Electricity Privatisation Revitsited:

Case of India

By

V. Ranganathan

May 1996

Please address alt correspondence to:

V. Ranganathan
Professor
Indian Institute of Management
Bannerghatta Road
Bangalore 560 076
India

Fax:(080)6644050

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 Electricity Privatisation Revisited
Case of India*

V, Ranganathan

Professor

Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore

Abstract

Normally privatisation is resorted to by different economies for different reasons —

resource mobilization, introducing efficiency by promoting competition, and for

achieving commercial orientation. Often these are assumed to be independent

objectives. The Indian experience is showing that they are quite interdependant and

unless all the three objectives are tackled simultaneously, privatisation will not

succeed. Specifically, the poor financial performance of the State Electricity Boards

and their lack of commercial orientation is applying a brake on investment in the

Power Sector by foreign IPPs. Simflarty the Government's approach to privatisation

without promoting competition,—through the so-called Memorandum of Understanding

— is leading to high cost solutions and acrimonious public debates demanding

transparency in decision making and review of those already made.

*********

* A revised version ofthis paper is appearing in BmrgyFbttbft UK

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Keywords : Electricity, Privatisation, IPPs, Restructuring

The imperative for privatisation

Presently India has an installed capacity of about 80,000 MW. For the next 5

years, there is demand for an additional 30,000 MW. This would call for an investment of

about $.7.5 billion for generation mid associated transmission. The traditional sources of

power sector funding have been the Central Government budgetary allocations- used

rather discretionarily by the States - and World Bank loans. Even the outlay in the 8th

Plan (1992-97) was about $.4.5 billion, per year, and this outlay has never materialized,

due to fiscal constraints, at Centre and States. The World Bank financing has grinded to a

halt since it has stopped lending to State Electricity Boards (SEBs) which make losses.

There is no scope for internal financing since the SEBs have an accumulated loss of about

$.2 billion. Hence there is an imperative for privatisation, to mobilize funds for expansion

The SEBs cannot tap the domestic capital market, due to their poor financial performance.

For even the private sector, the domestic capital market does not offer much, compared to

the investment needs of the power sector, the entire capital market mobilization for the

year 94-95 was about $.1 billion for all sectors put together Hence the major recourse has

to come from foreign direct investment through schemes like BOT, and foreign financial

institutions through portfolio investments in Indian/foreign managed power companies.

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Hie deeper cause for the lack of funds for the growth of electricity supply is the poor

financial performance of the SEBs, which is partly attributable to (in)efficiency reasons -

- like poor revenue collection -- but partly due to political tariff setting which subsidises

electricity heavily for the fanners, and marginally for the poor1. So far, electricity

pricing never reconciled the need to finance growth, since such finance was provided

externally through budgetary support. This has eroded the efficiency and commercial

orientation of the SEBs and has made them a plaything for political interference, since their

growth was controlled by the politicians who controlled the fimds. The loss of commercial

orientation has resulted in ignoring the consumer and die erosion of quality of service, on

the one hand and indiscipline with respect to both collection and payment of dues on the

part of the SEBs. On average they have 4 months' uncollected revenue, as arrears from

their consumers. They also owe the Central Government suppliers of power and coal an

amount roughly equal to this figure! Hie providers of fimds translate the insecurity of the

revenue stream to them into corresponding risk and demand higher cost for fimds. This

happens even if the borrower is a foreign EPP ( Independant Power Producer), since the

lending is project based Conversely if the revenue dream of the power utilities , i.e. the

present SEBs, is secure, then they themselves can tap the fimds in the international capital

market on account of their own creditworthiness. Tims we Aid a paradox that the

unnecessary subsidy to the well-to-do farmers, and laxity in collecting revenue for the

power sold fi^m consumers, mainly from the blackshcep of the industry, is hurting all

the citizenry in terms of high cost of funds, and hence high cost of power. Thus

commercialization is of paramount Importance in order to make the utilities financially

viable and hence creditworthy.

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finance overtaking economics: Another consequence of the excess demand and the

unavailability of funds to finance augmentation of supply, is the phenomenon offinance

overtaking economics . Hie Government is encouraging small scale high cost diesel

generation to tide over immediate problems of the day, by removing it from the perview

of the Central Electricity Authority's requirement of approval, thus sacrificing economies

of scale inherent in targe scale generation. Hie nonviable energy technologies like wind,

micro hydro etc, are also being promoted by tax breaks ? abundant availability of low cost

fimdsfromWorld Bank and organizations like USAJD, tied aid from equipment supplier

countries and through a higher selling price2 by the SEBs which are forced into it > as a

matter of "government policy'. The frequent power failures have also resulted in

infructuous investment in the form of captive generation not only by industry but also

commercial establishments, not to speak of institutions like hospitals and computer

installations. Residential buildings are going in for sumps for water storage, since water

supply becomes erratic consequent to power failures 3.

