Eti Chapter 4
Eti Chapter 4
Eti Chapter 4
Content
4.1 Digital forensics
● Introduction to digital forensic
● Digital forensics investigation process
● Models of Digital Forensic Investigation –
o Abstract Digital Forensics Model (ADFM)
o Integrated Digital Investigation Process (IDIP)
o An extended model for cybercrime investigation
4.2 Ethical issues in digital forensic
● General ethical norms for investigators
● Unethical norms for investigation
4.3 Digital Evidences
● Definition of Digital Evidence
● Best Evidence Rule
● Original Evidence
4.4 Characteristics of Digital Evidence
● Locard’s Exchange Principle
● Digital Stream of bits
4.5 Types of Evidence : Illustrative, Electronics, Documented, Explainable, Substantial,
Testimonial
4.6 Challenges in evidence handling
o Authentication of evidence
o Chain of custody
o Evidence validation
4.7 Volatile evidence
Identification
Preparation
Approach Strategy
Preservation
Collection
Examination
Analysis
Presentation
Returning Evidence
Physical
Readiness Deployment Crime Review
Investigation
Digital
Crime
Investigatio
● Detection and Notification phase; where the incident is detected and then
appropriate people notified.
● Confirmation and Authorization phase; which confirms the incident and
obtains authorization for legal approval to carry out a search warrant.
3. Physical Crime Investigation phase The goal of these phases is to collect and
analyze the physical evidence and reconstruct the actions that took place during
the incident.
It includes six phases:
● Preservation phase; which seeks to preserve the crime scene so that evidence can
be later identified and collected by personnel trained in digital evidence
identification.
● Survey phase; that requires an investigator to walk through the physical crime
scene and identify pieces of physical evidence.
● Documentation phase; which involves taking photographs, sketches, and videos
of the crime scene and the physical evidence. The goal is to capture as much
information as possible so that the layout and important details of the crime scene
are preserved and recorded.
● Search and collection phase; that entails an in-depth search and collection of the
scene is performed so that additional physical evidence is identified and hence
paving way for a digital crime investigation to begin
● Reconstruction phase; which involves organizing the results from the analysis
done and using them to develop a theory for the incident.
● Presentation phase; that presents the physical and digital evidence to a court or
corporate management.
4. Digital Crime Investigation phaseThe goal is to collect and analyze the digital
evidence that was obtained from the physical investigation phase and through
any other future means. It includes similar phases as the Physical Investigation
phases, although the primary focus is on the digital evidence. The six phases are:
● Preservation phase; which preserves the digital crime scene so that evidence
can later be synchronized and analyzed for further evidence.
● Survey phase; whereby the investigator transfers the relevant data from a
venue out of physical or administrative control of the investigator to a
controlled location.
● Documentation phase; which involves properly documenting the digital
evidence when it is found. This information is helpful in the presentation
phase.
● Search and collection phase; whereby an in-depth analysis of the digital
evidence is performed. Software tools are used to reveal hidden, deleted,
swapped and corrupted files that were used including the dates, duration, log
file etc. Low-level time lining is performed to trace a user’s activities and
identity.
● Reconstruction phase; which includes putting the pieces of a digital puzzle
together, and developing investigative hypotheses.
● Presentation phase; that involves presenting the digital evidence that was
found to the physical investigative team.
It is noteworthy that this DFPM facilitates concurrent execution of physical and
digital investigation.
5. Review phase this entails a review of the whole investigation and identifies areas
of improvement. The IDIP model does well at illustrating the forensic process,
and also conforms to the cyber terrorism capabilities which require a digital
investigation to address issues of data protection, data acquisition, imaging,
extraction, interrogation, ingestion/normalization, analysis and reporting. It also
highlights the reconstruction of the events that led to the incident and emphasizes
reviewing the whole task, hence ultimately building a mechanism for quicker
forensic examinations.
