, session of American Sociological Association, Annual
Meeting, Montreal, Canada, 2017.
11. Ph. Sormani, “Power in Go: Instructional Matter, Algorithmic Drama,
and Symmetry Politics”, forthcoming.
*
354
Workshops
Hintikka’s Logical Thought

Saloua Chatti
University of Tunis, Tunisia
[email protected]
Jaakko Hintikka (1929–2015) was one of the founders of modern logic

and philosophy of logic. This workshop is dedicated to the exploration not
only of his work but also its future.
The keynote speaker at this workshop is Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

(page 152).
Call for papers

We invite submissions of proposals that advance the work of Hintikka
on those areas in which he made significant contributions, including but not
limited to:
Categorical semantics (e.g. topos theory, linear logic, type theory)
Modal logic
Epistemic logic
Possible-worlds semantics
Game-theoretic semantics
Model theory
Interrogative model of inquiry
Quantifiers
History of ideas
Aristotle
Leibniz
Kant
Peirce
Wittgenstein
Cross-disciplinary approaches
Critical analytic philosophy
Future of logic
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by December 1st, 2017 via e-mail
355
World Lines Semantics and the Contingent A Priori

Matthieu Fontaine
Centre for Philosophy of Science,
University of Lisbon, Portugal
[email protected]
In their virulent criticism against Kripke [7], Hintikka and Sandu [6]
show that the necessity of identity between proper names is question-begging,
even if they are rigidly interpreted. Indeed, in the context of world lines se-
mantics, this would amount to assume that world lines never split or merge,
i.e. to assume the necessity of identity itself. By contrast, rigidity would
restore the validity of existential generalization, which is invalidated it we
do not presuppose uniqueness of reference of proper names. This thesis had
been initially advocated by Hintikka [4], and deepened in a more system-
atic study on epistemic logic by Hintikka [5]. In this presentation, I argue
that endorsing the validity of existential generalization commits to another
paradoxical Kripkean thesis, namely the thesis of the contingent a priori.
Therefore, in world lines semantics, if we reject the contingent a priori,
we must also reject the presuppositions of uniqueness of reference. After
a critical discussion of the contingent a priori, I propose a modal formula-
tion of the paradox. I conclude with further considerations in relation to
Tulenheimo’s innovative approach to world lines semantics.
One of Kripke’s [7, p. 56] well-known examples is the following: the
length referred to by “one metre” is fixed by stipulating its identity with
the length of a particular stick (S) at a determinate instant (t), namely the
standard metre rod. Since we are fixing that length by stipulation, we know
a priori (automatically) that “the standard metre rod is one metre long” is
true. Once the length of “one metre” has been fixed, “one metre” rigidly
refers to that length. The length of S might change, not the length of one
metre. Therefore, that S is one metre long at time t is a contingent fact.
Even though we know a priori that “the standard metre rod is one metre”
is true, this statement expresses a contingent truth.
According to Dummett [3, p. 124], this thesis is the sign that something
goes wrong with rigidity. By following Donnellan’s [1] distinction between
attributive and referential uses of definite description, it can be explained
that when we know the contingent fact expressed by “the standard metre
rod is one metre”, we do not know the same that when we know a priori
that “the standard metre rod is one metre”. Indeed, the attributive use
consists of introducing “one metre” as a name for the length of S at time
t, whatever this length is. By stipulation, we thus know a priori that “the
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Workshops
length of S at t = one metre” is true. However, we do not know which

this length is. By contrast, the referential use consists of making use of the
description with the intention to refer to a determinate length. But this
determinate length is an empirical fact that cannot be known a priori.
Such a distinction between attributive and referential uses can be ex-
pressed in Hintikka’s first-order epistemic logic. Attributive use can be
phrased in terms of de dicto knowledge, i.e.
K(the length of S at t = one metre),
which can express a conceptual knowledge acquired a priori. No matter

the length of S at t or the length of one metre, we know they are identical,
merely by stipulation. The knowledge of a determinate length intended by
a referential use would assume a de re (knowing-who) construction like
(∃x) K(the length of S at t = x).
Now, if “one metre” was a rigid designator for that length, the latter
knowledge attribution would follow the former, by existential generalization.
Therefore, if a priori contingent truths are rejected, existential generaliza-
tion, and thus rigidity, must be rejected too. For the sake of comparison,
Donnellan [2, p. 18] suggests distinguishing between “knowing that a certain
sentence expresses a truth and knowing the truth of what is expressed by
the sentence”, but without emphasizing the role of existential generalization
and without rejecting rigidity.
We will conclude by discussing some new insights provided by the dis-
tinction of physical and intentional modes of predications put forward by
Tulenheimo [8] in the context of world lines semantics. What is the impact
of such a distinction with respect to the different kinds of knowledge attri-
butions we have previously referred to? What consequences can be drawn
with respect to our analysis of the paradoxical thesis of the contingent a
priori?
References
1. K.S. Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”, The Philosoph-
ical Review, vol. 75(3), 1966, pp. 281–304.
2. K.S. Donnellan, “The contingent a priori and rigid designators”, Mid-
west Studies in Philosophy, vol. 2(1), 1977, pp. 12–27.
3. M. Dummet, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Gerald Duckworth, Lon-
don, 1973.
4. J. Hintikka, “Modality as Referential Multiplicity”, Ajatus, vol. 20,
1957, pp. 49–64.
357
5. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, 1962.

6. J. Hintikka & G. Sandu, “The Fallacies of the New Theory of Refer-
ence”, Synthese, vol. 104(2), 1995, pp. 245–283.
7. S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, 1980.
8. T. Tulenheimo, Objects and Modalities — A Study in the Semantics of
Modal Logic, Springer, 2017.
Tableau Approach to Epistemic Logic Based

on Relating Logics
Krzysztof Krawczyk & Tomasz Jarmużek
Department of Logic,
Epistemic logic has been traditionally viewed as a certain interpretation

of modal logic. Thanks to Hintikka [3], possible worlds semantics turned
out to provide standard models not only for alethic and temporal, but also
for epistemic logic. From then on, this approach has been adopted to logi-
cal folklore, eventually forming something, that can be called a paradigm.
Normal modal logics fail to cover epistemic states of non ideal agents (those
who are not logically omniscient). This shortcoming, labeled “the logical
omniscience problem”, appear to stand out as main flaw of epistemic normal
modal logic.
In the presentation, we suggest different logics to express propositional
attitudes, namely relating logics. First systems of epistemic logic were dis-
covered by Epstein [1,2]. More general description of relating logics can be
found in Jarmużek and Kaczkowski [4]. The main ideas of epistemic relat-
ing logic are introduced together with their motivations. We choose tableau
methods for the proof-theoretic description of our logic, which is founded
on the more general theory [5].
References
1. R.L. Epstein, “Relatedness and Implication”, Philosophical Studies,
vol. 36(2), 1979, pp. 137–173.
2. R.L. Epstein, The Semantic Foundations of Logic, Volume 1: Proposi-
tional Logics, Springer, 1990.
3. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the
Two Notions, Cornell University Press, 1962.
4. T. Jarmużek & B. Kaczkowski, “On some Logic with a Relation Im-
posed on Formulae: Tableau System F”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
vol. 43(1–2), 2014, pp. 53–72.
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Workshops
5. T. Jarmużek, “Tableau Metatheorem for Modal Logics”, in Recent

Trends in Philosophical Logic, edited by R. Ciuni, H. Wansing
& C. Willkommen, Trends in Logic book series, vol. 41, Springer, 2014,
pp. 103–126.
Dialogues and Strategies in Aristotle’s Logic:

Furthering Hintikka’s Insights
Zoe McConaughey
STL* , CNRS , Université Lille 3, France
Université du Québec, Montréal, Canada
[email protected]
In his 1997 reply to Woods and Hansen, “What was Aristotle Doing in
His Early Logic, Anyway?”, Jaakko Hintikka clears some misunderstandings
concerning his reconstruction, by means of an interrogative model, of Aris-
totle’s logic. He thus explicitly challenges some of the deep-rooted assump-
tions of Aristotelian scholars and modern logicians: Aristotle’s Analytics,
asserts Hintikka, are not radically separated from his Topics and De So-
phisticis Elenchis, but are rather the pursuit of the same goal at a different
level, that of strategies, as opposed to down-to-earth — or “down-to-agora”
as he says — dialectical bouts between individual, concrete opponents.
Hintikka justifies the absence of an explicit question-and-answer frame-
work in the Prior and Posterior Analytics by the strategic principle of antic-
ipation of the answers to one’s questions: since the best strategic course of
action in a game of questions and answers is to ask only those questions of
which you can anticipate the answers, and for which the anticipated answers
go your way, then, in a strategic perspective, one can actually do without
an answerer. This would thus yield both the presentation of Aristotle’s
syllogistic framework and Hintikka’s interrogative model of it.
Two essential elements of Hintikka’s interpretation can thus be outlined:
that Aristotle was first and foremost interested in question-and-answer in-
quiries and in this regard thought like a dialectician; and that this question-
and-answer mold for reasoning could be made implicit through a strategic
perspective.
The purpose of this talk will be to uphold Hintikka’s perspective on
Aristotelian logic, which is still not universally accepted among scholars,
and further his insights by proposing a new logical framework in which
the rules themselves are defined through questions and answers, or, as we
*
Unité Mixte de Recherche 8163: Savoirs, Textes, Langage

359
call them, through challenges and defenses. The dialogical structure of the
syllogisms should thus become apparent in the logical framework, with the
added benefit that such a framework rests on a rule, the Socratic rule, that
directly yields Hintikka’s distinction between a justification ad hominem,
concerning only the dialectical bouts at the agora level, and a justification
ad argumentum, which also concerns the strategy level.
The path which will be tread in order to defend and illustrate Hintikka’s
two tenets on Aristotelian logic will not be Hintikka’s own path consisting
in making the interlocutor implicit, but will rather be the path consisting
in making everything more explicit, enabling us to emphasize, in the logical
framework itself, the structural link between syllogistics (Analytics) and
dialectics (Topics), and to provide a logical rendering of the distinction
between ad hominem and ad argumentum conclusions through the Socratic
rule.
References
1. J. Hintikka , “What was Aristotle Doing in His Early Logic, Anyway?
A Reply to Woods and Hansen”, Synthese, vol. 113(2), 1997, pp. 241–
249.
2. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, translated by R. Smith, Hackett Publishing
Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1989.
Hintikka on the “Kant-Frege view”: A critical assessment

Giovanni Mion
İstanbul Technical University, Turkey
[email protected]
In [1], Hintikka rejects the “Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis” (i.e., the
claim that ‘is’ is ambiguous) in favor of a contextual account of existence.
In addition, he also argues that the “Kant-Frege view” (i.e., the claim that
Kant is a forerunner of Frege’s treatment of existence) is wrong, for his
supporters erroneously assume that also for Kant, ‘is’ is ambiguous. In my
presentation, I will focus on Hintikka’s take on the Kant-Frege view. So, I
will first critically evaluate his arguments against it and then, in contrast
to him, I will attempt to prove that Kant’s claim that existence is not a
predicate and Frege’s claim that existence is a quantifier are in fact logically
interdependent.
Reference
1. J. Hintikka, “Kant on Existence, Predication, and the Ontological Ar-
gument”, Dialectica, vol. 35(1–2), 1981, pp. 127–146.
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Workshops
Logic for Children

Eduardo Ochs
Department of Natural Sciences,
Fluminense Federal University, Rio das Ostras, Brazil
[email protected]
Fernando Lucatelli Nunes

Centre for Mathematics, University of Coimbra, Portugal
[email protected]
When we explain a theorem to children — in the strict sense of the term

— we focus on concrete examples, and we avoid generalizations, abstract
structures and infinite objects.
When we present something to “children”, in a wider sense of the term
that means “people without mathematical maturity”, or even “people with-
out expertise in a certain area”, we usually do something similar: we start
from a few motivating examples, and then we generalize.
One of the aims of this workshop is to discuss techniques for particular-
ization and generalization. Particularization is easy; substituting variables
in a general statement is often enough to do the job. Generalization is much
harder, and one way to visualize how it works is to regard particularization
as a projection: a coil projects a circle-like shadow on the ground, and
we can ask for ways to “lift” pieces of that circle to the coil continuously.
Projections lose dimensions and may collapse things that were originally
different; liftings try to reconstruct the missing information in a sensible
way. There may be several different liftings for a certain part of the circle,
or none. Finding good generalizations is somehow like finding good liftings.
The second of our aims is to discuss diagrams. For example, in Cate-
gory Theory statements, definitions and proofs can be often expressed as
diagrams, and if we start with a general diagram and particularize it we
get a second diagram with the same shape as the first one, and that second
diagram can be used as a version “for children” of the general statement and
proof. Diagrams were for a long time considered second-class entities in CT
literature ([2] discusses some of the reasons), and were omitted; readers who
think very visually would feel that part of the work involved in understand-
ing CT papers and books would be to reconstruct the “missing” diagrams
from algebraic statements. Particular cases, even when they were the moti-
361
vation for the general definition, are also treated as somewhat second-class
— and this inspires a possible meaning for what can call “Category The-
ory for Children”: to start from the diagrams for particular cases, and then
“lift” them to the general case. Note that this can be done outside Category
Theory too; [1] is a good example.
Our third aim is to discuss models. A standard example is that every
topological space is a Heyting Algebra, and so a model for Intuitionistic
Predicate Logic, and this lets us explain visually some features of IPL.
Something similar can be done for some modal and paraconsistent logics;
we believe that the figures for that should be considered more important,
and be more well-known.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Bob Coecke (page 124) and
Ralf Krömer (page 133).
Some resources related to this workshop are in http://angg.twu.net/logic-

for-children-2018.html.
References
1. M. Jamnik, Mathematical Reasoning with Diagrams: From Intuition to
Automation, Center for the Study of Language and Information, 2002.
2. R. Krömer, Tool and Object: A History and Philosophy of Category
Theory, Birkhäuser, 2007.
Call for papers

Topics of interest to the workshop include, but are not limited to:
Ways to visualize logics or other algebraic structures
(The many roles of) diagrams in Category Theory
Translations between digrammatical languages and formal languages
December 1st, 2017 to [email protected].
362
Workshops
Community of Philosophical Inquiry

Anne Brel Cloutier
Philosophy Doctorate Student,
Institute of Cognitive Sciences,
Université du Québec, Montréal, Canada
[email protected]
According to Piaget, the first psychologist to study reasoning from a

logician point of view, children are not born logical and logical reasoning
only appears progressively up to adolescence. His theory of the development
of rationality [4] was criticised for diverse reasons. Several studies demon-
strated that children have some degree of logical understanding at a very
young age [3] and that adults are not optimally logical [6].
David Moshman, a professor of educational psychology at the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln, offers a new reading of Piaget’s work by understanding
the development of rationality at a metalogical level. Following his pluralist
rational constructivism theory [2], logical reasoning develops through the
increase of metalogical understanding. In order to have a consciousness on
ones inference, it is necessary to make it explicit and that process occurs
during peer interaction. I argue that Community of Philosophical Inquiry
(CPI) used in Philosophy for Children (P4C), if practiced with a special
attention on its metacognitive aspects, can constitute the perfect didactic
to put into practice Moshman’s theory. Furthermore, adding some explicit
notions of logic and reflections on logical thinking could transform the CPI
method into a logic lesson for children and learners of all ages.
I will present CPI as the practice of dialogue [1] and how this method
puts into practice Moshman’s theory through intellectual moves performed
by the children themselves [5]. My research consists in linking the metacog-
nitive and metalogical strategies with those moves in order to foster the
development of logical understanding, transforming CPI in CLI — Commu-
nity of Logical Inquiry.
The claims I endorse put forward the possibility to build a toolbox for the
learning of logical thinking in schools. This work could help teachers’ work
in providing them the tools they need to develop better teaching methods
that they can put into practice in their classroom. Since metacognitive
strategies have been proven efficient for all levels learners, this approach
could have a major impact in scholar system, in teachers’ training and also
in a broader social scale.
References
1. M. Lipman, Thinking in Education, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
363
2. D. Moshman, “From inference to reasoning: the construction of ratio-

nality”, Thinking and Reasoning, vol. 10, 2004, pp. 221–239.
3. R. Pears & P. Bryant, “Transitive inferences by young children about
spatial position”, British Journal of Psychology, vol. 81(4), 1990,
pp. 497–510, doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1990.tb02375.x.
4. J. Piaget, “Part I: Cognitive Development in Children: Piaget Develop-
ment and Learning”, Journal of Research in Science Teaching, vol. 2,
1964, pp. 176–186, doi:10.1002/tea.3660020306.
5. M. Sasseville & M. Gagnon, Penser ensemble à l’école: Des outils pour
l’observation d’une communauté de recherche philosophique en action,
Presses Université Laval, 2nd edition, Quebec City, Canada, 2012.
6. P.C. Wason, “Regression in reasoning?”, British Journal of Psychology,
vol. 60(4), 1969, pp. 471–480.
Visualization as Restructuring and thus a Source

of Logical Paradox
[email protected]
We survey and systematize the ways our minds organize and visualize
thoughts. We then observe their relevance in explaining different kinds of
logical paradox. We also show where they arise in math.
We were inspired by educator Kestas Augutis’s vision that every high
school student write three books (a chronicle, a thesaurus, and an encyclo-
pedia) so as to master three kinds of thinking (sequential, hierarchical, and
network) [1]. We thus collected dozens of examples of how we organize our
thoughts [2]. Surprisingly, we never use sequences, hierarchies or networks
in isolation. Instead, we use them in pairs:
Evolution: A hierarchy (of variations) is restructured with a sequence (of
times).
Atlas: A network (of adjacency relations) is restructured with a hierarchy
(of global and local views).
Handbook: A sequence (of instructions) is restructured with a network (of
loops and branches).
Chronicle: A sequence (of events in time) is restructured with a hierarchy
(of time periods).
Catalog: A hierarchy (of concepts) is restructured with a network (of cross-
links).
Odyssey: A network (of states) is restructured with a sequence (of steps).
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In general, a first, large, comprehensive structure grows so robust that we

restructure it with a second, smaller, different structure of multiple vantage
points.
In a separate investigation, we listed and grouped paradoxes. This
yielded the following six themes:
Concepts may be inexact. (The paradox of an evolution.) We can’t
specify exactly at what point in the womb a child becomes conscious,
or at what point in evolution two species diverge.
The whole is not the sum of the parts. (The paradox of an atlas.) If we
replace all of the parts of an automobile, and then build a copy with all
of the old parts, which is the original?
Our attention affects what we observe. (The paradox of a handbook.)
Achilles can never catch a tortoise if we keep measuring the distance
between them.
There may be a limited contradiction. (The paradox of a chronicle.)
How can we reliably learn from one who has ever made a mistake?
We cannot make explicit all relevant assumptions. (The paradox of a
catalog.) 10 + 4 may equal 2 if we happen to be thinking about a clock.
We can choose differently in the same circumstances. (The paradox of
an odyssey.) I am lying when I say ‘I am lying’.
Each type of paradox brings to light the fundamental gap between the
(seemingly infinite) primary comprehensive structure and the (manifestly
finite) secondary structure which organizes our vantage points. Our mind
visualizes a qualitative but illusory relationship between the two structures.
These same six restructurings arose in a broader investigation which
yielded 24 ways of figuring things out in mathematics [3]. We identify the
six restructurings with six axioms of set theory: Pairing, Extensionality,
Well-Ordering, Power Set, Union and Regularity.
References
1. K. Augutis, “Effective use of a computer at school” (in Lithuanian:
“3 knygos”), Contest entry, Open Society Fund, Vilnius, Lithuania,
1997.
2. A. Kulikauskas & S. Maskeliunas, “Organizing Thoughts into Sequences,
Hierarchies and Networks”, in 4th International Workshop on Evalua-
tion of Modeling Methods in Systems Analysis and Design, EMMSAD
1999, http://www.ms.lt/papers/1999-Organizing-Thoughts.pdf.
3. A. Kulikauskas, “Discovery in Mathematics: A System of Deep Struc-
ture” (in Lithuanian: “Matematikos išsiaiškinimo būdu, apžvalga”), in
57th Conference of Lithuanian Mathematical Society, 2016, http://www.
ms.lt/sodas/Book/DiscoveryInMathematics.
365
Elementary introduction to pasting

Fernando Lucatelli Nunes
Centre for Mathematics, University of Coimbra, Portugal
[email protected]
The operation of pasting of 2-cells is part of the foundations of 2-category

theory [4]. It was introduced by Bénabou in [1], and then further explored
in [2]. However its associative property, fundamental aspect that makes it
useful to prove theorems, was not proved (or even properly stated) before
[4].
The main purpose of the talk is to give some elementary aspects of
pasting, giving examples within basic category theory in order to motivate
its day-to-day use even in 1-dimensional category theory. These examples
intend to demonstrate that, once we assume pasting is well-defined, pasting
gives nice ways of understanding and dealing with proofs diagrammatically.
For instance, the whiskering and interchange law come for free in proofs
using pasting of 2-cells.
If time permits, we finish giving a brief discussion on results that gives
another perspective on the well definition/associativity of the operation
pasting, relating it with presentation of 2-categories, deficiency of presenta-
tions and, hence, topology [3].
References
1. J. Bénabou, “Introduction to Bicategories”, in Reports of the Midwest
Category Seminar, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 47, Springer,
1967, pp. 1–77, doi:10.1007/BFb0074299.
2. G.M. Kelly & R.H. Street, “Review of the elements of 2-categories”, in
Category Seminar, Lectures Notes in Mathematics, vol. 420, edited by
G.M. Kelly, Springer, 1974, pp. 75–103, doi:10.1007/BFb0063101.
3. F.L. Nunes, “Freely generated n-categories, coinserters and presenta-
tions of low dimensional categories”, arXiv:1704.04474, Cornell Univer-
sity Library, 2017.
4. A.J. Power, “A 2-categorical pasting theorem”, Journal of Algebra,
vol. 129(2), 1990, pp. 439–445.
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Workshops
Subjectivism and inferential reasoning on teaching practice

Laura Rifo
[email protected]
In this work, we analyse well-succeeded strategies and challenges of

teaching principles of decision theory as developed in [2,3,1], for students in
secondary school. Among other things, we emphasize the aspects of prob-
ability and conditional probability under the subjectivistic interpretation
and inferential reasoning based on a Bayesian learning approach [4].
References
1. D. Blackwell, Basic Statistics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969.
2. M.H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions, John Wiley and Sons,
2004.
3. D.V. Lindley, Making Decisions, 2nd edition, John Wiley and Sons,
1985.
4. J. Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of
Plausible Inference, Morgan Kaufmann, 1988.
367
Categories and Logic

Peter Arndt
[email protected]
Category theory and logic interact in many ways. Category theory is

used as a general organizational tool for the structures arising in logic,
specifically in the study of categories of logics and translations, but also in
other ways, via categorical semantics and internal languages of categories,
syntactic categories, categorical foundations of mathematics and their rela-
tion to set theoretic foundations.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Pierre Cartier (page 123)
and Ingo Blechschmidt (page 121).
Call for papers

We invite contributions on all interactions of category theory and logic.
Topics include:
Topos theory (also in its not primarily logical aspects)
Categorical structures arising in logic (e.g. display categories, dagger
categories, fibrations)
Classes of categories arising in logic (e.g. accessible categories, locally
presentable categories)
Particular categories arising in logic (e.g. categories of logics and trans-
lations, particular quasivarieties)
Institution theory
Categorical algebra for algebraic logic
Category theoretic accounts of model theoretic constructions (e.g. of
ultraproducts, elementary classes)
Category theoretic foundations for mathematics
Abstracts (one page) should be sent by November 15, 2017 via e-mail to
[email protected].
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Workshops
Proof Diagrams as Concurrent Syntax for Sequent Calculi

Matteo Acclavio
LIX* , INRIA Saclay Research Centre, Paris, France
[email protected]
Keywords: string diagrams, linear logic, monoidal categories, proof

semantics.
In this presentation we show how the sequent calculus formalism can
be replaced by an alternative 2-dimensional version: proof diagrams. Proof
diagrams are particular kind of string diagrams that allows to capture a
more comprehensive notion of proof.
Sequent calculus is a formalism introduced by Gentzen [4] for intuition-
istic and first-order classical logic. Since then, sequent calculus has become
the standard proof formalism for a wide variety of logics. Sequent calculus
main theorem is cut elimination, which ensures analiticity of derivations;
however, the cut elimination step might not be directly applied to any
derivation, since some preliminary permutations of rules inferences could
be required.
For this reason the “good” notion of proofs coincides with the equiva-
lence class of derivations for a formula rather then syntactical equivalence.
A part of this equivalence is generated by transformations related with syn-
tactical impossibility of sequent calculus formalism to represent concurrent
computations.
String diagrams are a formalism for monoidal categories able to capture
at the same time the two opposite notions of causality and concurrency. In
this syntax, we have two compositions: the parallel one and the sequential
one, which may interact by the interchange rule.
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369
If we consider this rule as an equality, string diagrams are a syntax for

strict monoidal categories. The string diagrams 2-dimensional representa-
tion of terms is able to capture the notion of concurrence in a more intuitive
way with respect to traditional “in line” formulas.
Proof diagrams, introduced in [1], are an alternative 2-dimensional syn-
tax for multiplicative linear logic derivations. The syntax allows the defini-
tion of a framework with a linear time sequentializability procedure, i.e. a
procedure to reconstruct the derivation from a given diagram, able to cap-
ture a large part of syntactical proof equivalence (the one related with in-
ference rules concurrency). Moreover, this formalism can be adapted to
p-simulate any logical system sequent calculus and to defines for it a non-
standard denotational semantics.
References
1. M. Acclavio, “Proof diagrams for multiplicative linear logic: Syntax and
semantics”, arXiv:1702.00268, Cornell University Library, 2017.
2. J.C. Baez & A. Lauda, “A prehistory of n-categorical physics”, arXiv:
0908.2469, Cornell University Library, 2009.
3. A. Burroni, “Higher-dimensional word problems with applications to
equational logic”, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 115(1), 1993,
pp. 43–62.
4. G. Gentzen, “Investigations into Logical Deduction”, in The collected
papers of Gerhard Gentzen, edited by M.E. Szabo, North-Holland, 1969.
5. P. Selinger, “A Survey of Graphical Languages for Monoidal Cate-
gories”, in New Structures for Physics, edited by B. Coecke, Springer,
2010, pp. 289–355.
370
Workshops
κ-filter pairs and non-finitary logics

Peter Arndt
[email protected]
Hugo Luiz Mariano
[email protected]
Darllan Conceição Pinto
Federal University of Bahia, Brazil
[email protected]
The notion of filter pair was introduced in [1], for creating and analyz-
ing general finitary propositional logics and their translation morphisms,
expanding the work initiated in [4], that is restricted to the setting of alge-
braizable logics [2].
Considering the special case of filter pairs ⟨G, i⟩ where the functor
G = CoK is given by congruences relative to a class of algebra K, we give
criteria when the associated logic is protoalgebraic, equivalential, algebraiz-
able, truth-equational, self-extentional or Lindenbaum algebraizable, just
analyzing the relation between Leibniz operator, Suszko operator and Frege
operator with the adjoint of i, improving our previous results.
We adjust the notion of filter pair in such a way that we can treat κ-
compact logics, for each regular cardinal κ: The corresponding new notion
is called κ-filter pair. We show that any κ-filter pair gives rise to a κ-
logic and that every κ-logic comes from a κ-filter pair. Taking adequate
notions of morphisms, we show that the category of κ-logics and translation
morphisms is (isomorphic to) a full reflective subcategory of the category
of κ-filter pairs. We use the notion of κ-filter pair to show that logics
always admit natural extensions, providing an(other) answer to a question
of Cintula and Noguera [3]. We further point out how κ-filter pairs allow to
extend standard notions from finitary logics to arbitrary logics, e.g. those of
being algebraizable, protoalgebraizable, equivalential or truth-equational.
References
1. P. Arndt, R. Jansana, H.L. Mariano & D.C. Pinto, “Filter functors in
logic and applications to categorial analysis of meta-logic properties”,
to be published, 2016.
2. W.J. Blok & D. Pigozzi, Algebraizable Logics, Memoirs of the American
Mathematical Society, vol. 77(396), 1989, doi:10.1090/memo/0396.
371
3. P. Cintula & C. Noguera, “A note on natural extensions in abstract

algebraic logic”, Studia Logica, vol. 103(4), 2015, pp. 815–823.
4. H.L. Mariano & D.C. Pinto, “Algebraizable Logics and a functorial
encoding of its morphisms”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 25(4),
2017, pp. 524–561.
Beyond the categorial forms of the Axiom of Choice

Andreas Brunner, Darllan Conceição Pinto
& Samuel G. da Silva
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Hugo Luiz Mariano
[email protected]
In the sequel of [1], besides to work on new categorial forms of axiom of

choice, we explore categorial forms of statements on partial ordered sets such
that are equivalent to the axiom of choice, namely Zorn’s Lemma, Hausdorff
Maximal Principle and the Principle of Cofinality. This categorial forms are
different from categorial set-forms of axiom of choice defined in [1]. There,
the authors state that a statement ϕ is a categorial Set-Form of the Axiom
of Choice if the Axiom of Choice for Sets is equivalent to the statement ϕSet ,
since ϕ declares properties of objects, morphisms and/or constructions in
a category, and the relativization of ϕ with respect to the category C is
denoted by ϕC . In the present case, the categorial form is a statement
ϕ such that ϕ(P,≤) ((P, ≤) is viewed as a category) for any poset (P, ≤) is
equivalent to axiom of choice for sets.
In [2], the authors have introduced a notion of categorial Zorn’s Lemma
that is: “in a category C, if every filtered diagram has an inductive limit,
then C has a quasi terminal object ”. We realized that an inductive limit
does not translate precisely the notion of “upper bound”. So, we introduce
another categorial Zorn’s Lemma: “if every filtered diagram has a cocone in
C, then it has an almost maximal object ”. If C = (P, ≤) is a poset viewed
as a category, both categorial notions coincide and are equivalent to Zorn’s
Lemma on C (this means that the Zorn’s Lemma can be considered for any
poset (P, ≤) but one concludes that it has maximal element if any chain has
upper bound in(P, ≤)).
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Workshops
We also introduce the categorial Hausdorff Maximal Principle, that is:

“the category of filtered subcategories of C has a quasi terminal (almost max-
imal) object ”. A property P on a locally finitely presentable category C has
finite character if, for any object c of C has the property P , then ci has the
property P , for all i ∈ I, where ci is a finitely presentable object, {ci }i∈I is
a directed diagram with c = colimi∈I ci . The categorial Teichmüller-Tuchey
Principle is considered as: “For every locally finitely presentable category C
and every property P of finite character, there exists a quasi terminal (al-
most maximal) object with the property P ”.
References
1. A. Brunner, H.L. Mariano & S.G. da Silva, “Categorial forms of the ax-
iom of choice”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 25(4), 2017,
pp. 408–430, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzx020.
2. M. Kashiwara & P. Schapira, Categories and Sheaves, Springer, 2006.
Boole-Weyl Algebras in a Categorical Context

Rafael Diaz
School of Mathematics,
National University of Colombia, Medellin, Colombia
[email protected]
We review the construction of the Boole-Weyl algebras, which are the

analogue of the algebra of algebraic differential operators on the affine plane
over the field with two elements, a proceed to study these algebras from a
categorical viewpoint, namely we show that they correspond to the endo-
morphisms of certain objects in the category of finite dimensional vector
spaces over the field with two elements, and study the quantum-like struc-
tural properties of this category. This talk is based on [1].
Reference
1. R. Diaz, “Quantum Boolean Algebras”, arXiv:1011.5215, Cornell Uni-
versity Library, 2015.
*
373
Logical rules are fractions

Dominique Duval
Laboratoire Jean Kuntzmann,
University Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
[email protected]
H
Key: A logical rule C is indeed a fraction, but its numerator is C and its
denominator is H.
The link between inference rules as H C where H is the hypothesis and

N
C the conclusion, and fractions as D where N is the numerator and D the
denominator, goes through the categorical notion of fraction. Categories of
fractions were introduced by Gabriel and Zisman in [5] as a tool for homo-
topy theory. The link with logic, using limit sketches, was studied in [3,4].
An application can be found in [1,2].
References
1. C. Domı́nguez & D. Duval, “Diagrammatic logic applied to a parameter-
isation process”, Mathematical Structures in Computer Science,
vol. 20(4), 2010, pp. 639–654.
2. C. Domı́nguez & D. Duval, “A parameterization process: from a func-
torial point of view”, International Journal of Foundations of Computer
Science, vol. 23(1), 2012, pp. 225–242.
3. D. Duval, “Diagrammatic Specifications”, Mathematical Structures in
Computer Science, vol. 13(6), 2003, pp. 857–890, doi:10.1017/
S0960129503003979.
4. D. Duval, “Diagrammatic inference”, arXiv:0710.1208, Cornell Univer-
sity Library, 2007.
5. P. Gabriel & M. Zisman, Calculus of Fractions and Homotopy Theory,
Ergebnisse der Mathematik und ihrer Grenzgebiete book series, vol. 35,
Springer, 1967.
374
Workshops
Makkai duality, descent and definability

Jesse Han
Department of Mathematics and Statistics,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
[email protected]
In his 1963 thesis, Lawvere showed that an algebraic theory T

could be reconstructed from its category of models Mod(T ) as functors
Mod(T ) → Set preserving all limits, filtered colimits and regular epimor-
phisms. In the ’80s, Michael Makkai extended this to first-order theories
to show that a first order theory T could be reconstructed from Mod(T )
as Set-valued functors (the “ultrafunctors” preserving all ultraproducts and
canonical maps “ultramorphisms” between them.
One thinks of these preservation requirements as descent data for re-
constructing, for a given functor F on Mod(T ), an object of the classifying
topos of T which realizes F as its evaluation functor.
This talk will have two parts: first, I will construct “exotic pre-ultrafunctors”
which show that only considering certain ultramorphisms is not enough to
guarantee descent. Second, I will apply these techniques to study internal
category theory and internal adjoint functors in the classifying topos of T ,
and obtain results around an internal general adjoint functor theorem.
Fibrations of contexts beget fibrations of toposes

Sina Hazratpour
School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK
[email protected]
The notions of (op)fibration in the 2-category of toposes and geometric

morphisms have close connections with topological properties. For exam-
ple, every local homeomorphism is an opfibration. This connection is in line
with the conception of toposes as generalized spaces. Borrowing from work
of Ross Street [2], we introduce a syntactic notion of (op)fibration in the
2-category Con of contexts developed in [3]. Among other things Con gives
a syntactic presentation of finitary fragment of theory of toposes. It also
provides us with good handling of strictness. We establish that every con-
text extension (op)fibration in Con gives rise to an (op)fibration of toposes
in the sense of Johnstone [1]. The machinery developed here will produce a
large group of examples of toposes over a base classifying internal structures.
375
References
1. P. Johnstone, “Fibrations and partial products in a 2-category”, Applied
Categorical Structures, vol. 1(2), 1993, pp. 141–179.
2. R. Street, “Fibrations and Yoneda’s lemma in a 2-category”, in Pro-
ceedings of Sydney Category Theory Seminar, 1972–1973, edited by
G.M. Kelly, Lectures Notes in Mathematics book series, vol. 420, 1974,
pp. 104–133.
3. S. Vickers, “Sketches for arithmetic universes”, arXiv:1608.01559,
Cornell University Library, 2016.

with Quantifiers
Caio de Andrade Mendes & Hugo Luiz Mariano
In [2], the authors describe an approach to define categories of logics

with good properties, in particular are considered categories of algebraizable
logics. They describe a way to algebraize logics though quasi-varieties of
algebras in a uniform way, and [3] establishes several connections between
the category of algebraizable logics and the category of quasi-varieties.
A natural question is: how to extend (naturally) a category of propo-
sitional logics to a category of logics with quantifiers? Historically, several
algebrizations of the first-order logic (FOL) have been proposed, like cylin-
dric/polyadic algebras. These algebras are used to establish a particular
and ad doc algebraic semantics. Others approaches utilizes categorical logic
to extend the particular algebraic construct to a suitable category. For
example, the propositional intuitionistic logic IPC is (Blok-Pigozzi [1]) re-
lated with the variety of Heyting algebras HA; on other hand intuitionistic
(higher-order) logic are interpreted in toposes by the slogan “quantifiers as
adjoints”. Instead to showing a specific construction to understand what
is the quantification in a algebraic sense, we want to find what is the best
place to “algebraize” logics with quantifiers.
In [4], it appears an abstract notion of “logics with a sets of free vari-
ables” as hierarchy of sets (H-set), i.e. given a set V , it is a functor
F ∶ (Parts(V ), ⊆) → Set,
satisfying adequate coherence conditions: this concept can be used to de-
scribe cylindric algebras. Our idea is use this notion to provide a more
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Workshops
conceptual approach to abstract quantification that could also extend the

idea of Blok-Pigozzi uniform technique to the logic with quantifiers setting.
In this proposal, quantifier are defined as families of arrows satisfying several
commuting diagrams and coherence conditions. These conditions are com-
patible with some prescriptions of what a quantifier should be (see Frege,
Russell or Quine).
This new vision of the quantifiers in a H-set can be algebraizable in many
ways (Lindenbaum-Tarski, Blok-Pigozzi’s algebrization, Czelakowski’s pro-
toalgebrization), and since some conditions are satisfied, a (covariant) sheaf-
like structure emerges from this H-sets and quantifiers become some mor-
phisms between these algebras that acts like a “deformation retraction”.
References
Mathematical Society book series, vol. 77(396), American Mathemati-
cal Society, Providence, USA, 1989, doi:10.1090/memo/0396.
2. H.L. Mariano & C.A. Mendes, “Towards a good notion of categories of
logics”, arXiv:1404.3780, Cornell University Library, 2014.
3. D.C. Pinto & H.L. Mariano, “Algebraizable logics and a functorial en-
coding of its morphisms”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 25(4), 2017,
pp. 524–561.
4. G. Voutsadakis, “On the Categorical Algebras of First-Order Logic”,
Scientiae Mathematicae Japonicae Online, vol. 10, 2004, pp. 47–54,
http://www.jams.or.jp/scm/contents/Vol-10-1/10-7.pdf.
Interchangeable formulas and categories of logics

Francisco Antonio Vibrentis & José Luis Castiglioni
CONICET , Faculty of Exact Sciences,
National University of La Plata, Argentina
francisco [email protected], [email protected]
Keywords: categories of logics, interchangeable formulas, quotient

categories.
The study of categories of logics is motivated, among other reasons,

by questions such as how to combine logics and when they are equivalent
[e.g. 1,2] and the bibliography therein). Categories of logics do not always
have good categorical properties such as the existence of finite limits and
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377
colimits. The existence of these provides natural mechanisms for the fac-
torization and combination of logics. One natural way to obtain from these
categories new ones with better properties is to consider the quotient cat-
egory induced by the interdemonstrability relation, as done in [4]. In this
case the existence of finite limits and colimits is only guaranteed when the
objects involved are congruential logics.
Following the aforementioned works, we consider the category whose
objects are Tarskian logics and whose morphisms are flexible translations
that preserve the interchangeability relation between metaformulas. We
say that two metaformulas with the same metavariables α(ξ1 , . . . , ξn ) and
β(ξ1 , . . . , ξn ) are interchangeable if, for any metaformula φ(ξ1 ) and formulas
α1 , . . . , αn , we have φ[α(α1 , . . . , αn )] and φ[β(α1 , . . . , αn )] are interdemon-
strable. This relation induces a congruence on the class of morphisms of
this category.
In this communication, we study the quotient category induced by in-
terchangeability and some of its categorical properties. For example, the
existence of finite products and coproducts, without needing to be restricted
to congruential logics. This is of interest since there are relevant examples,
such as some logics of formal inconsistency studied in [3] that are not con-
gruential.
References
1. P. Arndt, “Homotopical categories of logics”, in The Road to Universal
Logic: Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau, vol. 1, edited
by A. Koslow & A. Buchsbaum, Birkhäuser, 2015, pp. 13–58.
2. C. Caleiro & R. Gonçalves, “Equipollent logical systems”, in Logica
Universalis: Towards a General Theory of Logic, edited by J.-Y. Beziau,
Birkhäuser, 2007, pp. 97–109, doi:10.1007/978-3-7643-8354-1 6.
3. W. Carnielli, M. Coniglio, D.M. Gabbay, P. Gouveia & C. Sernadas,
Analysis and Synthesis of Logics: How to Cut and Paste Reasoning
Systems, Springer, 2008.
4. C. Mendes & H.L. Mariano, “Towards a good notion of categories of
logics”, arXiv:1404.3780, Cornell University Library, 2016.
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Workshops
Differential Geometry in Modal Type Theory

Felix Wellen
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
[email protected]
We demonstrate that basic concepts of Differential and Algebraic Geom-

etry may be expressed in a very general and abstract way using Modalities,
a notion inspired by Modal Operators. Our framework is built on top of
Homotopy Type Theory following ideas of Urs Schreiber.
A Pierce representation theorem for varieties with BFC

William Zuluaga
CONICET* , National University of Cordoba, Argentina
[email protected]
By a variety with 0⃗ and 1⃗ we understand a variety V for which there

are 0-ary terms 01 , . . . , 0n , 11 , . . . , 1n such that V 0⃗ ≈ 1⃗ → x ≈ y, where
⃗0 = (01 , . . . , 0n ) and 1⃗ = (11 , . . . , 1n ). If a ⃗
⃗ ∈ A and b ∈ B n , we write [⃗
n
a, ⃗b]
for the n-uple ((a1 , b1 ), . . . , (an , bn )) ∈ (A × B) . If A ∈ V, then we say that
n
e⃗ = (e1 , . . . , en ) ∈ An is a central element of A if there exists an isomorphism

τ ∶ A → A1 × A2 , such that τ (⃗ e) = [0, ⃗ ⃗1]. Also, we say that e⃗ and f⃗ are a
pair of complementary central elements of A if there exists an isomorphism
τ ∶ A → A1 × A2 such that τ (⃗ e) = [0, ⃗ and τ (f⃗) = [⃗1, 0].
⃗ 1] ⃗ In general, the
isomorphism τ is not unique; furthermore, usually the pair (⃗ e, f⃗) of com-
plementary central elements does not determine the pair of complementary
factor congruences (ker(π1 τ ), ker(π2 τ )), where the πi ’s are the canonical
projections. We call the following property the determining property (DP):
(DP) For every pair (⃗ e, f⃗) of complementary central elements, there is a
unique pair (θ, δ) of complementary factor congruences such that, for
every i = 1, . . . , n,
(ei , 0i ) ∈ θ and (ei , 1i ) ∈ δ and (fi , 0i ) ∈ δ and (fi , 1i ) ∈ θ.
Observe that (DP) is in some sense the most general condition guaran-
teeing that central elements have all the information about direct product
decompositions in the variety. In [1] it is proved that (DP) is equivalent to
each one of the following conditions:
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379
(FD) There is a first order formula Ψ(x, y, z⃗) such that, for every A, B ∈ V,
A×B ⃗ ⃗1])
Ψ((a, b), (a′ , b′ ), [0, iff b = b′ .
(BFC) V has Boolean factor congruences, i.e., the set of factor congruences
of any algebra in V is a Boolean sublattice of its congruence lattice.
Let V a variety with BFC. If the formula Ψ of (FD) is existential we
will say that V is a variety with exBFC. The aim of this talk is to exhibit a
representation theorem for some varieties with exBFC in terms of internal
connected models in toposes of sheaves over bounded Boolean algebras. The
present work is motivated by the Pierce representation theorem for integral
rigs [2] and Lawvere’s strategic ideas about the topos-theoretic analysis of
coextensive algebraic categories [3].
References
1. P.S. Terraf & D.J. Vaggione, “Varieties with definable factor congru-
ences”, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
vol. 361(10), 2009, pp. 5061–5088.
2. W. Zuluaga, Representación por haces de riRigs, PhD Thesis, Uni-
versidad Nacional de La Plata, 2016, http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/
10915/54115.
3. F.W. Lawvere, “Core varieties, extensivity, and rig geometry”, Theory
and Applications of Categories, vol. 20(14), 2008, pp. 497–503.
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Workshops
Logic, Law and Legal Reasoning

Shahid Rahman & Hans Christian Nordtveit Kvernenes

STL* , CNRS , Department of Philosophy,
Université Lille 3, France
The workshop will discuss new insights in the interaction between logic
and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question:
What role does logic play in legal reasoning?
It will present both current challenges and historical perspectives in the
relation between logic and law. The perspectives to be discussed involve the
interface of the following studies:
Foundational studies:
Logical Principles and Frameworks
Meaning
Reasoning in Deontic Contexts
Applications:
Legal practice and Computer-Based Modelisations
Argumentation Theory
Historical perspectives:
Legal reasoning in Ancient Roman, Arabic, Jewish and Far-East con-
texts
Others contexts
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Walter Edward Young
(page 166) and Matthias Armgardt (page 121).
Call for papers

The submissions should contribute to the development of those perspec-
tives by the discussion of subjects such as:
Analogical Reasoning in Law
Deontic Logic and Law
Non-Monotonic Reasoning and Law
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381
Defeasible Reasoning and Law

Argumentation Theory within legal Contexts
Epistemic Logics and Law
Joergensen’s Dilemma
Hypothetical Reasoning and Law
Proof-Theory and Legal reasoning
Reliability, Epistemic Logics and Legal Reasoning
Probability and Legal Reasoning
discussion. A one-page abstract should be sent via email before November
15, 2017 to [email protected].
The Interaction of Logic and Jurisprudence in the Islamic

Tradition: A Genealogy of a Long-Lasting Antagonism
Zidani Farid
Department of Philosophy, University of Alger 2, Algeria
zidani [email protected]
The Muslim logicians contributed to the consolidation of the relationship

between logic and law (Islamic Jurisprudence, Fikh), but this relationship
had endured turbulence between two contradictory tendencies.
The first one, represented by the jurist Ibn al-Çalāh (13s), who cate-
gorically refused the introduction of logic in the field of jurisprudence, not
only that, he also with others went so far as to forbid the teaching of logic.
What makes this tendency interesting is that it has supporters until today.
The second tendency, represented by the philosophers and jurists Ibn
ĥazm (11s), the initiator, who was able to introduce logical analysis within
jurisprudence in his eminent work Al-Taqrı̄b li-H . add al-Mant.iq wa’l-Madkhal
ilayhi bi’l-Alfāz. al-‘Āmmiyya wa’l-Amthila al-Fiqhiyyam, and Al-Ghazālı̄
(12s), in his work Al-Mustaçfā fı̄ Uçūl al-Fiqh, despite their very hostile
environment. And even many other philosophers attempted to analyze the
statements of jurisprudence from a logical point of view, but their approach
was very similar to that of Aristotle. In our contribution we will discuss the
arguments of the jurist Ibn al-Salāh and the contribution of philosophers
and lawyers such as Al-Fārābı̄ (10s), Ibn ĥazm (on which I will focus),
Al-Ghazālı̄ and Ibn al-Nafı̄s (13s).
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Workshops
Ludics for modelling the role of a judge during legal debates

Christophe Fouqueré
LIPN* , CNRS , Université Paris 13, France
[email protected]
Myriam Quatrini
CNRS, Institut de Mathématiques de Marseille,
Université d’Aix-Marseille, France
[email protected]
Ludics [2] is a Theory of Logic developed in the proof theory framework,

when this latter focuses on the proof-as-program paradigm. Even if this
theory comes within the context of calculus theoretical study, it provides
fruitful concepts for both Logics and Argumentation Theory. Indeed, Ludics
arose with the slogan that the core principle of Logics is interaction.
Based on this principle, the authors already used Ludics as a unified
framework for analysing both dialogue and reasoning [1]. Namely, dialogues
in natural language are modelled in Ludics: in a motto, a dialogue is the
interaction between two designs (viewed as strategies, one for each locutor).
Moreover, as designs may also be seen as proofs (in fact proof attempts),
it is possible to focus, inside the same framework, on logical and rhetorical
aspects of dialogues and reasoning. We illustrate our formalization of con-
troversies on the artificial legal debate that Prakken studied. We show in
which extent our modelling may account for the actions of a judge during
a legal debate. More precisely we interpret the distribution of the burden
to prove and the adjudication by means of formal invariants. We account
for the judge interventions as if the judge produces and receives interven-
tions in place of the two debaters. In particular, the adjudication consists
in closing all still open questions or questionable statements (made explicit
in the modelling).
References
1. C. Fouqueré & M. Quatrini, “Un cadre formel issu de de la théorie de
la démonstration pour la théorie de l’argumentation”, Mathématiques
et Sciences Humaines, vol. 198(2), 2012, pp. 49–83.
2. J.-Y. Girard, “Locus solum: From the rules of logic to the logic of
rules”, Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, vol. 11(3), 2001,
pp. 301–506.
*
Laboratoire d’Informatique de Paris-Nord

383
Textual Discourse Analysis: Towards an Illocutionary-

Argumentative Model for the International Legal Discourse
Hális A.N. França
PPgEL* , CAPES ,
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil
[email protected]
This research proposes an illocutionary-argumentative theoretical model
of analysis for the international legal discourse that serves as a tentative
extension of the Textual Discourse Analysis (ATD, in French), as proposed
by Jean-Michel Adam [1]. Using it as a stepping-stone, we aim to focus on
features of the international legal discourse that the ATD may not seem to
address with precision. Such limitations stem mostly from the normative
nature of international agreements, which essentially entails instances of
legal reasoning and argumentation in the use of imperative sentences and
deontic operators.
Thus, we currently investigate how international agreements establish
legal commitments through a binding to non-binding force continuum on
an illocutionary-argumentative level, and how they convey these meanings
based on types and degrees of illocutionary and argumentative forces. In
order to do so, we have been following a number of works regarding speech
acts and illocutionary logic [2], and argumentative semantics [3], thus rein-
terpreting Austin’s concept of illocutionary acts [4] to integrate argumenta-
tive frameworks into the sentence-utterance, establishing a wider spectrum
of description. We consider the traditional representation of an illocution-
ary act, F (P ), where P is the propositional content and F its illocutionary
force, and reinterpret it with the understanding that P is also charged with
argumentative value, and therefore, argumentative force. We propose that
such a complementary investigation may be able to lead to a more complete
description of normative sentence-utterances, specially considering uses in
the field of Linguistics, Argumentation Theory and Law.
References
1. J-M. Adam, A Linguı́stica Textual: Introdução à Análise Textual dos
Discursos, translated by M.G.S. Rodrigues, J.G.S. Neto, L. Passeggi &
E.V.L.F. Leurquin, scientific revision by J.G.S. Neto, Cortez Editora,
São Paulo, 2011.
2. J. Searle & D. Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cam-
*
Graduate Program in Language Studies

Coordination of Improvement of Higher Level Personnel
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Workshops
3. J-C. Anscombre & O. Ducrot, L’argumentation dans la langue, Éditions

Mardaga, 1997.
4. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford University Press,
1976.
Abū Ish.āq al-Shı̄rāzı̄’s System of Co-Relational Inferences

by Indication
Muhammad Iqbal
STL* , CNRS , Université Lille 3, France
Antasari State Islamic University, Indonesia
[email protected]
The notion of fiqh, that literally means deep understanding, supposes
that legal knowledge is achieved by rational endeavour, the intellectual ef-
fort of human being; this is what is meant when the term ijtihād, endeavour
of the intellect, is used in Islamic jurisprudence. One of the most remarkable
features of the practice of ijtihād is that it presupposes that law is dynamic
in nature. Indeed, since the ultimate purpose of such a kind of rational
endeavour is to achieve decisions for new circumstances or cases not already
established by the juridical sources, the diverse processes conceived within
Islamic jurisprudence were aimed at providing tools able to deal with the
evolution of the practice of fiqh. The dynamic nature of Islamic law, as
indicated by Young [2], is put into action by both the dialectical under-
standing and the dialectical practice of legal reasoning. According to this
perspective, the practice of ijtihād takes the form of an interrogative enquiry
where the intertwining of giving and asking for reasons features the notion
of meaning that grounds legal rationality. More precisely, the conception of
legal reasoning developed by Islamic jurisprudence is that it is a combina-
tion of deductive moves with hermeneutic and heuristic ones deployed in an
epistemic frame.
Several systematic instruments are developed within ijtihād, one of them
is qiyās or co-relational inference. The study is focused on Abū Ish.āq al-
Shı̄rāzı̄’s system of qiyās as discussed in his Mulakhkhas. [1]. He classifies
qiyās in general into two types: qiyās based on the occasioning factor (qiyās
al-‘illa) and qiyās based on indication (qiyās al-dalāla). The study provides a
dialectical meaning-explanation of the main notion of co-relational inference
relevant for the development of al-Shı̄rāzı̄’s system of qiyās. In other words,
what we are aiming at is to set out a kind of interactive language game
that makes apparent the dialectical meaning of the main notions involved
*

