ND Journal of Political Science Spring 2024

Spring 2024
Notre Dame
Journal of
Political Science
Bupe Lughano Kabaghe, Olivia Hrivnak, Aid, Katherine Gottemoller,

Advocacy or Family Democracy, and Growth Restraining an Ally: U.S.
Relations? Response to Israel’s Crisis
Exploring Pathways for of Democracy
Women into the Zambian
National Assembly
Anna Gazewood, The Tyler Leonard, LIV Golf

Autism Spectrum and and the Campaign for
Public Policy: How Social Sportswashing:
Construction Impacts An Analytical Approach to
Efficacy NGO Success Using Sport
as a Political Tool
Notre Dame Journal of Political Science Spring 2024
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NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 2

Notre Dame Journal of Political Science 2023–2024

STAFF
_________________________
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Angela McCarthy
Editor-in-Chief
Timothy Sullivan
Deputy Editors-in-Chief
Abigail Keaney
Julia McCann
Digital Editors Marketing Editors

Anne Rehill Andrew Ryan
Sakura Yamanaka Maeve O’Shaughnessy
Yamilka Moreno
Adrian Zheng Reviewers
Matthew Bourke Doherty
Content Editors Elizabeth Bernath
Colly Urdan Molly Griffith
Julia Thomalla Matthew Amante
Lauren Cottrell Bryce Bustamante
Nathan Brower Mattison Knobloch
Zachary Geiger Liam Kelly
Mackenzie Olsen
Contributing Writers
Anne Rehill
Edward Nagler
Marko Gural
Michael Donelan
Kendall Manning
Catalina Scheider Galiñanes
Kurowei Indiamaowei

Call for Papers
The Notre Dame Journal of Political Science will soon be soliciting papers from Notre
Dame undergraduates! If you are proud of a paper from one of your classes or seminars,
research projects, or even independent study, please submit it via the submission
instructions which will be released in the Fall of 2025. Excerpts or drafts from in-
progress senior theses are also welcome, and you may submit multiple papers if desired.
Selected papers will be edited in collaboration with a team of Notre Dame students and
published in a scholarly volume by the end of the Fall semester. This is a perfect
opportunity to add a publication to your resume, and it is exclusive to Notre Dame
students. You may reach out through the contact page of our website,
https://sites.nd.edu/beyond-politics/contact-us/, with any questions.

Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,
I am excited to share the Spring 2024 edition of the Notre Dame Journal of Political
Science. This project required the efforts of many staff members to whom I am deeply
indebted. These include the Deputy Editors-in-Chief who have served crucial roles
assisting me in leading this Journal, the Content Editors and Reviewers who selected
and edited the wonderful pieces in this edition, the Digital Editors who have labored to
flesh out a whole new website to highlight undergraduate writing, the Contributing
Writers who filled said website with high-quality works of political analysis, and the
Marketing Editors who built upon last semester’s incredible design in exciting new ways.
The efforts of these individuals have strongly positioned the Journal for success in the
years to come.
In this edition, we were fortunate to receive a multitude of excellent submissions which

span the gamut of political science research conducted by the undergraduates of the
University of Notre Dame. These include topics covering the means of overcoming
barriers to female political representation in Zambia, the relationship between
democracy and aid effectiveness in recipient nations, an analysis of the factors
contributing to a patchwork of federal and state government support programs for
autism, the methods and effectiveness of NGO ‘sportswashing’ schemes through the case
study of Saudi Arabia’s LIV Golf league, and finally an assessment of how Israel’s recent
internal democratic troubles may feed into a foreign policy program which is misaligned
with US interests in Southwest Asia.
While I am saddened to see my time with Beyond Politics come to an end after 4 years
of involvement, I am assured that its future is a bright one indeed. Under the leadership
of next year’s Co-Editors in Chief Marko Gural, a current Contributing Writer, and
Zachary Geiger, a current Content Editor, the 2024-2025 iterations of the Journal will
only continue to build upon earlier foundations. I am excited to see the bigger and better
things which still lie ahead for this organization.
Again, this journal would not be possible without the dedicated work of our staff.
Additionally, special thanks are due to Dr. Angela McCarthy, our faculty advisor, whose
advice, guidance, and constant support has been crucial to the Journal’s success over the
past academic year. On behalf of all of us at the Notre Dame Journal of Political Science,
we hope you enjoy this publication.
Timmy Sullivan
Editor-in-Chief

Contents
Advocacy or Family Relations? Exploring Pathways for Women into the

Zambian National Assembly…………………………………………………………….……7
Bupe Lughano Kabaghe
Edited by Zachary Geiger, Molly Griffith and Matthew Bourke Doherty
Aid, Democracy, and Growth…………………………………………………….…….…..29

Olivia Hrivnak
Edited by Colly Urdan, Liam Kelly and Mackenzie Olsen
The Autism Spectrum and Public Policy: How Social Construction Impacts
Efficacy…………………………………………...………………………..………………..…….40
Anna Gazewood
Edited by Julia Thomalla and Bryce Bustamante
LIV Golf and the Campaign for Sportswashing: An Analytical Approach to

NGO Success Using Sport as a Political Tool…………………………….………….53
Tyler Leonard
Edited by Nathan Brower and Matthew Amante
Restraining an Ally: U.S. Response to Israel’s Crisis of Democracy….….…64

Katherine Gottemoller
Edited by Lauren Cottrell, Mattison Knobloch and Elizabeth Bernath

Advocacy or Family
Relations?
Exploring Pathways for
Women into the Zambian
National Assembly
Bupe Lughano Kabaghe

Key Words: National Assembly of Zambia, experience when they tell their families that they
women, Member of Parliament (MP), family want to run for political office.
LIST OF ACRONYMS In Zambia, women currently comprise fifteen

percent of the Zambian National Assembly,
MP Member of Parliament marking a decline from its peak of eighteen percent
VP Vice President between 2016 and 2019. Political scientists
UNIP United National Independence Party attribute this low female representation to factors
MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy such as resource mobilization1, socialization2, and
PF Patriotic Front institutional structures3. While existing research in
UPND United Party for National Development Africa has explored aspects of institutional design,
LEGICO Legislative Council such as quotas, political party incentives, and
ECZ Electoral Commission of Zambia women’s movements to enhance women’s political
WPC Women’s Parliamentary Caucus participation, little is known about the specific
CWPC Commonwealth Women’s Parliamentary factors contributing to women’s success in contexts
Caucus without quotas. This raises the crucial question: do
SADC-PF Southern African Development the same theoretical frameworks of resource
Community Parliamentary Forum mobilization, political socialization, and
RWPC Regional Women’s Parliamentary Caucus institutional factors explain women’s political
(RWPC) representation in Zambia? Going into the field for
NA National Assembly my research, I hypothesized that the Zambia
National Women’s Lobby, the foremost advocacy
INTRODUCTION group for increased women’s participation and
representation at all levels of decision-making,
During a conversation with a high school classmate serves as the primary pathway for Zambian women
in Zambia, I mentioned that I wanted to become a to enter Parliament.
politician one day. He looked at me about to break
into laughter and told me that “politics is not for In this paper, I position the Zambian case in these
women.” The reaction and response I received from three theoretical frameworks to answer the
that classmate is not too different from the questions: what are some of the social and
reactions that women Members of Parliament monetary barriers that make it difficult for women
to run for political office as MPs? Additionally,
1 M.Y. Yoon, “Explaining Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29
(2004): 447-468, https://doi.org/10.3162/036298004X201258; M. Ohman and C. Lintari, “Political party financing and
equal participation of women in Kenyan electoral politics: a situation overview,” International institute for democracy
and Netherlands institute for multi-party democracy, 2015, https://www.idea.int.
2 Nankyung Choi, "Women’s political pathways in Southeast Asia," International Feminist Journal of Politics 21, no. 2
(2019): 224-248; Brian D. Feinstein, “The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2010): 571–98, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25750402.
3 Aili Mari Tripp and Alice Kang, “The global impact of quotas: On the fast track to increased female legislative
representation,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 3 (2008): 338-361; Amanda Clayton, “Women’s Political
Engagement Under Quota-Mandated Female Representation: Evidence From a Randomized Policy Experiment,”
Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 3 (2015): 333–69, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014548104; Gisela Geisler,
“Sisters under the Skin: Women and the Women’s League in Zambia,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 25, no. 1
(1987): 43-45, 59; Gisela Geisler, “Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa, Case Studies from
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana,” African Affairs 94 (1995): 576-577; Gisela Geisler, “‘A second liberation’: lobbying for
women's political representation in Zambia, Botswana and Namibia,” Journal of Southern African Studies 32, no.1
(2006): 69-84.

what are the channels through which women 2021, defeating the incumbent President Edgar
succeed in becoming MPs in the Zambia National Lungu of the PF.
Assembly? To answer my research questions, I
contextualize Zambia within the larger body of Zambia has a presidential system of governance,
political science literature, discussing the where the President holds the positions of the head
challenges and motivations for women to of state, head of government, and leader of the
participate in political leadership. I argue that multiparty system. As the head of state, the
family ties are the most important pathway for President represents the country both domestically
women into Parliament and conclude that the and internationally. In his capacity as head of
Zambia National Women’s Lobby has not been an government, he is responsible for the
effective pathway for women into the NA. administration and governance of the country.
Lastly, as the leader of the multiparty system, the
The objective of my research is to identify and President plays a central role as leader of the ruling
understand the specific pathways that enable party. The country has three branches of
women to enter the adoption process and be elected government: the Executive, Legislature, and
to the legislature. I aim to demonstrate the Judiciary. The Executive branch comprises the
importance of family relations on women’s President and Cabinet, the Legislature includes the
representation in Zambia, which has received little National Assembly, and the Judiciary comprises the
attention in political science literature. Supreme Court, High Courts, Magistrates’ Courts,
and Local Courts.
BACKGROUND
My research focuses on Zambia’s National
Zambia, a nation located in Southern Africa, boasts Assembly, which is the country’s unicameral
a population of over 19 million as of 20224. Forty- legislative body with 156 members who are directly
nine percent of the population are men, and fifty- elected in single-member constituencies. The
one percent are women. Zambia gained its political President of Zambia has the prerogative to
independence from Britain on October 24th, 1964, nominate up to eight MPs and the VP, Speaker, and
under the leadership of Kenneth David Kaunda. It Deputy Speaker of the House are ex officio
remained a one-party state until 1991 when it members 5. This brings the total number of
transitioned into a multi-party democracy. This Members of Parliament to 167. Women only hold
transition marked the beginning of a stable 25, or fifteen percent, of these seats. Furthermore,
democratic system with regular elections. of the 25 women in the NA, only 21 are elected
members, making up thirteen and half percent of
The country has had nine democratically-elected
presidents, and its political landscape has been the elected MPs. The current VP, Speaker of the
House, and Deputy Speaker of the House are all
dominated by four political parties: UNIP was in
women, and the president nominated 1 other
power from 1964 to 1991, the MMD controlled the
government from 1996 to 2011, the PF was in power woman, making the total of women MPs 25.
from 2011 to 2021, and currently, the UPND is the In Africa, women’s legislative representation was
majority party. The UPND is led by President 0.94 percent in 1990, the lowest in the world. With
Hakainde Hichilema, who was elected in August the wave of democratization6, women’s
4 Zambia Statistics Agency, “2022 Census of Population and Housing Preliminary Report,” Zambia Statistics Agency,
December 2023, https://www.zamstats.gov.zm/.
5 An ex officio member is a member of parliament who is part of it by virtue of holding another office.
6 The wave of democratization that happened when multiparty elections in most African countries were introduced during
the 1990s.

representation increased to 7.78 percent and Since independence, the number of women in the
doubled from the 7.78 percent to 14 percent by NA has grown from 6 to 25. While there has been
20077. The participation of women in the pre- an upward growth in the number of women in
independence era of Zambia is poorly documented Parliament, the ratio of men to women in relation
because of “the domination of male to the population is still a matter of concern. The
parliamentarians in the Legislative Council8 that dismal amount of women in the NA is even more
ran from 1924 to 1964; and the cultural system troubling because the trajectory of women’s
then, which did not favor the recognition of women representation in Parliament has been
as leaders”9. The existing National Assembly characterized by fluctuations rather than a
literature tells us that women’s active political consistent upward trend. Beginning at 10 percent in
participation as members of political parties can be 1997 and 2001, the percentage of women MPs saw
traced back to pre-independence times in the incremental increases to 12 percent in 2002-2004,
1950’s through the UNIP Women’s League10. 13 percent in 2005, and 15 percent in 2006.
However, this progress reversed and women
Following Zambia’s political independence in 1964, representation declined to 11 percent in 2014,
the Government displayed a keen interest in followed by a remarkable surge to 18 percent
fostering opportunities for women to serve as between 2014 and 2016. Subsequently, the
parliamentarians. Some women ran on the UNIP percentage remained relatively stable from 2016 to
ticket and the majority were elected unopposed, 2019, then declined to 17 percent in 2020, and
while others were nominated to serve as MPs11. It further dropped to 15 percent from 2021 to the
was difficult for women to be involved in politics present. These figures starkly contrast with the
because “if women wanted to join in whatever little representation of male MPs, highlighting the
part they were given in politics, men had to be persistent disparity in gender representation within
pleased, and equitable policies had to be begged the Parliament.
for”12. Therefore, between 1924 and 1964, only
three women served as parliamentarians in the
Legislative Council13. In 1964, when the Zambian
people achieved their independence from the
British, 6 women served in Parliament, 4 were
elected and 2 were nominated14. Following its
independence, Zambia saw women in national
political leadership and had active political
participation amongst Zambian women more
broadly for the first time.
7 Jane L Parpart, "Women and the State in Africa," The Precarious Balance, Routledge, (2019): 208-230.
8 These were councils that existed in British colonies. They were an executive and administrative body for the governor
and approved and implemented executive acts. They are similar to what is now known as the National Assembly of
Zambia.
9 National Assembly of Zambia, Research Department, “An Insight into the Evolution of the Zambian Parliament,” 2022,
55.
10 Gisela Geisler, “Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa, Case Studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Botswana,” African Affairs 94 (1995): 576-577.

11 National Assembly of Zambia, “An Insight into the Evolution of the Zambian Parliament,” 41-60.
12 Gisela Geisler, “Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa, Case Studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and
Botswana,” African Affairs 94 (1995): 576-577.

13 National Assembly of Zambia, “An Insight into the Evolution of the Zambian Parliament,” 55.
14 National Assembly of Zambia Parliamentary Debates (1964 -1973).

Division within the Office of the President. This

division coordinates and monitors the effective
implementation of gender policies with government
ministries and cooperating partners18.
With low numbers of women in the NA, there is a

pressing need for an increase in their
representation. Various initiatives are ongoing
within Parliament, such as advocacy by the WPC.
These initiatives aim to increase the number of
women elected as members of Parliament and
promote women’s and girls’ empowerment.
15
Despite the presence of a Gender Division and

The Zambian Constitution dictates gender equality Women Parliamentarians caucus, the low
and the equal rights of men and women to shape representation of women in the NA remains a
the country’s political, legal, economic, and social critical concern. In other countries, quotas have
direction16. In 2014, the National Gender Policy was increased women’s representation 19. Zambia,
revised to address gender imbalances, reinforcing unlike several other African countries like Rwanda,
the call for equal opportunities for women and men Namibia, and South Africa, does not have a gender
in national development. The Gender Equity and quota for its NA. Consequently, these other African
Equality Act of 2015 strengthened the legal countries have a higher number of women in their
framework to eradicate all forms of discrimination national parliaments. For instance, in 2022, women
against women and girls17. held 61.25 percent of seats in the Rwandan
Parliament and occupied 44.3 percent and 45.61
In 2012, the ministry responsible for gender issues
percent of seats in Namibia and South African,
was established by merging the Gender in
respectively20. Gisela21 argues that women’s
Development Division of the Cabinet Office with
lobbying and advocacy groups often contribute to
the Child Development Department. Under
increasing the number of women represented in
President Edgar Lungu in 2016, this body was
parliaments.
renamed the Ministry of Gender. The current
president, H.E. Hakainde Hichilema, dissolved the Established in 1991, the Zambia National Women’s
Ministry of Gender, reverting to the Gender Lobby, a non-partisan, non-profit, and
15 Statista Data, “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in Africa as of 2022, by country,” published by
Saifaddin Galal, Sep 22, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1248493/percentage-of-women-in-national-
parliaments-in-african-countries/.
16 The Constitution of Zambia Act, 2016, Government Printer, 2016.
17 Ministry of Gender and Child Development, 2015, 2019
18 Gender Division, 2023. https://www.gender.gov.zm/?p=6634.
19 Drude Dahlerup, "Increasing women’s political representation: New trends in gender quotas," Women in Parliament:
Beyond Numbers 141 (2005).

20 Statista Data, “Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments in Africa as of 2022, by country,” published
by Saifaddin Galal, Sep 22, 2023 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1248493/percentage-of-women-in-national-

parliaments-in-african-countries/.
21 Gisela Geisler, “Sisters under the Skin: Women and the Women’s League in Zambia,” The Journal of Modern African
Studies 25, no. 1 (1987): 43-45, 59; Gisela Geisler, “Troubled Sisterhood: Women and Politics in Southern Africa, Case
Studies from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana,” in African Affairs 94, no. 377 (1995): 576-577; Gisela Geisler, “‘A second
liberation’: lobbying for women's political representation in Zambia, Botswana and Namibia,” Journal of Southern
African Studies 32, no. 1 (2006): 69-84.

membership-driven non-governmental Political scientists have long sought to understand

organization, has historically played a vital role in the factors that influence women’s involvement in
women’s representation and participation in political activities, as this work is crucial to the
politics. The Lobby’s mandate is to promote the cause of advancing gender equality and
representation and participation of women at all strengthening democratic institutions. I investigate
levels of decision-making through advocating for female political involvement in the Zambian
equality, lobbying for legislation in favor of equal legislature by exploring the role of critical feminist
representation, and capacity building for women. resource mobilization, political socialization, and
These efforts aim to empower women and enable institutional theories as key theoretical frameworks.
them to influence decisions on developmental and
governmental issues22. Margaret Conway, a political scientist who studies
the effects of gender and race on political
While the existing literature23 of Zambian women participation and behavior, defines political
in Parliament explains the role of the Women’s participation as “those activities of citizens that
Lobby, it is limited in answering my research attempt to influence the structure of government,
question because there has been a shift in the the selection of government authorities, or the
programming of the Lobby because of funding: policies of government”24. Research shows that
what are the channels through which women attain there are gendered differences in the political
positions as Members of Parliament in the Zambia interest and participation of adolescent
National Assembly? To develop my argument, I populations25. Variations between boys and girls
analyze the barriers and motivations for politically- influence their future participation in politics, such
minded women related to resource mobilization, as running for political office. I look to critical
political socialization, and institutional and feminist theory, institutional theory, resource
feminist theories. theory, and socialization theory to explain the
participation of women in the Zambian legislative
LITERATURE REVIEW government and answer the questions: What
To understand the pathways for women into the barriers do Zambian women experience as they run
for office? How do they counter these barriers?
Zambian National Assembly, we first need to
examine the theories that explain the general Critical feminist theory focuses on power structures
participation and representation of women in and patriarchal norms as barriers to women’s
political leadership. I draw on American and South political participation. I use it as a framework to
Asian literature to explain the case of Zambia. The analyze institutions, resources, and socialization to
biggest void within the literature that my work understand how institutions and power structures
seeks to fill is the limited scholarship explaining the function. Scholars have critiqued traditional gender
importance of social relationships, particularly roles, stereotypes, and societal inequalities as
family ties, within the Zambian political landscape. impediments to women's access to political power.
Key works by feminist theorist Bell Hooks26 critique
traditional notions of power and leadership in
22 Zambia National Women’s Lobby 2023. https://www.facebook.com/ZambiaNationalWomensLobbyZnwl/.

23 Ibid.
24 M. Margaret Conway, “Women and Political Participation,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 34, no. 2 (2001): 231–33,
JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1350210.
25 Elvira Cicognani, et al, "Gender differences in youths’ political engagement and participation. The role of parents and of
adolescents’ social and civic participation," Journal of Adolescence 35, no. 3 (2012): 561-576.
26 Bell Hooks, “Feminism and Black Women’s Studies,” Sage 6, no. 1 (1989): 54; Bell Hooks, Feminist theory: From
margin to center (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

politics. Hooks27 challenges the idea that women report asserted that, “while Article 11 of the 2016
should acquiesce to existing power structures Constitution acknowledges equal rights regardless
dominated by men, advocating instead for the of gender or sex, Article 23 accepts personal and
creation of alternative forms of leadership that customary law that perpetuates unconstitutional
prioritize cooperation, empathy, and collective rules and disciplines for as long as they are
decision-making. In African societies, the accepted by an ethnic group(s) as customs or
subordination of women within patriarchal traditions”30. This contradiction in the laws,
societies significantly deters their political coupled with social prejudices and stereotypes, has
involvement and further discourages their seriously impeded the achievement of gender
candidacy within male-dominated political equality in all aspects of society31.
systems28.
Political gatekeepers such as political parties are
In addition to critical feminist theory, institutional other critical institutions in determining who can
theory highlights the significance of formal political successfully run for public office32. Caul33
institutions, such as constitutional and statutory emphasizes the significance of gender goals and
requirements, in shaping women’s participation in quotas within political party rules to boost women’s
politics. Many African countries grapple with representation in political bodies. Consequently,
discriminatory legal and cultural practices that the ideologies, agendas, internal rules, and
obstruct progress toward gender equality. Zambia’s localized nomination/adoption processes34 within
dual legal structure, comprising statutory and political parties all play critical roles in shaping
customary laws, often contradict each other and women’s political representation35.
perpetuate gender inequality29. Zambia’s Ministry
of Gender reported in its 2019 Progress Report that For many political scientists, quota systems, which
programs and strategies for gender equality are mandate a certain percentage of political positions
affected by the dual aspect of Zambian laws. The for women, represent a practical institutional
approach to enhancing women’s representation in
27 Hooks, Feminist theory: From margin to center.