III. An Extended Model of Cybercrime Investigation (EMCI)
Storage of
Awareness Evidence
Authorization Examination
of evidence
Planning Hypothesis
Notification
Presentation
of hypothesis
Search for
identify evidence Proof/
Defense of
hypothesis
Collection
of
evidence
Dissemination
of information
Transport
of Evidence
There are many sources of digital evidence; the topic is divided into three major forensic
categories of devices where evidence can be found: Internet-based, stand-alone
computers or devices, and mobile devices. These areas tend to have different evidence-
gathering processes, tools and concerns, and different types of crimes tend to lend
themselves to one device or the other.
Some of the popular electronic devices which are potential digital evidence are: HDD,
CD/DVD media, backup tapes, USB drive, biometric scanner, digital camera, smart
phone, smart card, PDA, etc.
4.3.2 Forms of digital evidence: Text message, emails, pictures, videos and internet
searches are the most common types of Digital evidences.
The digital evidence is used to establish a credible link between the attacker,
victim, and the crime scene. Some of the information stored in the victim’s system can
be potential digital evidence, such as IP address, system log-in & remote log-in details,
browsing history, log files, emails, images, etc.
● Web History
● Cache files
● Cookies
● Registry
● Unallocated Space
● Slack Space
● Web/E-Mail server access Logs
● Domain access Logs
store either the best evidence or original evidence for every investigation in the evidence
safe.
4.4 Characteristics of Digital Evidence:
Characteristics of digital evidences can help and challenge investigators during an
investigation.The main goals in any investigation are to follow the trails that offenders
leave during the commission of a crime and to tie perpetrators to the victims and crime
scenes. Although witnesses may identify a suspect, tangible evidence of an individual’s
involvement is usually more compelling and reliable. Forensic analysts are employed
to uncover compelling links between the offender, victim, and crime scene.
Figure 4.4:
Evidence transfer in the physical and digital dimensions helps investigators
establish connections between victims, offenders, and crime scenes.
In computer intrusions, the attackers will leave multiple traces of their presence
throughout the environment, including in the fi le systems, registry, system logs, and
network-level logs. Furthermore, the attackers could transfer elements of the crime
scene back with them, such as stolen user passwords or PII in a file or database. Such
evidence can be useful to link an individual to an intrusion.
In an e-mail harassment case, the act of sending threatening messages via a Web-
based e-mail service such as Hotmail can leave a number of traces. The Web browser
used to send messages will store fi les, links, and other information on the sender’s hard
drive along with date-time–related information. Therefore, forensic analysts may find
an abundance of information relating to the sent message on the offender’s hard drive,
including the original message contents. Additionally, investigators may be able to
obtain related information from Hotmail, including Web server access logs, IP
addresses, and possibly the entire message in the sent mail folder of the offender’s e-
mail account.
Suppose that, as the examiner, you obtain metadata for a piece of evidence. However,
you are unable to extract meaningful information from it. The fact that there is no
meaningful information within the metadata does not mean that the evidence is
insufficient. The chain of custody in this case helps show where the possible evidence
might lie, where it came from, who created it, and the type of equipment that was
used. That way, if you want to create an exemplar, you can get that equipment, create
the exemplar, and compare it to the evidence to confirm the evidence properties.
It is possible to have the evidence presented in court dismissed if there is a missing link
Maharashtra State Board of Technical Education P a g e 88 | 151
Emerging Trends in CO and IT (22618)
If there is a break in the chain of custody brought to the attention of the court,
then the court has to decide whether the breach is so severe as to meet exclusion of the
item from trial. Alternatively, the court can decide that the Trier (trial judge or jury)
need to decide the value of the evidence. To prevent a breach, a forensic investigation
should follow a written policy, so that necessary deviations of the policy can be argued.
The policy itself should take all reasonable (or arguably reasonable) precautions against
tampering.