385
in these forms of reasoning. The present study is focused particularly on

qiyās al-dalāla, the second type of qiyās.
References
1. A.I.I. al-Shı̄rāzı̄, Al-Mulakhkhas. fi’l-Jadal fı̄ Us.ūl al-Fiqh li’l-Shaykh Abı̄
Ish.āq Ibrāhīm b ‘Alı̄ b Yūsuf al-Shı̄rāzı̄ (*1002 A.D.–1083 A.D.), edited
by M.Y.Ā.J. Niyāzı̄, 2 volumes, MA Thesis, Umm al-Qura University,
1407/1986, https://goo.gl/3mXxMd.
2. W.E. Young, The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evo-
lution of Islamic Law, Springer, 2017.
A Dialogical Framework for Analogy

in European Legal Reasoning
Hans Christian Nordtveit Kvernenes
STL* , CNRS , Department of Philosophy,
Université Lille 3, France
[email protected]
A challenge in theory of legal reasoning is to understand the procedures

that we use when we argue for a certain standpoint based on an older deci-
sion. Arguments by analogy have received a lot of attention in the common
law tradition. The structure of arguments by analogy that we find in the
common law tradition does not seem to be directly transferable to the civil
law tradition. More specifically, it does not seem to be transferable to Euro-
pean law. Arguments by analogy are also used in European law, but it has
received significantly less attention that its Anglo-American counterpart.
Rather than referring to relevant similarities between the source and the
target, European law refers to the principle behind the source, ratio legis,
and checks if it can also be applied to the target.
Dialogical framework is a kind of game-theoretical semantics and not
a logical system in itself. It is rather a universal way to implement or to
understand the meaning in a logical system. The main idea is to look at
meaning as how a statement can be challenged by another player. It is
a semantical framework that seems to fit very well to the situation that
we often find in legal reasoning. By explaining the use of analogies in
European law in a dialogical framework, we may end up with a very natural
and comprehensible way of capturing the actual legal argumentation.
In this on-going project I want to show how we can understand analogical
argumentation in a general framework, namely game-theoretical semantics.
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Workshops
It is an attempt to implement the process of analogical argumentation in

a semantical tradition that comes from Wittgenstein and more recently,
Hintikka. Based on the actual argumentation deployed in a juridical setting
in European law, I would like to examine the insights that the dialogical
framework can provide to the different forms of reasoning by analogy. This
may both show how we can distinguish different kinds of analogy arguments
and how the analogical argumentation in legal reasoning corresponds to the
dialogical meaning of analogical argumentation in general.
References
1. P. Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning, Oxford University Press, 2010.
2. S. Brewer, “Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Ra-
tional Force of Legal Argument by Analogy”, Harvard Law Review,
vol. 109(5), 1996, pp. 923–1028.
3. S. Rahman & M. Iqbal, “Unfolding Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Ju-
risprudence (I). Epistemic and Dialectical Meaning within Abū Ish.āq
al-Shı̄rāzı̄’s System of Co-Relational Inferences of the Occasioning
Factor”, Archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société,
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01265206, 2016.
Vagueness in the Law and the Sorites Paradox

Sébastien Lacroix
Laval University
[email protected]
It is a common truism to assert that language mediates the relation

between our concepts and the world around us. Without the latter, our
concepts would have no concrete reference. Conversely, without concepts to
describe our experiences, it would be impossible to understand our world.
Language, concepts and the empirical world are in constant interaction.
These interactions between language, concepts and the external reality
are rarely straightforward. One main issue we face is the philosophical
problem of vagueness [2]. The standard definition for vagueness is this: X
is vague if and only if X has borderline cases, where X is a concept. Thus,
the predicate “tall” is vague; so are “blue”, “unjust” and “pretty”. One
example of this is the Sorites paradox, also known as the paradox of the
heap. This paradox arises when there is no clear cut off between borderline
cases: when does a hay stack stop being a hay stack and starts simply being
strands of hay? At what point does a person become “bald” or “tall”? These
questions have been asked for millennia, but no clear answer has managed
to establish itself as the dominant position.
387
In this paper, two main objectives will be pursued. First, I wish to inves-
tigate different answers to the Sorites paradox as they have been developed
with modern logical tool. Three schools of thought will be presented: many-
valued logic, including a few of its variants [1,6,9,14]; supervaluationism and
subvaluationism, as the two sides to the same coin [7,11,14]; and contextu-
alism [5,8,12,14].
Secondly, after having examined these possible answers to the Sorites
paradox, I will draw parallels between these purely logical solutions and
their possible applications to the philosophical problem of vagueness in the
law. Philosophical vagueness raises special problems in legal philosophy.
Lawmakers often use vague, abstract terms. Some legal scholars have ar-
gued that this vagueness is a necessary feature of law [3,4], which cannot
be erased or bypassed. They think we should embrace vagueness and use
its tools — after all, it does seem to offer some benefits [10]. Others believe
that vagueness has no function in law [13], because the philosophical prob-
lems it raises are not at issue in practice. This answer highlights a crucial
aspect of legal adjudication: unlike a philosopher thinking about hay stacks,
a judge cannot simply remain befuddled. She must make a decision that
will have direct consequences on the life of other people. The main legal
issue concerning vagueness is thus that of pragmatic application.
References
1. P. Cintula, C.G. Fermüller & C. Noguera, “Fuzzy Logic”, in The Stan-
ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E.N. Zalta, 2016, https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-fuzzy.
2. D. Edgington, “The Philosophical Problem of Vagueness”, Legal The-
ory, vol. 7(4), 2001, pp. 371–378.
3. T. Endicott, “Law is Necessarily Vague”, Legal Theory, vol. 7(4), 2001,
pp. 379–385.
4. T. Endicott, “The Value of Vagueness”, in Philosophical Foundations
of Language in the Law, edited by A. Marmor & S. Soames, Oxford
University Press, 2011, pp. 14–30.
5. D. Graff, “Shifting sands: an interest-relative theory of vagueness”,
Philosophical Topics, vol. 28(1), 2000, pp. 45–81.
6. S. Halldén, The Logic of Nonsense, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift* ,
Uppsala, Sweden, 1949.
7. D. Hyde, “Sorites Paradox”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by E.N. Zalta, 2011, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-
paradox.
*
Uppsala University’s Annual Report
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8. H. Kamp, “The Paradox of the Heap”, in Aspects of Philosophical Logic:

Some Logical Forays into Central Notions of Linguistics and Philosophy,
edited by U. Mönnich, D. Reidel, 1981, pp. 225–277.
9. S. Körner, The Philosophy of Mathematics, Hutchinson University Li-
brary, 1960.
10. A. Marmor, The Language of Law, Oxford University Press, 2014.
11. G. Priest, K. Tanaka & Z. Weber, “Paraconsistent Logic”, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by E.N. Zalta, 2016, https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent.
12. S. Shapiro, Vagueness in Context, Oxford University Press, 2006.
13. R. Sorensen, “Vagueness Has No Function in Law”, Legal Theory,
vol. 7(4), 2001, pp. 387–416.
14. R. Sorensen, “Vagueness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2012, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness.
Abductive Inference in Legal Reasoning:

Reconceiving Res Ipsa Loquitur
Douglas Lind
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech College of Liberal
Arts and Human Sciences, USA
[email protected]
This paper examines the relevance of C.S. Peirce’s notion of abductive

inference for law and the formation of legal concepts. The importance of
this examination comes from the fact that several doctrinal practices in di-
verse areas of law — including criminal law, torts (delicts), constitutional
law, evidence — rely on logical inferences that defy neat explanation un-
der standard forms of deductive or inductive logic. I argue that abduction
resolves some of these logical infirmities, providing the logic underlying a
number of doctrines or conceptual practices common in modern law. My
analysis concentrates on the common law tort maxim res ipsa loquitur (‘the
thing speaks for itself’). This is for two reasons. First, to at least as great
a degree as any other legal concept, res ipsa loquitur manifests the form
and conditions of abductive inference. Second, though it entered English
common law over 150 years ago and remains today a form of inferential rea-
soning used in negligence cases throughout most of the common law world,
res ipsa loquitur is still highly controversial. Several issues as to its force and
effect split courts and prevent it from receiving uniform application across
jurisdictions. The issues include: (1) whether it is a necessary condition
389
for res ipsa loquitur that the defendant exerted exclusive control over the
injurious ‘thing’ or instrumentality; (2) whether there must be an entire
‘absence of explanation’ for the maxim to apply; (3) whether res ipsa lo-
quitur is a species of circumstantial evidence; and (4) whether it authorizes
a burden-shifting presumption of negligence or only a permissive evidentiary
inference. I argue that the controversy and jurisdictional disagreement over
these issues is due, in no small part, to the maxim’s little understood logical
foundation in abduction. By recognizing that foundation, these issues that
mar res ipsa loquitur’s consistent application largely fall away.
A Formal Analysis of (Human) Rights and (State) Duties

Réka Markovich
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences,
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Department of Logic, Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary
Department of Business Law,
Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary
[email protected]
The notion of correlativity — that someone’s right always involves some-

one else’s duty, and the other way around — often arises in legal arguments:
a duty’s acceptability or bizarreness helps us decide whether the correlative
(human) right exists or not. One has to see clearly, though, who the in-
volved agents are in these correlative pairs and, if necessary, dissociate them
from the State, otherwise the argument fails. W.N. Hohfeld’s analysis [3]
was the one which provided a compact picture on how correlativity — and
opposition — orders the system of different types of rights and duties. The
well-known system of correlative pairs of rights and duties [3] built can be
reconstructed in the following diagrams:
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This theory is decisive in analytical legal theory. Yet a century later,

the formalization of his theory remains, in various ways, unresolved. In
this talk I provide my own amended version of the Hohfeldian conceptions’
formal representation, in which the correlativity plays a crucial role and the
involved agents become visible, just like the role of the state. What is more,
this role of the state is the point I build on in order to grasp what having
a claim-right or duty in a given legal system means. This approach fits to
claimant theories, theories that identify a directed obligation’s (that is, a
duty’s) counterparty with the claimant, but while it is usual to involve the
notion of power (to initiate a legal action) [see e.g. 9,8] in my formalization
claim-right serves as a clue in showing what happens when someone violates
a (any kind of) right, and the way judicature is involved in the legal relation.
In the case of power and its group, the formal representation has to
give an account the special capacity involved into power and the incapacity
to actually do the given action when it lacks. In my approach I call this
capacitative feature of power ‘potential’, captured as borne by power and
acts together; and I argue that we can have power only on actions created
by constitutive rules.
I follow the classical formalizations authors, S. Kanger and L. Lindahl
[4,5,6,7], among others, in using SDL, and a simple ‘sees to it that’ operator
having an axiomatic background that B.F. Chellas [1] called ET (containing
only the rule of equivalents’ interchangeability and the T axiom in order to
have successful actions). But I use this latter operator iterably, enabling
us to capture the real action bound by the deontic operators (denoting the
rights and duties) that I also agent-indexed, using the notation of direct-
edness, introduced by H. Herrestad and C. Krogh [2], with the relevant
modalities in order to emphasize the Hohfeldian conceptions’s relationality.
Also, to describe the strict operating of a system of legal rights, we need to
introduce a legal necessity operator with S5 logic behind.
This formal conceptual analysis shows how a system of legal rights and
duties works, expressing the way how new legal facts (statements on rights
and duties) arise, concentrating on what legal consequences each type of
rights and duties, together with acts and refrainings have. This analysis is
also adequate for showing the layered role of the state in ensuring rights,
referring to the tasks of judiciary and legislation separately.
References
1. B.F. Chellas, Modal Logic: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press,
1980.
2. H. Herrestad & C. Krogh, “Obligations directed from bearers to coun-
terparties”, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Law, Association for Computing Machinery, 1995,
pp. 210–218. 391
3. W.N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental legal conceptions applied in judicial rea-

soning”, in Fundamental Legal Conceptions Applied in Judicial Rea-
soning and Other Legal Essays, edited by W.W. Cook, Yale University
Press, 1923, pp. 23–64.
4. S. Kanger, “New foundations of ethical theory”, in Deontic Logic: In-
troductory and Systematic Readings, edited by R. Hilpinen, D. Reidel,
1971, pp. 36–58.
5. S. Kanger, “Law and logic”, Theoria, vol. 38(3), 1972, pp. 105–132.
6. S. Kanger, “On realization of human rights”, Acta Philosophica Fennica,
vol. 38, 1985.
7. L. Lindahl, “Stig Kanger’s Theory of Rights”, in Logic, Methodology
and Philosophy of Science IX, edited by D. Werserstahl, D. Prawitz &
B. Skyrms, Elsevier, 1994, pp. 889–911.
8. D. Makinson, “On the formal representation of rights relations: Re-
marks on the work of Stig Kanger and Lars Lindahl”, Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, vol. 15(4), 1986, pp. 403–425.
9. C. Wellman, “Relative duties in the law”, Philosophical Topics,
vol. 18(1), 1990, pp. 183–202.
Cohen’s Criticisms of the Use of Probability in the Law

David Miller
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
[email protected]
Bolzano [1] was the first to propose explicitly that a probability function
p(c ∣ a) may be used to measure the degree to which a conclusion c is
classically deducible from an assumption (or premise) a. It is central to the
logical interpretation of probability that the value of p(c ∣ a) is 1 when c is
deducible from a, and sinks to 0 when c′ is deducible from a; that is, when
c contradicts a.
Cohen’s The Probable and the Provable [2] argues that the other popular
interpretations of probability, which are all tied to variants of the axioms
of Kolmogorov [4], may also be understood as measures of deducibility, but
of deducibility in deductive systems of diverse kinds. It seems to have been
the first work to state explicitly that what he labels mathematical or Pas-
calian probability is not the only respectable way of grading the deducibility
or provability (in a loose sense) of a conclusion c from the evidence (or
assumption) a, and to contest the idea that the lowest grade of deducibility
must reflect the inconsistency of c with a. According to Cohen, reasoning
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within incomplete deductive systems, legal reasoning in particular, requires

a method of gradation that ranges from the possession of conclusive evidence
(a c) to there being no evidence at all, one way or the other (a ≡ ⊺). The
book expounds at length a system of ordinal (non-numerical) comparisons
of deducibility called inductive or Baconian probability.
With regard to legal reasoning, Cohen supports his approach by consid-
eration of half a dozen difficulties that, he maintains, plague the Pascalian
construe of probability but are easily accommodated within the Baconian
construe. These difficulties are adjudged to show the inadequacy of both
the standard product law p(cb ∣ a) = p(c ∣ ba)p(b ∣ a) and the standard com-
plementation law p(c ∣ a) + p(c′ ∣ a) = 1. The soundness of Cohen’s criticisms
has been evaluated by lawyers (such as Schum [5]), statisticians (such as
Dawid [3]), and others, but not, to my knowledge, from a specifically logical
standpoint. A brief logical assessment will be offered here.
In § 37 of [2], discussing ‘the difficulty about corroboration and con-
vergence’, Cohen observes that this difficulty for the probability function
p(c ∣ a) would largely disappear if it were replaced by the function q(c ∣ a)=
p(a′ ∣ c′ ), which ranges in value from deducibility to absence of evidence.
But he seems not to have considered whether the function q might solve
some of the other difficulties that he lays at the door of p. It turns out that
it does just that.
References
1. B.P.J.N. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Seidel’sche Buchhandlung, Sulz-
bach-Rosenberg, 1837, English translation: Theory of Science, Oxford
2. L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1977.
3. A.P. Dawid, “The Difficulty About Conjunction”, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series D (The Statistician), vol. 36(2–3), 1987,
pp. 91–97, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2348501.
4. A.N. Kolmogorov, Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung,
Springer, Berlin, 1933, English translation: Foundations of the Theory
of Probability, Chelsea Publishing Company, New York, 1950.
5. D.A. Schum, “A Review of a Case against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs”,
Michigan Law Review, vol. 77(3), 1979, pp. 446–483.
393
Judgement based on chance in legal ties

Hesam Mohamadi
Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran
[email protected]
Imagine two cars have a head-on collision in a desert and a police officer
arrives on the scene. She has to decide about the liability of a driver but
she has no reason to accuse one and acquit the other driver. Sometimes,
in such dilemmas, a moral principle [1] or a legal preference [2] helps the
judge to adjudicate the case as some scholars have proposed. However, it is
hard to see why a principle or a preference might work for one driver and
against the other one. Thus, the question is that: How the judge decides in
such cases? Sometimes evidence for and against a verdict is equally strong
and based on objective criteria; the judge does not know how to decide. In
modern contemporary legal systems, these cases simply ask for a subjective
judgement pictured by Roy Sorensen [3, p. 300] and a judge would decide
based on her personal interests even if she might not be aware of that. This
way of decision-making might cause a great injustice by imposing racial, sex-
based or ethnic discriminations, reflected in personal unconscious interests
of judges.
I argue that in cases in which there is not enough evidence, it is better to
leave the case to a chancy process of judgement instead of deciding it based
on personal interests since a random process removes the adverse impact of
psychological or political biases on legal decisions. In the next step, firstly,
I show that an automatic decision procedure that includes randomness is
practically more efficient than a manual procedure like flipping a coin. Sec-
ondly, I show that an automatic decision procedure could be achieved by
using electric devices such as robot referees.
References
1. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, 1977.
2. S. Soames, “Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Spe-
cial about the Law”, in Philosophical Essays, volume 1, by S. Soames,
3. R. Sorensen, “How Vagueness Makes Judges Lie”, in Vagueness in the
Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, edited by G. Keil
& R. Poscher, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 297-316.
394
Workshops
Narrations in judiciary fact-finding and the difficulty

about conjunction
Rafal Urbaniak
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science,
Ghent University, Belgium
Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism,
University of Gdańsk, Poland
[email protected]
According to Legal Probabilism (LP), degrees of conviction in juridi-

cal fact-finding are to be modeled exactly the way degrees of beliefs are
modeled in standard Bayesian epistemology [6]: by means of probabilistic
distributions satisfying the standard axioms of probability theory. Quite a
few conceptual issues with LP have been raised (mostly by legal scholars)
[3,4,7,9,10,11,12], but not many of them have been satisfactorily answered.
In [13] I developed a formal, Bayesian account of the interplay of narra-
tions as used in juridical fact-finding. In [14] I argued that independently
motivated features of the framework lead to a fairly natural resolution of the
so-called gatecrasher paradox. To put the issue very briefly: the paradox
arises when, for instance, 999 out of 1000 participants crashed the gates to
attend an event without purchasing the ticket, while 1 participant did buy
her ticket. Now, randomly pick one of the participants; their probability
of guilt is very high (one can manipulate the thought experiment to obtain
any threshold < 1), and yet, intuitively, penalization is not justified. The
resolution is quite sensitive to the details of the formulation, but the main
gist is that the conviction is not justified because no accusing narration
satisfying all the requirements is available.
In this paper I look at how the approach handles the difficulty about
conjunction (DAC): em if the claim to be proven is a conjunction, what
should we apply the probability threshold to: the conjuncts taken separately,
or the conjunction as a whole? A secondary goal is to look at existing
approaches to DAC [1,2,3,5,8] and to evaluate them from the perspective of
the framework.
References
1. R.J. Allen, “No Plausible Alternative to a Plausible Story of Guilt as
the Rule of Decision in Criminal Cases”, in Proof and Standards of Proof
in the Law, edited by J. Cruz & L. Laudan, Northwestern University
Law School, 2010, pp. 10–27.
2. E.K. Cheng, “Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof”, The Yale Law
Journal, vol. 122(5), 2013, pp. 1104–1371.
395
3. L.J. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford University Press,
1977.
4. L.J. Cohen, “Subjective probability and the paradox of the gatecrasher”,
Arizona State Law Journal, vol. 2(2), 1981, pp. 627–634.
5. A.P. Dawid, “The Difficulty About Conjunction”, The Statistician,
vol. 36(2–3), Special Issue: Practical Bayesian Statistics, 1987,
pp. 91–97.
6. J. Earman, Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Con-
firmation Theory, Bradford Books, 1992.
7. S. Haack, Evidence Matters: Science, Proof, and Truth in the Law,
8. S. Haack, “Legal Probabilism: An Epistemological Dissent”, in [7],
2014, pp. 47–77.
9. C.R. Nesson, “Reasonable doubt and permissive inferences: The value
of complexity”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 92(6), 1979, pp. 1187–1225.
10. L.H. Tribe, “The Continuing Debate over Mathematics in the Law of
Evidence: A Further Critique of Mathematical Proof”, Harvard Law
Review, vol. 84(8), 1971, pp. 1810–1820.
11. L.H. Tribe, “Trial by mathematics: Precision and ritual in the legal
process”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 84(6), 1971, pp. 1329–1393.
12. B.D. Underwood, “The thumb on the scale of justice: Burdens of
persuasion in criminal cases”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 86(7), 1977,
pp. 1299–1348.
13. R. Urbaniak, “Narration in judiciary fact-finding: a probabilistic expli-
cation”, submitted to Artificial Intelligence and Law, 2017.
14. R. Urbaniak, “Reconciling Bayesian epistemology and narration-based
approaches to judiciary fact-finding”, Proceedings of Sixteenth Con-
ference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, Liver-
pool, UK, 2017, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence, vol. 251, edited by J. Lang, Open Publishing Association, 2017,
pp. 504–514.
396
Workshops
Coping with inconsistencies in legal reasoning

Max Urchs
EBS* University of Business and Law, Wiesbaden, Germany
[email protected]
Law cases are triggered by conflicting opinions on juridical matter. Legal

discourse reflects these contradictions. One may “index them away” in
logical formalization. That, however, usually leads to unduly abstract —
or, under-complex — formal models which thus become non-descriptive,
i.e. naive and boring. Wouldn’t it be better to accept the real differences
in a specific legal dispute and to adequately reflect them in the logical
description? There seems to be an obvious counterargument: accepting
inconsistencies would conflict the principle of contradiction. This principle
is considered the very keystone of (Western) rationality and should therefore
be preserved, come what may. It turns out, indeed, that there is no good
reason to question the ex contradictione quodlibet-principle [2]:
H ∧ ¬H F,
and, what is more, there is no need to do so. It suffices to abandon a similar,

but stronger rule: the so-called ex falso quodlibet-principle:
H, ¬H F.
In order to differentiate between one and the other, one has to block the
rule of adjunction:
H, F H ∧ F.
To that aim the Polish logician Stanislaw Jaśkowski designed his system
D2 [1]. This non-adjunctive calculus, the first inconsistency-tolerant one in
history, is correlated with Lewis’ modal logic S4. We demonstrate how D2
(and alternative systems) provide a promising methodological basis for legal
reasoning.
References
1. S. Jaśkowski, “A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Sys-
tems”, Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sectio A, vol. 1(5),
1948, pp. 57–77, reprinted in Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, 1999,
pp. 35–56.
2. J. Lukasiewicz, On Aristotle’s principle of contradiction (in Polish),
PWN , Warsaw, Poland, 1987.
*
European Business School

397
Logic and Physics

Bob Coecke
[email protected]
We invite contributions on all interactions of physics and logic, new or

old, modest or bold, hot or cold. However, the keynote talks focus on two
brand-new, hot and very bold results.
The first talk concerns a unified account on all forms of physical causal-
ity, including the indefinite causal structures that one may expect in quan-
tum gravity, and was first presented this year at IEEE* -LiCS .
The other one concerns a complete logical calculus for Hilbert space
quantum theory, which is the 1st ever of its kind.
We would like the speakers, independent of the particular subject of
their contribution, to reflect on how logical accounts on physics could con-
tribute to future theories of physics, rather than merely explanation and/or
recasting the existing theories. The failure to have done so may be an expla-
nation for why currently the role of logic in mainstream physics is nowhere
near e.g. the role of logic either in mathematics or computer science.
The keynote speakers at this workshop are Sander Uijlen (relativity talk,
page 164) and Simon Perdrix (quantum talk, page 151).
Call for papers

We invite contributions on all interactions of physics and logic, for ex-
ample:
logic for relativity theory
logic for quantum theory
logic for thermodynamics
logic for ‘quantum gravity’
Here, logic should be conceived in the very broad sense as any reasoning
aid.
discussion. A one-page abstract should be sent via email before December
1st, 2017 to [email protected].
*

Logic in Computer Science
398
Workshops
From Quantum to Cognition

Bob Coecke
[email protected]
For well over a decade, we developed an entirely pictorial (and formally

rigorous!) presentation of quantum theory [1]. Meanwhile, the pictorial
language has also been successful in the study of natural language [2], and
very recently we have started to apply it to model cognition, and in par-
ticular how compositional reasoning about human senses can be achieved
[3]. We present the key ingredients of the pictorial language as well as their
interpretation across disciplines.
References
1. B. Coecke & A. Kissinger, Picturing Quantum Processes. A first course
on quantum theory and diagrammatic reasoning, Cambridge University
Press, 2017.
2. B. Coecke, M. Sadrzadeh & S. Clark, “Mathematical Foundations for a
Compositional Distributional Model of Meaning”, in A Festschrift for
Jim Lambek, edited by J. van Benthem, M. Moortgat & W. Buszkowski,
Linguistic Analysis, vol. 36, 2010, pp. 345–384, arXiv:1003.4394.
3. J. Bolt, B. Coecke, F. Genovese, M. Lewis, D. Marsden & R. Piedeleu,
“Interacting Conceptual Spaces I : Grammatical Composition of Con-
cepts”, arXiv:1703.08314, Cornell University Library, 2017.
Theory of Forms: a reconstruction of ancient metaphysics

applied to the logical foundations of modern physics
Douglas Moore
Cofounder of FusionSport.com,
former director of Grabba International
[email protected]
Keywords: Periodic table of subatomic particles, Geometric Algebra, Stoic

Logic, operational calculus, sub-quarks.
The problem tackled in this work is to develop from purely rational

considerations the foundations and ontology of forms universally applicable
to any self-managed autonomous system. The physics universe is a special
case of such a system. The approach is fundamentally a priorist and so
399
free of empirical or axiomatically determined structures. Key aspects of the

approach are developed from a reconstruction of Stoic natural philosophy
and logic.
Leibniz famously introduced a new dimension into this ancient problem-
atic, notably that of developing a theory of the forms of nature in terms
of a “geometry without number”. Nowadays we see that there are two
modern geometric traditions, one analytic (Analytic Geometry [AG] gen-
eralized from linear analysis) and the other synthetic (Geometric Algebra
[GA]). GA arises from the exterior and geometric products of Grassmann
developed further by Cayley and Hamilton and in modern times by David
Hestenes. Hestenes and others claim that GA is the fulfillment of Leib-
niz’s dream. GA certainly provides the great simplifications that Leibniz
demanded and is free of coordinates. But it is not free of number, nor does
it provide an algebra based on “a few letters” that would describe the forms
of nature both in the biological and non-biological worlds.
This work is presented as a true fulfillment of Leibniz’s dream by devel-
oping a more fundamental version of GA which is truly a “geometry without
number” and integrating it into a radical reconstruction of Stoic logic and
physics.
Since the universe we live in can be considered as a totally autonomous
self-managed system, the resulting theory should be applicable to develop-
ing the foundations of physics from a fundamental quantum perspective.
This turns out to be possible and, unlike String Theory, leads to practi-
cal results. One result is the development of a sort of “Periodic Table” of
subatomic particles that extends beyond the already known constituents.
The theory predicts a lower “sub-quark” level as the primary substratum
and. Unlike the Standard Model” does not require quarks with fractional
charge. Everything is presented in terms of geometric semantics including
such allusive notions as “colour charge.”
The end-result can best be understood as “doing a Heaviside” by pre-
senting quantum mechanics in a time independent “non-diachronic” form.
This approach is considered as the complementary opposite of the present
day standard approach. The tools of Laplace formalize Heaviside’s approach
and works well for DEs but not for partial DEs. To universally handle the
latter, a more powerful formalism is required. The elements of that approach
can be found in Stoic logic once properly reconstructed and explained.
400
Workshops
Eigenlogic
Zeno Toffano
CentraleSupélec, L2S* , CNRS , Université Paris-Saclay,
Gif-sur-Yvette, France
[email protected]
This work presents an operational and geometric approach to logic. It
starts from the multilinear elective decomposition of binary logical functions
in the original form introduced by George Boole [1]. A justification on
historical grounds is presented bridging Boole’s theory and the use of his
arithmetical logical functions with the axioms of Boolean algebra using sets
and quantum logic.
It is shown that the algebraic polynomial formulation can be naturally
extended to operators in vector spaces. In this way propositional logic can
be formalized in linear algebra by using combinations of tensored elemen-
tary operators. The original and principal motivation of this work is for
applications in the new field of quantum information, differences are out-
lined with more traditional quantum logic approaches. This formulation is
named Eigenlogic [3].
The interesting feature is that the eigenvalues of these operators are
the truth values of the corresponding logical connective and the associated
eigenvectors correspond to one of the fixed combinations of the inputs (in-
terpretations). The outcome of a “measurement” or “observation” on a
logical observable will give the truth value of the associated logical proposi-
tion, and becomes “interpretable” when applied to its eigenspace leading to
a natural analogy with the measurement postulate in quantum mechanics.
The following diagram summarizes this point of view:
eigenvalues Ð→ truth values ; eigenvectors Ð→ interpretations ;
logical operators Ð→ connectives.
One can generalize to eigenvalues different from the Boolean binary val-
ues {0, 1} for example with {+1, −1} associated to self-inverse unitary op-
erators [2]. In general one can associate a binary logical operator with
whatever couple of distinct eigenvalues {λ1 , λ2 } the corresponding family
of logical operators can be found by Lagrange-Cayley-Hamilton matrix in-
terpolation methods. The extension from binary to many-valued logic is
then considered by defining specific operators using multivariate interpola-
tion. The interesting property is that a unique seed operator generates the
complete logical family of operators for a given m-valued n-arity system.
*
Laboratoire des Signaux et Systèmes

401
This method can be applied to the synthesis of binary and multivalued

quantum logical gates. Eigenlogic brings a correspondence between control
logic (David Deutsch’s quantum logical gate paradigm) and ordinary propo-
sitional logic. Several of the logical observables turn out to be well-known
quantum gates. It is well known that the 2-quibit entangling Control-Z
Cz gate in association with 1-quibit gates is a universal quantum gate set.
In Eigenlogic the Cz gate is the conjunction (AND) self-inverse Eigenlogic
operator. Following this approach a new design method of the universal
Toffoli gate, using T gates is proposed.
Ternary-logic quantum gates using qutrits lead to less complex circuits,
the design of a balanced qutrit arithmetic full-calculator circuit is realized
using an Eigenlogic approach [4].
In Eigenlogic all propositional binary and multivalued logic can be built
on the basis of a complete family of commuting logical observables. With
non-eigenvectors the logical operators are no more diagonal and correspond
to propositions with a fuzzy logic interpretation []2: the degree of truth
corresponding to the fuzzy membership function defined by the mean value
(Born rule) applied on the logical observables. Also when using two max-
imally incompatible logical families such as those generated by the X and
Z gates one gets an interesting outlook: the usual Grover gate turns out
to be the self-inverse Eigenlogic inclusive disjunction operator (OR) in the
X system and can be interpreted in the Z system as a predicative logical
existential connective. This could permit to extend the Eigenlogic approach
including first-order logic.
References
1. G. Boole, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic. Being an Essay To a
Calculus of Deductive Reasoning, 1847.
2. F. Dubois & Z. Toffano, “Eigenlogic: a Quantum View for Multiple-
Valued and Fuzzy Systems”, in International Symposium on Quantum
Interaction, QI 2016, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10106,
2017, pp. 239–251, arXiv:1607.03509.
3. Z. Toffano, “Eigenlogic in the spirit of George Boole”, arXiv:1512.06632,
Cornell University Library, 2015–2018.
4. Z. Toffano & F. Dubois, “Interpolating Binary and Multivalued Logi-
cal Quantum Gates”, The 4th International Electronic Conference on
Entropy and Its Applications, ECEA-4 2017, Proceedings * , vol. 2(4),
2018, http://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/2/4/152/pdf.
*
Proceedings (ISSN 2504-3900) publishes publications resulting from conferences, work-
shops and similar events.
402
Workshops
A Categorical Reconstruction of Quantum Theory

Sean Tull
[email protected]
The Hilbert space formulation of quantum theory has remained difficult
to interpret ever since its first description by von Neumann [9]. Over the
years this has led to numerous approaches to understanding quantum theory
from more basic, operational or formal principles. Recent years have seen
numerous ‘reconstructions’ of quantum theory as a theory of information
[5,2,6,10], singling it out via certain operational axioms from within the
framework of generalised probabilistic theories.
In parallel, the field of categorical quantum mechanics (CQM) [1] has
developed another more formal framework for studying general physical the-
ories, by representing them as monoidal categories, hugely general mathe-
matical structures in which one may speak of composable processes between
systems [4]. Categorical aspects are employed in many of the existing quan-
tum reconstructions, but these all rely on the extra assumption of finite
tomography, enforcing that the processes of any given type form a finite-
dimensional real vector space. This makes them less suitable as a logical
formalisation of quantum theory, and there has long been desired a purely-
process theoretic reconstruction in the spirit of CQM [3].
In this work, we present such a category-theoretic reconstruction of
quantum theory. More precisely, we present axioms which ensure that a
dagger-compact category C is equivalent to a generalised quantum theory
QuantS over a ring S. Further conditions then ensure that S is the ring
C of complex numbers, yielding the category QuantC of finite-dimensional
Hilbert spaces and completely positive maps. This result differs from pre-
vious reconstructions by being entirely category-theoretic in both its state-
ment and proof, in particular not assuming tomography. As such, it can be
seen as akin to other logical formalisation of quantum theory (such as [8])
and of quantum reasoning and computation more generally.
Even from the perspective of probabilistic theories, the reconstruction
is of interest. Avoiding tomography allows us to novelly reconstruct quan-
tum theory QuantR over real Hilbert spaces as well as QuantC , and we
show these to be the unique theories satisfying our axioms whose scalars
correspond to (unnormalised) probabilities. Our axioms also have an oper-
ational interpretation coming from their similarity to those of the so-called
‘Pavia’ reconstruction [2], particularly its axioms of ‘purification’, and also
of ‘perfect distinguishability’ and ‘ideal compressions’ which we explain to
correspond categorically to the existence of dagger kernels [7].
403
Our proof works from these axioms to show that the ‘pure’ processes in
our theory possess phased coproducts, a categorical feature we introduce to
describe superpositions in general process theories. In fact, we show that any
theory possessing these contains a copy of QuantS for some semi-ring S. This
provides a general and highly promising recipe for further reconstructions,
beyond our special axioms. In the future, we hope to use this to remove our
less operationally motivated axiom of dagger-compactness, to provide even
simpler and more intuitive categorical axioms for quantum theory.
References
1. S. Abramsky & B. Coecke, “A categorical semantics of quantum pro-
tocols”, in Proceedings of the 19th Annual IEEE * Symposium on Logic
in Computer Science, LICS ’04, 2004, pp. 415–425.
2. G. Chiribella, G.M. D’Ariano & P. Perinotti, “Informational derivation
of quantum theory”, Physical Review A, vol. 84(1), 2011.
3. B. Coecke & R. Lal, “Categorical quantum mechanics meets the pavia
principles: towards a representation theorem for cqm constructions”, in
Quantum Physics and Logic, hold in October 27–29, 2011, Nijmegen,
The Netherlands, p. 67, 2011.
4. B. Coecke & É.O. Paquette, “Categories for the Practising Physicist”,
in New Structures for Physics, edited by B. Coecke, Lecture Notes in
Physics, vol. 813, Springer, 2010, pp. 173–286.
5. L. Hardy, “Quantum Theory From Five Reasonable Axioms”, arXiv:
quant-ph/0101012, Cornell University Library, 2001.
6. L. Hardy, “Reformulating and Reconstructing Quantum Theory”, arXiv:
7. C. Heunen & B. Jacobs, “Quantum logic in dagger kernel categories”,
‘Order, vol. 27(2), 2010, pp. 177–212.
8. M.P. Solèr, “Characterization of Hilbert spaces by orthomodular spaces”,
Communications in Algebra, vol. 23(1), 1995, pp. 219–243.
9. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,
10. A. Wilce, “A Royal Road to Quantum Theory (or Thereabouts)”,
extended abstract, in Proceedings of 13th International Conference
on Quantum Physics and Logic, QPL 2016, University of Strathclyde,
UK, June 6–10, 2016, arXiv:1701.00664.
*

Logic in Computer Science
404
Workshops
Negations and Truth-perspectives pertaining to Qudit based

Multi-valued Quantum Computational Logics
Ranjith Venkatrama, Roberto Giuntini & Giuseppe Sergioli
University of Cagliari, Italy
[email protected]
In the present work, certain peculiar aspects of the concept of Negation

pertaining to the circuit model of quantum computation are explored in the
framework of a continuous t-norms based fuzzy-type representation of qudit
based multivalued quantum computational logics.
405
15 – Sessions
Universal
The keynote speaker at this session is Alexander Paseau (page 149).
Logics as models versus logics as proposals

Pavel Arazim
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
[email protected]
Robert Brandom contrasted his inferentialist approach to language with

what he called representationalism. While representationalism sees the
essence of meaningfulness of our language in the relation between an ex-
pression and its denotation, inferentialism sees the normative relations of
consequence and incompatibility between statements as primary. This gen-
eral viewpoint leads to an unorthodox stance on the significance of logic,
namely to logical expressivism, which claims that logic is here primarily to
make the relations of consequence and incompatibility between sentences of
our languages explicit.
We will extend this inferentialist approach also into philosophy of logic.
From Brandom’s viewpoint, it is obvious that the logic which we use to
make inference rules explicit must have always been present in our language
in the workings of specifically logical expressions, such as or, not, if, then,
etc. We did not have to wait for the formal logics of Frege or even Aristotle
in order to have the capacity to make inference rules explicit, as Brandom
mentions Socrates as the great practitioner of expressive rationality.
Nevertheless, given the many formal logics which exist today, we should
wonder how they relate to the logic inherent in natural languages? Clearly,
many answers have already been provided, yet a specifically inferentialist
one — taking logical expressivism seriously — still has to be found. In fact,
there is a temptation for the inferentialists to fall prey to representationalism
on a higher level and see the various formal logics as representations of the
logic which is implicit in our language and which we use for expression of
rules. This temptation, I believe, should be resisted.
First of all, there are good reasons to doubt the point of modelling or
representing the logic inherent in our language. Clearly, there are many
407
fascinating phenomena which we endeavour to model in our languages and

theories, for example the movements of galaxies etc. Yet what would be so
fascinating about modelling the behaviour of a few quite common words of
our natural languages? I rather propose to see logics as proposals of modi-
fications of our everyday logical practice of making inference rules explicit.
Any parts of our languages can and in fact do develop in multifarious
ways. The development does not primarily happen by our arbitrary decrees
to start using this or that expression in this or that sense. Rather, it is
typically a spontaneous and organic development. Yet it can always be to
some degree marshalled by us, exactly by making some of the problematic
rules explicit and therewith enabling discussion about whether they are rea-
sonable. Equally in case of logic, we can gain some limited control over the
development by means of various formal logics. As there are typically more
ways in which we can develop our logical practice, so there are different
logics.They show us new ways the complex of logical expressions could be
used. Thus they cultivate our logical capacity and possibly influence it. As
for the representationalist view the plurality of logics meant a complication
which had to be somehow resolved and explained, for my view this pluralism
is seen from the very beginning as an asset. The plurality of logic does not
mean that we are unsure about what logical laws really hold but rather that
we gain more control over them and therewith attain a new kind of freedom.
References
1. J.C. Beall & G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press,
2006.
2. R.B. Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Dis-
cursive Commitment, Harvard University Press, 1994.
3. J. Peregrin, Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter, Palgrave Macmillan,
2014.
Preservationist Consequence and Logical Pluralism

Bryson Brown
Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge, Canada
[email protected]
The possibility of preservationist treatments of consequence relations

arises naturally from Dana Scott’s treatment of multiple conclusion con-
sequence relations [4]. In his paper, Scott demonstrated (in the course of
defending the honour of modal logic against certain Quinean objections)
408
Sessions
that any reflexive, monotonic and transitive relation on a language is

determined by the set of 1/0 valuations on the language L such that, for Γ
and ∆ subsets of L, Γ ∆ holds if and only if Γ ∆, where Γ ∆ if and
only if every valuation that assigns 1 to every member of Γ also assigns 1
to at least one member of ∆.
This result has a straightforward intuitive reading: some property of
the sentences of the language is preserved (from left to right) by any such
consequence relation, while the complementary property is preserved from
right to left. There are many reflexive, monotonic and transitive relations
on the sentences of an arbitrary language, all of which can be understood as
‘preserving’ some property of premises from left to right (and equivalently,
as preserving the complement of that property from right to left). However,
the 1/0 valuations that determine these relations are only fully expressed in
a multiple conclusion consequence relation.
In particular, some criticism of proof-theoretic treatments [3] assume
single conclusion relation in which the union of the consequences of a
consistent premise set Γ are the intersection of the maximal consistent sets
including the premises. But in a multiple-conclusion consequence relation,
the minimal ‘cross-sections’ of the conclusion sets, i.e., the least sets of
sentences which intersect every conclusion set–are the maximal sets of sen-
tences including all the premises and having the ‘property’ preserved by the
consequence relation [2]. In the case of classical logic these are the maximal
consistent supersets of the premises.
1/0 valuations on a language don’t just determine what individual sen-
tences ‘follow from’ assigning all members of a premise set the value 1: they
also capture all the sets of sentences at least one of which is assigned the
value 1 when all members of the premise set are assigned the value 1. Sim-
ilarly, multiple conclusion logics allow proof theory to capture the maximal
consistent sets that satisfy the premises, rather than just their intersection.
The generality of Scott’s result suggests a preservationist approach to con-
sequence relations, while encouraging a broader, pluralistic perspective on
them.
References
1. J.-Y. Beziau, M. Chakraborty & S. Dutta (editors), New Directions in
Paraconsistent Logic: Proceedings of the 5th World Congress on Para-
consistency, Kolkata, India, February 2014, Springer, 2015.
2. B. Brown, “Symmetrical Preservation Relations and Cognitive Com-
mitments”, in [1].
3. P. Raatikainen, “On rules of inference and the meanings of logical con-
stants”, Analysis, vol. 68(300), 2008, pp. 282–287, doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8284.2008.00754.x.
409
4. D. Scott, “On engendering an illusion of understanding”, Journal of

Philosophy, vol. 68(21), 1971, pp. 787–807.
?
Universal Logic = Logic of the Universal
Laurent Dubois
Free University of Brussels, Belgium
[email protected]
Is “Universal Logic”, if any, obligatory the fundamental Logic of the

Universal (Universe)? The question will lead to interesting conclusive ques-
tions:
— What is the “real power” of Universal Logic and Logic in general?
— Which lessons can be drawn on the supposed functioning of the Uni-
verse?
Before that, the initial questioning induces more fundamental questions:
— What does the expression “Universal Logic” mean?
— What does the expression “Logic of the Universal” mean?
So we need a definition of:
— Universe: what do we mean by “Universe”?
— Logic: what do we mean by Logic?
Let us note that, contrary to the appearances, our talk will not con-
cern “embedment” of questioning, even if a full interesting article could be
devoted to the topic!
As a starting point of the development of our talk, we suggest to consider
the “Systematic Creativity” process, where logic (systematicity) is beat by
Divergence (Creativity), as the first fundamental Law of the universe.
Indeed, initially, at the so-called beginning of the universe, no standard
logic. Why?
What the initial hypothesis is to explain the origin of the universe, it
corresponds to “non-standard logic”:
— “Eternity” model, with or without divinity: unary logic (1)
— “Spontaneous generation” model: no logic (Λ)
— “Less than nothing” model: negative logic (-1)
We suggest the “Extended Evolution” process as the second fundamental
law of the universe. At the universal level, the law of evolution is charac-
terized by the notion of “qualitative jump”.
This is where the concept of “Logico-Divergence” can be introduced.
410
Sessions
Binary Logic will appear to be a subset of Systematic Creativity. (Do

we see limits in “set” approach? Systematic creativity is not a set, not even
a category, this is a law; does it prevent us to use the “set” notion in our
descriptions?) In any case, logic appears in a second time. So it is not
fundamental.
We will conclude by proposing a new approach of the notion of Universal
Logic.
References
1. J. Barwise, “Axioms for abstract model theory”, Annals of Logic, vol. 7,
1974, pp. 221–265.
2. J.-Y. Beziau (editor), Logica Universalis: Towards a General Theory of
Logic, 2nd edition, Springer, 2007.
3. J.-Y. Beziau (editor), Universal Logic: An Anthology — From Paul
Hertz to Dov Gabbay, Springer, 2012.
4. A. Koslow and A. Buchsbaum (editors), The Road to Universal Logic:
Festschrift for 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau, Volume I, Birkhäuser,
2015.
5. R. Brady, Universal Logic, CSLI* Publications, 2006.
6. L. Dubois, “Lambda Theory: introduction of a constant for “nothing”
into set theory, a model of consistency and most noticeable conclusions”,
Logique et Analyse, vol. 56(222), 2013, pp. 165–181.
Characterizing Context-Independent Logical Notions Among

the Context-Dependent Ones. The Case of Quantifiers and
Inferences
Stanislaw Krajewski
[email protected]
Context is essential in virtually all human activities. Yet some logical

notions seem to be context free. The matter is not that simple as each
application of a notion, even a logical one, depends on the context of the
application. For example, the universal quantifier refers to all elements of
the explicit or intended domain. The domain constitutes its context. How-
ever, the nature of the universal quantifier, the very meaning of “all”, seems
to be independent of the context. Similarly, all real life inferences and also
actual mathematical proofs are context dependent because they use many
*
Center for the Study of Language and Information
411
assumptions assumed to be true in the context of the specific reasoning.

However, purely logical consequence seems to be context independent, and
it is sometimes operative in the binding mathematical and also real-life
conclusions.
Whereas “all” seems context-free there are many quantifier expressions
and some are context-independent while other ones are not. Similarly, some-
times the logical consequence is hidden inside an inference while much more
often we encounter strong inferences, good enough for practical purposes
but not valid.
The two types of examples suggest a general problem, here applied to
logic only: How to characterize the context-free logical concepts in their nat-
ural environment, that is in the field of their context-dependent associates.
This approach is generally not adopted in logical considerations, even in
the philosophy of logic. The focus usually is on the strictest notions, the
most context-independent and the easiest to treat formally. To consider
the context-free notions as special, maybe extreme, cases in a broader field
of related context-dependent notions can hopefully shed light on all these
concepts. It would be good to have a general method or approach cov-
ering all such situations, but there is no guarantee that a uniform way of
characterizing context-independence is possible.
In the paper, the issue of quantifiers is treated in the way presented in
the forthcoming [4]. A general thesis is formulated: among all quantifiers,
the context-free ones are just those definable by the universal quantifier.
The issue of inferences is treated according to [1,2], where, however, the
subject is not presented as a study of context (in)dependence. The treat-
ment is not fundamentally novel; yet it does stress the unity of all inferences:
the valid ones are an extreme case, the result of disappearance of context-
dependence. This idea is especially nicely applied, as mentioned in [3], to
an analysis of a form of abduction, called “reductive inference” in Polish
literature on logic.
References
1. R.L. Epstein, Critical Thinking, Wadsworth Publishing, 1st edition,
1998.
2. R.L. Epstein, Five Ways of Saying “Therefore”: Arguments, Proofs,
Conditionals, Cause and Effect, Explanations, 2nd edition, Wadsworth
Publishing, 2001.
3. S. Krajewski, “Wnioskowania prawomocne i mocne: jednolite podejście
do wnioskowań niezawodnych i uprawdopodobniajacych”,
, in Identy-
cznosc znaku czy znak identycznosci, edited by J. Golinska-Pilarek &
A. Wojtowicz, Wydawnictwa UW, Warsaw, 2012, pp. 247–254.
412
Sessions
4. S. Krajewski, “All Quantifiers versus the Quantifier All”, The Lvov-

Warsaw School. Past and Present, edited by A. Garrido & U. Wybraniec-
Skardowska, Birkhäuser, Basel, Switzerland, 2018.
Intensionality as a unifier: Logic, Language and Philosophy

Marı́a Manzano
University of Salamanca, Spain
[email protected]
Manuel A. Martins
CIDMA* , Department of Mathematics,
University of Aveiro, Portugal
[email protected]
Manuel C. Moreno
[email protected]
Intensional Logic as understood here is a research program based upon

the broad presupposition that so-called “intensional contexts” in natural
language can be explained semantically by the idea of multiple reference.
Our present contribution is a natural consequence of our previous re-
search in Hybrid Intensional Logic. We have defined several systems of
intensional logic from a formal point of view; namely, Hybrid Type Theory
(HTT) [1], Equational Hybrid Propositional Type Theory (EHPTT) [2] and
Intensional Hybrid Type Theory (IHTT) [3]. During the definition of them
we were aware of the fact that our systems were trying to solve a variety of
problems that arise not only in humanities but also in science. Moreover,
we now believe that intensionality can serve as a unifying tool from a log-
ical perspective as well as from a linguistic and philosophical one. That is
the main objective of this research work,i.e., to present Intensional Logic
as a unifying tool of research in distinct areas, such as logic, philosophy
and linguistics. From a logical perspective, the field of combining logics,
has a philosophical interest, and could also be motivated from a practical
perspective whose goal is to obtain new logic systems from old, by inte-
grating features and preserving properties to a reasonable extent. We have
been working in a special kind of combined logic, Equational Hybrid Propo-
sitional Type Theory, which combines three heterogeneous logics, namely
propositional type theory, equational logic and hybrid modal logic. The
driving force of that combination was intensionality.
*
Center for Research and Development in Mathematics and Applications
413
Most of the issues treated in intensional logic have their roots in phi-
losophy. A look to the history reveals that modal notions (like necessity or
possibility) as well as the distinctions between de re and de dicto readings
of sentences are present all over.
The treatment of the identity concept and its distinction from the also
binary relation of equal denotation between terms of the formal language
can also be analyzed from a philosophical perspective.
In particular, we were surprised by the philosophical concept of nomi-
nalism. The models we have created in our completeness proofs need only
terms of the language and maximal consistent sets of sentences with partic-
ular extra properties. We wonder if, following ideas of Leon Henkin, we can
dispense with sets and relations in the definition of models by using sets of
formulas instead, and limit the existing objects to individuals. When modal,
hybrid and intensional logics are taken into account this view gains force as
it is in consonance with Carnap’s view of worlds as maximal consistent sets
of sentences.
References
1. C. Areces, P. Blackburn, A. Huertas & M. Manzano, “Completeness
in Hybrid Type Theory”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 43(2–3),
2014, pp. 209–238.
2. M. Manzano, M.A. Martins & A. Huertas, “Completeness in Equational
Hybrid Propositional Type Theory”, forthcoming.
3. M.C. Moreno, Intensions, Types and Existence, PhD thesis, University
of Salamanca, Spain, 2017.
414
Sessions
Modular analysis of Hilbert calculi*

Sérgio Marcelino & Carlos Caleiro
SQIG , Telecommunications Institute,
Department of Mathematics, Higher Technical Institute,
[email protected],
[email protected]
Culminating a long research path, we have recently identified the inter-

action patterns of combined Hilbert calculi, and established the ingredients
of a workable modular semantics for them. In this presentation we shall
give an overview of these contributions by means of illustrating examples.
Namely, in [3], we have played a game where we depart from different
Hilbert calculi given by subsets of rules for classical implication (→) and
bottom (¬), and study the negations defined by the usual abbreviation
(¬A ∶= A → ) in each of the given logics. In each case we extract a semantics
for the defined →, -logics using the general recipes for fibred logics [2,5],
and then also for the corresponding ¬-only fragment. Using [1] we further
obtain upper bounds for the complexity associated to deciding these logics.
In a distinct setting, in [4], we take advantage of the same technical
tools and of Post’s classification in order to show that classical logic cannot
be broken into two disjoint non-functionally complete fragments (except in
very extreme circumstances). Using the general recipe for fibring we can
now give semantics to the myriad logics obtained by combining different
fragments of classical logic.
References
1. S. Marcelino & C. Caleiro, “Decidability and complexity of fibred logics
without shared connectives”, Logic Journal of the IGPL , vol. 24(5),
2016, pp. 673–707, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzw033.
2. S. Marcelino & C. Caleiro, “Disjoint fibring of non-deterministic matri-
ces”, in Logic, Language, Information, and Computation: 24th Inter-
national Workshop, 2017, edited by J. Kennedy & R. Queiroz, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10388, pp. 242–255, 2017.
3. C. Caleiro, S. Marcelino & U. Rivieccio, “Plug and play negations”,
Studia Logica, special volume on “Between Consistency and Paracon-
sistency”, to be published.
*
This work was done under the scope of R&D Unit 50008, financed by the applicable
financial framework (FCT/MEC through national funds and when applicable co-funded
by FEDER/PT2020).

