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chapter three

Power and Authority in Morocco

Haim Malka

In December 1990 tens of thousands of Moroccans filled the

streets of Fes and smaller cities across the country.1 Organised
protests quickly turned to riots. The rioters were mostly young,
many of them unemployed university graduates, frustrated by
socio-economic hardship, lack of opportunity and poor job
prospects.2 King Hassan II responded forcefully at first. In the
ensuing violence, security forces killed more than 30 people and
arrested more than 200 in Fes alone.3 But Hassan II’s response
evolved. In the following years, he acknowledged mounting
public calls for greater political, civil and economic rights
and launched a series of managed political and constitutional
reforms.4 The Fes riots were not the first time that Moroccans
had taken to the streets in protest. But it was the first time that
protests led to such direct constitutional changes.
Almost exactly two decades after those riots, in February
2011, tens of thousands of Moroccans took to the streets again
in 53 cities across the country. The protesters called to amend
the constitution, limit the king’s powers and end corruption.
They also called for justice and dignity. Their message was
clear: they wanted change. Most of the protesters had come of
60 | North Africa in Transition

age at a time when mass media and information were chang-

ing the way people throughout the region thought about their
rights as citizens. After seeing the power of popular demon-
strations to change regimes in Egypt and Tunisia only weeks
earlier, many Moroccans were hopeful and fearless. Except for
several isolated incidents, security forces allowed protesters
to march peacefully with little interference.5 King Mohammed
VI, who had ruled for over a decade since the death of his
father Hassan II in 1999, responded quickly. Seventeen days
after the first protests, he addressed the nation on television,
promising ‘comprehensive constitutional reform’ and a ‘new
charter between the throne and the people’.6 The most signifi-
cant constitutional reforms included a mandate that the prime
minister would be chosen from the largest political party, and
Morocco’s indigenous Amazigh language would be estab-
lished as an official language alongside Arabic.
The king’s response stabilised a volatile situation at a time
when regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were crumbling. His
actions followed a pattern by Morocco’s monarchy of adapting
to public pressure in order to maintain stability and survive.
While the monarchy uses coercive mechanisms and co-opts
elites, similar to other regimes, its most powerful tool in the
past two decades has been managing a process of gradual polit-
ical reform. The reforms have attempted to satisfy just enough
public discontent while maintaining a monopoly of executive
power in religious, political, diplomatic and security affairs.
Although Mohammed VI’s response to popular uprisings
in 2011 has mostly succeeded, it has revived a persistent ques-
tion of whether gradual, palace-driven reforms from above can
produce tangible institutional change in how power is shared
and exercised. For Moroccans eager to see their country change,
the process appears to be endless. What will Moroccans call for
in one, five or ten years from now?
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 61

The challenge is that the reforms carried out may – if they

are successful – only partially address the frustrations under-
pinning protests since the 1990s. While the king’s response to
popular uprisings has focused on constitutional and parlia-
mentary reforms, core public grievances, especially among
young people, centre on an unequal system characterised by
corruption, favouritism and lack of opportunity. What many
young Moroccans want – dignity and justice – are intangible
and difficult to measure, let alone deliver. But without address-
ing these popular demands, the future will remain turbulent.

The nature of authority and power

Once a year, for the past several centuries, Morocco’s notable
family heads, senior civil servants and tribal representatives
gather in one of the king’s palaces. Assembled in neat rows and
wearing traditional clothes, they wait for the monarch to emerge.
Once he appears, each row of men bows and shouts an oath of
allegiance (ba’ya) to the king. The annual ceremony reinforces
the king’s authority as the foundation of the Moroccan state and
nation. That authority is based on both secular political rule,
and his religious authority, as a descendant of the Prophet and
his title of commander of the faithful (amir al-mu’minin).
For centuries, however, Morocco’s kings or sultans faced
opposition and have struggled to enforce that authority. Before
independence in 1956, the struggle depended on the sultan’s
ability to collect taxes and raise armies from quasi-independent
tribes in the hinterland.7 Many tribes resisted, but even those
that refused to pay and rejected the sultan’s political authority
still maintained contact with the sultan and acknowledged his
religious lineage as a descendant of the Prophet.8 Even if they
resented his powers and violently resisted him at times, they
did not question the monarchy as an institution. The debate,
instead, was over the monarchy’s appropriate political powers.
62 | North Africa in Transition