For example, assume that a PDA is seized from a suspected drug dealer. In the
case of an PDA, there is no hard drive image to mirror, that is, the examination will
have to be done on the powered-on original. The PDA can lose data, for example by
disconnecting it from its battery. On seizure, the device should not be switched on. If it
is seized switched on, it should be switched off in order to preserve battery power. It
needs to be put into an evidence bag that does not allow access to the PDA without
breaking the seal (no clear plastic bag!). The evidence needs to be tagged with all
pertinent data, including the serial number of the PDA and the circumstances of the
seizure. The PDA should never be returned to the accused at the scene, because the
device can lose data if reset. To maintain the data in the PDA, it needs to be kept in a
continuously charged mode. It should only be used to extract evidence by a competent
person who can testify in court. As long as the PDA could be evidence, it needs to be
kept in an evidence locker, with check-out logs, so that it can be determined who had
access to the PDA at any time.
4.6.3 Evidence Validation: The challenge is to ensure that providing or obtaining the
data that you have collected is similar to the data provided or presented in court. Several
years pass between the collection of evidence and the production of evidence at a
judiciary proceeding, which is very common. To meet the challenge of validation, it is
necessary to ensure that the original media matches the forensic duplication by using
MD5 hashes. The evidence for every file is nothing but the MD5 hash values that are
generated for every file that contributes to the case.
The verify function within the Encase application can be used while duplicating
a hard drive with Encase. To perform a forensic duplication using dd , you must record
MD5 hash for both the original evidence media and binary files or the files which
compose the forensic duplication.
Note: Evidence collection calculated by MD5 after 6 months may not be helpful.MD5
hashes should be performed when the evidence is obtained.
4.7 Volatile Evidence: Not all the evidence on a system is going to last very long. Some
evidence is residing in storage that requires a consistent power supply; other evidence
may be stored in information that is continuously changing. When collecting evidence,
you should always try to proceed from the most volatile to the least. Of course, you
should still take the individual circumstances into account—you shouldn’t waste time
extracting information from an unimportant/unaffected machine’s main memory when
an important or affected machine’s secondary memory hasn’t been examined.
You need to respond to the target system at the console during the collection of
volatile data rather than access it over the network. This way the possibility of the
attacker monitoring your responses is eliminated, ensuring that you are running trust
commands. If you are creating a forensic duplication of the targeted system, you should
focus on obtaining the volatile system data before shutting down the system.
To determine what evidence to collect first, you should draw up an Order of
Volatility—a list of evidence sources ordered by relative volatility. An example an
Order of Volatility would be:
Note: Once you have collected the raw data from volatile sources you may be able to
shutdown the system.{Matthew Braid, “Collecting Electronic Evidence After A System
Compromise,” Australian Computer Emergency Response Team}
Registers, Cache: The contents of CPU cache and registers are extremely volatile,
since they are changing all of the time. Literally, nanoseconds make the difference here.
An examiner needs to get to the cache and register immediately and extract that
evidence before it is lost.
Routing Table, ARP Cache, Process Table, Kernel Statistics, Memory: Some of
these items, like the routing table and the process table, have data located on network
devices. In other words, that data can change quickly while the system is in operation,
Maharashtra State Board of Technical Education P a g e 92 | 151
Emerging Trends in CO and IT (22618)
so evidence must be gathered quickly. Also, kernel statistics are moving back and forth
between cache and main memory, which make them highly volatile. Finally, the
information located on random access memory (RAM) can be lost if there is a power
spike or if power goes out. Clearly, that information must be obtained quickly.
Temporary File Systems: Even though the contents of temporary file systems have the
potential to become an important part of future legal proceedings, the volatility concern
is not as high here. Temporary file systems usually stick around for awhile.
Disk: Even though we think that the data we place on a disk will be around forever, that
is not always the case (see the SSD Forensic Analysis post from June 21). However, the
likelihood that data on a disk cannot be extracted is very low.
Remote Logging and Monitoring Data that is Relevant to the System in Question:
The potential for remote logging and monitoring data to change is much higher than
data on a hard drive, but the information is not as vital. So, even though the volatility of
the data is higher here, we still want that hard drive data first.
