KURT HOBNER

University o] Kiel

IN MEMORY OF IMRE LAKATOS

ON THE QUESTION OF RELATIVISM

AND PROGRESS IN SCIENCE

Introduction

Our age is called the scientific and technical age. By that we mean that
science plays a dominating role nowadays and almost everything is in-
fluenced by it for this reason. The position of science can be compared with
the position of theology in the past, however strange this may seem to us
at first. In the same way as theology once penetrated life and made people
understand, interpret and solve everything by means of theology, the
sciences of today are considered to be capable of everything. The voice of
scientists will not be ignored in any kind of problem. Today people ask
scientists before inaugurating a big event; in earlier time it was the church
that was asked to bless the plan. Both in public and private affairs they are
asked for their advice, even if they are occupied with rather controversial
subjects such as sociology, political science, and futurology. Fantastic
amounts of money are spent on science and scientific programs comparable
with the costs which were spent on the building of cathedrals in earlier
times. And in the same way as in the past nobody thought he could be saved
without theological instruction, people nowadays believe nobody can reach
happiness without having received a university education.
What is the origin of this supreme importance of science ? The supreme
role of science is based on the opinion which originated in the age of the
Enlightenment that science alone can open up the way to the real truth.
According to this opinion science has in this or that case already reached the
absolute truth, or has at least gotten closer and closer to the truth. The
picture of reality created by the sciences is becoming more and more exact
and intensive all the time. Their statements and theories are justified either
by objective facts or by necessarily true principles, and they are constantly
being examined by them.
It is not important here that some, being dependent upon empiricism,
put more weight on facts, and that some, being rationalists, emphasize
principles more. In the end empiricism and rationalism have contributed
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equally to the scientific optimism which has always been the motive power
for the immense changes which have taken place in the world since the
time of the Enlightenment. I even believe that this optimism is still in-
creasing greatly.
Nevertheless it is based on an illusion and is under the spell of a myth :
the myth of science.

1. The Myth of Science

There are neither absolute facts nor absolutely true principles on which
scientific statements and theories could be based or by which they could
be justified in a cogent way. On the contrary, in science, principles and
propositions about facts are only parts of theories. They are given, selected,
and valid within their frame of reference only, and consequently they are
dependent on it. This is true of all empirical sciences, the natural sciences
as well as the historical. 1
The situation today is even worse, however, for the myth of science.
Scientific facts, unavoidably dependent on theories, will change as soon as
the theories change. For this reason it is wrong to assume that science con-
tinuously and necessarily improves its knowledge about the same subjects in
the course of its development. We must not be confused by the fact that
very often the same words are used when one theory is replaced by another.
Thus we meet the same words everywhere in present-day physics; words such
as mass, momentum, velocity, time, or space. But strangly enough they often
mean something different depending on the theoretical context in which
we use them. For example, we could use them in the context of Cartesian
physics, Newtonian physics, or the physics of Einstein, etc.
Therefore in science new facts never appear just by themselves. They
will only be discovered in light of a new theory (which must pre-exist them).
It would be in vain to try to simply add new facts to the present knowl-
edge of science. They will first have to be put into the changed context
which created them. The facts already known, however, will partly be in-
terpreted in a new way, partly they will be excluded, or they will even be
declared an illusion. Let us think, for example, of the rise of mechanics in
the seventeenth century. After the basic idea had been created, a great
number of new discoveries in the field of the laws of motion were made.
The facts which had been interpreted more biologically with the Aristotelian

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method were now considered in a very different way. Everything was seen
from the point of view of mechanics. Natural life, which once had been
the center of scientific research, remained almost without attention during
that time. "Animalia sunt automata" said Descartes categorically, and with
these words he concealed the special scientific problems of natural life.
In my opinion, this example makes it clear that new discoveries and
ideas in science cannot always be considered to be an extension, improve-
ment, or enrichment of the old. Often the appearence of new discoveries
and ideas is (somehow) comparable to the rise of a completely new interpre-
tation of the world, a world of partly different, partly enlarged, or partly
limited contents. Let me sum up these thoughts once more. The empirical-ra-
tionalist optimism about science is based on a myth for the following reasons:
1. There are no absolute facts, nor absolute principles, on which the sciences
could be based. 2. Science does not offer a constantly improved and enlarged
picture of the same subjects and the same empirical contents. 3. In the
course of its history science does not approach an absolute truth, free of
any theories.

2. An historical Situation determines facts and principles and not vice

versa. Historical systems and historical system of sets.