Today, the debate concerns the king’s executive author-

ity, the division of power between the monarchy and elected
representatives in government and parliament, and the king’s
relationship with the Moroccan people.9

The monarchy’s support base

The king can mobilise a range of support bases to promote his
agenda, most importantly loyal political parties, business elites,
civil-society groups, security services and religious institutions.
For example, on the Friday prior to the 2011 constitutional
referendum, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs reportedly issued
instructions for imams to urge their congregants to vote, on
religious grounds, in favour of the referendum. The king indi-
rectly influences the editorial content of broadcast media by
appointing the heads of all public radio and television stations.
He can also direct economic resources to large-scale public initi-
atives, such as the National Initiative for Human Development
(INDH) aimed at reducing poverty and the National Human
Rights Council, created to support his reform agenda.
The security services and police are also an important tool,
as they are in any system. During Hassan II’s reign, known as
the ‘years of lead’, the king used widespread force to intimi-
date and repress political opposition. Mohammed VI took
a different approach when he ascended the throne, dismiss-
ing security chiefs and launching a process to publicise past
abuses. However, following the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
which killed 33 people, the security forces arrested between
2,000 and 5,000 people. Despite some improvements to the
criminal justice system, allegations of torture in prisons and
unfair or politically motivated trials persist. Regime opponents
who cross unspoken red lines often find themselves in court
on trumped-up charges that lead to jail or hefty fines. Unlike
in many countries, however, in Morocco local and interna-
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 63

tional organisations routinely document and publicise these

complaints.
One of the monarchy’s most important support bases is the
circle of the ruling elite, referred to as the makhzen. It extends
throughout the country from the palace’s inner circle of advis-
ers to regional governors and local officials appointed by the
king. Through the makhzen the king and his royal advisers set
political agendas and influence debates through pro-palace
party elites, parliamentary committees, state-controlled media,
security services and business allies.

Managed reform
The king’s response to demands for change in 2011 was swift,
making full use of his sources of influence. In the days after
his 9 March speech he called for new elections, released nearly
200 prisoners arrested after the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
and appointed a committee to draft a series of constitutional
amendments.10 It was the most sweeping set of political changes
of his rule.
A hastily arranged constitutional referendum was passed in
July 2012, followed by parliamentary elections in November.11
The king appointed Abdelilah Benkirane, head of Morocco’s
Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), to form the new
government, after his party won the largest share of votes.12
It was not the first time the king had appointed an opposition
party to lead,13 but it was the first Islamist one in Morocco’s
history. What also made this case different was that, under the
new constitution, Mohammed VI was now obligated to allow
the PJD to form the new government; he could no longer use an
ill-defined executive authority to name someone.
Morocco’s 2011 constitution built on Mohammed VI’s earlier
reforms that centred on improving women’s rights and inves-
tigated past regime abuses. These efforts further supported
64 | North Africa in Transition

the monarchy’s democratisation and human rights agenda.14

During this period, public debate and political space expanded
on a range of sensitive subjects in unprecedented ways. A 2008
initiative on regionalisation also sought to empower local and
regional governments, which remains an ongoing effort.
The country’s reform process has combined progress on
human rights and representative governance with traditional
ways of exerting authority, including occasionally coercion,
silencing dissent and using elite groups to promote the monar-
chy’s decisions and agenda.15 This strategy has been in part
to enlist as many constituencies as possible to participate in
the process. Unlike regimes in other parts of the region, which
provide little or no space for political activism, Morocco’s
monarchy recognises the importance of sharing political
space within boundaries, including with Islamist movements.
By giving different segments of the population a stake in the
process, the monarchy has been able to build a broad consen-
sus for its gradual reforms and legitimise its actions.
Despite its limits, Morocco’s reform process has generated
robust public debate about the separation of powers. From this
perspective, Morocco’s reform process does not have a finish
line by design. The monarchy reacts and adjusts to pressure
when necessary in order to maintain equilibrium and preserve
its powers.