28 Daniel Kasomo, “Factors Affecting Women Participation in Electoral Politics in Africa,” International Journal of
Psychology and Behavioural Sciences (2012): 57-63.
29 Mulela Margaret Munalula, “Dilemmas of Dual Justice Paradigms: Gender Inequality in the Zambian Courts,” Special
Edition Zam, LJ (2008): 33.

30 United Nations. “The Sustainable Development Goals Report.” 2022, pp. 36–38; SADC. “A SADC REGION-WIDE
STUDY ON CHALLENGES AFFECTING WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SADC REGION.” Shalestone
Elections and Governance Consultants submitted to SADC Parliamentary, 2023.
31 United Nations. “The Sustainable Development Goals Report.”
32 David Niven, "Party elites and women candidates: The shape of bias," Women & Politics 19, no. 2 (1998): 57-80; Pippa
Norris, “Legislative Recruitment,” in Comparing Democracies: Elections And Voting in Global Perspective, ed. L. LeDuc,
R. G. Niemi, and P. Norris (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996); Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski, Political recruitment:
Gender, race and class in the British Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Norris, Pippa, and
Mona Lena Krook, "Gender equality in elected office: A six-step action plan," (2011).
33 M Caul, “Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties,” Party Politics 5, no. 1 (1999), 79-98.
https://doi-org.proxy.library.nd.edu/10.1177/1354068899005001005.
34 Political party nomination and adoption refers to the process by which political parties select candidates to run for
elected positions, such as Members of Parliament. This process typically involves party members nominating potential
candidates, who are then vetted by party leadership and selection committees. Once approved, the selected candidates are
formally adopted by the party as its official representatives for the upcoming elections. The nomination and adoption
process determines who will be eligible to contest on behalf of the party and represents the party’s endorsement of a
particular candidate. In the Zambian context, the party leadership and nomination committees are mainly made up of
men.
35 Caul, “Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties.”

politics. Research has examined the effectiveness of participating in elections because political
quota systems in various countries, including campaigns are very costly.
African countries like Rwanda and South Africa.
Prominent studies by Dahlerup36 and Norris and Furthermore, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady41 stated
Krook37 have assessed the positive impact of quota that time, money, and skills are essential resources
systems on women’s political participation and in political participation. In this case, women’s
representation. They argue that quotas present an leagues and lobbying groups act as key resources
important strategy to promote gender equality in for women running for political office because of
elected officials. Okedele38 acknowledges that, their ability to provide campaigning materials and
while quotas have proven effective in countries like capacity-building42. Geisler’s43 research on barriers
Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda, their success faced by women within political parties and
depends on rigorous monitoring and evaluation. governments in Africa highlights the focus of
women’s lobbies on increasing women’s
In addition to institutions, limited resources representation in government rather than within
contribute to the low representation of women political parties themselves. This perspective
because campaigns are costly. Western and South remains relevant in the current study of women's
Asian scholars have identified a multitude of factors representation in Zambian politics, allowing for an
contributing to the persistently low number of analysis of the role of organizations like the
women in political leadership roles. Resource Women’s Lobby. This organization is the largest
mobilization theory posits that access to resources, women’s advocacy group in Zambia dedicated to
financial, play a pivotal role in determining promoting women’s representation and, therefore,
women’s involvement in politics. Scholars have plays a central role in supporting women on their
examined how financial support, access to the right journeys toward parliamentary leadership through
networks, and educational opportunities impact capability building and advocacy44.
women's political engagement. Yoon39 and Ohman
and Lintari40 emphasized the importance of Moreover, Kalinda and Chirwa45 underscore the
economic resources for mobilizing political critical contributions of NGOs like the Women’s
participation, asserting that, when economies are Lobby in nurturing and propelling individuals
low-performing or deteriorating, women suffer the toward elected political leadership positions. This
most from unemployment and limited access to organization can provide women with information
finances. Economic turmoil discourages them from and skills, access to networks, and campaign
materials such as posters and radio airtime. By
36 Drude Dahlerup, "The story of the theory of critical mass," Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 511-522.
37 Norris and Krook, "Gender equality in elected office: A six-step action plan.”
38 Adebusola Okedele, "Women, quotas, and affirmative action policies in Africa," The Palgrave Handbook of African
Women's Studies (2021): 449-463.

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Henry E. Brady, et al., “Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation,” The American Political Science
Review 89, no. 2 (1995): 271–94, JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082425.

42 The United Nations defines “capacity-building” as the process of developing and strengthening the skills, abilities,
processes and resources that communities or people need to survive, adapt, and thrive in a fast-changing world.
43 Gisela Geisler, “Sisters under the Skin: Women and the Women’s League in Zambia,” The Journal of Modern African
Studies 25, no. 1 (1987).

44 SADC. “A SADC REGION-WIDE STUDY ON CHALLENGES AFFECTING WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
THE SADC REGION” Shalestone Elections and Governance Consultants submitted to SADC Parliamentary, 2023.
45 Roy Kalinda and Chirwa Masauso, “Women’s Participation in key decision making institutions in Zambia: Case of three
arms of government: Legislature, Executive and The Judiciary,” Journal of Societal and Cultural Research 1, no. 3 (2015):
128-137.

facilitating women’s participation, these civil This notion holds true for women who have been
society organizations actively shape the landscape raised in households where their parents or
of political leadership and pave the way for greater grandparents are involved in politics. Growing up
gender equality in Zambian politics46. in such environments instills in women a
familiarity with political discourse and processes,
While feminist thought, institutions and resources fostering a natural inclination towards political
are crucial frameworks to analyze the engagement. This early exposure to political
representation of women in politics, I would also discussions within the family setting not only
would like to emphasize the importance of cultivates an interest in politics but also imbues
socialization in the Zambian case. Socialization women with a sense of civic duty and
refers to the lifelong process through which empowerment. As I further explore in my
individuals learn and internalize the norms, values, argument, familial socialization significantly
behaviors, and social roles of their culture or influences women’s aspirations to participate in
society. It typically occurs through interactions with politics, shaping their decision to pursue leadership
family, peers, educational institutions, media, and roles within the political sphere.
other social institutions. Socialization shapes
individuals’ understanding of themselves, their Furthermore, children whose parents protest and
identities, and their place within society, volunteer are more likely to engage in such
influencing their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. activities50. Specifically, Cicognani et al.51 find that
In their study of youth political participation in “adolescents’ political engagement and
Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, Asante, Richard, et participation are influenced by parents’
al.47 find that family and educational experiences participation, especially among girls”. As we will
are determinants for youth political engagement in see further in the paper, a significant number of
Africa. They draw on socialization literature that Zambian women parliamentarians have been
has emphasized that the type of family in which a influenced by their family members in their
child is socialized influences his or her political political journeys. Asante, Richard, et al.52
identity and attitudes48. Growing up in families emphasize how youth become socialized through
where political issues are regularly discussed their educational experiences. The authors give
fosters a natural inclination towards political examples of how a young person’s engagement in
engagement. As Asante, Richard, et al.49 aptly put “high-school clubs, hobby groups, and school
it, “In families where political issues are regularly government influences their long-term political
discussed, youth are more likely to vote, to engagement”53. This type of exposure gives young
volunteer, and to talk about politics with peers”. people skills in political communication,
46 Aili Mari Tripp and Joy C. Kwesiga, “The women's movement in Uganda: history, challenges, and prospects,” (2002).
47 Richard Asante, et al, “What motivates young African leaders for public engagement? Lessons from Ghana, Tanzania,
and Uganda,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 34, (2020): 309-333.
48 Jennings and Niemi 1974; Quintelier 2013; Andolina et al. 2003 qt in Asante, Richard, et al. What motivates young
African leaders for public engagement? Lessons from Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda." International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 34 (2020): 309-333.
49 Ibid.
50 R. E. Klatch, A generation divided: the new left, the new right, and the 1960s (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1999); Elvira Cicognani, et al, “Gender differences in youths’ political engagement and participation. The role of
parents and of adolescents’ social and civic participation,” Journal of Adolescence 35, no. 3 (2012): 561-576.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Beck and Jennings 1982 as quoted in Asante, Richard, et al.. “What motivates young African leaders for public
engagement? Lessons from Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 34
(2020): 309-333.

networking, mobilization, and knowledge of 5. Women's Lobby of Zambia: I interviewed 1

different political issues54. Therefore, the representative who works for the Women’s
background that an individual comes from plays a Lobby.
significant part in their political participation and
motivation to run for political office. 6. Unsuccessful Women Candidates: I
interviewed 2 women who aspired to
METHODS political positions but were not elected.
To answer my research questions: what are some of 7. Other Stakeholders: I interviewed 3 other
the social and monetary barriers that make it stakeholders, including a male MP, a
difficult for women to run for political office as representative from the office of the
MPs? And, what are the channels through which Speaker, and an office barrier at the
women succeed in becoming MPs in the Zambian National Assembly of Zambia.
Parliament? I conducted my research in Lusaka,
Zambia, at the National Assembly, over six weeks, Interview Approach
spanning from May 29, 2023, to July 10, 2023. I carried out semi-structured interviews at the
During this period, I interviewed 26 key
National Assembly of Zambia. These interviews
stakeholders in the political scene in Zambia. I
began conversationally, fostering a comfortable
conducted 30 to 90-minute interviews in English,
environment for the interviewee. This approach
which shed light on the pathways to political
was essential to ensure the willingness of the
leadership for Zambian women. I interviewed the
parliamentarians to share their opinions and
following individuals: personal information.
1. Women Parliamentarians: Of the 25 women
After the conversational start, I transitioned into a
parliamentarians, I interviewed 16. semi-structured format with a standardized set of
2. Female Secretary Generals of Political questions. These questions aimed at gathering
Parties: I interviewed 2 individuals holding information regarding the obstacles that the
these positions within their respective interviewees faced before and during their election
parties. campaigns.
3. SADC Parliamentary Forum Representative: I maintained the same interview structure with the
I interviewed a representative from the Women’s Lobby representatives, the unsuccessful
Southern Africa Development Community women candidates, and the leaders of political
(SADC) Parliamentary Forum. parties.
4. Advocates for Women's Representation: I Participant Observation

interviewed 1 advocate who is actively
In addition to interviews, I observed parliamentary
involved in promoting women's
debates and interacted with the members of
representation in Zambia. Parliament. This approach provided valuable
insights into the dynamics between female
parliamentarians and their male counterparts.
Participant observation enabled access to a wide
54Thomas H. Sander and Robert D. Putnam, “Still bowling alone? The post-9/11 split,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1
(2010), 9–16; Thomas Yarrow, “Maintaining independence: the moral ambiguities of personal relations amongst
Ghanaian development workers,” in A.-M. Fecher & H. Hindman (Eds.), Inside the everyday lives of development
workers: the challenges and futures of aidland (Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2011), 41-58.

range of information that extended beyond the DISCUSSION

semi-structured interviews, offering a deeper
understanding of the political environment. Challenges and Barriers
Considerations and Biases While Zambian women are motivated to attain

political office, this journey comes with challenges
As I interviewed my subjects, I withheld my full and barriers. Intimidation, name-calling, male
name. Interviewees might have responded dominance, and financial constraints are common
differently knowing my family names because they challenges that women face. These challenges make
are recognizable in the political environment in it difficult for women to run for office, campaign
Zambia. I introduced myself by my first and middle successfully, and win elections. MP 1855 said, “The
name without stating my family name or explaining problem is the culture.” Cultural norms deeply
my political family background. The unintentional rooted in Zambia’s patriarchal society manifest in a
revelation of my family name and background led variety of ways. For example, women are told that
to a noticeable shift in how interviewees treated me politics is “for men,” just like the story that I
and their willingness to participate, thereby recounted earlier in this paper. The women that I
validating my approach. interviewed were all adopted by various political
parties to run for office despite the gender
It is important to stress that despite these stereotypes and the discouragement that comes
considerations, the methods that I employed with it, showcasing their personal resilience
remain robust and valid. There were only 5 cases Therefore, the obstacles I want to focus on are not
when my family name was revealed and the gender stereotypes—the “soft” factors—but rather
interviewees still provided me with seemingly the “hard,” more tangible challenges that women
candid opinions. The connections that I formed encounter after deciding to run for office.
provided a unique window into the experiences of
the interviewees, offering a depth of insight that The opposition (who are mainly men) employ the
might have been challenging to access otherwise. strategy of character assassination, particularly
through social media, to discredit women
My positionality as a Zambian woman with political candidates. MP 356 said, “I was attacked, as a
connections and aspirations, rather than being a woman you know . . . social media was harsh, they
hindrance, actually served as a bridge. It created an will strip you off naked.” This form of attack not
environment of shared experiences, which only undermines the credibility of women as
encouraged interviewees to open up and share their leaders but perpetuates harmful gender
stories more candidly. In essence, it facilitated a stereotypes. The women with whom I spoke all
level of vulnerability that enriched the responses. experienced some form of character assassination,
and they attest to feeling discouraged to a greater
This paper underscores the importance of
recognizing the personal dynamics in research degree than their male counterparts while
while reinforcing the validity of the methods campaigning.
employed. In the end, the methods I employ serve The findings also underscore the negative impact of
as a testament to the depth and authenticity of the campaign violence.57 Campaign violence poses a
gathered insights. significant barrier to women’s meaningful
participation in politics, exacerbating existing
55Interview with MP 18 conducted on 15th June, 2023.

56Interview with MP 2 conducted on 15th June, 2023.
57Any acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in
the context of electoral competition.

inequalities and perpetuating a hostile environment over 20 times this monthly average income on their
for female candidates. MP 958 highlighted the campaigns. This stark contrast underscores the
pervasive nature of campaign violence, citing financial magnitude involved in political
instances where men utilize social media platforms campaigning, rendering it a pursuit feasible for only
to issue threats of violence against women a privileged few.
candidates. She asserted, “I think the political space
in our country is not favorable for women. You This financial barrier poses a significant challenge,
know, there’s a lot of name-calling, there’s a lot of particularly for women aspiring to engage in
violence against women, verbal, even abuse.” This politics. In interviews with women
alarming reality underscores the broader challenges parliamentarians, all of them emphasized the
faced by women in the political arena, as they financial constraints to run a campaign. This
navigate a landscape rife with intimidation, verbal obstacle becomes even more pronounced for
abuse, and physical attacks. The prevalence of such women who lack robust family support or a
violence not only undermines women’s safety and substantial career that could serve as a source of
well-being but also diminishes their confidence and financing. The financial demands of political
agency to engage in political activities. campaigns thus emerge as a critical factor limiting
Furthermore, the fear of reprisals and the specter of the participation of women in the political arena.
violence serve as powerful deterrents, dissuading Lastly, all of the women interviewed regardless of
many women from entering politics or contesting
political party identified the process of nomination
elections altogether. and adoption by parties as another significant
Additionally, running a political campaign in challenge in their political journey. MP 21
Zambia requires ample financial resources. emphasized the difficulty of adoption and
Finances are the largest barrier that women face in nomination, citing excessive monetary transactions
their political careers. The various resources and an unfair process that gave undue preference to
important for a successful campaign are, but are people, mainly men who were financial or
not limited to, ECZ fees which cost about K13500 politically influential. This sentiment was also
($535), campaign costs (transport, party regalia, echoed by the two aspiring candidates from
etc.), and human resources. According to the different parties, both of whom asserted that the
Westminster Foundation, the cost of running a nomination and adoption process is often marred
political campaign in Zambia ranges from $30,000 by irregularities. One interviewee explained that the
to $50,000 and even higher. This cost variation is process lacks transparency, is susceptible to
influenced by factors such as the geographical corruption, and that committees often pre-
location within the country, the political party determine their nominees before conducting
involved, and the duration of the campaign59. interviews. One woman highlighted the importance
of political connections in the process. All the
To put this immense political expenditure into women that I interviewed shared these sentiments.
perspective, the average monthly earnings in
Zambia stood at $211 in December of 202160. The sentiments of women towards the nomination
During the same year, political candidates spent and adoption process establishes political parties as
the ultimate gatekeepers for political participation,
58 Interview with MP 9 conducted on 7th June, 2023.

59 Michael Wahman, “The Cost of Politics in Zambia: Implications for political participation and development,”
Westminster Foundation for Democracy, March 2023, www.wfd.org/what-we-do/resources/cost-politics-zambia.
60 Zambia Monthly Earnings,” Zambia Monthly Earnings, 2017 – 2023 | CEIC Data, 2021.
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/zambia/monthly-
earnings#:~:text=What%20was%20Zambia’s%20Monthly%20Earnings,table%20below%20for%20more%20data.

influencing who runs for office and who does not, resources, networks, and connections outside the
irrespective of gender as argued by Niven1998, family sphere. First, financial resources have a huge
Norris 1997, and Norris and Lovenduski 1999. In impact on political participation. As previously
interviews with the Secretaries General of political mentioned, it costs between $30,000 and $50,000
parties, it became evident that party policies play a to run a campaign in the 2021 elections. Men, on
pivotal role in determining the adoption of average, may have greater access to financial
candidates. A representative from one political resources, including personal wealth, inheritance,
party emphasized her party’s commitment to and business connections, which can facilitate their
gender inclusivity, noting that gender experts political campaigns and activities. In their study of
formulated policies to increase the number of developing countries, Deere and Doss62 show that
adopted women candidates, a goal they claim to women often do not share in the wealth of men,
have achieved. In contrast, the other political party even within the same household or family. This
lacks deliberate policies, resulting in significantly financial disparity is due to factors such as
lower numbers of adopted women candidates. inheritance law that most times does not favor the
These gender disparities exist between parties women and this limits access to capital. In addition
because the Zambian government does not to this gendered-financial variance, men often have
constitutionally mandate political parties to have wider social networks and connections beyond the
equal gender representation; they just encourage it. family, including influential contacts in business,
academia, and the political sphere. These networks,
My analysis of institutions goes beyond political which are usually built from their experience in
parties. The absence of deliberate efforts to increase schools and at work, provide access to valuable
women’s representation in Parliament and the resources, support, and opportunities for political
language of the Constitution are other barriers for advancement. In traditional Zambian culture, the
women in political leadership. Article 259 (b) of the women’s role has been more confined as women
Zambian Constitution states, “Where a person is who often have large networks with men are viewed
empowered to make a nomination or an as promiscuous. Therefore, men are a part of more
appointment to a public office, that person shall social groups than women, and this provides them
ensure— that fifty percent of each gender is access and resources that are not reachable to
nominated or appointed from the total available women. Men, particularly those from affluent
positions unless it is not practicable to do so” 61 This backgrounds, may have access to influential male
article does not compel political parties or peers who can provide financial support, strategic
governments to do so, and it is often disregarded advice, and endorsements for their political
especially at the nomination and adoption levels. endeavors. These rich male friends come from the
Therefore, the absence of deliberate policies within very networks I discuss above.
political parties shows a significant variation in
adoption rates based on the existence of gender- Motivations
sensitive policies.
During the semi-structured interviews with MPs,
It is essential to recognize the inherent gender familial influences were a central aspect of their
disparities that exist within the political sphere. motivations for entering politics. This recurring
While both men and women may benefit from pattern underscored the significance of family ties
familial networks and connections, men often have in shaping political aspirations. Consequently, it
certain advantages over women in terms of
61The Constitution of Zambia Act, 2016, Government Printer, 2016.