Naturally, I realize how briefly I have explained these theses here. I have,
however, already tried to explain them in a more extensive way on other
occasions, :~ and I may hope to find some consensus with the supposed con-
sequences of such theories. People ask: "Haven't we lost everything, if
neither experience nor reason are final and irrevocable instances deciding
like a supreme court on scientific statements and theories ? Can science be
justified at all in any way other than rationalistically or empirically ?
Wouldn't it become somehow enigmatic, mystic, and irrational ? Would it
not disintegrate into total arbitrariness ? Would it not be made wide open
to relativism and scepticism ? Would we not have to bury all hope of
scientific progress ?"
I will now try to do something, which may appear paradoxical; to cast out
devils by Beelzebub. I will try to show that these dangers conjured up will
disappear in the moment in which we see the sciences in their radical histori-
dry.
To prove this I maintain first of all that, although science is based on
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facts and principles, neither of these are absolute - - this would be the em-
pirical rationalist opinion - - but rather they are determined by a certain
historical situation. This situation then decides about the scientific facts and
principles and not vice versa.
In an attempt to clarify this, I will first define the term "Historical
situation" with the help of two historical scientific categories, which I want
to call "historic system ''a and "historical system set." The category "historic
system" deals with the structure of historical processes in general and not
just with the scientific ones. Such processes are based partly on natural
laws (psychological, physica[, etc.), partly, however, according to rules man
has created.
I want to concentrate on these rules.
There are as many rules of this kind as there are spheres of life. Think of
the rules of daily life, the rules of custom or the various relationships people
have to each other. Think of the rules we follow in the world of business,
economics, public affairs, or the rules of art, music, religion, and last but
not least, of the rules of language.
On the one hand such rules arose through historical development and are
therefore also subject to changes in history. On the other hand, they si-
multaneously give our lives a systematic constitution. So I want to speak of
historical rule systems, referred to below just as "systems." They do not
satisfy certain ideals of exactness and completeness; it is mostly true, how-
ever, that they are as exact as is necessary in order to be applicable in
situations for which they are intended. Contrary to wide spread opinion, I
therefore believe that our nonscientific normal life also has a certain formal
rationality and logic insofar as it takes place within such systems.
The second historical scientific category mentioned - - called "historical
system set" - - I want to define as a structured set of partly contemporary,
partly traditiona!, systems related to each other in many different ways, with-
in the frame of which a human community lives at a given time. Scientific
systems - - and these are theories and hierarchies of theories, as well as the
rules of scientific work - - are therefore part of this total set of systems,
which is the world of rules in which we live and work all the time.
The relations of the elements of this set to each other can be those of
practical motivation; for example, one system can be morally judged, sup-
ported, or rejected by another. Think of the method used in the past for
correcting theoretical scientific statements with the help of theological or

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ethical principles. We may also think of the growing tendency in present

times to judge sdentific projects by the guiding principle of what is now
called "social relevance." Another possibility of relations among systems
consists of theoretical criticism of one system by means of another. Here
we should remember Leibniz' critidsm of Newton by means of his relativist
philosophy of space or, conversely, Euler's criticism of such relativist
philosophies on the basis of the principle of inertia, which Euler considered
to be self evident. You may recall, too, how often ethical principles are re-
jected through a reference to the theoretical statement that everything, in-
cluding human action and thought, is always determined. I must limit myself
to these few examples of the possible relations which systems can have to
each other. Finally, I want to stress that there can be systems within a system
set which are incompatible with each other and which are even incommen-
surable with each other.
With the help of the historical categories which I have just explained,
I can now define the expression "historical situation" more exactly. A
"historical situation" is a historical period which is dominated by a certain
system set. I may now state that each historical period has a constitution of
this sort. When I said earlier that a historical situation determines scientific
facts and principles and vice versa, I wanted to express the opinion that the
system set characterizing a certain historical period exercises this dominating
power. Let us consider some examples.
The facts and principles on which the Ptolemaic system was based were
partly derived from the Aristotelian doctrine of that time concerning the
difference between the translunar and sublunar spheres. Because of this
doctrine there was a widespread opinion that human perception is a strictly
reliable source of knowledge only on earth. Therefore the celestial facts
did not contradict Ptolemaic astronomy but could be regarded as being in
accordance with it. This astronomy, however, was also based on the prin-
ciples of contemporary physics, metaphysics, and theology.4
I will take the next example from modern physics. Here we can find two
different opinions about what constitutes physical reality. As I have al-
ready tried to show elsewhere, reality for Einstein consists of substances
which have their own characteristic features in themselves, notwithstanding
the fact that they may be connected with other substances in different ways. 5
The origin of this opinion is an old philosophical tradition which was es-
tablished mainly by Aristotle and Descartes. According to Bohr, however,
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reality consists essentially of the relations between substances. This point