Security and Quantum Information Group
415
4. C. Caleiro, S. Marcelino & J. Marcos, “Merging Fragments of Classical

Logic”, in International Symposium on Frontiers of Combining Sys-
tems, FroCoS 2017, edited by C. Dixon & M. Finger, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 10483, 2017, pp. 298–315, doi:10.1007/978-3-
319-66167-4 17.
5. C. Caleiro & S. Marcelino, “Fibring partial non-deterministic matri-
ces”, in abstract booklet of ISRALOG17 * , 2017, http://www.tau.ac.il/
∼yotamdvir/isralog17/abstract booklet.pdf, pp. 60–63.
Semantics for combined Hilbert calculi

Sérgio Marcelino & Carlos Caleiro
SQIG , Telecommunications Institute,
Department of Mathematics, Higher Technical Institute,
[email protected],
[email protected]
Combining Hilbert calculi is well known to correspond to the mecha-

nism of fibring logics, yielding the smallest (Tarskian) logic that extends
the components. Moreover, Hilbert calculi are notoriously non-modular,
which makes their understanding particularly challenging. In this talk, cul-
minating a long research path, we will finally outline the ingredients of a
workable semantics for them [1,2]. The results rely on using possibly par-
tial non-deterministic matrices instead of the most common logical matrices,
and on the properties of a straightforward but rich saturation operation. Us-
ing them, we show how to directly obtain complete semantics for combined
Hilbert calculi by suitably combining the semantics of their components.
We illustrate the results with some meaningful examples.
References
1. S. Marcelino & C. Caleiro, “Disjoint fibring of non-deterministic matri-
ces”, in Logic, Language, Information, and Computation: 24th Inter-
national Workshop, 2017, edited by J. Kennedy & R. Queiroz, Lecture
*
Research Workshop of the Israel Science Foundation

This work was done under the scope of R&D Unit 50008, financed by the applicable
financial framework (FCT/MEC through national funds and when applicable co-funded
by FEDER/PT2020).
Security and Quantum Information Group
416
Sessions
2. C. Caleiro & S. Marcelino, “Fibring partial non-deterministic matri-

ces”, in abstract booklet of ISRALOG17 * , 2017, http://www.tau.ac.il/
∼yotamdvir/isralog17/abstract booklet.pdf, pp. 60–63.
On Dissent Pluralism and Paradigm-shifts

from plural perspectives
Tony Marmo
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
Keywords: Pluralism, Philosophical Logic, History and Philosophy of

Logic, History and Philosophy of Science, Paradigm-shift.
We explore the evolution of Logic in the West in terms of paradigm-

shifts. Here we propose that paradigms themselves should be understood
by the kind of debates in which researchers engage, to wit, by the exemplary
questions they choose to investigate or exemplary distinctions they use dur-
ing a certain era. Some distinctions are crucial for theoretical construction,
but are not represented in the theories they underline, or even remain in-
accessible for a long time. Paradigm shifts coincide with the introduction
of new distinctions that allow researchers to access the other crucial dis-
tinctions that had not been accessed previously: this movement occurs as
a consequence of production conditions on the research, which includes the
effort to solve operational problems accrued against one paradigm. Here, we
propose that the prevalence of logical pluralism is the result of such process.
Paradigm-shifts involve the non-accumulativeness and incommensurability
issues: here we focus the former, whilst the latter will be examined in an-
other work.
*
Research Workshop of the Israel Science Foundation
417
Disjunctive and conjunctive multiple-conclusion consequence

relations
Marek Nowak
University of Lódź, Poland
[email protected]
In 1978 [2] (cf. also [3]) a concept of multiple-conclusion consequence

relation was introduced. It is a binary relation ⊆ ℘(L) × ℘(L) defined on
the Boolean algebra of all subsets of a set of formulas L, satisfying for any
X, X ′ , Y, Y ′ ⊆ L the following conditions:
Overlap: X ∩ Y ≠ ∅ ⇒ X Y ,
Dilution: X ⊆ X ′ , Y ⊆ Y ′ , X Y ⇒ X ′ Y ′ ,
Cut for Sets: ∀S ⊆ L[∀Z ⊆ S(X ∪ Z Y ∪ (S − Z)) ⇒ X Y ].
In turn, in [1], a concept of a multiple conclusion consequence relation
was introduced as a reflexive and transitive relation ⊆ ℘(L) × ℘(L) sat-
isfying the conditions:
Y ⊆X ⇒ X Y,
X ⋃{Y ⊆ L ∶ X Y }.
This new multiple conclusion consequence relation can be called con-
junctive as a finite set Y of conclusions in case X Y is equivalent, in a
sense, to the conjunction of conclusions. This is in opposition to the former
multiple conclusion consequence relation, where a set of conclusions may be
interpreted disjunctively.
Both types of consequence relations are generalized to be defined on any
complete lattice (A, ≤). The disjunctive relation (i.e., in the sense of Smiley)
is associated with the following standard Galois connection
f ∶ (℘(A2 ), ⊆) Ð→ (℘(A), ⊆), g∶ (℘(A), ⊆) Ð→ (℘(A2 ), ⊆)∶

for any ρ ⊆ A2 , x, y, t ∈ A and T ⊆ A∶
t ∈ f (ρ) iff ∀(x, y) ∈ ρ (x ≤ t ⇒ y ∧ t ≠ 0A ),
(x, y) ∈ g(T ) iff ∀t ∈ T (x ≤ t ⇒ y ∧ t ≠ 0A ).
The counterdomain of the mapping g is just the set of all disjunctive

relations defined on (A, ≤). In turn, the conjunctive relation is associated
with the Galois connection (f1 , g1 ) defined by
t ∈ f1 (ρ) iff ∀(x, y) ∈ ρ (x ≤ t ⇒ y ≤ t),
(x, y) ∈ g1 (T ) iff ∀t ∈ T (x ≤ t ⇒ y ≤ t).
418
Sessions
The counterdomain of g1 is the set of all conjunctive relations defined

on (A, ≤).
Some theorems which are consequences of those Galois connections (es-
pecially when some enriching conditions are put on the lattice (A, ≤)) are
established.
References
1. M. Nowak, “A syntactic approach to closure operation”, Bulletin of the
Section of Logic, vol. 46(3–4), 2017, pp. 219–232.
2. D.J. Shoesmith & T.J. Smiley, Multiple-conclusion Logic, Cambridge
3. J. Zygmunt, An Essay in Matrix Semantics for Consequence Relations,
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, Wroclaw, Poland, 1984.
S5 is a semi-bivalent logic, and so is classical logic

Fabien Schang
[email protected]
Let ∣∣ϕ∣∣ = X ⇒ Y an arbitrary valuation for a given sentence ϕ, where

X is the input value and Y is the output value of ϕ.
The Principle of Bivalence (PBV) can be defined as a combination of
valuation rules:
(PBV) A proposition is either true or false, not both.
This means that, for any ϕ, the lack of both truth and falsity is excluded:
(PBV1 ) 1 ⇒ 0, and (PBV2 ) 0 ⇒ 1.
This also means that the occurrence of both truth and falsity is also
excluded:
(PBV3 ) 1 ⇒ 0, and (PBV4 ) 0 ⇒ 1.
Likewise, sentential negation (NEG) can also be defined by valuation
rules:
(NEG) A sentence ϕ is false if and only if its negation ¬ϕ is true.
This means that the negation of non-falsity yields falsity, and conversely:
(NEG1 ) 0 ⇒ 0, and (NEG2 ) 0 ⇒ 0.
This also means that the negation of non-truth yields truth, and con-
versely:
(NEG3 ) 1 ⇒ 1, and (NEG4 ) 1 ⇒ 1.
Then it can be shown that both (PBV) and (NEG) can be translated into
a 4-valued logic AR4 in the form of affirmative operators [a] and negative
419
operators [n]. We want to defend two main theses about modal logic S5
and classical logic CL, considered as closed sets of theorems:
(1) S5 can be characterized by a semi-bivalent affirmative operator
[viii]ϕ = ([ii] ⊗ [iii])ϕ obeying (PBV2 ) and (PBV3 ), together with a
Morganian and non-Boolean negation obeying none of (NEG1 )–(NEG4 ).
(2) CL can be characterized by a semi-bivalent affirmative operator
[x]ϕ = ([i] ⊗ [iv])ϕ obeying (PBV1 ) and (PBV4 ), together with a
Morganian and Boolean negation obeying all of (NEG1 )–(NEG4 ).
References
1. F. Berto, “A Modality Called ‘Negation’ ”, Mind, vol. 124(495), 2015,
pp. 761–793.
2. J.-Y. Béziau, “Bivalence, excluded middle and non contradiction”, in
The Logica Yearbook 2003, edited by L. Behounek, Academy of Sciences,
Prague, 2003, pp. 73–84.
3. J.-Y. Béziau, “Classical negation can be expressed by one of its halves”,
Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 7(2), 1999, pp. 145–151.
4. J.-Y. Béziau, “S5 is a paraconsistent logic and so is first-order classical
logic”, Logical Investigations, vol. 9, 2002, pp. 301–309.
5. J.-Y. Béziau, “A new four-valued approach to modal logic”, Logique et
Analyse, vol. 54(213), 2011, pp. 109–121.
6. J. Dugundji, “Note on a property of matrices for Lewis and Langford’s
calculi of propositions”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 5(4), 1940,
pp. 150–151.
7. J.M. Font & P. Hajek, “On Lukasiewicz’s four-valued logic”, Studia
Logica, vol. 70, 2002, pp. 157–182.
8. J. Lukasiewicz, “A system of modal logic”, Journal of Computing Sys-
tems, vol. 1(3), 1953, pp. 111–149.
9. R. Purtill, “Four-valued tables and modal logic”, Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, vol. 11, 1970, pp. 505–511.
10. F. Schang & A. Costa-Leite, “Une sémantique générale des croyances
justifiées”, CLE e-Prints, vol. 16(3), 2016, pp. 1–24.
*

420
Sessions
Internal Logic of the H-B topos and Universal Metalogic*

Vladimir L. Vasyukov
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
[email protected]
For each topos one can define a language which would be employed as a
convenient mean for yielding statements on objects and arrows of the topos
in question or even for proving theorems about them. Brief description of
the language and zero-order topos logic, formulated in this language, could
be found, for example, in [1].
Chris Mortensen, in his book “Inconsistent Mathematics” [2], introduced
the notion of complement topos where internal logic is dual to the usual logic
of standard topos. A principal peculiarity of complemented topos lies in a
presence of complement classifier in the latter. At the same time Mortensen
shown that a complement classifier in a topos Set is indistinguishable (via
categorical methods) from a standard subobject classifier, that they are
isomorphic. Thus, in Set we always have paraconsistency because of the
presence of both types of subobject classifiers. And complement toposes
support paraconsistency logic via Brouwerian algebra in a way exactly par-
allel to the way toposes support intuitionistic logic via Heyting algebras.
Since toposes support intuitionistic logics due to reflecting the Heyting
algebra structure by subobject classifier then in a complement topos comple-
ment classifier reflects the Brouwerian algebra structure respectively. Hence,
to describe an internal logic of complement topos we have to proceed in a
dual way. Taking that into account L. Estrada-Gonzáles in [3] presented a
sequent calculus for the zero-order complement topos logic.
But it seems that this ‘abstract’ categorical structure of toposes is prin-
cipally twofold by its nature. Actually, Heyting logic and Brouwer logic
always appear as Siamese twins — if one is given then the second might
be reconstructed. So, maybe in this case we should discuss not the stan-
dard topos alone and not the complement topos alone but another type of
category which, in a sense, contains them both.
The respective an H-B topos would be defined as a topos for which an
algebra of subobjects of any object is a semi-Boolean algebra [4]. It might
be regarded as the join of Heyting and Brouwerian algebras. For an H-B
topos one can also define an internal typed language and internal logic which
would be employed as a convenient mean for yielding statements on objects
and arrows of such topos in question.
*
This research is supported by RFH grant 16-03-00364.
421
A non-standard example of H-B topos is a category of logical systems

Log introduced within the framework of Universal Logic [5]. Universal Logic
itself should be consider as a general theory of logical systems regarded as a
specific kind of mathematical structures the same manner Universal Alge-
bra treats algebraic systems. A category-theoretical approach where logical
systems are combined in a category of the special sort provides us with some
basis for inquiring the universe of Universal Logic. The category Log ap-
pears to be, in fact, the H-B topos. Internal logic of Log in this case would
serve as a convenient tool for obtaining statements about the Universe of
Universal Logic being a system of universal metalogic — a logic of logical
systems and their translations.
References
1. C. McLarty, Elementary Categories, Elementary Toposes, Clarendon
Press, 1992.
2. C. Mortensen, Inconsistent Mathematics, Springer, 1995.
3. L. Estrada-González, “From (Paraconsistent) Topos Logic to Universal
(Topos) Logic”, in The Road to Universal Logic: Festschrift for 50th
Birthday of Jean-Yves Béziau, Volume II, edited by A. Koslow & A.
Buchsbaum, Birkhäuser, 2015, pp. 263–296.
4. C. Rauszer, An algebraic and Kripke-style approach to a certain ex-
tension of intuitionistic logic, Dissertationes Mathematicae, vol. 167,
PWN* , Warsaw, Poland, 61 pages, 1980.
5. V.L. Vasyukov, “Structuring the Universe of Universal Logic”, Logica
Universalis, vol. 1(2), 2007, pp. 277–294.
Tarski: Logical Concepts as Invariants

Jan Woleński
Rzeszów, Poland
[email protected]
Tarski’s analysis of logical concepts was modelled on Klein’s program in

the foundations of geometry. Roughly speaking, this program consisted in
considering geometrical notions as invariant under definite transformations.
Tarski together with Lindenbaum applied a similar idea to logical concepts
in the 1930s; they even planned a monograph (in German) devoted to this
topic (the book was even announced but never published). In the 1950s,
*
422
Sessions
1960s and 1970s, Tarski delivered at least three lectures on the nature of
logical concepts, but his related work was posthumously published in 1986
(in History and Philosophy of Logic). According to Tarski, a concept is
just logical provided that “it is invariant under all possible one-one trans-
formations of the world onto itself”. The adequacy of this characterization
depends whether we work in the type theory (the answer is “yes”) or ax-
iomatic set theory (the answer is negative). Thus, logicism can be defended
in the former scheme, but not in the latter. The problem is how to relate
invariance of logical notions to the universality of logic.
423
Modal
Polynomial Semantics for Normal Modal Logics
Juan C. Agudelo-Agudelo
Institute of Mathematics,
University of Antioquia, Medellin, Colombia
[email protected]
The Polynomial Ring Calculus (PRC) introduced in [4] is an algebraic

proof method that consists in translating formulas into multivariate poly-
nomials over finite fields and in reducing polynomials in order to determine
whether a formula is a theorem or not. The PRC works for every finite-
valued logic and even for some paraconsistent logics that cannot be charac-
terised by a finite-valued matrix. The PRC is extended to the modal logic
S5 in [1] and to the modal logics K, KD, T and S4 in [2].
PRC is not the only method that proposes to interpret formulas of a logic
system into polynomials and to use algebraic properties and algorithms to
solve logic questions. In [5], for instance, formulas of finite-valued logics are
also translated into polynomials over finite fields and several logic questions
are algebraically characterised. Then, it is shown that the theory of Gröbner
bases can be used to solve these logic questions.
In [3], it is given an abstract definition of whether a propositional logic
is characterised by polynomials and the methods in [4,5] are combined and
generalized.
In this work we extend the results in [1,2], following the approach in [3].
In summary, we show that any normal modal logic can be characterised by
polynomials and that the theory of Gröbner bases can also be applied to
solve logical questions in any of these logics.
References
1. J.C. Agudelo-Agudelo & W. Carnielli, “Polynomial ring calculus for
modal logics: a new semantics and proof method for modalities”, The
Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4(1), 2011, pp. 150–170.
2. J.C. Agudelo-Agudelo & W. Carnielli, “Polynomial ring calculus for
modalities”, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 27(6), 2017,
pp. 1853–1870, doi:10.1093/logcom/exv069.
3. J.C. Agudelo-Agudelo, C.A. Agudelo-González & O.E. Garcı́a-Quintero,
“On polynomial semantics for propositional logics”, Journal of Applied
Non-Classical Logics, vol. 26(2), 2016, pp. 103–125.
424
Sessions
4. W. Carnielli, “Polynomial ring calculus for logical inference”, CLE *

e-Prints, vol. 5, 2005, pp. 1–17.
5. J. Chazarain, A. Riscos, J.A. Alonso & E. Briales, “Multi-valued logic
and Gröbner bases with applications to modal logic”, Journal of Sym-
bolic Computation, vol. 11(3), 1991, pp. 181–194.
Divided modality for Ockhamists

Jacob Archambault
Highlands Latin School, Louisville, USA
[email protected]
The earliest known treatise on consequences to discuss modality be-

longs to William of Ockham, and is to be found in his Summa Logicae.
Central to Ockham’s account is his distinction between composite and di-
vided modality. Contemporary literature addressing the topic assimilates
Ockham’s distinction between composite and divided modality to one of
scope: in a composite modal proposition, the modality takes wide scope,
while it takes narrow scope in a divided one. But this representation ren-
ders aspects of Ockham’s account incoherent. In this paper, I provide a
coherent and complete account of the relations between categorical modal
propositions of subject-predicate form on Ockham’s approach. I show the
Ockhamist distinction between divided and composite modals is orthogo-
nal to Russellian considerations of scope: for Ockham, a modal proposition
with syntactically wide scope will always have both a composite and a di-
vided reading. However, the difficulty in representing Ockham’s views arises
not so much from modality, as the ways in which modality interacts with
quantification and negation. After describing these difficulties, the relations
between divided Ockhamist modals are catalogued, then illustrated with an
example from Ockham’s text.
*
425
Hypersequential Argumentation Frameworks:

An Instantiation in the Modal Logic S5 *
AnneMarie Borg
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
[email protected]
Ofer Arieli
School of Computer Science,
The Academic College of Tel-Aviv, Israel
[email protected]
Logical argumentation is a branch of argumentation theory in which ar-
guments have a specific structure. This includes formalisms that are based
on Tarskian logics [e.g. 3], in which classical logic is the deductive base (the
so-called core logic). The latter were generalized in [1] to sequent-based ar-
gumentation, where Gentzen’s sequents [5] are incorporated for representing
arguments, and attacks are formulated by sequent elimination rules. The
result is a generic and modular approach to logical argumentation, in which
any logic with a corresponding sound and complete sequent calculus can be
used as the underlying core logic.
In this work we further extend sequent-based argumentation to hyper-
sequents [2]. This is a powerful generalization of Gentzen’s sequents which
was used for providing cut-free Gentzen-type systems to a variety of non-
classical logics such as Gödel-Dummett intermediate logic LC, the modal
logic S5, and the relevance logic RM. It allows a high degree of parallelism
in constructing proofs and has some applications in the proof theory of fuzzy
logics. In the context of argumentation theory, the incorporation of hyper-
sequents allows to split sequents into different components, and so different
rationality postulates [4] can be satisfied, some of which are not available
otherwise.
The usefulness of hypersequential argumentation is illustrated here on
frameworks whose core logic is S5. We show that the hypersequent-based
argumentation framework that is based on this well-studied and applicable
modal logic yields a defeasible variant of S5 with several desirable properties.
We consider some of these properties and discuss the potential applications
of this framework for argumentation with conflicting norms, temporal rea-
soning, multi-agents argumentation, and other forms of reasoning by (dy-
namic) epistemic logics.
*
The first author is supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Ger-
man Ministry for Education and Research.
Both authors are supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant 817/15).
426
Sessions
References
1. O. Arieli and C. Straßer, “Sequent-based logical argumentation”, Argu-
ment and Computation, vol. 6(1), 2015, pp. 73–99.
2. A. Avron, “A constructive analysis of RM”, Symbolic Logic, vol. 52(4),
1987, pp. 939–951.
3. P. Besnard & A. Hunter, “A logic-based theory of deductive arguments”,
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 128(1-2), 2001, pp. 203–235.
4. M. Caminada and L. Amgoud, “On the evaluation of argumentation
formalisms”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 171(5), 2007, pp. 286–310.
5. G. Gentzen, “Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen I, II”, Ma-
thematische Zeitschrift, vol. 39, 1934, pp. 176–210, pp. 405–431.
Intensional: what it is about?

Antonia Huertas
Open University of Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain
[email protected]
Marı́a Manzano & Manuel C. Moreno

In general, a formal language consists of a set of well-formed formulas

that expresses meanings to which correspond denotations. Formulas might
involve logical terms, which can have different denotations corresponding to
a single meaning in an intensional logic. As an example, the meaning of a
logical term can be “the president of the United States”, which corresponds
to the denotation “Barack Obama” in 2013 and “Abraham Lincoln” in 1863.
The semantics of a formal logical language has to specify how to associate
meanings with the well-formed formulas and the terms of that language.
In formal logic, meanings are not linguistic entities, they are mathemat-
ical entities. Viewed this way, intensional logic provides a mathematical
foundation for semantics.
Frege did not give a formal definition of “sense”, but Carnap (1947) gave
a precise definition of two closely related notions called “extension” and
“intension”. Moreover, Kripke (1963) gave a new semantics for modal logic
by using possible worlds to model possibilities. Montague (1974) brought
these ideas together and showed that modal logic could be used to model
intensions in natural language. Later, in Lewis (1968), intensions are de-
fined as functions from possible worlds and times to extensions. Montague’s
427
program is also related to the program of Church for representing natural

language, especially in its use of higher-order logic (type theory). Frege’s
important distinction between sense and reference, which modern inten-
sional systems translate to intension and extension, has proven to be very
successful in the study of natural language semantics, especially in analyz-
ing “intensional contexts”. When embedding definite descriptions in such
environments their behaviour changes significantly.
Moreover, it often happens that the discussions of the intensional phe-
nomena in natural language and other philosophical or logical contexts, both
in relation to definite descriptions, but also in the relation to the treatment
of various quantifiers and indexicals, do not benefit from the formal sophis-
tication that recent intensional logics have achieved. On the other hand, it
is noticeable that in the existing logical literature on intensional contexts
most of the examples contain descriptions; however, the formal treatment of
descriptions in this literature is often formally simplistic and unsatisfactory.
Thus, our initial question is: do intensions, despite being a good math-
ematization of senses, capture their meaning totally? The objective of this
work is a revision of the definition and use of the intensional main con-
cepts, like intension, extension, sense, denotation, description or existence,
in order to explore and clarify them, and answer the previous question.
Topology and Measure in Logics for Point-free Space

Tamar Lando
Columbia University, New York, USA
[email protected]
For a long time, logicians have wondered whether our ways of repre-
senting space are in some sense too idealized. Euclidean space is made up
of points: dimensionless, indivisible regions. These are the smallest parts
of space — the atoms beyond which we can divide no further. On an al-
ternative, region-based approach to space, extended regions together with
some mereological and topological relations are taken as primitive; points
are constructed as mathematical abstractions from regions.
In recent years, simple formal logics for region-based theories of space
were developed in [2] and further discussed in [3]. As Balbiani et al. [2]
show, such logics have an algebraic, relational and topological semantics.
In the algebraic semantics, the logics are interpreted in contact algebras,
or Boolean algebras with a binary ‘contact’ relation. In the relational se-
mantics, the logics are interpreted in reflexive, symmetric Kripke frames,
428
Sessions
or pairs F = (W, R), where W is a non-empty set and R is a reflexive and

symmetric relation on W . Surprisingly, every consistent axiomatic exten-
sion of the minimal logic for contact algebras, Lcont
min , is weakly complete for
the class of frames determined by the given extension — and indeed, for the
subclass of finite frames determined by the extension.
In the topological semantics, on the other hand, logics for region based
theories of space are interpreted in the Boolean algebra RC(X) of regular
closed subsets of some topology X, together with a contact relation defined
on the algebra. Balbiani et al. [2] show that the minimal logic of contact
algebras, Lcont
min , is weakly complete for the class of all topological spaces —
and indeed, for the smaller class of all compact, semiregular, T 0, κ-normal
topological spaces. The present paper explores the question of completeness
of Lcont
min and its extensions for individual topological spaces of interest: the
real line, the rationals, Cantor space, and the infinite binary tree. A second
aim is to study a different, algebraic model of logics for region-based theo-
ries of space, based on the Lebesgue measure algebra (or algebra of Borel
subsets of the real line modulo sets of Lebesgue measure zero). As a model
for point-free space, the algebra was first discussed in [1]. The main results
of the paper are that Lcontmin is weakly complete for the rationals and Can-
tor space; the extension Lcontmin + (Con) is weakly complete for the real line
and the Lebesgue measure contact algebra. We also prove that the logic
min + (Univ) is weakly complete for the infinite binary tree.
Lcont
References
1. F. Arntzenius, “Gunk, topology and measure”, in Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics, volume 4, edited by D. Zimmerman, Oxford University
Press, 2008, pp. 225–247.
2. Ph. Balbiani, T. Tinchev & D. Vakarelov, “Modal Logics for Region-
based Theories of Space”, Fundamenta Informaticae, vol. 81(1–3),
2007, pp. 29–82.
3. D. Vakarelov, “Region-Based Theory of Space: Algebras of Regions,
Representation Theory, and Logics”, in Mathematical Problems from
Applied Logic II: Logics for the XXIst Century, edited by D.M. Gabbay,
M. Zakharyaschev & S.S. Goncharov, Springer, 2007, pp. 267–348.
429
Moving from the Opposition of Normal and Non-Normal

Modal Logics to Universal Logic: Synthesizing T, S4, Tr, Verum
and Falsum systems by the Square and Hexagon
Vladimir Lobovikov
Department of Philosophy, Ural Federal University, Russia
[email protected]
An axiomatic epistemology system Ξ contains all formulae, axioms and

inference-rules of the classical propositional logic. Symbols α and β (belong-
ing to meta-language) stand for any formulae of Ξ. Additional formulae of
Ξ are obtained by the following rule: if α is a formula of Ξ then Ψα is a
formula of Ξ as well. The symbol Ψ belonging to meta-language stands
for any element of the set of modalities {2, K, A, E, T, P, Z, G, O, S}. Sym-
bol 2 stands for the alethic modality “necessary”. Symbols K, A, E, T,
P, Z, G, O, S, respectively, stand for modalities “agent knows that. . . ”,
“agent a-priori knows that. . . ”, “agent a-posteriori knows that. . . ”, “it is
true that. . . ”, “it is provable that. . . ”, “there is an algorithm (a machine
could be constructed) for deciding that. . . ”, “it is (morally) good that. . . ”,
“it is obligatory that. . . ”, “under some conditions in some space-and-time a
person (immediately or by means of some tools) sensually perceives (has sen-
sual verification) that. . . ”. Meanings of the mentioned symbols are defined
by the following schemes of own-axioms of epistemology system Ξ which
axioms are added to the axioms of classical propositional logic. Schemes of
axioms and inference rules of the classical propositional logic are applicable
to all formulae of Ξ (including the additional ones):
Axiom scheme AX-1: Aα → (2β → β).
Axiom scheme AX-2: Aα → (2(α → β) → (2α → 2β)).
Axiom scheme AX-3: Aα ↔ (Kα & (2α & 2¬Sα & 2(β ↔ Ωβ)).
Axiom scheme AX-4: Eα ↔ (Kα & (¬2α ∨ ¬2¬Sα ∨ ¬2(β ↔ Ωβ))).
In AX-3 and AX-4, the symbol Ω (belonging to the meta-language)
stands for any element of the set {2, A, T, P, Z, G, O}. Let elements of this
set are called “perfection-modalities” or simply “perfections”.
If Aα, then the inference-rule of 2-elimination is derivable in Ξ, namely;
if Aα 2β, then Aα β. Moreover, if Aα, then Gödel necessitation-rule
is derivable in Ξ too, namely; if Aα β, then Aα 2β. Consequently,
under the condition that Aα, the system Ξ contains the normal modal log-
ics T, S4, Tr and Verum. However, in general, both mentioned rules of
inference are not valid in Ξ. The applicability domain of these rules is
limited to the sphere in which the presumption, that Aα, is acceptable.
430
Sessions
If Eα, then the two rules of derivation are not valid. But, if Eα, then in
Ξ there is a possibility of the non-normal modal system called Falsum one.
Thus Ξ unites the normal and non-normal modal logics in one conceptual
scheme modeled by the square-and-hexagon [1].
Reference
1. V. Lobovikov, “An Axiomatization of Philosophical Epistemology”,
Tomsk State University Journal, Series: Philosophy, Sociology, Polit-
ical Studies, vol. 36(4), 2016, pp. 69–78.
The Logic of Change LC enriched by Leibnizian modalities

Marcin Lyczak
[email protected]
The logic of change LC was given by K. Świetorzecka

, in [1]. It is an
extension of the classical sentential logic by the primitive operator C to be
read it changes that. . . In [2] the Leibnizian interpretation of LC was given
which is our start-point of the proposed analysis.
We add a new kind of necessity to LC which may be associated with
a weak version of Leibnizian conditional necessity. This modality is char-
acterized by two modal relations: temporal succession and copossibility of
possible worlds.
The main subject of our interest is the description of relationships be-
tween C and conditional necessity.
We give an axiomatization of the proposed extension of LC and prove
the completeness theorem in the assumed semantics.
References
1. K. Świetorzecka,
, Classical Conceptions of the Changeability of Situa-
tions and Things Represented in Formalized Languages, Cardinal Stefan
Wyszyński University, Warsaw, Poland, 2008.
2. K. Świetorzecka
, & J. Czermak, “A Logic of Change with Modalities”,
431
Correctness and Strong Completeness

for Logic of Time and Knowledge
Bojan Marinković & Zoran Ognjanović
Mathematical Institute,
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, Serbia
Paola Glavan
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture,
University of Zagreb, Croatia
[email protected]
Our aim is to provide axiomatization and to prove correctness and the

strong completeness for the logic of time, isomorphic to non-negative inte-
gers, and knowledge [1].
Let N be the set of non-negative integers. We denote N = {n0 , . . . , nm−1 },
where m ∈ N, and then let N1 = N ∪ {u} be the set of propositional vari-
ables. The set For of all formulas is the smallest superset of N1 which is
closed under the formation rules: ψ ↦ ∗ψ, where ∗ ∈ {¬, ◯, , Ki }, and
⟨φ, ψ⟩ ↦ φ ∗ ψ, where ∗ ∈ {∧, U, S, ≻, ≺}. The remaining logical and tempo-
ral connectivities ∨, →, ↔, F, G, P, H are defined in the usual way. The
operators ≻ and ≺ represent relations successor and predecessor of a node.
We define models as Kripke’s structures. A model M is any tuple
⟨R, W, π, K⟩ such that: R = {⟨xji1 , . . . , xjim ⟩j ∣ j = 0, 1, . . .} is the set of possi-
ble runs (rj ), W is the set of time instances with the time flow isomorphic
to ω, π∶ R × W × N → {⊺, } is the truth assignment, with the restriction:
when some xks become ⊺, then for every positive l xk+l s will never be , and
Ki ⊂ (R × W ) : ⟨r, t⟩Ki ⟨r , t ⟩ iff (⟨r, t⟩ xi iff ⟨r , t ⟩ xi ) are the sets of
2 ′ ′ ′ ′
possibility relations. The satisfiability relation (formula α is satisfied in

a time instance of a run R × W α) is defined recursively as usual.
The axioms of our theory are all instances of tautologies, standard ax-
ioms of the discrete linear temporal logic, the axiom that takes into con-
sideration specificity of our model and the restriction that when some ni
become ⊺, then it will never be , standard axioms for reasoning about
knowledge, axioms about successor and predecessor of a node.
The inference rules of our theory are the modus ponens, necessitations
for temporal operator ◯, and for knowledge operators Ki , and the infinitary
inference rules that characterize the Until and Since operators.
Strong completeness theorem. Every consistent set of formulas

is satisfiable.
432
Sessions
Decidability theorem. Checking the satisfiability of a given formula ψ is

decidable.
Using our logic, we can prove the correctness of the maintenance of the
ring topology of the Chord protocol [2] with the respect of the fact that
nodes are not allowed to departure the system after they join it.
References
1. R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses & M.Y. Vardi, Reasoning About
Knowledge, MIT* Press, 1995.
2. I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Liben-Nowell, D. Karger, M. Kaashoek, F.
Dabek & H. Balakrishnan, “Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup
Service for Internet Applications”, IEEE /ACM Transactions on Net-
working, vol. 11(1), 2003, pp. 17–32.
Modal logics obtained by means of Jaśkowski’s model

of discussion§
Marek Nasieniewski, Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska
& Andrzej Pietruszczak
We consider modal logics obtained by application of Jaśkowski’s model
of discussion. The original discussive logic D2 has been formulated [cf. 1,2,3]
with the help of the modal logic S5 by means of the following condition:
D2 ∶= { A ∈ Ford ∶ ⌜3A● ⌝ ∈ S5 },
where (−)● is Jaśkowski’s standard translation of discussive formulae Ford

into the set of modal formulae Form .
In [4], an extension of D2 with the help of the modal operators of possi-
bility ‘3d ’ and necessity ‘2d ’ are considered. The translation used in [4] is
an extension (−)●n of the function (−)● onto the set of modal formulas by
means of two additional clauses:
(i) (3d A)●n = ⌜3A●n ⌝,
(ii) (2d A)●n = ⌜2A●n ⌝.
*

§
All the authors of this paper thank for a financial support of National Science Centre
(NCN), grant no. UMO-2016/23/B/HS1/00344.
433
The obtained logic is called S5D2 , and it is meant as the set
{ A ∈ Ford ∶ ⌜3A●n ⌝ ∈ S5 } .
The formulation of S5D2 depends on the normal modal logic S5. Al-
though, it is known [e.g. 5] that the very same logic D2 can be obtained
by means of different modal logics, it is possible to indicate modal logics
that give other than D2 discussive-like logics. Similarly, by appropriately
varying the accessibility relation, i.e. the relation that connects participants
of a given discussion, we can obtain other than S5D2 modal discussive logics.
The change of the accessibility relation leads to change of the philosophical
interpretation of functors in terms of Jaśkowski’s model of discussion.
References
1. S. Jaśkowski, “Rachunek zdań dla systemów dedukcyjnych sprzecznych”,
Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sectio A, vol. 1(5), 1948,
pp. 57–77, English version: “Propositional calculus for contradictory
deductive systems”, Studia Logica, vol. 24(1), 1969, pp. 143–157, other
English version: “A propositional Calculus for inconsistent deductive
systems”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, 1999, pp. 35–56.
2. S. Jaśkowski, “O koniunkcji dyskusyjnej w rachunku zdań dla systemów
dedukcyjnych sprzecznych”, Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis,
Sectio A, vol. 1(8), 1949, pp. 171–172, English version: “On the discus-
sive conjunction in the propositional calculus for inconsistent deductive
systems”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, 1999, pp. 57–59.
3. J. Kotas, “The axiomatization of S. Jaśkowski’s discussive system”,
4. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska, M. Nasieniewski & A. Pietruszczak, “A modal
logic over Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 , in preparation.
5. M. Nasieniewski & A. Pietruszczak, “A method of generating modal log-
ics defining Jaśkowski’s discussive logic D2 ”, Studia Logica, vol. 97(1),
2011, pp. 161–182.
434
Sessions
A Modal Logics Framework for the Modeling

of Human Reasoning
Serge Robert
University of Québec, Montréal, Canada
[email protected]
Many different modal logics have been developed about different modali-
ties (ontic, deontic, temporal, topological, epistemic. . . ). Syntactically, they
all share modal operators that affect propositional contents. Semantically,
from a Kripkean standpoint, they all can be represented as systems that
establish relations between possible worlds or between the actual world and
possible worlds. Each modal system has some axioms that define the specific
relations that it establishes between these worlds. This way, the specificity
of a modal system resides in the presence or the absence of axioms of seri-
ality, reflexivity, density, transitivity, symmetry, asymmetry, euclidianity. . .
Our talk aims at producing a general metamodal framework for modal
logics that can classify existing modal logics within it and that can generate
new modal logics from that framework. In such a framework, there are
two basic modalities, the strong one (the one true in all possible worlds,
like “necessary”) and the weak one (true in at least one possible world, like
“possible”).
The second goal of our talk is to develop hypotheses about the concep-
tions of different modalities that spontaneous reasoners might apply when
they reason with modalities. This way, many modal fallacies can be repre-
sented and explained as simplifications of the information occurring in the
premises. For example, many spontaneous reasoners consider “not neces-
sary p” (∼2p) as equivalent to “possible p” (3p). On the other hand, some
ways of reasoning can be different from what the modal system allows, with-
out being a fallacy, but being rather a distinctive philosophical conception
of the modality, like avoiding the asymmetry of time (FHp ⊃ p and PGp ⊃ p)
in temporal modalities, when holding, for example, a circular conception of
time. Of course, some logicians have made relevant contributions on such
philosophical conceptions of modalities [see e.g. 1,2], our aim is to suggest
a general framework for such contributions.
So, our metamodal framework for modalities allows 1) the generation of
new modal systems, 2) the modeling of what can be considered as modal
fallacies and 3) the modeling of different philosophical conceptions about
the different types (ontic, deontic, temporal. . . ) of modalities.
435
References
1. R. Girle, Modal Logics and Philosophy, McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2nd edition, 2009.
2. J.-L. Gardies, Essai sur la logique des modalités, Presses Universitaires
de France, 1979.
Modal approach to region-based theories of space:

undecidability of modal definability*
Tinko Tinchev
Department of Mathematical Logic and its Applications,
Sofia University, Bulgaria
[email protected]
The region-based theories of space, also known as point-free theories of

space, basically study the complete Boolean algebra of the regular closed (or
regular open) sets in a topological space with the binary predicate contact
— topological contact algebras. Recall that the meet and complement in
this algebras are not the corresponding set-theoretic operations, and also
that two regular closed sets A and B are in contact if and only if their
set-theoretic intersection, A ∩ B, is non-empty. The Kripke style semantics
of the quantifier-free fragment of the first-order language of the Boolean
algebras with a binary predicate symbol is proposed and studied in [2,1],
in particular, a complete axiomatization of all validities in the class of all
topological contact algebras is found.
The atomic formulas of this language are all expressions of the type
(t1 = t2 ) and C(t1 , t2 ), where t1 , t2 are Boolean terms. The formulas are all
propositional formulas constructed by atomic formulas. A Kripke frame is
an ordered pair F = ⟨W, R⟩, where W ≠ ∅ and R ⊆ W × W . A valuation V
is a map from the set of all Boolean variables into the power set of W . In
a standard way the value V (t) of the terms t is defined. The truth value of
atomic formulas is defined in the following way:
F, V (t1 = t2 ) iff V (t1 ) = V (t2 )
and
F, V C(t1 , t2 ) iff (∃x ∈ V (t1 ))(∃y ∈ V (t2 ))(xRy).
The extension to all propositional connectives is defined in a standard

way. A formula is valid in a given frame iff it is true in all valuations in
*
This work was supported by the Bulgarian NSF grant DN02/15/2016.
436
Sessions
the frame. The completeness theorem from [1] says that (1) the formulas
valid in all contact algebras are exactly the formulas valid in all Kripke
frames F with reflexive and symmetric accessibility relation R. Moreover,
if the contact algebras correspond to the connected topological spaces, then
the valid formulas are exactly the valid formulas in the class of Kripke
frames with reflexive, symmetric and connected (in the graph theory sense)
accessibility relation.
In this talk we will demonstrate undecidability of the modal definability
of the first-order sentences over the class of all (1) reflexive and symmetric
frames and (2) reflexive, symmetric and connected frames.
References
1. P. Balbiani, T. Tinchev & D. Vakarelov, “Modal Logics for Region-
based Theories of Space”, Fundamenta Informaticae, vol. 81(1–3),
2008, pp. 29–82.
2. I. Düntsch & D. Vakarelov, “Region-Based Theory of Discrete Spaces:
A Proximity Approach”, in Proceedings of Fourth International Con-
ference Journées de l’Informatique Messine, Metz, France, 2003, edited
by M. Nadif, A. Napoli, E. SanJuan & A. Sigayret, pp. 123–129, journal
version: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence,
vol. 49(1–4), 2007, pp. 5–14.
On the modal and first-order definability

Tinko Tinchev
Department of Mathematical Logic and its Applications,
Sofia University, Bulgaria
[email protected]
Philippe Balbiani
CNRS* , IRIT , University of Toulouse, France
[email protected]
In this talk we will discuss the correspondence problem between modal

and first-order sentences in several classes of Kripke frames. For simplicity
we consider the basic modal language M , with the standard Kripke se-
mantics and the first-order language with equality and a binary predicate
symbol, L. Let C be a class of Kripke frames. Recall that a sentence A
*

437
from L is called modally definable in C if there is a modal formula ϕ from

M such that, for any frame F from C, F is a model of A if and only if ϕ is
valid in F. Analogously, a formula ϕ from M is called first-order definable
in C if there is a sentence A from L such that, for any frame F from C, ϕ is
valid in F if and only if F is a model of A.
Modal C-definability is a problem for an arbitrary sentence A to decide
whether A is modally definable in C. First-order C-definability is a problem
for an arbitrary modal formula ϕ to decide whether ϕ is first-order definable
in C. The classical Chagrova’s theorems [3] say that, in the case when C is
the class of all Kripke frames, both definability problems are undecidable.
Nevertheless, in certain cases, both problems are decidable, for example, if C
is the class of all equivalence relations [2] or C is the class of all KD45-frames
[4]. Let us note that, for the class Ceuc of all Euclidean frames, any modal
formula is first-order definable in Ceuc , but the modal Ceuc -definability is an
undecidable problem [1].
The new results presented here concern the class CS4.3 of all linear tran-
sitive and reflexive frames with finitely many clusters.
Theorem.
(i) Any modal formula is first-order definable in CS4.3 .
(ii) First-order CS4.3 -definability is decidable.
References
1. Ph. Balbiani, D. Georgiev & T. Tinchev, “Modal correspondence theory
in the class of all Euclidean frames”, Journal of Logic and Computation,
to appear.
2. Ph. Balbiani & T. Tinchev, “Decidability and complexity of definability
within the class of all partitions”, in 5th Panhellenic Logic Symposium,
Athens, Greece, pp. 26–33, 2005.
3. A. Chagrov & L. Chagrova, “The Truth About Algorithmic Problems in
Correspondence Theory”, in Advances in Modal Logic, volume 6, edited
by G. Governatori, I. Hodkinson & Y. Venema, CSLI* Publications,
2006, pp. 121–138.
4. D. Georgiev, “Definability in the class of all KD45-frames computability
and complexity”, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, to appear.
*
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Sessions
Non-Classical Logics
The keynote speakers at this session are Didier Dubois (page 125), Anna
Zamansky (page 167) & David Makinson (page 138).
Abduction for Reconstructing Proto-Languages

Cristina Barés Gómez
Post-Doctoral Researcher, VPPI* ,
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science,
University of Seville, Spain
[email protected]
Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández
[email protected]
Francisco Salguero
Department of Spanish Languages, Linguistics
and Literature Theory, University of Seville, Spain
[email protected]
The aim of this paper is to analyze the kind of inference that we use to
reconstruct Proto-Languages [7,4,6]. The importance of hypotheses for the
process and the whole structure of reasoning make us think that we are in
front of a certain kind of reasoning called abduction [5,3,1,8]. We analyze
the nature of this concrete abductive reasoning and we specify its nuances
and particularities. In fact, what is new in this work is that we center our
point in the importance of context. We pay attention to a form of abduc-
tion that goes beyond the context, where the scientific work is developed by
using other sciences as a contextual frame. So, an inter-contextual chain of
inferences can be part of an abductive process, being the resulting hypothe-
sis still provisional. To explain the ways for reconstructing Proto-Languages
— where several disciplines play a cognitive role, as archeology, history and
linguistic — we need several contexts, not just one.
We use the case of Proto-Semitic language reconstruction from the un-
expected fact of the discoveries of Ugarit and Ebla languages. Pointing
at Proto-Semitic, we need to presuppose the existence of a proto-Semitic
society, just like the most plausible hypothesis. The problem we have is
*
V Plan Propio de Investigación
439
that archeological evidence provides limited remaining material. Therefore,

we use different hypotheses that take into account the lack of the mate-
rial sources and the lack of the linguistic evidence. Sometimes, we have an
unexpected fact, the discovery of some material sources (maybe with some
language sources like the discovery of Ebla or Ugarit). This fact helps us to
fill the gap in the relationship between family languages and society changes
(mainly migrations and ethnic contact). Other disciplines serve to complete
the picture of the history of languages, such us archaeology, prehistory,
comparative religion, epigraphy, comparative literature, etc. Otherwise,
linguistics help to fill out history, archaeology. . .
So, by taking into account this process, we try to approach it by using
logical tools. First, we use contextual logic [2] to express the contextual
relation between disciplines. Then, we add dynamics [9] to approach the
whole reasoning process. Our goal is to specify the abductive structure be-
hind Proto-Languages reconstruction. We try to analyze the specific context
change and the analogies used to decide the new hypothesis. This will help
us to understand better the abductive process and the selection of a certain
hypothesis. By analyzing Proto-Language reconstruction as an abductive
reasoning, we may also shed light on the use of abduction to explain certain
scientific practices.
References
1. A. Aliseda, Abductive Reasoning: Logical Investigations into Discovery
and Explanation, Springer, 2006.
2. P. Bonzon, M. Cavalcanti & R. Nossum (editors), Formal Aspects of
Context, Springer, 2000.
3. D.M. Gabbay & J. Woods (editors), The Reach of Abduction: Insight
and Trial, volume 2 of A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems, Elsevier,
2005.
4. G. Garbini & O. Durand, Introduzione alle lingue semitiche, Paideia
Editrice, 1994.
5. J. Hintikka, Inquiry as Inquiry: A Logic of Scientific Discovery, Springer,
1999.
6. E. Lipinski, Semitic Languages Outline of a Comparative Grammar,
Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta book series, vol. 80, 2nd edition, Peeters,
2000.
7. S. Moscati, A. Spitaler, E. Ullendorff & W. von Soden, An Introduction
to the Comparative Grammar of the Semitic Languages: Phonology and
Morphology, Porta Linguarum Orientalium book series, vol. 6, Otto
Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, German, 1969.
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Sessions
8. Á. Nepomuceno-Fernández, F. Soler-Toscano & F.R. Velázquez-Quesada,

“An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: selecting
the best explanation”, Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 21(6), 2013,
pp. 943–961.
9. H. van Ditmarsch, W. van der Hoek & B. Kooi, Dynamic Epistemic
Logic, Springer, 2008.
Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Context-Sensitivity

and Indexicals
Ana Cholodovskis
LMU , Munich, Germany
[email protected]
A special type of context-sensitive expressions caught philosopher’s at-

tention in the past decades: the indexicals. Roughly speaking, indexicals
are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context.
Considering a statement made at a given time t, we would associate both
a content and a character. The content is the specific context-sensitive in-
formation within the statement; and the character, on the other hand, is
the context-free manner which gives us the content. Thus character is in-
dependent of the context while content is dependent both on character and
on context. Expressions involving demonstratives will, in general, express
different concepts (content) if uttered in different contexts.
Default reasoning, on the other hand, is widely studied by theorists of
artificial intelligence, but philosophers are also interested in the subject.
One interesting aspect about defeasible reasoning, for instance, is that in
some cases the defeasibility is related to the context of the utterance. Other
cases might include situations where we derive a conclusion even though we
do not know a relevant information, or we infer about ongoing actions (we
often use progressive verbs in our everyday language), or even many forms
of generalizations. Defeasible reasoning allow us to engage in hypothetical
reasoning, for instance. Hypothetical thinking is relevant in developing
knowledge since we often use suppositions in order to prove a point. A
supposition is always related to a context; however, it creates a new parallel
context with new parameters. Some of those hypothetical thinking might
even help in the process of making belief changes.
*

PhD research financially supported by CNPq.
Ludwig Maximilian University
441
We shouldn’t ignore the importance of nonmonotonic systems and de-

fault systems are not the only ones that we should consider. In everyday
reasoning we use propositions with no justification other than we do not
have evidences that contradict them. Moreover, we might give a closer look
to our beliefs set and update ours preferences or infer new conclusions, spe-
cially when they involve a indexical belief. That is why when faced with
new information that contradict the previous conclusion, most agents would
withdraw the conclusion.
Nonmonotonic Modal Logics can be used to deal with context-sensitive
expressions, since they offer a possible interpretation to the Kripke models
to be preferred or intended. That allows us to do many kinds of inferences
and deal with belief sets in many ways. These possible interpretations
are particularly interesting if we consider the so called intended context
for demonstratives.
On one hand, indexicals are present in many examples all over philosoph-
ical literature and, yet, most philosophers of Language do not agree on how
they should be treated within the theories; on the other hand, give up on
monotonicity is important to deal with many situations such as generalized
information confronting new specific information; incomplete information
confronting additional ones; doubts concerning the credibility of premisses;
and so on. For many reasons, sometimes we try to make a sincere assertion,
but when confronted with new information, we are forced to withdraw our
conclusions. However, in our daily reasoning, we keep inferring defeasible
conclusions — often involving utterances of indexicals/demonstratives in
the sentence. In that sense, adding a nonmonotonic feature that is context-
sensitive to a system depending on contexts seems to be interesting as con-
texts shift all the time. Indexicals and default reasoning have very aspects
in common: many examples of defeasible reasoning involve occurrences of
demonstratives of some form.
Acquiring information in a decision making process, for instance, is quite
common and a formal system able to deal with them should be considered as
relevant. Thus it is possible to see a relation between knowledge and belief to
acquiring new information that might intervene in our decision making pro-
cess; for instance, many false propositions might be considered as common
knowledge and used to make an assertion or even a choice. Moreover, those
new information might contain special features and be context-sensitive.
Those special cases are as common as they are interesting.
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Universal Logic and Generalized Probability Theory