62Carmen Diana Deere and Doss Cheryl R., “Gender and the distribution of wealth in developing countries,” No.
2006/115. WIDER Research Paper, 2006.

prompted me to further explore the role of family thought of going back to the village because I
background in women’s political trajectories. thought it’s underdeveloped. It needs my presence,
at least maybe my voice and my contribution will
Family connections are important for several change the landscape of that place. Hence, it made
reasons. First, family connections and background me decide to stand as a Member of Parliament.” MP
shape political views. The influence of women’s 567 shared that she had worked in maternal health
upbringing has shaped their desire for political care assistance before she was an MP. She built a
engagement. MP 263 stated that she joined politics maternity ward in a hospital because she did not
because she was inspired by the “great” work of late have access to one when she became pregnant
President Micheal Sata and her grandfather who many years ago. These narratives highlight a
was not a politician himself but an influential figure selfless commitment to community development
in the political landscape. Another woman asserted and service, dispelling notions of power-hungry
that “my father was a politician . . . my journey in ambitions. The emphasis on helping others,
Foreign Service prepared me to become a Member especially in areas where they have personal
of parliament” (MP 864). Notably, family experiences, reinforces the notion that women in
backgrounds emerge as the most significant politics prioritize societal impact over personal
motivator for women to run for office. 10 power.
interviewees pointed to political role models within
their family who influenced their decisions to enter Pathways for Women into the National Assembly
politics as well. Various family members play a of Zambia
pivotal role in inspiring and mentoring these
women. The familial support serves not only as Not only is family background an important
motivation but also as a crucial route into political motivator for women to join politics, it also
careers. emerges as a pivotal pathway for women into the
Zambian National Assembly. This dismisses my
If women did not have family ties with people in hypothesis that advocacy groups, particularly the
politics, it would make it significantly harder for Women’s Lobby, serve as the central pathways for
them to not only participate in elected positions but women to participate in Zambian politics. My
also develop an interest in politics. Cicognani et research uncovered that current women
al.65 explains, “Adolescents, especially girls’ parliamentarians have not received substantive
participation and engagement in politics are support from advocacy groups, particularly the
influenced by parents’ participation.” Therefore, Women’s Lobby. In the interviews, women MPs
women’s entry into political leadership positions expected the financial backing and a visible display
would likely be further hindered if they do not of support and solidarity in the media from the
develop the interest in the first place, as family Women’s Lobby. When asked if they had received
backgrounds often serve as a crucial stepping stone any support from the Women’s Lobby, only twenty
for political opportunities. percent of the women acknowledged receiving
support in terms of campaign regalia, but there was
Moreover, these women have a genuine desire to no other substantial assistance. The majority of the
serve and bring about positive change in their
communities. For example, MP 1866 explained, “I

64 Interview with MP 8 conducted on 21st June, 2023.
65 Ibid.

MPs expressed that advocacy groups played an From my observations at the National Assembly of
insignificant role in their path to becoming MPs. Zambia, a significant number of men also hail from
political family backgrounds. However, for the sake
During interviews with representatives from two of this study, I focus on why family backing is
advocacy groups, they informed me that, as non- disproportionately more important for women than
governmental organizations, they primarily rely on men because of the resources that are accessible to
grants and, as a result, lack the financial resources men more than women. I argue that these familial
to provide direct support to women MPs. Moreover, connections serve as a powerful pathway for
the grants they receive are earmarked for specific women, affording women access to critical
projects, limiting the extent to which advocacy resources, networks, and information crucial for
groups can influence the representation of women navigating and succeeding in elections.
in Parliament. 2 women MP’s said they received
campaign posters once or twice and radio airtime In the literature section, I highlighted the
from Women’s Lobby, but the rest stated that they importance of family political engagement as a
did not receive any assistance from the advocacy motivator for future political participation and an
groups. Therefore, the perceived value of advocacy influencer of political identity69. Here socialization
groups, particularly the Women’s Lobby, as a viable is much more than that: it is about name
channel for women’s entry into political leadership recognition, legitimacy, and access to networks and
diminishes because of its lack of support of women financial resources. It is particularly important in
MPs. Zambia where it is difficult for women to run for
elections and win because of a lack of quotas,
In the absence of advocacy groups, particularly the political party gatekeeping, and high financial costs.
Women’s Lobby, as a viable pathway, an essential
question arises: what are the pathways available for Name recognition plays a significant role in
women to gain access to political leadership? I women’s participation in politics by enhancing
found that fifty-two percent of women in the electability through voter familiarity and trust. It
Zambian National Assembly hail from political also facilitates access to party support and
families. During the interviews, the majority of the resources, as well as networking opportunities
women MPs were related to a current or former crucial for effective campaigning and governance.
political leader. I further confirmed this Ultimately, name recognition acts as a powerful
information for those who I did not interview by tool for overcoming barriers associated with
analyzing the profiles of MPs on the National successful election. MP 1070 narrated, “My
Assembly members list. grandfather was a minister in the colonial
government . . . my father was a minister, and now
I am also a Member of Parliament. It is much easier
for you to stand in a place where you come from,
where people can relate because, at the end of the
day, we’re all one family. And people will look at
your family background, who are you? So judgment
is mostly based on your past. Everyone has the fear
68
of bringing in someone new to say, ‘Oh, if we pick
that person, but we don’t know them, we don’t
68 Graph based on data collected during study.

69 See section on socialization and Richard Asante, et al, “What motivates young African leaders for public engagement?
Lessons from Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda," International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 34 (2020): 309-333.

know where they come from,’ you know. So there’s stereotypes72. Women have a lot more to lose if they
always the added advantage if you come from a do not have the support of their families. For
political background, and people can see to it that example, a woman who did not have the support of
they know who you are, they know where you come her husband said, “At home, it was a bit difficult. I
from. The name recognition really, really helps.” was threatened with divorce, my mother-in-law
Through her family background, specifically the came in, and we had a lot of discussions around my
recognition of her family, she gained access to her decision” (MP 473). She added that, without familial
family networks and leveraged the respect and support, “you will be denied financial support.”
positionality of her father and grandfather for Therefore, family relations help to overcome some
herself. of these barriers women face such as financial
resources and political party gatekeeping. Women
The recognition of a woman’s familial name not can depend on their family for financial support
only opens doors but also bestows upon these and also rely on the credibility and legitimacy of
women legitimacy and authority within political their familial ties and surnames during political
circles. The cachet of their family backgrounds party nomination and adoption to be successful.
empowers these women to navigate spaces that
would otherwise be inaccessible, leveraging their Women without familial political backgrounds face
connections to forge alliances, garner support, and greater challenges in accessing resources, networks,
ultimately propel their political careers forward. and support needed for successful political careers.
Additionally, having the surname of a former leader An aspiring candidate shared that she fell into debt
gives these women more credibility. As MP 1071 and found it incredibly difficult to finance her
states, constituents trust people they have campaign because she did not have the connections
previously seen lead, so name recognition makes that her competing candidates had. Furthermore, a
those with family ties to former leaders more former male MP gave examples of two women MPs
trustworthy to the Zambian public. who are daughters of male politicians. He gave
insight into how these two women leveraged the
Furthermore, family support manifests in various resources of their fathers to finance their
ways, including financial assistance and moral campaigns. He asserted that, “if it was not for her
encouragement. Family background provides father’s money, name, and networks, she would not
women with a valuable reservoir of financial have won the election” (former male MP74).
resources, enabling them to finance their Therefore, the absence of family ties could
campaigns and sustain their political endeavors. In exacerbate existing gender disparities in political
a landscape where campaign costs loom large and representation, as women would have to rely solely
financial constraints often serve as insurmountable on individual merit gained from work experience
barriers to entry, access to familial wealth can make and education rather than familial connections.
the difference between success and obscurity for
aspiring female politicians. Moreover, the moral In a context where name recognition and familial
backing that family members provide can be crucial ties are important in succeeding politically, the
for women as they navigate the political arena that absence of such networks can be crippling. The
is often fraught with gender-based biases and Zambian context exacerbates these challenges, with

72 Meriem Trabelsi, “Women in Politics and the Media,” International IDEA, 3 Mar. 2023, www.idea.int/news/women-
politics-and
media#:~:text=When%20reporters%20cover%20women%20in,weak%2C%20indecisive%2C%20and%20emotional.
74 Interview with former male MP conducted on 22th June, 2023.

the high costs of campaigning serving as a Thus, family background emerges as a critical
formidable hurdle for aspiring female politicians. pathway for women to ascend to political
leadership roles. While work experience and
Additionally, party gatekeeping practices further education also play a role, the motivating influence
entrench the dominance of established political and essential resources provided by family
dynasties, leaving newcomers, especially women connections significantly bolster women’s electoral
without familial political pedigrees, at a distinct success in the Zambian Parliament.
disadvantage. Thus, it becomes abundantly clear
that family background holds disproportionate The prevalence of familial ties as a pathway for
sway in Zambia’s political arena, conferring not women into political leadership, coupled with the
only access to crucial resources but also serving as a advantages men have in terms of resources and
defining factor in the trajectory of one’s political networks, underscores the systemic barriers women
career. face in gaining access and being elected into
political leadership. Without concerted efforts to
While advocacy groups particularly the Women’s address these disparities and create more inclusive
Lobby are not a viable pathway for women into pathways for women’s political participation,
political leadership, the role of family background gender inequality in political leadership is likely to
emerges as a vital and indispensable pathway for persist.
women’s advancement in Zambian politics. By
leveraging their familial connections, women can While family ties serve as a significant pathway for
defy the odds, navigate the complexities of political women into political leadership in Zambia, the
life, and carve out a space for themselves within the absence of such ties would further exacerbate
halls of power. Therefore, for women who do not gender disparities in the Zambian legislature. Men’s
have as much economic power as their male advantages in terms of resources, networks, and
counterparts in Zambia, familial ties play a pivotal connections outside the family sphere highlight the
role in determining women’s political participation need for targeted interventions to address systemic
and success. barriers and promote gender equality in politics.
CONCLUSION Contribution to literature
Zambian women encounter substantial obstacles Southeast Asian scholars, who explore political
when entering politics, including financial dynasties, emphasize the role that family
constraints associated with expensive campaigns, background plays in women’s decisions to run for
political party gatekeeping, and the absence of office and ability to succeed in elections. These
quotas. My findings did not fully support my initial scholars contend that female political figures within
hypothesis regarding the significance of the the region often emerge as byproducts of
Women’s Lobby as a pathway for women into the entrenched political dynasties. Furthermore,
Zambian National Assembly. Instead, my study Richter observes that, in Southeast Asia, “the most
found that fifty-two percent of the women in important political posts open to women have been
Parliament have familial ties to current or former so because of familial ties to prominent male
male politicians, granting them access to vital politicians”75.
resources such as networks and financial support.
Moreover, familial name recognition lends My study shows that this phenomenon is not
credibility and legitimacy, increasing their chances unique to Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, in many
of nomination and adoption by political parties. African nations such as South Africa, Zambia and
75 Linda K Richter, "Exploring theories of female leadership in South and Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs (1990): 524-540.

Namibia, wives and daughters of former political lies in exploring the intricate process of nomination
leaders have assumed parliamentary positions. This and adoption by political parties. The insights that I
pattern underscores the considerable impact of gleaned from interviews and existing literature
familial ties to male political figures on a woman’s underscore the pivotal role of political parties in
likelihood of securing nominations and electoral shaping women’s political trajectories. However,
success76. While there exists limited literature on further investigation is warranted to elucidate the
the connection between familial ties and political specific policies and practices of political parties
engagement in Africa, as a Zambian citizen, I have and their implications for women’s actual
observed a prevalence in familial relations among representation in Parliament. Additionally,
both male and female politicians in Zambia. There conducting a comparative study to examine the role
have been several instances where people of the of family ties for men in political leadership could
same family have served in political office. My provide valuable insights into the broader dynamics
research proves this observation because fifty-two of political power and familial influence within the
percent of women that I interviewed came from Zambian context. Such research endeavors hold the
political families. potential to deepen our understanding of the
complex interplay between party politics, familial
Recommendations for moving forward connections, and gender representation in Zambian
Drawing parallels with successful implementations governance.
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Aid,
Democracy,
and Growth
Olivia Hrivnak
Introduction and strategies to improve aid effectiveness and

promote positive outcomes in recipient countries.
Does foreign aid effectively promote
The empirical strategy of this study seeks to
economic growth and development in recipient
address two primary inquiries: first, the impact of
nations? If so, is the success of aid programs related
foreign aid on economic growth and second,
to the quality of democracy in those countries? If
whether the value of aid programs is contingent on
the success of foreign aid programs is related to
the quality of democracy within the recipient
democracy, this will have important implications
country. Data for the analysis is derived from two
for how aid is allocated and conditioned. Therefore,
key databases: the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
determining the correlation, if any, between aid
dataset and the World Bank World Development
programs and democracy may have important
Indicators.2,3 To explore the nuanced relationships
implications for economic aid policy. Craig
between foreign aid, democracy, and economic
Burnside and David Dollar’s journal article, “Aid,
growth, a difference-in-difference specification in
Policies, and Growth,” is most closely related to this
regression analysis is employed. The dependent
paper’s research question and empirical analysis
variable is economic growth, while the independent
structure.1 This paper’s findings suggest that
variables encompass the lagged net official
foreign aid can indeed promote economic growth in
development assistance and official aid received
developing countries, but its effectiveness is heavily
(constant 2020 USD), the Liberal Democracy Index
dependent on the quality of economic policies.
score measuring the democratic status of the
Most economic policies are established by
country, and an interaction term investigating the
governments, making it important to establish
varying impact of aid on growth based on the level
whether or not different types of government, such
of democracy.2 The analysis further incorporates
as democracies or autocracies, allocate and use aid
control variables such as GDP per capita (constant
differently. For example, if aid is given to two
2015 USD), educational attainment (at least
countries, one being a strong democracy and the
completed lower secondary), population 25 yrs +
other being an autocracy, which one will economic
total (%), and trade (% of GDP). The regression
aid benefit more? The answer to this question will
equation is a comprehensive examination of the
provide policymakers important information to
interplay between foreign aid, democracy, and
support and justify decisions on where to best
economic growth, accounting for a range of
distribute foreign aid. Aside from economic policies
influential factors, which allows for an assessment
directly relating to the distribution of foreign aid,
of the role of democracy in shaping the outcomes of
determining which types of governments will
aid programs.
benefit more from economic aid touches on
This analysis reveals an intricate
humanitarian and political aspects of international
relationship between foreign aid, democracy, and
relations and development. Answering these
economic growth. While a positive association
questions can inform policies, resource allocation,
1 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth," The American Economic Review 90, no. 4 (2000): 847-
868.
2 Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David
Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken,
Anna Lührmann, Seraphine F. Maerz, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel
Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm,
Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt, "V-Dem Codebook v11.1," Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) Project, 2021, https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/
3 World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2021, https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-
development-indicators/

exists between lagged aid per capita and economic may not yield significant benefits in countries with
growth, the impact varies alongside the quality of poor policy environments.
democracy. The inclusion of the Liberal Democracy Another article written by Steven Knack
Index and its interaction with aid suggests that the considers the question, “Does Foreign Aid Promote
success of aid programs may depend on the level of Democracy?”5 His study examines recipients of
democracy in recipient nations. However, the lack foreign aid between 1975-2000 using two different
of statistical significance in the interaction terms democracy indexes and two different measures of
indicate that these relationships are not aid intensity, finding no evidence that aid promotes
consistently robust across the examined range of democracy.
democracy scores. These findings underscore the In the final article examined, “Do Elites
need for a nuanced understanding of the dynamics benefit from democracy and foreign aid in
between foreign aid, democracy, and economic developing countries?”, author Christian Bjørnskov
growth. It implies that the effectiveness of aid studies data concerning income quintiles derived
programs is likely influenced by contextual factors, from the World Income Inequality Database for 88
and a one-size-fits-all approach may not be developing countries.6 Bjørnskov finds that
appropriate. together, foreign aid and democracy are associated
Background with a higher share of income held by elites.
A closer look at Burnside and Dollar’s article Therefore, it appears that foreign aid leads to a
provides context and demonstrates the importance more skewed income distribution in democratic
of this research question. Burnside and Dollar developing countries, while in autocratic countries,
examine the relationship between foreign aid, these effects are less significant. Although these
economic policies, and economic growth in articles together assist in one’s understanding of
developing countries.4 The authors investigate the relationship between foreign aid and
whether foreign aid can effectively promote democracy, their relationship is not explicitly
economic growth and development in recipient stated.
nations and whether the success of aid programs is Understanding the conceptual links
contingent on the quality of economic policies in between the X-variables and Y-variable provides
those countries. The article’s findings suggest that insight into the conditions in which these
foreign aid can indeed promote economic growth in conceptual links are more or less relevant. First, by
developing countries, but its effectiveness is heavily examining net official development assistance and
dependent on the quality of economic policies. official aid and their conceptual link to GDP
Most economic policies are determined by growth, it is hypothesized that higher levels of
governments, prompting inquiry into whether the foreign aid will positively impact economic growth
quality of these policies fluctuates depending on the in the recipient country. Aid is expected to
type of government in place. Burnside and Dollar’s contribute to development by providing resources
research suggests that aid is more effective in for infrastructure, education, and other crucial
countries with good governance, well-functioning sectors. This association is more relevant based
institutions, and pro-growth policies; however, aid upon the assumption that aid is effectively utilized
and allocated towards beneficial investments.
4 Burnside and Dollar, 847-868.

5 Stephen Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (Mar. 2004): 251-
266.
6 Christian Bjørnskov, “Do Elites Benefit from Democracy and Foreign Aid in Developing Countries?” Journal of
Development Economics 92, no. 2 (July 2010): 115–24.

Additionally, the time lag introduced by using of aid on economic growth is more pronounced in
lagged values accounts for the expectation that the democratic settings. Conversely, if the interaction
impact of aid on economic growth may not be term is significant and negative, it suggests that the
immediate. impact of aid on economic growth is less
Second, by analyzing the link between the pronounced in democratic countries.
Liberal Democracy Index and GDP growth, I Fourth, dummy variables are introduced to
suggest that the quality of democracy influences the account for the potential time-invariant country
relationship between aid and economic growth. I characteristics and time-specific effects. Country
also expect that democracies are better equipped to dummy variables are used to represent individual
use aid efficiently due to factors such as country characteristics which will be more
accountability, transparency, and effective pronounced when considering persistent factors
governance. However, this connection is more that might influence economic growth consistently
important when considering that the positive across time, such as certain geographic features or
impact of aid on growth may be contingent on the historical legacies. Year dummy variables
presence of democratic institutions. In less demonstrate global or regional events that affect all
democratic settings, the effectiveness of aid may be countries simultaneously in a particular year. They
hindered by issues such as corruption and weak control for various factors, such as economic crises,
governance. global shocks, or major policy changes that may
Third, an interaction term is produced to influence economic growth uniformly across
indicate the relationship between democracy and nations in a specific year.
aid. The interaction term explores whether the Finally, control variables, including GDP
relationship between aid and economic growth per capita, educational attainment, and trade
varies based on the level of democracy. This will be openness, are included to account for additional
demonstrated when interpreting the results by factors that might independently influence
calculating the total impact of aid on GDP growth economic growth. These variables are introduced to
per capita by using the following equations for isolate the impact of aid and democracy from other
varying values of !!,# , the Liberal Democracy Index potential factors. The relevance of control variables
Score: is more pronounced when there is substantial
For non-democracies, !!,# = 0 heterogeneity across countries in terms of the
variables being controlled. For instance, if
&!# = ' + )$ *+,,-. +/. 0-1 2+0/3+ education levels vary significantly across countries,
controlling for this variation becomes more
for perfect democracies, !!,# = 1 relevant in isolating the effect of aid and democracy
on economic growth. Additionally, when using GDP
&!# = ' + ()$ + )% )*+,,-. +/. 0-1 2+0/3+ per capita growth as the dependent variable, GDP
per capita must be controlled for because higher
for partial democracies, !!,# = 0.5 income countries typically have lower growth rates.
Data
This empirical work attempts to answer two
&!# = ' + ()$ + )% ∗ 0.5)*+,,-. +/. 0-1 2+0/3+
key questions: (1) does aid promote economic
growth and (2) does the success of aid programs
Based on the prior analysis, it is anticipated
rely on the quality of democracy within that
that aid will have a more positive impact on growth
country? Data was collected from two databases,
in stronger democracies compared to more
autocratic countries. If the interaction term is
significant and positive, it suggests that the impact