of view is again mainly derived from the dialectical philosophy of Kierke-
gaard and James. The opposition of Einstein and Bohr demonstrates clearly,
I think, that facts do not have the same meaning for both and cannot be
given in the same way. Logically Einstein rejects Quantum Mechanics as in-
complete since Quantum Mechanics does not comprehend everything which
he considers to be a fact, while Bohr denies the existence of such facts.
As a final example I will speak of the theory of facts which was set up
by the positivist historical school. The people who belonged to. this school
were primarily American philosophers; C.G. An&ew, D. White, John Fiske,
H.B. Adams, Walter F. Webb, and others. They tried to develop radically
the ideas of German historians such as Savigny, Niebuhr, Sachmann, und
Ranke, whom they misunderstood considerably. They were convinced that
there were absolute facts in history and that it was the task of the historian
to discover them. In their opinion, however, this goal could be reached on-
ly if the historian made use of reports about documents, of excavations and
ruins, of weapons, treaties, letters, diaries, chronicles, historical works, etc.
Only the profound study of these things could tell us what had happened
and how it really happened. This particular doctrine of facts also has its
different roots; Biblical criticism, the methods of classical philology, the
philosophy of the Enlightenment, and last, but not least, the attitude of
the natural sciences. This last source is clearly proved by Webb's remarkable
utterance that Ranke had turned the lecture hall into a laboratory in which
documents were used instead of reto;ts, s
This opinion was later rejected, mainly by the German historical school
who held that facts must be interpreted by the historian in connection with
the concepts he uses and that they are, therefore, not absoluteF Here we
can see again how something that is supposed to be a historical fact is de-
pendent upon various theories which originate in a certain historical situation.

3. The development of sciences is largely caused by disharmonies within

individual of systems.

No matter whether we take Ptolemy, Einstein, Bohr, or Webb, they all

live and work within the frame of a system which is bound to a certain
period of time. This set of systems is the ground on which we stand, the
air which we breathe, and the light in which we see everything. Having

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established all this we have to face the question which inevitably arises.
What does scientific progress mean ?
First of all, we see that the development of science is largely caused by
disharmony within individual sets of systems and by internal change in such
sets. I will try again to clarify this by giving an example. Consider the
system set of the Renaissance. It contains, among other things, a certain
emancipatory humanism, certain doctrines of theology, Ptolemaic astronomy,
and Aristotelian physics. This humanism contradicts Ptolemaic astronomy,
which itself is closely connected with the theology of the time. The contra-
diction was solved by Copernicus through a change in astronomy, and this
was to the advantage of humanism. Through this, however, a new contra-
diction appeared, namely that between the new astronomy and the physics
of Aristotle which had remained unchanged. Thus attempts were also made
to solve this problem. When with Newton this attempt was finally completed,
not only had Aristotle been given up, but also Copernicus. 8 The changed
scenery of natural science now had its feedback effect on humanism and
theology. In the end, everything had changed; astronomy, physics, humanism,
theology, and also, and this must be given particular emphasis, the facts and
principles connected with them. The result was an entirely new system set
and an entirely changed historical situation.
This example not only demonstrates that the term "system set" is very
suitable for collecting, sorting out, and putting into order developments of
the kind mentioned above, but it also confirms the opinion expressed earlier
that such developments have their origins in disharmonies. Just as any
other, the Renaissance system set had its flaw, and the attempt was made to
remove it. The example, however, also demonstrates something else which is
no less remarkable. It in fact shows that this "catharsis" was only reached
with the help of the available means; that is, with those means provided by
the system set. Solutions are sought within the given situation, which only
changes of its own accord. This is exactly what I mean when I speak of
an internal change in the system set. For what did people do ? They accepted
one part of the set and tried to adapt the other elements to this part.
Criticism and creative change were based on something already existing
historically. Finally, we can settle here a last and very typical point. In the
example mentioned above those parts of the system set survived which
strongly contradicted the facts combined with them, while those parts of
the system vanished which seemed to harmonize much better with the facts
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seen in their own right. Thus, for example, the rotation of the earth re-
mained an unsettled problem as long as no law of inertia existed and as long
as the physics invented ad hoc to save the Copernican theory remained back-
ward in comparison to Aristotelian physics. The reason for the change here
is not the discovery of new facts, it is rather the internal disharmony of
the system set. In order to sum up my thoughts once more, I wish to ex-
press them metaphorically: the movement of science is mainly the self-
movement of system sets.
This metaphor has nothing to do with Hegel's philosophy, even if this
might seem to be the case at first sight. A few indications may suffice to
show this. The disharmonies of which I speak and the processes they bring
about are not dialectical. Thus, for example, the emancipatory humanism of
the Renaissance, on the one hand, and Ptolemaic astronomy, on the other
hand, are not opposed to each other as Thesis and Antithesis in Hegel's
sense, since the one did not of necessity produce the other. Systems are
usually not perfectly exact and clear, and, therefore, their disharmonies
and their possible solutions cannot be rationally given with strict necessity.
Scientific systems are no exception here, since their difference from other
systems is, with regard to their exactness, only one of degree. The reason
for this is by no means just carelessness. On the contrary, we usually avoid
formal perfection because it easily leads to sterility and to a lack of flexi-
bility in connection with constantly changing situations. Thus, if we try to
adapt any system to new situations we will generally not be able to decide
in a necessary manner and without any other alternative how to do, so.
Consequently there will always be ranges of possibilities, and neither the
disharmonies nor their solutions will be strictly determined in a unique way.
Hegel's dialectic, however, consists of a process, the necessity, strictness, and
exactness of which is claimed to be in no way inferior to that of formal
logic, most particularly because it is consecrated by the Weltgeist. I can
detect nothing of this kind in historical events. Thus, in opposition to Hegel,
I stress the contingency in history.
This contingency concerns, on the one hand, the spontaneous acts which
transform the vagueness mentioned above into more or less clear contra-
dictions, or into their solutions, in the course of practice. I call them
"spontaneous" because nothing can force us to do this transformation in
just one way. On the other hand, everything is also contingent which is em-
pirical. The empirical has by no means been eliminated here, even if it has
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been pointed out that facts are dependent on theories. On the contrary, every
system set delivers a totality of possibilities of communicating with reality,
or, to put it in Kantian terms, it delivers "the conditions of the possibilities"
of having experience at all. These conditions may change historically - - and
this is the difference from Kant - - but ho~v, the reality will appear under the
special conditions of a given system set we can never necessarily foresee, and
consequently it is as contingent as the reaction to it within the same system
set?
I shall add some remarks concerning the opinion that historical processes
are determined by nature; that is, by psychological, biological, physical and
other laws. In this connection people usually refer to emotions which have
at any time determined human beings; emotions such as love, hatred,
thirst for revenge, vanity, etc. There are also references to instincts such as
hunger, thirst, sexuality, etc., as well as to the conditions of climate, geog-
raphy, and similar things. It can be gathered from what I have already said
concerning the role of experience that the self-movement of system sets
does not exclude the influence and effectiveness of such permanent and
therefore nonhistorical natural conditions. On the other hand, it seems to
me that they too can be effective only in the frame of a system set and that
only there can we find the necessary conditions and contents for them.
Thus, for example, the sensual desire of Salome to seduce John the
Baptist is completely mixed up with Jewish, pre-Christian, metaphysics. Or
let us consider homosexuality in ancient Athens. This shows very clearly
how even sexuality is determined by cultural ideas. We never can abstract
Werther's love from the sentimentality of the Storm and Stress movement in
German literature of the eightheenth century, and the love between Tristan
and Isolde can only be understood in connection first with medieval mys-
tidsm, and later, in Wagner's interpretation, with Schopenhauer's mysticism.
To be sure, the pistol shot of an assassin is a physical process, but no Brutus
could have done it; and no Roman could become psychologically tired from
driving for too long a time on the highway.