Pressure points
Since independence in 1956, the monarchy’s authority has
steadily grown. Nevertheless, it is not immune to political pres-
sure from opposition parties, powerful families, trade unions,
civil society, independent media and grassroots activists. It
constantly assesses public sentiment in order to accommodate
these constituencies in different ways. The king has been able
to manage these different groups and maintain stability in part
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 65

because they have different demands and objectives, which the

monarchy can respond to with different tools and policies.
Political opposition has traditionally emerged from three
broad sources: political parties, which work through parlia-
mentary politics; non-parliamentary Islamists; and civil-society
or grassroots organisations. Morocco boasts over 30 political
parties, most of which support the status quo. Some parties,
such as the PJD, seek to slowly rebalance power from the
monarchy to elected representatives. Very few want to radi-
cally alter the political and economic status quo by limiting the
king’s executive powers. Morocco also has a diverse and active
civil society that advocates issue-specific policies, which often
push the limits of public debate on nearly every issue facing
the country. At times, these broad constituencies for reform
overlap and share similar objectives.

Opposition within limits

By the 1990s most of Morocco’s parties largely accepted the
king’s dominant role in Moroccan politics and decision-
making. They either worked to promote the palace’s agenda
or posed no serious challenge to monarchical rule. The king
successfully co-opted the Istiqlal Party, which led Morocco’s
independence movement, and later the Socialist Union of
Popular Forces (USFP), which headed the government from
1997–2002. Both political threats were neutralised by giving
them a stake in the parliamentary system, along with the pres-
tige of heading the government, even with constrained powers.
Only a handful of small leftist parties continue to call for a
parliamentary monarchy in which the king’s powers would be
tightly constrained.
The PJD has been the greatest source of parliamentary oppo-
sition in the past decade. Whereas most political parties are
ideologically indistinguishable from one another, the PJD is
66 | North Africa in Transition

well organised, disciplined, has a clear conservative ideological

agenda and, most importantly, has a vision for Morocco, which
it calls the ‘third way’. Rather than advocating revolutionary
change or the status quo, the PJD sees slow, deliberate reform
as the most effective strategy to shift the balance of power in
favour of parliament and elected government, and away from
the palace. This strategy involves three main phases. Firstly,
political parties focus on modest social and economic changes.
Next, the government and parliament work toward strength-
ening national institutions and improving accountability and
transparency. In the final phase, the balance of power between
the monarchy and elected government will shift in the govern-
ment’s favour.16 While the PJD sees a role for the monarchy in
Morocco’s future, it is a monarchy vested with a more symbolic
role rather than wielding executive authority in policymaking.
For the moment the palace has neutralised the PJD as an
immediate threat. It allowed the PJD to form a political party
and compete in the 1997 parliamentary elections at a time
when Islamists in neighbouring countries were denied entry
into formal politics.17 Unlike other Moroccan Islamists, most
importantly the al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) move-
ment, the PJD accepts the king’s religious role as commander
of the faithful and the importance of the monarchy as a unify-
ing national institution. Integrating the PJD in the 1990s not
only broadened the political space and competition, but also
prevented religion from becoming a source of political opposi-
tion and conflict as it was in neighbouring countries. Moreover,
it more clearly divided Islamists between those who accept
monarchical rule and those who reject it. This distinction is the
dividing line between political participation and exclusion.
The PJD election victory in 2011 cemented the palace’s
co-optation of the movement by allowing the party to head the
government and carry the burden that came with it. The PJD
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 67