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset and the Table 1 shows the summary statistics. I gathered
World Bank World Development Indicators.7,8 panel data based on countries. There are 6,363
Data on the level of democracy was gathered observations collected from 58 years from 131
from the V-Dem dataset. V-Dem is an extensive and countries. In my summary statistics, the variables
widely used resource in the field of political science are as follows:
and comparative politics. It is designed to provide - Net Aid: Net official development assistance
detailed information on various aspects of and official aid received (constant 2020
democracy and governance around the world. The USD)
Liberal Democracy Index is used to measure the - Educational Attainment: Educational
level of democracy in each country. It incorporates attainment, at least completed lower
measures of the rule of law, checks and balances, secondary, population 25+, total (%)
and civil liberties along with the concepts measured (cumulative)
in the electoral democracy index. The electoral - Growth GDP per capita: GDP per capita
democracy index measures the principle of electoral growth (annual %)
or representative democracy, including whether - GDP per capita: GDP per capita (constant
elections were free and fair, as well as the 2015 USD)
prevalence of free and independent media. Experts - Population: Population, total
argue that these components of the Liberal - Trade Openness: Trade (% of GDP)
Democracy Index are the most crucial to a - Aid per capita: netaid divided by population
functioning democracy. - Lagged Aid per capita: the lagged value of
The rest of the data was collected from the aid per cap
World Bank World Development Indicators.9 This - Liberal Democracy: Liberal Democracy
is the primary World Bank collection of Index score
development indicators, compiled from officially - Interaction: libdem*lagaidpc
recognized international sources. All monetary Empirical Strategy
values gathered are in constant USD. I use data The empirical method employed will use
from the years 1961 to 2019. While data from 2020, statistical analysis to examine the relationship
2021, and 2022 was available, it was not included between foreign aid, democracy, and economic
to avoid any influence from the COVID-19 growth. A difference in differences panel data
pandemic. regression model with fixed effects is utilized, with
economic growth as the dependent variable, and
Table 1 – Summary Statistics foreign aid and democracy as independent
Year
Observations
8,386
Mean
1991.063
Standard_Deviation
16.99511
Min
1961
Max
2019
variables. Other relevant variables that might affect
Net Aid 6,363 4.82e+08 8.51e+08 -1.05e+09 2.63e+10 economic growth, such as education levels, trade
Education Attainment
Growth GDP per capita
4,811
7,071
38.79629
2.081187
29.55079
6.147901
0.6
-64.42584
99.91719
140.48
openness, and GDP per capita, are also controlled
GDP per capita 7,086 9973.923 15336.56 163.9071 114047.9 for. In addition, an interaction term between
Population 8,386 3. 07e+07 1.24e+08 40111 1.41e+09
Trade Openness 6,598 74.34047 49.69705 .0209992 437.3267
foreign aid and democracy is generated to test
Aid per capita 6,363 80.15434 129.7109 -49.65758 1950.747 whether the impact of aid on growth varies
Lagged Aid per capita 6,344 80.02532 130.4089 -49.65758 1950.747
Liberal Democracy 8,301 .3436461 .2784017 0.005 0.898
depending on the level of democracy. This allows
Interaction 6,280 23.13172 48.14095 -25.9146 666.8979 for the analysis of whether the success of aid
Notes: Country is not included in the summary statistics. programs is contingent on democracy to be
conducted. The effects of aid on economic growth
7 Coppedge, et al.
8 Development Index, World Bank.
9 World Development Indicators.

and the relationship between aid and democracy measure of democracy introduces the risk of
are investigated by using the following equation: selection bias if certain country characteristics
&!# = +! + ,# + )$ :!,#&$ + )' !!,# + )% :!,#&$ !!,# influence both democracy scores and economic
+ )( ;!,# + -!# growth. While a comprehensive set of control
variables is included to address this, controlling for
- i indexes countries and t indexes years. all potential bias is challenging.
- +! is a dummy variable for country i which Thirdly, omitted variable bias is a concern
controls for time-invariant country despite efforts to include a broad set of control
characteristics like geography or colonial variables, meaning the study may not capture all
history. determinants of economic growth adequately.
- ,# dummy variable for year t. Furthermore, the assumption of a time lag in the
- :!,#&$ is the net official development impact of aid on economic growth might
assistance and official aid received (constant underestimate short-term effects. Lastly, the study
treats all forms of aid uniformly, disregarding
2020 USD) by country i in year t-1. In my
regression, I will use the lagged value of X in potential distinctions in the impact of different aid
the equation above, since aid received this types. Although stratifying the analysis by aid type
year is more likely to affect growth next year could offer more nuanced insights, data limitations
rather than in this year itself. This is may constrain such stratifications. Additionally, the
because it takes time to use the aid and chosen difference-in-difference specification
spend it on specific things. assumes that unobserved time-varying factors
affecting aid-receiving and non-receiving countries
- !!,# is a measure of the democratic status of
are adequately captured, and misspecification of
the country, the Liberal Democracy index
the model could lead to biased estimates. In sum,
score.
while the analytical approach aims to control for
- ;!,# represents control variables that might
various factors, the study acknowledges and
affect economic growth, such as GDP per
actively addresses inherent limitations through
capita (constant 2015 USD), educational
several considerations and detailed analysis.
attainment, at least completed lower
Another aspect of the data that must be
secondary, population 25+, total (%)
addressed is the net official development assistance
(cumulative), and trade (% of GDP).
and official aid received (constant 2020 USD),
- :!,#&$ !!,# represents the interaction term
“netaid,” variable, which is negative in several
between foreign aid and democracy. countries and years. Since the value is net, it is
negative in countries where the aid they provided to
While this empirical approach attempts to other countries was larger than the aid they
address a variety of concerns, several potential received.
limitations warrant consideration. First,
endogeneity in aid receipt poses a challenge, as the Table 2 – Countries and Years with Negative Net Aid
decision to provide aid may be correlated with
Country Year
unobservable factors influencing economic growth. Angola 1969, 1970, 1971
Argentina 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1970, 2015, 2017
To mitigate this challenge, the study uses a lagged Azerbaijan 2013
Bahrain 1988, 1989
value of aid, assuming a reduced likelihood of aid Barbados 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006
Belarus 2016, 2017
being influenced by contemporaneous economic Brazil 1992
Chile 1979, 1980
conditions. However, the possibility of China 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
Costa Rica 1996
unobservable factors influencing both aid receipt Cuba 1963
Dominican 1993
and economic growth remains a concern. Secondly, Republic
Gabon 2003
the use of the Liberal Democracy Index as a Hungary 1995

Indonesia
Iraq
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019
1984 capita. The findings suggest that a 1,000 USD
Jamaica
Kuwait
1999
1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 increase in lagged aid per capita is associated with a
Malaysia
Malta
1996, 1997, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
1987, 1988, 1989 1.44 percentage point increase in growth for GDP
Mauritius
Mexico
2003
1964, 2000 per capita. This is statistically significant at the 10%
Mozambique
Oman
1964
2010 level, indicating that there is evidence to suggest a
Panama
Peru
2007, 2014
1961, 2010, 2017 positive association between increased lagged aid
Philippines
Qatar
2011
1963 per capita and higher economic growth.
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 2007
1961, 1999, 2000, 2001 In the second column, lagged aid per capita,
Sri Lanka
Thailand
2018
2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2018, the liberal democracy score, and the interaction
Trinidad and
2019
1981, 1991, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 term is regressed on economic growth, GDP growth
Tobago
United Arab 1981, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 per capita. The findings suggest a 1 point increase
Emirates
in the Liberal Democracy index is associated with a
1.154 percentage point increase in growth for GDP
The potential effects of negative net aid values are
per capita. This is significant at the 5% level,
addressed by running each regression twice, once
indicating a higher level of democracy is associated
with all values of net aid and a second time with
with increased economic growth.
values of net aid greater than or equal to zero.
The interaction term explains if more
Results
democratic countries benefit from aid more than
Table 3 – Results with All Net Aid Values
(1) (2) (3) autocracies. If the country is fully autocratic,
Lagged Aid per capita 0.00144*
(0.000777)
0.00202
(0.00145)
0.00955***
(0.00312) meaning their liberal democracy index score is 0,
Liberal Democracy 1.154**
(0.503)
1.038
(0.934)
the interaction term coefficient indicates that a
Interaction 0.000207
(0.00422)
-0.00897
(0.00752)
1,000 USD increase in lagged aid per capita is
GDP per capita -9.72e-07
(7.59e-05)
associated with a 0.00000202 percentage point
Education Attainment 0.00440
(0.0124)
increase in growth for GDP per capita. However, if
Trade Openness 0.0233***
(0.00545)
a country is fully democratic, meaning their liberal
Observations 5,478 5,455 3,170
democracy index score is 1, the interaction term
R-Squared 0.001 0.003 0.183
coefficient indicates that a 1,000 USD increase in
lagged aid per capita is associated with a
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Standard errors are included below the coefficient in
0.000002227 percentage point increase in growth
parenthesis. R-squared values are low, however difference-in- for GDP per capita. More realistically, if the country
differences models often deal with observational data, and has a liberal democracy score of 0.5, the interaction
achieving a high R-squared may be challenging, especially if term coefficient indicates that a 1,000 USD increase
there is substantial variability in the data or if the treatment
in lagged aid per capita is associated with a
effect is modest. In (3), this is a fixed-effects regression,
country and year dummy variables have been included. Lagged 0.0000021235 percentage point increase in growth
Aid per capita is the lagged value of net aid per capita, Liberal for GDP per capita. These coefficients are not
Democracy is the liberal democracy index score, Interaction is statistically significant. This suggests that within
the liberal democracy index score times the lagged value of net the presented range of liberal democracy scores,
aid per capita, GDP per capita is GDP per capita (constant 2015
USD), Education Attainment is the cumulative percent of the
there is no robust evidence that the impact of aid on
population 25 years of age or older who completed at least GDP growth varies significantly with the level of
lower secondary education, and Trade Openness is the percent democracy. In other words, the effect of aid on
of GDP from trade. The interaction term shows us the added economic growth is no different in democracies
benefit to receiving aid based on the strength of your
compared to non-democracies.
democracy.
In the third column, lagged aid per capita,
In the first column, lagged aid per capita is the liberal democracy score, and the interaction
regressed on economic growth, GDP growth per term is regressed on economic growth, GDP growth
per capita. Additionally, control variables are added

including education levels, trade openness, and Observations 5,387 5,366 3,108
GDP per capita. Dummy country and year variables R-Squared 0.001 0.003 0.182
are also added. The findings suggest a 1,000 USD

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
increase in lagged aid per capita is associated with a * p<0.1. Standard errors are included below the coefficient in
9.55 percentage point increase in growth for GDP parenthesis. R-squared values are low, however difference-in-
per capita. This is significant at the 1% level, differences models often deal with observational data, and
suggesting a substantial positive association achieving a high R-squared may be challenging, especially if
there is substantial variability in the data or if the treatment
between increased lagged aid per capita and higher effect is modest. In (3), this is a fixed-effects regression,
economic growth. country and year dummy variables have been included. Lagged
If the country is fully autocratic, meaning Aid per capita is the lagged value of net aid per capita, Liberal
their liberal democracy index score is 0, the Democracy is the liberal democracy index score, Interaction is
the liberal democracy index score times the lagged value of net
interaction term coefficient indicates that a 1,000
aid per capita, GDP per capita is GDP per capita (constant 2015
USD increase in lagged aid per capita is associated USD), Education Attainment is the cumulative percent of the
with a 0.00000955 percentage point increase in population 25 years of age or older who completed at least
growth for GDP per capita. However, if a country is lower secondary education, and Trade Openness is the percent
fully democratic, meaning their liberal democracy of GDP from trade. The interaction term shows us the added
benefit to receiving aid based on the strength of your
index score is 1, the interaction term coefficient democracy.
indicates that a 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid
per capita is associated with a 0.00000058 In these next three regressions, only positive
percentage point increase in growth for GDP per values of net aid are included to eliminate any
capita. More realistically, if the country has a liberal errors generated by using negative values of net aid.
democracy score of 0.5, the interaction term In the first column, lagged aid per capita is
coefficient indicates that a 1,000 USD increase in regressed on economic growth, GDP growth per
lagged aid per capita is associated with a capita. A 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid per
0.000005065 percentage point increase in growth capita is associated with a 1.58 percentage point
for GDP per capita. This data is not statistically increase in growth for GDP per capita. There is
significant which reinforces the absence of clear evidence to suggest a positive association between
evidence that the impact of aid on GDP growth is increased lagged aid per capita and higher
significantly influenced by the level of democracy. economic growth. The result is statistically
When considering the amount of trade that significant at the 5% level, indicating that this
contributes to a country’s GDP, a one percentage relationship is likely not due to random chance.
point increase in the amount of trade, contributing In the second column, lagged aid per capita,
to a country’s GDP, is associated with a 0.0233 the liberal democracy score, and the interaction
percentage point increase in growth for GDP per term are regressed on economic growth, GDP
capita. This is significant at the 1% level, suggesting growth per capita. The findings suggest a 1 point
that greater trade openness is associated with increase in the Liberal Democracy index is
higher economic growth. associated with a 1.092 percentage point increase in
Table 4 – Results When Net Aid Values Are Greater Than or Equal to Zero
growth for GDP per capita. This is significant at the
95% level, implying that a higher level of democracy
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged Aid per capita 0.00158** 0.00213 0.0101*** is associated with increased economic growth.
(0.000783) (0.00146) (0.00315)
Liberal Democracy 1.092** 0.982 If the country is fully autocratic, meaning
(0.512) (0.957)
Interaction 0.000412 -0.00985 their liberal democracy index score is 0, the
(0.00426) (0.00760)
GDP per capita 3.25e-05 interaction term coefficient indicates that a 1,000
(7.99e-05)
Education Attainment 0.00434 USD increase in lagged aid per capita is associated
(0.0126)
Trade Openness 0.0248*** with a 0.00000213 percentage point increase in
(0.00558)

growth for GDP per capita. However, if a country is capita. These are not statistically significant, which
fully democratic, with a liberal democracy index reinforces the absence of clear evidence that the
score of 1, the interaction term coefficient indicates impact of aid on GDP growth is significantly
that a 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid per capita influenced by the level of democracy.
is associated with a 0.000002542 percentage point When considering the amount of trade that
increase in growth for GDP per capita. More contributes to a country’s GDP, we see that a one
realistically, if the country has a liberal democracy percentage point increase in the amount of trade,
score of 0.5, the interaction term coefficient contributing to a country’s GDP, is associated with
indicates that a 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid a 0.0248 percentage point increase in growth for
per capita is associated with a 0.000002336 GDP per capita. This is significant at the 1% level
percentage point increase in growth for GDP per indicating that greater trade openness is associated
capita. These are not statistically significant, with higher economic growth.
suggesting that within the presented range of When comparing the results from Table 3 to
liberal democracy scores, there is no robust the results in Table 4, there are several key findings.
evidence that the impact of aid on GDP growth Both tables provide similar results. In both sets, the
varies significantly with the level of democracy. interaction term coefficients are not statistically
In the third column, lagged aid per capita, significant, indicating no robust evidence that the
the liberal democracy score, and the interaction impact of aid on GDP growth varies significantly
term are regressed on economic growth, GDP with the level of democracy. The inclusion of only
growth per capita. Additionally, control variables positive net aid values in the second does not
are added including education levels, trade drastically alter the main findings and the
openness, and GDP per capita. Dummy country and significance of the coefficients remains consistent
year variables are also added. This is for when net in many cases.
aid is positive. A 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid In examining the regression results, a
per capita is associated with a 10.1 percentage point consistent positive association emerges between
increase in growth for GDP per capita. The large lagged aid per capita and GDP per capita growth,
and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% indicating that, on average, increased aid is linked
level suggests a substantial positive association to higher economic growth. However, the
between increased lagged aid per capita and higher significance of the Liberal Democracy Index
economic growth. fluctuates across regressions, sometimes indicating
If the country is fully autocratic, with a a positive correlation between higher democracy
liberal democracy index score of 0, the interaction levels and economic growth. At other times, the
term coefficient indicates that a 1,000 USD increase relationship is not statistically significant. The
in lagged aid per capita is associated with a interaction term, designed to explore the
0.0000101 percentage point increase in growth for conditional impact of aid based on democracy,
GDP per capita. However, if a country is fully consistently lacks significance. This suggests that,
democratic, meaning their liberal democracy index within the presented range of democracy scores,
score is 1, the interaction term coefficient indicates there is no robust evidence that the impact of aid on
that a 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid per capita GDP growth is significantly influenced by the level
is associated with a 0.00000025 percentage point of democracy. Additionally, the sensitivity of results
decrease in growth for GDP per capita. More to the inclusion of control variables is evident,
realistically, if the country has a liberal democracy highlighting the importance of considering various
score of 0.5, the interaction term coefficient factors in assessing the relationship between aid,
indicates that a 1,000 USD increase in lagged aid democracy, and economic growth. Furthermore,
per capita is associated with a 0.000005175 trade openness consistently shows significance,
percentage point increase in growth for GDP per

suggesting that higher trade percentages contribute associated with democracy levels necessitate
to higher economic growth. caution in drawing definitive conclusions. While
To fully understand the results, several there are observable trends, particularly in the
limitations must be acknowledged. The study direction of the coefficients, the absence of
establishes associations but cannot definitively significance suggests that the relationship between
establish causation. Data limitations, including aid, democracy, and economic growth is not
variations in the quality and completeness of uniformly robust across the examined range of
datasets, may impact the reliability of findings. democracy scores.
Omitted variable bias is a concern, as factors not These findings underscore the need for a
included in the analysis could confound observed nuanced understanding of the dynamics between
relationships. Endogeneity issues, particularly foreign aid, democracy, and economic growth. They
related to aid allocation decisions, may affect the indicate that the effectiveness of aid programs is
accurate estimation of the impact of aid on growth. likely influenced by contextual factors, and a one-
The generalizability of results may be limited to the size-fits-all approach may not be appropriate.
chosen dataset and time period, raising questions Policymakers should consider the specific
about the applicability of findings across diverse democratic conditions and unique characteristics of
regions and time frames. The complexity of recipient nations when designing and
measuring democracy using the Liberal Democracy implementing aid programs to maximize their
Index introduces uncertainties regarding its impact on economic development. The study thus
comprehensiveness and ability to capture the contributes valuable insights to the ongoing
multidimensional nature of democracy. Lastly, the discourse on the intricate relationship between
exclusion of data from 2020-2022 to avoid foreign aid, democracy, and economic growth.
pandemic influence may overlook potential changes Generalizability is subject to the specific
or crises affecting the relationship between aid, characteristics of the sample and the time period
democracy, and economic growth. covered. Caution should be exercised in extending
Discussion and Conclusions these findings to other countries or regions with
The findings of the analysis provide distinct political and economic landscapes.
nuanced insights into the original research question Additionally, the exclusion of recent data limits the
regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid in applicability of the results to the current global
promoting economic growth and its interaction context. Further research across diverse contexts
with the quality of democracy. The positive and time periods is needed to enhance the external
association between lagged aid per capita and validity of the findings.
economic growth suggests that, on average, foreign Bibliography
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development-indicators/

The Autism Spectrum
and Public Policy:
How Social
Construction Impacts
Efficacy
Anna Gazewood
“Deserving, but not entitled”: This is how federal appropriated around $1.8 billion over five years.4
policymakers view those on the autism spectrum.1 Additionally, since 2001, 46 states have passed
Policy reinforces the conceptualization of autism mandates requiring insurance carriers to cover
spectrum disorder as a medicalized, services related to ASD, including habilitative
neurobiological condition of childhood, rather than treatments such as Applied Behavior Analysis
one that affects an individual throughout their therapy.5
lifetime. While this means that policy conversations On the surface, it may seem as though state
often neglect adults on the spectrum, policy and federal governments have adequately
interventions fail even children who are deemed responded to the growing prominence of autism
deserving of social support. I seek to gain a deeper spectrum disorder. However, closer examination
understanding of why this is the case by looking at raises concern in terms of the efficacy of these
how the social construction of children on the policies. For example, the 2019 reauthorization of
spectrum influences the inadequacy of policy the Autism CARES Act appropriated $1.48 billion
responses. I first present a background of the recent (over 80% of allocated funds) to research at the
history regarding autism as a medical and policy National Institutes of Health and the Interagency
area before diving into theories that help explain Autism Coordinating Committee, which primarily
the failure of federal policy responses. I apply serves as an advisory board for research goals. In
Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social contrast, only $252.9 million (around 14%) was
construction to three case studies of federal appropriated to the Health Resources and Services
responses to the autism community: No Child Left Administration (HRSA), which provides healthcare
Behind, the Affordable Care Act, and COVID-19 services to at-risk communities.6 Overall, much of
pandemic relief. the federal policy surrounding ASD prioritizes
research because support for scientists is seen as
I. Background benefiting all of society, in contrast with welfare
Diagnosis rates of autism spectrum disorder benefits which are framed as benefiting
(ASD) increased by over 300% from 2000 to 2020, individuals.7 While this is important for
from 1 in 150 children to 1 in 36.2 Since 2006, the determining causes and effective interventions,
federal government has appropriated funds to without adequate resources for those on the
address this growing issue through the Autism spectrum, research can only make so much of a
Collaboration, Accountability, Research, Education, difference.
and Support (CARES) Act, originally known as the Interventions for children with ASD are
Combating Autism Act.3 The most recent costly, as annual costs range from $6000 to
reauthorization of the Autism CARES Act in 2019 $35000 per child.8 Traditionally, private insurers
1 Giuseppina Chiri, Meredith Bergey, and Thomas I. Mackie. “Deserving but Not Entitled: The Social Construction of
Autism Spectrum Disorder in Federal Policy.” Social Science & Medicine (1982) 301 (2022): 114974–114974.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114974.
2 “Data & Statistics on Autism Spectrum Disorder.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 4, 2023.
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html.
3 Sarah Mueller. “Autism Cares Act (P.L. 116-60) Detailed Summary of Changes to the Law.” Association of University
Centers on Disabilities. Accessed November 3, 2023.

https://www.aucd.org/docs/AUCD_Autism%20CARES%20Act%20Changes%20Report%20(002).pdf.
4 Mueller 2023, 3.
5 Timothy Callaghan and Steven Sylvester. “Autism Spectrum Disorder, Politics, and the Generosity of Insurance
Mandates in the United States.” PloS One 14, no. 5 (2019):e0217064–e0217064.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0217064.
6 Mueller 2023, 3.
7 Chiri, Bergey, and Mackie 2023.
8 Callaghan and Sylvester 2019, 1.

have excluded services related to ASD from their up regarding ineffective government interventions
offered benefits.9 The extension of coverage to ASD- for ASD.
related services only occurred through policy James Wilson predicts the outcome of
intervention, and even then, state insurance political contests depending on whether policy
mandates differ in the generosity of benefits effects (described as costs and benefits) are diffuse
required. Some states have age caps for insurance or concentrated.12 Policy effects are diffuse when
mandates, and some place limits on medical they are spread over a large group of people,
spending that are below what many families would whereas they are concentrated when they are
reasonably spend.10 Additionally, there is a shortage spread over a smaller group. For example, a carbon
of professionals to provide treatment for ASD. tax would be a concentrated cost among carbon-
More generous mandate benefits are shown to have emitting businesses with diffuse environmental
a positive impact on workforce supply; however, benefits among the general population. Wilson’s
over half of US counties have no board-certified schematic arrangement of these two variables
behavioral analysts, and over 70% have no child results in four different types of political contests:
psychiatrists.11 diffuse costs versus concentrated benefits, diffuse
Given the increasing rate of autism costs versus diffuse benefits, concentrated costs
spectrum diagnosis alongside the high costs of versus concentrated benefits, and concentrated
treatment and labor shortages, an already costs versus diffuse benefits.13 He predicts that in
lackluster policy response to ASD is likely to only contests of diffuse versus concentrated benefits, the
become more inadequate. This raises the question concentrated interests will triumph.14 In many
of why government interventions have failed to instances, such as rollbacks of environmental
serve this population adequately. regulations, this is true. However, ASD policy
serves as an exception to the prediction of
II. Theoretical Explanations concentrated interests winning out over diffuse
In analyzing the politics of ASD-related interests.
policy in the United States, I draw upon James In the political context of ASD policy,
Wilson’s theory of two-dimensional policy effects benefits are concentrated among autistic
and Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram’s theory of individuals (individuals with ASD) and their
social construction. Schneider and Ingram provide families, whereas the entire population takes on the
insight into why Wilson’s predictions do not hold diffuse cost of funding government programs.15 Per-
9 Li Wang et al. “Healthcare Service Use and Costs for Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Comparison between Medicaid and
Private Insurance.” Journal of autism and developmental disorders, May 2013.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3534815/.
10 Callaghan and Sylvester, 2019.
11 RK McBain et al. “Systematic Review: United States Workforce for Autism-Related Child Healthcare Services.” J Am
Acad Child Adolesc Psychiatry. 2020 Jan; 59(1):113-139. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2019.04.027. Epub 2019 May 29. PMID:
31150751; PMCID: PMC6883168.
12 Stone, Deborah A. 2012. “Chapter 10: Interests,” in Policy Paradox : The Art of Political Decision Making, 3rd ed. New
York: W.W. Norton, 229-247.