4. Seven Laws of Historical Processes

After these preparatory remarks, I wish to state the following laws re-
garding the structure of historical processes.
1. Each historical period is determined by a system set.
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2. Each system set is unstable and disharmonic within itself.

3. All system sets change through the attempt to remove such disharmonies.
4. This happens by adapting one part of the system set to another.
5. This process is not strictly determined.
6. An exact determination is limited by the vagueness of systems.
7. Each historical event happens within a system set, even if it is also de-
termined by natural laws. Nothing can bring entirely strange elements into
this system set, and no historical event can take place ontside it.
I realize of course that these laws provoke a number of questions. I
apologize for this shortcoming, which I cannot avoid in such a brief outline.
It is not so much my intention, however, to develop my theory of historical
processes here in extenso, but rather, as I have already said, to show that,
assuming this theory to be true, such a radical historism - - for that is what
it would have to be called - - would not force us to give up all hope of
progress, nor would it lead to a disastrous relativism.

5. The Historical point of view is not necessarily a relativist one.

The structural laws just mentioned do indeed say something about the
constant internal change of system sets, but the question about progress and
relativism in science is not yet answered by this.
I will first turn my attention to relativism. Relativism means that only
accidents, arbitrariness, or a sort of historical destiny decide what is true
or false, what is good or bad. If we regard the structural laws I have al-
ready enumerated we will see that nothing of that kind could necessarily
by concluded therefrom.
First of all, criteria are found within systems for what is true or false,
good or bad. Within systems, decisions can be made about truth and un-
truth, etc. More than this, systems as a whole, and their mutations, can
be rationally accounted for in a historical situation. Let us try the following
example.
If space is Euclidean and if it is established what observation, facts, con-
firmation, and falsification mean, then under certain conditions we will have
the experience that space is filled with gravitational forces, and through this
experience we will discover this truth. Historically these presuppositions
were given neither arbitrarily nor by fatalism, but they were logically
justified by widespread rationalism and its principles during the time of

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Renaissance humanism. On the one hand, it is senseless to say that space

is Euclidean or that it is not, but, on the other hand, it makes sense to say
that the theory about Euclidean space was a well founded and well justified
part of the given conditions in the Renaissance. These are conditions which
we no longer face, which is why the question about the nature of space is
entirely different for us from what it was in those times. 1~
Perhaps a comparison will clarify things a little more. Let us suppose
that a group of people are playing cards together. The rules of the game
determine what is true or false, good or bad, in the game. For instance it
is true that a player will lose the hand in which a certain suit is trump, if he
does not have any. It is good tactics to be cautious rather than reckless, etc.
Let us suppose further that the players discover certain inconsistencies in the
rules of the game. Of course they will change them, and, accordingly, the
ideas about what is true, untrue, good and bad in this game will also change.
After some time the new rules, too, may seem unsatisfactory. Again they
will be changed, and this will again have the same consequences. We can
imagine that after some time the players will be playing a totally different
game from the one with which they started, although they may still use
the same name for it.
It woulld be senseless to use this example if one wanted to show what re-
lativism is. W e are not only dealing here with a sort of logic concerning
a certain situation, but the change in the situation itself is in a certain way
logical.
I want to stress that I do not at all claim that the history of science
progresses in a strictly logical way, even if logical only with regard to the
situation. This is certainly not true. I want to make clear, however, that
a consistently historical point of view is not necessarily a relativist one,
unless the word "relativism" is used for matters that have lost all fear of
subjective arbitrariness or historical fatality. But how can we answer the
question about progress in science ?