Huacan He
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
Beijing, China
[email protected]
Yanquan Zhou
Beijing, China
[email protected]
As we all know, Boolean Algebra is the mathematical basis of mathemat-

ical logic (standard logic, rigid logic), which represents certainty reasoning
specifically. It is a common view in field mathematician. The rigid logic
elements prescribe rigid constraint, which can be described as “either this
or that”. Based on the principles of mathematical logic, we change them
to flexible constraint, like “both this and that”. Successfully, we build a
propositional universal logic, containing both rigid logic and flexible logic.
It is able to describe many uncertainty reasoning, and is widely used.
As an universal logic that includes both standard logic and all of the
possible non-standard logics, it has different mathematical basis. We used
to regard it as an abstract algebra system, which is called flexible logic
algebra. In this paper, we will further discuss that such flexible logic algebra
is equal with generalized probability theory. Generalized probability theory
is our own original theory. We make use of Schweizer operator in triangular
norms to expand and refine classical probability theory. As a result, it can
describe not only uncertainty reasoning under universal logic, but also the
working principle of flexible neuron.
There are five parts discussing about our theory in this paper:
1. The truth-degree of flexible proposition equals the probability within its
feature space.
2. Estimating error is acceptable during probability measure. If error does
exist, it is additive measure. Otherwise, it is nonadditive measure.
3. The correlativity between propositions x, y is described by generalized
correlation coefficient.
4. We use a partial coefficient β ∈ [0, 1] to measure the relative change
between propositions x and y. By using this method, we success in
adding flexible predicate logic to define each flexible quantifier.
443
5. Differing from flexible logic, rigid logic does not have transition values
between 0 and 1. Consequently, it is workable as soon as it satisfies
reliability and completeness, without any abnormal results. However,
flexible logic does have transition values between 0 and 1. We cannot
use them directly, because abnormal results may appear. To solve this
problem, we put forward the condition to the integrity of flexible logic.
The basic principles for ensuring logical integrity are:
(1) The truth of two propositions may be the same, but h is not neces-
sarily 1, and the truth of the same proposition must be the same,
and h must be 1.
(2) As long as k is the same, integrity must be guaranteed.
The Syllogistic System: A Paraconsistent Logic Model

for Human Reasoning
Bora Kumova
Institute of Zoology,
University of Veterinary Medicine, Hannover, Germany
[email protected]
Keywords: Categorical syllogisms, knowledge management, approximate
reasoning, learning.
Our first argumentation is that human reasoning with information can
be modelled with the moods of the syllogistic system and more expressively
with the fuzzy syllogistic system that consists of fuzzy moods, ie moods
with intermediate quantifiers, such as few, several, half, most, many, etc
and their negations.
Humans memorise knowledge essentially with symbolic concepts and
their relationships, which can be represented as quantified propositions. We
associate new information as evidence for the quantified proportions that we
know. For instance, if we know a proposition like “all sports are suitable for
children”, but are confronted with evidence like “marathon is not suitable
for children”, then we would probably relax the universal quantification in
our knowledge to “almost all sports are suitable for children”. Addition-
ally, we would memorise the evidence as new knowledge and relate it to
our existing knowledge, like “marathon is one sport”, which has an exact
cardinality, rather than a fuzzy linguistic quantifier. The more evidences
we encounter for further sorts of sports that are not suitable for children,
the more we would relax the quantifier “almost all” further, maybe down
until “few”. This is because over time we will accumulate only a “few” such
evidences for children, whereas we will accumulate “many” such evidences
444
Sessions
for teenagers. We may also be confronted with exceptional evidences, such

that under restricted circumstances, individual children may be suitable for
some variations of high-performance sports too. This way we continuously
refine our knowledge and create increasingly more complex ontological net-
works in our mind. That can be modelled with numerous interrelated fuzzy
quantified propositions.
Our second argumentation is that, for any new evidence we encounter,
we try to discover directly associated propositions in our ontological net-
works for “recalling” facts and in a “thinking” process we may even find
interrelated propositions with reasonable categories for syllogistic reason-
ing.
Now we need to define, what we mean with syllogistic system and fuzzy
syllogistic system. The syllogistic system consists of the well known 256
different moods of categorical syllogisms, of which only 25 are fully true,
103 are more true, 103 are more false and 25 are fully false. The 25 true
moods are well studied and understood in the literature. It is also known
that the mood barbara is the easiest to understand by everybody, whereas
the remaining 24 true moods are not that easy to fully grasp by everybody.
This is due to the fact that barbara has only one true syllogistic case. A
syllogistic case is a specific combination out of the possible 7 distinct spaces
for thee sets in the Venn diagram, which are matched or not by a particular
mood. Another 11 of the true moods have also just one true syllogistic
case each and therefore may also be understand relative easily, if each one’s
specific syllogistic case is inspected carefully. Another true mood has 4 true
cases, 2 have 5, 1 has 9, 4 have 10 and 5 have 11 true cases. In order to
fully understand the truth of a mood, one needs to verify everyone of its
cases. Every syllogistic case of a mood can be interpreted as an alternative
true state of the mood.
Out of the 103 more true moods, 9 have in total 4 cases, of which 3 are
true and 1 is false. 2 moods have as much as 72 cases in total, of which one
has 65 true and 7 false and the other has 61 true and 11 false. The remaining
92 moods have varying numbers of cases in between. In order to able to
fully understand the truth of such moods, one needs to verify everyone of
its true and false cases. This is impossible for humans to do, neither in
daily information processing nor in conscious think processes. However it is
possible and should make sense in electronic information processing, where
logical and hence interesting relationships in complex quantified ontological
networks can be discovered and with truth values associated.
Fuzzy syllogistic systems have additionally to the universal and exis-
tential quantifiers and their negations, further linguistic quantifier, such as
few, several, half, most, many, etc and their negations. Fuzzy moods with
445
linguistic quantifiers can represent more closely logical relationships in in-

formation processing than syllogisms with solely “all” or “some” quantified
propositions.
Finally we need to explain our understanding of paraconsistency in such
logic systems. Basically for every single mood or fuzzy mood that is not
fully true, we can define a specific sort of paraconsistency based on its
specific true and false syllogistic cases. In the syllogistic system we could
potentially identify 125 distinct paraconsistencies, as there are that much
distinct groups of identical moods.
A Probabilistic Interpretation for an Intuitionistic Sequent

Predicate Calculus with Strong Negation
François Lepage
Université de Montréal, Canada
[email protected]
In this paper we present a sequent calculus for intuitionistic first-order
logic with strong negation (SCISN). The semantic is probabilistic, more
precisely, it is based on partial conditional probability functions.
A standard system of sequents for intuitionistic logic is introduced, to
which is added left and right rules governing the strong negation “∼”. For
example:
Γ⇒A A, Γ ⇒ C ∼A, ∼B, Γ ⇒ C
L∼, L∼∼, L∼∨,
∼A, Γ ⇒ C ∼∼A, Γ ⇒ C ∼(A ∨ B), Γ ⇒ C
Γ⇒A Γ ⇒ ∼B Γ ⇒ ∼A[t∣x]
R∼⊃, R∼∀,
Γ ⇒ ∼(A ⊃ B) Γ ⇒ ∼∀xA
and so on.
The notion of partial conditional probability function is introduced. It
is any partial function Pr∶ WFF × 2WFF → [0, 1] satisfying 20 postulates
which express constraints. For example, POS.4: If A ∈ Γ, then Pr(A, Γ) = 1,
POS.8: Pr(A ⊃ B, Γ) = Pr(B, Γ ∪ {A}), and so on. POS.8 is critical: it
says that the probability of the conditional in SCISN is the conditional
probability (in fact, Lewis’ triviality result does not hold in SCISN nor in
intuitionistic logic). See [1] and [2].
The definition of probabilistic validity is given: the sequent Γ ⇒ A is
valid iff for any Pr and ∆, Pr(A, Γ ∪ ∆) = 1. See [3].
All the rules of SCISN are proved to be sound, i.e. if Pr satisfies all the
POS.n, then when the antecedent(s) is (are) valid, the succedent is valid.
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Sessions
For example, if Pr(A, Γ ∪ ∆) = 1 for all ∆ and Pr(∼B, Γ ∪ ∆) = 1 for all ∆,

then Pr(∼(A ⊃ B), Γ ∪ ∆) = 1 for all ∆, so R∼⊃ is sound.
SCISN is proved to be complete: if, for any Pr satisfying the POS.n and
any Γ, Pr(A, Γ ∪ ∆) = 1 for any ∆, then Γ ⇒ A. Completeness is proved by
defining a canonical Kripke model using saturated sets.
We argue that SCISN can be viewed as the set of logical constraints on
rational beliefs of constructive agents.
References
1. C. Morgan & E. Mares, “Conditional Probability, and Non-Triviality”,
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 24(5), 1995, pp. 455–467.
2. F. Lepage, “Is Lewis’s Triviality Result Actually a Triviality Result?”,
3. C. Morgan, “Canonical Models and Probabilistic Semantics”, in Logic,
Probability and Science, edited by N. Shanks & R. Gardner, Rodopi,
Amsterdam, 2000, pp. 17–35.
A basic dual intuitionistic logic

José M. Méndez
[email protected]
Gemma Robles & Francisco Salto
Department of Psychology, Sociology and Philosophy,
University of León, Spain
Concerning da Costa’s paraconsistent logic Cω , Richard Sylvan (origi-

nally called Routley) notes that “Cω is in certain respects the dual of in-
tuitionistic logic” [2, p. 48]. This opinion is based upon the following facts
[cf. 2, pp. 48-49]: (1) Both Cω and intuitionistic logic H extend positive
logic H+ (i.e., the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic); (2) H rejects
the “Principle of Excluded Middle” (PEM), A ∨ ¬A, but asserts the “Prin-
ciple of Non-Contradiction” (PNC), ¬(A ∧ ¬A), while Cω do the reverse;
and (3) H accepts “Double Negation Introduction” (DNI), A → ¬¬A, but
denies “Double Negation Elimination” (DNE), ¬¬A → A, whereas, again,
Cω do the reverse. Sylvan adds [2, p. 49]: “This duality also takes a se-
mantical shape: whereas intuitionism is essentially focused on evidentially
incomplete situations excluding inconsistent situations, the C systems admit
inconsistent situations but remove incomplete situations”.
447
The aim of this paper is to define a basic dual intuitionistic logic in

Sylvan’s sense. This basic logic is included in Sylvan’s extension of Cω ,
CCω .
Consider Sylvan and Plumwood’s basic logic BM [cf. 3]. Given a lan-
guage with conditional, conjunction, disjunction and negation as proposi-
tional connectives, it is known that BM is the minimal logic representable
with the Routley-Meyer semantics [cf. 1]. Then, the aims of the paper are
the following: (1) to expand BM with a dual intuitionistic negation of the
kind discussed above; (2) to endow this expansion with a Routley-Meyer
semantics; (3) to show how to extend the basic logic to CCω ”, and beyond;
and (4) to study the relations between the dual intuitionistic negation and
the De Morgan negation characteristic of relevance logics in general and BM
in particular.
References
1. R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, V. Plumwood & R.T. Brady, Relevant Logics
and Their Rivals 1, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascadero, CA, USA, 1982.
2. R. Sylvan, “Variations on da Costa C Systems and dual-intuitionistic
logics I. Analyses of Cω and CCω ”, Studia Logica, vol. 49(1), 1990,
pp. 47–65.
3. R. Sylvan & V. Plumwood, “Non-normal relevant logics”, in Rele-
vant Logics and Their Rivals 2, edited by R. Brady, Ashgate, 2003,
pp. 10–16.
Many-Valued Decision Logic for Rough Sets

Yotaro Nakayama
Nihon Unisys, Ltd., Tokyo, Japan
[email protected]
Seiki Akama
C-Republic, Inc., Kanagawa, Japan
[email protected]
Tetsuya Murai
Chitose Institute of Science and Technology, Hokkaido, Japan
[email protected]
Pawlak introduced the theory of rough sets for handling rough informa-
tion [1]. Rough set theory is used as a mathematical foundation of granu-
larity and vagueness in information systems and is applied to a variety of
problems. In applying rough set theory, decision logic was proposed for in-
terpreting information extracted from data tables. However, decision logic
adopts the classical two-valued logic semantics. It is known that classical
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Sessions
logic is not adequate for reasoning with indefinite and inconsistent informa-
tion. Moreover, the paradoxes of material implication of classical logic are
counterintuitive.
Rough set theory is concerned with the lower and the upper approxi-
mation of object sets. This approximation divides sets into three regions,
namely, the positive, negative, and boundary regions. Thus, Pawlak rough
sets have often been studied in a three-valued logic framework because the
third value is thought to correspond to the boundary region of rough sets
[2,3].
In this study, we show the relationship between decision logic and three-
valued semantics based on partial semantics and propose extended decision
logics based on three-valued logics. The formalization of many-valued logic
is carried out using a consequence relation based on partial semantics [4].
The basic logic for decision logic is assumed to be many-valued, in particular,
three-valued and some of its alternatives [5]. The decision logic will be ax-
iomatized using Gentzen sequent calculi and three-valued semantic relation
as basic theory. To apply three-valued logics to decision logic, consequence
relations based on partial interpretation are investigated, and sequent cal-
culi of three-valued logics are constructed. Subsequently, three-valued logics
with different structures are considered for the deduction system of decision
logic. These logics can serve as foundations for reasoning about rough and
vague information and we propose some extended decision logics.
References
1. Z. Pawlak, Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Data, Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 1991.
2. A. Avron and B. Konikowska, “Rough Sets and 3-Valued Logics”, Studia
Logica, vol. 90, 2008, pp. 69–92.
3. Y. Nakayama, S. Akama & T. Murai, “Deduction System for Decision
Logic based on Partial Semantics”, The Eleventh International Confer-
ence on Advances in Semantic Processing, 2017, to appear.
4. J. van Benthem, “Partiality and Nonmonotonicity in Classical Logic”,
Logique et Analyse, vol. 29, 1986, pp. 225–247.
5. A. Urquhart, “Basic Many-Valued Logic”, in Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, volume 2, 2001, pp. 249–295.
449
On a correspondence of positive and negative modalities

on the basis of some non-normal logics*
Marek Nasieniewski & Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska
In the paper we consider a connection between modal logics with the
standard modalities and those which are expressed by means of negative
ones. The initial idea comes from [1], where the negation is read as ‘not
necessary’. Using translation that transforms propositional formulas with-
out modalities into the modal language one can ask, whether an image of the
considered assignment is a thesis of a specific modal logic. In [1], the normal
modal logic S5 has been used and a logic Z is obtained by the mentioned
translation. Similar question can be applied to other normal modal logics.
The idea which led Béziau to invention of Z refers to Jaśkowski’s idea of
modalising of propositional formulas. Logics obtained by treating negation
as a negative modal operator we call Béziau-logics. It appears [see 3,4] that
there is an equivalence between family of all normal logics and respective
Béziau-logics. One can also search for similar equivalences for the case of
non-normal logics, for example regular or quasi-regular. It is possible to
obtain such equivalence results for chosen logics from the mentioned classes
[e.g. 5]. It this context one can also consider the dual negative operator
‘it is not possible’. Such negation (or its equivalent version) is known from
the literature [e.g. 2]. Using it one can enrich the object language of a
given Béziau-logic and obtain equivalence correspondence results for new
cases of non-normal logics, in particular for logics closed under tautologi-
cal equivalences. In the paper it will be also discussed the issue of finding
such translation which allows for obtaining a given Béziau-logic directly as
a surjective image — usually to obtain a destined logic, one has to apply
the closure on the consequence relation.
References
1. J.-Y. Béziau, “The paraconsistent logic Z. A possible solution to Jaś-
kowski’s problem”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 15(2), 2006,
pp. 99–111, doi:10.12775/LLP.2006.006.
2. K. Došen, “Negative Modal Operators in Intuitionistic Logic”, Publica-
tions de L’Institut Mathématique, vol. 35(49), 1984, pp. 3–15, http://
eudml.org/doc/255086.
*
The authors of this paper thank for a financial support of National Science Centre (NCN),
grant no. UMO-2016/23/B/HS1/00344.
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Sessions
3. J. Marcos, “Nearly every normal modal logic is paranormal”, Logique

et Analyse, vol. 48(189–192), 2005, pp. 279–300.
4. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska & M. Nasieniewski, “Syntactical and Seman-
tical Characterization of a class of Paraconsistent Logics”, Bulletin
of the Section of Logic, vol. 34(4), 2005, pp. 229–248.
5. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska & M. Nasieniewski, “Béziau’s logics obtained
by means of quasi-regular logics”, Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
vol. 38(3–4), 2009, pp. 189–203.
Fuzzy Logic and Communication

in a Social Context
Rohit Parikh
[email protected]
In [1], Bellman and Zadeh point out that many of the terms used in
ordinary discourse are fuzzy and that probability theory cannot always be
used to address the problems which the fuzziness creates. Here is what they
say:
By decision-making in a fuzzy environment is meant a decision pro-
cess in which the goals and/or the constraints, but not necessarily
the system under control, are fuzzy in nature. This means that the
goals and/or the constraints constitute classes of alternatives whose
boundaries are not sharply defined.
An example of a fuzzy constraint is: “The cost of A should not
be substantially higher than α”, where α is a specified constant.
Similarly, an example of a fuzzy goal is: “x should be in the vicinity
of x0 ”, where x0 is a constant. The italicized words are the sources
of fuzziness in these examples.
However, a second issue arises, namely that when terms are fuzzy then
social agreement on when the term applies or even what it means can become
dilute or even vanish. This point was made by me in a survey I took during
some lectures in Sicily [3]. I asked questions like “Is a handkerchief an
item of clothing?”, “Is Sonia Gandhi an Indian?” or “Is Henry Kissinger
an American?” The respondents were allowed to answer with fuzzy values.
But even then the answers were quite different. Interestingly “Is Henry
Kissinger an American?” got an average value of 0.89 whereas “Is Sonia
Gandhi an Indian?” only got a value of 0.53. This is odd, because Sonia
Gandhi is a naturalized Indian and Kissinger is a naturalized American and
the answers should have been close (another fuzzy term).
451
The conclusion is that fuzzy logic and fuzzy semantics does not go the
whole way towards solving the communication problem in the presence of
words with inexact meanings and inexact domains of application, thus the
success of [2] and [5] is only partial.
This will be a small problem in a purely decision theoretic context. If
I am an Indian citizen and think that Sonia Gandhi is only 0.53 Indian,
I might then decide to vote for someone else. But many of our practices
are game theoretic or communication theoretic. We often need to work
with others who may use a different (fuzzy) semantics. See [4] for a partial
solution.
Can we develop a semantics where disagreements about the meaning
and application of words are minimized or eliminated? If two people have
similar values, but one likes feminism and the other opposes feminism, it
could be that they understand the same term “feminism” differently. Can
we reconcile them somehow? This is a burning question for modern times,
where AI has brought us closer and closer to social issues and not just
scientific issues or engineering issues.
References
1. R.E. Bellman & L.A. Zadeh, “Decision-Making in a Fuzzy Environ-
ment”, Management Science, vol. 17(4), 1970, pp. B141–B164.
2. M.K. Chakraborty & S. Dutta, “Graded consequence revisited”, Fuzzy
Sets and Systems, vol. 161(14), 2010, pp. 1885–1905.
3. R. Parikh, “A test for fuzzy logic”, ACM * SIGACT News, vol. 22(3),
1991, pp. 49–50.
4. R. Parikh, “Vagueness and utility: The semantics of common nouns”,
Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 17(6), 1994, pp. 521–535.
5. L.A. Zadeh, “The concept of a linguistic variable and its application
to approximate reasoning—I”, Information Sciences, vol. 8(3), 1975,
pp. 199–249, doi:10.1016/0020-0255(75)90036-5.
*

Special Interest Group on Algorithms and Computation Theory
452
Sessions
Investigations on the axiomatic presentation

of ALC Description Logic and its formalization in Lean
Alexandre Rademaker
IBM Research, School of Applied Mathematics,
Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
Edward Hermann Haeusler
Department of Informatics,
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
Fabricio Chalub
IBM Research, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
Description Logics (DLs) are a family of formalisms used to represent
knowledge of a domain. It is equipped with a formal logic-based semantics.
Knowledge representation systems based on description logics provide vari-
ous inference capabilities that deduce implicit knowledge from the explicitly
represented knowledge.
In [8] some of the authors investigate the proof theory of DL. Sequent
Calculi and Natural Deduction-style deductive systems were proposed for
the description logics ALC and ALCQ. The most important meta-theoretic
results about semantics and proofs for these systems were proven: sound-
ness, completeness, cut-elimination and normalization. It is argued that
those systems can improve the extraction of computational content from
DLs proofs, for proof explanation purposes.
The completeness of the Sequent Calculus for ALC (SCALC ) was first
presented in [9]. It was shown relative to the axiomatic presentation of
ALC presented by Schild in [10], that is, in order to prove the SCALC com-
pleteness, we shown the axioms can be derived in the system.
Nevertheless, soundness and completeness of ALC was not really pre-
sented by Schild. Schild cited [4] and it turns out to be a mistake. Schild
was intended to cite [3] since both [4] and [5] address only uni-modal log-
ics, clearly not directly related to description logics. On the other hand,
although the syntax translation of ALC concepts to Kn formulas are con-
sidered obvious by many authors, and their intuition described by [10,1], in
[3] the authors have presented the Kn multi-modal logic axioms only.
In this work, we aim to start a discussion about a detailed mapping
from the Kn multi-modal logic from [3] to the ALC axiomatic presentation
presented by [10].
453
We aim to discuss the classical presentation of ALC, showing that system

SCALC in [7] is sound and complete using two proof methods, filling the gaps
not explained in [10]. These results can help to confirm that the axiomatic
presentation of ALC presented by [10] is indeed sound and complete too.
But there are unanswered questions about how that axiomatic presentation
was obtained from [3]. Some further clarifications about the classical ALC
can come from the works on intuitionistic versions of ALC. In [2], the system
SCALC was adapted to an intuitionistic presentation of ALC, the iALC.
We are also working on the mechanization of the meta-theorems about
the calculi for ALC using the interactive theorem prover Lean [6].
References
1. F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D.L. McGuinness, D. Nardi & P.F. Patel-
Schneider, The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation
and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
2. E.H. Haeusler & A. Rademaker, “On how kelsenian jurisprudence and
intuitionistic logic help to avoid contrary-to-duty paradoxes in legal
ontologies, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 2016, to appear.
3. J.Y. Halpern & Y. Moses, “A guide to completeness and complexity for
modal logics of knowledge and belief”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 54(3),
1992, pp. 319–379.
4. E.J. Lemmon, “Algebraic semantics for modal logics I”, The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, vol. 31(1), 1966, pp. 46–65, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2270619.
5. E.J. Lemmon, “Algebraic semantics for modal logics II”, The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, vol. 31(2), 1966, pp. 191–218.
6. L.M. de Moura, S. Kong, J. Avigad, F. van Doorn & J. von Raumer,
“The Lean Theorem Prover (system description)”, in 25th Interna-
tional Conference on Automated Deduction, CADE-25, Berlin, Ger-
many, 2015, August 1-7, pp. 378–388.
7. A. Rademaker, A Proof Theory for Description Logics, Ph.D. thesis,
Pontifı́cia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2010.
8. A. Rademaker, A Proof Theory for Description Logics, SpringerBriefs
in Computer Science series, Springer, 2012, doi:10.1007/978-1-4471-
4002-3.
9. A. Rademaker, E.H. Haeusler & L.C. Pereira, “On the proof theory
of ALC ”, in Proceedings of the XV Brazilian Logic Conference, State
University of Campinas, Brazil, 2008.
10. K. Schild, A correspondence theory for terminological logics: Prelimi-
nary report, Technical Report 91, in International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, Technische Universität Berlin, 1991.
454
Sessions
Expansions of relevance logics with a quasi-Boolean negation

of intuitionistic character
Gemma Robles
Department of Psychology, Sociology and Philosophy,
University of León, Spain
[email protected]
In [4], intuitionistic-type negations are investigated from the point of
view of Routley-Meyer semantics, negation being interpreted similarly as
in standard binary Kripke semantics: ¬A is true in w iff A is false in w′
for all w′ , w′′ such that Rww′ w′′ . The aim of the present paper is to study
a family of logics only marginally referred to in [4]. Negation will now
be interpreted by using the Routley operator, the expedient customarily
employed for elucidating negation in Routley-Meyer semantics.
Let L be a relevance logic. A Boolean negation (B-negation) can be
introduced in L by adding to it the following axioms and rule [cf. 2,3 and
5,§5.4]:
a1) ¬¬A → A,
r1) (A ∧ B) → ¬C ⇒ (A ∧ C) → ¬B.
Consider now the following axioms:
a2) (A ∧ ¬A) → B,
a3) B → (A ∨ ¬A).
It will be not difficult to prove that if L contains the positive fragment
of Anderson and Belnap’s “First Degree Entailment Logic”, FDE+ , [cf. 1],
a1 and r1 are derivable in L plus a2 and a3, whence B-negation can be in-
troduced in L by adding a1 and a3 to it. This way of introducing negation
in relevance logics suggests the definition of two families of quasi-Boolean
negation (QB-negation) expansions of relevance logics. One of them, intu-
itionistic in character, has a2 but not a3; the other one, dual intuitionistic
in nature, has a3 but lacks a2. The aim of this paper is to investigate the
former family of QB-negation expansions of relevance logics.
B-negation expansions of relevance logics are of both logical and philo-
sophical interest [cf. 5, pp. 376ff.]. It is to be expected that QB-negation
expansions of the same logics (not considered in the literature, as far as we
know) will have a similar logical and philosophical interest.
References
1. A.R. Anderson & N.D.Jr. Belnap, Entailment. The Logic of Relevance
and Necessity, volume I, Princeton University Press, 1975.
2. R.K. Meyer & R. Routley, “Classical relevant logics I”, Studia Logica,
vol. 32(1), 1973, pp. 51–66.
455
3. R.K. Meyer & R. Routley, “Classical relevant logics II”, Studia Logica,
vol. 33(2), 1974, pp. 183–194.
4. G. Robles & J.M. Méndez, Routley-Meyer ternary relational semantics
for intuitionistic-type negations, Elsevier, forthcoming in 2018.
5. R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, V. Plumwood & R.T. Brady, Relevant Logics
and their Rivals, volume 1, Ridgeview Publishing Co., Atascadero, CA,
USA, 1982.
A pluralist account of relevant implication and a sequent

calculus for classical logic’s version
Peter Verdée *
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
[email protected]
In this lecture we first develop a logic independent account of relevant
implication. We propose a stipulative definition of what it means for a
multiset of premises to relevantly L-imply a multiset of conclusions, where
L is a Tarskian consequence relation. Premises are said to relevantly im-
ply conclusions iff there is an abstraction of the pair ⟨premises, conclusions⟩
such that the abstracted conclusions are L-consequences of the abstracted
premises and none of the abstracted premises or the abstracted conclusions
can be omitted while still maintaining valid L-consequence. In this defini-
tion, ⟨Γ1 , ∆1 ⟩ is an abstraction of ⟨Γ2 , ∆2 ⟩ iff the latter can be obtained from
the former by a series of applications of Uniform Substitution (i.e. replace
every occurrence of a sentential letter by the same formula).
Subsequently, we apply this definition to the classical logic (CL) conse-
quence relation to obtain NTR-consequence, i.e. the relevant CL-implication
relation in our sense, and develop a sequent calculus that is sound and
complete w.r.t. relevant CL-consequence. We present a sound and complete
sequent calculus for NTR. In a next step we add rules for an object lan-
guage relevant implication to the sequent calculus. The object language
implication reflects exactly the NTR-consequence relation. One can see the
resulting logic NTR→ as a relevant logic in the traditional sense of the word.
By means of a translation to the relevant logic R via LR (i.e. R with-
out Distribution), we show that the presented logic NTR→ is very close
to relevance logics in the Anderson-Belnap-Dunn-Routley-Meyer tradition.
However there are important differences. On the one hand, NTR→ is decid-
able for the full language, Disjunctive Syllogism (A and ¬A ∨ B relevantly
*
The results presented here were obtained in collaboration with Inge De Bal (Ghent Uni-
versity, Belgium) and Aleksandra Samonek (Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium).
456
Sessions
imply B) and Adjunction (A and B relevantly imply A ∧ B) are valid. On

the other hand, certain versions of Modus Ponens and Cut are not valid in
NTR→ .
Finally, an elegant diagrammatic system for NTR→ will be presented.
This system nicely visualises certain aspects of goal directed reasoning in
classical logic, viz. how one reasons from the candidate conclusion towards
the premises that may justify it. We will illustrate the logic by means of
some diagrammatic proofs.
S-shape Transconsistent Logic System

Jincheng Zhang
Party Committee Party School,
Guangde County, Anhui Province, China
[email protected]
Yanquan Zhou
Beijing, China
[email protected]
The Diagonal Proof Method has played a dominating role in the math-
ematics field for a long time. For example, Russell finds the paradox of set
theory. Cantor proves that the power set of natural numbers is uncountable
and the set of real numbers is uncountable. These propositions are based
on the same mathematic method which is praised as Golden Diagonal.
By contrast, this paper manages to prove: the propositions proved by
Diagonal Methods are out of domain (extra-field term). The uncloseness
in mathematical calculus is an extensive and profound mathematical phe-
nomenon, which leads to contradictions and paradoxes. It is significant that
Diagonal Proof Method is indeed an unclosed method, therefore we can find
uncloseness in logical thinking calculus. Further, we build transconsistent
logic systems S-L and S-K, which are called S-shape Transconsistent Logic
for short.
For recent years, some logic systems containing contradictions came up
in the world, such as da Costa’s Paraconsistent Logic, R. Brandow’s Incon-
sistent Logic, R. Routley’s Transconsistent Logic and so on. By restricting
effective using scope to law of contradiction, these logic systems make use
of Harmless Contradictions to break consistency of classical logic system.
As a result, such systems conflict with classical logic system, making them
be far away from mathematical practice. Consequently, they are of certain
philosophy but not of mathematical value.
457
S-shape Transconsistent Logic directly analyzes source of paradoxes and

contradictions in mathematics. It notices that paradoxes come from un-
closed terms (extra-field term). It directly takes extra-field term as logical
objects in study, making logical and mathematical property in extra-field
increasingly clear and close to mathematics. We believe extra-field term can
better guide pioneering mathematical practice. Based on S-shape Transcon-
sistent Logic, we find a large group of extra-field term mathematic proposi-
tions in mathematical logic field, such as set theory, recursion theory, etc.
The essence of Diagonal Proof Method is a method to prove construct-
ing paradoxes. The paradoxes are used in proving “reduction to absur-
dity”, which may result in errors. It is not a normal error, but a method
error, which will lead to deviation in proposition group. Thus the Diagonal
Method and “reduction to absurdity” will spread to specific mathematics
field which involves in philosophy, mathematical logics, computer, function
theory, measure theory and specific mathematics these fields. Therefore,
paradoxes and Diagonal Proof Method deserves further study and more
attention.
Universal M-Valued logic

Tihomir Žilić, Mario Essert & Juraj Benić
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture,
University of Zagreb, Croatia
Ivana Kuzmanović
Department of Mathematics,
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University, Osijek, Croatia
[email protected]
This paper based on M -theory [1] wants to show the correlation of Carte-
sian product of elements of ordered set with a basic, multi-value logic. Us-
ing simple algorithms discovered by M. Šare in the natural laws of electrical
networks [3], it is possible to construct logical tables, i.e. grids, for all logic
functions of n variables.
458
Sessions
For example, n = 2 gives the Dunn/Belnap

∧ ba bb aa ab B4 logic table (left table), while n = 4
ba ba bb aa ab gives ‘Sweet-sixteen’ [2] (figure below). All
bb bb bb ab ab higher order logics include those below:
aa aa ab aa ab Sixteen3 includes Four2 , and Four2 includes
ab ab ab ab ab Bool’s logic (bold elements in table, where
ba ≡ T and ab ≡ F ).
Each element of the ordered set has its ‘semantic domain’ in the partition
of the total logical space (dashed in the table), e.g. for n = 2 domains are
‘ba, bb’ (for element ‘b’) and ‘aa, ab’ (for element ‘a’). Unlike fuzzy logic,
domains have (hierarchical) structure. By increasing the dimension n, there
is a shift of the value (weight) of the logic variable, as already noted in [2].
The paper is accompanied with an interactive M -theory online program
written in Python.
References
1. M. Essert, I. Kuzmanović, I. Vazler & T. Žilić, “Theory of M-system”,
Logic Journal of the IGPL * , vol. 25(5), 2017, pp. 836–858.
2. Y. Shramko & H. Wansing, “Some Useful 16-Valued Logics: How a
Computer Network Should Think”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 34(2),
2005, pp. 121–153.
3. M. Šare, Jorbologija, Element, Zagreb, Croatia, 2000.
*
459
Argumentation
The keynote speakers at this session are Leila Amgoud (page 119), Leon
van der Torre (page 163) and Elena Lisanyuk (page 135).
Abduction in Unconceded-Preserving Dialogues

Matthieu Fontaine
Centre for Philosophy of Science,
[email protected]
Cristina Barés Gómez

Post-Doctoral Researcher, VPPI* ,
[email protected]
A lot of divergent interpretations of Peirce’s schema of abduction

[2, p. 5.189] have been defended. Gabbay and Woods [1] have argued that
most of them neglect its pragmatic dimension and the conjectural aspect of
the conclusion. By taking this advice as starting point, our proposal consists
in an understanding of abduction based on the conditions of use of abductive
conjectures in the context of dialogical logic. When abductive conjectures
can be introduced in an argumentative dialogue (triggering)? How abduc-
tive conjectures are introduced (guessing)? What are we committed to
when we introduce abductive conjectures (committing)? According to the
GW-model, abduction is triggered by an ignorance problem that acts as a
cognitive irritant. That is, an agent faces a surprising fact, something that
cannot be explained by his background knowledge. In such a situation, the
agent may (among other possibilities) conjecture a hypothesis that allows
him to continue a reasoning or an action despite a persisting state of igno-
rance. That hypothesis can be released in further reasoning. However, it is
not stated as a new piece of knowledge and it is defeasible. According to the
GW-model, abduction is an ignorance-preserving inference in which what
is unknown at the level of the premises remains unknown at the level of the
conclusion. Our aim is not to propose a dialogical formalization of the GW-
model. It is not to provide criteria to evaluate abduction either. It is rather
to think about a dialogical ground for the use of abductive conjectures in
order to define a general framework in which a more fine-grained analysis of
*
V Plan Propio de Investigación
460
Sessions
abduction might take place. In this respect, we focus on the notion of con-
cession that plays a central role in deductive dialogues. Indeed, abductive
dialogues are triggered by a concession-problem. That is, some participants
in a dialogue might want to continue an argumentative interaction despite
a blockage provoked by a lack of concessions. In that context, the dia-
logue becomes non-deductive and the proponent is allowed to introduce an
abductive conjecture by means of a conditional move. According to our ap-
proach, abductive dialogues are unconceded-preserving dialogues, that is,
what has been introduced by the proponent without previous concessions
of the opponent remains unconceded when the conjecture is used.
References
1. D.M. Gabbay & J. Woods, The Reach of Abduction: Insight and Trial,
Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems: volume 2, Elsevier, 2005.
2. C.S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited
by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A.W. Burks, 8 volumes, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1931–1958.
Analytic Tableaux for Argumentation Frameworks

Fernando Tohmé & Gustavo Adrián Bodanza
IIESS* , INMABB , CONICET ,
National University of the South, Argentina
Argumentation is a process in which arguments are advanced by con-
tending parties, each one trying to defeat the arguments of the other. We
assume the framework of attack relations among arguments of Dung [6], for
which several semantics have been proposed [7,2,4,5]. These semantics de-
fine the acceptance and rejection of arguments. On the other hand, this can
also be determined in terms of proof procedures, as for instance dialogue
games [9,3] in which two players, Pro and Con put forward, sequentially,
arguments attacking the previous one, starting with Pro. The last one to
move wins. If it is Pro, the initial argument is accepted; otherwise it is
rejected.
In this paper we present an alternative decision method for argument
justification, inspired in the method of analytic tableaux [1,8]. The latter
allows to decide on the satisfiability of a formula or set of formulas by
developing a tree (the tableau ) in which any formula becomes “expanded”
according the truth table of its principal connective. In a finite sequence
*
Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales del Sur

Instituto de Matemática Bahı́a Blanca
461
of steps the procedure yields either the satisfiability or not of the formula
or formulas. In our case, we want a method to decide if sentences like
‘argument a is in’ or ‘argument a is out’ are satisfiable, combining ideas
from proof-theoretic and semantic approaches to argumentation. Starting
with an original sentence about the acceptation status of an argument, a
tree is build upon the different attack lines. Arguments along them are
marked in or out. In the end, some of the branches remain “open” (i.e.
without contradiction) and tracking back we can state whether the original
formula is satisfiable or not.
We define notions of satisfiability and validity, based on this tableaux
method, for argumentation frameworks. Furthermore, we show how to apply
it to capture skeptic/credulous acceptance criteria for Dung’s preferred and
credulous semantics.
References
1. E. Beth, Semantic Entailment and Formal Derivability, Mededelingen
van de Knifelike Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling
Letterkunde, vol. 18(13), 1955, pp. 309–342, reprinted in The Philos-
ophy of Mathematics, edited by J. Hintikka, Oxford University Press,
1969.
2. M. Caminada, “On the Issue of Reinstatement in Argumentation”,
in Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 10th European Conference, Lecture
3. C. Cayrol, S. Doutre & J. Mengin, “Dialectical Proof Theories for the
Credulous Preferred Semantics of Argumentation Frameworks”, in Sym-
bolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty: 6th
European Conference, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2143,
pp. 668–679, 2001.
4. C.I. Chesñevar & G.R. Simari, “An Abstract Model for Computing
Warrant in Skeptical Argumentation Frameworks”, in Proceedings of
the 11th Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, edited by J. Dix & A.
Hunter, IfI Technical Report Series, Clausthal University of Technology,
UK, 2006, pp. 409–417.
5. C.I. Chesñevar & G.R. Simari, “A Lattice-based Approach to Com-
puting Warranted Belief in Skeptical Argumentation Frameworks”, in
Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial In-
telligence, 2007, pp. 280–285.
6. P.M. Dung, “On the Acceptability of Arguments and its Fundamental
Role in Non-Monotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming and n-Person
Games”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 77(2), 1995, pp. 321–357, doi:10.
1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X.
462
Sessions
7. H. Jakobovits & D. Vermeir, “Robust Semantics for Argumentation

Frameworks”, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 9(2), 1999,
pp. 215–261.
8. R. Smullyan, First Order-Logic, Dover Publications, 1998.
9. G. Vreeswijk & H. Prakken, “Credulous and Sceptical Argument Games
for Preferred Semantics”, in Logics in Artificial Intelligence: European
Workshop, JELIA 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1919,
2000, pp. 239–253.
How not to aggregate reasons

Frank Zenker
Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Sweden
[email protected]
Assume an arguer forwards two reasons, R1, R2, in support of a claim

C. Further, assume the meanings of R1 and R2 neither exhaust, nor fully
include, the meaning of C. This makes the argument “R1 and R2, there-
fore C” an instance of ampliative reasoning, and so projects onto inductive
inference.
As an a priori truth, if R1 and R2 provide some positive support for C,
then the support that R1 lends to C either does, or it does not, depend on the
support that R2 provides, and vice versa. The case where reasons provide
negative support (of the undermining or undercutting kind) is analogous. In
principle, factual and normative reasons (or evidence) can be treated alike
[1].
Abbreviating ‘support’ by ‘P ’, as in ‘probability’, we can hence express
“How do reasons aggregate?” as “How to define P (C∣R1 ⊕ R2)?”, where ‘⊕’
denotes the concatenation of R1 and R2. Raising this question, then, is to
ask how we might specify the function f (P (R1), P (R2)).
There is no shortage of candidates for this. One candidate is the “weak-
est link principle” (or Theophrastus’ rule), according to which
f (P (R1), P (R2)) outputs the minimum value of P (R1) or P (R2). A
second (related) candidate selects the maximum of both values. A third
settles for some value below the maximum (e.g., the multiplicative sum,
P (R1)×P (R2), or the average sum, (P (R1)+P (R2))/2, or a weighted com-
bination thereof). The fourth candidate, finally, sends f (P (R1), P (R2)) to
values above the maximum.
The four options are exhaustive. Hence, we can express both positive
and negative support along whichever scale measures the strength of the ‘is a
reason for’-relation. Following Spohn’s [3] ranking theory [see 4], therefore,
463
we can define the most general scale as:
+∞ ≥ P (C∣R1 ⊕ R2) = f (P (R1), P (R2)) = P (C∣R1) + P (C∣R2) × a ≥ −∞,
where a (being some rational number) is an “aggregation term” that, if

suitably selected, specifies one of the above four candidates.
What many today call a Bayesian (or Pascalian) approach to probabilis-
tically calculating argument strength [e.g. 2], itself defined over the [0,1] in-
terval, is a limiting case of the above Baconian scale [+∞, −∞]. Of course,
important differences between a Pascalian and a Bayesian approach [5] can
arise from defining rules that relate P (C∣R) with P (¬C∣R), which are co-
dependent terms in the former approach, but not in the latter.
We briefly review — yet criticize — approaches that define
f (P (R1), P (R2)) according to the structural linked vs. convergent vs. serial
distinction. In particular, a probabilistic perspective lets a serial (aka sub-
ordinate) structure appear as a non-distinct instance of a linked structure.
The two basic structures, then, are the linked and convergent structure.
We also explain why the four aggregation-candidates (rightly) apply to
some natural language arguments. Decisive reasons to favor this or that
candidate, however, not only cite, but indeed pivot on semantic rather than
structural information. Which structure properly models reasons R1 and
R2, and which candidate properly aggregates them, therefore stands or falls
with the dependence or independence of the semantic contents these reasons
express.
References
1. S. Kearns & D. Star, “Reasons as evidence”, in Oxford Studies
in Metaethics, edited by R. Shafer-Landau, volume 4, Oxford University
Press, 2009, pp. 215–242.
2. D. Godden & F. Zenker, “A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency”,
Synthese, vol. 195(4), 2018, pp. 1715–1740, doi:10.1007/s11229-016-
1299-2.
3. W. Spohn, The Laws of Belief, Oxford University Press, 2012.
4. F. Zenker, Review of [3], Philosophical Quaterly, vol. 65(259), 2014,
pp. 310–313.
5. F. Zenker, “Denying the Antecedent Probabilized: a Dialectical View”,
in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the International
Society for the Study of Argumentation, edited by F.H. van Eemeren,
B. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell, Rozenberg, Amsterdam, 2014,
pp. 1–14.
464
Sessions
Language and Semiotics

How Combinatory Logic can be used to formalize meanings
Jean-Pierre Desclés
Université Paris-Sorbonne, France
[email protected]
Curry’s Combinatory Logic (CL) is an applicative formalism in which

each expression is constructed by applications of operators on operands. CL
is a logical theory (following Curry: an “Ur-Logik”) defined from abstract
operators (called combinators) used to compose whatever operators (for in-
stance specific operators linked to given domains) or to transform them;
the compositions and transformations are executed by intrinsic ways, i.e.
without any reference to a domain of interpretations. The combinators can
be defined in the general Gentzen’s natural deduction system by means of
introduction and elimination rules defined for each combinatory [1]. The
formalism of CL is not fully equivalent to the Church’s lambda-calculus
(LC) for three principal reasons: (i) there is an equivalence ‘in extension’
but not ‘in intension’ [2]; (ii) CL does not use bound variables as LC neces-
sarily does: the bound variables in LC are necessary linked to a domain of
interpretation of variables, hence it is not possible to define intrinsic general
properties about operators, as it is possible in CL; and (iii) since CL uses
only free variables, the technical complications involved by substitution —
with obligatory changes of bound variables in LC — are completely avoided
in CL. In Categorial Grammars (CG), the syntactic categories are canoni-
cally associated to Church’s functional types [3]; in the extension of CG by
the Lambek Calculus [4], it is possible to compose functional types and to
change a functional type (for instance by a type rising operation). In this
communication, we will show that each formal composition of functional
types of the Lambek Calculus (defined on functional types) introduces, in
a syntactic analysis, some combinator of the ‘typed CL’; then, the elimina-
tion rule associated to the introduced combinator contributes to construct
the applicative organization underlying to the analyzed linguistic expression
(for instance a possible sentence). In GRACE (GRammar of Applicative,
Cognitive and Enunciative operations) [3], the meanings of lexical and gram-
matical units are expressed by applicative expressions (schemes) obtained
from a composition of a small set of semantico-cognitive primitives. How-
ever, in this computational model of Cognitive Semantic, by using com-
binators, we can explain how these applicative representations (schemes)
465
can be synthesized into lexical predicates and composed with grammatical

operators (in a top down approach) and also, how verbal predicates and
grammatical units can be decomposed and represented inside of applicative
representations of their meanings (in a bottom up approach). The aim of
the communication is a presentation of this new logical and computational
analysis of natural languages with the help of complete formal treatments
of examples in which are explicitly associated, by formal deductions, on one
hand, semantic and cognitive representations of grammatical units (tenses
and aspects) and representations of the meanings of lexical verbal units (by
schemes) and, on another hand, syntagmatic organizations of these linguis-
tic (lexical and grammatical) units in utterances.
References
1. J.-P. Desclés, G. Guibert & B. Sauzay, Logique Combinatoire et λ-
Calcul: des logiques d’opérateurs, Cépaduès Éditions, 2016.
2. J.R. Hindley & J.P. Seldin, Lambda-Calculus and Combinators: An
Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2008.
3. J.-P. Desclés, G. Guibert & B. Sauzay, Calculs de significations par une
logique d’opérateurs, Cépaduès Éditions, 2016.
4. J. Van Bethem, “The Lambek Calculus”, in Categorial Grammars and
Natural Language Structures, edited by R.T. Oehrle, E. Bach & D.
Wheeler, Springer, 1988, pp. 35–68.
The Structural Unconcious: the Logic of Differences

Ricardo Jardim
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
F. de Saussure found out an objective reality in “human speech” (fr.

langage) totally contingent on the observer’s influence. In the Course of
General Linguistics [1], he names this reality “language” (fr. langue), op-
posing it to “speech” (fr. parole). The latter is the individual speaking
and the former is systemic. In language, an expression has value in itself
not because of what is positively consisted of but because of what makes
it different from the other expressions. Therefore, language is a system of
differences or oppositions. Linguists from Prague School managed to iso-
late in language the phoneme, conceived by R. Jakobson as a “bundle of
distinctive features” [units of sound] deprived of meaning [2]. In language,
466
Sessions
as in every communication system, “what makes a sign different is exactly

what it is consisted of”. Saussure, thus, announces the project of a new
science — Semiology — which object is precisely “the study of the life of
signs in social life”. It is through using the phonological model on kinship
sociology, that Cl. Lévi-Strauss sorted out the enigma of incest prohibition
in Elementary Structures of Kinship [3]. Relating The Gift by M. Mauss to
Course in General Linguistics, Strauss established that matrimonial insti-
tutions are essentially “reciprocity structures” unconsciously produced by
human spirit which make possible the exchange of the “good by excellence”,
“the supreme gift’, i.e., the woman. It is important to notice that incest
prohibition does not concern intrinsic female characteristics, such as the bi-
ological ones, but its belonging to antithetical relations system that make
the exchange operative.
What matters is the “alterity sign”, or rather, the woman’s position “as
the same or the other” in an “opposition system”. Therefore, there is a clear
parallelism between the phoneme and the incest prohibition. In Elementary
Structures of Kinship conclusion, Cl. Lévi-Strauss proposes to conceive the
woman as a kind of sign. This perspective opens the possibility to think
culture as “a set of symbolic systems” and anthropology as a semiological
science. The “symbolic function” is, thus, the condition that makes culture
possible. “Specifically human”, this function works “in all men according
to the same laws”. A symbolic function organ, the structural unconscious,
deprived of content, is the basis “of the laws of human thinking”. “Non-
reflexive totality, language is a part of human reasoning with reasons that
man does not know”, says Cl. Lévi-Strauss, paraphrasing Pascal.
References
1. F. de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale, Critical Edition, edited
by T. De Mauro, Payot, Paris, 1983.
2. R. Jakobson, Essais de Linguistique Générale 1, Minuit, Paris, 1963.
3. Cl. Lévi-Strauss, Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, Paris, 1967.
467
A Structural Semiotic Study of How We Use Variables

in Math and Logic
[email protected]
One of the profoundest hurdles for students of mathematics is learning

to think of a given mathematical symbol in a variety of ways. The variable
X may be thought of as a “constant” which may be “specified” or “unspec-
ified”, and which may “vary” or be “fixed”, and may be “independent” of
other variables or “dependent” on them.
The options which our minds have for interpreting a variable may be
dictated by a cognitive structure. We collected a variety of terms which
characterize variables. Indeed, we found 12 pairs such as “known” and
“unknown”, “free” and “bound” or “input” and “output”.
Such pairs indicate how a variable may be reinterpreted. Semiotically,
a variable is a sign. What can we say about what different kinds of vari-
ables signify? A logical or mathematical expression contains variables from
some alphabet A, B, C. . . If these variables are “free” or “unknown”, then
they refer to nothing more and we may think of them as uninterpreted.
But if they are “bound” or “arbitrary” or “independent”, then we imagine
them indicating a range of possibilities. If they are “known” or “particular”
or even “unspecified” then they refer to particular possibilities, which we
ourselves may not yet know, however. And if they are “specified” or “de-
pendent” or “values”, then they are explicitly related to other variables so
that we may say that we ourselves do know them.
In summary, we may think of variables as referring to unrelated originals
(in an alphabet), interchangeable copies (in a multiset), particular elements
(in a set) or prioritized items (in a list). They manifest a recurrent cognitive
framework of levels of knowledge: whether, what, how and why. Each pair
of terms refers to two such levels. Structurally, we find six pairs which our
minds use to enrich the content of a variable, for example, to reinterpret a
free variable as a bound variable, in order to define a problem by adding
information. We also find six pairs which our minds use to emphasize the
form of a variable, for example, to reinterpret an output as an input, in
order to solve a problem by removing information. The way that our minds
recast variables to create and solve problems is meaningful in exploring the
cognitive foundations of logic.
468
Sessions
The origin of semantics in formal languages

Vı́ctor Aranda Utrero
Faculty of Philosophy and Letters,
Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain
[email protected]
In [1], Marı́a Manzano and Enrique Alonso claimed that talking about
semantics before the 1920s is ‘a misconception’. For this reason, they pro-
pose the word ‘proto-semantics’ to speak about the collection of algorithmic
proceedings which were employed by Post [2], Bernays [3] or Wittgenstein
[4] to classify formulas of propositional logic. But contrary to them, we
argue that a conscientious analysis of the earliest consistency proofs for the
theory of propositional logic reveals that, while Post’s procedure of truth
tables can be fairly named ‘proto-semantics’, Bernays was able to identify
valid and provable formulas by providing an interpretation to his axioms.
What is more, Bernays compared the set of valid formulas with the set of
provable formulas, so that he proved soundness and completeness for propo-
sitional logic. We conclude our contribution wondering why Hilbert’s own
469
consistency proof does not present an independent semantics: since some

key concepts are blurred in his texts, syntax and semantics are not precisely
delimited.
References
1. M. Manzano & E. Alonso, “Completeness: from Gödel to Henkin”, in
History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 35(1), 2013, pp. 50–75, doi:10.1080
/01445340.2013.816555.
2. E. Post, “Introduction to a general theory of elementary propositions”,
1921, in [5] pp. 264–283.
3. P. Bernays, “Beiträge zur axiomatischen Behandlung des Logik-Kalküls”,
1918, in [6], pp. 231–271.
4. L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge, 1922.
5. J. van Heijenoort (editor), From Frege to Gödel: a Source Book in
Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Harvard University Press, 1967.
6. W. Ewald & W. Sieg (editors), David Hilbert’s lectures on the Founda-
tions of Arithmetic and Logic, 1917–1933, Springer, 2013.
Bilingual Logic Based on the Scientific Method System

Xiaohui Zou & Shunpeng Zou
China University of Geosciences, Beijing, China
Searle Research Center,
University of California, Berkeley, USA
Keywords: logical matrices, tableau, completeness, decidability, bilingual

logic, method system.
The purpose of this paper is to start from the basis of formal logic and
mathematical logic, to establish the generalized bilingual logic based on the
scientific method system. The method is as follows: Step 1, use formal logic
with any language or symbol system; Step 2, use mathematical logic with
logical matrices and tableaux; Step 3, use logic of sequence and position
with the completeness of a single set or a series of finite set from hierarchi-
cal sets, and the relative completeness of attribute sets. It is characterized in
that the linkage function relation between two series of symbolic systems by
using the double list or matrix of both digital and textual, which is based
on human-computer interaction system, in both of interaction and batch
processing, based on the scientific method system. The result is that the
470
Sessions
generalized bilingual logic based on the scientific method system, in which

the determinability and calculability of formalized system, for that the sub-
stantial miscellaneous set which contains three types of sets — single set,
hierarchical sets and attribute sets, is the most critical with both language
and knowledge. In the dual formalized man-machine system, relying on the
logic of sequence and location, and linkage function, interaction process of a
series of targeted selection, the advantages of both sides of human brain and
computer are played just right, that is, can produce software much easier.
Its significance is that conditions of both complete and necessary are avail-
able with the foundation for the big production of knowledge, as the time
goes, not only formal system engineering of language, knowledge, software
and hardware, but also social system engineering of education, management,
learning and application, by using of logical matrices, tableaux, complete-
ness and decidability that will be significantly optimized based on the new
scientific method system.
471
Basic models of ambiguity analysis:

(a) model of basic views, (b) model of basic methods.
472
Sessions
Tools and Results