13 Stone 2012, 239.
14 Stone 2012, 240.
15 Throughout the paper, I use identity-first language to refer to autistic individuals, rather than person-first language (i.e.
individuals on the autism spectrum). Many individuals in the autism community now prefer identity-first language as it
validates neurodiverse identities, although the debate is still ongoing. For more information, see:
Shannon Wooldridge, “Writing Respectfully: Person-First and Identity-First Language,” National Institutes of Health,
April 19, 2023, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/science-health-public-trust/perspectives/writing-

person costs are much lower, while per-person legislation, elected officials prioritize policies that
benefits can be very high due to the medical costs assist in their reelection and address widely
associated with ASD treatment. Groups such as acknowledged problems. As they consider the
Autism Speaks have successfully lobbied for some effects (whether positive or negative) of a policy on
policy changes, such as the instatement of state a target group, lawmakers consider the political
insurance coverage mandates.16 However, groups power of the target group’s potential reaction as
such as the Autistic Self-Advocacy Network and the well as whether society as a whole believes the
Autism Society of America point to how this group target group should be either advantaged or
often fails to center autistic voices in their disadvantaged by a proposed policy.20 Society
advocacy, citing how little of their budget is spent constructs target groups, which range from the
on actually helping autistic individuals as well as elderly to the rich to criminals, either positively or
the lack of representation of autistic voices on their negatively. Additionally, these target groups are
board.17 Although Autism Speaks is often regarded classified as politically strong or weak. Similar to
as the most influential or notable organization in Wilson’s scheme, Schneider and Ingram design a
this issue area, it often does not accurately reflect two-by-two matrix sorting target populations into
the interests of autistic people in its advocacy work. four categories, depending on whether they are
In practice, the few policy changes that have politically strong or weak and positively or
been implemented do not go far enough in negatively constructed.21 Politicians tend to grant
providing sufficient treatment for all affected. benefits to the advantaged groups who are
Current failures will only lead to increased costs for positively constructed and politically strong, and
families or the state down the line, as those on the they impose punishments on groups who are
spectrum may struggle with participating in a negatively constructed and politically weak.22 The
society designed for neurotypical individuals. In her political process becomes more complicated when
analysis of Wilson’s cost-benefit scheme, Deborah considering negatively constructed groups with
Stone suggests that, rather than the nature of a power, as these groups can implement electoral
certain policy issue impacting political processes, backlash towards lawmakers in response to policy.
“politics shapes the way policy issues are… Additionally, the government’s relationship with
perceived in the first place.”18 Here, it is useful to positively-constructed, weak target groups is
consider Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social qualitatively different from any other category.
construction. Schneider and Ingram classify “dependents”
In analyzing power relations in politics, as those groups that are positively constructed but
Schneider and Ingram propose that the social politically weak. These groups include children,
construction of target populations plays a key role mothers, and the disabled; this is the category
in the policy process.19 In creating and passing
respectfully-person-first-identity-first-
language#:~:text=Many%20people%20in%20the%20autism,firmly%20against%20person%2Dfirst%20language%20. ;
Lydia Brown, “Identity-First Language,” Autistic Self Advocacy Network, accessed April 3, 2024,
https://autisticadvocacy.org/about-asan/identity-first-language/.
17 “Before You Donate to Autism Speaks, Consider the Facts,” Autistic Self Advocacy Network, accessed April 3, 2024,
https://autisticadvocacy.org/considerthefacts.
18 Stone 2012, 241.
19 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. “Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy.”
The American Political Science Review 87, no. 2 (1993): 334–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/2939044.
20 Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335.
21 1993, 336.
22 Ibid.

under which autistic people would be classified.23 constituents perceive the target group as deserving.
Because dependents are positively constructed by Because dependents have little political power in
society, they are likely to receive benefits; however, influencing policy, policymakers will receive little
these benefits differ from those given to advantaged backlash for the inefficacy of their policies as long
groups. For example, many welfare benefits and as it appears that a problem is being addressed.
subsidies for the economically disadvantaged have This helps to explain why Wilson’s
eligibility requirements that force the target prediction, in which concentrated benefits win out
population to acknowledge their dependent status over diffused costs, does not necessarily hold in this
before receiving benefits.24 The political rationale case. Autistic individuals generally have a reduced
for granting benefits to dependent groups capability to mobilize for political change in
emphasizes a moral motivation: the government comparison with other groups. Therefore, Wilson’s
implements policy because it is the right thing to causal logic does not hold up, as mobilization of
do. In contrast, the government gives benefits to concentrated interests does not take place. The
the advantaged without eligibility tests because Autism CARES Act is the main piece of federal
their interests are seen as supporting the public legislation dealing exclusively with ASD in the 21st
good.25 On the other hand, dependent groups often century. However, most of the federal
have to prove their need for services, whether that appropriations granted through the Autism CARES
be through reporting their income or a Act go towards research rather than directly
standardized medical diagnosis. Whereas the supporting autistic individuals through subsidizing
government helps advantaged groups because their treatment costs and expanding access. In re-
goals are connected to broader society, dependents’ examining Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social
issues are seen as individual rather than systemic.26 construction, scientists are included in the
From this perspective, the current state of “advantaged” group of being positively constructed
policy targeting autistic individuals is demystified. and politically strong.28 In the same policy context,
Lawmakers pass legislation with provisions for the interests of scientists are seen as benefiting the
autistic individuals because they are constructed as greater good, whereas autistic people are treated as
dependents. Schneider and Ingram propose that individuals with isolated problems rather than
elected officials seek policies that assist in problems that impact society as a whole.29 Both
reelection, and benefiting a population that is groups receive concentrated benefits from ASD
constructed as “deserving” by society is an effective policy, but at least in the short term, the scientific
way to do this. The Autism CARES Act was first community benefits more directly based on how
implemented under the Bush administration and funds are appropriated.
has been subsequently renewed under presidential
administrations from both parties; compared to III. Case Studies
other welfare provisions, ASD policy receives While the Autism CARES Act and its
greater bipartisan support due to the positive predecessors are unique among federal legislation
construction of recipients.27 However, according to in exclusively dealing with autism, other pieces of
the theory of social construction, a policy’s efficacy federal legislation more directly impact the lives of
matters less for elected officials than whether those on the spectrum. No Child Left Behind

27 Mueller 2023, 1.
28 1993, 336.

introduced federal accountability metrics for public The use of standardized testing as the
education, which changed priorities in special primary metric for student success raises questions
education programs.30 The Affordable Care Act about the treatment of autistic students, who must
mandated coverage for pediatric services and be provided an equal education under the
prevented the exclusion of coverage based on Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
preexisting conditions, and the vast majority of IDEA established the use of individualized
states passed their own mandates requiring education programs (IEPs), in which parents,
coverage of ASD-related treatments. However, the educational staff, and medical personnel create a
implementation of these guidelines was left up to list of goals for students to achieve in a given year,
state benchmarks, resulting in state-by-state depending on their abilities and the clinical
variance in benefit generosity.31 Recently, the manifestations of their diagnoses.34 However,
COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the normal mode of under NCLB, those in special education programs
operation for early intervention and treatment; must still receive an assessment that measures their
schools closed, many children missed routine achievement of state educational standards. While
doctor’s visits, and the healthcare system struggled NCLB establishes an option for alternate (rather
with resource constraints and high demand. I than standardized) assessments, these can only
analyze how each of these moments in policy represent 3% of students and must still measure
history affected autistic people, using the theories achievement of state standards, rather than
of Schneider and Ingram along with Wilson as students’ progress towards goals outlined in their
explanatory tools. IEPs.35 This creates issues for educational
professionals, who are incentivized under NCLB to
A. No Child Left Behind make sure disabled students are prepared for state
At the time of its implementation in 2002, assessments rather than meeting their IEP goals,
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) represented the most which range from developing academic to social to
significant expansion of the federal government in life skills. Depending on their symptoms, some
the education realm in US history.32 This legislation autistic children struggle to perform basic functions
increased the federal government's oversight of necessary for communication and daily life tasks.
public school outcomes. In order to receive federal However, NCLB dedicates precious educational
funding, states had to establish educational resources to ensuring they do not “fall behind”
standards and administer statewide assessments to educational standards while neglecting their true
determine student achievement of those standards. needs.
Previous legislation had tied federal funds to NCLB represents a federal policy that fails
accountability metrics, but NCLB tightened this to acknowledge the unique needs of students with
relationship by measuring outcomes quantitatively ASD. The construction of those with ASD as
using standardized test scores.33
30 Shima Kalaei. "STUDENTS WITH AUTISM LEFT BEHIND: NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT." Thomas Jefferson Law Review 30, no. 2 (Spring, 2008): 723-749.
http://proxy.library.nd.edu/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/trade-journals/students-with-autism-left-behind-no-
child/docview/198181606/se-2.
31 Aimee M. Grace, Kathleen G. Noonan, Tina L. Cheng, Dorothy Miller, Brittany Verga, David Rubin, and Sara
Rosenbaum. “The ACA's Pediatric Essential Health Benefit Has Resulted In A State-By-State Patchwork Of Coverage With
Exclusions.” Health Affairs 33, no. 12 (2014): 2136–43. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0743.
32 Mitchell L. Yell, Erik Drasgow, and K. Alisa Lowrey. “No Child Left Behind and Students With Autism Spectrum
Disorders.” Focus on Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities 20, no. 3 (2005): 130–39.
https://doi.org/10.1177/10883576050200030101.
33 Yell et al 2005.
34 Kalaei 2008.
35 Kalaei 2008, 735.

dependents plays into this; because their voices are range of Essential Health Benefits (or EHBs). EHBs
not present in the policy-making process, their of importance for this discussion include pediatric
needs are overlooked and assumed to be the same services, which cover developmental assessments
as other students’ needs. In 2001 when NCLB was crucial to early diagnosis, and “rehabilitative and
introduced, diagnosis rates were still relatively low habilitative services and devices,” which are used
and most states did not have insurance mandates partially to treat ASD.39
for ASD treatment. There were not many policy Despite these important policy gains, the
advocates for those with ASD, as Autism Speaks reality of their implementation across the US paints
was not founded until 2005, followed shortly after a different picture of how they impacted autistic
by the foundation of the Autistic Self-Advocacy children and their families. Despite 47 states having
Network in 2006.36 Therefore, even though benefits insurance coverage mandates for ASD-related
might be concentrated according to Wilson’s services as of 2021, the types of services covered
typology, autistic individuals were not yet varies widely between states.40 This is the case for
conceptualized as a potential policy target. both private and public insurance, as services
covered under Medicaid also vary by state.41
B. The Affordable Care Act and Medicaid reimbursement rates, or the rates at
Insurance Mandates which the state pays for treatment, are shown to
Amidst the implementation of state benefit have a significant independent effect on residents’
mandates, the policy landscape regarding health ability to receive treatment.42 Alongside differences
insurance regulation in the early 2000s became between states in accessing care, there are also
more sympathetic to the needs of socially differences between those on public and private
constructed dependent groups, including disabled insurance. The trend toward cost-sharing, which
people. In this realm, policy shifts beginning at the transfers costs to families through high deductibles
state level preceded and likely influenced federal and copays, has led to greater burdens for those on
regulations, most notably the essential health private insurance. This impacts access to treatment,
benefit stipulations under the Affordable Care Act.37 as expenditures for ASD treatment are four times
In response to growing diagnosis rates and higher for children under Medicaid, which covers
pressure from ASD advocates, legislatures passed
mandates requiring coverage of treatment related
to ASD in 46 states from 2001 to 2017.38 The
Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010,
mandated private and public insurers to cover a
36 “Who We Are.” Autistic Self Advocacy Network. Accessed April 3, 2024. https://autisticadvocacy.org/about-asan/who-
we-are/. ;
“About Autism Speaks.” Autism Speaks. Accessed December 13, 2023. https://www.autismspeaks.org/about-autism-
speaks#:~:text=Autism%20Speaks%20wa%20founded%20in,help%20financially%20launch%20the%20organization.
37 Aimee M. Grace et al. “The ACA's Pediatric Essential Health Benefit Has Resulted In A State-By-State Patchwork Of
Coverage With Exclusions.” Health Affairs 33, no. 12 (2014): 2136–43. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0743.
39 Ryan, Meghan, and Tim Nanof. 2021. “Why Don't Some Insurers Have to Cover Autism Services?” ASHA Leader 26 (3):
26–27.
40 Ryan and Nanof 2021.
41 Madeline Guth et al. “Medicaid Coverage of Behavioral Health Services in 2022: Findings from a Survey of State
Medicaid Programs.” KFF, March 17, 2023. https://www.kff.org/mental-health/issue-brief/medicaid-coverage-of-

behavioral-health-services-in-2022-findings-from-a-survey-of-state-medicaid-programs/.
42 Kathleen C. Thomas et al. “Access to Care for Children with Autism in the Context of State Medicaid Reimbursement.”
Maternal and Child Health Journal 16 (8): 1636–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10995-011-0862-1.

long-term care services that private insurers often According to Wilson’s theory, in cases where
do not.43 concentrated interests compete with diffuse
As an example of increased federal interests, the concentrated interests will win the
regulation, the EHB provisions in the Affordable policy contest.47 This can be seen in some aspects of
Care Act are unspecific in what services must be Medicaid policy. For example, many state Medicaid
covered. Under the ACA, each state establishes its programs have implemented waivers that allow
own base plan of coverage that serves as a children to qualify for coverage if they have certain
benchmark for all plans in the state; which results disabilities, regardless of income.48 However, as
in a wide variety of covered and excluded services costs rise, these policies are likely to become more
depending on the state of residence.44 Additionally, challenging to maintain. At the same time,
to cut costs, employers have opted into self-funded Schneider and Ingram’s theory of social
plans, in which they decide which services are construction provides a more nuanced look at why
covered. These plans represent almost 50% of all policies have not done enough to address the needs
employer-sponsored health plans, and they are of this population.
often exempt from the EHB provisions of the The theory of social construction asserts
ACA.45 This means that parents whose children are that the problems of socially constructed dependent
on these plans may have to pay out-of-pocket for groups are the responsibility of the private sector.49
routine developmental exams as well as treatment. Additionally, their problems are seen as individual,
Luckily, the EHB provisions in the ACA have raised rather than systemic, leading to solely individual-
consumer expectations, leading employers to self- level interventions. These predictions hold true for
elect to include more covered services than policies regulating health insurance coverage of
required by law.46 However, this is not always the ASD-related services. State governments, while not
case. private entities, are more decentralized than the
In analyzing the impact of state mandates federal government and are given the flexibility to
and the ACA on coverage of ASD services, a determine how to implement the ACA and
patchwork of different policies emerges. This leads Medicaid programs in their state.
to disparities in access to care based on the state of Some state governments are more
residence and the generosity of a child’s insurance sympathetic to this private responsibility argument
plan. In the US, it is not easy for parents to switch and are therefore less generous in their policies. For
insurance plans, as this would often necessitate example, partisanship has been shown to have a
changing jobs or, in the case of Medicaid, moving significant relationship with the generosity of state
states entirely. Because the costs of treatment can insurance mandates, as governments controlled by
run so high, policy is a crucial tool to ensure that Democrats are more likely to implement generous
those on the spectrum receive crucial interventions. policies.50 Interestingly, the presence of interest
However, both state insurance mandates and the groups has no significant impact on state
ACA have fallen short in ensuring access to governments. This suggests that, in the realm of
affordable care. state policy, Schneider and Ingram’s theory of
43 Li Wang, David S Mandell, Lindsay Lawer, Zuleyha Cidav, and Douglas L Leslie. “Healthcare Service Use and Costs for
Autism Spectrum Disorder: A Comparison between Medicaid and Private Insurance.” Journal of autism and
developmental disorders, May 2013. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3534815/.
44 Grace et al 2014.
45 Ryan and Nanof 2021, 26.
46 Ryan and Nanof 2021, 27.
47 Stone 2012
48 Wang et al 2013.

social construction may be more relevant than Children of all abilities were impacted by the move
Wilson’s typology. Partisanship as a variable adds to virtual learning and often required the assistance
additional nuance to Schneider and Ingram’s of parents; this was especially true for those on the
theory of social construction, as Democratic spectrum. However, parents, especially those with
governments are more likely to give dependent fewer resources, often did not have the bandwidth
groups benefits than Republican governments in to support their children in this environment due to
this case. Within their predictions of how the other work or childcare commitments.54
government treats dependent groups, Democrats The pandemic interrupted autism
are likely to cling to morality arguments, whereas management practices, as most autistic children
Republicans tout the importance of individual and stopped receiving educational and clinical therapies
private responsibility. for some amount of time. For example, due to
virtual learning, the number of hours children
C. COVID-19 and Federal spent in special education decreased.55 This will
Pandemic Response likely have long-term impacts due to delayed and
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the lives missed treatments that are most effective in
of autistic children in many ways that have not been childhood.
adequately addressed by policy. In terms of COVID- Shutdowns interrupted the routine of
19 itself, autistic individuals are more likely to preventive doctors’ visits and diagnostic
experience complications, as 25% of autistic assessments, as disabled children were less likely to
children have co-occurring immune deficiencies or be officially diagnosed during the pandemic.56 This
dysfunctions.51 Additionally, it was challenging for impacted the ability for early treatment, as most
autistic individuals to adhere to mitigation insurers require an official diagnosis, often
procedures such as masking and physical following a standardized procedure or assessment,
distancing due to ASD-associated sensory to cover services. Although the switch to telehealth
sensitivities, which may have increased their risk of partially alleviated this to some extent, not all
contracting the disease.52 Alongside these direct individuals or health systems were able to make the
effects of the virus on health, public shutdowns, switch as easily, and face-to-face assessments are
particularly of schools, dramatically altered the still considered the most effective.57
lives of those on the spectrum and their families. Autistic children and their families faced
For many autistic children, routine is crucial numerous unprecedented challenges during the
to developing life skills, and the COVID-19 pandemic that impacted their developmental
pandemic meant constant abrupt changes to progress and will likely impact their future abilities.
established routines. Long-term exposure to stress However, this impact can theoretically be offset by
and environmental deprivation in a lockdown can policy interventions. Amidst the lockdown, robust
lead to regressions in sensory-motor, physical, and support systems for parents were determined to be
mental health development for autistic people.53
51 Mohammed Al-Beltagi et al. “Effects of Covid-19 on Children with Autism.” World Journal of Virology 11, no. 6 (2022):
411–25. https://doi.org/10.5501/wjv.v11.i6.411.
52 Al-Beltagi et al 2022
53 Al-Beltagi et al 2022
54 Susan Sonnenschein et al. “‘This Will Likely Affect His Entire Life’: Parents’ Views of Special Education Services during
COVID-19.” International Journal of Educational Research, February 4, 2022.