6. There is no absolute Truth which we are approaching more and more

closely.

At the very beginning I said that there is no absolute truth which we are
approaching more and more closely. There is no absolute truth because
there are no absolute facts or absolutely valid principles which could guide

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us. The thought of an approach to absolute truth is also absurd because

we would have to be at an infinite distance from the absolute truth, other-
wise we would have to suppose that we will reach it some day. But if
absolute truth is infinitely far away we will always remain at the same dis-
tance from it, namely at infinite distance. Finally, there are theories which
follow each other historically which contradict each other logically, as, for
example, Newtonian physics and the theory of relativity. The former claims
that space is Euclidean and that within it certain forces are effective. The
latter tells us the exact contrary. What kind of sense would it make to say
that the theory of relativity is closer to the truth than the theory of Newton,
which is less close to it. If we consider the rules of logic, one theory would
have to be simply wrong, and not merely less true, if we want to give to
theories values of that kind at all. Or suppose that someone maintains
that the so-called "Pure Cases" in microphysics are in fact mixtures, as
Einstein believed. Let me put it metaphorically. It would be as if he had
said that the probability of drawing a white ball out of an urn is one half
because half of the balls in there are white and not because it is only the
act of putting one's hand into the urn which produces them. What sense
would it make to say that the one sentence is closer to the truth than the
other one, which consequently is considered to be less true but not absolutely
false ? They are just incompatible with each other. 11 It is also deceptive to
maintain that the theory which arises later contains the earlier as a sort of a
borderline case. Since I have already treated this problem elsewhere, I only
want to say this much. In my opinion, the so-called borderline cases only
appear through the logical trick of equivocation or by inexact terms. If, for
example, someone claims that the special theory of relativity turns into
Newtonian physics when the velocity becomes lower, he is obscuring the
fundamental differences in terms such as space, time, and velocity, in both
theories. TM
I think we should finally stop comparing the development of scientific
knowledge with the painting of a portrait where we can make the likeness
to the living person better and better, more and more exact.

7. The Explication and the mutation of systems. Progress I and Progress II.

What can progress in science possibly mean with regard to the structural
laws mentioned above ? Obviously, we can differentiate between two basic

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forms of development. The first of these is the explication of scientific

systems, and the second is their mutatio'n. 13 By explication of systems, I
mean their information and development without any change in their foun-
dation. This would be, for example, what Kuhn calls "normal science";
namely, the deduction of theories from given axioms and the more exact
determination of constants demanded within a theory. We are dealing with
a case of mutation, however, if the foundations of systems themselves are
changed.
Progress, therefore, can only take place in these two basic forms of
historical movements, and consequently we also have to differentiate be-
tween two basic forms of progress, which I want to call Progress I and
Progress II. When would it be possible to speak of Progress II in the case
of a mutation ?
I think that an explication by itself is already progress in science, since
it makes clear of what a system consists and what degree of efficiency the
system has. In fact, we can even say that the explication is the basis of all
scientific progress because without it everything would remain a fragment,
a draft. Let us have a look at the explication of the theory of relativity. It
begins, historically speaking, with the setting up of laws which are covariant
for inertial systems. This necessarily brought Einstein to a definition of
certain terms and finally leads us to the well-known energy-mass equation.
It is remarkable that a cosmos slowly opens up, how the theory takes
possession of more and more fields and brings them into harmony. Wherever
we make a prognosis, no matter whether it concerns the perihelial movement
of Mercury or the divergence of light rays in the sun's field of gravity, in
all cases we first see the explication of given premises.
This explication alone, however, is obviously not enough to enable us
to speak of progress in the sense of Progress I. To be able to do that we
must compare the explicated system with others with regard to its function
and significance in connection with the existing system set. Only in this
way can we a v d d the disappointment of finding that our system is not
worth the work we invested in it. Otherwise it could be considered sterile,
provincial, or backward. Think of the extreme case of total insanity capable
of inventing complete systems, which are, however, characterized by their
hopeless idiosyncrasies within the mental context. What kind of function
and significance of a scientific system within a system set would be needed
so that its explication may be an example of Progress I ? In order to answer
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this question, it is useful to turn to the term "Progress II," which has to
be based on a mutation.

