IPC Journal Main

© 2022 COUNCIL FOR STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE RESEARCH
3, PRATAP SINGH BUILDING

JANPATH LANE, NEW DELHI
INDIA 110001
PHONE: 011-43104566
EMAIL: [email protected]
WEB: WWW.CSDRONLINE.ORG
TWITTER: @CSDR_INDIA
THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW
GUEST EDITOR
DR. SINDERPAL SINGH
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
DR. HAPPYMON JACOB
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
DR. GAURAV SAINI
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
EDITORIAL AND WEB ASSISTANT

DEVIKA MAKKAT
EDITORIAL BOARD
YAMINI AIYAR
PROF. C. RAJA MOHAN

DR. TOBY DALTON
PROF. ANNE MARIE BRADY
DR. CHRISTIAN WAGNER
DR. BEC STRATING
DR. SINDERPAL SINGH
The INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW is a peer-reviewed journal produced by the Council for

Strategic and Defense Research in New Delhi, India. The journal is the flagship publication
of the Indo-Pacific Circle. The Indo-Pacific Review seeks to highly emerging analyses on
emerging issues in the Indo-Pacific.
The views and opinions expressed or implied in Indo-Pacific Review are those of the authors
and should not be understood to reflect the opinions or stance of either Council for Strategic
and Defense Research nor the Editorial Board. Copyright of the contents of the Indo-Pacific
Review is held by the Council for Strategic and Defense Research.
THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW
VOL. 1
OCTOBER 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
EXPERT COMMENTARIES 4
THE INDO-PACIFIC: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 4
RAKESH SOOD
CHINA S WO OCEAN AND THE WEST S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGIES: THRUST AND REPOSTE IN
A GEOPOLITICAL WAR OF WORDS?
AK CHAWLA 8
ARTICLES 17
VALUE OF TRILATERAL COOPERATION FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY & THE GHOST OF
HISTORY: THE CASE OF US-JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA ALLIANCE
AAKRITI SETHI 17
ASEAN CENTRALITY AND THE INDO-PACIFIC: FINDING A CONVERGENT REALITY?

EERISHIKA PANKAJ 40
INDIA S DEFENSE DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: SHAPING A NEW REGIONAL SECURITY

ORDER?
LADHU RAM CHOUDHARY 55
PROSPECTS FOR MINILATERALISM IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

GULSHAN SACHDEVA 84
INDO-PACIFIC: CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC SYSTEM AND ITS

ATTRIBUTES
SHREY KHANNA 101
BOOK REVIEW 130

A GAME FOR THE AGES
ROHIT KUMAR 130
THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 1

FROM THE CHIEF EDITOR
DR. HAPPYMON JACOB
I am honoured to bring to you the inaugural issue of The Indo-Pacific Review, the flagship
-
Before I introduce The Indo-Pacific Review, a few words about the idea of the Indo-Pacific.
Indo-Pacific the rechristened expression for a historical continuum spanning millennia with
contemporary geopolitical meanings and implications is very much in its infancy,
intellectually and otherwise. The region, of course, may not be new - geographically,
geopolitically or geo-economically - but the reimagination of the region is both new and
contested.
The Indo-Pacific is poised to become the epicentre of a great deal of geopolitical activity in the
near future, and is attracting a lot of political and strategic attention.
Even as it is one of the most discussed and debated geopolitical concepts of our times, there
are certain foundational questions that remain unanswered: How do we conceptualize the Indo-
Pacific as a geopolitical entity today? How do we define a rule-based order for the region?
What are some of the values and rules that contribute to such an order?
More importantly, who will define the Indo-Pacific? What is the vision/s that will guide the
imagination and construction of the region? (For, after all, regions do not come ready-made;
they are political constructions)
At the Indo-Pacific Circle, we believe that however one defines the Indo-Pacific, India and the
ASEAN will be at the heart of it, both physically and as a mental map. Mental maps matter as
they lend meanings to physical regions.
Indo-
and India (as does China except that China has not used this mental imagery of the Indo-Pacific,
2
A NOTE FROM THE EDITOR
yet) in shaping the region. This journal intends to highlight the varying cartographies, mental
maps and imageries about the region across domains such as geopolitics, geoeconomics,
climate, development and gender, among others.
The Indo-Pacific Circle began with the objective of generating ideas, networks, and debates
from within the region so as to contribute to shaping the global narratives on the Indo-Pacific.
As an intellectual collective of emerging leaders, I hope the network and the journal will
contribute to the creation of a free, open and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region that,
integrity, and the eq
The Indo-Pacific Circle and The Indo-Pacific Review are premised on the strong belief that the
inhabitants of the region have the right, and responsibility, to provide intellectual sustenance
to a process which will define and curate locally sensitive narratives about the region.
We are deeply conscious of the reality that the Indo-Pacific region is not a monolith. There are
indeed diverse narratives about the Indo-Pacific even within the region. So, the objective of the
journal is not to privilege any one narrative, but to bring together multiple narratives and
provide a platform for dialogue and debates. The biannual, online peer-reviewed journal will
curate views on the Indo-Pacific from around the world by scholars and practitioners including,
primarily, by the IPC members.
The Indo-Pacific Review, therefore, is an attempt from within the region to contribute to the
rich, growing debate in the scholar and practitioner communities in and around the Indo-
Pacific. I am certain that the journal will become an authoritative, scholarly and reasoned voice
on the Indo-Pacific in the years to come.
Happymon Jacob
New Delhi
November 3, 2022