A second order propositional logic with subtyping
Nino Guallart
Logic, Language and Information Group,
[email protected]
In this work we propose a variation of second order propositional logic

with subtyping over propositions, in a way that can be considered a case of
an impredicative higher order type theory [1,2]. We have several subtypes
or predicates, all of them being subdomains of the type of all propositions
Prop. For example:
Syntactic subtypes such as At (subtype of atomic propositions).
Arbitrary semantic subtypes or classes of propositions depending on the
nature of the world we are considering.
These subtypes can be considered as predicates over propositions. In
this way, we can quantify over propositions of type 1. Thus, we can con-
sider usual propositions as propositions of type 1, and predicates over them
as propositions of type 2. This allows us to increase the expressive power
of our language, since we can express things such as for any atomic propo-
sition there exists its negation, or if it holds any proposition of class A,
then q. Although this work deals with the formalisation and semantics of
this language, the most important issues are those that have to be debated,
mainly if it is possible and safe the construction of compound propositions
that mixes these two types of propositions.
References
1. J.-Y. Girard, Interprétation fonctionnelle et élimination des coupures
de l’arithmétique d’ordre supérieur, Ph.D. Thesis, Université Paris 7,
1972.
2. J.C. Reynolds, “Towards a theory of type structure”, in Programming
Symposium, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 19, Springer, 1974,
pp. 408–425.
473
The generalized probability theory

and intelligent information processing
Huacan He
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China
Beijing, China
[email protected]
Yanquan Zhou
Beijing, China
[email protected]
Generalized probability theory is our own original theory. We make use

of Schweizer operator in triangular norms to expand and refine classical
probability theory. As a result, it can describe not only uncertainty reason-
ing under universal logic, but also the working principle of flexible neuron.
We believe that it is a indispensable mathematical logic for intelligent sci-
ence and technology, laying the foundations for uncertainty reasoning and
intelligent information processing.
A Natural Deduction System for Leśniewski’s Protothetic

Pierre Joray
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Rennes 1, France
[email protected]
Stanislaw Leśniewski’s Protothetic is one of the richest systems for propo-

sitional logic. It is not only a calculus for the usual connectives, but also
a theory for the use of quantifiers binding propositional variables, variables
for connectives and, in fact, variables for functions of any order or cate-
gory (like connectives, properties of connectives, operations on connectives,
properties of such operations, etc.). One of the important features of this
ambitious system is that its formal language cannot be restricted once and
for all to any set of syntactic categories. On the contrary, it must always
remain open to the infinitely many new and more complex categories of
constants to be further introduced by the way of a procedure of definition,
which was explicitly codified by Leśniewski, as a formal inference rule of the
system.
474
Sessions
Protothetic remains today quite unknown for a large part of logicians,

even if it was central in the celebrated Warsaw School. It was studied and
used for different purposes by eminent scholars, among them A. Tarski,
T. Kotarbiński, K. Ajdukiewics, J. Slupecki, C. Lejewski, A. Prior and P.
Simons. More than Leśniewski’s death in 1939 and the breaking up of
the Warsaw School during the War, the main reason of the current weak
following of Protothetic lies probably in the fact that this logic only exists
in difficult and old-style axiomatic versions. Teaching Leśniewski’s logic is
today quite a challenge, for it is often seen as too different from the standard
of the subject. Students are accustomed to streamlined methods of working,
far from Leśniewski’s very meticulous axiomatic method.
Nevertheless, it is known by testimonies and also by examples in the
literature that, in everyday work, Leśniewski and his colleagues in Warsaw
(among them Lukasiewicz and Tarski) used a convenient method for find-
ing their proofs, very close to nowadays natural deduction. The idea was
to draw consequences from assumptions, using derived inference rules and
collecting the results into generalized conditional propositions. This is just
like our students in logic are accustomed. Jaśkowski’s well-known natural
deduction system (1934) has clearly been inspired by this uncodified prac-
tice. Unfortunately, no one worked after Leśniewski’s death on an explicit
system of this sort for his logic.
In this talk, we are going to show that a system very close to Fitch’s and
Jaśkowski’s style of natural deduction systems is available for Protothetic.
Apart from usual rules for the introduction and elimination of basic logical
constants, the system contains a specific and powerful rule for definitions.
The main challenge in the conception of such a system is the way to deal with
an evolutional notion of well formed formula. Each time a new definition
is stated (in particular, when the defined constant is of a new syntactic
category) the language and also, possibly, the inferential power of the system
increase. These novelties have to be integrated into the proofs to be further
constructed. This is indeed an unusual way to proceed in standard formal
logic. But it is in fact very common in the developments of scientific theories.
Leśniewski’s logic is not only a tool for the formalization of a given state
of a theory, but a logical machinery the aim of which is to formalize into
a single framework the often quite complex definitional expansions through
which a theory is developed.
With very elementary propositional examples, we are going to show how
this machinery works. We will also make explicit the fact that there exist a
way to deal with Protothetic (and later on, to larger Leśniewski’s systems)
perfectly accessible to everyone acquainted to the basics of propositional
standard logic.
475
Tableau Systems for Epistemic Interpretations of Jerzy Loś’

R-Operator Logics
Krzysztof Krawczyk & Tomasz Jarmużek
Jerzy Loś is the Polish logician who happens to be one of the pioneers in
the field of philosophical logic. Precisely, his works [3,4] covering epistemic
and temporal logic, are the very first publications offering systems which
formalize topics such as propositional attitudes and time. However, the
pathfinder’s glory has somehow passed him by. One could point out many
causes for such exclusion, but, more than anything, unfortunate times are
there to blame. Nonetheless, despite the Iron Curtain, Loś’ ideas became
accessible to the western world due to reviews of Henryk Hiż [1] and Roman
Suszko [7]. In this respect, Polish thinker’s ideas are appreciated in Prior
[5] and Rescher [6]. Soon after that, his name is rarely mentioned.
The year 2018 marks the 70th anniversary of publishing [3], which makes
a great occasion to bring back some of the Loś’ work. We present general
treatment of logics with R-operator logics, as in [2]. Then we give it an epis-
temic interpretation by selecting certain systems. We construct a tableau-
style proof systems for those logics based on the more general theory [8].
References
1. H. Hiż, Review of [4], The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 16, 1951,
pp. 58–59.
2. T. Jarmużek & M. Tkaczyk, Normalne logiki pozycyjne (Normal posi-
tional logics), Towarzystwo naukowe KUL* , Lublin, 2015.
3. J. Loś, “Logiki wielowartościowe a formalizacja funkcji intensjonalnych”
(Multivalued logics vs. intensional functions formalization), Kwartalnik
Filozoficzny, vol. 17(1–2), 1948, pp. 59–78.
4. J. Loś, “Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonów Milla” (Basics of
methodological analysis of Mill’s canons), Annales Universitatis Mariae
Curie-Sklodowska, Sectio F, vol. 2, 1948, pp. 269–301.
5. A. Prior, Formal Logic, Oxford University Press, 1955.
6. N. Rescher & A. Urquhart, Temporal Logic, Springer, 1971.
7. R. Suszko, Review of “Many-Valued Logics and the Formalization of In-
tensional Functions”, by J. Loś, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14(1),
1949, pp. 64–65.
*
Scientific Society of the Catholic University of Lublin
476
Sessions
8. T. Jarmużek, “Tableau Metatheorem for Modal Logics”, in Recent

Trends in Philosophical Logic, edited by R. Ciuni, H. Wansing
& C. Willkommen, Trends in Logic book series, vol. 41, Springer, 2014,
pp. 103–126.
Comparing Classical and Relativistic Kinematics

in First-Order Logic
Koen Lefever
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
[email protected]
Gergely Székely
Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics, Budapest, Hungary
[email protected]
The aim of this talk is to present a new logic-based understanding of the

connection between classical kinematics and relativistic kinematics. These
theories are axiomatized as in the tradition of the Andréka-Németi School
[see 1].
We show in [2,3] that the axioms of special relativity can be interpreted
in the language of classical kinematics. This means that there is a logical
translation function from the language of special relativity to the language
of classical kinematics which translates the axioms of special relativity into
consequences of classical kinematics.
We also show that if we distinguish a class of observers (representing
observers stationary with respect to the “ether”) in special relativity and
exclude the non-slower-than light observers from classical kinematics by an
extra axiom, then the two theories become definitionally equivalent (i.e.,
they become equivalent theories in the sense as the theory of lattices as
algebraic structures is the same as the theory of lattices as partially ordered
sets).
Furthermore, we show that classical kinematics is definitionally equiv-
alent to classical kinematics with only slower-than-light inertial observers,
and hence by transitivity of definitional equivalence that special relativity
theory extended with “Ether” is definitionally equivalent to classical kine-
matics.
So within an axiomatic framework of mathematical logic, we explicitly
show that the transition from classical kinematics to relativistic kinematics
is the knowledge acquisition that there is no “ether”, accompanied by a
redefinition of the concepts of time and space.
477
The above allows us to introduce a metric “conceptual distance” between

theories: theories which are equivalent have a conceptual distance of zero,
while the distance between non-equivalent theories is the number of concepts
which need to be added or subtracted to make them equivalent. Since the
only concept which need to be added to relativistic kinematics to make it
equivalent to classical kinematics is the “ether”, the conceptual distance
between both theories is “one”.
References
1. H. Andréka, J.X. Madarász & I. Németi, On the logical structure of rel-
ativity theories, research report, Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2002, https://old.renyi.hu/
pub/algebraic-logic/olsort.html.
2. K. Lefever, Using Logical Interpretation and Definitional Equivalence
to Compare Classical Kinematics and Special Relativity Theory, PhD
thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2017.
3. K. Lefever & G. Székely, “Comparing Classical and Relativistic Kine-
matics in First-Order Logic”, forthcoming in Logique et Analyse, 2018.
Type Theory and the Theory of Forms

Goran Lojkić
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
[email protected]
My intention is to formalize in a type-theoretical setting certain meta-
physical intuitions concerning intensional objects (properties, concepts or
universals, maybe even something like Forms or Ideas) and to describe one
possible formal interpretation of the Platonic metaphysical outlook. For
that aim, I present a system of cumulative intensional ramified type theory
CIRTT, inspired by Russell’s ramified type theory from the first edition of
Principia Mathematica [1], but with somewhat loosened restrictions given
by the Vicious Circle Principle, and guided by a realist interpretation of a
ramified type hierarchy. As a formal system, CIRTT is a modification of
Fitting’s intensional simple type theory with semantics based on an inten-
sional generalisation of Henkin models, as presented in his Types, Tableaus,
and Gödel’s God [2].
First I explain briefly some of the ideas and intuitions that motivate
CIRTT, most notably the reasons for ramification and cumulativeness of
type hierarchy, and then sketch formative rules, semantics, and proof pro-
cedures. I also describe some basic metatheoretical properties of CIRTT.
Lastly, I explain the relations between CIRTT, its intended semantics and
the background metaphysics.
478
Sessions
References
1. A.N. Whitehead & B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, volume 1, Cam-
2. M. Fitting, Types, Tableaus, and Gödel’s God, Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 2002.
Coloring Venn Diagrams

Raja Natarajan
School of Technology and Computer Science,
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
[email protected]
Diagrammatic approaches to deductive and formal reasoning [1,2] have

seen a resurgence in recent years. We propose a diagrammatic method for
deciding whether Boolean equations over set-valued variables are tautologies
or not. Conventional diagrammatic approaches to the above decision prob-
lem work reasonably well when the total number of sets under consideration
is rather small.
However, conventional approaches become cumbersome, if not com-
pletely unusable, while dealing with a large number of sets. We devise
an algorithm for the above decision problem, and demonstrate that it scales
well when the number of set variables in the equations increases rapidly.
References
1. M. Gardner, Logic Machines and Diagrams, 2nd edition, The University
of Chicago Press, 1982.
2. D.D. Roberts, The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Pierce, Mouton,
The Hague, 1973.
479
Some mathematical approaches for defining the notion

of quasi-topology
Anca Christine Pascu
Université de Bretagne Occidentale, Brest, France
[email protected]
Jean-Pierre Desclés
Université Paris-Sorbonne, France
[email protected]
Ismaı̈l Biskri
Université de Québec, Trois Rivières, Canada
[email protected]
The notion of quasi-topology founded by Jean-Pierre Desclés [1] as a

mathematical model must be a model encoding the idea that a set as mem-
ber of an abstract space can have a strict interior and an interior, a closure
and a large closure. This approach comes from the linguistic expressions of
the space, the linguistic expression of the time, even from basic notion in
law as “legal” opposite to “illegal” or from the social notion of “inhabitant
of a city”. In the mathematical literature, several approach modeling the
notion of strict interior and large closure where de fined and studied. In
this paper, we investigate some previously defined mathematical structures
which are likely to be more or less closely to the quasi-topology classical
topology, rough sets, locology giving to the quasi-topology the status of
mathematical model. We study also the quasi-topology induced by each of
them in the general case of mathematical space and, in a particular case,
when the mathematical space is the extension of a property, Ext(f ) [2].
References
1. J.-P. Desclés, “Schèmes et topologie (de Kant à la sémantique cog-
nitive)”, in Colloque Histoire des mathématiques et sciences sociales,
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, November 15–17, Lyon,
France, 2009.
2. J.-P. Desclés & A.C. Pascu, “Logique de la Détermination des Objets
(LDO): structuration topologique et quasi-topologique des extensions”,
in Logique en Question — Logic in Question, Association des Sciences
du Langage, Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2016.
480
Sessions
On Generalized Unified Boolean-Fregean Semantics

Sergey Pavlov
Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
[email protected]
The main aim of this report is to consider the unified Boolean-Fregean
semantics and then its generalization.
Let L be the language of the sentential logic with negation ∼ and con-
junction ∧. Sentential variables: p, p1 , p2 , . . . Formation rules are standard.
We will denote the set of variables as Var, and the set of wffs as For.
Metavariables for formulae are P, Q.
George Boole supposed that the truth is represented by 1 and the uni-
verse, and the false is represented by 0 and nothing — an empty set (class).
1 and 0 are logical values.
The Boolean semantics, based on the Boolean algebra of subsets, is
considered. The valuation function V is a mapping from the set For into
the set {U, ∅} (short V∶ F or Ð→ {U, ∅}). Designated value is U. We have:
1. Var Ð→ {U, ∅};
2.1. V (∼P ) = ∅, if V (P ) = U; 2.2. V (∼P ) = U, if V (P ) = ∅;
3.1. V (P ∧ Q) = U, if V (P ) = U and V (Q) = U; 3.2. V (P ∧ Q) = ∅, otherwise.
The operations of Boolean logic are associated with the operations of

the algebra of sets. Thus, for ∧ and ∩ we have that the equality for the
valuations V (P ∧ Q) and V (P ) ∩ V (Q) follows from the above semantic
rules, i.e. V (P ∧ Q) = V (P ) ∩ V (Q).
From the point of view of Fregean semantics, sentences stand for either
truth or false. Set-theoretic interpretation of Fregean logic, similar to the
set-algebraic interpretation of Boolean logic, we construct as follows:
V ∶ F or Ð→ {{truth}, {f alse}}. Designated value: {truth}.
It does not hold that V (P ∧ Q) = V (P ) ∩ V (Q).
The consistent unification of Boolean and Fregean semantics can be con-
structed by using the set {{truth}, ∅} (or, more abstractly, {{∅}, ∅}) as the
set of logical values. (This corresponds to the modification of the Fregean
semantics by means of rejection of the reference false as non-existent.) Now
it does hold that V (P ∧ Q) = V (P ) ∩ V (Q).
So, the unified Boolean-Fregean semantics has been obtained.
The proposed approach can be generalized to non-classical cases, for
which the bivalence principle doesn’t take place. In this case the sentences
P , ∼P stand (or doesn’t stand) for truth independently. We have four
variants:
481
V (P ) = {truth} and V (∼P ) = ∅,

V (P ) = ∅ and V (∼P ) = {truth},
V (P ) = {truth} and V (∼P ) = {truth},
V (P ) = ∅ and V (∼P ) = ∅.
Thus, the unified Boolean-Fregean semantics would be extended to the
non-classical case too.
Reference
1. S. Pavlov, “Semantics with Only One Bedeutung: Rethinking Frege’s
Semantics”, in Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philoso-
phy, Seoul, Korea, 2008, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 13, 2008,
pp. 81–85, doi:10.5840/wcp22200813935.
The Rule of Explicit Substitution into (Hyper)intensional

Contexts
Jiřı́ Raclavský
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
[email protected]
Intensional logic employing possible world semantics (PWS) resolves the
failure of substitutivity of identicals (SI) within the scope of belief operators
on the proviso that objects of agent’s attitudes are rather coarse-grained.
Yet objects of belief attitudes are meanings of embedded sentences, i.e.
fine-grained entities that are beyond the reach of PWS. Thus there is no
surprise that there occurs, if one utilizes PWS, a failure of substitution into
hyperintensional contexts because of non-identity of meanings of logically
equivalent expressions. As a remedy, several hyperintensional logics were
proposed, some of them deploy algorithms as models of hyperintensions
(Tichý, Muskens, Moschovakis, Dužı́ et al.).
The present paper utilizes a recent variant of Tichý’s proposal [5]. Its
basic notion is construction — an abstract structured algorithmic computa-
tion of the denotation of the term expressing it. Constructions are recorded
by λ-terms of forms
x ∣ 0X ∣ 1X ∣ 2X ∣ [CC1 . . . Cm ] ∣ [λx1 . . . xm .C],
where X is any construction or non-construction and C( i) a construction.

Tichý’s early natural deduction system [3,4] has been extended for his ram-
ified type theory in [2].
My (SI) rule utilizes achievements of [2]. Let “C(Ci /x) ” be C that has
Ci instead of all hospitable occurrences of x. Sub is a partial mapping from
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Sessions
triples ⟨C2 , C1 , C⟩ to constructions of form C(C2 /x) ; C(C2 /x) is v-congruent

(≅) with C.
C(C1 /x)
[C1 ≅C2 ]
(SI)
2
[Sub 0 C2 0 C1 0 C(C1 /x) ]
(SI)’s conclusion is called execution of explicit substitution; it is derived

from [5], so it precedes the famous proposal in [1]. That this (SI) does not
licence the familiar arguments displaying failure of substitutivity, while it
retains an expected deductive strength, is demonstrated in the talk.
References
1. M. Abadi, L. Cardelli, P.-L. Curien & J.-J. Levy, “Explicit substitu-
tions”, Journal of Functional Programming, vol. 1(4), 1991,
pp. 375–416.
2. J. Raclavský, P. Kuchyňka & I. Pezlar, Transparent Intensional Logic
as Characteristica Universalis and Calculus Ratiocinator (in Czech),
Masaryk University Press, 2015.
3. P. Tichý, “Foundations of Partial Type Theory”, Reports on Mathe-
matical Logic, vol. 14, 1982, pp. 59–72.
4. P. Tichý, “Indiscernibility of Identicals”, Studia Logica, vol. 45(3),
1986, pp. 251–273.
5. P. Tichý, The Foundations of Frege’s Logic, De Gruyter, 1988.
Embodiment of some Logical, Computable and Categorical

Notions by a Logic of Operators
Benoı̂t Sauzay & Gaëll Guibert
Independent Scholars, France
Formal systems incarnate abstract ideas on the basis of more or less
elementary ones. They are said to be “closed” if the new constructions are
of the “same nature”, “ground” or “medium”, where they do come from.
It appears that such kind of mathematical structures integrates their own
“internal logic”. In the Theory of Categories, Grothendieck’s Topos are a
Cartesian Closed Category, which is “governed” by the Intuitionist Type
Theory and corresponding logic. At a weaker level, in the Typed Illative
Combinatory Logic (CL), more or less “abstract” properties (inversion, pro-
longation, duplication, recursion, abstraction,. . . ) can be embodied into a
“medium” by the application of typed syntactic operators (nominal sym-
bols) also called combinators.
483
This “applicative” embodiment into one operation of application, is iso-

morphic to the Cartesian product. The application of operators is governed
too by a more fundamental logical system (or type system) also called : the-
ory of functionality (without which the applicative system is inconsistent).
Following [3] on ancient texts, we continue on the comparison of CL
and Category Theory. They both share the study of processes which are
ordinarily carried out by means of variables. We show that the “algebra”
of combinators can be embodied into CL itself. In that picture, we rely on
Guibert’s expression ‘BY0 EVAL’ with the Cartesian product combinator and
Church’s numerals. The latter is comparable by many aspects to that of
exponentiation in Cartesian Closed Categories. Doing such, we embody high
level or complex structures into the applicative medium, without having to
modify the latter.
References
1. M. Bunder, Set Theory Based on Combinatory Logic, Amsterdam, 1969.
2. O. Caramello & L. Lafforgue, “Sur la dualité des topos et de leurs
présentations et applications: une introduction”, Institut des Hautes
Études Scientifiques, IHES/M/16/26, 2016, https://goo.gl/jGJQY1.
3. G. Guibert, “A Logical Trinity of Rational Ideas Across a Logic of
Operators”, in 2nd World Congress on Logic and Religion, Warsaw,
2017.
Nested Sequents, Focusing and Synthetic Connectives

Lutz Straßburger
INRIA* Saclay Île-de-France Research Centre,
LIX , École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
Nested sequent calculus is a generalization of ordinary Gentzen sequent
calculus. It has been introduced independently by Kashima, Poggiolesi and
Brünnler [1]. The basic idea is that a sequent, which is list of formulas, is
generalized to a tree of lists of formulas. This allows for more freedom in
the design of inference rules, by still maintaining important properties like
cut elimination and the subformula property.
And, indeed, many logics that could not be treated by standard sequent
calculus have a concise proof system in nested sequents, for example all logics
in the modal S5 cube [1], many intuitionistic modal logics [6], intermediate
logics, and substructural logics. This shows, that nested sequents have the
potential of becoming a universal tool for universal logics.
*

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Sessions
Focusing is a general technique for transforming a sequent proof system

into one with a syntactic separation of non-deterministic choices without
sacrificing completeness. It has its origin in the foundations of logic pro-
gramming and is now increasingly relevant in structural proof theory be-
cause it improves proof search procedures and because focused proofs have
clearly identifiable and semantically meaningful synthetic normal forms.
The full theory of focusing was initially developed for the sequent calcu-
lus for linear logic, but it has since been extended to a wide variety of logics
and proof systems. This generality suggests that the ability to transform a
proof system into a focused form is a good indication of its syntactic quality,
in a manner similar to how admissibility of cut shows that a proof system is
syntactically consistent. In the talk I will make the case that the focusing
theorem is a universal property of a logic.
The basic idea behind focusing is to control the non-deterministic choices
in a proof, so that a proof can be seen as an alternation of negative phases,
where invertible rules are applied eagerly, and positive phases, where appli-
cations of the other rules are confined. This, in turn, lets us abstract from
the usual unary and binary logical connectives by collapsing whole phases
into n-ary synthetic connectives.
In this presentation, which is based on joint work with Kaustuv Chaud-
huri and Sonia Marin [5,2,3], I will first introduce nested sequents and show
how the focusing technique can be applied to a nested sequent system. Then
I will use as example the 15 logics in the modal S5 cube and demonstrate
the construction of synthetic connectives.
An excellent introduction and overview of the state of the art of focusing
for modal logics is Sonia Marin’s PhD thesis [4].
References
1. K. Brünnler, “Deep sequent systems for modal logic”, Archive for Math-
ematical Logic, vol. 48(6), 2009, pp. 551–577.
2. K. Chaudhuri, S. Marin & L. Straßburger, “Focused and synthetic
nested sequents”, in Proceedings of the 19th International Conference
on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures, edited
by B. Jacobs & C. Löding, 2016.
3. K. Chaudhuri, S. Marin & L. Straßburger, “Modular focused proof sys-
tems for intuitionistic modal logics”, in 1st International Conference on
Formal Structures for Computation and Deduction, June 22–26, Porto,
Portugal, LIPIcs * , vol. 52, edited by D. Kesner & B. Pientka, Schloss
Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, pp. 16:1–16:18, 2016.
*
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
485
4. S. Marin, Modal proof theory through a focused telescope, PhD thesis,

Université Paris-Saclay & École Polytechnique, 2018.
5. S. Marin & L. Straßburger, “Label-free Modular Systems for Classical
and Intuitionistic Modal Logics”, in Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 10,
2014.
6. L. Straßburger, “Cut elimination in nested sequents for intuitionistic
modal logics”, in 16th International Conference on Foundations of Soft-
ware Science and Computation Structures, 2013, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, vol. 7794, edited by F. Pfenning, 2013, pp. 209–224.
On First-order Mereological Complementation

Hsing-chien Tsai
National Chung-Cheng University, Chiayi, Taiwan
[email protected]
Mereology is the theory of the relation “being a part of”. The formal
language of mereology contains only one binary predicate “P”, whose in-
tended meaning is “being a part of”. Two additional binary predicates
“PP” and “O”, whose intended meanings are respectively “being a proper
part of” and “overlapping”, can be defined as follows. PPxy = Pxy ∧ ¬Pyx
and Oxy = ∃z (Pzx ∧ Pzy). The following axiom which can be found in
the literature [1] is called by the present writer “global complementation”
(GC):
∀x (¬∀y Pyx → ∃z ∀w (Pwz ↔ ¬Owx)).
Such an axiom says that anything which is not the greatest member
has a complement. There is another axiom called “local complementation”
(LC), which is formulated by the present writer [2] as follows:
∀x ∀y ((PPxy ∧ ¬∀z Pzy)

→ ∃z (PPzy ∧ ¬Ozx ∧ ∀w (Owy ↔ (Owx ∨ Owz)))).
It says that, for anything which is not the greatest member, any of its
proper part must have a complement in respect to that thing. It has been
shown that (GC) and (LC) have a lot to do with whether a first-order
axiomatizable mereological theory is decidable or not.
However, there can be some kind of complementation located in between,
for example, the complement of a member in respect to a definable class of
members. Let α(x) be a formula in which x is a free variable (where other
486
Sessions
variables might also occur free). The axiom of α-complementation (α-C)

can be formulated as follows:
∀x ((∃y (α(y) ∧ ¬Oyx) ∧ α(x)) → ∃z ∀w (Owz ↔ ∃u (¬Oux ∧ α(u) ∧ Owu))).
Other kinds of complementation are still possible and this talk will look
into them in a more systematical way but will be confined to those which
can be first-order defined. In addition, some metalogical issues, such as
completeness or decidability, will also be touched.
References
1. R. Casati & A.C. Varzi, Parts and Places, MIT* Press, 1999.
2. H.-c. Tsai, “Notes on Models of First-Order Mereological Theories”,
Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 24(4), 2015, pp. 469–482, doi:10.
12775/LLP.2015.009.
*
487
Philosophy
The keynote speaker at this session is Hartry Field (page 128).
Philosophy, Art, Science, Economy (PHASE) of self

and internal integrity
Director of the Neuroscientific Research Unit,
and Communication
[email protected]
Patrizio Paoletti
and Communication
[email protected]
Neuroscientific studies have demonstrated that our brain can be re-

garded as fragmented, and that increased neuronal synchronization, which
is related to cognitive flexibility, attention and self-awareness, can aid in
enhancing internal integrity. Several brain-based integrity scales have been
developed to measure state of consciousness, and were found to be con-
nected to moral judgments and problem solving. Together, these results
emphasize the importance of finding paradigms to elicit efficient neuronal
synchronization.
Also logics confirm the complexity of the human brain. However, are we
only logical beings? And what does it mean to be logical from a bio-logical,
neuro-logical or from a rational point of view? In addition, what role do
emotions play in cognitive processes, and how may they change as a result
of mental and sensorimotor training?
In this context, neuroscientific research has further demonstrated that
neuronal synchronization can be elicited by practicing music and medita-
tion, such as the Quadrato Motor Training. QMT was further found to
improve emotional regulation, creativity and information processing. In the
current talk, we will discuss these results, emphasizing that training can
help in enhancing neuronal integrity cognitive and emotional, which are
crucial for logical process and moral problem solving.
488
Sessions
Is Life Logical? Application of the Peirce-Leśniewski-Tarski

Meta-Logics to the Organic Mathematics of the Perplexity
of Natural Sorts and Kinds
Jerry Chandler
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study,
George Mason University, USA
Jerry LR [email protected]
Is life logical? Here, I propose a categorical approach to numeric combi-

nations that unite several formal logics for the purpose of scientific analysis
of natural sorts and kinds. In order to represent the novelties of organic
objects, this logico-scientific strategy generates novel propositional forms
for numbers representing natural sorts and kinds. The collective logics of
these novel grammatical sentences are graphically represented within the
perplex number system [1,2]. These novel propositional forms require both
copulative and predicative conceptualization of scientific terms in order to
inform imperative numerical relations of addition. The logical compositions
of the novel sorts and kinds of numbers stand in one to one correspondence
(mappings) with the parts of atoms. From this logico-scientific perspective
of natural sorts and kinds, meaningful sentences necessary contain both
grammatical and numerical elements in order to generate representations
of organic mathematics are empirically represented in propositions relating
the denotations and connotations of antecedents and consequences. The
predicative symbolic terms must inform the denotive predicative symbolic
changes and the copulative symbolic terms must inform the connotative
copulative changes. The terms in the propositional equations of organic
mathematics must be informed by the abstract scientific units of physics,
chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, medicine and other associative disciplines.
The guiding compositional principle for validating propositions of organic
mathematics is simply stated: The union of units unites the unity.
The formal logic of the union of scientific units is constrained by the em-
pirical meanings of the scientific symbol systems used to represent natural
sorts and kinds. The several notational systems used to represent natural
sorts and kinds emerge coherently from the additive logic of the perplex
number system [1,2,3,4]. Perplex numbers have meaning. From this logico-
scientific perspective of information, the compositional logic of scientific
forms emerges from the physical attributes of electricity and the atomic
numbers. (The traditional geometric forms of mathematical physics can
be inferred from organic mathematical terms by merely changing the infor-
489
mational content of the representational metric spaces.) But, the scientific

meaning of perplex propositions is only achieved by validation of indicative
antecedents to generate an imperative consequent.
Within the historical constraints of the scientific symbol systems emerg-
ing from empirical scientific observations, a union of the distinctive formal
logics of the inorganic sciences inform a set of terms for forming the logi-
cal and structural attributes of the organic sorts and kinds. The meaning
of perplex numbers is encoded in scientific symbol systems. Within this
logico-scientific formalism, the propositional sentences for forming organic
entities from inorganic entities representing novel electrical relationships
among the electrical parts of the whole. The antecedent parts are repre-
sented by symbols for mass and electricity and the consequential whole is
also represented by mass and electricity. Organic forms emerge from inor-
ganic forms by creating new species of electrical connections. The scientific
necessity for conserving the symbolic meanings of both categories of terms
infers combining both copulative and predicative logics for all propositions
representing natural sorts and kinds. This novel form of scientific logic
was named synduction [1,2]. The associated philosophy of science is called
perplex systems theory. The essential distinction between synduction and
other logics is that the grammar of synductive propositions must relate the
copulative and predicative terms representative of the semiotics of the nat-
ural entity in order to correspond with empirical scientific symbols deduced
from its natural emanations.
Precursors of the combinatorial structure of the perplex logic of synduc-
tion were described by C.S. Peirce (*1839–1914), S. Leśniewski
(*1886–1939) and A. Tarski (*1901–1983). A rudimentary relational logic
for interpreting the emanations of natural sorts and kinds was formulated
by Peirce’s hypothetical method of constructing propositions from emana-
tions [5, par. 230, p. 136]. The formal logic of perplexity aligns the inorganic
attributes of the atomic numbers and the forms of mathematical graph the-
ory as is suggested by the relational logic of parts of wholes as suggested by
Leśniewski. The necessity of combining symbolic logics is intrinsic to repre-
senting multiple symbol systems as is suggested by the conceptual relations
between scientific symbol systems and Tarski’s meta-languages. Synduc-
tive logic draws on these three conceptual notions of relational logics to
create new species of relations in order to organize the parts into wholes
(e.g., atoms into molecules). Logical arithmetic operations on the primi-
tive inorganic terms combine predicative terms non-linearly. The combined
primitive terms create an emergent whole with the concomitant manifesta-
tion of new natural emanations. The copulation of the parts of the whole
490
Sessions
is expressed as a novel grammatical identity of a natural sort or kind. (For

example, the masses of hydrogen and oxygen are combined in the emergent
structure of the whole, water, the masses of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen
are combined in the emergent structures of carbohydrates and lipids, the
masses of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen are combined in the emer-
gent structures of nucleic acid bases and the masses of carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen, nitrogen and sulfur are combined in the emergent structures of pro-
teins.) Organic mathematics requires the semantic naming of each unique
organic identity in order to be consistent with the species of emanations, the
specific patterns of the isomeric copulative unions and the specific emergent
physical predicates that are created by copulative unions of parts to become
wholes.
Consequently, the synductive logic of the natural union of atoms to form
molecules differs from B. Russell’s abusive metaphor of combining atomic
sentences to form molecular sentences. The concept of the natural associa-
tion of inorganic electrical particles (e.g., atoms) by copulation (e.g., bond-
ing) into molecular patterns parallels logically the concept of association
of terms in propositional sentences. The Tarskian difference that makes
a difference between Russell’s logic and synductive logic is the difference
between a simple grammatical conjunction (“and”) and a physical combi-
nation (“bind to”) expressing the logic of stable electrical forces intrinsic
to the relations among atomic numbers. Scientifically, the abductive cop-
ulative / predicative statements representing the mapping from atoms to
molecules are combined into exact equational forms that are subject to
direct empirical verification. Scientifically, a three-fold verification of
perplex propositions is required. The first verification denotes the parts
of the whole as a composition of atomic numbers such that these specified
parts connote the abductive substrates of compositions. The second verifi-
cation connotes graphically the composition of adjacency relations among
the parts of the specific emergent identity. The third verification, which is
essential for bio-organic molecules, denotes the three-dimensional electrical
arrangements of all the parts of an entity (e.g., the handedness of amino-
acids, carbohydrates, nucleic acids, etc.) These empirical validations inform
the change of the verbal propositional mood from terms indicative of parts
to an imperative term (or terms).
Perplex logic links the scientific disciplines by the composition and de-
composition of the anatomies of scientific terms (units). The three-fold logi-
cal processes of perplexification associate the connotations of the methodical
approach to forming symbolic propositions of C.S. Peirce and logical meta-
languages of Tarski with the denotive organic mathematics of the atomic
491
numbers concomitantly with propositional terms consistent with Leśniewski

concept of denoting part-whole relations. The mathematical concept of par-
titioning plays a central role in the scientific symbolic representations of
assembly and disassembly of natural sorts and kinds. The units of union
and disunion are the perplex numbers and networks of relations.
Deductive propositions can denote the mapping processes that disas-
semble the anatomies of larger units into smaller units, such as the atomic
numbers. The perplex number line aligns abductively the partitions of all
integers with the natural parts of wholes. The perplex number line asso-
ciates abductively with each partition a specific set of all possible three-
dimensional arrangements of natural sorts and kinds (denoted by electrical
particles, atoms, molecules, viruses, cells, organs, organ systems and all
higher organisms). The perplex number spine is a line of potential infinite
length and a potential infinite number of organic branch points. Each and
every organic object associates with an enumerable organization of its elec-
trical parts. Each integer number is associated with a partition of an integer
and a perplex mathematical graph that associates the specific electric parts
of the whole. The perplex partitions of integers are associated with the
labelled bipartite graphs composed exclusively from atomic numbers [1,2].
A living system can be decomposed by partitioning into anatomical struc-
tures, each part connotes a semeiotic identity as a term of natural language.
Iterative partitioning of natural sorts and kinds decomposes the whole into
simple integer units, the atomic numbers. The equivalency of the relational
logic paths of composition and decomposition validate the synductive logic
of “proof of structures” for entities arranged along the perplex number spine
as structural units and as potential emergent dynamic units, under the con-
straints of the mass and the electrical laws.
The two physical symbolic forms of combinatorial logics of identity (mass
and electricity) are used concomitantly to construct deductions from induc-
tive and abductive hypotheses about natural sorts and kinds (scaling). The
partitions of anatomical structures of natural sorts and kinds are scaled
into collections of forests of the symbolic graphs of perplex numbers. The
composition of relations emerges from the electrical relations among the
anatomies of the parts. The form of the relations emerges from the electri-
cal forms of the perplex numbers. The number of relations between parts
is a function of symbolic language selected to represent the natural sort or
kind. In the case of the very simple chemical symbols, the number
of relations gained or lost is a simple exact electrical calculation.
The interdependencies between the alternative propositional terms for parti-
tions are inferred from semeiotic emanations within the context of the parts
492
Sessions
of the whole. The propositional terms of different scientific disciplines scale

with the identity of the inorganic and organic species, the identity of the
ecosystem and the temporal interdependencies among them. The combi-
natorial relations among parts of the whole generate the electro-
dynamics of natural sorts and kinds (oxidation, reductions, trans-
formations, transpositions, translocations, transfers, transactions,
and so forth) as well as the quantum electro-dynamics necessary
to represent three-dimensional organic forms (handedness). The
emergence of relations among the parts of the wholes arranges electrical
units of partitions into unities to form anatomies of natural sorts and kinds.
In conclusion, the yoga (Sanskrit, union) of the abstract concepts of
C.S. Peirce, S. Leśniewski and A. Tarski is the logical ur-root of coherence
of multiple scientific symbol systems under the formal numerical constraint:
The union of units unite the unity.
References
1. J.L.R. Chandler, “Algebraic biology” Axiomathes, vol. 19(3), 2009,
pp. 297–320.
2. J.L.R. Chandler, “An introduction to the perplex number system”, Dis-
crete Applied Mathematics, vol. 157, 2009, pp. 2296–2309.
3. J.L.R. Chandler, “Organic Mathematics: On the Extension of Logics
from Physical Atoms to Cellular Information Processes”, in Information
Processing in Cells and Tissues, 10th International Conference, San
Diego, CA, USA, September 14–16, 2015, pp. 29–35.
4. J.L.R. Chandler, “An Introduction to the Foundations of Chemical In-
formation Theory. Tarski-Leśniewski Logical Structures and the Orga-
nization of Natural Sorts and Kinds”, Information, vol. 8(1), 2017.
5. Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
volume 2: Elements of Logic, edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss
& A.W. Burks, Harvard University Press, 1931.
493
A Formal Representation of Reasoning for Chemistry

Michèle Friend
Columbian College of Arts and Sciences,
George Washington University, Washington, USA
[email protected]
As we know, what is taken to be the underlying logic of an area of

research guides and shapes that area of research. For example, there are
pointed arguments to the effect that economics should be based on a con-
structive, or intuitionistic, logic rather than a classical logic.
The chemists studying: quantum chemistry, electro-chemistry, nano-
chemistry, the chemistry of acids and bases, the chemistry of metals and so
on; quite often are more concerned with properties, relations and sometimes
functions, than they are with objects, or even elementary particles (qua only
particles). The location boundary of a fluid or gas are vague, the purity of
a substance is almost always non-existent, the mixing of fluids or gasses
often yields emergent properties, chemical reactions depend on context, or
‘milieu’.
Standard formal representations of reasoning, assume, in: the grammar,
the notation, the operations, that we begin with elements, or objects, or
members of a domain. These formal systems representing reasoning are
ill-suited to representing reasoning in chemistry.
I propose to give the beginnings of a formal representation of reason-
ing, based on Lemmon’s 1960s development of “a formal logic (sic!) of
attributes” and some of the concepts in universal logic that are universal to
logic). The notion of ‘object’ will be secondary and derivative, being merely
a collection of properties located within a milieu. In contrast, the notions
of ‘property’ and ‘relation’ will be central.
Supplying chemists with a formal representation of reasoning tailored to
chemists needs and practice, will bring a rigour of reasoning and a clarity of
thought. Pluralists in logic, who think of formal representations of reasoning
as various ways of regimenting thought in a subject area, might find that
the formal system s) developed for chemistry will be useful in other areas of
thinking that are more concerned with properties and processes than with
objects.
494
Sessions
A Common Framework for the Empirical Sciences

Maurı́cio Vieira Kritz
National Laboratory for Scientific Computation, Petrópolis,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
[email protected]
Empirical phenomena result from a collection of interacting things that

change aspects we observe [1]. The (general) systems concept [2], as collec-
tion of interrelated objects, is hence directly applicable in their description.
This point of view clarifies the transdisciplinary nature of this concept and
its wide applicability. It shows also why it is natural to associate phenomena
with a system’s behaviour, independently of how it is formally expressed.
Nevertheless, the systems idea has fundamental shortcomings when used to
describe phenomena in W. Weaver’s organised complexity class [2]. The
difficulties are related to the “structural” invariability of systems and to its
inability to incarnate things, that is, to serve as an interacting component,
as will be seen in this talk.
Explanations about empirical phenomena are constructed iteratively
and incrementally in a cycle running through steps of observation gather-
ing, model construction and theory development [3]; where fundamental and
more immediate properties of models provide for enunciating axioms sup-
porting the development of theories that unveil hidden, often unexpected,
phenomenon properties and behaviour. A first step in constructing models
is to handle the complexity of interacting things. To a great extend, things
are considered as elements of certain well-known classes: particles, waves,
bodies, substances, individuals, and so on. These classes are characterised
by aspects and properties important to what is being questioned but cast
the subsequent modelling, shaping what can be described and explained
about the phenomenon. Next, a collection of aspects attached to things is
selected as the system-state and the interrelations and interactions creat-
ing the phenomenon are described in respect of this collection. The system
concept is cardinal in this last step.
However, the system framework is insufficient to handle systems of
variable-structure and the hierarchy inherent in biological phenomena [4],
where many things are indeed phenomena themselves. In this talk, I shall
use interaction graphs to clarify the above statement and argue about its
soundness. I shall also show how systems are special cases of organisations
[4], that organisations can be typical elements of thing-classes and that its
definition comply with biological hierarchy. Organisations relief systems
from the insufficiencies above and introduce a brand new perspective in the
empirical sciences.
495
References
1. M.V. Kritz, “Boundaries, interactions and environmental systems”,
Mecánica Computacional, vol. 29(26), 2010, pp. 2673–2687.
2. G.J. Klir, Facets of Systems Science, 2nd edition, Plenum Press, New
York, 2001.
3. M.V. Kritz & J.-Y. Beziau, “Théorie et modèle II”, Cadernos UFS de
Filosofia, vol. 10, 2011, pp. 7–16.
4. M.V. Kritz, “From systems to organisations”, Systems, vol. 5(1), 2017,
article no. 23, http://www.mdpi.com/2079-8954/5/1/23.
The Analytic and the Synthetic.

From Homology to Heterology
Sylvain Lavelle
ICAM* , GSPR , Department of Humanities,
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France
[email protected]
The distinction between the analytic and the synthetic as well as the
problem of the a priori synthetic judgment is an important point in mod-
ern history of philosophy and logic. In Kant’s Critique [3], the analytic is
associated with the a priori and the synthetic with the a posteriori, and the
distinction between the two is linked to the criteria of necessity and uni-
versality. The a priori synthetic judgment makes it possible to account for
the nature of judgments in logic and mathematics, but it appears to many
philosophers as a kind of monstrous hybrid. The critics of the analytic / syn-
thetic distinction and of the hybrids it allows for are diverse: some of them
assume it, but reject the a priori synthetic judgment [2], while some others
does accept it (Husserl); some reject the analytic/synthetic distinction [6]
while some others dispute the association between the analytic, a priori and
necessity and between the synthetic, a posteriori and contingency [4]. Il
would like to suggest that the debate on the analytic / synthetic distinction
can be thought over in a new way and framed as a problem of heterological
synthesis. It is a fact that the problem of synthesis has hitherto been posited
in terms of homology, for instance, when one makes an epistemic synthesis
of some theoretical and empirical statements. The outcome of this kind of
homological synthesis is well illustrated by an epistemic statement such as
P : ‘It is possible to clone a human being’. It is quite different if the problem
of synthesis is posed in terms of heterology, for instance, when one makes an
*
Institut Catholique d’Arts et Métiers

Groupe de Sociologie Pragmatique et Réflexive
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epistemic-ethical combination. This kind of heterological synthesis is well

illustrated by an epistemic statement P : ‘It is possible to clone a human
being’ that is related to an ethical statement Q: ‘It is not possible to clone
a human being’. Here, the modal category of the possible is interpreted
in two different senses: on the one hand, an epistemic sense the stake of
which is the True; on the other hand, an ethical sense the stake of which is
the Good (or some other values such as the Useful or the Beautiful). The
question that arises is that of heterological synthesis to be conceived of as a
combination of heterologic statements according to some classical patterns
of reasoning and inference (disjunction, conjunction, conditional). Unlike
the homologic judgment (pariter) that produces a synthesis within a single
sphere of rationality, the heterologic judgment (aliter) produces a synthesis
between multiple spheres of rationalities. The possibility of heterologic syn-
thesis entails that conditions for the relation to the object and consequently
for its construction and regulation are not merely internal and can be also
external. It then questions, firstly, the dogma of internal conditions to be
seen as a consequence of the Law of Hume that prohibits the derivation of
‘Ought’ from ‘Is’; and, secondly, the possibility of the function F (x) to in-
corporate in logical terms this extension of statements conditions from the
internal (homology) to the external (heterology).
References
1. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin, 2001.
2. G. Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetics: A Logico-Mathematical En-
quiry into the Concept of Number, Northwestern University Press, 1980.
3. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
4. S.A. Kripke, Naming and necessity, Wiley-Blackwell, 1999.
5. H. Putnam, “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, in Mind, Language
and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge University Press, 1975,
pp. 33–69.
6. W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical Re-
view, vol. 60(1), 1951, pp. 20–43.
7. G. Schurz, “The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical
Logic”, Studia Logica, vol. 65(3), 2000, pp. 432–434.
8. S. Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, 2 volumes, Prince-
ton University Press, 2005.
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The logic of content and contentual understanding

of sentences
Piotr Lukowski*
Department of Cognitive Science, Institute of Psychology,
University of Lódź, Poland
[email protected]
In our approach, a contentual understanding of sentences means that a

content of any sentence (also atomic) can be understood as an intersection
of contents of other sentences. Formalization of this approach is possible,
among others, by using of the content implication connective “:” [1,2]. A
classical propositional logic with the content implication connective (CCl,
the Contentual Classical Calculus) is one of possible logics of content. A
semantic interpretation of the content implication is the following:
v(α ∶ β) ∈ D iff v(α) = v(β) ∩ v(γ) for some sentence γ.
“p says what is said by q” or, shortly, “p says q” is an intended reading

of the sentence of the shape “p : q”, and unveils a desired meaning of the
content implication connective as expressing a fact that a content of some
sentence can be a part of the content of other sentence. Obviously, the con-
tent implication connective is not truth-functional and a logic strengthened
with this connective has several properties, like: it is free from the liar and
other liar like paradoxes, it enables an intuitive interpretation of the nega-
tion of a sentence as well as justification of the popular in the Middle Ages
opinion that every sentence says of itself that it is true [3,4], it formalizes
Grice’s implicatures. It is also possible a “contentual” defining of the truth.
References
1. P. Lukowski, “An approach to the liar paradox”, in New Aspects in Non-
Classical Logics and Their Kripke Semantics, RIMS, Kyoto University,
1997, pp. 68–80.
2. P. Lukowski, Paradoxes, Springer, 2011.
3. A.N. Prior, “On a family of paradoxes”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, vol. 2(1), 1961, pp. 16–32.
4. S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo & E. Genot (editors), Unity, Truth and the
Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox,
Springer, 2008.
*
This research is supported by the National Science Center of Poland — grant no.
2015/17/B/HS1/02332.
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Stereology
Nikolay Milkov
Paderborn University, Germany
[email protected]
The tasks put forward by the recent developments in information sys-
tems research, especially those connected with the problems of knowledge
representation, made the parallel task of advancing a formal ontology for
the common sense world — for the world of everyday human experience
— of first rate importance. This is, above all, a task of representing the
denizens of the naive physics, of the mesoscopic objects and of the quan-
titative reasoning in space and time in general. By way of addressing this
problem, many authors placed great hopes on a variety of new approaches
of increasing complexity:
(a) Set Theory. To this purpose the resources of the naive set theory are
widely used. Unfortunately, set theories — of any kind — fail to do
justice to the difference between natural totalities, such as dog, and ad
hoc totalities, such as Brezhnev, the sun, the sea.
(b) Mereology. This is the discipline investigating the relation between
parts and whole. Unfortunately, as it was noted in the literature, in ca-
pacity of formal ontology of the mesocosmic objects, traditional mere-
ology has many deficiencies. For example, it neglects the problems of
continua and boundaries which are sine qua non when the objective is
to represent integral objects of the mesocosmos.
(c) Mereotopology. This motivated attempts — made in the recent years
mainly by Roberto Casati, Achille Varzi and Barry Smith — to supple-
ment mereology with topology to a mereotopology. Central concepts of
mereotopology are boundary, inside/outside, abutting and surrounding.
It is based on a simple mereo-topological primitive of connected part-
hood. Regrettably, mereotopology fails to present the objects in their
full integrity as well. This brings some proponents of mereotopology to
the idea to supplement it with at least two other disciplines: (1) mor-
phology: theory of qualitative discontinuants, and (2) kinematics and
dynamics which explain the behavior of its parts. They must help to
represent the shape and behavior of objects, as well as the interaction
between them.
(d) Theory of Granular Partitions. This new discipline tries to come
to terms with the task to represent the results of sorting, classification,
dividing into units, counting, parceling out, mapping, listing, pigeon-
holing, and cataloguing. Its models apply different types of partitions
— that are appropriate for different situations — in which the objects
under scrutiny can be put in. Partitions themselves are not objects.
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In this paper we advance a new type of formal ontology, which suggests

more exact models of the experienced reality (or merely treats it in a more
exact, full-fledged terms) than set theory, mereology, mereotopology, and
the theory of granular partitions. In particular, stereology is clearly different
from the theory of granular partitions, since is sees the objects and processes
under scrutiny as constructed exactly like their modes — it sees no difference
but identity between objects and models.
What Philosophy of Logic are we Teaching?