8. Progress I and Progress II consist of the harmonizing of a system set.

A mutation, for the same reasons as those given for an explication, will
not be considered progressive just by its existence. No one will seriously
consider arbitrariness, the loye of novelty, pomposity, or even insanity as
the only sources of change. This would be completely inadequate. From
whence could we take rational arguments for a mutation but from the
given system set ? I repeat : there are no eternal ideas beyond the system
set where we could find criteria for progress. If this is true, if we have
to remain in a given set of systems, and if there is no way out of it, if our
only chance is to change it by changing its elements, such a change will
be rational only if it improves the harmony of the elements within this
system set. This means that a mutation can only be considered progressive
insofar as it contributes first to the elimination of contradiction, secondly to
the elimination of obscurities, and thirdly to the construction of coherent
connections which are as comprehensive as possible. These contributions I
call the harmonizing of a system set.
Again we take the theory or relativity as an excellent example. When
Einstein decided to attempt a mutation with it - - at first with the Special
Theory of Relativity - - he had intended to reconcile the Maxwell theory
of light with a main principle of classical physics; namely, the principle that
all inertial systems are of the same importance. Later on, however, when it
became obvious that this reconciliation could only take place if the law of
gravity remained excluded from it, he completed a second system mutation
which finally led to the general theory of relativity. He himself maintained
emphatically that his guiding principle was the idea of harmony in this
world. Less speculatively, I would say that in reality he was determined by
the idea of the harmony of the scientific system within the given system set.
After this discussion, we can now also answer the question mentioned
before as to the kind of function and significance a system must have, if
its explication is to be considered as "Progress I." It must contribute to the
removal of disharmonies within the system set in the same way as the
mutation by which it was produced. Once more the theory of relativity may
serve as an example, since its ability to bring various phenomena and
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principles together harmoniously is obviously a contribution of the kind

required. On the other hand, we also have to call an explication progressive
which brings obscurities and contradictions to light, since this naturally
implies an invitation to remove them.
To sum up, what we must understand by the harmonizing of a system set
is this : the detection of obscurities and contradictions, the removal of
both, and the creation o] coherent connections which are as comprehensive
as possible.
Several discussions have shown me that the concept of "the harmonizing
of a system set" has sometimes been misunderstood. Some people think it
has something to do with aesthetics, whereas it is actually something logical.
Some think that with it we can also justify a unity which has been produced
by omitting or surpressing disturbing parts, or even by forging desirable
parts of systems. I was asked, for example, if Lysenko's notorious biology
must not also be called a harmonizing of a system set; namely, of Soviet
socialism. Did he not adapt his biology to materialist principles, although he
neglected scientific methods and experimental results ? But in such cases a
contradiction will not ~eally be removed but at best be concealed, if it is
not altogether extinguished by fraud or even by force. Existing biology is,
with regard to its clarity, its comprehensive and harmonious connections, so
much better than the so-called Diamat that there can be no doubt which of
the two systems should be preferred in the case of Lysenko. Thus, harmoni-
zing means in this case that we should truly overcome in thought the existing
difficulties and not just make believe that this has been done or do it by
force.
Let us go back once more to Copernicus. He was searching, as I mentioned
above, for the elimination of a contradiction; namely, the contradiction
between the new humanism and traditional astronomy. He tried to solve
this contradiction by changing astronomy in favor of Humanism. Why did
he not try it the other way around ? Did he not obtain this harmony rather
violently, since the price for it was disharmonies with physics ?
The Copernican decision, however, reveals its sense and its contri-
bution to the harmony of the situation if we do not confine ourselves to
the small sector of "astronomy and physics" within the Renaissance system
set. Then we can recognize that Renaissance Humanism is only a part of
a comprehensive and comparatively coherent connection dominating the
whole world more and more. The discovery of America, for example, caused
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 RELLATIVlSM AND PROGRESS IN SCIENCE

immense changes which finally deeply affected even sacred structures such
as those of the German Reich. In this age we can observe the beginning of
the secularization of the states. The printing press and the rise of the
commoners destroyed old hierarchies and privileges, and strengthened a new
individualism. All these emancipatory movements led finally to the idea
that the divine creation and consequently the construction of the celestial
universe, too, shollld be understandable to human reason.
Thus, on the one hand, there was a more or less coherent, more or less
harmonious, variety of systems, and, on the other hand, this variety was
opposed to different systems which seemed to be more and more contra-
dictory in themselves. In this situation Copernicus' decision, favorable as it
was to Renaissance Humanism, is comprehensible, and it is comprehensible
that his own discrepancies did not disturb him very much. His opponents
were progressive, too, inasmuch as they brought these discrepancies to light.
Consequently, it is wrong when people usually maintain that the church,
which fought against Copernicus so strongly, was merely reactionary.
The aim of harmonizing a system set cannot, however, be confined only
to progress in science. A system set comprehends much more than this.
Therefore, we can say in general that progress as such, wherever it may
occur, in science or elsewhere, will not be directed towards a goal outside
history, to an eschaton, for instance, because nothing of that kind exists.
Nor will it consist of a radical change, a creation of something absolutely
new. For a change which does not somehow involve bringing into harmony
something which already exists will end in the madness of idiosyncrasy.
Progress may certainly contain disharmony, disagreement, challenge, con-
tradictions, and problems. Real progress, however, will only be achieved
if such disharmonies and disagreement are the price to be paid for a much
larger and much more important agreement of the system set within itself.
There is something else which I wish to say. Progress, as I understand it,
is not just confined to a so-called progressive age, as the common notion
would have it. To believe that would be to show narrow-mindedness and a
lack of historical sense. Every historical system set is capable of harmonizing,
and each is, of course, also capable of spoiling itself by making the dis-
harmonies already in existence hopelessly bigger and bigger. The course of
history demonstrates both processes in many examples.~ Progress I and
Progess II are normative standards of measurement. By using them we can
determine the value of explications or mutations.