went from an opposition party that challenged the government

to condemning the February 20 demonstrators and defending
the king in numerous venues. In doing so, the party hoped
to demonstrate its support for the monarchy and silence any
uncertainty about its loyalty. Given that the king sets the pace
of reform, the party’s strategy now depends on cooperation
with the palace.
By heading a government with monarchical oversight,
the PJD has become a convenient scapegoat for unpopular
yet necessary economic policies such as subsidy and pension
reform, which it has carefully started to implement as part of
its commitments to the IMF. The PJD campaigned on promises
of ending corruption, improving government transparency
and services, and boosting economic growth and job creation.
It has struggled at times, however, in part because it does not
have the authority to shape government policies, which are
set by the royal court. Early efforts to legislate media reforms,
such as limiting alcohol advertisements and including the call
to prayer on public broadcasting, sparked a backlash from
pro-palace parties and the elite. Plans to investigate corruption
have also been stonewalled. Despite these setbacks, the PJD
overcame a coalition crisis in 2013 and remains popular as an
authentic party that resonates with many people. It performed
well in the September 2015 municipal and regional elections,
especially in urban areas, where it demonstrated solid middle-
class support. Its future role and success, however, will depend
not only on whether it can meet the expectations of its voters
and demonstrate progress on its core issues, but also on its
ongoing accommodation with the palace.

Non-parliamentary Islamists
Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, a popular grassroots Islamic movement that
rejects the king’s political and religious authority (and there-
68 | North Africa in Transition

fore does not participate in parliamentary politics), remains

a long-term challenge to the monarchy. Because it does not
compete in elections, it is difficult to gauge the movement’s
size and popularity, but it is widely believed to be one of the
largest social-political movements in the country. Al-adl wal-
Ihsan rejects violence as a strategy, but has a revolutionary
vision for a new political and social order in Morocco without
the monarchy. After the death in 2012 of its charismatic leader,
Abdessalam Yassine, the movement debated whether to enter
formal politics. For the moment, it has rejected the Moroccan
political system and is not likely to pose a direct challenge.
Instead, al-Adl wal-Ihsan will probably continue building
grassroots support for its anti-monarchy message.
Salafists are also active and increasingly visible in Morocco.18
After cracking down on them following deadly bombings in
Casablanca in 2003, the king began pardoning leading Salafist
sheikhs in 2011–12. This strategy allows greater space for
Salafists, as long as they demonstrate loyalty to the monar-
chy, and it further divides the Islamist opposition. One sheikh,
Mohammed Fizazi, for example, who had been sentenced to
30 years in prison for his links to the Casablanca bombings,
declared his support for the monarchy after his release.19
Whether Salafist preachers remain apolitical or not, non-violent
Salafists are likely to remain part of Morocco’s future religious
and social landscape.

New coalitions
The 2011 uprisings created new and diverse coalitions
demanding fundamental and immediate change. In 2011, for
example, the February 20 movement emerged when young
activists, inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, called for a
day of action and protest. Unlike previous efforts to rally young
activists through social media, on that Sunday in February
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 69

tens of thousands gathered in cities across Morocco. Many

of the organisers came from middle-class backgrounds, and
some had experience working for civil-society organisations.
Crucially, the February 20 movement tapped into a growing
phenomenon of online activism by previously disengaged
young people, which focused on specific causes, such as police
brutality and economic inequality.
February 20’s initial strength came from its success in uniting
both secular and Islamist activists. The youth wing of al-Adl
wal-Ihsan joined the movement in its first year. Overall, more
than 40 civil-society groups, including several political parties,
joined the broad coalition. This included some of Morocco’s
established non-governmental organisations, such as the
Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), al-Adl wal-
Ihsan and extreme leftist political parties, including the Unified
Socialist Party (PSU) and Anahj Democrati (Democratic Way).
While a core group of young activists had launched the move-
ment, it remained largely decentralised, with no clear national
leadership structure.
The February 20 protesters initially laid out seven broad
demands, which fell into two categories.20 The first focused
on power and authority. These demands called for: an elected
constitutional committee that would draft a new constitution
to enshrine popular sovereignty and place limits on the king’s
authority; the dismissal of parliament and the government; the
creation of an independent judiciary; and the release of politi-
cal prisoners. The second category called for socio-economic
justice, equality and an end to corruption. February 20 also
demanded that Amazigh be recognised as an official language
along with Arabic. Ultimately, what Moroccans called for
during those early protests of 2011 was a system in which the
monarchy’s political and economic power would be substan-
tially diminished to a more symbolic role enshrined in law.
70 | North Africa in Transition