Elizabeth Olsen
School of History, Philosophy, Political Science
and International Relations,
Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
[email protected]
The time has come to take a long hard look at the teaching of intro-
ductory logic. The very first lesson of the very first logic course contains
highly contested material that only those with an interest in the philoso-
phy of logic will ever again re-visit. Teachers say things which are vital to
an understanding of logic, right at the point when those things are most
likely to be accepted without critical examination, and then never return
and re-examine those points. As Stephen Read says, “Teaching in philoso-
phy departments across the world exhibits this schizophrenia, in which the
dogmatic approach to the philosophy of logic sits uncomfortably side by side
with the ceaseless critical examination which is encourages and demanded
in philosophy” [1, p. 2]. This alone is bad enough, but the current state of
the teaching of philosophy of logic is worse.
The teaching of logic starts in the right place, with a discussion of the
nature of the subject matter at hand, which as it happens is also introduc-
tory philosophy of logic. Courses typically open with a discussion of what
logic is about and a definition of validity, and as Stephen Read says, “The
central topic in the philosophy of logic is inference, that is, logical conse-
quence, or what follows correctly from what” [1, p. 1]. So, forcibly excising
the teaching of the philosophy of logic from introductory logic course would
be the wrong approach because another way to see that very first lesson is
not as a lesson at all but merely the sort of sensible introduction to what
the student will learn during the course.
There are hard questions in the philosophy of logic, questions that stu-
dents probably can’t engage with immediately, so the introduction should
walk a fine line — setting the stage for a conversation that a student will not
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be prepared to join until later. But in the very first lesson of the very first
logic course students are introduced to the central topic in the philosophy
of logic in a manner which is unforgivably contradictory and inexcusably
dogmatic. This bad pedagogy is bad enough, but the potential ramifica-
tions for the discipline are worse. In what has become a pivotal piece in the
discussion of the nature of validity MacFarlane says that for addressing the
hard questions in the philosophy of logic “The dominant methodology for
addressing them involves frequent appeals to our “intuitions” about logical
validity. I do not think it should surprise us that this methodology leads dif-
ferent investigators in different directions. For our intuitions about logical
validity, such as they are, are largely the products of our logical educations”
[2, p. 2]. It is a disservice to philosophical colleges who will not specialise
in logic to teach bad philosophy of logic, but it shows a reckless disregard
for the advancement of the discipline to introduce a central topic in a way
that impairs future investigators.
In this paper, I will present a combination of the results of a text analysis
of introductory logic texts along with some exemplars of the ideas that these
texts communicate on the subject matter of logic. I break the examples of
problematic teaching down into three categories: the pseudo psychological,
the normative nonsense, and the over-concentration on argument as if that
gets you out of it. I discuss the aspects of the current debate in philosophy
of logic that make these teachings problematic.
I finish with a discussion of the connections between logic, psychology,
norms, and argument and explain that I am not arguing that these ideas
do not belong to the discipline of logic, but their impact on the notion of
validity is significant enough that presentation in introductory texts should
be conducted with care.
References
1. S. Read, Thinking about Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Logic, Oxford University Press, 1995.
2. J. Macfarlane, “In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for
Thought?”, in Central Division * Meeting, Symposium on the Normativ-
ity of Logic, American Philosophical Association, 2004, https://
johnmacfarlane.net/normativity of logic.pdf.
*
The Central Division is one of three divisions of the American Philosophical Association,
along with the Eastern and Pacific Divisions.
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A Reply to Logical Revisionists: Strict Finitism, Feasibility

and Structural Rules
Fabrice Pataut
SND* , CNRS , Pantheon-Sorbonne University, France
[email protected]
As far as logic is concerned, the conclusion of Michael Dummett’s man-

ifestability argument is that Heyting’s intuitionistic logic satisfies the core
semantic requirement of antirealism. The argument is that since we can-
not manifest a grasp of possibly justification-transcendent truth conditions,
we must countenance conditions which are such that, at least in principle,
we are able to recognize that they are satisfied whenever they are. Intu-
itionistic logic satisfies the requirement that we should thus constrain the
notion of truth by provability in principle [3]. Some philosophers have ar-
gued that the traditional antirealist desideratum of decidability in principle
is too weak. Semantic antirealism properly construed must be committed
to effective decidability. As such, it either leads to strict finitism [4] or to a
yet stronger kind of logical revisionism: substructural logics, and in partic-
ular linear logics, rather than intuitionistic logic, satisfy the core semantic
requirement of strict antirealism [2].
I shall develop two kinds of replies. The first is concerned with the
notion of meaning per se and looks to strict finitism directly, although not
on the ground that it would lead to soritic paradoxes (the primary focus of
discussion in [4]). The second is concerned with the justification of structural
and logical rules in Gentzen’s natural deduction system where deductive
derivations are built out of sequents.
The first kind of reply is that if we jettison the effectively vs. in prin-
ciple distinction, we end up with an unsatisfactory explanation of how the
meaning of logical constants is fixed whenever they occur in statements cov-
ering the practically unsurveyable or pro tempora undecided cases. If we
have a method which may be used over some small range, then we have
determined a way of applying the method everywhere in principle and that
this is enough as far as fixing meaning is concerned.
I shall then look at two radical antirealist principles disqualifying struc-
tural rules: Token Preservation and Preservation of Local Feasibility. Against
Bonnay and Cozic’s criticisms of Dubucs and Marion [1], I shall argue that
*
Science, Norms, Decision is a joint research team from Pantheon-Sorbonne University
and CNRS.

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(i) some conceptual support may be provided for Token Preservation, which
doesn’t rely on a causal misreading of the turnstile, and that (ii) the appeal
to non feasible ways of doing feasible things is not a good way to argue for
Preservation of Local Feasibility.
I shall then assess the merits and limits of radical antirealism and the
logic of feasible proofs, whether the radical antirealist merely stipulates what
human feasibility amounts to, or dispenses with structural rules by arguing
in favour of a curb on the epistemic idealizations they unwarrantedly embed.
It will be noted here that there is a great difference, conceptually speak-
ing, between the rejection of classical logic via the curbing of the epistemic
idealizations embedded in structural rules, and the rejection of classical logic
via the criticism of introduction and elimination rules which fix the meaning
of the classical constants. E.g., the rejection of Weakening and Contraction
by way of Token Preservation and Preservation of Local Feasibility doesn’t
have to rely on arguments in favour of the surveyability of the implemen-
tation of decision procedures, or to any particular conception of how one
may go from one proof to another by way of deductive rules. The reasons
why we should want to narrow the scope of idealization are quite different
in each case. One telling case of study in this respect is that of the rela-
tion between structural rules and logical rules in the intuitionistic context.
The kind of logical revisionism envisaged by intuitionists from Heyting on
is in many respects stronger than the one envisaged by advocates of linear
logic, should such revisionists ground their arguments on an endorsement of
strict antirealism. A clearer philosophical conception is needed of how the
rules for the logical connectives in the intuitionistic calculus depend on the
structural rules which the radical antirealist wishes to reject.
References
1. D. Bonnay & M. Cozic, “Which Logic for the Radical Antirealist?”, in
The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics, edited
by S. Rahman, G. Primiero & M. Marion, Springer, 2012, pp. 47–67.
2. J. Dubucs & M. Marion, “Strict Antirealism and Substructural Log-
ics”, in Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science, edited by J.
Cachro, G. Kurezewski & A. Rojsczak, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2004, pp. 235–249.
3. M. Dummett, “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic” (1973),
in Truth and Other Enigmas, Harvard University Press, 1st edition,
1978, pp. 215–247.
4. C. Wright, “Strict Finitism” (1982), in Realism, Meaning and Truth,
Wiley-Blackwell, 2nd edition, 1993, pp. 107–175.
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On the Status of Questions in the Practice of Science

William Rawleigh
Institute of the History and Philosophy of Science
[email protected]
Recent developments in erotetic logic have greatly improved our under-

standing of the nature of questions. However the role of questions in the
actual practice of science remains underappreciated. Despite the acknowl-
edgement of the central role played by questions by Popper and Kuhn,
discussions of scientific change typically focus on transitions from theory
to theory and from method to method. This conception of science is in-
complete as it does not include questions as a separate element of scientific
change. The evidence from the actual practice of science suggests that just
like theories and methods of their evaluation, questions too can be accepted
or rejected by epistemic communities. While in the 16th century the ques-
tion “what is the distance between the earth and the sphere of stars?” was
a topic of scientific discourse, it is no longer accepted as a legitimate topic of
scientific inquiry. Similarly, the question “what are the properties of phlo-
giston?” would be accepted in the 18th century, while the question “why
are there no observed instances of CP (charge conjunction-parity symmetry)
violation in quantum chromodynamics?” is among a plethora of questions
pursued by physicists nowadays.
The main goal of this paper is to find out whether questions are reducible
to other elements that undergo scientific change — theories or methods —
or whether they constitute a separate class of elements. I argue that it is
impossible to reduce questions to either methods or theories. I discuss and
reject two attempt at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative
theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions
can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions [1], while according to
the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propo-
sitions [2,3]. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing
the propositional content expressed by scientific questions; any possible re-
duction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of
questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories
introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a ques-
tion, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ad infinitum.
Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure
from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements
irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions as a separate class
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of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism

of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come
to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate.
References
1. W. Künne, “Are Questions Propositions?”, Revue Internationale de
Philosophie, vol. 224, 2003, pp. 45–56, https://www.cairn.info/revue-
internationale-de-philosophie-2003-2-page-45.htm.
2. J. Groenendijk & M. Stokhof, “Questions”, in The Handbook of Logic
and Language, edited by J. van Benthem and A. Ter Meulen, North
Holland, 1997, pp. 1055–1124.
3. L. Åqvist, “Revised foundations for imperative-epistemic and interrog-
ative logic”, Theoria, vol. 37(1), 1971, pp. 33–73.
Combinations of Interpretations
in Universal Logical Hermeneutics
Elena Shulga
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
[email protected]
The method of logical interpretation of a philosophical system accord-

ing to Boguslaw Wolniewicz [1] is aimed to its axiomatization, i.e. to such
transformation of a system that it becomes one in which everything (ex-
cept the axioms themselves) is semantically determinate and deductively
complete. There are many obstacles on that way induced by the lack of
univocal method of the exact translation from the language of philosophy
to the language of logic. And there is one more problem concerning the logi-
cal background of a particular philosophical theory. Any theory presupposes
a logical system laying in its foundation and Wolniewicz by default supposes
that it is a classical one. But from the history of philosophy are perfectly
known troubles occurring while we trying to interpret contradictions in par-
ticular philosophical theories, e.g. in M. Heidegger’s works. Sometimes we
can succeed in overcoming such troubles by employing non-classical (e.g.
paraconsistent in case of Heidegger) logical systems.
Since Universal Logic should be considered as a general theory of logical
systems the same manner Universal Algebra is a general theory of algebraic
systems then it seems that we can think of Universal Logic Hermeneutics
(modifying Wolniewicz’s term of logical hermeneutics) when trying to use
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one or another logical system for the logical interpretation of philosophical

theories. This is especially important in case of logical hermeneutic eval-
uation of one and the same philosophical system. Logical interpretations
may have different validity due to the good or bad choice of the logical
background and sometimes simply lead to triviality.
As it was shown in [2] the universe of Universal Logic admits at least
the four basic types of combination of logical systems. This allows to obtain
respective combinations of logical interpretations while trying to compare
competing or disagreeing versions. One type of combinations, fibring of
logics, gives us an opportunity to join together two interpretations while
generating fibring of interpretations combining them both. Another type
of combination, co-fibring or product, leads to the “labelling” of one in-
terpretation with the help of another or to the pairing of interpretations.
Exponentiation and co-exponentiation bind two interpretations together ad-
mitting just their specific correlations and coordination. All these types of
combinations of logics generate the respective combinations of logical in-
terpretations extending the range of possible hermeneutical evaluations of
philosophical theories.
References
1. B. Wolniewicz, Logic and Metaphysics, Znak-Jȩzyk-Rzeczywistość, War-
saw, Poland, 1999.
2. V.L. Vasyukov, “Structuring the Universe of Universal Logic”, Logica
Universalis, vol. 1(2), 2007, pp. 277–294.
Knowledge, Behavior and Rationality*

Todd Stambaugh & Rohit Parikh
In strategic situations, agents base their behavior on knowledge and

beliefs about the circumstances at hand. At the very least, this includes
knowledge about the possible strategies of themselves and others and the
preferences agents have regarding those profiles, but often agents’ prefer-
ences rely partly on some other facts beyond the control of those involved.
For example, if the weather is nice, one might prefer to go to a park, but
otherwise one might prefer to go to a museum. With this in mind, it would
be irrational to go to the park knowing that it will rain. Without that
*
This joint work extends works previously presented by both authors separately.
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knowledge, even if is raining, going to the park might still be considered

rational. Put simply, the basis of rationality rests in part on knowledge.
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) each defined the broad game theoretic
solution concept of rationalizability, which is built on the premise that ratio-
nal agents will only take actions that are the best response to some situation
that they consider possible. This accounts for the consideration that the
other agents are rational as well, which limits the possible actions to which
a particular agent must respond, enabling further elimination of strategies
until the set stabilizes. This process is fundamentally built on the strategic
considerations that underlie behavior. It is natural, then to generalize the
notion of rationalizability for games in which payoffs depend not only on
the strategies of the players, but on some facts of the world as well. This
will enable us to examine the interplay between strategic and knowledge
based rationality. We give an account of what it means for an action to
be rational relative to a particular state of affairs, and in turn relative to a
state of knowledge. Additionally, we present a class of games called Epis-
temic Messaging Games (EMG) which involve a period of communication
between the players prior to the play of the game. This communication
stage results in a particular epistemic state among the players which can be
quite complex, and thus requires a broad framework to examine. For this
purpose we use a version of the kind of history based models presented by
Chandy & Misra (1986) and Parikh & Ramanujam (2003), which frames
individual knowledge as a local projection of a global history. Using this
technique, we present a general account of rationalizability for subclasses
of EMG.
Formal intensional semantics of Aczel applied to Bolzanian

substantial metaphysics
Kordula Świȩtorzecka
Department of Logic and Methodology of Science,
[email protected]
Our research concerns a formal representation of Bolzano’s original con-

cepts of his substantial metaphysics. The reconstruction is built as an exten-
sion of Zalta’s theory of abstract objects, describing two types of predication:
attribution and representation. Our aim is to show limitations of Bolzano’s
theory that prevent a contradiction in view of the known suspicions about
the contradiction of this theory. We discuss two competing semantics for
507
the proposed theory: Scott’s and Aczel’s semantics. The first one yields a
problematic result, that there are no models for the considered theory, con-
taining a non-empty collection of all substantially funded attributes - the
so called adherences. We show that Aczel’s semantics does not contain this
difficulty. There are described Aczel’s models with a non-empty set of all
adherences. The self-referentiality of such a collection becomes irrelevant
here. Finally, we show that there are Aczel’s structures verifying the for-
mula on reloading abstracts and we exclude them from the class of models
intended for our theory.
On the universality of the principle of determination

Denis Vernant
University of Grenoble-Alpes, France
[email protected]
To contribute to the problematic of the universal logic, we shall ask the

question to know which principle can have an universal value. Our answer
will be the principle of determination in its various versions.
The standard forms of the principle of determination

Frege introduces the principle of determination for a concept: it must
be able to determine unambigously if an object falls or not under him.
Wittgenstein in 1914–1916 defines the determination of a proposition by
its bipolarity: b − p − a = false − p − truth [1].
The limits of these standard forms of the principle

The principle of concept determination cannot apply to the fuzzy logic
of Zadeh: a concept may determine + or − to its objects.
The principle of determination of the proposition is limited to a bivalent
system. Tri, quadri, multivalent, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, etc. systems
break the bipolarity of the true and the false.
The universality of the general principle of determination

Other forms of determination, however, apply to any formal system.
A first form was explained by Vasiliev, whose metalogic admits the fol-
lowing principle: “A proposition can admit only one value of truth” [2]. We
shall show that this applies to any logical system, regardless of the number
of truth values mobilized.
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In fact, the basic requirement of determination extends to all aspects

of a formal system. We can then decline it in its syntactic, semantic and
metalogical dimensions. For example, at the syntactic level, a proposition of
the system can only be well or badly formed. The analysis of these different
declination draws a universal metalogic in the sense of Vasiliev.
References
1. L. Wittgenstein, Carnets (1914–1916), translated by G.-G. Granger,
Gallimard, Paris, 1971.
2. N.A. Vasiliev, “Logic and Metalogic” (1912–1913), translated by V.L.
Vasyukov, Axiomathes, vol. 4(3), 1993, pp. 329–351.
Logic does not distinguish any extralogical content

Jan Woleński
Rzeszów, Poland
[email protected]
That logic does not distinguish any extralogical content is a characteris-

tic property of first-logic. Philosophically speaking, this feature displays the
fact that logic is topically-neutral. First-order arithmetic is an extension of
first-order logic, but this enlargement is not a logic. Consider deontic logic
which is an extension of classical propositional calculus by adding deon-
tic operators and suitable axioms. Does this systems does not distinguish
extralogical contents? Clearly, the answer is negative. The accessibility re-
lation for deontic frames is not reflexive (A does not imply that is obligatory
that A). However, this property is not logical, although it can be formally
explicated. This argument can be extended to alethic modal logic as well
with exception with respect to the system K — the accessibility relation
associated with it has no specific formal properties. The discussed issue
may suggest various thoughts related to the concept of logic. If the theorem
that logic does not distinguish any extralogical content is taken as basic, it
motives a restrictive definition, practically identifying logic with first-order
one and its modal counterparts (like K). On the other hand, there are
good reasons for considering logic more broadly, that is, as studying various
concepts via formal (or logical) methods.
509
Computation
Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate
for Theory of Computation?
Farzad Didehvar
School of Mathematics and Computer Science,
Amir Kabir University, Tehran, Iran
[email protected]
In this talk, we try to show how and why our mathematical framework
seems inappropriate to solve some problems in Theory of Computation.
More exactly, the concept of turning back in time in paradoxes causes incon-
sistency in modeling of the concept of “Time” in some semantic situations.
As we see in the first chapter, by introducing a version of “Unexpected
Hanging Paradox”, first we attempt to open a new explanation for some
paradoxes. In the second step, by applying this paradox, it is demonstrated
that any formalized system for the Theory of Computation based on Clas-
sical Logic and Turing Model of Computation leads us to a contradiction.
We conclude that our mathematical frame work is inappropriate for Theory
of Computation. Furthermore, the result provides us a reason that many
problems in Complexity Theory resist to be solved.
References
1. F. Didehvar, “A Semantic Situation without Syntax (Non axiomatiz-
ability of Theories)”, in Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School
on Universal Logic, İstanbul University, Turkey, 2015, pp. 307–311.
2. F. Didehvar, “Is Classical Mathematics Appropriate for Theory of Com-
putation?”, viXra.org, 2017, viXra:1705.0226.
3. F. Didehvar, “When the proof doesn’t show the truth”, World Philos-
ophy Day, 2010, pp. 153–161.
4. R. Lipton, The P = NP Question and Gödel’s Lost Letter, Springer,
2010.
510
Sessions
Methodological Principles for Program Logic Construction

Vitalii Gavryluk
European University of Kyiv, Ukraine
[email protected]
Mykola Nikitchenko
[email protected]
Program logics are main formalisms that are used to prove properties of
software systems. Different types of such systems (sequential, distributed,
real-time, reactive, embedded, etc.) lead to different types of program logics.
Obtained diversity of logics complicates their investigation and usage. In
this situation, methodological principles can provide the theoretical under-
pinning for understanding of program logics construction and investigation.
In this paper we continue our research on developing methodological
basis for logic construction [1,2] concentrating on program logics. The main
attention is paid to the principle of development from abstract to concrete
and to the principle of integrity of intensional and extensional aspects.
These principles are applied to the main semantic notions of programs:
data, function and composition. Data are specified as intensionalized data
that represent integrity of data intension and extension [1]. We identify
three types of such data: abstract data, nominative sets and hierarchical
nominative data. A such classification leads to three types of intension-
alized functions: abstract function, quasiary functions and hierarchic-ary
functions. Finally, we define three classes of compositions over above men-
tioned classes of functions. This permits to construct various classes of
algebras which form the semantic base for predicate logics [3] and program
logics of Floyd-Hoare type [4].
Obtained program logics better represent such program properties as
partiality, nondeterminism and semistructuring of data. Such logics gen-
eralize conventional program logics and demonstrate usefulness of method-
ological principles for their construction.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko & A. Chentsov, “Basics of Intensionalized Data: Pre-
sets, Sets, and Nominats”, Computer Science Journal of Moldova,
vol. 20, no. 3(60), 2012, pp. 334–365.
2. V. Gavryluk & M. Nikitchenko, “Philosophical Aspects of Program-
ming Theory Development”, in Handbook of the 5th World Congress
and School on Universal Logic, İstanbul, Turkey, 2015, pp. 210–211.
511
3. M. Nikitchenko & S. Shkilniak, “Algebras and logics of partial quasiary

predicates”, Algebra and Discrete Mathematics, vol. 23(2), 2017,
pp. 263–278.
4. A. Kryvolap, M. Nikitchenko & W. Schreiner, “Extending Floyd-Hoare
Logic for Partial Pre- and Postconditions”, in ICTERI 2013 * , Commu-
nications in Computer and Information Science book series, vol. 412,
Springer, 2013, pp. 355–378.
Turing’s Fallacy of Substitution

Timm Lampert
Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany
[email protected]
In philosophy as well as in mathematics logical formalization is an es-

tablished practice. However, the rules of this practice are far from clear.
Recently, logicians with a philosophical background started to discuss cri-
teria of adequate formalization (cf., e.g., the most recent monograph [1]).
However, the discussion mostly focusses on the philosophical practice of for-
malizing ordinary language propositions. In my talk, I intend to broaden
this focus and apply a well-known problem of logical formalization of or-
dinary propositions to Turing’s formalization of Turing machines. It is a
well-known problem in the philosophical literature that one cannot infer the
logical form from the grammatical form of a proposition. This dictum is one
variant of the so-called ‘misleading form thesis’. One illustration of this the-
sis is the fallacy to infer that any formula is a correct formalization of its in-
stances. A necessary condition for the correctness of a logical formalization
φ of a proposition p is that p must be true if φ is provable. However, in so-
called ‘opaque’ (‘non-referential’, ‘non-extensional’) contexts, this condition
is not satisfied. Examples of such contexts are intensional, meta-linguistic
or diagonal contexts. Instances of provable formulas that are not true are
‘inadmissible instances’. No general criterion to distinguish admissible from
inadmissible instances is available. In particular, no criterion referring to
the grammatical or syntactic form of the formalized proposition is at hand.
Therefore, the inference that an instance is true because it is an instance of
a provable formula is a fallacy. I call this fallacy the ‘fallacy of substitution’.
Turing’s proof of his Lemma 2 in his undecidability proof of first-order logic
*
International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies in
Education, Research and Industrial Applications, held in 2013.
512
Sessions
is a prominent example of committing this fallacy. Turing explicitly bases

his proof on the following fallacious principle [cf. 2, p. 262]:
If we substitute any propositional functions for function variables

in a provable formula, we obtain a true proposition.
Regarding the problematic application of this principle to propositions

involving diagonalization, the question arises whether Turing’s application
of his principle is valid in the diagonal case such as the logical formalization
of a machine that involves a decision machine for logic that, in turn, evalu-
ates its own formalization. I will discuss this problem in my talk.
References
1. J. Peregrin & V. Svoboda, Reflective Equilibrium and the Principles of
Logical Analysis, Routledge, 2017.
2. A. Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Ent-
scheidungsproblem”, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
vol. 2(42), 1936, pp. 230–65.
Extending Classical Logic with Quasiary Predicates

Mykola Nikitchenko & Stepan Shkilniak
Logics are widely used for investigation of software systems. To be suc-

cessful, such logics should adequately represent systems properties. Among
such properties we identify partiality and nondeterminism of software sys-
tems (programs), usage of complex data structures etc. In particular, map-
pings of fixed arity (n-ary mappings) and of flexible arity (quasiary map-
pings) are used in programs [1]. These properties imply the necessity of con-
struction of program-oriented logics that are based on n-ary and quasiary
mappings. In this paper one of such logics — first-order logic of n-ary and
quasiary predicates LNQ — is built. We construct this logic as an extension
of classical logic with quasiary predicates.
Construction of LNQ consists of several steps:
1. We define semantics of LNQ by special algebras of quasiary predicates.
In this case, n-ary predicates can be represented as a subclass of quasiary
predicates. The class of compositions (operations) consists of composi-
tions of disjunction, negation, renomination and existential quantifica-
tion.
513
2. We define a language of LNQ as the class of terms of the constructed al-

gebras. The logic signature includes sets of n-ary and quasiary predicate
symbols. This language being restricted on the class of n-ary predicate
symbols corresponds to the first-order language of classical logic; and
being restricted on the class of quasiary predicate symbols it coincides
with the language of first-order quasiary logic [2].
3. We define formula interpretation mappings as term interpretations in
algebras of quasiary predicates.
4. We define the consequence relation as irrefutability.
5. Finally, we construct sequent calculus which is based on the sequent
calculus for the logic of quasiary predicates [2].
In the paper we study properties of LNQ . In particular, logical equiva-
lence relations are studied for the introduced consequence relation. Trans-
formations based on such equivalence relations permit to transform formulas
to various normal forms. Also, soundness and completeness of the con-
structed sequent calculus are proved.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko & V. Tymofieiev, “Satisfiability in Composition-Nomina-
tive Logics”, Central European Journal of Computer Science, vol. 2(3),
2012, pp. 194–213.
2. M. Nikitchenko & S. Shkilniak, “Algebras and logics of partial quasiary
predicates”, Algebra and Discrete Mathematics, vol. 23(2), 2017,
pp. 263–278.
Direct Products on Computing Languages and Models:

A preliminary
Cyrus F. Nourani & Johannes Fähndrich
AI Labs, Berlin Institute of Technology, Germany
A briefing on the mathematical basis for what we began on developing

NLP algorithms since [6] we have new applications for compound signatures
over product languages. The fragment categories [2] can be addressed at
several levels:consider defining a correspondence to an arbitrary infinitary
language where the sets you wish to address with respect to the new sig-
natures on structures for languages definable, call that L ⊂ Σ. On TΣ we
can take well-defined fragments on the language towards small complete
categories and onto creating generic functors [2,3,4] that cradle the new
models.
514
Sessions
Theorem 1. Let L1 , L2 be two positive languages. Let L = L1 ∩L2 . Suppose

T is a complete theory in L and T ⊂ T1 , T ⊂ T2 are consistent in L1 , L2 ,
respectively. Suppose there is a model M definable from a positive diagram
in the language L1 ∪ L2 such that there are models M1 and M2 for T1 and
T2 where M can be homomorphically embedded in M1 and M2 .
(i) T1 ∪ T2 is consistent.
(ii) There is model N for T1 ∪ T2 definable from a positive diagram that
homomorphically extends that of M1 and M2 .
Proposition 1. [3,4] There is a small complete category on the infinitary

language fragment definable with the Σ ⊂ i ∈ ω based on the direct product
on TΣ ⊂ i ∈ ω.
Theorem 2. [3,4] There is a generic functor on the category the omitting

n-types realizing a direct product model.
Application Areas
Defining a category for languages allows us to define lifts, for example,
from context. The linguistics abstraction techniques proposed allows us to
lift from context. With signature tree languages we can carry on partitions
on models for a formal language that factor generic models. Let L1 , . . . , Ln
be language fragments n ∈ ω. Σ1 , . . . , Σn are the fragment natural grammar
signatures. TΣ1 , . . . , TΣn are the free trees on the grammar signatures. Each
fragment language signature tree TΣ ⊂ i ∈ ω can be assigned a fragment
semantics whereby to each t ∈ TΣi the free well-formed syntax trees ti and
tj are congruent, which is denoted ti ≡ tj , iff there is a context free parse
normal form common to both. Let us denote that congruence with ≡ ⊂ CT F
fragment. L1 , L2 , . . . , Ln are fragments n < ω, i.e. natural numbers.
Proposition 2. ≡ ⊂ CT F is a Σ-congruence.
Theorem 3. TΣi ≡ ⊂ CT F is the initial algebra semantics for the Li lan-

guage fragment for i ∈ ω.
References
1. J.A. Goguen, J.W. Thatcher, E.G. Wagner & J.B. Wright, A Junction
Between Computer Science and Category Theory (parts I and II), IBM
Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, USA, 1973.
2. C.F. Nourani, “Slalom tree computing — a tree computing theory for
artificial intelligence”, AI Communications, vol. 9(4), 1996,
pp. 207–213.
515
3. C.F. Nourani, A Functorial Model Theory: Newer Applications to Alge-

braic Topology, Descriptive Sets, and Topos Computability, Apple Aca-
demic Press, 2014.
4. C.F. Nourani, A Preliminary brief on direct product language models,
memo, Technischen Universität Berlin, 2014.
5. C.F. Nourani & P. Eklund, “Fragment functors and term constructible
sets”, preliminary brief, Computer Science Department, Umeå, Sweden,
2014, also published in AMS * -MAA Joint Meeting, Atlanta, 2016.
6. C.F. Nourani & J. Fähndrich, “Factors on Signatured Trees and Se-
mantic Language Processing”, abstract, DAI-Labor , Technischen Uni-
versität Berlin, 2014.
Rules versus Axioms: a Constructive View of Theories§

Andrei Rodin
Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia
[email protected]
In a Hilbert-style non-logical axiomatic theory the semantics of logical

symbols is rigidly fixed, while the interpretation of non-logical symbols usu-
ally varies giving rise to different models of the given theory. All non-logical
content of such a theory is comprised in its non-logical axioms (e.g. axioms
of ZF) while rules, which generate from these axioms new theorems, belong
to the logical part of the theory (a.k.a. “underlying logic”). This Hilbertian
notion of axiomatic theory and its model has been used by Patrick Sup-
pes and his many followers in their attempts to develop a general formal
framework for representing scientific theories belonging to a wide range of
disciplines [3].
An alternative approach to axiomatization due to Gentzen amounts to a
presentation of formal calculi in the form of systems of rules without axioms.
Gentzen did not try to extend his approach to non-logical theories by con-
sidering specific non-logical rules as a replacement for non-logical axioms.
However the more recent work in Univalent Foundations of Mathematics [2]
suggests that the Gentzen-style rule-based approach to formal presentation
of theories may have important applications also outside the pure logic.
*
American Mathematical Society

Mathematical Association of America
Distributed Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
§
This work is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, research grant
number 13-03-00384.
516
Sessions
A reason why one may prefer a rule-based formal representation is that it

is more computer-friendly. This, in particular, motivates the recent work on
the “constructive justification” of the Univalence Axiom via the introduction
of new operations on types and contexts [1]. Another reason is that such
form of the representation allows one to represent formally various extra-
logical methods, which play an important role in the justification of scientific
theories but are left aside in the standard axiomatic representations.
Using Homotopy Type Theory and the Univalent Foundations as a moti-
vating example I argue that the Gentzen-style rule-based approach provides
a viable alternative to the standard axiomatic approach not only in logic
but also in science more generally.
References
1. C. Cohen, Th. Coquand, S. Huber & A. Mörtberg, “Cubical Type The-
ory: a constructive interpretation of the univalence axiom”, arXiv:1611.
02108, Cornell University Library, 2016.
2. Univalent Foundations Program* , Homotopy Type Theory: Univalent
Foundations of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton,
New Jersey, USA, 2013.
3. P. Suppes, Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures, CSLI
Publications, 2002.
Hypercomputation and Philosophy of Mathematics

Krzysztof Wójtowicz
[email protected]
In my talk I will discuss the relationship between mathematical and

physical knowledge in the context of hypercomputational models. I argue,
that the importance of hypercomputation for the philosophy of mathemat-
ics has not been recognized yet. Even if is most probably only a thought
experiment, I claim, that is sheds some light on important philosophical
problems, in particular:
1. The problem of understanding and explanation in mathematics
2. The problem of empirical elements in mathematics
3. The impact of these models on the realism/antirealism debate
*
This is the group pen name of researchers participating in the Univalent Foundations
Program at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, which led to the publi-
cation of the monograph entitled Homotopy Type Theory.

517
Consider first the hypothetical situation, where we have at our disposal a

very fast computer (e.g. 21000 times faster than our computers). It works in
ZFC and proves new theorems; e.g. it solves Riemann’s hypothesis (provided
it is not independent from ZFC. . . ). But we do not have any insight into
the conceptual structure of the proof, so it no explanatory value. Our
supercomputer would just be a kind of (empirical) oracle. The problem of
computer-assisted proofs has been discussed extensively in the literature.
But consider also a hypercomputational procedure, which leads to a new
mathematical result A (theorem?). One example discussed in the literature
is Con(ZFC), a such a device could check by brute force all possible proofs
in search of a contradiction (it is usually discussed in the context of the
Relativistic Turing Machine). So what is the status of A? It is not a
theorem, so perhaps it should be considered to be a new axiom, justified by
the “hyperargument”? But the situation is very different from the situation
of (hypothetical) new axioms of ZFC, which are justified by metatheoretical
considerations (cf. the discussion concerning large cardinal axioms, Woodins
Ω-logic providing an answer to the continuum hypothesis, etc.). We do not
have any arguments of this kind in favor of this new axiom — just the verdict
of an “empirical oracle”. Perhaps it is even not mathematical knowledge,
but something different?
I argue that hypercomputational models invite us to rethink the tra-
ditional model of mathematical knowledge, the notion of explanation in
mathematics, the problem of empirical elements in proofs and offer new
arguments in the realism-antirealism debate. Being clearly just thought ex-
periments, they offer an important inspiration for the philosophy of math-
ematics, and deserve a thorough philosophical discussion.
A Universal Language for First-Order Constraints

Uwe Wolter
Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, Norway
[email protected]
Sketches form a category-theoretic analog to the logical concept of a
theory and its models. They use the language of arrows, commutative di-
agrams, limit cones and/or colimit cocones to specify structures on the
objects of a category. Generalized sketches have been developed indepen-
dently by Makkai, motivated by his work on an abstract formulation of Com-
pleteness Theorems in logic [1,2,3], and a group in Latvia around Diskin,
triggered by their work on data modeling [6]. Later, generalized sketches
have been applied and further developed to meet the needs in Model Driven
Software Engineering (MDSE) [4,5].
518
Sessions
Generalized sketches extend ordinary sketches in two directions: (1) In-

stead of graphs/categories only, we are allowed to work with objects in any
chosen base category. In applications in MDSE the base category is usually
a certain pre-sheaf topos. (2) Instead of using the “pre-defined” commu-
tativity, limit and colimit predicates, we allow any appropriate predicates.
To specify a relation R ⊆ A × B, e.g., we use a predicate jointly monic, with
e1 e1
its arity given by the graph (v1 ← v3 → v2 ), instead of using an auxiliary
product cone plus a monic edge into the product node. Especially, we can
use predicates that can not be specified by limits and colimits in the chosen
semantic universe as the category Rel [see e.g. 5].
To axiomatize arbitrary predicates in arbitrary base categories we need
a universal language to define constraints in arbitrary categories. To achieve
a proper generalization of sketches, those constraints should be first-order to
enable us, at least, to axiomatize universal properties of limits and colimits
respectively. Such a universal language is presented in the talk. Following
the idea of sketch axioms in [3] it further develops the ideas, concepts and
results in [4].
At present, we consider only predicates but not operations. We see, how-
ever, no principal obstacles to extend our framework by operations [see 6,7].
Following the tradition of first-order logic, we rely here on the semantics-as-
interpretation paradigm instead of the semantics-as-instance paradigm as
in [4] even if the latter one is more appropriate to formalize meta-modeling
[6].
As a sanity check, we show, in generalizing our results in [4], that any
appropriate choice of the components of our universal framework in any
chosen base category gives rise to an institutions.
References
1. M. Makkai, “Generalized sketches as a framework for completeness the-
orems. Part I”, Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra, vol. 115(1), 1997,
pp. 49–79, doi:10.1016/S0022-4049(96)00007-2.
orems. Part II”, Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra, vol. 115(2),
1997, pp. 179–212, doi:10.1016/S0022-4049(96)00008-4.
orems. Part III”, Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra, vol. 115(3),
1997, pp. 241–274, doi:10.1016/S0022-4049(96)00009-6.
4. Z. Diskin & U. Wolter, “A Diagrammatic Logic for Object-Oriented
Visual Modeling”, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 203(6), 2008, pp. 19–41.
519
5. A. Rutle, A. Rossini, Y. Lamo & U. Wolter, “A formal approach to the

specification and transformation of constraints in MDE”, The Journal
of Logic and Algebraic Programming, vol. 81(4), 2012, pp. 422–457.
6. Z. Diskin, “Towards algebraic graph-based model theory for computer
science”, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 144–145.
7. U. Wolter, Z. Diskin & H. König, “Graph Operations and Free Graph
Algebras”, in Graph Transformation, Specifications, and Nets, In Mem-
ory of Hartmut Ehrig, edited by R. Heckel & G. Taentzer, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol. 10800, Springer, 2017, pp. 313–331.
520
Sessions
History
The keynote speaker at this session is Anne-Françoise Schmid (page 159).
Logic Functions in the Philosophy of Al-Farabi

Abduljaleel Kadhim Alwali
College of Humanities and Social Sciences,
United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE
[email protected]
Abu Nasr Muhammad Al-Farabi (870–950 AD), the second outstanding

representative of the Muslim peripatetic after al Kindi (801–873 AD), was
born in Turkestan about 870 AD.
Al-Farabi’s studies commenced in Farab, then he travelled to Baghdad,
where he studied logic with a Christian scholar named Yuhanna b. Hailan.
Al-Farabi wrote numerous works dealing with almost every branch of
science in the medieval world. In addition to a large number of books on
logic and other sciences, he came to be known as the “Second Teacher”
(al-Mou’allim al-Thani), Aristotle being the first.
One of Al-Farabi’s most important contributions was clarifying the func-
tions of logic as follows:
1. He defined logic and compared it with grammar, and discussed the clas-
sification and fundamental principles of science in a unique and useful
manner.
2. He made the study of logic easier by dividing it into two categories:
Takhayyul (idea) and Thubut (proof).
3. He believed that the objective of logic is to correct faults we may find
in ourselves and in others, and faults that others find in us.
4. He said that if we do not comprehend logic, we must either have faith in
all people, or mistrust all people, or differentiate between them. Such
actions would be undertaken without a basis of evidence or experimen-
tation.
In this paper, I will analyse the functions of logic in Al-Farabi’s works,
Enumeration of the Sciences, Book on the Syllogism, Book on Dialectic,
Book on Demonstration and Ring Stones of Wisdom, in order to present his
contributions in the field of logic.
521
References
1. Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Ihsa’ al-’ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), in-
vestigated by O. Amin, Anglo Library, Cairo, Egypt, 1968.
2. Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on
Aristotle’s De Interpretation, Investigation by P.W. Zimmerman, Ox-
ford University Press, 1981.
3. Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Book in Logic Al-Burhan (Analytica Posteriore),
investigated by M.G. Salem & D. Alktub, Book of House, Egypt, 1976.
4. J. Allwood, L.-G. Andersson & O. Dahl, Logic in Linguistics, Cam-
5. O. Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic
Philosophies of Science, The Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, UK,
1998.
6. J. van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology”, chapter in
Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, edited by G.E. von Grunebaum, Otto
Harrassowitz, Germany, 1970.
A New Method of Demonstration

for Aristotle’s Ontological Syllogistic
Emre Arda Erdenk
Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Karaman, Turkey
[email protected]
Since Aristotle’s works of logic edited under the title of Organon [1],
many logicians prepared and evaluated methods of demonstrating the va-
lidity and invalidity of Aristotle’s syllogisms that we encounter mainly in
the Prior Analytics of Organon. This paper is not a historical evaluation
of various such methods and attempts of demonstrations. Instead, I intend
to put forward a new and simple method of checking the validity of syl-
logisms for which I will claim that it has several advantages over some of
the previous influential and popular methods. Some of the methods that
I am going to evaluate in this paper are either algebraic, geometrical or in
modern symbolic fashion. By means of this, I will evaluate Leibniz’s linear
diagrams, Boole’s [2] algebraic treatment of syllogisms, Venn’s diagrams
and Lucasiewicz [3], Simely and Corcoran [4] types of proofs by natural
deduction and compare them with the method I am proposing here.
This paper have two main parts. In the first part I will introduce a
new method of demonstration which I will call the hierarchical method of
demonstration for the ontological logic of Aristotle. The core reason of
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Sessions
introducing this new method is that Aristotle’s syllogisms and categories

must be read collectively. In other words, I am against the way some logi-
cians take when studying the logic of Aristotle. They mainly separate three
headings of Aristotle’s logic — categories, syllogisms, and induction — and
work them mostly by isolating them from each other. However, I think this
is a mistake. Syllogisms is a theory of deduction that Aristotle puts forward
for the categories. In other words, these set of deductions is the science of
categories. In this sense, the method of this science must reflect this very
idea. The hierarchical method is the way to construct the syllogisms in such
a way that we can see the genus-species relations for the given premises and
to determine whether the relation stated in the conclusion is categorically
necessary for the given hierarchy of the premises.
In the second part, I am going to show that the above-mentioned meth-
ods are not constructed to relate Categories and Prior Analytics. By show-
ing this, my main objective is not to give an exclusive evaluation of these
methods but to critically show their inadequacies. First, whether they are
extensional or intensional neither of them are intended to extract the genus-
species relations of a given syllogisms. Secondly, they are not capable of
showing why exactly an invalid syllogism is invalid. For this, I do not mean
the rules of validity but instead I mean the categorical relations that are the
sole causes of the (in)validities. Thirdly, these methods lack the power of
producing possible valid deductions for a given set of categories. This last
point is important for the following reason. By using the notion of Aris-
totle’s categories, we can construct any arbitrary artificial sets of objects
that are sorted in a hierarchical order. So, for a n-sized set of objects and
with certain preliminary relations we can determine the necessary genus-
species relations by which we can determine the ontological export of the
given categorical system. By doing this the new method is suitable to be
the deductive system for the ontological logic for the categories.
References
1. Aristotle, Organon, in The Works of Aristotle, edited and translated by
W.D. Ross, Clarendon Press, 1951.
2. G. Boole, An Investigation of the Law of Thought (1854), on line source:
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15114.
3. J. Lukasiewicz, Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern
Formal Logic, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1957.
4. J. Corcoran, “Aristotle’s demonstrative logic”, in History and Philoso-
phy of Logic, volume 30, 2009, pp. 1–20.
523
Does the Metalogic that Underlies the Aristotelian Logic

Resemble what Timothy Williamson Calls a “Folk Logic”?
Stamatios Gerogiorgakis
Department of Philosophy, University of Erfurt, Germany
[email protected]
Etchemendy’s [2,3,4] conception of logical consequence as a conditional

that always has a model in a non-fixed domain, has been criticised by Man-
cosu [5,6] and Williamson [8,9,10]. Non-fixed domains, the criticism goes,
were not presupposed in Tarski’s [7] analysis of logical consequence (this is
Mancosu’s objection to Etchemendy) and they reflect the idea of logic’s be-
ing uninformative, which is characteristic of folk logic, not of scientific logic
(this is what Williamson argues for). Williamson takes traditional logic to
be the main influence of what he — obviously pejoratively — calls “folk
logic”.
However relevant for Etchemendy’s understanding of Tarski, Kaplan’s
view on the uninformativeness of logic, and Dummett’s contempt for ab-
ductive methods in logic, Mancosu’s and Williamson’s criticisms, at least if
I am right, leave a great part of traditional logic intangible. Indeed, they
leave intangible the most distinctive part of traditional logic: Aristotelian
syllogistic [1]. Implicitly, syllogistic does not encourage views akin to what
Williamson calls “folk logic” — at least if syllogistic is properly understood.
Aristotle not only ignored very much of what we today would take to be
features of non-fixed domains: he also employed fixed domains instead.
For example, Aristotle’s view of necessity as a feature of valid inference
does not involve what contemporary logicians call “logical necessity”. It
rather involves necessity as a feature of sentences that are true at all times.
The fact that he propagated two-valued logic did not make him oversee the
deviations he only too briefly discussed in Peri hermeneias. His understand-
ing of logical necessity did justice also to these deviations.
Also in the realm of classical logic, Aristotle saw valid inferences as fulfill-
ing some prerequisites that are informative, substantial or (in Etchemendy’s
sense) extra-logical. I shall show that some of these prerequisites involve the
fixity of the domain of discourse. Further, I shall argue that these prerequi-
sites are the motivation for two, in fact well-known features of Aristotelian
logic: 1) it does not consider every true implication to be a valid inference;
2) it considers some false implications to be valid inferences.
I shall support my claim that Aristotelian logic is not a folk logic in
Williamson’s sense by reference to, among others, the following topics of
Aristotelian logic: quaternio terminorum due to vagueness, the fallacy a dicto
524
Sessions
simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid, the subalternation of sentences at the

right-hand side of the square of opposition, modal syllogisms with de re
modalities.
References
1. Aristotle, Analytica Priora et Posteriora, edited by W.D. Ross, Claren-
don Press, 1964.
2. J. Etchemendy, “Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence”, The Jour-
nal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 53(1), 1988, pp. 51–79.
3. J. Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1990.
4. J. Etchemendy, “Reflections on Consequence”, in New Essays on Tarski
and Philosophy, edited by D. Patterson, Oxford University Press, 2008,
pp. 263-299.
5. P. Mancosu, “Tarski on Models and Logical Consequence”, in The
Architecture of Modern Mathematics. Essays in History and Philos-
ophy, edited by J. Ferreiros & J. Gray, Oxford University Press, 2006,
pp. 209–237.
6. P. Mancosu, “Fixed- versus Variable-domain Interpretations of Tarski’s
Account of Logical Consequence”, Philosophy Compass vol. 5(9), 2010,
pp. 745–759.
7. A. Tarski, “Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung”, Actes du Congrès
International de Philosophie Scientifique, VII Logique, Actualités Scien-
tifiques et Industrielles, vol. 394, Hermann et Cie, Paris, 1936, pp. 1–11.
8. T. Williamson, “Logics as Scientific Theories”, unpublished paper pre-
sented on October 26, 2011 at the Munich Center of Mathematical
Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, Germany, 2011.
9. T. Williamson, “Logics as Scientific Theories”, unpublished paper pre-
sented on October 30, 2011 in the Parliament Hall of St. Andrews, Arché
Workshop: The Epistemology of Logic, 2011.
10. T. Williamson, “Logics as Scientific Theories”, unpublished talk given
on June 5, 2012 at the University of Lisbon, Petrus Hispanus Lectures,
2012.
525
Interpretations of Chance within the Dialectic

Paul M. Healey
Independent Scholar, London, UK
[email protected]
Given a model of chance Mc , it requires an Interpretation I, formalist,

intuitionist, speculative, paraconsistent or empiricist, etc. then its proposi-
tional formulae can be Understood U , have different symbolic values. ⟨IU ⟩
will then be an argument for Mc , but is not synonymous with a Theory of
Chance Tc . The latter I will propose also requires a more specialized Knowl-
edge K of a specific concept, so will be represented as ⟨IU K⟩; so different
method(s) for the likelihood of an event can be instantiated. To satisfy a
concept of chance, so it can be in a correspondence to reality, I will pre-
sume the method also has a disposition D. This will mean it has relational
properties; as being-in-itself, for-itself and or to some other-than-itself. Ful-
filling the complete argument ⟨IU K⟩ will therefore satisfy the conditions of
the dialectic. These are confirmed and advanced by a higher standpoint of
system, given true propositions are not self-contradictory [3], as these are
contradicted. E.g., ‘All propositions are analytical’ is self-contradictory, as
it refers to itself as being analytical, but is not true by being consistent with
a definition of analysis. That is, it is contradicted by ‘some propositions are
analytical’. What I will try to show is that Lewis’ [4,5] credence function is
self-contradictory in that it is undermined by the definition of a Dialectical
Principle [1,2].
References
1. P.M. Healey, “Understandings of Logic Sublated by the Dialectic”, Phi-
losophy Study, vol. 4(1), 2014, pp. 41–54, doi:10.17265/2159-5313/2014.
01.006.
2. P.M. Healey, “Squaring the Dialectic of Inference and Chance”, Phi-
losophy Study, 2015, vol. 5(5), 2015, pp. 257–271, doi:10.17265/2159-
5313/2015.05.004.
3. K. de Boer, “Hegel’s Account of Contradiction in the Science of Logic
Reconsidered”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 48(3), 2010,
pp. 345–373.
4. D.K. Lewis, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance”, in Philos-
ophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, edited by R.C. Jeffrey,
University of California Press, 1980, pp. 83–132.
5. D.K. Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged”, Mind, vol. 103(412),
1994, pp. 473–490.
526
Sessions
A justification for Aristotle’s Thesis on the basis of the law

of non-contradiction
Sara Ipakchi
Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany
[email protected]
I am convinced that the three laws of thought by Aristotle: Identity,

LEM (law of excluded middle) and LNC (law of non-contradiction), are
some of the fundamental propositions in our belief-set. In this talk I defend
the idea that our intuition about Aristotle Thesis [1,2],
AT∶ ¬(p → ¬p) or ¬(¬p → p),

is closely connected to the law of non-contradiction,
LNC∶ ¬(p ∧ ¬p).