Case Studies :
Background:
The assistant manager (the complainant) with the fraud control unit of a large business
process outsourcing (BPO) organization filed a complaint alleging that two of its
employees had conspired with a credit card holder to manipulate the credit limit and as
a result cheated the company of INR 0.72 million.
The BPO facility had about 350 employees. Their primary function was to issue the
Maharashtra State Board of Technical Education P a g e 93 | 151
Emerging Trends in CO and IT (22618)
bank's credit cards as well as attend to customer and merchant queries. Each employee
was assigned to a specific task and was only allowed to access the computer system for
that specific task. The employees were not allowed to make any changes in the credit-
card holder's account unless they received specific approvals.
Each of the employees was given a unique individual password. In case they entered an
incorrect password three consecutive times then their password would get blocked and
they would be issued a temporary password.
The company suspected that its employees conspired with the son (holding an add-on
card) of one of the credit card holders. The modus operandi suspected by the client is
as follows.
The BPO employee deliberately keyed in the wrong password three consecutive times
(so that his password would get blocked) and obtained a temporary password to access
the computer system. He manually reversed the transactions of the card so that it
appeared that payment for the transaction has taken place. The suspect also changed the
credit card holder's address so that the statement of account would never be delivered
to the primary card holder.
The team analysed the attendance register which showed that the accused was present
at all the times when the fraudulent entries had been entered in the system. They also
analysed the system logs that showed that the accuser's ID had been used to make the
changes in the system.
The team also visited the merchant establishments from where some of the transactions
had taken place. The owners of these establishments identified the holder of the add-on
card.
Current status:The BPO was informed of the security lapse in the software utilised.
Armed with this evidence the investigating team arrested all the accused and recovered,
on their confession, six mobile phones, costly imported wrist watches, jewels, electronic
items, leather accessories, credit cards, all worth INR 0. 3 million and cash INR 25000.
The investigating team informed the company of the security lapses in their software so
that instances like this could be avoided in the future.
This case won the second runner-up position for the India Cyber Cop Award, for its
investigating officer Mr S. Balu, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime, Chennai
Police. The case was remarkable for the excellent understanding displayed by the
investigating team, of the business processes and its use in collecting digital evidence.
Using the same log-in details, the investigating team accessed the Web pages where
these profiles were uploaded. The message had been posted on five groups, one of which
was a public group. The investigating team obtained the access logs of the public group
and the message to identify the IP addresses used to post the message. Two IP addresses
were identified.
The ISP was identified with the help of publicly available Internet sites. A request was
made to the ISPs to provide the details of the computer with the IP addresses at the time
the messages were posted. They provided the names and addresses of two cyber cafes
located in Mumbai to the police.
The investigating team scrutinised the registers maintained by the cyber cafes and found
that in one case the complainant's name had been signed into the register.
The team also cross-examined the complainant in great detail. During one of the
meetings she revealed that she had refused a former college mate who had proposed
marriage.
In view of the above the former college mate became the prime suspect. Using this
information the investigating team, with the help of Mumbai police, arrested the suspect
and seized a mobile phone from him. After the forensic examination of the SIM card
and the phone, it was observed that phone had the complainant’s telephone number that
was posted on the internet. The owner of the cyber cafes also identified the suspect as
the one who had visited the cyber cafes.
Based on the facts available with the police and the sustained interrogation the suspect
confessed to the crime.
Current status:The suspect was convicted of the crime and sentenced to two years of
imprisonment as well as a fine.
The investigators were successful in arresting two people as they laid a trap in a local
bank where the accused had fake accounts for illegally transferring money.
During the investigation the system server logs of the BPO were collected. The IP
addresses were traced to the Internet service provider and ultimately to the cyber cafes
through which illegal transfers were made.