EXPERT COMMENTARY
AMB. RAKESH SOOD*
Indo-Pacific: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
History marches forward but often, it is difficult to discern its trajectory in the fog of immediate
but political leadership is the art of convincing the world.
The term Cold War symbolised the post-World War II era. Yet not many would recall that it
was first used by Bernard Baruch, a successful Wall Street financier-statesman who also served
as adviser to US Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman. He is better known for
the Baruch plan, the first global plan to bring all nuclear activity under the supervision of the
newly created United Nations that he introduced as a US delegate in the newly created United
Nations in 1946. A year later, speaking in the South Carolina House of Representatives, he
term in his widely read column; it caught on and the phrase came to symbolise the bipolar
world of growing rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the two nuclear superpowers.
For the 21st

Abe will always be remembered as the statesman who defined the 21st century with the term
Indo-Pacific and lived to see his vision take concrete shape. During the Cold War, Asia had
lost its identity; it was divided into Northeast Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia,
Central Asia and West Asia also called Middle East.
The first realisation of Asian connectivity was driven home by the forces of nature, the massive
earthquake on December 26, 2004, off the coast of Sumatra, followed 20 minutes later by the
worst tsunami the world had seen. From Indonesia to Thailand to Myanmar to Bangla Desh to
India to Sri Lanka to Maldives all the way to Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa the tsunami
claimed over 225000 lives leaving behind a trail of destruction. The maritime forces of
4
Australia, Japan, India and the U.S. emerged as the first responders, demonstrating an
impressive degree of shared responsibility and coordination.
Two years later, a young Japanese politician Shinzo Abe authored a book Toward a Beautiful
Country: My Vision of Japan. His prescription for Japan in the 21st century was to build up ties
with the U.S., Australia and especially India, a group of democracies that could come together
to promote peace and prosperity across the region. He found the accepted term Asia-Pacific
heast Asia and so he adopted the term Indo-Pacific to
give it the stamp of political legitimacy.
During his first term in 2006-07 that barely lasted twelve months, Prime Minister Abe sough
to give shape to his concept. A quadrilateral Security Dialogue of mid-level officials of the
four countries was held in Manila. It was followed by India inviting Japan, Australia and
Singapore to join in Ex Malabar, the annual naval exercises that it had been conducting with
the U.S. for over a decade. Addressing the Indian parliament in mid-2007, PM Abe delved into
region, free of force or coercion.
Australia, a new Sinophile Prime Minister Kevin Rudd changed course, and in the U.S.,
President Obama sought to open a new chapter in Sino-U.S. relations. The Quad proved to be
short-lived. But it is difficult to keep down an idea whose time has come.
History kept marching on. Xi Jinping, a relatively unknown Vice President came into the
limelight in 2008 for successful organisation of Beijing Olympics. Since 2012, Xi has upset
financial crisis convinced the Chinese leadership that the West was in decline. In 2009, China
drew the 9-dash line in the South China Sea, followed by land reclamation to build islands to
assert its claims and in 2014, declared an ADIZ in the East China Sea.
Prime Minister Abe was back in 2012 and now found a more receptive environment for his
vision of the Indo-Pacific. By 2016, Japan had rejoined the Malabar exercises. Australia
introduced new laws to curtail Chinese funding in its political processes. A new report-Picking