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35136282/.
55 Sonnenschein et al 2022
56 Sonnenschein et al 2022
57 Lonnie Zwaigenbaum et al. “Rethinking Autism Spectrum Disorder Assessment for Children during COVID-19 and
Beyond.” Autism Research 14, no. 11 (September 9, 2021): 2251–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/aur.2615.

an effective solution to ASD management.58 Taking pandemic. Schneider and Ingram argue that
into account the stoppage of diagnosis and dependent groups are seen as having individual,
treatment, one might assume that more resources rather than systemic, problems and needs.62 The
should be allocated toward special education, government only grants them benefits out of a
diagnostic, and treatment efforts in the coming sense of morality which is rooted in unequal power
years. Unfortunately, federal and state policy relationships. On the other hand, advantaged
responses to the pandemic have almost completely groups receive benefits because they are seen as
ignored the needs of this vulnerable population. good for society as a whole.63 At this time when the
In response to the COVID pandemic, pandemic affected many groups, the government
Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and prioritized funding for groups that were seen as
Economic Security (CARES) Act in 2020 and the advancing the economic well-being of society, such
American Rescue Plan in 2021, which provided as college-educated students and businesses.
federal funds to a multitude of federal and state Although support was—and still is—much needed
agencies.59 While it is difficult to track exactly how for autistic children and their families, they do not
these agencies and state governments used these have the same larger effect on the economy that
funds, the federal government does track agency might occur if millions of graduates defaulted on
funding, including the Department of Education their student loans. This suggests that at times
and its Office of Special Education and when many groups are calling for support, socially
Rehabilitative Services. As a result of COVID-19 constructed advantaged groups will win out over
stimulus funds, the Department of Education’s dependents.
funding doubled from the 2019-2020 fiscal year
and almost doubled again from 2020 to 2021.60 IV. Conclusion
However, funds toward the Office of Special No Child Left Behind, health insurance
Education and Rehabilitative Services only regulation, and federal policy in response to the
increased by a small portion from $17.15 billion in COVID-19 pandemic all highlight how the social
FY 2019 to $17.57 billion in FY 2020. While construction of a target group impacts the policy
funding increased to $20.94 billion in 2021, it went responses. With No Child Left Behind, autistic
back down to $18.40 billion in FY 2022, which children were still not yet understood as a social
shows the lack of priority given to special group with distinctive needs from other students.
education. The majority of funding distributed to Although the Essential Health Benefit regulations
education during the pandemic went to student of the ACA represent a shift in policy, the federal
loan relief.61 Although this is important, not enough government did not take a strong enough stance to
support was given to special education, particularly provide direct support for autistic children and
as students began to return to school. their families. Because dependent groups are seen
The social construction of autistic as the responsibility of the private sector rather
individuals as dependents likely influences the lack than a policy priority, wide discrepancies emerged
of support they received during the COVID-19 in Medicaid and insurance coverage mandate
generosity between states. Recently, the COVID-19
58 Al-Beltagi et al 2022.
59 “About the American Rescue Plan.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 16, 2021.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/about-the-american-rescue-
plan#:~:text=The%20American%20Rescue%20Plan%20continues,of%20the%20COVID%2D19%20pandemic.
60 “Agency Profile: Department of Education.” USAspending.gov. Accessed December 11, 2023.
https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-education?fy=2023.
61 “Agency Profile” 2020 and 2021.

pandemic response highlighted the

conceptualization of those on the spectrum as “About the American Rescue Plan.” U.S.
having individual rather than systemic problems. Department of the Treasury, September 16,
During this period of systemic collapse, they were 2021.
not given much federal support, which will likely https://home.treasury.gov/policy-
have impacts on their lives as they did not receive issues/coronavirus/about-the-american-
interventions at crucial times. These three case rescue-
studies highlight how the social construction of plan#:~:text=The%20American%20Rescue
autistic individuals as dependents can influence %20Plan%20continues,of%20the%20COVI
policy responses. Autistic individuals are seen as D%2D19%20pandemic.
deserving, but not entitled, and policymakers do Al-Beltagi, Mohammed, Nermin Kamal Saeed, Adel
not center their voices to ensure that policy is Salah Bediwy, Rawan Alhawamdeh, and
effective. Samara Qaraghuli. “Effects of Covid-19 on
From these shortcomings, the question then Children with Autism.” World Journal of
becomes how policy can be more effective given a Virology 11, no. 6 (2022): 411–25.
dependent social construction. Advocates in the https://doi.org/10.5501/wjv.v11.i6.411.
neurodiversity movement call for a rethinking of “Agency Profile: Department of Education.”
the pathology paradigm, in which those on the USAspending.gov. Accessed December 11,
spectrum are viewed as inferior and needing to be 2023.
“fixed,” towards a neurodiversity paradigm that https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/depa
recognizes the role that social inequalities play in rtment-of-education?fy=2023.
creating a world that is hostile toward “Autism Spectrum Disorder in Children.” American
neurodivergent people, including autistic Academy of Pediatrics. 23 March 2023,
individuals.64 Perhaps in the future as the adult https://www.healthychildren.org/English/h
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LIV Golf and the
Campaign for
Sportswashing:
An Analytical Approach to
NGO Success Using Sport
as a Political Tool
Tyler Leonard
“Serious sport is war minus the shooting.”1 sportswashing as a political tool. Third, I outline
These words from George Orwell not only highlight the Public Investment Fund, the funding source of
the intensity of in-game conflict between opposing LIV Golf. Fourth, I discuss the objectives of LIV
athletes and teams in sport, but they also indicate Golf as a sports organization. Fifth, I walk through
the potential for sport to be utilized as a tool to the historical timeline of LIV Golf. Sixth, I go
advance one’s political agenda. In today’s through the sportswashing tactics employed by the
interconnected world highlighted by “new NGO. Seventh, I analyze the effectiveness of these
electronic communication technologies” and faster tactics using Rutherford’s theory of agenda setting.
information flows,2 sports have proliferated in Eighth, I address counterarguments to my
global popularity, bringing new actors into the theoretical approach by refuting the application of
sporting arena. One group of such sporting activists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s theory of
are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to LIV
operate in a space outside the state-centric order of Golf. Ninth, I conclude the essay by considering the
international relations, allowing them to realize implications of my analysis on future NGO
unique political successes through sport, primarily sportswashing.
through sportswashing. Due to the recent rise of Saudi Arabia’s Human Rights Record
this political tactic in multiple different sports The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia commits
industries, it is necessary to understand how NGOs various human rights abuses in violation of the
employ sportswashing to achieve their political 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.3
objectives. These violations include the use of torture as
In this essay, I analyze this question punishment for the accused, increasing numbers of
through the case study of LIV Golf and its campaign state-ordered public executions, limitations on the
to sportswash Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. freedom of speech and religion, and gender
Using Kenneth Rutherford’s theory of agenda inequality.4 Human rights organizations, led by
setting, I argue that LIV Golf puts sportswashing on Amnesty International, have publicized these
the cognitive agenda of its international audience abuses, leading to widespread dissent in opposition
through its rivalrous relationship with the Players’ of the Saudi regime, especially in the United States
Golf Association (PGA) Tour; this issue framing and Western Europe. For example, the 2018 killing
successfully distracts away from and minimizes the of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi
prevalence of dissent against Saudi human rights in consulate in Istanbul led to global outcries against
international communication networks. I also find Saudi Arabia, elevating Khashoggi to the status of a
that LIV Golf is minimally successful in normative political martyr. The dissemination of this story
agenda setting, as the NGO fails to normalize throughout the world led to the imposition of
discursive positions on Saudi human rights despite economic sanctions on Saudi Arabia by the United
its merger with the PGA Tour signaling economic
behavioral change from a target actor.
I develop my argument in nine parts. First, I
provide a background of Saudi Arabia’s human
rights record. Second, I summarize the concept of
1 SarathGanji, “The Rise of Sportswashing,” Journal of Democracy 34, no. 2 (April 2023): 62,
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-rise-of-sportswashing/.
2 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), 14.

3 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 81.
4 “Ten ways that Saudi Arabia violates human rights,” Amnesty International UK, last modified May 18, 2020,
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/saudi-arabia-human-rights-raif-badawi-king-salman.

States.5 The case of Jamal Khashoggi provides an Fund (PIF). Beginning in 2016, Vision 2030, led by
example of the negative international reputation Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister
Saudi Arabia engenders through its human rights Mohammed bin Salman, aims to revolutionize all
record, something the country aims to ameliorate facets of Saudi society through PIF economic
through various political tactics. investment, allowing Saudi Arabia to become a
Sportswashing leader in the Arab world and around the globe.9
In response to such international With $650 billion worth of assets owned by the
disapproval, autocratic regimes have recently Saudi Arabian monarchy, the current PIF portfolio
increased their use of sport as a political tool, primarily has economic holdings in the oil
working through various sportswashing NGOs.6 industry;10 Crown Prince bin Salman’s economic
Sportswashing is the “desire for attention on a blueprint wishes to extend PIF expenditures into
known moral violation to be routed away through new, burgeoning enterprises capable of supporting
sport.”7 Originating with the 1934 FIFA World Cup broader Saudi geopolitical goals.
hosted by Mussolini’s Fascist Italy and the 1936 One of the primary areas for Saudi
Olympics hosted by Hitler’s Nazi Germany, investment under the Vision 2030 initiative is the
sportswashing aims to manipulate the emotional sports industry, which Crown Prince bin Salman
appeal of sport to attract international audiences to asserts can help cultivate a vibrant Saudi society
a particular culture or political regime.8 prioritizing “cultural traditions” and “national
Sportswashers exploit the emotive attraction of pride.”11 As a result, the PIF, led by Governor Yasir
sport to diminish the international ubiquity and al-Rumayyan whose sporting investments also
importance of various political issues in public include an ownership stake in English soccer club
discourse. In today’s digitized world in which Newcastle United, invested $2 billion to establish
negative perceptions of state actions can easily be LIV Golf in October 2021.12 This initial investment
propagated online, sportswashing NGOs from the PIF covered the operating costs of LIV
increasingly use the Internet, social media, and Golf for its first two seasons in 2022 and 2023;
other forms of technology to combat these opinions there are plans to invest an additional $1 billion in
on various platforms. order to finance the upcoming 2024 season.13
Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund Objectives of LIV Golf
In order to sportswash its human rights Using funding from the Saudi Arabian PIF,
record and to advance its international economic the LIV Golf League was created in 2021 as an
goals, Saudi Arabia recently announced a alternative professional golf league to the United
commitment to diversify its government-controlled States-based PGA Tour, which has long held a
economic portfolio, called the Public Investment worldwide monopoly on golf by attracting the
5 “Sanctions against Saudi Arabia,” Sanction Scanner, accessed December 3, 2023,

https://sanctionscanner.com/knowledge-base/sanctions-against-saudi-arabia-
55#:~:text=In%20the%20case%20of%20Saudi,%2C%20terrorism%2C%20and%20international%20conflicts.
6 Ganji, “The Rise of Sportswashing,” 62-76.
7 Kyle Fruh, Alfred Archer, and Jake Wojtowicz, “Sportswashing: Complicity and Corruption,” Sport, Ethics and
Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2023): 103, https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2022.2107697.

8 Fruh, Archer, and Wojtowicz, “Sportswashing: Complicity and Corruption,” 104.
9 “Saudi Vision 2030,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/.
10 “Public Investment Fund,” Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accessed December 3, 2023,
https://www.pif.gov.sa/en/Pages/Homepage.aspx.
11 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “Saudi Vision 2030.”
12 Chris Isidore, “Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund just reshaped pro golf. It’s not stopping there,” CNN Business,
last modified June 7, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/07/investing/saudi-arabia-pif-golf-liv/index.html.

13 Evan Bleier, “How Much Did LIV Golf Spend This Season to Compete with the PGA Tour?,” InsideHook, last modified
October 28, 2022, https://www.insidehook.com/sports/much-liv-golf-spend-season-compete-pga.

world’s best professional players and receiving the promotion.19 Through these various enterprises,
highest revenues in leading television markets.14 In LIV expands its commitment to “holistically
response to the lack of innovation and opportunity improve the health of professional golf” by
afforded to players by the PGA Tour, LIV aims to “enabling and inspiring a better tomorrow”
create “golf but louder” through the “modernization throughout contemporary global society.20
and supercharging of the world golf landscape.”15 In Historical Timeline of LIV Golf
order to realize this objective, LIV differentiates Despite the investment of $800 million
itself from other traditional professional golf from the PIF as well as the uniqueness of the
leagues in numerous ways. LIV offers its players league’s tournament format, LIV’s revenue for its
large, fully guaranteed contracts, worth up to inaugural season in 2022 was “virtually zero.”21
hundreds of millions of dollars annually, as This lack of financial success derived from the
opposed to prize money contingent on performance league’s inability to secure a broadcasting deal with
in a tournament.16 In addition, LIV supplements any major television network; instead, Facebook
the individual competition in its tournaments and YouTube freely streamed all eight LIV Golf
(which is the conventional setup of all professional tournaments in 2022, with a low average
golf leagues) with a team component in which viewership of 180,000 people.22 The league was,
teams of four compete against each other for however, able to attract 26 of the top 100 ranked
greater shares of tournament prize money. LIV professional golfers in the world, indicating the
brings this unique format to new audiences around potential for future success of the league.23
the world with events on five of the seven In the midst of the 2022 LIV season, the
continents, helping to popularize golf in places PGA Tour banned all players who joined LIV Golf
previously not exposed to the sport.17 from playing in PGA events. In response, a group of
LIV supplements its global sporting 11 LIV players (including major champions Phil
footprint with a deliberate desire to use golf as a Mickelson and Bryson DeChambeau) and LIV Golf
source for positive societal change off the course.18 as an organization filed an antitrust lawsuit against
Under the “Potential, Unleashed” initiative, LIV has the PGA Tour in California. Attorneys representing
invested in a number of social and environmental LIV Golf and its players claimed that the PGA Tour
programs, including refugee assistance, educational was using its entrenched monopoly to squash fair
funding and golf lessons for underprivileged competition in the professional golfing industry.24
communities, and environmental sustainability In response, the PGA Tour countersued against LIV
14 David Dayen, “PGA Golf Is the Latest in a Long Line of Sports Monopolists,” The American Prospect, last modified June
9, 2023, https://prospect.org/power/2023-06-09-rollups-pga-golf-sports-monopolists/.
15 “LIV Golf,” LIV Golf, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.livgolf.com/.
16 LIV Golf, “LIV Golf.”
19 “Potential, Unleashed,” LIV Golf, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.livgolf.com/potential-unleashed.
21 Josh Sim, “LIV Golf had ‘virtually zero’ revenue for first season,” SportsPro Media, last modified February 8, 2023,
https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/liv-golf-tour-revenue-finances-court-documents-pga-pif/.
22 “2022 LIV Golf Invitational Series,” Wikipedia, accessed December 3, 2023,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=2022_LIV_Golf_Invitational_Series&oldid=1184774865.
23 Justin Birnbaum, “LIV Golf Now Has 26 Of The World’s Top 100 Golfers. Here’s Who They Are,” Forbes, last modified
August 30, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/justinbirnbaum/2022/08/30/liv-golf-now-has-26-of-the-worlds-top-

100-golfers-heres-who-they-are/?sh=15f8f54c74fd.
24 Doug Ferguson, “Saudi-backed LIV Golf, PGA Tour file joint motion to dismiss lawsuits,” AP News, last modified June
16, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/liv-lawsuits-pga-tour-dismissal-saudi-arabia-

fab5777b05c9cbc69eb38c0ab1bdf34a.

Golf, claiming that LIV’s financial backing from ability to convince the most highly marketable
Yasir al-Rumayyan and Saudi Arabia’s PIF signaled golfers to play for LIV decreased the quality of
“tortious interference,” as they coerced PGA golfers playing in PGA Tour events, adversely
members to violate their contracts to join the affecting PGA revenues.32 Due to the negative
Saudi-based league.25 This protracted legal battle financial impact both leagues exerted on each other
marked a climax in the rivalry between LIV and the amid ongoing litigation, it was in the interest of
PGA that first arose following LIV’s creation in both parties to drop all mutual lawsuits and merge
2021. into one entity sharing television and commercial
Amid this ongoing lawsuit, LIV Golf began rights. Announced on June 6th, 2023, this
its second season in February 2023.26 For this currently pending merger places Yasir al-
season, the league managed to broker a television Rumayyan as the Chairman of the Board of
broadcasting deal with The CW network.27 This Directors of a new company controlling both LIV
agreement did not lead to significant increases in Golf and the PGA Tour.33
revenue, however, as LIV Golf did not receive any Political Tactics of LIV Golf
upfront television rights fee but, rather, only shared LIV Golf has pursued three primary tactics
in advertising sales revenue with The CW, of discourse manipulation throughout this process,
amounting to $300,000 per event.28 (To provide allowing the NGO to pursue its sportswashing
context to its financial losses, LIV pays $20 million agenda: distracting away, minimizing, and
in prize money per event to its players).29 normalizing. First, distracting away involves
Viewership numbers did increase to an average of “usurping Internet searches from a moral violation”
300,000 viewers per event on The CW network; to prevent more people from attending to the
however, these numbers remained significantly issue.34 Second, minimizing is the relegation of a
lower than the PGA viewership average of 2.6 moral violation to a position of less prominence to
million people.30 the sport.35 Third, normalizing aims to influence
Despite the persistence of low viewership audiences to stop viewing the issue as a moral
and revenue figures, LIV attracted more high- violation.36 Hierarchically arranged, these levels of
ranking professional golfers to join its league, influence demonstrate how a sportswashing NGO
highlighted by Jon Rahm, currently ranked third in can progress to be able to alter discursive positions
the Official World Golf Rankings.31 This continued
25 Doug Ferguson, “Saudi-backed LIV Golf, PGA Tour file joint motion to dismiss lawsuits.”
26 “2023 LIV Golf Invitational Series,” Wikipedia, accessed December 3, 2023,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_LIV_Golf_League.
27 “LIV Golf,” The CW, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.cwtv.com/shows/liv-golf-league/.
28 “LIV-CW terms: Two-year deal with one-year option,” Sports Business Journal, last modified January 24, 2023,
https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Daily/Issues/2023/01/24/Media/liv-golf-tv-cw-deal.aspx.
29 “Here's the prize money payout for each golfer at the 2023 LIV Golf Invitational - Jeddah,” Golf Digest, last modified
October 13, 2023, https://www.golfdigest.com/story/here-is-the-prize-money-payout-for-each-golfer-at-the-2023-liv-

golf-league-invitational-jeddah.
30 Tim Schmitt, “CBS says TV viewership up for 2023 PGA Tour season, with Tour Championship getting big numbers,”
Golfweek, last modified August 29, 2023, https://golfweek.usatoday.com/2023/08/29/cbs-sports-tv-pga-tour-numbers-

up/.
31 “Official World Golf Ranking,” Official World Golf Ranking, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.owgr.com/.
32 Brian Panton, “Is the PGA Tour Losing Its Grip on Its Revenue Driver?,” Dow Jones, accessed December 3, 2023,
https://www.dowjones.com/professional/resources/blog/is-the-pga-tour-losing-its-grip-on-its-revenue-driver.
33 Kevin Draper, “The PGA Tour and LIV Golf Merger, Explained,” The New York Times, last modified July 17, 2023,
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/07/sports/golf/pga-liv-golf-merger.html.
36 Fruh, Archer, and Wojtowicz,“Sportswashing: Complicity and Corruption,” 104.