The limits of reform

Morocco’s reforms have helped advance the debate on a range
of issues and genuinely increased citizen participation, but
they have not fundamentally altered the balance or separa-
tion of powers. More importantly, constitutional reforms only
address part of Morocco’s problems: namely, demands for
greater political representation and participation. The reforms
fail to address the favouritism, corruption and lack of oppor-
tunity that have created a marginalised and unemployed
youth population with little chance of advancement. Without
addressing these critical issues, popular protests will continue
to threaten Morocco’s stability.
Part of the challenge is that these problems are deeply
ingrained in Morocco’s social, economic and political struc-
ture. Although nearly all of the country’s macroeconomic and
human development indicators have improved over the last
several decades, the numbers skew endemic and worsening
problems, such as a growing income gap between rural and
urban areas, poor public education and youth unemployment
close to 30%. Access to healthcare remains unequal, especially
between rural and urban areas, and between wealthy and
poor populations.21 Morocco is diversifying its economy away
from overdependence on the agricultural sector, but greater
economic growth has not translated into more jobs, and higher
education does not necessarily help.
The king acknowledged these deep challenges in a speech
marking Morocco’s Throne Day in August 2013. In the speech,
the king asked, ‘Why is it that so many of our young people
cannot fulfil their legitimate professional, material, and social
aspirations?’22 The speech bluntly acknowledged Morocco’s
deficiencies, especially its poor education system, but did not
present a strategy to address them.23 The following year the king
marked the 15th anniversary of his rule with another speech
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 71

that addressed social injustice and the income gap. He cited

World Bank studies that indicated growing income and wealth
in Morocco and asked: ‘Where is this wealth? Has it benefited
all Moroccans or only some segments of society?’24 Speeches
addressing these sensitive questions display confidence but
also require a delicate balance. They seek to acknowledge and
champion widespread problems, while also distancing the
monarchy from culpability. However, they could also draw
greater scrutiny of the monarchy’s role in overseeing a system
that perpetuates these challenges if such questions remain
unanswered.
Unlike its neighbour Algeria or the Gulf Arab monarchies,
Morocco does not have the financial resources to buy political
stability by providing public-sector jobs or large-scale spend-
ing projects. Following the protests in 2011, the government
raised civil-servant wages and almost tripled the stabilisation
fund, which keeps the prices of consumer staple goods down.
But subsidies, especially for fuel and basic commodities, carry
a significant financial burden on state revenues, and Morocco
has searched for practical ways to direct subsidies more effec-
tively to the population that is most in need.
Moreover, given that the monarchy’s power depends in part
on its large elite patronage network, any attempt to redistribute
wealth would meet fierce opposition from the monarchy’s key
support base. Morocco’s elite system is similar to other soci-
eties where wealthy families dominate economic activity and
pass wealth and privilege to their children. What is different
in Morocco’s case is the vestige of a feudal class system, which
often impedes social mobility. Hard work and education are not
enough to secure a job, let alone greater prosperity and financial
security. Without connections and favours from powerbrokers,
it is difficult to gain entry into prestigious schools, secure credit
and business loans or enter the civil service.
72 | North Africa in Transition

Serious reforms would also have to systematically address

Morocco’s corruption, which limits the country’s economic
potential. In 2013, Transparency International ranked Morocco
97th out of 177 countries on its global corruption perception
index and gave it a score of 37 out of 100.25 Morocco suffers from
two types of corruption: low-level transactional corruption,
to secure administrative favours for basic services, including
medical treatment, and larger-scale corruption based on secur-
ing public procurement contracts.
There are limits to how much power the monarchy is willing
to devolve in order to preserve and protect its status. It is
unclear how much more authority the monarchy will devolve
to parliament in the future. What is clear is that the king’s
role as commander of the faithful is a non-negotiable founda-
tion of the monarchy. Mohammed VI has redoubled efforts to
define and shape Moroccan religious identity, by implement-
ing a number of reforms in the religious sphere, intended to
strengthen his religious leadership, and promote Islamic values
that are tolerant and respect authority.26 His March 2011 speech
and the revised constitution make it clear that his religious role
is ‘sacred’ and an ‘immutable value’, and his public speeches
since then have continued to stress the importance of this.