Context of electricity privatisation: Presently what is needed is for the electricity

industry to acquire commercial orientation and to generate surpluses to enable long term

growth, with a redefined and clear focus on its objectives towards supply of electricity to

the poor. Electricity Privatisation in India should be looked at in this light to secure

• financing, for growth

• efficiency and commercial orientation, to achieve

cost competitiveness and improved revenue realization

• customer focus through reduced supply interruptions

improved voltage and service levels

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However, as explained earlier, in practice, it is the financing dimension that domonates

the privatisation agenda

The speed, selectivity and secrecy with which the contracts for additional power were

signed with foreign IPPs have resulted in a backlash questioning the competence and

credibility of the decision making process, with such decisions being reversed or stalled.

As for the IPPs, as the Economist put it, they have learned that transparency and robustness
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of the offer that can withstand public scrutiny, are key to long term success.

Government Policy on Privatisation: The Government formulated a set of policies to

attract private capital in the power sector,

• Attractive Return on Equity (of 16%) : On top of this there is a 0.7%

incentive for every 1% rise in Plant Load Factor beyond the stipulated
normative PLF of 68.5%, which for a 90% PLF amounts to about 31% . This
return is post tax and insulated for devaluation. The policy of giving a fixed
return on equity , where the equity portfolio may contain foreign and domestic
investors, would effectively lead to giving them different returns, since the
return on foreign equity is insulated against devaluation , but the return to the
domestic equity holders is not insulated against inflation.

• Counter guarantees by the Government of India: This was offered by the

Government for the first 8 "fast track' projects, since the buyer SEBs were not
financially sound and the IPPs needed to secure the revenue stream. But since
this amounts to making the market debt into sovereign debt, it will lower the
country's credit rating eventually. Viewed domestically, this amounts to the
federal government encouraging fiscal indiscipline of the States, since the
electricity tariff setting is, de facto, within the ambit of the States.

• Amendment to Act, to permit direct sale of IPP power to consraners : This

was done to facilitate the IPPs to sell power to industries, at times when the
buyer SEB was not in a position to buy the power. But at present , the
provision is subject to the caveat of Government permission, lest the IPPs
should corner the creamy segment of the customers, viz. the industries. Thus,
the idea of letting the customers shop around for the best deal, is still far away.

• Lenient operating norms (heat rate, PLF etc.): This has had the effect of
translating public sector inefficiency into super-normal profits for the private

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 sector.

• No income tax for 5 yews : In the light of the provision for expensing the
income tax paid in the fixed charge recovery, this provision is only meant to
relieve the the SEB (and ultimately the consumer ) of this burden in the tariff

• Higher depreciation provision: This is provided to enable better debt

servicing.

• Waiver of export requirement to repatriate dividends

Over the last 5 years the Government has learned some lessons and announced several
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policy shifts. These are:

• Counter guarantees stopped, beyond the first few projects.

• MOU approach abandoned and replaced by requirement

of competitive bidding.

• the 2-part tariff-which was misused as a single part tariff in some Power

Purchase Agreements, by combining the capacity and energy charge portions

and thereby claiming a second helping of the fixed costs, beyond the stipulated

PLF-being re-examined Price based bidding being considered instead of cost

based bidding.

• Relaxing the 5 year income tax exemption further to any 5 year period

Allowing return on equity on share premia aid reinvestment of internal

surpluses, for die project. This additional incentive for the investor, will lead

to higher cost of power, since the investors will, over the years, substitute low

cost debt with high return equity, on which the returns are guaranteed

• Distribution privatisation: Recognizing the reluctance of JPPs to sell power to

financially unviable SEBs, and the poor record on revenue collection of SEBs,

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Govt is experimenting with privatisation of Distribution. Here two aspects

are noteworthy. Firstly, since the aim appears to be only to discover a

financially viable bulk buyer, the efficiency aspects and the effect of natural

monopoly in distribution on the consumer are not satisfactorily addressed.

Secondly, since electricity is in the concurrent list, it leads to a peculiar

situation where policy formulation is in the domain of the federal government,

while policy implementation is left to the State Government Many State

Governments are lukewarm about distribution privatisation , since they do not

hope to raise cash through sale of assets to domestic private sector. The

politicians are also wary about any reform' in the agricultural electricity tariff,