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9. Neither Progress I nor Progress II is something which constantly in-

c1"ea~es.

Could we not imagine Progress II as something constant and increasing,

perhaps in such a way that in the course of the history of science the harmony
within the systems sets would increase ?
Anyone who answers this question in the affirmative would be disregard-
ing the following : even when certain disharmonies are removed, it is not
the same system set which becomes more harmonious and stable. This is due
to the fact that when a system set harmonizes it changes gradually of its
own accord and will even turn into an entirely new one in time. Thus it
is not only new questions and answers which appear, but also new inconsist-
encies and difficulties which were necessarily unknown in the former system,
until we are finally confronted with a completely new situation. I have
already tried to show this in an example.
W e could agree with Wittgenstein that the subjects with which science
is concerned in the course of its history usually only appear to be of the
same kind. In reality, however, they merely have some slight family resem-
blance. Let us take space, time in the world, the stars, the moving forces of
bodies, etc. We would look in vain for something identical, which all scien-
tific theories founded on these terms in the course of the history would
possess in an unbroken thread, something identical that would enlarge
slowly and be built up continuously. It took us a long time to understand
that 4 PM here on earth is not the same as 4 o'clock in the afternoon on Siri-
us. It may be even more difficult for us to comprehend that the same subjects
of scientific research in the past and in the present are in fact not the same
things at all. For there are no strict identities which remain unchanged all
the time. If there were such identities, the so-called essentialism would be
right to say that for all of them there are certain definitions of their essence,
certain definitions which are based on such identities. Try, however, to
define terms such as "space, time in the world, bodies, moving force," etc.
without already touching on the world of ideas contained in theories deter-
mined by history. Try to formulate these definitions without making use of
thoughts and ideas which were by no means always connected with these
terms or that, if they were, are more than truisms.
Consequently, it will be impossible to say of two system sets which follow
each other directly in time that the second must be the better one in the

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final result. We cannot say that the second and later system set contains
more truth than the one before, even if all the mutations that produced the
new system set were produced in a very rational and progressive way, which
is not always the case. Progress II can only provide a short time of happiness,
just as any time of happiness will only be a short one. I hardly need to
mention Progress I, which leads to a standstill in the long run and which
furthermore will be brought to an end by a mutation in any case. Progress
II primarily means finding temporary relief before being confronted again
with new and different problems. 15

10. Conclusion

What I have tried to show here could be considered a contribution to

the destruction of a myth that has accompanied the sciences because they were
supposed to be rationalist and empirical. By doing this, I am also challenging
the claim that science has attained the one and only access to truth and
reality. The reason that science appears to be capable of everything is itself
only a consequence of our historical situation. The advance of science
nowadays is not justified by the rise of true knowledge. N o r must we un-
derstand the growth of science as the birth of a rational mankind. On the
contrary, there is no fundamental difference between the rise of science and
the rise of Renaissance ideals. There is even a close connection between them.
By creating a scientific and technical world we have chosen a way of life
which is based on a certain historical situation. W e have no, reason to be-
lieve that this scientific and technical world will remain and progress for-
ever, and there is also no reason to believe that barbaric customs would arise
the moment we turned to another way of life again. There are even reasons
for believing that scientific technical development, and the ideas of progress
connected with it, could be barbaric in their own way. Everything is barbaric
that pretends to be in possession of absolute truth, or at least on the way
to it.

NOTES

1 The reader will notice that I deal first with scientific facts, later with scientific sentences
about facts. If the latter are dependent upon theories, however, then the former cannot be
a n y t h i n g absolute either. For the content of the fact can be given scientifically only by a
sentence about it. In saying, "'this electric current has a voltage of zoo," I want to express