The registers maintained in cyber cafes and the owners of cyber cafes assisted in
identifying the other accused in the case. The e-mail IDs and phone call print outs were
also procured and studied to establish the identity of the accused. The e-mail accounts
of the arrested accused were scanned which revealed vital information to identify the
other accused. Some e-mail accounts of the accused contained swift codes, which were
required for internet money transfer.
All the 17 accused in the case were arrested in a short span of time. The charge sheet
was submitted in the court within the stipulated time. In the entire wire transfer scam,
an amount to the tune of about INR 19 million was transferred, out of this INR 9 million
was blocked in transit due to timely intimation by police, INR 2 million was held in
balance in one of the bank accounts opened by the accused which was frozen. In
addition the police recovered cash, ornaments, vehicles and other articles amounting to
INR 3 million.
During the investigation the investigating officer learned the process of wire transfer,
the banking procedures and weakness in the system. The investigating officer suggested
measures to rectify the weakness in the present security systems of the call centre. This
has helped the local BPO industry in taking appropriate security measures.
Background: The accused in this case was posing to be a genuine railway ticket agent
and had been purchasing tickets online by using stolen credit cards of non residents.
The accused created fraudulent electronic records/ profiles, which he used to carry out
the transactions.The tickets so purchased were sold for cash to other passengers. Such
events occurred for a period of about four months.
The online ticket booking service provider took notice of this and lodged a complaint
with the cyber crime investigation cell.
Investigation: A procedure to find the Digital Evidence
The service provider gave the IP addresses, which were used for the fraudulent online
bookings, to the investigating team. IP addresses were traced to cyber cafes in two
locations.
The investigating team visited the cyber cafŽs but was not able to get the desired logs
as they were not maintained by the cyber cafŽ owners. The investigating team was able
to short list the persons present at cyber cafes when the bookings were made. The
respective owners of the cyber cafes were able to identify two persons who would
regularly book railway tickets.
The investigating team then examined the passengers who had travelled on these tickets.
They stated that they had received the tickets from the accused and identified the
delivery boy who delivered the tickets to them. On the basis of this evidence the
investigating team arrested two persons who were identified in an identification parade.
The investigating officer took the original e-mail from the complainant and extracted
the IP address of the same. From the IP address he could ascertain the Internet service
provider.
The IP address was traced to a cable Internet service provider in the city area of
Hyderabad. The said IP address was allotted to the former husband sometime back and
his house was traced with the help of the staff of ISP.
A search warrant was obtained and the house of the accused was searched. During the
search operation, a desktop computer and a handicam were seized from the premises. A
forensic IT specialist assisted the investigation officer in recovering e-mails (which
Maharashtra State Board of Technical Education P a g e 98 | 151
Emerging Trends in CO and IT (22618)
were sent to the complainant), using a specialised disk search tool as well as
photographs (which had been posted on the Internet) from the computer and the
handicam respectively. The seized computer and the handicam were sent to the forensic
security laboratory for further analysis.
The experts of the forensic security laboratory analysed the material and issued a report
stating that: the hard disk of the seized computer contained text that was identical to
that of the obscene e-mail; the computer had been used to access the matrimonial
websites on which the obscene profiles were posted; the computer had been used to
access the e-mail account that was used to send the obscene e-mail; the handicam seized
from the accused contained images identical to the ones posted on the matrimonial
Websites. Based on the report of the FSL it was clearly established that the accused had:
created a fictitious e-mail ID and had sent the obscene e-mail to the complainant; posted
the profiles of the victim along with her photographs on the matrimonial sites.
Current status:Based on the material and oral evidence, a charge sheet has been filed
against the accused and the case is currently pending for trial.
References
1. http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/digital/
2. http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/digital/
3. https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2007/07/20/the-rules-for-computer-
forensics/ as on 28 August 2019
4. Digital Evidence and Computer Crime, Third Edition © 2011 Eoghan Casey.
Published by Elsevier Inc.
5. www.cse.scu.edu/~tschwarz/COEN252_13/LN/legalissues.html