since it touches a vast segment of the vote bank. A third worry is about the

political impact of downsizing in the SEBs which together employ about 1

million to serve about 86 million consumers.6 Hence they are proceeding

cautiously. In Orissa the first Zone which is 'privatised' is given on a

management contract for 2 years. Orissa was peiiiaps chosen care&lly since it

had a low agricultural load of about 8.7%, in contrast to say Andhra Pradesh

which had 34% agricultural load Secondly the people of Orissa were mild

mannered; so, resistance to reforms was not significant In Andhra Pradesh,

the proposal is to decentralize distribution into 5 Zones, for greater autonomy

and accountability. Financial viability is sought to be ensured by a mix of

remunerative and unremunerative loads, and in case the latter predominates in

the Zone, differential pricing from the grid is suggested. Hie hope is that

decentralization and commercialization in terms of correcting raisclassification

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 of consumer categories and better revenue collection would bring in the

improvement Option for consumers to shop around is not provided This

decentralization is expected to bring the organization ripe for privatisation,,

either through the management contract, lease or sale route, at a later date/

In spite of efforts, to attract private capital, the fruits have been modest The only effect

of the Government announcing a guaranteed rate of return and settling contracts through the

Memorandum of Understanding route, avoiding competitive bidding, has been a

vindication of the Averch-Johnson hypothesis8. There has been a sharp increase in the cost

per MW after the announcement of guaranteed return policy by the Government, from a

range of $.0.5-1 million per MW to $.1-1,4 million per MW, in real terms9. Not even a

single project has, by 1995 achieved financial closure. Obviously there is apprehension

from many parties:

Apprehension of DPPs

• How secure is (he revenue stream, in the absence of counter-guarantee by the

GOI? (World Bank gives counter guarantees, but only for financially sound utilities,

which do not need them anyway!). In this context, we need to know the risk perceptions

of multinational institutions -both lenders and EPPs — towards public utility buyers in

other countries. If the developing countries were to form a buyers' cartel and adopt

uniform policies, it is possible that they can get the fimds aid equipment at better terms

than at present

• Whether foreign exchange will be available, in future, for repatriation?

Apprehension of Indian public

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 • Are we getting the best deal, given the recessionary conditions in the power

equipment industry? Is the ultimate price per kwh comparable to what IPPs

sell in developed country power pools? What is the cost per MW in developed

country markets? In the absence of a Regulator, how the anti-competitive

practices of private monopolies be curbed? Will the price of power go on

escalating due to continuous devaluation? or the power intensive industries,

cost of power is an important element in maintaining competitive edge in the

coming years of lower tariff barriers and they would be unwilling to either

cross subsidise for agriculture or pay for high cost power from IPPs arising out

of inefficient decision making.

• The Indian Industry is facing the power crisis in terms of high supply

restrictions and both industry and domestic consumers feel the need for a more

responsive supply organization.

Gaps at present

Lack of institutional capacity in decision making: Presently there is a lack of

institutional capacity in decision making in the power sector. This requires a critical mass

of skill formation in technical, financial and legal and project finance aspects of the power

sector. Hie Indian financial institutions which have co-financed, have also appraised the

projects from a narrow point of view, viz .whether they will get back the money, rattier

than from the national economic and environmental points of view. In the appraisal of

Industrial Development Bank of India, of the Enron project, they never asked the question if

the cost of the project cost was too high. Rather they went by rules of thumb, like the cost

per MW of project bids recently submitted by different IPPs, instead of asking what is the

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competitive or border price of the cost per MW of power equipment of the Combined

Cycle Gas TYirbine type.10 Similarly, in the Cogentrix project in Karnataka, the effect of

sulphurous emission on the Western Ghats eco-system and effect of hot water discharges

into the sea on the marine eco system and its impact on the economy of the fishermen, have

not been properly addressed.

Lack of a professional regulator:

So far, being a public monopoly, the power sector did not need a Regulator. Hie Govt.

did the price control, though customer service took a back seat Now, with privatisation,

the Regulatory apparatus needs to be put in place. The Regulator must be a professional

who will make policies, instead of the Government, so as to facilitate inflow of private

capial on the one hand, and protect interest of consumers on the other. The skills required

of an Electricity Regulator are different from that of a judge or a bureaucrat or a technical

person, who is traditionally thought of to fill the place. The regulator should have

sensitivities to environment, rural and consumer issues on the one hand and a eye on

efficiency and financing aspects on the other, together with a solid understanding of power

system economics.

Lack of coordinated set of policies: It is not possible to have market and competition in

one segment and administered pricing and supra-market behaviour in a related segment. In

order to bring the two into alignment, the prices of domestic coal and natural gas must be

made to reflect their inherent competitiveness so that if they are cheaper there must be

automatic mechanisms which promote their use. Presently questions arise such as why

imported gas and coal are used in IPPs, while they are domestically available. These

create a divergence between private financial profitability and national economic

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profitability. Similarly, when SEB enters into a set of contracts with IPPs for buying

generated power, defining each other's obligations through a contract, it has to enter into

another set of contracts with the transmission authorities, the Power Grid Company or the

Regional Electricity Board, regarding counterpart obligations. At present this issue is not

addressed Similarly commercial contracts should govern domestic coal supply and coal

transport through railways. At present, these are done through bureaucratic fiat, with no

penalty for breach of performance.