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 KURT H13-BN E R

a fact. Therefore, if this sentence is dependent on theories, which it is, then this is also the
case regardng the fact which it expresses.
2 Cf. also K. Htibner, "Theorie und Empiric," in : Philosophia Naturalis X (1968); " D u h e m s
historische Wissenschaftstheorie und ihre gegenw~rtige Weiterentwicklung," in : 9- Deutscher
Kongress ffir Philosophic DF~sseldorf 1969, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, Meisenheim am Glan 1972;
and in Fhilosophia Naturalis XIII (I97x); "Von der Bedeutung der Geistesgeschichte ftir Grund-
legungen in der P h y s i k " i n : Akten des XIV. InternationaIen Kangresses fiAr Philosophic,
Wien x968; " U b e r die Philosophie der Wirklichkeit in der Quantenmechanik," in Philoso-
phia Naturalis XIV (x975). I am citing here mostly my own publications only because I have
to confine myself in this rather short article to my own point of view. (Cf. Footnote x~.) I
will discuss other standpoints in later publications.
3 I introduced the concept "historical s y s t e m " for the first time in my article "Philosopkische
Fragen der Zukunftsforschung" in Sfudlum Generale 0-4 (~97~); of. also my article on " W a s
sind und Was bedeuten Theorien in Natur und Geschichtswissenschaften ?" ed. by the Greek
Humanistic Society, Athens x975, and i n : Natur und Geschichte, xo. Deutsc'her Kongress fi2r
Philosophic z97a, ed. Hfibner and Menne, H a m b u r g ~974, Meiner.
4 Cf. also K. Hilbner, " W a s zeigt Keplers "Astronomia Nova' der modernen Wissenschafts-
theorie ?" in Philosophia Naturalls XI (~969).
s. K. Htibner, " U b e r die Philosophie der Wirklichkeit in der Quantenmechanikr" in Philo-
sopha Naturalis XIV (x973).
6 W.P. Webh, "The Historical Seminar, Its Outer Shell and Its Inner Spirit" in Mississippi
Valley Historical Review 4z, x955/56.
7 Cf. Also K. H/.ibner, "'Was sind "and was bedenten Theorien in Natur und Geschichtswissen-
schaften ?", see footnote 7.
8 For an extensive explanation of the contradiction between Renaissance H u m a n i s m and
Ptolemaic astronomy and Copernicus" attempt to solve it, see H. Blumenberg, Die Kopernika-
nische Wende, Frankfurt x965. K. Hfibner, " W a s zeigt Keplers' "Astronomia Nova' der moderuen
Wissenschaftstheorie und ihre gegenw~rtige Weiterentwicklung," see footnote 2.
9 I have discussed the role of experience more extensively in "Theorie und Empirie" (see
footnote 2). After having distinguished my standpoint from that of Hegel, I shall now add
some comments on Marx. Marx tries to understand all historical processes as being basically
dependent upon the so-called productive powers. This would mean that the starting point
of every change is always exactly the same part of the system set. Marx has, however, extrap-
olated a partly correct description of the system set in a particular epoch, that of the first
industrial revolution, to the whole of history, which is a completely nonhistorical monism.
10 The senselessness of absolute propositions about space follows from the fact that
all the results of the measurements on which they are based, can always be interpreted
either as reflecting the geometry of space or as being influenced by the physical conditions
under which they took place. For example, in antiquity the ideas about space resulting from
Aristotelian philosophy and physics obviously could not be identified with those of Euclidian
geometry. Descartes, on the other hand, deduced his physics from the presupposition that
space is Euclidian, a presupposition which again was rooted, as I have mentioned already, in
his rationalism. Einstein, finally, in introducing Riemannian space into physics, ~tarted from
the principle of the equality of all inertial systems and not from geometry. Thus, by studying
the main turning points in the interpretation of space during the history of science we can
observe with particular clarity how presuppositions render certain decisions on truth or
falsehood possible at all, and how the horizons in which decisions can take place are
changed, and indeed changed by reasonable arguments and certainIy not by pure arbitrariness.
As I have tried to show, for example, in the article already mentioned on "'Theorie und
Empiric," this means that only hypothetical recta-sentences of the following kind can be
empirically true or f a l s e : " I f this or that geometry, then this or that physics," and the
other way around. The fact that we begin with the one or the other, however, can only be
explained in the context of the system which existed before these sometimes revolutionary
changes.
11 Cf. also my article " U b e r die Philosophic der Wirklichkeit in der Quantenmechanik'"

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 REILATIVISM AND PROGRESS IN SCIENCE

(see footnote 5).

1:~ Cf. K. Hiibner, "Theorie und Empirie" (see footnote a).
18 These concepts have already been introduced in my article "Philosophische Fragen der
Zukunftsforschung" (see footnote 3)-
14 The first scientist to recognize this kind of corruption intuitively was Thucydides when
he called " f c c ~ a ~ (hopeless confusion) the real evil of his epoch, the epoch in which
Homeric harmony had perished once and for all.
15 A number of papers and books have been written on the problem of scientific progress
during the last few years, such as those by Lakatos, Feyerabend, and Stegmtiller. See es-
pecially Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. by Lakatos and Musgrave, Cambridge,
University Press x97o, and W. Stegmiiller, Theorienstruktur und Theoriendynamik, Springer
2973. It is impossible to dscuss them here, where I wish to confine myself to developing my
own ideas on this topic. I hope to publish some articles later on, however, in which I will try
to show where I agree and where I disagree with the philosophers mentioned above.

413