I work with AT and LNC without negation by virtue of the simplicity
of their form. Roughly, I think that:
(i) If we believe in LNC, then we have the intuition that AT is true.
(ii) If we don’t believe in LNC, then we don’t have the intuition that AT
is true.
With the assumption that there is some analogy between our fundamen-
tal beliefs and axioms in a logical system, I want show that (i) is true in
PA1 [3] and (ii) is true in LP [4].
References
1. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Book
II, Chapter 4, edited by J. Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1984.
2. M. Storrs, “A History of Connexivity”, in Logic: A History of its Central
Concepts, edited by D.M. Gabbay, F.J. Pelletier & J. Woods, volume
11 of Handbook of The History of Logic, North-Holland, 2012.
3. R.B. Angell, “Three Logics of Subjunctive Conditionals”, presented
at Colloquium on Logic and Foundations of Mathematics, Hannover,
Germany, 1966, online resource: http://www.rbangell.com/papers
AndArticles.asp, abstract published in The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 32(4), 1967, pp. 556–557.
4. G. Priest, “The logic of paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 8(1), 1979, pp. 219–241, doi:10.1007/BF00258428.
527
The Principle of Excluded Middle in Kant

Esma Kayar
Department of Philosophy, İstanbul University, Turkey
[email protected]
In this paper I will examine the principle of excluded middle in the

philosophy of Kant from aspects of kinds of judgments and concepts of
negation, determination and opposition.
First, I will explain that how the principle of excluded middle in Kant is
used to differentiate the kinds of judgment. This principle is the principle of
disjunctive and apodictic judgments in Kant’s famous table of judgments.
For disjunctive judgments this principle is also called the principle of divi-
sion. “Sphere” is an important concept to elucidate this division.
Then I will examine how the principle of excluded middle is derived from
the principle of contradiction according to Kant’s understanding of negation.
He separates negation of copula, negation of predicate and real negation. A
negative proposition with a negative copula indicates that something is not
contained under the sphere of a given concept occurs in accordance with
the principle of excluded middle.
The principle of excluded middle is a principle of concept not a “thing”.
This principle assumes two opposite concepts. In this sense Kant calls this
principle also as the principle of determination. The determinability of every
single concept is the universality of this principle. But determination of a
thing needs sum total of all possible predicates and another principle which
is not derived from the principle of contradiction.
Lastly, I will enlighten which kind of opposition is related to the princi-
ple of the excluded middle [1]. There are three types of opposition, mainly
real, logical and dialectical, in Kant. Only logical opposition pertains to
the principle of the excluded middle. As merely logical criteria of truth,
this principle grounds logical necessity of a cognition. When we necessar-
ily judge, opposite of this judgment is false. When judgments opposed to
one another contradictorily, the truth of one of the contradictorily opposed
judgments is deduced from the falsehood of the other. This procedure cre-
ates apagogical proofs.
Reference
1. I. Kant, Lectures on Metaphysics, edited and translated by K. Ameriks
& S. Naragon, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
528
Sessions
Eristic and the origin of logic

Geneviève Lachance
Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland
[email protected]
The term “eristic”(eristikos) first appeared during IV century BC to
characterise a specific type of logos taught to young Athenians as part of
their higher education (Isocrates). It was also employed during the same
historical period to describe a group of individuals who were engaged in the
activity of refutation or elenchus (Plato and Aristotle). These individuals,
however, seemed to have had a negative reputation in Athens. Plato, for
instance, condemned their lack of interest in crucial questions such as truth
or forms. Indeed, eristics used refutation to contradict their interlocutors
regardless of the veracity or the falsity of the theses defended. As for Aristo-
tle, he criticised the form of eristical arguments — which predominantly rest
on verbal trickery and paradoxes — and castigated the eristics’ ignorance
of what constituted a formal contradiction or a valid refutation.
It is undeniable that eristics had a major influence on the development
of logic. Aristotle’s analysis of sophisms used by eristics had prompted
him to reflect on the validity of arguments and on syllogisms. Some of the
logical paradoxes discussed by the Stoics also originated from the school of
Megara, a philosophical school that had been repeatedly linked with eristic
by ancient commentators and which had developed a different type of logic
than Aristotle’s. In fact, it is permitted to say that eristics were precursors
of logic or, at the very least, instigators of the formal study of arguments
and reasoning.
Despite its importance in the “prehistory” of logic, little is known about
eristic. Although it was characterised as a form of education (paideia) con-
sisting in the teaching of certain types of arguments, it is still unclear if eris-
tic constituted a movement or consisted in a homogenous group of individu-
als. The identity of eristics is also uncertain. Plato designated two sophists
as “eristics” (Euthydemus and Dionysodorus), but nothing is known about
them, except that they were real historical figures. Aristotle showed himself
equally reticent: although some of the eristical arguments he described can
be attributed to members of the school of Megara, he explicitly named no
one, except Euthydemus and Bryson. Finally, there remain no texts written
by eristics during the IV century BC. Consequently, in order to know what
eristic consisted of, it is necessary to rely upon the testimony of its strongest
critics, namely Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle. We also find description of
arguments used by eristics in works of other authors, but they are usually
posterior to IV century BC.
529
The objectives of the paper are threefold. First, it will aim at giving a
thorough description of eristic based on the ancient sources that remain. It
will also address the controversial question of the identity of eristics. Sec-
ondly, it will analyse the different arguments used by eristics and highlight
their originality and philosophical implications. Finally, it will discuss the
influence of eristic on the developments of logic and demonstrate its impor-
tance.
Nondeterminism and Chinese Traditional Logic

Yu Li
MIS* , Department of Informatics,
University of Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens, France
[email protected]
JianMing Zhou
Independent Scholar, YueYang, China
zhou [email protected]
One of the most basic and difficult problems in Computer Science and
Artificial Intelligence is about human judgment and machine decision as
well as their relationship, which concerns nondeterminism.
In computability theory, determinism is expressed in terms of com-
putability. A deterministic problem (P) is decidable and solvable by an exact
algorithm. The work of Turing [1] shows that the computability means that
the capacity of algorithm can match the growth of problem size. Moreover,
in computational complexity theory, determinism is precisely defined by the
concept of polynomial time complexity. The polynomial time complexity is
related to linear, while the exponential time complexity related to nonlinear,
which corresponds to nondeterministic problem (NP).
On the one hand, the power of computer gives people a conceptual
illusion: NP may be solved ultimately by exact algorithms as P; on the other
hand, people still keep a cognitive intuition that P is essentially different
from NP. This situation is expressed as famous P vs NP problem, designated
as one of seven Millennium Problems by the Clay Mathematics Institute [2].
Although P is defined by computability, but NP cannot be defined by
computability, which is logically unjudgeable, thus undecidable. P vs NP
expresses the inherent difficulty in formal logic due to self-winding, the
difficult relationship between the pure formal thought and the subjectivity
of human cognition.
*
Laboratoire de Modélisation, Information & Systèmes
530
Sessions
The difference and relation between nature languages and formal lan-
guages has become an important research direction in the modern philoso-
phy. In Chinese language, Chinese traditional logic focus on human judg-
ment, and has a natural rationality that is consistent with the content of
reasoning, so the difficulty of self-winding in formal logic can be naturally
avoided.
Chinese traditional logic is not separated from natural language to form
a special logic system, but combined with Chinese thought, which is inte-
grated into history and classics. It remains a few representative figures and
case studies, such as the famous Chinese paradox white horse is not horse,
proposed by a great Chinese logician Gongsun Long (*325–250 BC) [3].
From a modern point of view, Chinese traditional logic is based on the
idea of logical hierarchy. Although Chinese traditional logic has a particular
style and has not been sufficiently developed, it can bring insight into the
most difficult problems involved in modern mathematical logic.
References
1. A. Turing, “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Ent-
scheidungsproblem”, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society,
1937, doi:10.1112/plms/s2-42.1.230.
2. S. Cook, “The P versus NP Problem”, Clay Mathematics Institute,
2000, https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/pvsnp.pdf.
3. Q. Sun, Gongsun Long Zi, English version, ZheJiang Gongshang Uni-
Should Hegel’s theory of the syllogism be included

in the history of logic?
Brian MacPherson
Department of Biological Sciences,
University of Windsor, Canada
[email protected]
As Redding [6] observes, there is an ongoing debate regarding whether

Hegel’s logic [4,5] is really a logic in the sense of the term used by analytic
philosophers or whether it is a theory of metaphysics. For example, Di
Giovanni, in his Introduction to Hegel’s Science of Logic [4], contends that
Hegel’s logic primarily contributes to metaphysics, and, along similar lines,
Beiser [1] regards Hegel’s logic as either metaphysics or ontology. On the
other hand, as suggested by Eisnor [3], Hegel’s logic is an important rival to
531
Aristotle’s logic, which opens the possibility that it could be regarded as a

deviant logic. In The Science of Logic [4], Hegel compares and contrasts his
three figures of the syllogism (discounting his mathematical syllogism) with
Aristotle’s three figures of the syllogism, arguing that his figures are actually
an inter-related triad where one figure “passes over” into the next figure,
whereas in Aristotle’s logic, the syllogistic figures are static and simply
stand “side by side” [5]. If Hegel’s theory of the syllogism is regarded as a
logic that is an alternative to Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism rather than
merely a theory of metaphysics, then there is no reason to exclude it from
the history of logic.
Moreover, it could be argued that virtually any system of logic involves
a metaphysics and an ontology, so that Hegel’s logic is no different in that
regard. Hence, it should not be singled out as something to be excluded
from the history of logic simply because it involves an ontology. For exam-
ple, at least in philosophical circles, it is popular to employ a possible worlds
semantics for various systems of intensional and hyperintensional logics and
such as alethic modal logics, quantified modal logics, doxastic, deontic, epis-
temic and tense logics as well as intuitionistic and relevance logics. Granted,
there have been attempts to de-ontologize the semantics for intensional and
hyperintensional logics such as Dunn’s truth-value semantics for modal logic
[see 2], although even Dunn’s semantics makes use of model sets consisting
of modal ‘facts’ along with sets of laws, both of which stand in for possible
worlds.
Finally, on the assumption that Hegel’s theory of the syllogism can be
regarded as an alternative to Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, the possi-
bility of formalizing Hegel’s theory of the syllogism will also be investigated.
References
1. F. Beiser, Hegel, Routledge, 2005.
2. J.M. Dunn, “A truth value semantics for modal logic”, Studies in Logic
and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 68, 1973, pp. 87–100.
3. N.P. Eisnor, Hegelian and Syllogistic Logic Compared, Boston Univer-
sity Libraries, 1947, https://open.bu.edu/handle/2144/14797.
4. G.W.F. Hegel (1812–1816), The Science of Logic, Introduction and
translation by G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
5. G.W.F. Hegel (1830), Hegel’s Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical Sciences, translated by W. Wallace, Foreword by J.N.
Findlay, 3rd edition, Clarendon Press, 1975.
6. P. Redding, “The Role of Logic ‘Commonly So Called’ in Hegel’s Science
of Logic”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 22(2),
2014, pp. 281–301.
532
Sessions
Renaissance Analysis as a Solution to the Problem

of Induction
John Martin
University of Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
[email protected]
In a gloss on remarks by Euclid on analysis, the ancient geometer
Pappus appears to endorse the view that it is possible to discover the axioms
necessary to prove a theorem by working backwards from the theorem to
the required assumptions by a deductive argument — that you can deduce
axioms from the theorems. In the Renaissance Jacobo Zabarella, in his work
on method, seized upon the text as a solution to the problem of induction. If
Pappus was right, Zabarella reasoned, it would be possible to deduce natu-
ral laws from the empirical observations that follow from them as theorems.
He found the key in Aristotle’s distinction between demonstratio quia and
demonstratio propter quid, a distinction that had been preserved and devel-
oped in medieval logic. The method was accepted throughout the 16th and
17th centuries and is endorsed in the Port Royal Logic. This paper explains
Zabarella’s method and logical flaws. It turns out to be closely linked to
the medieval topic of “from the cause to the effect” and “from the effect to
the cause”.
Alsteed’s Encyclopedy
Ruxandra Irina Vulcan
University Paris-Sorbonne, France
[email protected]
After my presentation of Alsted’s Praecognitiones theologicae in his

Methodus sacrosanctae theologiae, at the 2nd World Congress of Logic and
Religion, I propose to present and comment the systematization of his
Praecognita disciplinarum, libri quatuor of his Encyclopaedia (1630) in re-
lation to his Scientiarum omnium encyclopediae, since 1649 (vol. I) and his
Logicae systema harmonicum (1628). The discussion of Alsted’s Method will
be about its logical construction, elaborated in the conjunction of platon-
ism and aristotelism as cognitive procedures from ignorance (Plato, Republic
VII) to knowledge in a demonstrative optimization which contains logical
questions of epistemological integration. The order and cognitive chains,
proposed as deductive, are in the center of the interest.
533
Two Syllogisms in the Mozi: Chinese Logic and Language

Byeong-uk Yi
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada
[email protected]
This paper examines two syllogistic arguments presented and contrasted

in the ancient Chinese book Mozi [2], which expounds doctrines of the Mo-
hist school of philosophers. We can use English plural constructions to
formulate the arguments as follows:
1. Any things that are one horse are horses. Any things that are horses
have four feet. ∴ Any things that are one horse have four feet.
2. Any things that are two horses are horses. Any things that are horses
have four feet. ∴ Any things that are two horses have four feet.
Both arguments involve sentences of the plural A form (or A*), the plu-
ral cousin of the standard universal affirmative form (or A) of categorical
sentences:
A* (the plural A form): Any things that are-P are-Q, where

‘are-P ’ and ‘are-Q ’ stand in for predicates of the plural form (e.g.,
‘are horses’, ‘are white’, ‘run fast’).
And the arguments seem instances of the plural cousin of the standard,
singular form of Barbara:
Plural Barbara: Any things that are-P are-Q. Any things that are-Q
are-R. ∴ Any things that are-P are-R.
One can get (2) from (1) by replacing ‘are one horse’ with ‘are two
horses’. While (1) is a valid argument, however, (2) is not. Although its
premisses are true, its conclusion is false — two horses have eight feet (with
four each), not four.
Some scholars of Chinese philosophy (e.g., [1] suggest that argument
(2) shows that Plural Barbara (or its Chinese counterpart) is not a valid
form. Like Barbara, however, Plural Barbara is a valid form. The paper
argues that (2) is not a genuine instance of the form because it involves
equivocal uses of the predicate ‘have four feet’. This predicate has the
distributive/non-distributive ambiguity (and so does its Chinese counter-
part). This shows the importance of the distributive/non-distributive dis-
tinction in studies of logic and semantics of constructions that go beyond
the confines of singular constructions.
534
Sessions
References
1. A.C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, Chinese Uni-
versity Press, Hong Kong, 1978.
2. D. Mo, The Mozi: A Complete Translation, translated by I. Johnston,
Columbia University Press, 2010.
535
Algebra and Category

A Constructive Proof of Coherence Theorem for Symmetric
Monoidal Category
Matteo Acclavio
LIX* , INRIA Saclay Research Centre, Paris, France
[email protected]
Keywords: String diagrams rewriting, Algebraic Theories, Coherence,

Monoidal Categories.
An algebraic theory is traditionally described in terms of a logical first-

order syntax with function symbols and equational laws. In his thesis, Law-
vere [5] gives a description of such (finitary) theories by means of categories
with finite products where their operations are represented by morphisms.
An higher dimensional point of view on such theories [2] allows us to consider
in the same higher dimensional category all the constituent of such theo-
ries: objects (1-cells), operations (2-cells), equalities (3-cells) and coherence
conditions (4-cells).
In this presentation we detail the proof given in [1] for coherence in
symmetric monoidal categories. In order to directly use the confluence of
Lafont’s string diagram rewriting system [4] which describe the underlying
algebraic theory, our proof adapts the method proposed by Guiraud and
Malbos in [3]. The resulting proof gives a constructive method to decom-
pose any diagram in a symmetric monoidal category by means of smaller
diagrams corresponding to the elementary coherence conditions.
References
1. M. Acclavio, “A Constructive Proof of Coherence for Symmetric Mon-
oidal Categories Using Rewriting”, arXiv:1606.01722, Cornell Univer-
sity Library, 2016.
2. A. Burroni, “Higher-dimensional word problems with applications to
equational logic”, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 115(1), 1993,
pp. 43–62.
3. Y. Guiraud & Ph. Malbos, “Coherence in monoidal track categories”,
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science, vol. 22(6), 2012,
pp. 931–969.
*

536
Sessions
4. Y. Lafont, “Towards an algebraic theory of boolean circuits”, Journal

of Pure and Applied Algebra, vol. 184(2), 2003, pp. 257–310.
5. F.W. Lawvere, “Functorial semantics of algebraic theories”, Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 50(5), 1963, pp. 869–872.
Filter pairs: A new way of presenting logics

Peter Arndt
[email protected]
Ramon Jansana
University of Barcelona, Spain
[email protected]
Hugo Luiz Mariano

[email protected]
Darllan Conceição Pinto

[email protected]
In this work we introduce the notion of filter pair as a tool for creat-
ing and analyzing logics. A filter pair over a signature Σ is a structured
collection of lattice homomorphisms LA → ℘(A), where A runs over all Σ-
structures, LA is some algebraic lattice and ℘(−) the power set. Taking A
to be the formula algebra, the image of this homomorphism can then be
taken as the lattice of theories of a logic. Thus a filter pair can be seen as
a presentation of a logic, different from the usual style of presentation by
axioms and derivation rules.
The case of interest for this work is LA = CoK (A), the lattice of congru-
ences whose quotient lies in some quasivariety K.
Theorem 1. Let K be a quasivariety, and τ = ⟨, δ⟩ a set of equations (i.e.

pairs of unary formulas in the signature of K). Then the collection of maps
CoK (A) ∋ θ ↦ {a ∈ A ∣ (a) = δ(a) in A/θ} ∈ ℘(A)
defines a filter pair.
537
One can show that the class of logics arising in this way is the class of
logics having an algebraic semantics in the technical sense of [2], a huge
class containing all algebraizable logics, but also logics that are neither
protoalgebraic nor truth-equational.
Theorem 2. Let L be a logic presented by a congruence filter pair as above.

If the quasivariety K has the amalgamation property, then L has the Craig
interpolation property.
This vastly generalizes one half of a landmark theorem of Czelakowski,

saying that an algebraizable logic with an additional property has the Craig
interpolation property if and only if its corresponding quasivariety has the
amalgamation property.
In the talk we will motivate and introduce the notion of filter pair and
show how it supplies structure which can be used to prove the second theo-
rem. We will further offer a point of view on filter pairs as being an approach
to algebraizing logics which is dual to the one via the Leibniz operator.
References
1. P. Arndt, R. Jansana, H.L. Mariano & D.C. Pinto, “Finitary Filter
pairs”, in preparation.
Mathematical Society, no. 396, 1989.
Swap Structures and non-deterministic algebraization

of logics
Aldo Figallo-Orellano
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and The History of Science,
Department of Mathematics,
National University of the South, Bahia Blanca, Argentina
[email protected]
Marcelo Esteban Coniglio & Ana Claudia Golzio
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and The History of Science,
Multialgebras (also known as hyperalgebras, or non-deterministic alge-
bras), have been very much studied in Mathematics and in Computer Sci-
ence. In 2016, Carnielli and Coniglio proposed in [3, chapter 6] a semantics
based on an special kind of multialgebra called swap structure as a semantic
538
Sessions
framework for dealing with several logics of formal inconsistency (or LFIs)
which cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In par-
ticular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract
algebraic logic. The swap structure semantics generalize the characteriza-
tion results of LFIs by means of finite Nmatrices due to Avron [see, e.g., 1].
Moreover, this semantics allows soundness and completeness theorems by
means of a very natural generalization of the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski
process.
In this talk some advances towards a theory of non-deterministic al-
gebraization of logics by swap structures will be described, following the
results recently obtained in [4]. It will be developed a formal study of swap
structures for LFIs, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multial-
gebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s
representation theorem will be described for each class of swap structures.
It will be shown that, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logic J3,
the usual class of algebraic models is recovered by means of this technique,
and so the swap structures semantics became twist-structures semantics (as
introduced by Fidel [6] and Vakarelov [7]). The twist-structures semantics
produces semisimple Nelson algebras, which are polynomially equivalent to
the variety of MV-algebras of order 3 [see 5]. From this, our representation
theorem coincides with the original Birkhoff’s representation theorem in the
case of the algebraizable 3-valued logic J3. This fact, together with the ex-
istence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category
of swap structures for each LFI, which is closely connected with Kalman’s
functor, strongly suggests that swap structures can be considered as non-
deterministic twist structures.
References
1. A. Avron, “Non-deterministic matrices and modular semantics of rules”,
in Logica Universalis, edited by J.-Y. Béziau, Birkhäuser, 2005,
pp. 155–173.
2. W.A. Carnielli, M.E. Coniglio & J. Marcos, “Logics of Formal Incon-
sistency”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by D.M. Gabbay
& F. Guenthner, vol. 14, 2nd edition, Springer, 2007, pp. 1–93.
3. W.A. Carnielli & M.E. Coniglio, Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency,
Contradiction and Negation, volume 40 of Logic, Epistemology, and the
Unity of Science, Springer, 2016.
4. M.E. Coniglio, A. Figallo-Orellano & A.C. Golzio, “Non-deterministic
algebraization of logics by swap structures”, arXiv:1708.08499, Cornell
University Library, 2017.
539
5. R. Cignoli, “The class of Kleene algebras satisfying an interpolation

property and Nelson algebras”, Algebra Universalis, vol. 23(3), 1986,
pp. 262–292.
6. M.M. Fidel, “An algebraic study of a propositional system of Nelson”,
in Proceedings of the First Brazilian Conference on Mathematical Logic,
edited by A.I. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa & R. Chuaqui, Campinas,
1977, also published in Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics,
vol. 39, Marcel Dekker, 1978, pp. 99–117.
7. D. Vakarelov, “Notes on N-lattices and constructive logic with strong
negation”, Studia Logica, vol. 36(1–2), 1977, pp. 109–125.
Analogies of meaning across logic and categories

Gaëll Guibert & Benoı̂t Sauzay
Independent Scholars, France
A deep understanding of a theorem, a logical proposition or more widely

an internal sense of a text, is not always restricted to the sequence of the
meanings of the unities. It is also constructed on more global structures
allowed by signifying organizations, toward semantic representations. Ana-
logical relations, underlying to syntactic unities and participating of the
global structure, create a comparison order and take part in the under-
standing.
Can we logically highlight some abstract representations from internal
relations in such utterances or logical propositions? Can we enter into the
logical properties of linguistic “objects”, rather than logical or mathematical
“objects”? A comparable way does exist in mathematics since Eilenberg
and MacLane (1945). Mathematics have a level of representation of an
issue (category, topos, set), but can linguistics build one or multiple ones?
Can the essence of lexical unities of this language, such as an operator, or
a simple verb, be formally represented, as certain mathematical properties
are? The approach aims to enter into the internal logic of the construction
and to formally bind some analog meanings. The question is the application
of a logical calculus of typed operators, to underline some comparisons in a
combinatory.
A mathematical approach is proposed in order to show a logical organi-
zation of semantic properties. Considering examples of analogical meanings
in natural languages as ancient Hebrew, Greek and Latin, a verb can partic-
ipate to the construction of comparative relations, and the properties of a
representation be calculated from signifying unities, to highlight an internal
sense.
540
Sessions
References
1. Aristotle, Catégories, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 2002.
2. E. Benveniste, “Catégories de pensée et catégories de langue”, in Pro-
blèmes de Linguistique Générale, by E. Benveniste, vol. 1, Gallimard,
1966, pp. 63–74.
3. O. Caramello & L. Lafforgue, Sur la dualité des topos et de leurs pré-
sentations et applications: une introduction, Institut des Hautes Études
Scientifiques, IHES/M/16/26, 2016.
4. J.-P. Desclés, G. Guibert & B. Sauzay, Calculs de signification par une
logique d’opérateurs, Cépaduès, 2016.
Dual Logic Concepts based on Mathematical Morphology

in Stratified Institutions: Applications to Spatial Reasoning
Alexandre Goy
MAS* , CentraleSupélec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France
[email protected]
Marc Aiguier
MICS , CentraleSupélec, Université Paris-Saclay, France
[email protected]
Isabelle Bloch
LTCI , Télécom ParisTech, Université Paris-Saclay, France
[email protected]
To cope with the explosion of logics, a categorical abstract model-theory,
the theory of institutions [6,8], has been proposed, that generalizes Bar-
wise’s “Translation Axiom” [2]. Institutions then define both syntax and
semantics of logics at an abstract level, independently of commitment to
any particular logic. Later, institutions have been extended to propose a
syntactic approach to truth [8]. For the sake of generalization, in institu-
tions signatures are simply defined as objects of a category and formulas
built over signatures are simply required to form a set. All other contingen-
cies such as inductive definition of formulas are not considered. However,
the reasoning (both syntactic and semantic) is defined by induction on the
structure of formulas. Indeed, usually, formulas are built from “atomic”
formulas by applying iteratively operators such as connectives, quantifiers
*
Laboratory of Applied Mathematics and Systems

Mathematics in Interaction with Computer Science
Laboratoire de Traitement et Communication de l’Information
541
or modalities. What we can then observe is that most of these logical oper-
ators come through dual pairs (conjunction ∧ and disjunction ∨, quantifiers
∀ and ∃, modalities 2 and 3).
When looking at the algebraic properties of mathematical morphology
[4] on the one hand, and of all these dual operators on the other hand,
several similarities can be shown, and suggest that links between institu-
tions and mathematical morphology are worth to be investigated. This has
already been done in the restricted framework of modal propositional logic
[3]. It was shown that modalities 2 and 3 can be defined as morphological
erosion and dilation. The interest is, based on properties of morphological
operators, that this leads to a set of axioms and inference rules which are
de facto sound. In this communication, we propose to extend this work by
defining, at the abstract level of institutions, a pair of abstract operators
as morphological erosion and dilation. We will then show how to obtain
standard quantifiers and modalities from these two abstract operators.
In mathematical morphology, erosion and dilation are operations that
work on lattices, for instance on sets. Thus, they can be applied to formulas
by identifying formulas with sets. We have two ways of doing this, either
given a model M identifying a formula ϕ by the set of states η that satisfy ϕ
and classically noted M η ϕ, or identifying ϕ by the set of models that sat-
isfy it. As usual in logic, our abstract dual operators based on morphological
erosion and dilation will be studied both on sets of states and sets of models.
The problem is that institutions do not explicit, given a model M , its set of
states. This is why we will define our abstract logical dual operators based
on erosion and dilation in an extension of institutions, the stratified institu-
tions [1]. Stratified institutions have been defined in [1] as an extension of
institutions to take into account the notion of open sentences, the satisfac-
tion of which is parameterized by sets of states. For instance, in first-order
logic, the satisfaction is parameterized by the valuation of unbound vari-
ables, while in modal logics it is further parameterized by possible worlds.
Hence, stratified institutions allow for a uniform treatment of such param-
eterizations of the satisfaction relation within the abstract setting of logics
as institutions.
Another interest of the proposed approach is that mathematical mor-
phology provides tools for spatial reasoning. Inspired by the work that was
done in [3, 5] in the propositional and modal logic framework, we show how
logical connectives based on morphological operators can be used for sym-
bolic representations of spatial relations. Indeed, spatial relations are a main
component of spatial reasoning, and several frameworks have been proposed
to model spatial relations and reason about them in logical frameworks.
542
Sessions
Since it is usual to introduce uncertainty in qualitative spatial reasoning,

we propose to extend our abstract logical connectives based on erosion and
dilation to the fuzzy case. This first requires to develop fuzzy reasoning
in stratified institutions. Fuzzy (or many-valued) reasoning has an institu-
tional semantics [7]. The approach proposed here is substantially similar to
that proposed in [7], although developed in stratified institutions.
References
1. M. Aiguier & R. Diaconescu, “Stratified institutions and elementary ho-
momorphisms”, Information Processing Letters, vol. 103(5–13), 2007.
2. J. Barwise, “Axioms for abstract model theory”, Annnals of Mathemat-
ical Logic, vol. 7, 1974, pp. 221–265.
3. I. Bloch, “Modal Logics on Mathematical Morphology for Qualitative
Spatial Reasoning”, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics,
vol. 12(3–4), 2002, pp. 399–423.
4. I. Bloch, H. Heijmans & C. Ronse, “Mathematical Morphology”, in
Handbook of Spatial Logics, Springer, 2007, pp. 857–947.
5. I. Bloch & J. Lang, “Towards mathematical morpho-logics”, in Tech-
nologies for Constructing Intelligent Systems, edited by B. Bouchon-
Meunier, J. Gutierrez-Rios, L. Magdalena & R. Yager, Springer, 2002,
pp. 367–380.
6. R. Diaconescu, Institution-independent Model Theory, Birkhäuser, 2008.
7. R. Diaconescu, “Institutional semantics for many-valued logics”, Fuzzy
Sets and Systems, vol. 218, 2013, pp. 32–52.
8. J.A. Goguen and R.-M. Burstall, “Institutions: Abstract model theory
for specification and programming”, Journal of the ACM * , vol. 39(1),
1992, pp. 95–146.
Categorical semantics for a variation of subjective logic

Nino Guallart & Ángel Nepomuceno-Fernández
Logic, Language and Information Group,
Jøsang’s subjective logic [2,3] is a relatively new probabilistic logic sys-
tem which considers not only probability but also uncertainty, similar to
Dempster-Shafer theory. In this work we study an epistemic propositional
logic system based on these approaches focusing on its categorical seman-
tics. We explore the categorical semantics of a probabilistic modal operator
*
543
with a degree of uncertainty. Akin to Giry monads [1], we consider an or-

dered tuple of rational numbers in the interval [0, 1] for the degrees of belief
and uncertainty. From this point, we examine categorically several aspects
of interest for the development of the system. The first one is the set of
rules that represent the formal conditions for the probabilistic coherence
of the system that allow to meet Kolmogorov’s axioms. The second one is
the study of the operators of subjective logic. Although most of them are
generalisations of usual binary operators, some of them such as abduction
or a Bayesian operator do not have a direct equivalence to classical opera-
tors [3]. We aim to find adequate categorical interpretations of them in our
work. A third issue is the relationship between categorical and Kripkean
semantics of this system. We suggest a variation of Kripke frames with the
corresponding degrees of belief and uncertainty. In the last section of our
work we want to sketch future improvements of the system, such as the
adding of polymorphism.
References
1. M. Giry, “A categorical approach to probability theory”, in Categorical
aspects of topology and analysis, Proceedings of an International Confer-
ence held at Carleton University, Ottawa, 1981, edited
by B. Banaschewski, Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 915, 1982,
pp. 68–85.
2. A. Jøsang, “Artificial reasoning with subjective logic”, in Proceedings
of the Second Australian Workshop on Commonsense Reasoning, Perth,
Australia, 1997, http://folk.uio.no/josang/papers/Jos1997-AWCR.pdf.
3. A. Jøsang, “Generalising Bayes’ Theorem in Subjective Logic”, in
IEEE * International Conference on Multisensor Fusion and Integration
for Intelligent Systems, Baden-Baden, Germany, 2016, doi:10.1109/MFI.
2016.7849531.
*
544
Sessions
Finite Strong Standard Completeness of IUL plus t ⇔ f *

Sándor Jenei
Institute of Mathematics and Informatics,
University of Pécs, Hungary
[email protected]
Hahn’s structure theorem [2] states that totally ordered Abelian groups
can be embedded in the lexicographic product of real groups. Residuated
lattices are semigroups only, and are algebraic counterparts of substruc-
tural logics [1]. Involutive commutative residuated chains (a.k.a. involutive
FLe-chains) form an algebraic counterpart of the logic IUL [3]. The focus
of our investigation is a subclass of them, called commutative group-like
residuated chains, that is, totally ordered, involutive commutative residu-
ated lattices such that the unit of the monoidal operation coincides with
the constant that defines the involution. These algebras are algebraic coun-
terparts of IUL plus t ⇔ f. We shall present a representation theorem for
the finitely generated algebras of this class, by using only totally ordered
Abelian groups as building blocks, and a here-defined construction, called
partial-lexicographic product. As a corollary, we shall extend Hahn’s em-
bedding theorem to this class, using partial-lexicographic products instead
of lexicographic ones. Its corollary is the finite strong standard complete-
ness of IUL plus t ⇔ f.
References
1. N. Galatos, P. Jipsen, T. Kowalski & H. Ono, Residuated Lattices:
An Algebraic Glimpse at Substructural Logics, Studies in Logic and the
Foundations of Mathematics book series, vol. 151, Elsevier, 2007.
2. H. Hahn, “Uber die nichtarchimedischen Größensysteme”, Sitzungsbe-
richte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 116, Mathe-
matisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Klasse, Vienna and Berlin, 1907,
pp. 601–655.
3. G. Metcalfe & F. Montagna, “Substructural Fuzzy Logics”, The Journal
*
This work was supported by the GINOP 2.3.2-15-2016-00022 grant.
GINOP stands for Economic Development and Innovation Operative Programme.
545
Prime and maximal filters for the free algebra

in the subvariety of BL-algebras generated by [0, 1]MV ⊕ H
Noemı́ Lubomirsky & José Luis Castiglioni
CONICET* , Department of Mathematics,
Faculty of Exact Sciences,
National University of La Plata, Argentina
Manuela Busaniche
CONICET, Institute of Applied Mathematics of the Coast,
National University of the Littoral, Santa Fe, Argentina
[email protected]
BL-algebras were introduced by Hájek [see 4] to formalize fuzzy logics

in which the conjunction is interpreted by continuous t-norms over the real
interval [0, 1]. These algebras form a variety, usually called BL. In this work
we will concentrate in the subvariety MS ⊆ BL generated by the ordinal sum
of the algebra [0, 1]MV and a hoop H, that is, generated by S = [0, 1]MV ⊕H.
The main advantage of this approach, is that unlike the work done in [2]
and [1], when the number n of generators of the free algebra increase the
generating chain remains fixed. This provides a clear insight of the role
of the two main blocks of the generating chain in the description of the
functions in the free algebra: the role of the regular elements and the role
of the dense elements.
We have a functional representation for the free algebra FreeMS (n). To
define this functions we need to decompose the domain Sn = ([0, 1]MV ⊕H)n
in a finite number of pieces. In each piece a function F ∈ FreeMS (n) coincides
either with McNaughton functions or functions of FreeH (n).
We study the filters in FreeMS (n). In BL-algebras the implicative filters
characterize the congruences, and on the contrary, if ≡ is a congruence
relation on A, then the set {x ∈ A ∶ x ≡ 1} is an implicative filter. Then the
correspondence F ↦ ≡F is a bijection from the set of implicative filters on
A on the set of congruences of A.
We will show a characterization of prime filters in terms of prime filters
in FreeMV (n) (which we describe as prime ideals were studied in [3]) and
prime filters in FreeH (n).
We also give a description of the maximal filters and a correspondence
between maximal filters on FreeMS (n) and the points of the cube [0, 1]nMV .
*
546
Sessions
References
1. S. Aguzzoli & S. Bova, “The free n-generated BL-algebra”, Annals of
Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 161(9), 2010, pp. 1144–1170.
2. S. Bova, “ BL-functions and Free BL-algebra”, PhD thesis, Department
of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Siena, Italy, 2008,
https://goo.gl/RCyfCU.
3. M. Busaniche & D. Mundici, “Geometry of Robinson consistency in
Lukasiewicz logic”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 147(1–2),
2007, pp. 1–22.
4. P. Hájek, Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, Springer, 1998.
On Two Mutually Inverse Isomorphisms between NEmHC

and NEK4.Grz
Alexei Muravitsky
Louisiana Scholars’ College,
Northwestern State University,
Natchitoches, Louisiana, USA
[email protected]
We continue our analysis [5] of the latices NEmHC and NEK4.Grz of

the normal extensions of two calculi, NEmHC and NEK4.Grz, which were
defined by Leo Esakia [4] as follows:
mHC ∶= Int2 + 2(p1 → p2 ) → (2p1 → 2p2 ) + p1 → 2p1

+ 2p1 → (p2 ∨ (p2 → p1 )),
and
K4.Grz ∶= Cl2 + 2(p1 → p2 ) → (2p1 → 2p2 ) + 2p1 → 22p1

+ 2(2(p1 → 2p1 ) → p1 ) → 2p1 + α/2α.
As established in [5], the maps τ (mHC + Γ) ∶= K4.Grz + Γst and

ρ(K4.Grz + Γ) ∶= {α ∣ K4.Grz + Γ st(α)} define mutually inverse iso-
morphisms τ ∶ NEmHC Ð→ NEK4.Grz and ρ∶ NEK4.Grz Ð→ NEmHC, where
st is an embedding operation; see [5, section 3].
A frame (W, R) is called a K4.Grz-frame if (a) R is transitive, (b) there
is no nontrivial R-cluster, and (c) there is no infinite set {ai }i<ω ⊆ W such
that a0 Ra1 Ra2 . . . Given a transitive (merely) frame F = (W, R), one can
547
define two kinds of modal frame algebras, the Boolean algebra B(F) of the
subsets of W , equipped with operation
2X ∶= {x ∈ W ∣ ∀y (xRy Ô⇒ y ∈ X)},
and the Heyting algebra H(F) of all SR -upward closed subsets of W , where
SR ∶= R ∪ {(x, x) ∣ x ∈ W },
also equipped with the same 2X. It has been shown [1] that B(F) val-
idates K4.Grz iff F is a K4.Grz-frame. It is easy to check that for any
transitive frame F, H(F) validates mHC. Given L ∈ NEK4.Grz, L is called
Boolean complete if L = LB(F). Given L ∈ NEmHC, L is called Heyting
complete if L = LH(F). Following [2], given L ∈ NEK4.Grz, we denote by
FcL = (WLc , RLc
) the “classical” canonical frame for L; and, following [3],
given L ∈ NEmHC, we denote by FiL = (WLi , RL i
) the “intuitionistic” canon-
i
ical frame for L. It is easy to see that RmHC is transitive.
We claim:
(I) τ does not preserve canonicity, since mHC is canonical, but K4.Grz is
not [1];
(II) for any L ∈ NEK4.Grz, L is Boolean complete iff ρ(L) is Heyting
complete with respect to a K4.Grz-frame;
(III) the logic mHC + (2p1 → p1 ) → p1 + ¬¬p1 → p1 is a canonical normal
extension of K4.Grz;
(IV) for any L ∈ NEK4.Grz, if L is canonical, so is ρ(L);
(V) for any L ∈ NEK4.Grz, L admits the rule 2α/α iff so does ρ(L);
(VI) K4.Grz admits the rule 2α/α and hence mHC does it too.
References
1. M. Amerbauer, “Cut-free tableau calculi for some propositional normal
modal logics”, Studia Logica, vol. 57(2–3), 1996, pp. 359–372.
2. P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke & Y. Venema, Modal Logic, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 2001.
3. M. Božić & K. Došen, “Models for normal intuitionistic modal logics”,
4. L. Esakia, “The modalized Heyting calculus: a conservative modal ex-
tension of the intuitionistic logic”, Journal of Applied Non-Classical
Logics, vol. 16(3–4), 2006, pp. 349–366.
5. A. Muravitsky, “Interconnection of the Lattices of Extensions of Four
Logics”, Logica Universalis, vol. 11(2), 2017, pp. 253–281.
548
Sessions
Visualizing Geometric Morphisms

Eduardo Ochs
Department of Natural Sciences,
Fluminense Federal University, Rio das Ostras, Brazil
[email protected]
Different people have different ways of remembering theorems. A person

with a very visual mind may remember a theorem in Category Theory
mainly by the shape of a diagram and the order in which its objects are
constructed. For such a person most books on Category Theory feel as if
they have lots of missing diagrams, that she has to reconstruct if she wants
to understand the subject.
The shape of a categorical diagram remains the same if we specialize it
to a particular case — and this means that we can sometimes remember a
general diagram, and the theorems associated to it, from the diagram of a
particular case.
In this talk we will present the general technique above and one ap-
plication: reconstructing the statements, and some of the proofs, of two
factorizations of geometric morphisms between toposes described in section
A4 of [1], from particular cases that are easy to draw explicitly — in which
our toposes are of the form SetA , where A is a finite category whose objects
are certain points of Z2 . The tricks for visualizing sheaves on these ‘SetA ’s
are described in [2].
References
1. P.T. Johnstone, “Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compen-
dium”, two volumes, Clarendon Press, 2002.
2. E. Ochs & P. Arndt, “Planar Heyting Algebras for Children, 3: Geomet-
ric Morphisms”, 2017, preprint available at http://angg.twu.net/math-
b.html#zhas-for-children-2.
549
Semantic Construction for Hilbert’s Category

Eleonoura Enoque da Silva
Catholic University of Pernambuco, Brazil
[email protected]
Giovanni Silva Queiroz & Enoaldo Enoque da Silva

Federal University of Paraı́ba, Brazil
The main objective of this study is to provide the basis for the elabora-
tion of a semantics for the Hilbert Spaces Category (Hilb), which requires,
in our view, the use of an algebra, necessary to interpret certain properties
of bifunctors and isomorphisms specific in (Hilb). Initially designed to deal
with certain problems characteristic of Quantum Computing, this category
later proved to be also effective in dealing with certain objects of Quantum
Mechanics. Thus, in addition to its notorious practical possibilities, this
same category possesses an enormous theoretical potential which, it seems
to us, deserves to be explored extensively, especially as this allows inte-
grating syntax, semantics and pragmatics of a category through which one
can easily and effectively transit both Mathematics and Physics, as well as
Logics. Preliminarily, we expose the syntax of (Hilb) based on the works of
Baez [1], Coecke [2] and Heunen [3]; then, we will make an interpretation of
certain properties of (Hilb) and at the end we will present a sketch of the
semantics that we are constructing for this category.
References
1. J.C. Baez, “Quantum Quandaries: a Category-Theoretic Perspective”,
arXiv:quant-ph/0404040, Cornell University Library, 2004.
2. B. Coecke, “Introducing categories to the practicing physicist”, arXiv:
3. C. Heunen, “An embedding theorem for Hilbert categories”, Theory and
Applications of Categories, vol. 22(13), 2009, pp. 321–344.
550
Sessions
Philosophy of Mathematics
Universality and intersubjectivity of mathematical
constructions. Toward a dialogical reading
of Brouwer’s proof of the bar theorem
Clément Lion
STL* , CNRS , Charles de Gaulle University, Lille, France
[email protected]
Brouwer’s proof of the bar theorem is based on a particular understand-

ing of what an implication is, leading to semantic puzzles. In his 1927 paper
[2], in order to set the validity of the implication: “if B is a bar, then it
is a well-ordered bar”, Brouwer does not start from the hypothesis that B
is a bar, but from the hypothesis that a demonstration of B being a bar
is actually given (to an epistemic subject). Let us assume that this un-
derstanding of what is an implication is sound; then we are immediately
confronted with the following difficulty: how can such mental constructions
be acknowledged by other minds?
Following [1] we can read Brouwer’s argument as a transcendental one
(in the sense of Husserl). Such a phenomenological reading provides an
interesting perspective on subjectivity: the transcendental reduction yields
subjectivity as giving access to a kind of necessity pertaining more to in-
tentional acts than to objective properties of mathematical entities. Yet,
the phenomenological framework does not seem to allow transcendental ar-
guments to count as mathematical ones, transcendental reduction being
rather an effort toward the purity of a transcendental core the expression
of which always remains provisory. Husserl’s claim about the impossibil-
ity to conclusively formalize transcendental researches could nonetheless be
considered relative to a static understanding of formality: if the dynamical
openness necessary for the acceptance of rules can be expressed within a
formal framework, then such a reading of Brouwer’s argument could gain a
precise logical status.
Our claim is that the dialogical framework offers such means, especially
through the distinction it provides between several levels of rules. Our
purpose then is to substitute the concept of “mental” with the concept of
“intersubjective interaction” in order to bring together universality and sub-
jective construction.
*

551
References
1. M. van Atten, On Brouwer, Wadsworth Philosophers Series, Thom-
son/Wadsworth, 2004.
2. L.E.J. Brouwer, “Über Definitionsbereiche von Funktionen”, Mathema-
tische Annalen, vol. 97, 1927, pp. 60–75.
Discovery in mathematics from a heuristic perspective:

the case of the calculus and its development
Giulia Miotti
Department of Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
[email protected]
I address the question of discovery in mathematics, meant as a practice
evolving through time, and I propose an account of how new items are
discovered, and I claim that such processes can be properly described in
terms of a particular logic, i.e. heuristics.
Scientific discovery is a rather debated issue: on the one side, we find a
“psychological” approach according to which discovery is necessarily linked
to the character of genius and to intuition; on the other, a “heuristic” ap-
proach according to which discovery can be rightfully appraised as a process
subject to logical and rational inquiry. The difference between these accep-
tations of discovery is summarized by the dichotomies individuality/inter-
subjectivity and intuition/hypothesis formulation.
The first step in my argumentation consists in providing a “deflationary”
definition of mathematical objects in terms of a particular kind of hypothe-
ses [see 2] and a general description of mathematics in terms of a highly
complex problem-solving activity [see 3,4]. Within a conception of mathe-
matics as a problem- solving practice, the introduction of new hypotheses
undergoes a trial-and-error process in order to be accepted, thus being ra-
tionally analyzable at each step; including their introduction. Hypotheses
as “cognitive efforts” differ from any psychological enterprise because of
their non- individualistic and non- idiosyncratic nature and therefore are
more apt to describe the mechanisms of discovery in the practice of math-
ematics. Their very acceptation relies on how satisfactorily they resist to
trial-and-error processes brought on by single mathematicians as well as by
mathematical communities in different places and different times.
Finally, I propose the historical example of the development of the Cal-
culus [see 1] showing how an actual discovery has entered the corpus of
mathematics through a series of changes and improvements of successive
hypotheses.
552
Sessions
References
1. C.B. Boyer, The History of Calculus and Its Conceptual Development,
Dover Publications, 1959.
2. S. Dehaene, The Number Sense: How the Mind creates Mathematics,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1997.
3. E.R. Grosholz, Representation and Productive Ambiguity in Mathemat-
ics and Science, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007.
4. T. Nickles, “Discovery”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Science,
edited by W.H. Newton-Smith, Blackwell Publishers, 2000, pp. 85–96.
What is Law?: the perception of Category Theory

Nick Rossiter
Northumbria University, UK
[email protected]
Michael Heather
University of Cambridge, UK
[email protected]
Law controls our lives. We live under the rule of Law. We are everywhere
also subject to the laws of science. Law in one way or another affects every
facet of human life. We need therefore to understand better the way that
Law operates. Do we even know the nature of law? To understand it we
need to examine its roots. For they lie in logic. There is prima facie a
distinction between the scientific law and human civil and criminal laws in
that the former are always strictly obeyed whereas the latter may not be
observed. However delving deeper we find that scientific law is not always
universally obeyed. On the other hand it may come as a surprise to find
that there is a sense in that human law always does.
Law whether scientific or human operates from a higher level. Current
mainstream mathematics that derives from set theory cannot deal directly
with separate levels but only collapse them into a model of first order.
Alfred North Whitehead (1860–1947) who had established 20th Century
mathematics subsequently drew attention to the limitations of first order
models and advocated a move to Process at the higher level of metaphysics
[1]. Unfortunately Whitehead did not have a formal metaphysical language
to replace the flat mathematics of set theory.
Today Category Theory now fills that gap. It is a formal language that
operates across four levels recursively with features like adjointness between
universal limits and co-limits that were not appreciated until the 1970’s.
553
All Laws arise from this natural adjointness as underlying functors [2].
But there is the caveat that the current representation of Category The-
ory only holds up to the natural isomorphism of the axioms of set theory.
Applied Category Theory needs to hold up to the natural isomorphism of
Physics.
References
1. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Macmil-
lan Publishers, New York, 1929, corrected edition by D.R. Griffin &
D.W. Sherburne, Free Press, New York, 1978, https://monoskop.org/
File:Whitehead Alfred North Process and Reality corr ed 1978.pdf.
2. M. Heather & N. Rossiter, “Logical Monism: The Global Identity of Ap-
plicable Logic”, Philosophia Mathematica, vol. 14(2), 2006,
pp. 39–52.
Structural investigation of the categorial logic-geometrical

system
Krzysztof Śleziński
Institute of Educational Science, Cieszyn, Poland
University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland
[email protected]
Mathematics includes itself the fields subjected to both the quantitative
and the qualitative research. With the aim of making mathematics a tool for
philosophical investigations, Benedict Bornstein (1880–1948) implemented
the logical algebra developed by George Boole and the existing projective
geometry. He imparted a categorial form to these fields and simultaneously
brought them closer to the philosophical investigations.
Bornstein’s transformation of the multitude projected geometry into the
categorial one, all the categories of locations and directions were derived on
the plane. He also introduced the categorial structure of algebra logic,
based on a system of axioms listed by Edward Huntington in 1904. He
connected categorial algebra logic with categorial projected geometry and
obtained a system for the categorial geometrical logic (logo-topics) or in
other words the categorial logical geometry (topo-logic). Both dimensions of
this system constitute one field (λóγoζ — τ óπoζ), examined in two aspects.
It appeared that this system possesses the profound philosophical meaning
(it is like Universal algebra of Whitehead’s). With the help of it, ontology
and categories of being become the science in quality of mathematics. The
logic-geometrical system revealed a reality point in terms of quality and
enabled one to develop the general theory of being.
554
Sessions
Bornstein’s area of research has been presented considering the possi-

bility of their continuation. Algebra, logical and geometrical investigations
that involve the categorial and ontological analysis, constitute an original
suggestion for a description and qualitative explanation for the structure
of the reality. The investigation includes many innovative ideas (topology,
theory of category), which remain still inspiring for modern analysis under-
taken in the field of formal ontology.
Visual Images and Non-Deductive Rules

in Mathematical Discovery
Irina Starikova
Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Philosophy,
[email protected]
Frege’s view that there cannot be a logic of discovery but only a logic
of justification is widely accepted. Even if there is no logic of discovery,
there still may be a dynamics of discovery, or at least systematic accounts
of ways that mathematical discoveries are made. As Lakatos [3] emphasised,
some account of discovery in mathematics is essential for understanding the
nature mathematical progress.
One (possibly) common aspect, to which philosophers nowadays pay
more attention, is the role of visual thinking in mathematical discovery.
Cellucci [1, chs. 20–21] gives rules of discovery. He illustrates use of non-
deductive rules by means of several diagrams and claims that diagrams
are “not only auxiliary means, they are also an important source of non-
deductive inferences on their own” [1, p. 357]. Indeed, mathematical senten-
tial non-visual thinking is normally used in conjunction with visual thinking.
The latter usually combines thinking with external visual representations
(e.g., diagrams, symbol arrays, kinematic computer images) and thinking
with internal visual imagery, and often involves imagining a certain spa-
tial transformation of an object represented by a diagram on paper or on
screen. Possible epistemic roles include contributions to evidence, proof,
understanding and grasp of concepts.
Though philosophical discussion of visual thinking in mathematics has
concentrated on its role in proof, visual thinking may be more valuable for
discovery than proof. Giaquinto [2] distinguishes three types of discovery
important in mathematical practice: (1) discovering a truth, (2) discovering
a proof-strategy, and (3) discovering a property or kind of mathematical
entity. He illustrates visual discovery of these kinds using examples and
555
infers that “It is hard to see how properties in these examples would have
been discovered without the use of visual resources” (ibid.). This claim
raises questions: images may be useful in mathematical discovery, but can
they play a crucial role? And if so, how? What properties make images
useful even in current mathematics (since some of his examples are relatively
recent and advanced)?
This talk is an attempt to go deeper into some of such examples focusing
on the third kind of discovery from Giaquinto’s list, with an aim to iden-
tify possible systematic elements of discovery involving visualisation. Are
there any repeated uses of visualisations in discovery? What are their key
components? Do they stabilise in visual practices? How do they influence
shaping the new concepts? These and related questions are to be discussed.
References
1. C. Cellucci, Rethinking Logic: Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evo-
lution, and Method, Springer, 2013.
2. M. Giaquinto, “The Epistemology of Visual Thinking in Mathematics”,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2016 Edition, edited
by E.N. Zalta, 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
epistemology-visual-thinking.
3. I. Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations, edited by J. Worrall & E. Zahar,
Explanation and Existence in Mathematics

Krzysztof Wójtowicz
[email protected]
The notion of explanation is widely discussed in philosophy and method-
ology of natural sciences. The situation is quite different in the case of
mathematics: the notion of explanation is widely used in informal discus-
sions among mathematicians, but only recently it received more attention
of philosophers of mathematics, and it still has not been analyzed as thor-
oughly as it deserves. However, it is of great importance for the In the last
years, for the realism-antirealism debate in mathematics, in particular in the
famous indispensability argument. The original indispensability argument
rests on two premises:
(1) we are committed to the existence of those entities, which are indis-
pensable to our best scientific theories;
(2) mathematical objects are such entities.
556
Sessions
The discussion has recently been given new impulses by the EIA (“en-
hanced indispensability argument”), where several cases from biology of
physics have been discussed, and the (possible) explanatory role of mathe-
matics has been the subject of analysis (the most famous examples are the:
periodical life-cycle of cicadas (and the fact, that they are prime numbers);
the honeycomb conjecture, the Borsuk-Ulam theorem — and many oth-
ers). These examples seem to be clearly non-causal, as mathematical facts
and properties are present in the explanans. The topic is much discussed,
and the problem, which constitutes the special character of mathematical
explanations in science, is acute.
The problem of explanation within mathematics, as well as the problem
of the explanatory role of mathematics has quite different aspects, but some
specific examples of the cases where the notion of explanation can be applied
are:
(a) the problem of explanatory role of mathematical proofs (in particular
the interplay between the real and formalized versions of mathematical
proofs);
(b) the problem of explanation in the context of justifying axioms.
(c) the problem of “local” versus “global” character of explanation within
mathematics (in particular the problem of extraneous elements in math-
ematical proofs; explaining one single mathematical fact versus provid-
ing a suitable conceptual framework for a particular branch of mathe-
matics);
(d) the problem of mathematical explanations in empirical science, espe-
cially in the context of the enhanced indispensability argument.
In the talk, I will focus on the last problem, and in particular present
some new examples inspired by the independence results (in arithmetic and
set theory). These results invite us to rethink the explanatory role of math-
ematics in natural science, as their status is quite different from the well-
known examples. I claim, that their analysis in the realism-antirealism
debate will give new, important insights (as the problem of the strength of
necessary “background resources” becomes more acute).
557
16 – Contest Logic Prizes
In the previous editions of UNILOG, we had a prize based on a contest

with a theme, for this edition this has evolved in the contest Logic Prizes
(see details in the paper Universal Logic: Evolution of a Project), and, to
understand how the prize works, have a look at the page A Prize of Logic in
Every Country!. Each winner of a prize will present his/her work in 30mn,
including discussion, on Sunday 24 afternoon.
The jury will then give the Universal Logic Prize to the best of them. Be-
sides receiving this honorific prize, the winner will be an invited speaker at
the next UNILOG and will receive a purchase voucher of Birkhäuser/Sprin-
ger-Nature.
Jury Members:
Hartry Field
Department of Philosophy, New York University, USA
Michèle Friend
Department of Philosophy, Columbian College of Arts and Sciences,
George Washington University, USA
Grzegorz Malinowski
Peter Schroeder-Heister
Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Germany
Göran Sundholm
Department of Philosophy, University of Leiden, The Netherlands
Leon van der Torre

Computer Science and Communication Lab,
559
Organizer of the Contest:

Jean-Yves Beziau
The 2018 Winner of Universal Logic Prize is Ivan Varzinczak (Univer-

sité d’Artois, Lens, France) for his paper “A note on a description logic of
concept and role typicality” (page 575).
A prize of Logic in every country!