on a potentially problematic issue in politically to attract the highest quality players to its
favorable ways. tournaments. They have successfully signed many
To distract away from Saudi Arabia’s human of the most talented and famous golfers in the
rights record, LIV created a golf league unique from world, including Jon Rahm, Dustin Johnson,
the PGA Tour and other traditional leagues. The Brooks Koepka, and Phil Mickelson, who together
primary distinction derives from the pay structure have won 15 major championships and have
of the league, in which players receive guaranteed millions of followers on social media platforms.38
contracts worth up to hundreds of millions of Through its association with these celebrities, LIV
dollars per year, regardless of the quality of their Golf as an organization received an immense
performance in LIV events. As a result, LIV Golf international presence via the emotional appeal
received backlash from the professional golf these golfers engender in their fan bases worldwide.
orthodoxy, capturing the attention of the Consequently, the NGO became a legitimate
international media and leading to a debate over member of the sporting community through its
the fairness of fully guaranteed salaries in a sport high-profile members, allowing the LIV programs
known for its emphasis on financial meritocracy. supported by these individuals to receive greater
For example, high-profile golfers like Phil media publicity than any human rights issues.39
Mickelson (a leading LIV member) and Rory One such LIV initiative was the “Potential,
McIlroy (a leading PGA member) exchanged Unleashed” program for sustainability and
impassioned public messages on Twitter relating to development. The social impact of this project and
the issue.37 The popular interest in these disputes its publication online signified LIV’s desire to
between famous athletes led to the publication of sportswash not only through quality professional
more articles online and on social media covering golf, but also through its demonstration of a Saudi
the relationship between LIV Golf and the PGA commitment to improving the world. “Potential,
Tour. Moreover, the legal action LIV took against Unleashed” is an attempt to change the negative
the PGA Tour transformed this conflict, which was narrative of Saudi human rights to one of positive
previously limited to disputes between individual social change, further minimizing the importance of
LIV and PGA Tour golfers, into a rivalry between human rights issues in comparison to the
the entities of LIV Golf and the PGA themselves. As substantive work of LIV Golf and its famous
a result, these two LIV strategies combined to form members.
an emotionally appealing narrative of personal Pursuing enhancement of the distraction
ethics, sporting betrayal, and organizational away from, and minimization of, Saudi human
competition that people wanted to consume online, rights abuses, LIV Golf also tried to use
allowing for the media to elevate the LIV-PGA Tour sportswashing to normalize the actions of the Saudi
conflict and therefore distract people away from government, as reflected in the discursive positions
issues concerning Saudi human rights abuses. of international actors (primarily in the United
Furthermore, LIV aimed to enhance this States). LIV Golf has recruited and publicized
initial distraction with a minimization of human famous golfers who not only advocate for LIV
rights issues relative to its sporting actions both on programs like “Potential, Unleashed,” but also
and off the course. From its inception, LIV Golf has those who openly support broader Saudi
aimed to utilize its economic backing from the PIF geopolitical and economic goals. For example,
37 Riley Hamel, “Phil Mickelson takes shot at Rory McIlroy on Twitter, claiming no LIV team would want him because of
his 'bs',” Golfweek, last modified June 3, 2023, https://golfweek.usatoday.com/2023/06/03/phil-mickelson-twitter-rory-
mcilroy-liv-golf-news/.
38 “List of men's major championship winning golfers,” Wikipedia, accessed December 3, 2023,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_men%27s_major_championships_winning_golfers.

major champion Graeme McDowell, one of the first issue.”42 Level-two agenda setting involves
members of LIV Golf, asserted, “if Saudi Arabia “changing policymakers' perceptions” about Saudi
wanted to use the game of golf as a way for them to Arabia’s human rights record as an issue of political
get to where they want to be [...], I think we are salience.43 There are three strategies of issue
proud to help them on that journey.”40 Such formulation that determine an NGO’s success in
statements reflect the ability of LIV Golf to elevate both the cognitive and normative levels of agenda
pro-Saudi narratives through the platforms of its setting: framing, schema, and priming.44 Framing is
players in order to sportswash critical viewpoints; “the selection of elements within a particular issue;”
through expanding supportive sentiments beyond schema is the way in which an NGO reduces
the sporting facets of LIV into the broader political complex information into comprehensible frames;
discourse surrounding the league, LIV aims to priming is the “frequency and intensity of media
normalize the actions of the Saudi government on exposure” in order to activate and publicize various
an international scale. An example of the effect of schemas.45
this normalization of opinions on LIV’s Connecting the tactics of sportswashing to
sportswashing strategy is the league’s merger with Rutherford’s theory of agenda setting, I find that
the PGA Tour, indicating a long-term economic LIV Golf is successful in level-one agenda setting,
partnership between Saudi Arabia (as embodied by as the NGO places sportswashing on the
LIV Golf) and the United States (as embodied by international center stage through distracting away
the PGA Tour). This deepening of economic from and minimizing Saudi Arabia’s human rights
relations between these entities and the countries issues. From its inception in 2021, LIV Golf framed
they represent introduces greater opportunity for its creation within the context of a rivalry with the
sportswashing, providing the potential for PGA Tour. The league attracted some of the most
international discourse on Saudi Arabia’s human prominent PGA Tour golfers with large guaranteed
rights to further normalize in the near future. contracts and engaged in legal action against the
Effectiveness of LIV Golf Sportswashing PGA Tour, painting the PGA as a monopolist
To analyze the effectiveness of LIV Golf’s undermining fair competition in the sport. The
ability to sportswash Saudi Arabia’s human rights popular appeal of this organizational conflict amid
record, I use Kenneth Rutherford’s theory of the broader emotive capacity of golf worldwide
agenda setting as a framework. Rutherford divides allowed for LIV to distract away from the increased
agenda setting into two levels: level-one (or publication of Saudi Arabia’s human rights abuses.
“cognitive”) agenda setting and level-two (or Furthermore, the schema of LIV Golf as a
“norm”) agenda setting.41 Level-one agenda setting sustained alternative to the PGA Tour over a two-
involves “getting governments and the public to year period enhanced the original framing of its
think about [sportswashing] as an important rivalry with the PGA Tour. To evolve sportswashing
40 Riath Al-Samarrai, “'We're not politicians', says Graeme McDowell, as LIV golfers asked about Saudi Arabia's human
rights,” Sky Sports, last modified June 8, 2022, https://www.skysports.com/golf/news/12176/12629518/were-not-
politicians-says-graeme-mcdowell-as-liv-golfers-asked-about-saudi-arabias-human-rights.
41 Kenneth R. Rutherford, “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning
Antipersonnel Landmines,” World Politics 53, no. 1 (2000): 78. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054137.

42 Rutherford, “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel
Landmines,” 79.
Landmines,” 92.
Landmines,” 78.
Landmines,” 78.

as a distraction from human rights to a minimizing did not find broader audiences due to LIV’s low
factor relative to the popularity of golf, LIV had to viewership ratings. Despite its ability to create a
develop into a legitimate organization capable of narrative with the PGA Tour, the NGO was never
challenging the PGA Tour’s entrenched stronghold able to make its golf tournaments (its main
on the sport. Through PIF funding, LIV utilized product) salient enough to have a normalizing
economic leverage to attract many of the world’s effect on the discursive positions about Saudi
preeminent players to leave the PGA Tour for its human rights.
league; this trend has continued throughout the In spite of not changing international
lifetime of LIV’s existence, creating a sporting discursive positions, LIV Golf did find minimal
organization led by numerous world-famous success in normative agenda setting, as the league
golfers. LIV Golf primed these golfers (who did change behaviors of some policymakers. The
function as the schemas under Rutherford’s theory) merger between LIV Golf and the PGA Tour marks
to use their platforms to enhance the sporting a behavioral shift from the target actor, as the
product of LIV Golf and publicly approve of Saudi previously independent monopoly of the PGA Tour
Arabia’s political objectives. As evidenced through united with its rival in the golf industry. This
the example of Graeme McDowell, LIV members commercial unification does not exemplify
distracted away from and minimized public changing perceptions of the United States on Saudi
outcries against Saudi Arabia’s human rights record human rights abuses, but it does indicate a
through their actions and their words. Within the commitment to a long-term economic partnership
frame of the emotionally appealing narrative of its between the two entities. Therefore, the merger
rivalry with the PGA Tour, LIV Golf was therefore creates the potential for future normalizing
able to successfully make sportswashing an issue on sportswashing activity by LIV Golf through
the international agenda. economic relations with the United States. In this
Despite LIV Golf’s success in the cognitive way, there is a small level of normative change in
agenda setting of sportswashing, I find that the the PGA Tour’s behavior toward LIV through
NGO is only minimally successful in level-two sportswashing, even though there is no discursive
agenda setting, as the discursive positions of target positional change from the United States and the
actors (specifically the United States, as embodied broader international community.
through the PGA Tour) do not change. LIV aims to
normalize international attitudes toward Saudi Addressing An Alternative Theoretical
Arabia’s human rights policies by publicizing Approach
support from its prominent players as well as Despite the ability of Rutherford’s theory of
launching benevolent programs like the “Potential, agenda setting to explain the sportswashing success
Unleashed” initiative. However, LIV Golf was of LIV Golf, certain theorists assert that Keck and
operating in an environment highly disapproving of Sikkink’s theory of TANs is the most
Saudi Arabia’s moral reputation both within and comprehensive explanation of NGO behavior in
without the world of golf. Therefore, in order to international politics. Keck and Sikkink outline four
change these widespread negative opinions (which tactics of NGOs: information politics, symbolic
framed the NGO’s goal of normalization), LIV Golf politics, (moral and material) leverage politics, and
needed to further prime the positive comments of accountability politics. These tactics aim to achieve
its players and its social impact in the media to five levels of influence: issue creation and agenda
create positive international dialogue. LIV Golf setting, discursive positional change, institutional
failed to foster such conversation, however, as the procedural change, policy change in target actors,
approving words of players like Graeme McDowell and state behavioral change.46 A common way in
46 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 16-25.

which NGOs employ these tactics is through the of its merger with the PGA. Keck and Sikkink would
Boomerang Pattern, in which an NGO calls on one attribute this inconsistency to LIV Golf’s inability to
state to pressure another state into action.47 apply moral leverage to the issue despite being able
Using this framework, Keck and Sikkink to use material leverage; nevertheless, Keck and
would say that LIV Golf primarily uses material Sikkink assert that NGOs are most successful in
leverage politics through PIF economic support to dealing with issues of “bodily harm to vulnerable
coerce PGA players into joining its league, individuals” and “legal equality of opportunity,”
legitimizing LIV at the expense of the PGA’s which include human rights.48 However, no NGO or
monopoly. LIV supplements leverage politics with state actor has prevented the LIV Golf-PGA Tour
information politics through player statements merger, indicating that material leverage can
supporting the Saudi regime and symbolic politics overcome moral opposition in areas Keck and
through its rivalry with the PGA Tour. All of these Sikkink predict it should not.
tactics coalesce to form a modified Boomerang Second, it is inconclusive as to whether LIV
Pattern, in which LIV Golf, working on behalf of the Golf intended to engage in a Boomerang Pattern at
Saudi government through the PIF, uses economic all. LIV’s rivalry with the PGA Tour through its
leverage to pressure the United States into economic leverage and symbolic lawsuits tried to
economic cooperation through sportswashing. distract and minimize the online prevalence of
In analyzing the success of LIV Golf, Keck Saudi human rights issues relative to the sport of
and Sikkink would assert that the NGO successfully golf; rather than a clearly opportunistic economic
puts sportswashing on the agenda through the partnership with the PGA Tour, these tactics meant
effects of the material leverage politics and to position LIV as a legitimate alternative to the
symbolic politics involved in LIV’s rivalry with the PGA Tour capable of sportswashing for a sustained
PGA Tour. They would argue that LIV was period of time. It was only after the failure of LIV to
unsuccessful in discursive positional change, as the attract considerable attention to its tournaments
lack of moral leverage involved in sportswashing that a merger came, indicating that it was not an
prevents LIV from changing international attitudes original goal of the NGO to merge with the PGA.
on Saudi human rights. Despite this lack of Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern operates
international discursive success, they would find from this unsubstantiated assumption, whereas
the NGO to be successful in procedural change as Rutherford’s theory of agenda setting not only can
well as minimally successful in both policy change explain this failure of level-two agenda setting, but
and state behavioral change through LIV’s merger also can demonstrate how LIV responded to realize
with the PGA Tour. minimal normative success through the PGA
There are two main limitations of Keck and merger.
Sikkink’s theory in explaining LIV Golf’s success in Conclusion
sportswashing. First, Keck and Sikkink’s levels of In this essay, I evaluate the effectiveness of
influence are hierarchically arranged, implying that LIV Golf’s ability to sportswash Saudi Arabia’s
a certain level of discursive positional change is a human rights record. The success of the NGO in
necessary prerequisite for change in the three achieving its objective is twofold, as LIV must
following levels of influence. LIV Golf has not, distract away and minimize the publication of
however, altered international discursive positions negative opinions regarding Saudi Arabia as well as
on Saudi Arabia’s human rights and still realized a normalize the actions of the Saudi regime through
certain level of procedural and state behavioral sport. Using Rutherford’s theory of two-level
success through the broader economic implications agenda setting, I find that LIV’s creation of an

engaging rivalry with the PGA Tour combined with World’s Top 100 Golfers. Here’s Who They
its economic leverage through the PIF allowed it to Are.” Forbes. Last modified August 30,
set sportswashing on the agenda; however, LIV 2022.
ultimately failed to normalize international https://www.forbes.com/sites/justinbirnba
attitudes, as the merger with the PGA Tour only um/2022/08/30/liv-golf-now-has-26-of-
signifies slight behavioral change in target actors the-worlds-top-100-golfers-heres-who-they-
amid unchanging discursive positions. Rutherford’s are/?sh=15f8f54c74fd.
approach provides a more comprehensive analysis Bleier, Evan. “How Much Did LIV Golf Spend This
of LIV Golf’s success as an NGO in comparison to Season to Compete with the PGA Tour?.”
Keck and Sikkink’s theory, which presents InsideHook. Last modified October 28,
inconsistencies in its hierarchically arranged levels 2022.
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Boomerang Pattern. liv-golf-spend-season-compete-pga.
This study of LIV Golf presents broader Dayen, David. “PGA Golf Is the Latest in a Long
implications for scholarly inquiry into NGO Line of Sports Monopolists.” The American
activism in sportswashing. My findings seem to Prospect. Last modified June 9, 2023.
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advancing and realizing an NGO’s overarching rollups-pga-golf-sports-monopolists/.
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this economic leverage seems to allow Merger, Explained.” The New York Times.
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legal equality of opportunity. As a result, LIV Golf Ferguson, Doug. “Saudi-backed LIV Golf, PGA Tour
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replicated and enhanced in the future, a potentially News. Last modified June 16, 2023.
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Restraining an Ally:
U.S. Response to
Israel’s Crisis of
Democracy
Katherine Gottemoller
How ought the U.S. government respond to that Israel has no written constitution to reference.
Israel’s proposed judicial reforms that weaken the Instead, the first Constitutional Assembly (Knesset)
power of the courts in making definitive rulings, established the Basic Laws of Israel that outline
give the executive branch power over members of government roles and human rights
the judiciary, appoint Netanyahu’s ultra- responsibilities.1 The judicial reform legislation was
nationalists as Finance Minister and Defense proposed in January of 2023 by Justice Minister
Ministry, and decrease checks on the prime Yariv Levin and some provisions were passed in
minister? I propose that the current U.S. foreign March. Netanyahu has temporarily postponed the
policy of no-questions-asked aid to Israel and judicial reform after hundreds of thousands of
regional diplomatic support is a national security Israeli citizens protested the measures. The
risk, and that the U.S. ought to respond to Israel’s proposed changes would increase the majority
crisis of democracy by leveraging aid and building necessary in the High Court of Justice (HCJ) to
up relations with Palestine and Arab states to overturn laws, give the Knesset power to overturn
communicate continued interest in a stable region judicial decisions until a unanimous decision is
and a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine reached, change the makeup of the Judicial
conflict. If Israel’s democratic crisis continues, its Selection Committee to include members chosen by
aggression over contested land with Palestine may the Knesset, prevent the application of a
result in an arms race and could spiral into war, “reasonableness” test to legislation and
harming the United States’ interest in security and governmental action, and give the Prime Minister’s
access to resources in the Middle East. I reach my cabinet the power to appoint legal advisers outside
conclusion by describing Israel’s crisis of of the Justice Ministry.2 Prime Minister Benjamin
democracy and its consequences for the United Netanyahu has justified these changes by claiming
States, analyzing the roots of the U.S.-Israel that the previous power of judicial review was so
diplomatic relationship by summarizing the foreign expansive that it eclipsed the power of the Knesset
policies of the Obama, Trump, and Biden to represent the interests of their constituents.
administrations. From this history of foreign policy, This judicial reform follows Netanyahu’s
I will propose a solution along with its costs and appointment of ultra-nationalists Itamar Ben-Gvir
benefits and conclude by assessing alternative as National Security Minister and Bezalel Smotrich
solutions and illustrating the challenges facing as Finance Minister. Ben-Gvir is the leader of
policymakers due to the changing nature of the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) and Smotrich leads
U.S.-Israel relationship. Halchud HaLeumi (National Union). Both parties
Section I: Israel's Crisis of Democracy are ultranationalist, as they support policies
Although the transition to ultranationalist intended to further national interests to the
leadership and proposed judicial reforms are detriment of any other.3 In November 2022, Gvir
recent, they could produce erratic foreign policy and Smotrich ran under a joint list for HaZionut
decisions that endanger the U.S.-backed two-state HaDaiti (Religious Zionism), which advocates
solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and could religion as a method to resolve disputes over the
ignite a security spiral. Determining the cause of rule of law, distribution of land, and conflicts
Israel’s crisis of democracy is outside the scope of
this paper, but the crisis is exacerbated by the fact
1 U.S. Congressional Research Service. Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations (R44245; April 7, 2023), by Jim Zanotti, 5.
2 Zanotti, 4.
3 “Itamar Ben-Gvir.” Encyclopædia Britannica, March 25, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Itamar-Ben-
Gvir. ; “National Union.” The Israel Democracy Institute. Accessed March 25, 2024. https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-elections-
and-parties/parties/national-union/.

between religious and ethnic groups.4 The coalition in the Knesset could result in controversial changes
has also supported annexation of the West Bank, a in Israel's religious-secular balance by allocating
position that risks further displacement of more weight to religious sectors as envisioned by
Palestinian inhabitants.5 Both ministers have the Religious Zionism coalition. Additionally, this
considerable power over the nation’s security legislation could endanger minority rights in the
policy. Minister Smotrich’s role also includes a seat West Bank and holy sites due to increased
within the Ministry of Defense with “formal militarization and aggression. The Security
responsibility over civil affairs units administering Dilemma, coined by John J. Hertz and elaborated
West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the on by Robert Jervis, is a political theory describing
planning commission that oversees West Bank the situation that occurs when actions a state takes
settlement construction and home demolitions.”6 in order to increase their own security may be
As National Security Minister, Ben Gvir controls interpreted by other states as revealing aggressive
policy over Israel’s police who patrol contested intent, disrupting the balance of power, and
areas in Jerusalem’s holy sites. These appointments compromising their own security. This applies to
and the power they wield over Israeli national Israel’s recent legislative changes. Although they
security decisions are certainly a cause for concern, have been framed as increasing their own security,
and they have not gone unchallenged within Israel. they may be perceived by Palestinians and
Netanyahu’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and surrounding states as a threat to their safety,
officials within the Israel Defense Forces have resulting in increased tension, an arms race, or
expressed their opposition to changes in the chain total war.8 Democratic checks and balances
of command and in the conduct of the border stabilize a nation’s foreign policy by eliminating the
police. This internal opposition and the thousands threat of radical policies and ensuring that foreign
of Israeli citizens who protested the judicial reform policy decisions are cohesive.
legislation indicate that the crisis of democracy, Section II: U.S.-Israel Diplomatic History
though serious, has not suppressed dialogue within The U.S.-Israel relationship, which has
Israel. served varying strategic purposes throughout the
There are two consequences to Israel’s Cold War and the War on Terror, is based on
crisis: domestic instability and aggressive foreign shared democratic principles and has enjoyed
policy. If the proposed reforms are passed, they bipartisan support. The primacy of Israel in U.S.
would allow slight majorities in Knesset (61 of 120 foreign policy has many causes and has existed
members) to pass legislation, and even if that since Israel’s founding in 1948, when President
legislation is in opposition to the basic laws, the Truman first recognized Israel’s statehood. Until
HCJ can only overturn it with a unanimous vote.7 the Kennedy administration, U.S. relations with
This process not only undermines the principles of Israel were controversial. President Kennedy
democracy that the United States and Israel claim introduced Israel as an ally in the Cold War to
to share, but would result in instability of Israel’s counter Soviet aid to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In the
foreign policy. Legislation passed by a slim majority 1970s, Israel became a strategic asset to the U.S. in
4 Brendan Szendro, “Israel’s Religious Zionists Gained Ground in the November Election.” The Washington Post,
December 16, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/12/16/israel-rzp-religious-zionist-knesset/.
;“Religious Zionist Party.” The Israel Democracy Institute. Accessed March 25, 2024. https://en.idi.org.il/israeli-
elections-and-parties/parties/religious-zionism/.
5 Szendro, “Israel’s Religious Zionists.”
6 Zanotti, 3.
7 Natan Sachs, “Israel’s Majoritarian Nightmare should be a US Concern,” Brookings, The Brookings Institution, February
23, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/israels-majoritarian-nightmare-should-be-a-us-concern/.