The next wave?

The king’s constitutional reform strategy in 2011 successfully
outmanoeuvred and split the organised opposition, which had
previously cooperated despite different agendas and objec-
tives. Some of the protesters were satisfied with the modest
reforms, while leftist activists continued calling for a parlia-
mentary monarchy where the king’s powers would be largely
symbolic. Others, led by al-Adl wal-Ihsan, rejected the idea of
the monarchy altogether and opposed any accommodation.
By the close of 2011 al-Adl wal-Ihsan had ceased its coopera-
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 73

tion with February 20, breaking the coalition between Islamists

and secularists and ending the unified opposition – one of
the biggest threats to the monarchy. Violence and uncertainty
were growing in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria, and many
Moroccans preferred the stability of the status quo to uncer-
tainty. Protests continued, but were smaller in numbers, and
the police increasingly used force against demonstrators. In
2014, a few hundred people gathered to commemorate the
third anniversary of the February 20 movement, rather than
the tens of thousands who had assembled before.
But dissent in Morocco continues; protests over a range
of local issues are routine across the country. The immedi-
ate threat has been neutralised but not eliminated. Crucially,
Morocco’s grassroots opposition is more willing to openly crit-
icise the king in new ways.
The post-February 20 opposition is being driven largely by
outspoken journalists, artists, and activists who are committed
to continuing a public debate over the king’s powers. Many of
the taboos have been broken, and many of these activists are
pushing the limits. A young rap musician and activist known
as al-Haqed (the enraged or indignant) was the public face of
individual protest in 2013–14. His lyrics take aim at the security
forces and monarchy, accusing them of corruption and support-
ing injustice.27 The authorities have used the justice system to
harass and punish journalists and artists who are critical of the
monarchy. However, rather than silencing dissent, the authori-
ties are attracting more attention to these activists and their
message.
Other issue-specific protests and calls to action continue. In
early August 2013, thousands of Moroccans protested after the
king pardoned a Spanish citizen in jail for committing heinous
crimes against children.28 The royal cabinet issued a statement
following the protests that the pardon was a mistake. A few
74 | North Africa in Transition

days later, the king announced that he had reversed it. This
was the first time the king had responded to a direct call to
reverse an unpopular decision.
It would be shortsighted to view this as an isolated case.
People have seen that public pressure, protest and specific
calls for action can force the monarchy to make changes.
Highly publicised incidents that highlight abuses of power or
disregard for average citizens could potentially unite a broad
cross-section of society, sparking off public protests and criti-
cism. Such incidents would not only be difficult to contain, but
would also make it increasingly difficult for the elected govern-
ment to defend the king’s actions, creating additional tension
between government and monarchy.
The February 20 movement laid the foundation for a diverse
network of organisers, activists and bloggers to build coalitions
demanding change. While they have failed to connect their
cause to broad-based national action, they have succeeded in
keeping alive the debate on executive power.
Moreover, protests over socio-economic issues have become
the norm in Morocco since 2011. One estimate in 2014 suggested
that Morocco witnesses approximately 50 unrelated demon-
strations every day throughout the country.29 The largest
protests, sometimes with up to several thousand people, are
usually made up of unemployed youth and graduates.
So far, opposition groups disagree over ideology, priorities
and objectives. Divisions between secularists and Islamists that
were bridged in early 2011 have deepened again. Protesters’
demands vary; most want jobs and better access to services
such as education, healthcare and housing. Some demand a
parliamentary monarchy where the king has more ceremo-
nial authority. Others, chiefly al-Adl wal-Ihsan, question the
necessity of the monarchy in any form and promote a more
conservative social agenda. As long as these different groups
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 75

fail to coalesce around a coherent and unified set of demands,

the monarchy will retain the upper hand.