Flowers (abroad) Making Honey (at home) revealed the penetration by Chinese military
officials in Australian scientific research establishments. In Delhi, concerns about the increase
in boundary incursions, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and the China Pakistan
Economic Corridor began to sound alarm bells. In the U.S., China was blamed for large scale
theft of IPR amounting to hundreds of millions. China had stopped hiding its light and was not
interested in biding its time.
A decade later, the Quad was reborn. There were still questions about what it stood for. After
the initial ministerial meeting in Manila in November 2017, each of the four countries
conducted their own press conferences. Yet, external developments were pushing the four
democracies together.
becoming louder. His new vision anchored in the Indo-Pacific was now taking shape. Bilateral
interactions among the four nations i
-person
summits of the Quad leaders. Joint statements have now become an accepted reality.
Not all questions about the Quad have been addressed but four summits in fifteen months is a
reflection of growing political will and comfort. It is not an alliance but then Asia is not Europe.
In the decade of 2007-17 that the Quad did not exist, did it make Chinese behaviour less
assertive? Is Quad a provocation as China would like to claim or is it a deterrent? With a dozen
working groups spanning critical and emerging technologies, climate change, supplying
COVID-19 vaccines, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, clean
energy, maritime domain mapping and awareness, regional infrastructure and supply chain
resilience, the Quad addresses critical concerns, both traditional and non-traditional. IPEF has
been launched with seven ASEAN countries and New Zealand joining in.
In the Indo-Pacific, the world does not reflect clean divisions that characterised Europe in the
bipolar era and therefore the European model of competing military alliances does not make
sense. The late Prime Minister Abe realised it as a statesman and the politician in him found
the right moment to convince the world about his vision. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of
the Indo-Pacific are not yet in place but the contours have been defined.

It is an idea whose time has come.
*Ambassador Rakesh Sood joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1976, serving in Brussels,
Dakar, Geneva, and Islamabad in different capacities, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in
Washington DC. At the Foreign Ministry, he set up the Disarmament and International
and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and later as

Ambassador to Afghanistan, Nepal and France. After retiring in 2013, Ambassador Sood was
Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for Disarmament and Non Proliferation till May 2014.
Ambassador Sood has been a principal participant at The Chao Track II Dialogues.

EXPERT COMMENTARY
VICE ADMIRAL AK CHAWLA PVSM, AVSM, NM, VSM (Retd.)*
-Pacific Strategies Thrust and Riposte in a
Geopolitical War of Words?
Traditionally, any grouping of countries, geographical regions or entities is founded on some

homogeneity, either of origin or of purpose. The homogeneity could be based on geographic,
oceanographic, geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic, security-related, cultural, linguistic,
ethnic, civilizational, biogeographic, climatological or environmental factors. When one or
more of these factors overlap, the grouping becomes stronger the example of NATO, G7 and
the EU are classic examples of groupings with multiple commonalities, and hence greater
resilience and unity of purpose.
While the Indo-Pacific region may seem to be too vast for any homogeneity, as the Indian and
and
masses of their littorals) (International Hydrographic Organization 1953); from a maritime
connected by the umbilical of Southeast Asia. Consequently, there has always been greater
biogeographic, oceanographic, climatological and civilizational interplay between the Indian
and Pacific Oceans, as compared to the Atlantic region, where the barriers imposed by the
continental land masses of the Americas and Africa, have reduced this substantially. Examples
of this close interaction include the similarity and richness of ocean species in the Indo-Pacific
region and climatological phenomena such as the El Nino/ La Nina Southern Oscillation
(ENSO) in central and eastern equatorial Pacific (World Meteorological Organization 2022),
which is closely linked with the development of monsoons in the Indian Ocean, and directly
impacts the lives of people on the Indian sub-continent. The various straits that link the Indian
and Pacific Oceans have also facilitated maritime interaction between the two oceans since
time immemorial, exemplified by the spread of Buddhism in Southeast and East Asia from
ancient India, as far east as Japan.
8
Essentially a geopolitical formulation in its current form, the Indo-Pacific region today is
generally understood to comprise the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, the western and
central Pacific Ocean and the seas connecting the two oceans, including, of course, the littorals
of this ocean area. There are variations to this broad understanding, which are discussed in the
next two sections of this essay.
The Indo-Pacific Formulation by the West
The earliest espousal of the Indo-