8 Robert Jervis. “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary” in Perception and Misperception in
International Politics New Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62.

the containment of Soviet expansion. This assist Israel’s military to ensure it has the latest and
relationship continued throughout the Cold War most efficient technologies and weapons available;
and after its end, the United States re-engaged with and $275 million in supplemental funding to
Israel as an ally in the war against terror.9 develop the Iron Dome missile system.”12 Obama
Domestic politics were marked by bipartisan also renewed a ten year Security Assistance
support for sending aid to Israel in order to Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Israel
maintain the country’s regional military supremacy. that amounted to $33 billion in foreign military
This increases Israel’s credibility and the threat funding.13 In addition, President Obama signed the
they pose to the nations surrounding them. The United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act in
U.S. has invested in Israeli military, economy, and 2014 that requires the United States to maintain
missile defense. Between 1946 and 2020, the U.S. Israel's “Qualitative Military Edge” by ensuring that
overseas loans and grants have provided Israel with Israel’s military is better-trained and better-
over $104 billion in military aid.10 Support for equipped than its regional competitors. The shift in
Israel is also popular among Americans, with a Pew foreign policy during the Obama administration
research poll finding that “54% of Americans tested the U.S.-Israel connection, but the
support Israel and 19% support Palestine.”11 relationship was re-solidified during the Trump and
Although the U.S.’s reasons for supporting Israel Biden administrations.
have shifted, the fact remains that we send them The Trump administration renewed the U.S.
substantial foreign aid and value them as a strategic commitment to aligning with Israel by withdrawing
ally. Recent U.S. presidential administrations have from the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018. In 2021, the
continued with this foreign policy. Trump administration produced the Abraham
President Obama reframed American Accords to improve relationships between Israel,
foreign policy in the Middle East to one that the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and
prioritized stability, as opposed to one that solely Sudan.14 Trump also recognized Jerusalem as
prioritized Israel's regional superiority. Although Israel’s capital and moved the U.S. Embassy from
the administration continued American status quo Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This policy alienated
relations with Israel, President Obama did Palestinians, who claim parts of the city as the
challenge Israel with his proposal of the Iran capital for a future state.15 The Biden
Nuclear Deal. At the time, Israel opposed the deal administration has continued expressing its desire
because it lifted economic sanctions from Iran, an for a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian
action that Israel felt would endanger their own conflict and has attempted to rebuild U.S.-
security. Though the Obama administration was the Palestinian relations. Secretary of State Antony
first to substantially oppose Israel’s wishes on the Blinken visited the West Bank in January 2023 and
world stage, depictions of Obama as anti-Israel are restated U.S. foreign policy, declaring, “We oppose
completely unfounded. During his terms as any action by either side that makes that goal [a
president, Obama sent “over $3 billion per year to two-state solution] more difficult to achieve, more
9 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2008), 51.
10 U.S. Congressional Research Service. “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” (RL33222; March 1, 2023) by Jeremy M. Sharp. See
appendix Graph 1.
11 Adam L. Fuller, Israel and the Neoconservatives: Zionism and American Interests (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2019), 67.
12 “President Obama & Israel - The Facts,” Joint Action Committee for Political Affairs, Accessed April 25, 2023,
https://jacpac.org/story/12/10/16/president-obama-israel-facts.
13 Sharp, 9.
14 Zanotti, 15.
15 Zanotti, 10.

distant [...] like settlement expansion, the change of intentions regarding their willingness to
legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, cooperate with the United States in maintaining
disruptions to the historic status quo of the holy stability in the region. In response to this threat,
sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to the U.S. ought to re-evaluate its diplomatic
violence.”16 Biden’s foreign policy has addressed the relationships in the region. Early and credible
increasing instability by remaining committed to a responses to this threat must include leveraging
two-state solution and denouncing both Israeli and U.S. military and foreign aid and investing in
Palestinian violence. Yet, the administration has diplomatic relationships with Israel’s competitors
sought to ensure that Israel remains a strategic ally in the region.
even despite internal instability and a right-wing My implicit assumption is that the current
shift. I propose that we must communicate our U.S. desire for a two-state solution to the Israel-
desire for a stable Middle East and leverage U.S. Palestine conflict ought to remain the focus of our
foreign and military aid to increase our credibility. policy toward Israel. By extension, it recognizes
Section III: Restraining Allies: Leveraging instability in Israel’s democracy as a danger to the
Aid and Israel’s Diplomatic Monopoly two-state solution, regional peace, and American
According to Stephen Walt’s balance of national security. My solution is threefold. First, we
threat theory, states form alliances to balance need to communicate diplomatically our belief that
against the threat of another state. States evaluate judicial reform, the expansion of presidential
threats based on geographic proximity, aggregate power, and the rise of ultra-nationalists within the
power, offensive power, and intentions.17 As a government pose a threat to U.S. national interest
result, the most salient threats are those that are in maintaining stability in the Middle East.
expressed by a nearby state, where the state has President Biden has already begun to do so, but
significant resources, greater offensive capabilities, statements of this kind cannot be delivered credibly
and expresses offensive intentions. Walt’s analysis without some type of enforcement mechanism. Our
of alliance formation as a response to a nation’s communication must be accompanied with the
external threat doesn't fully capture the U.S.-Israel threat of ending U.S. supplies of offensive military
relationship as a restraining alliance or one technology.19 The timing of diplomatic statements
intended to mitigate the risk that an ally poses to a as well as the threat of decreasing military support
nation’s national security. This theory of alliance and foreign aid are crucial. Therefore, it is critical
restraint was proposed by Jeremy Pressman and for the United States to build its credibility by
posits that “alliances are also formed to control and communicating to Israel that aggressive action,
influence those parties within the alliance, the such as the repudiation of the two-state solution,
members themselves.”18 Understanding the U.S.- will result in decreased military and foreign aid
Israel alliance as one of restraint necessitates that from the U.S. Finally, these specific actions must be
we control Israel’s behavior through leveraging the accompanied with a much broader shift toward
benefits that Israel gains from our relationship. I strengthening the U.S.-Palestinian relationship and
propose that Israel’s crisis of democracy and U.S. relationships with other Arab states. This
leadership by radical ultra-nationalists indicates a
16 “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President And Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas
After Their Meeting.” U.S. Department of State Press Releases, January 31, 2023. https://www.state.gov/secretary-
antony-j-blinken-and-palestinian-authority-president-mahmoud-abbas-after-their-meeting-2/.
17 Stephen M. Walt, “Explaining Alliance Formation” in The Origins of Alliance (Ithacaa: Cornell University Press, 1987),
21.
18 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 8-9.
19 Sharp, 2.

diplomatic shift will act to balance against the alienated the U.S.’s other allies, including Saudi
threat of Israeli aggression. Arabia and Syria. In National Security Directive 54,
My solution of leveraging aid and President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker
strengthening alliances with Palestine and Arab communicated their desire to restrain Israel from
nations to ensure their cooperation in pursuing a pre-emptive action and a promise that the U.S., not
two-state solution is a resurrection of U.S. foreign Israel, would respond if Israel was attacked by Iraq.
policy toward Israel. Specifically, this foreign policy This was communicated to Israel before the war,
was used in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 continued throughout the war, and included
through Obama’s foreign policy and Iran Nuclear cohesive military actions, such as withholding U.S.
Deal. The Iran Nuclear Deal, or Joint military support in the case of Israeli retaliation
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was a against Iraq, refusing to share information with the
diplomatic solution that established oversight for Israeli military, and limiting Israeli access to real-
Iran’s nuclear program and reinstated Iran’s time data. During this period, the U.S. also
commitments to nuclear non-proliferation treaties rewarded Israel’s cooperation with diplomatic
in exchange for an end of sanctions from the visits, and increased foreign aid and defense
European Union, United Nations, and United technology in the form of Patriot missile batteries.22
States.20 Obama’s foreign policy toward the Middle The foremost lesson from U.S. success in
East prioritized diplomacy as a tool to ensure restraining Israel, even when it was under attack, is
stability, redirecting U.S. foreign policy away from that the success of alliance restraint requires the
unquestioning loyalty to Israel to one that improves complete cooperation of the branches. The changes
U.S. national security. On August 5, 2015, President to U.S. foreign policy that I have proposed require
Obama addressed Prime Minister Netanyahu’s the support of the Department of Defense and
protests and Israeli concerns stating, “A nuclear- domestic institutions such as Congress. This must
armed Iran is far more dangerous to Israel, to be built by explaining national strategic interest in
America, and to the world than an Iran that this area. A secondary lesson from this incident is
benefits from sanctions relief.”21 This quote that hardline policies that threaten serious
demonstrates that President Obama’s investment in consequences must be accompanied by diplomatic
Israel was motivated by maintaining regional rewards.
stability, which subsequently influenced–and Section IV: Alternative Foreign Policy
ultimately protected–U.S. strategic national Solutions
interest. It is an admirable model for my proposed Alternative foreign policy solutions to the
action of expanding U.S. diplomatic relationships regional instability resulting from Israel’s crisis of
within the region. democracy arise from the application of the spiral
In 1991, the Bush administration used a and deterrence model. One solution is rooted in a
similar strategy to what I have proposed in order to differing interpretation of the root of Israel’s crisis
restrain Israel’s intervention in the Persian Gulf of democracy. They interpret the rising extremism
War. During the conflict, the U.S. wanted to and deterioration of democracy as a symptom of
prevent Israel from attacking Iraq after its invasion Israel’s insecurity and a response to perceived
in Kuwait, because Israeli involvement would have threat. The policy prescription resulting from this
20 Leila H. Farsakh, Rethinking Statehood in Palestine: Self-Determination and Decolonization Beyond Partition
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2021), 133.
21 U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, “Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Accessed
April 24, 2023, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-

deal.
22 Pressman, 111.

analysis would be investing in Israel and increasing debate is captured in a 2018 Pew Research Center
their Qualitative Military Edge over regional study finding that, “Since 2001, the share of
competitors. This approach would also suggest that Republicans sympathizing more with Israel than
a U.S. foreign policy of leveraging diplomatic and the Palestinians has increased 29 percentage
military aid would be misinterpreted by Israel as points, from 50% to 79%. Over the same period, the
additional proof of their vulnerability and push share of Democrats saying this has declined 11
them to even more aggressive actions that would points, from 38% to 27%.”24 This finding indicates
incite an arms race or war with regional that any foreign policy decision regarding the U.S.-
competitors. The problem with this policy proposal Israel diplomatic relations will be harder to
is that it does not guarantee that Israel will not act implement when it requires cooperation from
aggressively and trigger a crisis that counters U.S. domestic institutions such as Congress.
interests in the region. In fact, granting increased Understanding President Biden’s foreign policy as a
offensive capabilities to a democratically unstable product of domestic fracturing of Israel does not
country with ultra-nationalists at the helm of its justify the risk that it poses to America's strategic
foreign policy is the worst possible course of action. national interest. Furthermore, it operates on the
The benefit of this strategy is that it captures assumption that the crisis of democracy is a
Israel’s perceived vulnerability and accurately domestic Israeli issue rather than a threat to
predicts their response to our foreign policy. American interests in the region.
Misperception of my proposed foreign policy by The crisis in Israel’s democracy should
Israel can be avoided with clear diplomatic motivate a reframing of the U.S. policy on Israel to
communication and by rewarding Israel for its prioritize regional stability instead of Israel’s
cooperation with U.S. interests. security. By communicating American resolve for a
A second alternative model suggests that we two-state solution, leveraging military and
continue President Biden’s current foreign policy diplomatic aid, and ensuring that the systems to
strategy of denouncing Israel's democratic crisis enact these measures are prepared, the United
while maintaining our current Middle East foreign States can assure that the domestic instability and
policy of military aid, cooperation, and diplomatic political extremism that Israel is combatting
primacy. This strategy is misguided because it doesn’t result in offensive aggressive actions,
treats the crisis of democracy as an event that is increased tensions, or an armed conflict. The best
independent from Israel’s foreign policy decisions. U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding Israel have
Putnam’s two-level game model of domestic and resulted from understanding our alliance as one of
international politics suggests that this foreign restraint. Domestically, U.S. citizens and
policy is one that appeases U.S. domestic institutions are becoming more polarized in their
institutions, such as Congress and lobbying groups, support for Israel. This domestic polarization may
while maintaining a strong alliance with a strategic result in incohesive foreign policy decisions and be
regional partner who is known to be volatile.23 It misinterpreted by our volatile ally. The past
simultaneously upholds American conviction for underlying assumption that domestic institutions
civil rights and appeases the political left, while would support U.S. foreign policy in Israel no
retaining a foreign policy that American longer applies. My foreign policy prescription of
conservatives have supported. This split in U.S. increasing diplomatic relationships with Israel’s
domestic attitudes toward the Israel-Palestine traditional competitors and leveraging foreign aid
23 Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and
Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), Appendix.
24 Baxter Oliphant, “Republicans and Democrats Grow Even Further Apart in Views of Israel, Palestinians” Pew Research
Center, May 31, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/01/23/republicans-and-democrats-grow-even-

further-apart-in-views-of-israel-palestinians/. (See graph 3 in the Appendix).

to Israel will face the most difficulty in getting Following the October 7th attack, which
approval from domestic institutions such as killed an estimated 1200 people, Israel declared
Congress. Further research is necessary to war on Hamas on October 8, 2023 and began
determine the effects of domestic polarization on airstrikes on the Gaza Strip.25 Since the declaration
American foreign policy in Israel and the Middle of war, the death toll in Gaza has risen to 30,000 by
East. As the U.S.-Israel relationship loses many of February 2024 according to Gaza’s Health
its key characteristics, such as shared democratic Ministry.26 In addition to this heightened response,
ideals and bipartisan support, foreign policy Israel’s top ministers, who have espoused ultra-
decision-makers must construct policies that nationalist positions, have made incendiary
respond to these challenges while prioritizing statements about Palestinians and Israel’s future
regional stability and American interests. intentions for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Addendum: Itamar Ben Gvir, Israel’s National Security
This paper and its policy prescriptions refer Minister, drew criticism from the U.S. State
to current events as of May 2023. Since that time, Department in January for framing the conflict in
there have been substantial developments in the Gaza as an “opportunity to concentrate on
Israel-Palestine region as a result of the October 7, encouraging the migration of the residents of
2023 terrorist attack launched by Hamas, Israel’s Gaza.”27 This sentiment is shared by Finance
declaration of war, and its subsequent conduct Minister Bezalel Smotrich who–in addition to
throughout this war. When I proposed establishing supporting increased settlement in the West Bank–
diplomatic relationships with Israel's regional has encouraged Palestinians to leave Gaza so Israel
competitors and leveraging U.S. foreign aid, I could “make the desert bloom.”28 Globally, these
predicted that proposals to weaken the power of the statements, along with the use of dehumanizing
judiciary branch and ultranationalist leadership language describing Palestinians by Israel’s
would result in aggressive foreign policy and political figures, military leaders, and active
rejection of the U.S.-backed two-state agreement. I soldiers, have been the basis of South Africa’s
believe that these recommendations and a genocide case against Israel at the International
reconsideration of the U.S.-Israel relations Court of Justice (ICJ).29 On January 26, 2024, the
continue to apply to the situation because of Israel’s ICJ delivered provisional measures ordering Israel
disproportionate response to the October 7th to ensure that its military does not engage in
attack. This response has garnered admonition genocidal acts and to punish those who incite
globally and has polarized American public genocide.30
opinion.
25 Daniel Byman et al., “Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data.” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
December 19, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.
26 Victoria Kim, “Death Toll in Gaza Passes 30,000.” The New York Times, February 29, 2024.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/29/world/middleeast/gaza-death-toll-war.html.
27 “‘We Are Not Another Star in American Flag’: Israel Minister Dismisses Us Criticism over Emigration of Gazan
Civilians.” The Economic Times, January 3, 2024. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-

news/we-are-not-another-star-in-american-flag-israel-minister-dismisses-us-criticism-over-emigration-of-gazan-
civilians/articleshow/106506694.cms?from=mdr.
28 “Israeli Minister Repeats Call for Palestinians to Leave Gaza” Reuters, December 31, 2023.
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-minister-repeats-call-palestinians-leave-gaza-2023-12-31/.
29 “The Republic of South Africa Institutes Proceedings against the State of Israel and Requests the Court to Indicate
Provisional Measures.” International Court of Justice, December 29, 2023. https://www.icj-

cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20231228-app-01-00-en.pdf.
30 “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South
Africa v. Israel) – The Court Indicates Provisional Measures.” United Nations, January 26, 2024. United Nations.

Increasing international scrutiny of Israel’s Strengthened democratic institutions and

actions in Gaza is coupled with tensions in the democratic leadership protect against extremist
United States over the ethics of Israel’s response policies.
and the Biden administration’s handling of the
issue. Trends in data show both partisan divides Appendix
and generational differences. A survey conducted 1. Sharp, Jeremy M. “U.S. Foreign Aid to
by Pew Research Center in December of 2023 Israel - Congressional Research Service.” , 1
indicated that, “More than four-in-ten Democrats
(45%) say Israel is going too far in its military
operation against Hamas, compared with 12% of
Republicans.” This is coupled with the fact that
younger Americans are more likely to consider
Israel's response as excessive.31 This public opinion
data further illustrates the changing nature of the
U.S.-Israel relationship as one that is marked by
differing priorities and no longer characterized by
bipartisan support.
The Biden administration has maintained 2. Sharp, Jeremy M. “U.S. Foreign Aid to
its military support of Israel while also giving Israel - Congressional Research Service.”, 9.
humanitarian aid to Gaza. Criticism of Netanyahu
and Israel has been increasing from the
administration, with Biden characterizing Israel’s
military actions since October 7th as “over the
top.”32 A lengthy examination would be required to
determine whether U.S. foreign policy in relation to
Israel will significantly change in the upcoming
months and years, but I believe that a policy of
restrained allyship remains applicable. The crisis of
democracy I described above has certainly provided
ultra-nationalists such as Smtrich and Gvir
platforms to oppose the U.S.-backed two-state
solution and support the destruction of Gaza and
displacement of Palestinans. Now, more than ever,
I believe it would be advisable for the U.S. to
consider policies that maintain regional peace and
leverage U.S. aid in exchange for cooperation. The
current state of affairs in Israel-Palestine is a
testament to the fact that democracy matters.
https://www.un.org/unispal/document/application-of-the-convention-on-the-prevention-and-punishment-of-the-crime-
of-genocide-in-the-gaza-strip-south-africa-v-israel-the-court-indicates-provisional-measures-icj-press-release-
26jan2024/.
31 “Americans’ Views of the Israel-Hamas War.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy, December 8, 2023.
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2023/12/08/americans-views-of-the-israel-hamas-war/.
32 Peter Baker, “Biden Sharpens Criticism of Israel, Calling Its Gaza Response ‘over the Top.’” The New York Times,
February 9, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/09/us/politics/biden-israel-gaza.html.

3. Oliphant, Baxter. “Republicans and Byman, Daniel, Riley McCabe, Alexander Palmer,
Democrats Grow Even Further Apart in Catrina Doxsee, Mackenzie Holtz, and
Views of Israel, Palestinians.” Pew Research Delaney Duff. “Hamas’s October 7 Attack:
Center - U.S. Politics & Policy. Visualizing the Data.” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, December 19,
2023.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-
october-7-attack-visualizing-data.
Farsakh, Leila H.. Rethinking Statehood in
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Spring 2024

Bupe Lughano Kabaghe, Olivia Hrivnak, Aid, Katherine Gottemoller,

Anna Gazewood, The Tyler Leonard, LIV Golf

The Notre Dame Journal of Political Science is published biannually by the

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 2

Notre Dame Journal of Political Science 2023–2024

Digital Editors Marketing Editors

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 3

Call for Papers

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 4

Letter from the Editor

In this edition, we were fortunate to receive a multitude of excellent submissions which

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 5

Advocacy or Family Relations? Exploring Pathways for Women into the

Aid, Democracy, and Growth…………………………………………………….…….…..29

LIV Golf and the Campaign for Sportswashing: An Analytical Approach to

Restraining an Ally: U.S. Response to Israel’s Crisis of Democracy….….…64

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 6

Bupe Lughano Kabaghe

LIST OF ACRONYMS In Zambia, women currently comprise fifteen

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 8

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 9

Botswana,” African Affairs 94 (1995): 576-577.

Botswana,” African Affairs 94 (1995): 576-577.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 10

Division within the Office of the President. This

With low numbers of women in the NA, there is a

Despite the presence of a Gender Division and

Beyond Numbers 141 (2005).

by Saifaddin Galal, Sep 22, 2023 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1248493/percentage-of-women-in-national-

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 11

membership-driven non-governmental Political scientists have long sought to understand

22 Zambia National Women’s Lobby 2023. https://www.facebook.com/ZambiaNationalWomensLobbyZnwl/.

margin to center (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 12

27 Hooks, Feminist theory: From margin to center.

Edition Zam, LJ (2008): 33.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 13

Women's Studies (2021): 449-463.

Review 89, no. 2 (1995): 271–94, JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2082425.

Studies 25, no. 1 (1987).

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 14

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 15

networking, mobilization, and knowledge of 5. Women's Lobby of Zambia: I interviewed 1

4. Advocates for Women's Representation: I Participant Observation

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 16

range of information that extended beyond the DISCUSSION

Considerations and Biases While Zambian women are motivated to attain

55Interview with MP 18 conducted on 15th June, 2023.

the context of electoral competition.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 17

58 Interview with MP 9 conducted on 7th June, 2023.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 18

61The Constitution of Zambia Act, 2016, Government Printer, 2016.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 19

63 Interview with MP 2 conducted on 15th June, 2023.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 20

68 Graph based on data collected during study.

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 2024 21