Logic is a fundamental field of research. Among the most influential
intellectuals of the 20th century, at least four are directly connected to
logic: Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell, Alan Turing and Ludwig Wittgenstein.
However generally at a university there is no department of Logic. People
working in Logic are spread in various institutes: philosophy, mathematics,
computer sciences, linguistics, cognitive science. . . In a sense this spreading
of logic is good. But it is also important to reinforce the interaction between
logicians working in one university, in one country, in the world. This is the
spirit of logic prizes.
The Idea of a Logic Prize in a Given Country, say Smurfland, is:
(1) To encourage the development of logical research in Smurfland.
(2) To foster interaction between people having interest for logic in Smur-
fland.
(3) To make better known logic among researchers of all fields in Smurfland.
(4) To make the work of logicians in Smurfland better known outside of
Smurfland.
(5) To develop, promote and make better known logic in the world.
How to organize a Prize of Logic in Smurfland:
(1) Decide who will organize the prize and find a name of a famous logician
of Smurfland for the prize.
(2) Name a Jury of important logicians representative of the various ten-
dencies and geographical locations of Smurfland.
(3) Circulate a Call for Papers in Smurfland with a deadline, not too close
but not too far, e.g. March 31, 2018.
(4) The Jury of Smurfland chooses the winner
(5) Attribution of the prize: publication of the paper of the winner in
Logica Universalis + participation to UNILOG’2018 in Vichy.
560
Contest Logic Prizes
The prize of logic in Smurfland is open to anybody living and working

in Smurfland. There are no restrictions of age, sex, race, nationality. The
contestants only need to live in Smurfland and be affiliated to a University
(or other educational institution) in Smurfland.
If there is a logical association in Smurfland, this association can organize

the prize. If there is no such association of logic in Smurfland, it is a good
opportunity to create one. If it is too complicated to do it immediately the
prize can be organized to start by an already existing group of logicians
of Smurfland. Financial support: Smurfland will support the travel of the
winner to Vichy for UNILOG’2018. UNILOG will support the accomodation
of the winner of the logic prize of Smurfland at UNILOG’2018 in Vichy and
will waive the registration fee for the winner.
Logic Prizes around the World

Newton da Costa Logic Prize, in Brazil
Organizers:
Jean-Yves Beziau (University of Brazil)
Itala D’Ottaviano (State University of Campinas)
Jury for 2018:
Francisco Antônio Dória (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) — Chair
Andreas Brunner (Federal University of Bahia) — Mathematical Logic
Osvaldo Pessoa (University of São Paulo) — Philosophy of Science
Mario Benevides (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) — Logic and
Computation
Abı́lio Rodrigues (Federal University of Minas Gerais) — Philosophical
Logic
Newton da Costa was First President of the Brazilian Society of Logic,
and is President of Honor of the Brazilian Academy of Philosophy.
Da Costa’s international recognition came especially through his work
on paraconsistent logic and its application to various fields such as philos-
ophy, law, computing and artificial intelligence. He is one of the founders
of this non-classical logic. In addition, he constructed the theory of quasi-
truth that constitutes a generalization of Alfred Tarski’s theory of truth,
and applied it to the foundations of science.
The 2018 Winner is Jonas R. Becker Arenhart (Federal University of
Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil) for his paper “New logics for quantum
non-individuals?” (page 566).
561
Schotch-Jennings Logic Prize, in Canada

Organizers:
John Woods (University of British Columbia)
François Lepage (University of Montréal)
Jury for 2018:
Alasdair Urquhart (University of Toronto) — General Logic (Chair)
Wendy MacCaull (Saint Francis Xavier University) — Logic and Com-
puter Science
Jean-Pierre Marquis (University of Montréal) — Foundations of Logic
Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University) — History and Philosophy of
Logic
Bryson Brown (University of Lethbridge) — Non-Classical Logics
Peter K. Schotch is Emeritus Munro Professor of Metaphysics at Dal-
housie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. He is co-founder of
the Canadian School of paraconsistency known as preservationism, and has
written papers in many areas of philosophical logic, particularly many val-
ued logic and epistemic and deontic logic.
Ray Jennings is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Simon Fraser Uni-
versity.
The 2018 Winners are Allen P. Hazen & Francis Jeffry Pelletier
(University of Alberta, Canada) for their paper “FDE, L3, K3, RM3, LP:
Making Many-Valued Logic Work” (page 570).
Georgius Benignus Logic Prize, in Croatia

Organizers:
Croatian Logic Association
Centre for Logic, Methodology, and Decision Theory (University
of Rijeka)
Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb
Research Centre for Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
(University of Split)
Jury for 2018:
Zvonimir Šikić (President of the Croatian Logic Association, University
of Zagreb)
Srećko Kovač (Institute of Philosophy in Zagreb)
Nenad Smokrović (University of Rijeka)
562
Mladen Vuković (University of Zagreb)

Berislav Žarnić (University of Split)
Georgius Benignus (*circa 1445–1520) was a Croatian humanist, philoso-
pher, Franciscan, archbishop and theologian. He is the author of several
philosophical-theological works in Latin.
The 2018 Winner is Tin Perkov (University of Zagreb, Croatia) for his
paper “Abstract logical constants” (page 571).
Vasiliev Logic Prize, in Russia

Organizer: Elena Lisanyuk (Department of Logic, Institute of Philosophy,
Saint Petersburg State University)
Jury for 2018:
Valentin Bazhanov (Ulyanovsk State University)
Vladimir Vasyukov (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sci-
ences, Moscow)
Alexey Kislov (Ural Boris Yeltsin Federal University, Yekaterinburg)
Ivan Mikirtumov (Chair, Saint Petersburg State University)
Nicolai Alexandrovich Vasiliev (*1880–1940) was a Russian logician,
philosopher, psychologist and poet. His ‘imaginary non-Aristotelian logic’,
proposed in 1910–1914, was a forerunner of paraconsistent and multi-valued
logic.
The 2018 Winner is Yaroslav Petrukhin (Lomonosov Moscow State Uni-
versity, Moscow, Russia) for his paper “Natural Deduction for Regular
Three-Valued Logics and their Four-Valued Analogues” (page 573).
Bimal Krishna Matilal Logic Prize, in India

Organizer: Calcutta Logic Circle
Jury for 2018:
Amita Chatterjee (Jadavpur University) — Philosophical Logic, Indian
Logic and Cognitive Science
Rohit Parikh (City University of New York) — Mathematical Logic,
Logic for Computer Science and Social Software
Raja Natarajan (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research) — Logic and
Computer Science, and Automated Theorem Proving
Hanamantagouda P. Sankappanavar (State University of New York at
New Paltz) — Algebraic Logic and Universal Algebra
563
Mihir K. Chakraborty (Chair, Jadavpur University) — Non-classical

logics, Foundations of Mathematics and Logical Diagrams
Bimal Krishna Matilal (*1935–1991) was at the same time an exponent
of Indian logic and well conversant with modern/Western logical theories.
He studied with Quine in the early 1960s and from 1977 to 1991 he was the
Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at University of Oxford.
He was the founder editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy.
The 2018 Winner is Jolly Thomas (International Institute of Information
Technology, Hyderabad, India) for his paper “Developing Metalogic to For-
malize Ontological Disputes of the Systems in Metaphysics by Introducing
the Notion of Functionally Isomorphic Quantifiers” (page 574).
SILFS Italian Logic Prize, in Italy

Organizer: Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze (SILFS)
Jury for 2018:
Giovanna Corsi (University of Bologna)
Silvio Ghilardi (University of Milan)
Roberto Giuntini (University of Cagliari)
Hykel Hosni (University of Milan)
Pierluigi Minari (University of Florence)
The 2018 Winner is Stefano Bonzio (Marche Polytechnic University,
Ancona, Italy) for his paper “Logics of variable inclusion and Plonka sums
of matrices” (page 567).
Aristotle Logic Prize, in Greece

The 2018 Winner is Takis Hartonas (University of Applied Sciences of
Thessaly, Greece) for his paper “Canonical Extensions and Kripke-Galois
Semantics for Non-Distributive Propositional Logics” (page 570).
Alfred Tarski Logic Prize, in Poland

Organizers:
Andrzej Indrzejczak (University of Lódź)
Andrzej Pietruszczak & Marek Nasieniewski (Nicolaus Copernicus Uni-
versity in Toruń)
Jury for 2018:
Tomasz Bigaj (University of Warsaw) — Philosophy of Science
Janusz Czelakowski (University of Opole) — Mathematical Logic
564
Jacek Malinowski (Chair)(Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, Editor-

in-Chief of Studia Logica) — Philosophical Logic
Roman Murawski (Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań) — Logic
and Computation, and History of Logic
Tomasz Polacik (University of Silesia in Katowice) — Formal Semantics
Alfred Tarski (*1901–1983) is one of the most important figures in

the history of logic. Born in Warsaw, he was a student of Leśniewski and
Lukasiewicz and soon became a central member of the Lwów-Warsaw school
of logic. He then moved to the USA and founded a major group of logic
at the University of California, Berkeley. His contributions touch nearly all
the areas of logic: set theory, model theory (he coined the expression and
was the main developer of this field), many-valued logic, the theory of con-
sequence operator (founder), the theory of truth (creator), Boolean algebra
and other fields.
The 2018 Winner is Zalán Gyenis (Jagiellonian University, Kraków,
Poland) for his paper “On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization”
(page 569).
Louis Couturat Logic Prize, in France

Organizers:
Jean-Yves Beziau (University of Brazil, École Normale Supérieure)
Christophe Rey (CNRS* , LIMOS , University of Clermont Auvergne)
Jury for 2018:
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont (LEM , CNRS§ , PSL¶ Research University)
— History of Logic
Jean-Pierre Desclés (Paris-Sorbonne University) — Logic and Linguis-
tics
Gilles Dowek (LSV , INRIA** , École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay)
— Computational Logic
Didier Dubois (IRIT* )— Non-Classical Logics and Artificial Intelligence
*

§
¶

Laboratoire Spécification et Vérification
**
*
565
Pierre Joray (Department of Philosophy, University of Rennes) — Philo-

sophical Logic
Bruno Poizat (Department of Mathematics, University of Lyon I) —
Model Theory and Mathematical Logic
Francesca Poggiolesi (CNRS , IHPST ) — Proof Theory
Louis Couturat (*1868–1914) was the main promoter of symbolic logic
in France at the beginning of the 20th century, author in particular of a
book on the algebra of logic. He was a good friend of Bertrand Russell
with whom he had a long correspondence which was recently published. He
rediscovered and made worldwide known the work of Leibniz on logic. He
promoted the artificial language Ido.
More information about Couturat can be found in the tutorial on Louis
Couturat that will be presented by Oliver Schlaudt (page 87) at the 6th
World School on Universal Logic, June 16–20, 2018, and in the talk by
Anne-Françoise Schmid (page 159) at the 6th World Congress on Universal
Logic, June 21–26, 2018, in Vichy.
The 2018 Winner is Ivan Varzinczak (Université d’Artois, Lens, France)
for his paper “A note on a description logic of concept and role typicality”
(page 575).
Talks of Contest Logic Prizes

New logics for quantum non-individuals?
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart§
Department of Philosophy
Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil
[email protected]
According to a very widespread interpretation of the metaphysical na-

ture of quantum entities, the so-called Received View on quantum non-
individuality, quantum entities are non-individuals [see 1]. Still according
to this understanding, non-individuals are entities for which identity is re-
stricted or else does not apply at all. As a consequence, it is said, such
approach to quantum mechanics would require that classical logic be re-
vised, given that it is somehow committed with the unrestricted validity of
identity. In this paper we examine the arguments presented in [1] to the

Institute for History and Philosophy of Sciences and Technology
§
2018 Winner of Newton da Costa Logic Prize, in Brazil (page 561).
566
inadequacy of classical logic to deal with non-individuals, as previously de-

fined, and argue that they fail to make a good case for logical revision. In
fact, classical logic may accommodate non-individuals too. What is more
pressing, it seems, is not a revision of logic, but rather a more adequate
metaphysical characterization of such entities.
Reference
1. S. French & D. Krause, Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical
and Formal Analysis, Oxford University Press, 2006.
Logics of variable inclusion and Plonka sums of matrices

Stefano Bonzio*
Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy
[email protected]
It is always possible to associate with an arbitrary propositional logic ,

l r
two substitution-invariant consequence relations and , which satisfies,
respectively, a left and a right variable inclusion constraint, as follows:
l
Γ ϕ ⇐⇒ there is ∆ ⊆ Γ such that Var (∆) ⊆ Var (ϕ) and ∆ ϕ;
r Γ ϕ and Var (ϕ) ⊆ Var (Γ), or

Γ ϕ ⇐⇒ {
Σ ⊆ Γ,
where Σ is a set of inconsistency terms for . Accordingly, we say that

l r
the logics and are respectively the left and the right variable inclusion
companion of .
Prototypical examples of variable inclusion companions are found in
the realm of three-valued logics. For instance, the left and the right vari-
able inclusion companions of classical (propositional) logic are, respectively,
paraconsistent weak Kleene logic — PWK for short [6] — and Bochvar logic
[1].
Recent work [3] linked PWK to the algebraic theory of regular varieties,
i.e. equational classes axiomatized by equations ϕ ≈ ψ such that Var (ϕ) =
Var (ψ). The representation theory of regular varieties is largely due to
the pioneering work of Plonka [7], and is tightly related to a special class-
operator Pl (⋅), nowadays called Plonka sum.
*
2018 Winner of SILFS Italian Logic Prize, in Italy (page 564).
567
One of the main results of [3] states that the algebraic counterpart of
PWK is the class of Plonka sum of Boolean algebras. This observation
led us to investigate the relations between left and right variable inclusion
companions and Plonka sums in full generality. Our study is carried on in
the conceptual framework of abstract algebraic logic [5].
The starting point consists in generalizing the construction of Plonka
sums from algebras to logical matrices. This allows us to characterize the
matrix models for variable inclusion logics by performing appropriate Plonka
sums over direct systems of models of . As a matter of fact, variable
inclusion companions are especially well-behaved in case the original logic
has a specific kind of partition function [7,8], a feature shared by the vast
majority of non-pathological logics in the literature.
The use of the mentioned algebraic tools allow, on the one hand, to
produce a general method to transform every Hilbert-style calculus for a
finitary logic with a partition function into complete Hilbert-style calculi
l r
for both and . On the other hand, partition functions can be exploited
l r
to tame the structure of the matrix semantics ModSu ( ) and ModSu ( ),
l r
given by the so-called Suszko reduced models of and . As a byproduct
of our analysis, this formalism allows to provide topological dualities for the
algebraic counterpart of variable inclusion logics [4,2].
References
1. D. Bochvar, “On a three-valued calculus and its application in the analy-
sis of the paradoxes of the extended functional calculus”,
Mathematicheskii Sbornik, vol. 46, 1938, pp. 287–308.
2. S. Bonzio, “Duality for Plonka sums”, Logica Universalis, forthcoming.
3. S. Bonzio, J. Gil-Férez, F. Paoli & L. Peruzzi, “On Paraconsistent Weak
Kleene Logic: axiomatization and algebraic analysis”, Studia Logica,
vol. 105(2), 2017, pp. 253–297.
4. S. Bonzio, A. Loi & L. Peruzzi, “A duality for involutive bisemilattices”,
Studia Logica, 2018, doi:10.1007/s11225-018-9801-0.
5. J. Font, Abstract Algebraic Logic: An Introductory Textbook, College
Publications, 2016.
6. S. Halldén, The Logic of Nonsense, Lundequista Bokhandeln, Uppsala,
Sweden, 1949.
7. J. Plonka, “On a method of construction of abstract algebras”,
Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 61(2), 1967, pp. 183–189.
8. A. Romanowska & J. Smith, Modes, World Scientific, 2002.
568
On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization

Zalán Gyenis*
Department of Logic, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
[email protected]
In this talk we introduce modal logics to study the logical properties of

statistical inference (Bayesian belief revision) based on Bayes and Jeffrey
conditionalization.
Suppose (X, B, p) is a probability space where the probability measure
p describes knowledge of statistical information of elements of B. In the
terminology of probabilistic belief revision one says that elements in B stand
for the propositions that an agent regards as possible statements about the
world, and the probability measure p represents an agent’s prior degree of
beliefs in the truth of these propositions. Belief revision is about to learn
new pieces of information: Learning proposition A ∈ B to be true, the agent
revises his prior p on the basis of this evidence and replaces p with some
new probability measure q (often called posterior) that can be regarded as
the probability measure that the agent infers from p on the basis of the
information (evidence) that A is true. This transition from p to q is what is
called statistical inference. We say in this situation that “q can be learned
from p” and that “it is possible to obtain/learn q from p”. This clearly is
a modal talk and calls for a logical modeling in terms of concepts of modal
logic. Indeed, the core idea is to look statistical inference as an accessibility
relation between probability measures: the probability measure q can be
accessed from the probability measure p if for some evidence A we can infer
from p to q.
We take the standard Bayes model of probabilistic belief revision, where
the Bayesian agent can infer to a new probability given an evidence by
conditionalizing using the Bayes or Jeffrey rule. We define modal logics
that capture the general principles that Bayesian updating satisfies and
clarify the containment relations among these modal logics. In particular
we show that the logic of Bayes and Jeffrey updating are very close and that
the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite or
countably infinite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable.
The significance of this result is that it clearly indicates that axiomatic
approaches to belief revision might be severely limited.
*
2018 Winner of Alfred Tarski Logic Prize, in Poland (page 564).
569
References
1. W. Brown, Z. Gyenis & M. Rédei, “The modal logic of Bayesian belief
revision”, submitted for publication, 2017.
2. Z. Gyenis, “On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization”, accepted
for publication, 2018.
3. Z. Gyenis, “Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable”, submit-
ted for publication, 2018.
4. Z. Gyenis & M. Rédei, “General properties of Bayesian learning as a sta-
tistical inference determined by conditional expectations”, The Review
Canonical Extensions and Kripke-Galois Semantics

for Non-Distributive Propositional Logics
Takis Hartonas*
Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
University of Applied Sciences of Thessaly, Greece
[email protected]
This article presents an approach to the semantics of non-distributive

propositional logics that is based on a lattice representation (and duality)
theorem that delivers a canonical extension of the lattice. Unlike the frame-
work of generalized Kripke frames (RS-frames), proposed with a similar
intension, the semantic approach presented in this article is suitable for
modeling applied logics (such as temporal, or dynamic), as it respects the
intended interpretation of the logical operators. This is made possible by
restricting admissible interpretations.
FDE, L3, K3, RM3, LP: Making Many-Valued Logic Work

Allen P. Hazen & Francis Jeffry Pelletier
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
We investigate some well-known (and a few not-so-well-known) many-
valued logics [1,7] that have a small number (3 or 4) of truth values. For
some of them we complain that they do not have any logical use (despite
their perhaps having some intuitive semantic interest [6]) and we look at
*
2018 Winner of Aristotle Logic Prize, in Greece (page 564).

2018 Winners of Schotch-Jennings Logic Prize, in Canada (page 562).
570
ways to add features so as to make them useful, while retaining their in-
tuitive appeal. At the end, we show some surprising results in the system
FDE [2,3], and its relationships with features of other logics. We close with
some new examples of “synonymous logics” [4]. An Appendix contains a
natural deduction system for our augmented FDE, and proofs of soundness
and completeness.
References
1. A. Avron, “Natural 3-valued logics: Characterization and proof theory”,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 56(1), 1991, pp. 276–294.
2. N.D. Belnap, Jr., “A useful four-valued logic: How a computer should
think”, in Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, Volume II,
by A.R. Anderson, N.D. Belnap, Jr. & J.M. Dunn, Princeton University
Press, 1992, pp. 506–541, originally appeared as “A useful four-valued
logic”, in Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, edited by J.M. Dunn
& G. Epstein, D. Reidel, 1977, pp. 3–37, also appeared before as “How a
computer should think”, in Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, edited
by G. Ryle, Oriel Press, 1977, pp. 30–56.
3. J.M. Dunn, “Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and ’cou-
pled trees’ ”, Philosophical Studies, vol. 29(3), 1976, pp. 149–168.
4. F.J. Pelletier & A. Urquhart, “Synonymous Logics”, Journal of Philo-
sophical Logic, 32(3), 2003, pp. 259–285. [see also 5]
5. F.J. Pelletier & A. Urquhart, “Synonymous Logics: A Correction”,
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 37(1), 2008, pp. 95–100.
tion, Oxford University Press, 2006.
7. N. Rescher, Many-Valued Logic, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969.
Abstract logical constants*

Tin Perkov
Chair of Mathematics and Statistics,
Faculty of Teacher Education, University of Zagreb, Croatia
[email protected]
A possibility of defining logical constants within abstract logical frame-
works is discussed, in relation to abstract definition of logical consequence.
We propose using duals as a general method of applying the idea of in-
variance under replacement as a criterion for logicality. The question of
*
This work has been supported by Croatian Science Foundation (HRZZ) under the project
UIP-05-2017-9219.

2018 Winner of Georgius Benignus Logic Prize, in Croatia (page 562).
571
logicality is one of fundamental questions which are rarely answered with

consensus and often lead to controversies, but trying to answer such ques-
tions turns out to be very fruitful for developing useful theories, with some-
times unintended applications. We focus on a recent development [1], which
explores a close relation between logical constants and logical consequence.
We can have in mind the following goals:
ambitious: find the proper notion of logical constants — probably no
answer
less ambitious: understand how a choice of constants generates a con-
sequence relation, and vice versa.
For the latter converse goal, we use the idea of consequence extraction
as presented by Bonnay and Westerståhl in [1]. Given a language and a
consequence relation, they consider a symbol to be a constant if replacing
it with another symbol of the same category (categories being e.g. binary
Boolean connectives, unary modal operators, first-order quantifiers and so
on) makes at least one valid inference of that consequence relation to fail.
The idea of this paper is very simple, but fairly general: we assume that
any symbol s such as connective, quantifier, modal operator and so on, has
the dual s′ present in the language. Given a consequence relation ⇒, duality
means that we have valid inferences of the forms
s′ (ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . ) ⇔ ¬s(¬ϕ1 , ¬ϕ2 , . . . )
and
s(ϕ1 , ϕ2 , . . . ) ⇔ ¬s′ (¬ϕ1 , ¬ϕ2 , . . . ).
If s is not self–dual, then at least one of these inferences fails if we

replace s with s′ . Therefore, s is a constant. As for self-duals, we use
the following trick: replace with some other symbol of the same category
which is not self–dual, thus making at least one of the inferences which
express self-duality to fail. Another goal of the paper is to outline possible
generalizations of techniques from [1], in particular to the framework of
abstract logic [cf. e.g. 2]. We propose a refined definition of abstract logic
to encompass the previously presented ideas.
References
1. D. Bonnay & D. Westerståhl, “Consequence Mining: Constans Ver-
sus Consequence Relations”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 41(4),
2012, pp. 671–709.
2. M. Garcı́a Matos & J. Väänänen, “Abstract model theory as a frame-
work for universal logic”, in Logica Universalis: Towards a General
Theory of Logic, edited by J.-Y. Béziau, 2nd edition, Birkhäuser, 2007,
pp. 19–33.
572
Natural Deduction for Regular Three-Valued Logics

and their Four-Valued Analogues
Yaroslav Petrukhin*
Department of Logic, Faculty of Philosophy,
Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia
[email protected]
In this report, we introduce natural deduction systems for Kleene’s [2]

regular three-valued logics as well as their four-valued analogues presented
by Fitting [1] and Tomova [7]. The class of regular three-valued logics in-
cludes such well-known systems as K3 (Kleene’s strong logic), Kw 3 (Kleene’s
weak logic), and LP (Asenjo’s & Priest’s logic of paradox [6]). Natural de-
duction systems for K3 and LP were presented by Priest [6]. We introduce
natural deduction systems for the rest of regular three-valued logics. Be-
sides, we present natural deduction systems for Fitting’s [1] generalizations
of regular three-valued logics. Moreover, Tomova [7] discovered the class of
regular four-valued logics. She considers also monotonic logics and calcu-
lated that there are six both regular and monotonic four-valued logics. We
formalize all of them via natural deduction systems. Last, but not least, in
our presentation of these results, we follow our papers [3,4,5].
References
1. M. Fitting, “Kleene’s Three Valued Logics and Their Children”, Fun-
damenta Informaticae, vol. 20(1–3), 1994, pp. 113–131.
2. S.C. Kleene, “On a Notation for Ordinal Numbers”, The Journal of
Symbolic Logic, vol. 3(4), 1938, pp. 150–155.
3. Y.I. Petrukhin, “Natural Deduction for Three-Valued Regular Logics”,
Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 26(2), 2017, pp. 197–206.
4. Y.I. Petrukhin, “Natural Deduction for Fitting’s Four-Valued Gener-
alizations of Kleene’s Logics”, Logica Universalis, vol. 11(4), 2017,
pp. 525–532.
5. Y.I. Petrukhin, “Natural Deduction for Four-Valued both Regular and
Monotonic Logics”, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 27(1), 2018,
pp. 53–66.
6. G. Priest, “Paraconsistent Logic”, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic,
edited by D.M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner, volume 6 of Handbook of
Philosophical Logic book series, Springer, 2002, pp. 287-393.
7. N.E Tomova, About four-valued regular logics (in Russian), Logical In-
vestigations, vol. 15, 2009, pp. 223–228.
*
2018 Winner of Vasiliev Logic Prize, in Russia (page 563).
573
Developing Metalogic to Formalize Ontological Disputes

of the Systems in Metaphysics by Introducing the Notion
of Functionally Isomorphic Quantifiers
Jolly Thomas*
Center for Exact Humanities,
International Institute of Information Technology,
Hyderabad, India
[email protected]
A general metalogical theory is developed by considering ontological

disputes in the systems of metaphysics. The usefulness of this general
metalogical theory is demonstrated by considering the case of the onto-
logical dispute between the metaphysical systems of Lewis Modal Realism
and Terence Parsons Meinongianism. Using Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitments and his views on ontological disagreement, three principles of
metalogic is formulated. Based on the three principles of metalogic, the no-
tions of independent variable and dependent variable are introduced. Then,
the ontological dispute between Lewis Modal Realism and Terence Parsons
Meinongianism are restated in the light of the principles of metalogic. Af-
ter the restatement, independent and dependent variables are fixed in both
Lewis Modal Realism and Terence Parsons Meinongianism to resolve the
dispute. Subsequently, a new variety of quantifiers are introduced which is
known as functionally isomorphic quantifiers to provide a formal represen-
tation of the resolution of the dispute. The specific functionally isomorphic
quantifier which is developed in this work is known as st-quantifier. It is
indicated that how st-quantifier which is one of the functionally isomorphic
quantifiers can function like existential quantifier.
References
1. D. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.
2. G. Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Inten-
tionality, Oxford University Press, 2016.
3. W.V.O. Quine, “On What There Is”, The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 2(5),
1948, pp. 21–38.
*
2018 Winner of Bimal Krishna Matilal Logic Prize, in India (page 563).
574
A note on a description logic of concept and role typicality

Ivan Varzinczak*
CRIL , CNRS , Université d’Artois, Lens, France
[email protected]
Description Logics (DLs) [1] are a family of logic-based knowledge repre-

sentation formalisms with useful computational properties and a variety of
applications in artificial intelligence and in databases. In particular, DLs are
well-suited for representing and reasoning about terminological knowledge
and constitute the formal foundations of semantic-web ontologies. Tech-
nically, DLs correspond to decidable fragments of first-order logic and are
closely related to modal logics [4].
Notwithstanding their good trade-off between expressive power and com-
putational complexity, DLs remain fundamentally classical formalisms and
therefore are not suitable for modelling and reasoning about aspects that are
ubiquitous in human quotidian reasoning. Examples of these are exceptions
to general rules, incomplete knowledge, and many others, characterising the
type of reasoning usually known under the broad term defeasible reasoning.
In this regard, endowing DLs and their associated reasoning services with
the ability to cope with defeasibility is a natural step in their development.
In this work, we propose a meaningful extension of description logics
for non-monotonic reasoning. We introduce ALCH● , a logic allowing for
the representation of and reasoning about both typical class-membership
and typical instances of a relation. We propose a preferential semantics à
la KLM [2,3] for ALCH● in terms of partially-ordered DL interpretations
which intuitively captures the notions of typicality we are interested in.
We define a tableau-based algorithm for checking ALCH● knowledge-base
consistency and show that it is sound and complete with respect to our
preferential semantics. The general framework we here propose can serve
as the foundation for further exploration of non-monotonic reasoning in de-
scription logics and similarly structured logics.
References
1. F. Baader, D. Calvanese, D. McGuinness, D. Nardi & P. Patel-Schneider
(editors), The Description Logic Handbook: Theory, Implementation
and Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2007.
*
2018 Winner of Louis Couturat Logic Prize, in France (page 565), and of Universal Logic
Prize (page 559).

Centre de Recherche en Informatique de Lens
575
2. S. Kraus, D. Lehmann & M. Magidor, “Nonmonotonic reasoning, prefer-

ential models and cumulative logics”, Artificial Intelligence,
vol. 44(1–2), 1990, pp. 167–207.
3. D. Lehmann & M. Magidor, “What does a conditional knowledge base
entail?”, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 55(1), 1992, pp. 1–60.
4. K. Schild, “A correspondence theory for terminological logics: prelimi-
nary report”, in Proceedings of the 12th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI’91, volume 1, 1991, pp. 466–471.
576
Part IV
Publishers, Sponsors
and Partners
577
17 – Book Exhibition
During the event there will be a book exhibition with the following
publishers:
Birkhäuser
Oxford University Press
College Publications
Peter Lang
World Scientific
579
18 – Sponsors and Partners
UCA — Université Clermont-Auvergne, France
LIMOS — Laboratoire d’Informatique, de Modélisation et d’Optimisation

des Systèmes, Clermont-Ferrand, France
Pôle Universitaire de Vichy, Vichy, France
Vichy Communauté, Vichy, France
Région AuRA — La Région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, France
CNRS — Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France
l’ARC 6 — Communauté Académique de Recherche de la Région AuRA,

T.I.C. et usages informatiques innovants, Region of Auvergne-Rhône-
Alpes, France
IUT d’Allier — Institut Universitaire de Technologie d’Allier de l’UCA,

Region of Auvergne, France
MMI — Département Métiers du Multimédia et de l’Internet, IUT

d’Allier, Vichy, France
AfIA — Association Française pour l’Intelligence Artificielle, France
Département de l’Allier, France
Ville de Vichy, France
Digital League, Region of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, France
Birkhäuser/Springer, Basel, Switzerland
IRSTEA Clermont-Ferrand — Institut National de Recherche

en Sciences et Technologies pour l’Environnement et l’Agriculture, site
de Clermont-Ferrand, France
SMF — Société Mathématique de France, Paris and Marseille, France
581
Index of Authors
Acclavio, Matteo, 369, 536 Basti, Gianfranco, 215

D’Agostini, Franca, 17, 19, 23, Bazhenov, Nikolay, 229
295 Bedkowski,
, Marcin, 272
Agudelo-Agudelo, Juan C., 424 Bellucci, Francesco, 266
Aiguier, Marc, 541 Ben-Soussan, Tal Dotan, 19, 28,
Akama, Seiki, 448 488
Akrami, Musa, 4 Van Bendegem, Jean Paul, 4
Albergo, Gaetano, 205, 258 Benevides, Mario, 561
Alwali, Abduljaleel Kadhim, 4, Benić, Juraj, 458
521 Benignus, Georgius, 563
Amgoud, Leila, 119, 460 Benoit, Charlotte, 115
Angius, Nicola, 230 van Benthem, Johan, 5
Antoine-Mahut, Delphine, 344 Benzmüller, Christoph, 108, 250
Aranda Utrero, Vı́ctor, 469 Bernard, Stephan, 3
Arazim, Pavel, 407 Berni, Jean Cerqueira, 108
Archambault, Jacob, 425 Beziau, Jean-Yves, i, 3, 17, 19,
Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker, 120, 31, 111, 115, 332, 333,
296, 297, 561, 566 560, 561, 565
Arieli, Ofer, 426 Bigaj, Tomasz, 564
Arisaka, Ryuta, 163 Biraben, Rodolfo C. Ertola, 259
Armgardt, Matthias, 121, 381 Biskri, Ismaı̈l, 480
Arndt, Michael, 193 Bittencourt, Maı́ra, 312
Arndt, Peter, 19, 26, 368, 371, Black, Joshua David, 260
537 Blackburn, Patrick, 4
Avo, Antsa Nasandratra Nirina, Blechschmidt, Ingo, 121, 368
107
Bloch, Isabelle, 541
Avron, Arnon, 5
Bodanza, Gustavo Adrián, 461
Ayari, Yanis, 3
Bonzio, Stefano, 564, 567
Bachelet, Bruno, 3 Borg, AnneMarie, 426
Baizhanov, Sayan, 236 Bornard, Marie, 3
Balbiani, Philippe, 437 Bourdieu, Béatrice, 3
Bangu, Sorin, 345 Brady, Ross, 5
Barés Gómez, Cristina, 439, 460 Brier, Søren, 122, 214
Barseghyan, Hakob, 298, 352 Brown, Bryson, 408, 562
Bashmakov, Stepan I., 227 Brożek, Anna, 272
583
Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie, 19, Czernecka-Rej, Bożena, 273

33, 342, 347, 565 Czerniawski, Jan, 274
Brunner, Andreas, 372, 561
Bryant, Kyle, 108 Demey, Lorenz, 169, 181
Buchsbaum, Arthur, i, 3 Deniz, Ebubekir Muhammed, 300
Bueno-Soler, Juliana, 311, 313 Desclés, Jean-Pierre, 465, 480,
Busaniche, Manuela, 546 565
Diaz, Rafael, 373
Cahill, Kevin M., 347 Didehvar, Farzad, 510
Caleiro, Carlos, 5, 415, 416 Dimarogkona, Maria, 230
Capolupo, Antonio, 215 Dionı́sio, Francisco, 4
Carneiro, Gregory, 108, 299 Dória, Francisco Antônio, 561
Carnielli, Walter, 5, 311, 314, Dowek, Gilles, 565
318, 339 Dubois, Didier, 111, 125, 439, 566
Cartier, Pierre, 111, 123, 368 Dubois, Laurent, 410
Castiglioni, José Luis, 377, 546 Dunn, Michael, 5
Caterina, Gianluca, 263 Dunning, David, 183
Chakraborty, Mihir K., 4, 337, Dutta, Soma, 126, 337
564 Duval, Dominique, 374
Chalub, Fabricio, 453
Eldridge-Smith, Peter, 301
Chandler, Jerry, 489
Emelyanov, Dmitry, 231
Charasse, Cécile, 115
Erdenk, Emre Arda, 522
Chatterjee, Amita, 563
Esbelin, Henri-Alex, 3, 19, 41
Chatti, Saloua, 171, 355
Essert, Mario, 458
Chevalier, Jean-Marie, 257
Esteves, Luı́s Gustavo, 319
Chiffi, Daniele, 262
Estrada-González, Luis, 4
Chlebowski, Szymon, 197
Cholodovskis, Ana, 441 Fähndrich, Johannes, 514
Chybińska, Alicja, 272 Farid, Zidani, 382
Citkin, Alex, 19, 37 Farjami, Ali, 108
Ciucci, Davide, 4 Ficara, Elena, 19, 44, 295, 349
Cloutier, Anne Brel, 363 Field, Hartry, 128, 488, 559
Coecke, Bob, 124, 362, 398, 399 Figallo-Orellano, Aldo, 538
Coniglio, Marcelo Esteban, 538 Fontaine, Matthieu, 356, 460
Cordes, Moritz, 180 Fouqueré, Christophe, 383
Corsi, Giovanna, 564 França, Hális A.N., 384
Costa, Diana, 305 Friend, Michèle, 5, 494, 559
da Costa, Newton, 5, 561 Fuenmayor, David, 250
Couturat, Louis, 566
Czelakowski, Janusz, 564 Gabbay, Dov, 5
584
Index of Authors
Gaëll, Guibert, 540 Huertas, Antonia, 427

Gangle, Jonathan, 263 Huuskonen, Taneli, 280
Garrido, Angel, 270, 275, 278
Gaultier, Benoit, 257 Indrzejczak, Andrzej, 4, 20, 55,
Gavryluk, Vitalii, 511 282, 564
Gazzari, René, 194 Ipakchi, Sara, 527
Gerogiorgakis, Stamatios, 524 Iqbal, Muhammad, 385
Ghilardi, Silvio, 564 Isaac, Manuel Gustavo, 20, 58,
Ghorfi, Tayeb Abderrahmani, 3 332
Giovagnoli, Raffaela, 214, 217 Ivanyk, Stepan, 272, 283
Giuntini, Roberto, 405, 564 Izbicki, Rafael, 319
Glavan, Paola, 432
Golińska-Pilarek, Joanna, 280 Jäger, Gerhard, 5
Golzio, Ana Claudia, 538 Jansana, Ramon, 537
Goncharov, Sergey, 129, 226 Jardim, Ricardo, 466
Goodey, Christopher, 131 Jarmużek, Tomasz, 358, 476
Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste, 19, 47 Jaspers, Dany, 172
Goy, Alexandre, 541 Jenei, Sándor, 545
Grygiel, Joanna, 281 Jennings, Ray, 562
Guallart, Nino, 473, 543 Joray, Pierre, 20, 61, 474, 566
Guibert, Gaëll, 483
Gyenis, Zalán, 565, 569 Kamer, Vedat, 4, 115, 334
Karczewska, Anna Maria, 289
Haeusler, Edward Hermann, 453 Kassymetova, Maira, 232
Han, Jesse, 375 Kayar, Esma, 528
Hansen, Casper Storm, 19, 50 Kiouvrekis, Yiannis, 233, 235
Hartonas, Takis, 564, 570 Kolman, Vojtěch, 207
Hazen, Allen P., 562, 570 Koslow, Arnold, 5
Hazratpour, Sina, 375 Koueya, Nestor, 3
He, Huacan, 5, 443, 474 Kouri Kissel, Teresa, 252
Healey, Paul M., 526 Kovač, Srećko, 4, 253, 562
Heather, Michael, 212, 553 Krajewski, Stanislaw, 411
Heine, Clemens, 111 Krawczyk, Krzysztof, 358, 476
Heinemann, Anna-Sophie, 179 Kritz, Maurı́cio Vieira, 495
van der Helm, Alfred, 184 Krömer, Ralf, 133, 362
Hjortland, Ole Thomassen, 132, Kulikauskas, Andrius Jonas, 208,
249 364, 468
Hlobil, Ulf, 195 Kulpeshov, Beibut Sh., 236
Hosni, Hykel, 564 Kumova, Bora, 444
Hudry, Jean-Louis, 20, 52 Kuzmanović, Ivana, 458
585
Kvernenes, Hans Christian Maksimova, Larisa L., 248

Nordtveit, 381, 386 Malinowski, Grzegorz, 138, 270,
271, 559
Lachance, Geneviève, 529 Malinowski, Jacek, 565
Lacroix, Sébastien, 387 Manzano, Marı́a, 413, 427
Lampert, Timm, 512 Marcade, Erik, 325
Lando, Tamar, 428 Marcelino, Sérgio, 415, 416
Lapointe, Sandra, 562 Mariano, Hugo Luiz, 108, 109,
Lappalainen, Jonna, 219 371, 372, 376, 537
Lavelle, Sylvain, 496 Marinković, Bojan, 432
Lefever, Koen, 477 Markovich, Réka, 390
Legris, Javier, 186 Marmo, Tony, 417
Leitsch, Alexander, 134, 192 Marquis, Jean-Pierre, 562
Lemanski, Jens, 174
Martin, Ben, 254, 302
Lepage, François, 446, 562
Martin, John, 533
Leszczyńska-Jasion, Dorota, 197,
Martı́nez-Ordaz, Marı́a del
284
Rosario, 139, 296
Lézé, Samuel, 350
Martins, Manuel A., 305, 413
Li, Yu, 530
Matilal, Bimal Krishna, 564
Lind, Douglas, 389
Max, Ingolf, 204, 211
Linnebo, Øystein, 4
Mayer, Andreas, 350
Linsbichler, Alexander, 187
McConaughey, Zoe, 359
Lion, Clément, 551
McCurdy, William James, 20, 70,
Lisanyuk, Elena, 135, 460, 563
265
Lobovikov, Vladimir, 430
McGoveran, David, 142, 322
Lojkić, Goran, 478
Melo, Ederson Safra, 297
Lorenzi, Giulia, 210
Mendes, Caio de Andrade, 376
Lorini, Emiliano, 20, 64
Méndez, José M., 447
Lovsted, Daniel, 189
Lowe, Robert, 214, 220 Miginiac, Séverine, 3
Lubomirsky, Noemı́, 546 Milkov, Nikolay, 499
Lukowski, Piotr, 498 Miller, David, 143, 311, 392
Lutsak, Svetlana, 237 Minari, Pierluigi, 564
Lyczak, Marcin, 431 Mion, Giovanni, 20, 74, 92, 360
Miotti, Giulia, 552
Macbeth, Danielle, 137, 257 Mohamadi, Hesam, 394
MacCaull, Wendy, 562 Moktefi, Amirouche, 145, 170,
MacPherson, Brian, 531 179
Madelaine, Florent, 20, 66 Moore, Douglas, 399
Magnani, Lorenzo, 221 More, Malika, 20, 66
Makinson, David, 138, 439 Moreno, Manuel C., 413, 427
586
Index of Authors
Moriconi, Enrico, 198 Pavlyuk, Inessa, 242

Mruczek-Nasieniewska, Krystyna, Peckhaus, Volker, 149
433, 450 Pelletier, Francis Jeffry, 562, 570
Mueller-Theys, Joachim, 316 Perdrix, Simon, 151, 398
Mugnier, Marie-Laure, 20, 76 Peretyat’kin, Mikhail G., 239
Murai, Tetsuya, 448 Perkov, Tin, 563, 571
Muravitsky, Alexei, 20, 37, 547 Pessoa, Osvaldo, 561
Murawski, Roman, 285, 565 Petrukhin, Yaroslav, 563, 573
Peybernès, Hélène, 3
Nakayama, Yotaro, 448 Piecha, Thomas, 192
Nasieniewski, Marek, 433, 450, Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko, 152,
564 262, 266, 355, 559
Natarajan, Raja, 4, 479, 563 Pietruszczak, Andrzej, 4, 433, 564
Ndoj, Albert, 3 Pinto, Darllan Conceição, 371,
Németi, István, 5 372, 537
Nepomuceno-Fernández, Ángel, Pinus, Aleksandr, 240
439, 543 Plagnol, Arnaud, 335
Nikitchenko, Mykola, 17, 20, 79, Poggiolesi, Francesca, 153, 192,
511, 513 566
Nitulescu, Anca, 109 Poizat, Bruno, 154, 226, 566
Noll, Thomas, 146, 204 Polacik, Tomasz, 565
Nourani, Cyrus F., 514 Porwolik, Marek, 286
Nowak, Marek, 418 Prade, Henri, 20, 81
Nunes, Fernando Lucatelli, 361, Pratt, Scott L., 156, 343
366 Priest, Graham, 158, 296, 339
Pshenichny, Cyril, 330
Ochs, Eduardo, 361, 549 Ptakhov, Denis, 240
Ognjanović, Zoran, 432
Olsen, Elizabeth, 500 Quatrini, Myriam, 383
D’Ottaviano, Itala, 561 Queiroz, Giovanni, 550
Paoletti, Patrizio, 488 Rabe, Florian, 21, 84

Paoli, Francesco, 5 Raclavský, Jiřı́, 482
Parent, Xavier, 108 Rademaker, Alexandre, 453
Parikh, Rohit, 111, 147, 337, 451, Rahman,Shahid, 381
506, 563 Randriamahaleo, Solo, 107
Pascu, Anca Christine, 480 Rawleigh, William, 504
Paseau, Alexander, 149, 407 Renardel de Lavalette, Gerard
Pataut, Fabrice, 502 R., 200
Patomäki, Joel, 222 Rey, Christophe, 3, 115, 326, 565
Pavlov, Sergey, 481 Reznikov, Vladimir, 317
587
Rifo, Laura, 367 Śleziński, Krzysztof, 554

Robert, Serge, 435 Smessaert, Hans, 169
Roberto, Kaique Matias de Smokrović, Nenad, 562
Andrade, 109 Sodaigui, Cyril, 3
Robles, Gemma, 447, 455 Sorensen, Roy, 160, 296
Rodin, Andrei, 516 Sormani, Philippe, 353
Rodrigues, Abı́lio, 318, 561 Sosa, Carlos Mario Márquez , 327
Rodrigues, Cassiano Terra, 268 Stambaugh, Todd, 506
Rohr, Tabea, 190 Starikova, Irina, 555
de Ronde, Christian, 4 Stefaneas, Petros, 4, 226, 230,
Rosental, Claude, 342, 351 233, 235
Rossiter, Nick, 212, 553 Stepanova, Alena, 240
Rousset, Marie-Christine, 21, 85 Stern, Rafael Bassi, 319
Roussey, Catherine, 3 Stodder, David, 328
Rupik, Gregory, 352 Straßburger, Lutz, 202, 484
Sudoplatov, Sergey, 226, 231,
Salguero, Francisco, 439 233, 235, 242
Sallantin, Jean, 107 Sundholm, Göran, 161, 333, 559
Salto, Francisco, 447 Surowik, Dariusz, 287
Salva, Sébastien, 3 Świȩtorzecka, Kordula, 162, 271,
Samuel1, John, 326 507
Sankappanavar, Székely, Gergely, 477
Hanamantagouda P., 563 Tarski, Alfred, 565
Satoh, Ken, 163 Therrien, Valérie Lynn, 288
Sauzay, Benoı̂t, 483, 540 Thomas, Jolly, 340, 564, 574
Schang, Fabien, 176, 249, 419 Thomsen, Erik, 21, 74, 92, 321,
Schlaudt, Oliver, 21, 87 329
Schlimm, Dirk, 158 Tinchev, Tinko, 436, 437
Schmid, Anne-Françoise, 159, 521 Tkaczyk, Marcin, 289
Schotch, Peter K., 562 Toffano, Zeno, 401
Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 192, 559 Tohmé, Fernando, 461
Schwarz, Eva, 219 Tomasik, Jerzy, 21, 95
Sergioli, Giuseppe, 405 van der Torre, Leon, 163, 460,
Shkilniak, Stepan, 513 559
Shulga, Elena, 505 Toumani, Farouk, 3, 115
Šikić, Zvonimir, 562 Traczykowski, Dominik, 272
da Silva, Eleonoura, 550 Trafford, James, 249
da Silva, Enoaldo, 550 Trybus, Adam, 306
da Silva, Samuel G., 372 Tsai, Hsing-chien, 486
Silvestre, Ricardo, 21, 89, 336 Tull, Sean, 403
588
Index of Authors
Tussupov, Jamalbek A., 243 Wolski, Marcin, 292

Wolter, Uwe, 330, 518
Uijlen, Sander, 164, 398
Woods, John, 562
Ulbrikht, Olga, 244
Wybraniec-Skardowska, Urszula,
Urbaniak, Rafal, 290, 395
270
Urchs, Max, 308, 397
Urken, Gulzhan, 246
Urquhart, Alasdair, 562 Yeshkeyev, Aibat, 232, 244, 246
Yi, Byeong-uk, 534
Valde, Katherine, 309 Yon, Loı̈c, 3
Vandoulakis, Ioannis, 17, 21, 97 Young, Walter Edward, 166, 381
Varzinczak, Ivan, 560, 566, 575 Yun, Veta F., 248
Vasiliev, Nicolai Alexandrovich, Yuste, Piedad, 293
563
Vasyukov, Vladimir L., 5, 421 Zamansky, Anna, 167, 439
Venkatrama, Ranjith, 405 Žarnić, Berislav, 563
Verbovskiy, Viktor, 247 Żegleń, Urszula M., 294
Verdée, Peter, 456 Zenker, Frank, 21, 103, 463
Vernant, Denis, 508 Zhang, Jincheng, 457
Vibrentis, Francisco Antonio, 377 Zhao, Chuan, 4
Vitiello, Giuseppe, 215 Zhou, JianMing, 530
Vuković, Mladen, 563
Zhou, Xunwei, 21, 106
Vulcan, Ruxandra Irina, 533
Zhou, Yanquan, 443, 457, 474
Wansing, Heinrich, 5 Žilić, Tihomir, 458
Wellen, Felix, 379 Zollo, Fabiana, 223
Wenz, Daniel, 177 Zolyan, Suren, 224
Wójtowicz, Krzysztof, 517, 556 Zou, Shunpeng, 470
Woleński, Jan, 165, 271, 291, 422, Zou, Xiaohui, 470
509 Zuluaga, William, 379
589

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Handbook of the

6th World Congress and School

June 16–26, 2018

Vichy University Campus

1 Organizing, International Organizing

2 What is Universal Logic? 7

3 Aim of the event 9

4 Call for papers 11

II 6th World School on Universal Logic 13

5 Aim of the School 15

6 ¿Why Study Logic? 17

7 Speakers of the 6th World School on Universal Logic 19

Lindenbaum Method, by Alex Citkin & Alexei Muravitsky . . . . . 37

9 Poster Session for Students 107

Faithful Semantical Embedding of Dyadic Deontic Logic E

10 ¿Why, what, when, where and how to publish? 111

III 6th World Congress on Universal Logic 113

11 Opening Ceremony of the 6th World Congress

12 Secret Speaker 117

13 Talks of Keynote Speakers 119

Importance of distinction of levels in a logical discourse:

General principles for the design of logical notations,

Truth-tables and Tautologies in Early Logical Empiricism:

Rituals as “Social Habits”, by Raffaela Giovagnoli . . . . . . . 217

Lattices of bounded based subvarieties of discriminator

Methodological peculiarities of the Lvov-Warsaw School,

(De)motivating Gluts, by Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Singular reference, dynamic thoughts and spatial

Learning Logic in a Department of Philosophy:

Interchangeable formulas and categories of logics,

A Categorical Reconstruction of Quantum Theory,

Intensional: what it is about?, by Antonia Huertas,

On a correspondence of positive and negative modalities

The generalized probability theory and intelligent

The Analytic and the Synthetic. From Homology

Logic Functions in the Philosophy of Al-Farabi,

Finite Strong Standard Completeness of IUL plus t ⇔ f,

16 Contest Logic Prizes 559

Talks of Contest Logic Prizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 566

IV Publishers, Sponsors and Partners 577

17 Book Exhibition 579

18 Sponsors and Partners 581

Index of Authors 583

 Christophe Rey (Co-Chair), LIMOS* -CNRS , Université Clermont-

 Farouk Toumani, Director of LIMOS-CNRS, Université Clermont-

 Olivier Cavagna, Vice-Director of Vichy Communauty, France

 Geneviève Chervy, Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France

 Stéphanie Lavigne-Masson, Technical Manager, Vichy Communauty,

 Hélène Peybernès, ex-Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France

 Béatrice Bourdieu, Séverine Miginiac, Sébastien Salva, Bruno Bachelet,

 Marie Bornard, Cyril Sodaigui, Yanis Ayari, IUT d’Allier , Université

 Catherine Roussey, Stephan Bernard, Tayeb Abderrahmani Ghorfi, TSCF

 Arthur Buchsbaum (Editor of the Handbook), Federal University of

International Organizing Committee

 Srećko Kovač, Philosophy Institute, Zagreb, Croatia

 Raja Natarajan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai,

 Luis Estrada-González, National Autonomous University of Mexico

 Patrick Blackburn, Roskilde University, Denmark

 Andrzej Pietruszczak, Copernic University, Torun, Poland

 Øystein Linnebo, Oslo University, Norway

Christophe Rey (Co-Chair), LIMOS* -CNRS , Université Clermont-

Farouk Toumani, Director of LIMOS-CNRS, Université Clermont-

Olivier Cavagna, Vice-Director of Vichy Communauty, France

Geneviève Chervy, Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France

Stéphanie Lavigne-Masson, Technical Manager, Vichy Communauty,

Hélène Peybernès, ex-Vice-Director of Vichy University Centre, France

Béatrice Bourdieu, Séverine Miginiac, Sébastien Salva, Bruno Bachelet,

Marie Bornard, Cyril Sodaigui, Yanis Ayari, IUT d’Allier , Université

Catherine Roussey, Stephan Bernard, Tayeb Abderrahmani Ghorfi, TSCF

Arthur Buchsbaum (Editor of the Handbook), Federal University of

Srećko Kovač, Philosophy Institute, Zagreb, Croatia

Raja Natarajan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai,

Luis Estrada-González, National Autonomous University of Mexico

Patrick Blackburn, Roskilde University, Denmark

Andrzej Pietruszczak, Copernic University, Torun, Poland

Øystein Linnebo, Oslo University, Norway

Musa Akrami, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

Mihir K. Chakraborty, Kolkata Logic Circle, India

Abduljaleel Kadhim Alwali, United Arab Emirates University, United

Andrzej Indrzejczak, University of Lódź, Poland

Francisco Dionı́sio, University of Lisbon, Portugal

Christian de Ronde, CONICET* , University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Jean Paul Van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium

Davide Ciucci, University of Milan, Italy

Petros Stefaneas, Technical University of Athens, Greece

Chuan Zhao, Chengdu University of Technology, China

Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Ross Brady, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia

Carlos Caleiro, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, Portugal

Walter Carnielli, State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil

Newton da Costa, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Florianópolis,

Michael Dunn, School of Informatics, Indiana, USA

Michèle Friend, George Washington University, USA

Dov Gabbay, King’s College, London, UK

Huacan He, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China

Gerhard Jäger, University of Bern, Switzerland

Arnold Koslow, City University of New York, USA

István Németi, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

Francesco Paoli, University of Cagliari, Italy

Vladimir L. Vasyukov, Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences,

Heinrich Wansing, Bochum University, Germany

Franca D’Agostini, Polytechnical University of Turin, Italy

Mykola Nikitchenko, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,

Julio Michael Stern, University of São Paulo, Brazil

Ioannis Vandoulakis, Hellenic Open University, Greece

Henri-Alex Esbelin, LIMO , Clermont-Auvergne University, France

Florent Madelaine, GREYC , University of Caen, France

Erik Thomsen, CTO at Blender Logic, Cambridge, Mass, USA