concept of an anti-colonial India and Republican China as German allies against Euro-America
Indopazifischen Raum -Pacific region), written in the 1920s.In the 21st century,
-
Confluence of the Two
Seas n and Pacific Oceans as
by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in January 2007 in collaboration with
the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) (Kharana 2021).
The term gained traction in the West in the 2010s and the Trump Administration in the United
States (US) included the Indo-Pacific construct in its National Security Strategy released in
hing from the west coast of India to the western
and security (The White House 2017). In May 2018, the US also renamed its largest and oldest
combatant command, the Pacific Command (PACOM), as the Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM), though the geographical boundary in the Indian Ocean has been retained at
68 degrees East, as was the case with the PACOM, which excludes the Western Indian Ocean
(WIO) from its Area of Responsibility (AoR) and divides it between the US Central Command
(CENTCOM) and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). The latest document was
Indo-Pacific Strategy
which envisions the Indo-

Interestingly, the US strategy also mentions the Euro-Atlantic as a complementary region to

the Indo-Pacific.
Europe has not been too far behind the US in adopting the Indo-Pacific concept. In May 2018,
the French President set out the French strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, which was formally
promulgated as a policy document in February 2022 (Government of France 2022). Germany
Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific
Strategy for Cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific concept has been consistently opposed by China, but what is not very
commonly known is that the Indo-Pacific formulation was also adopted by China in 2004,
Two-Ocean
maritime revival, and in its 2004 Defence White Paper, China announced a shift in its maritime
near seas defence far seas operations
command of the seas -
in Chinese literature as a pre-conceptualised project set by the Communist Part of China (CPC)
(Sun and Payette 2017).
The Two- Science of Military

Strategy
territorial air space to continuously expand toward the periphery and the world, continuously
he
strong and strategic support within a greater spatial scope to maint
-
well as the littoral regions of neighbouring Asia, Africa, Oceania, North America, South

aritime strategy aims to not only build up its maritime military power,
but more importantly, use that power to secure resources, trade routes, export markets and
overseas bases for the eventual realisation of the Chinese Dream, is best exemplified by Chin
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The maritime leg of the initiative was announced in October
st
he had laid out the broad concept of a land-centric Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) in his
September 2013 address at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan (Xinhua 2013). It is to
the German founder of modern geography as an academic discipline, Ferdinand Freiherr von
Richthofen (1833-
coined to specifically describe the myriad routes crossing Inner Asia, linking Han China with
the Roman West, as also maritime routes existing for trade between the South China Sea and
the Roman Empire, via India and the Indian Ocean (Waugh 2007). China has cleverly arrogated
this historical concept to meet its modern ends. It is not surprising that the map of the MSR
- Science of
Military Strategy (2013)
Contrasting Strategic Visions for the same Region
While the geographical expanse of the Indo-Pacific region is broadly the same between China
and the West, their strategic visions are very different. The United States frames its vision in
terms of five objectives: advance a free and open Indo-Pacific; build connections within and
outside the region; drive regional prosperity; bolster Indo-Pacific security; and build resilience
to transnational threats. The EU strategy has outlined seven priority areas, largely similar to
the objectives listed by the US: sustainable and inclusive prosperity; green transition; ocean