Looking forwards
Managing a process of gradual reform has been the monarchy’s
most effective tool in addressing public protest and discontent.
In this sense, the king’s strategy in 2011 stabilised Morocco at
a volatile period and successfully reframed the political debate
to focus on the new constitution and strengthening parliamen-
tary powers. Morocco has made significant strides in many
areas and shown an ongoing commitment to positive change.
What Morocco has failed to do is address broader grievances
concerning dignity and socio-economic justice. Progress in
these areas is more difficult to measure and could take genera-
tions to achieve, even if the political will at the top existed.
The crucial challenge for the monarchy is to avoid discred-
iting the reform process, either by undermining the elected
government, by over-extending the king’s executive authority,
or harassing its critics excessively. Though the reforms of 2011
did not change the balance of power in Morocco, they were an
acknowledgement that there could be limits on the monarchy’s
authority.
Morocco’s record over the last two decades, and since
February 2011, demonstrates that widespread public protest
can spur the monarchy to accelerate reforms and devolve
power. Without addressing deeper issues of inequality,
however, opposition will grow, and a future wave of popular
uprisings could pose new threats. Then the protests of 1990 and
2011 will not be bookends, but chapters in Morocco’s ongoing
reform struggle. The next chapter is unlikely to be the last, and
future protests could demand more revolutionary, rather than
evolutionary, change.
76 | North Africa in Transition

Notes
1 The protests were part of a general 7 Morocco is a culturally diverse
strike called by two Moroccan country with multiple identities:
unions. The rioting lasted for Arab, Islamic, Berber and African.
several days. The monarchy binds them together
2 Morocco’s economic liberalisation under a broad Moroccan national
policies of the previous decade had identity. The common thread
taken a toll on the disadvantaged. through these multiple identities
3 ‘33 Dead in 2-Day Riot in Morocco is the strong Islamic foundation of
Fed by Frustration Over Economy’, Moroccan society and the king’s
Reuters, 17 December 1990, http:// religious role as commander of the
www.nytimes.com/1990/12/17/ faithful (amir al-mu’minin).
world/33-dead-in-2-day-riot-in- 8 See Rom Landau, Moroccan Drama
morocco-fed-by-frustration-over- 1900-1950 (San Francisco, CA:
economy.html. The American Academy of Asian
4 Throughout the mid-1990s, Studies, 1956), pp. 36–8.
Morocco held a number of 9 King Mohammed V and the
parliamentary and local elections, Istiqlal Party, which led Morocco’s
and constitutional referendums. A independence movement, found
constitutional amendment, passed common cause in independence
in 1996, allowed for a directly from France. However, in the
elected lower house of parliament, ensuing years they competed over
a longstanding opposition demand. setting Morocco’s political agenda.
For a more detailed account of King 10 The king appointed a constitutional
Hassan II’s policies, see Guilain drafting committee headed by
Denoeux and Abdeslam Maghraoui, Abdellatif Menouni, an adviser to
‘King Hassan’s Strategy of Political the king. The king also appointed a
Dualism’, Middle East Policy, vol. 5, consultative body to act as a liaison
no. 4, January 1998, pp. 104–30. between the committee and a range
5 According to Human Rights Watch of political parties, civil-society
the protests took place ‘largely organisations, labour unions and
without interference from police, other constituencies.
who in some areas were barely in 11 Morocco’s first constitution was
evidence’. See ‘Morocco: Thousands adopted in 1962. Subsequent
March for Reform’, Human Rights constitutions under Hassan II’s
Watch, 21 February 2011, http:// reign were issued in 1970, 1972,
www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/20/ 1992 and 1996.
morocco-thousands-march-reform. 12 The National Democratic Institute
6 See text of King Mohammed estimated that up to 25% of ballots
VI’s speech, ‘King Mohammed in parliamentary elections were
VI Speech’, 9 March 2011, either intentionally spoiled in
http://moroccansforchange. protest or invalidated. The PJD
com/2011/03/09/king-mohamed-vi- won the largest share of valid votes
speech-3911-full-text-feb20-khitab/. with close to 23%, almost double
 Power and Authority in Morocco | 77