Steps taken so far:

The World Bank is leading the power sector reforms in the country so far, albeit with

limited success. It organized a workshop with Ministry of Power, on Competitive bidding

for Private Power in June 1994, where the participants were educated on the technical
n
aspects of how to go about competitive bidding. Again in June 199S it organized

through MOP another workshop on Private Sector Participation in Distributioa12 Here the

experience of other countries like Argentina, Chile etc. in distribution privatization was

shared, along with the latest inputs from Orissa experiment in distribution privatisation and

the decentralization proposal for the Andhra Pradesh SEB.

Present status: On the generation side, the stress by the Government has been on

privatisation rather than on competition. Arguably, this approach has been due to an

anxiety to secure financing. Ironically, not only has international fund flow into power

sector fallen much short of expectations , but even the reduced budgetary outlays by (he

Government of India have not materialized, worsening the crisis even further. In short

there is a paralysis in generation investment. On the distribution side, apart from the early

privatised areas as in Bombay, Calcutta and Ahmedabad, an urban area on the border of

ll
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Delhi and U.P, Noida has been given to private sector and has been in operation for about

an year. The lessonsfromthis experiment are, that while commercial orientation has come

to the fore by way of better revenue realization and better attention to paying customers,

predictably, the connections to agriculture — which is free supply, as per the terms of the

contract — have not increased, nor has the quality of supply to this category improved In

Orissa thefirstcontract to the private sector for one zone (out of 4) has just been awarded.

The power industry has also been restructured in Orissa, effectively unbundling generation,

transmission and distributioa In West Bengal and Gujarat, pockets of areas have been

given on a management contract to a foreign firm for improving the quality of supply in

distribution along with provisions for green-field generation. In many other States like

Kamatakau while privatisation in generation is pursued with vigour, distribution

privatisation is ruled out by the politicians. Hie vexed questionof agricultural electricity

tariff, though discussed in several power ministers' conferences, has defied a solution.

Conclusion: Electricity privatisation in India is going without a strategy behind it This

is primarily because it is a decision thrust from outside. As a result it has not even

achieved the main purpose, viz. attracting capital. Hie main constraint is die non-

commercial nature of the State Electricity Boards, with apolitical pricing for agriculture

thrust on them . Yet politicians are interested in generation privatisation, because they

would be bringing power, while the future generations of consumers who would be paying

for it. But they will not be interested in distribution privatisation, wholesale for the whole

State, because thai would deprive them of a potent too) of patronage. So, in distribution

privatisation, cities may be privatised, but not rural areas. This would then leave two

different market segments, one, high cost good quality commercial power for the cities

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and another, low cost, poor quality social electricity for rural areas and possibly domestic

consumers.

3
Hie political argument for continuing subsidies for electricity to agriculture is that

65% of the people depend on agriculture and it constitutes 34% of GDP. Also agriculture

gets only 2.7% subsidy as opposed to GATT ceiling of 10 %

Since wind energy is an intermittent energy source, its cost should be compared only with

the energy cost of electricity generation, and not the total cost, which includes the capacity

cost For economics of wind energy see, Ranganathan V and Sharath Kumar "Economics

of wind eneqjy: A Reappraisal" International Journal for Energy, Environment

Economics, Nova Science Publishers, NY. Vol.1, No.4, pp293-296,1991.

3
There are also the secondary costs of equipment bum outs due to voltage fluctuations,

and costs varying from inconvenience to loss of life, due to supply interruptions in

hospitals.
4
"Are there profits in Asian Power?", The Economist, Oct 28,1995
5
Ministry ofPower, Govt of India, India's Electricity Sector - Widening the Scope

for private Participation, 3rd Edition, Oct. 1994, and Gazette Extra Ordinary,

Part E, Section 3, Sub section (II), dated 13th January 1995)

6
Planning Commission Annual Report on the working of State Electricity Boards

New Delhi, 1995.

7
Hiten Bhaya et al. Report on Distribution Privatisation of Andhra Pradesh

Electricity Board, Govt of Amfcra Pradesh, Hyderabad 1995

* Averch H and Johnson L.L "Behaviour of the firm under regulatory constraint"

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 American Economic Review 52,1052-1069
9
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Current Energy Scene in India June 1994,

Bombay, p. 42
10
Personal communication.
11
World Bank and Ministry of Power, Govt of India Technical Workshop for
competitive bidding for power sector, Hyderabad, June 21-23,1994.
12
Ministry of Power (with (he assistance of World Bank) Workshop on Private Sector
Participation in distribution, Bangalore, June 26-28,1995.

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