governance; digital governance and partnerships; connectivity; security and defence; and
human security (EU 2021 6).
The fact that both the US and the EU strategies are aimed right and centre at China is clearly
that that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is
combining its economic, diplomatic, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence
in the Indo-
2022 5). While the EU Strategy for the Indo-Pacific is more guarded in naming China, the
emphasis on an open and rules-based regional security architecture leaves no room for doubt
about who is obstructing such a security architecture. Both the US and the EU strategy
formulations can, therefore, be seen as geopolitical and geo-
Two-Ocean strategy.
While the western formulation frames a future Indo-Pacific in terms of a multilateral, inclusive
-Ocean strategy looks at the area purely from its own
national security and economic prosperity point of view. On this basis
-Ocean region, participate in resource
The document expects traditional and non-
China 2013 247), thereby building a rationale for further concerted qualitative and quantitative
development of their Armed Forces, especially their Navy, for years to come (Erickson 2019
253). The Two-
centenary of formation. As part of its strategy, China seeks to build a set of client states across
the region, which would be partially or wholly dependent on China. However, its unilateral
tly flawed. The absence
of any homogeneity, other than dependence on China, can never be the basis for a strong
alliance, certainly not one required to dominate a region as vast and diverse as the Indo-Pacific.
The example of the US, which has been the leading power in the Indo-Pacific since the end of
World War II, in alliance with like-minded treaty partners such as Japan, South Korea and
Australia, as also Major Defence Partners (MDP) such as India, amply illustrates this reality.

The recent invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and the developing China-Russia axis after their
Joint Statement in February 2022, has introduced a new equation into the Indo-Pacific by re-
focusing attention on the Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic. The Ukraine war is a win-win
situation for China, and it is evident that China seeks a weakened Russia as a junior partner
and a source for cheap raw materials in its quest to dominate the world. Besides, the conflict
would distract the current US focus from the Indo-Pacific, as was the case during the Cold War,
thereby giving China a freer rein in the region. If this indeed comes into being, as seems likely,
it would, for the first time, provide China with a strong ally to pursue its Grand Strategy to
outcome, the importance of the Indo-Pacific region
is unlikely to diminish in the decades ahead.
* Vice Admiral Anil Kumar Chawla joined the National Defence Academy in Jan 1978.
Commissioned in the Indian Navy on 01 Jan 1982, he specialised in Navigation and Direction
His five sea commands
include Coast Guard Ship C-01 in 1986-87, INS Vinash (which he commissioned) from 1992-
94, INS Kora from 2001- 02, INS Tabar from 2006-07 and INS Viraat from 2008 to 2010. On
promotion to the rank of Vice Admiral he took over as the Director General Naval Operations
on 31 Dec 2014. He took over as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief Southern Naval
Command, Kochi on 31 Jul 18. He has participated in Op Pawan in Sri Lanka in 1989 while
on board INS Arnala and was commended for gallantry by FOC-in-C East. He was awarded
the Nausena Medal in 2003 while in command of INS Kora during Operation Parakram. Vice
Admiral Chawla was conferred the VishishtSeva Medal on 26 Jan 13 and the AtiVishishtSeva
Medal on 26 Jan 2015 for distinguished service. He was conferred with the honorary title of
Aide-De-Camp to President of India in 01 Dec 2019. He was awarded the ParamVishishtSeva
Medal for distinguished service of the highest order on 26 Jan 2020.

REFERENCES
China Aerospace Studies Institute, In their Own Words: Foreign Military Thought, The
Science of Military Strategy (2013), (English translation of the book written by the Academy
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/ Translations/2021-02-
08%20Chinese%20Military%20Thoughts-%20In%20their%20own%20words%20Science %
20of%20Military%20Strategy%202013.pdf?ver=TdMNn2O9Ktebbf6tMzgT6g%3d%3d
Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007, MOFA, Government of Japan,

https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-.html
, , (Eds) Ashley Tellis,

Alison Szalwinski and Michael Wills, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019, 253.
World Meteorological Organisation,

https://public.wmo.int/en/our-mandate/el-ni%3C%B1ola-ni%C%B1a-update, accessed 15
Apr 2022.
- Government of France, February 2022,

https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_dcp_a4_indopacifique_022022_v1_4_web_cle8
78143.pdf
-Japan Cooperat
Strategic Analysis, 31:1, (n.d.), https://idsa.in/strategic
analysis/SecurityofSeaLinesProspectsforIndiaJapanCooperation_gskhurana_0107
-
Cambridge University Press, 04 June 2021,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/modern-intellectual-history/article/indopacific-

intellectual-origins-and-international-visions-in-global-
context/21B142B132F694349D46CAD22EA8C7CD
The EU Strategy for