the number for the RNI, the second Participation: The Moderation
largest party. See ‘Final Report on of Moroccan Salafis since the
the Moroccan Legislative Elections’, Beginning of the Arab Spring’, SWP
National Democratic Institute, 25 Comments, Comment 01, January
November 2011, https://www.ndi. 2013, http://www.swp-berlin.
org/files/Morocco-Final-Election- org/fileadmin/contents/products/
Report-061812-ENG.pdf. comments/2013C01_msb.pdf.
13 At the end of 1997, Hassan II 19 ‘Morocco King Attends Prayers
named Abderrahmane Youssoufi, led by Reformed Salafi-Jihadist’,
a longtime leftist political opponent Al Arabiya News, 28 March 2014,
who had spent time in prison and http://english.alarabiya.net/en/
living in exile, as prime minister. News/middle-east/2014/03/28/
14 In mid-2011 the king established Morocco-king-attends-prayers-led-
the National Human Rights Council by-reformed-Salafi-jihadist.html.
(CNDH), which evolved from 20 For a list of early demands and
the Advisory Council on Human description of the February 20
Rights established in the 1990s. movement written by movement
The organisation investigates and activists, see Mamfakinch, June
publicises human-rights issues 2011, http://pomed.org/wp-content/
including prison conditions, uploads/2011/06/Press_Kit_
migration, child labour and June2011.pdf.
women’s rights. 21 For a more complete summary of
15 This combination of progress and Morocco’s economic challenges,
repression has been described see ‘Morocco: Selected Issues’,
as dualism. See Denoeux and IMF Country Report, no. 13/110, 18
Maghraoui, ‘King Hassan’s Strategy January 2013, http://www.imf.org/
of Political Dualism’. external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13110.
16 See remarks by Mustafa Elkhalifi pdf.
in ‘Islamists in Power: Views from 22 See ‘HM The King Delivers Speech
Within, Building New Regimes to Nation on Occasion of 60th
After the Uprising’, Carnegie Anniversary of Revolution of King
Endowment event transcript And People’, Agence Marocaine
provided by Federal News de Presse, 20 August 2013, http://
Service, Washington DC, 5 April www.map.ma/en/activites-royales/
2012, http://carnegieendowment. hm-king-delivers-speech-nation-
org/files/040512_transcript_ occasion-60th-anniversary-
openingnew-regimes.pdf. revolution-king-and-peopl.
17 The PJD emerged from the 23 In 2005 the palace launched its
Movement of Unity and Reform, a National Human Development
coalition of Islamic movements that Initiative (INDH) to address the
competed under the PJD banner in country’s dismal socio-economic
the 1997 parliamentary elections. conditions. The initiative sought
18 For an analysis of Moroccan to give broader powers to local
Salafism, see Mohammed Masbah, communities to launch their own
‘Moving Towards Political development projects to create
78 | North Africa in Transition

jobs, improve housing and address struggle-religious-identity-tunisia-

poverty. The programme was and-maghreb.
coordinated by the Ministry of 27 One of his songs substitutes the
Interior with a modest annual word ‘freedom’ for ‘the king’ in a
budget of US$200 million a year. national saying: ‘God, the nation,
The INDH has undoubtedly helped and the king’. Al-Haqed has been
people, but, after nearly a decade, arrested several times since 2011
not enough. on various unrelated charges
24 See ‘Full Text of The Throne Day and subjected to lengthy court
Speech Delivered By HM King proceedings.
Mohammed VI’, Agence Marocaine 28 The king traditionally pardons
de Presse, 30 July 2014, http://www. prisoners every Throne Day
map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm- (celebrated on 30 July to mark the
le-roi/full-text-throne-day-speech- king’s ascension to the throne).
delivered-hm-king-mohammed-vi. One of those pardoned was Daniel
25 See ‘Corruption Perceptions Index Galvan, a Spanish citizen convicted
2013’, Transparency International, of sexually abusing 11 Moroccan
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/ children and sentenced to 30 years
results/. in prison.
26 See Haim Malka, ‘The Struggle for 29 ‘Protest Culture in Morocco’,
Religious Identity in Tunisia and Economist, 11 June 2014,
the Maghreb’, Center for Strategic http://www.economist.com/
and International Studies, 2 May blogs/pomegranate/2014/06/
2014, http://csis.org/publication/ protest-culture-morocco.