Cooperation in the Indo- European Union, Brussels, 16 September 2021,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-indo-pacific_en, 2.
rd International Hydrographic Organisation, 1953,

https://epic.awi.de/id/eprint/29772/1/IHO1953a.pdf, 22, 34-35, accessed 14 April 2022.
The White
House, Washington D.C., https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
-Pacific Region: Germany Europe Asia: Shaping the 21st

The Federal Government, September 2020,
https://rangun.diplo.de/blob2380824/a27b62057f2d2675ce2bbfc5be01099a/policy-
guidelines-summary-data.pdf,
ASEAN China Centre, 03 October

2013, http://www.asean-china-centre.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm
Institut de Realtions Internationales et

Strategiques, https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Asia-Focus-31.pdf
- The White House,

Washington D.C., https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/Uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-
Pacific-Strategy.pdf, 4.
The
Silk Road, 5/I (Summer 2007), http://www.silkroadfoundation.org/newsletter/vol5num1/

Xinhua, 07 September
2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201309/07/c_132700695.htm
https://rusi.org/publication/2004-chinese-
defence-white-paper

Value of Trilateral Cooperation for the Indo-Pacific Strategy & the Ghost of History:
The Case of US-Japan-South Korea Alliance
Aakriti Sethi
Abstract
The trilateral alliance of America, Japan and South Korea has long been desired by
Washington to become the backbone of the US alliance system in Asia due to similar
interests and values, especially in the face of common threats. Originally fostered with the
aim to counter North Korea and later institutionalized in 1999, the US-Japan-South Korea
trilateral alliance has been successful in establishing a coordinated mechanism for
cooperation. However, in 2017 when US President Trump pushed ahead with FOIP, the
opposing response by Japan and South Korea exposed perception gaps in the trilateral
groupin
FOIP highlighted the dilemma of supporting US initiatives without being entangled in the
US-
So -
South Korea relations due to debates over historical narratives have weakened the post-Cold
War bonhomie developed by the neighbouring states. This paper assesses the American
rational for attaching importance to the trilateral alliance and its position within the Indo-
Pacific construct. Most importantly, the paper addresses the evolution of the triad amidst
evolving regional geopolitics.
Key words: US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Alliance; Free & Open Indo Pacific; Japan-
South Korea Relations
Introduction
The US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance stems from the bilateral ties fostered by the US
with each of these countries in the years following World War II. American bilateral
interactions were the basis for the hub-and-spoke alliance network, or San Francisco system,
which helped the US play an instrumental role in constructing modern-day Asian regional
security architecture. During the Cold War, the US cultivated tightly-knit bilateral ties with
central hub with little to no interaction between these
spokes (Cha 2016). At the time, America was considering the idea of an Asian organization
that would be established on the principle of collective security in the backdrop of the
intensifying ideological war of influence with USSR in the Asian theatre. However, the deep
mistrust and fear towards Japan and the rise of nationalism within the region resisted these
plans (Snyder 2007). These hub & spoke ties were asymmetric, with America holding far
greater influence over the states. Japan and South Korea remained two important states in this
17
bilateral US alliance network; however, their relations with one another were somewhat
strained, even as they normalised relations in 1965. America acted as the central hub, whereas
the two Asian countries (Japan and South Korea) had limited connection with each other,
creating an unofficial alliance network; a stark contrast to the US-led alliance system existing
in Europe (NATO) (Cha 2016).
The hub and spoke alliance system gave Japan and South Korea two guarantees: US
commitment to defend these states through mutual security treaties; and, their addition to the
US nuclear umbrella (i.e. American willingness to use nuclear weapons to protect these allies)
(Roehrig 2007). Treaties signed in 1951 and 1953, with Japan and South Korea respectively,
led to America gaining forward base access in the Pacific as America stationed troops in these
states. The close nature of these security ties has not only led to providing bases to the
American troops, but also intelligence sharing, closer defense cooperation, logistics support
and assistance to US led defense initiatives. One of the important Cold War characteristics in
East Asia was the ideological confrontation between the two triangles (i.e., Washington DC-
Tokyo-Seoul and Moscow-Pyongyang-Beijing). Over the years, the convergence of values like
democracy and freedom made the US-Japan-South Korea triad an important pillar of East
Asian security (Jo and Mo 2010).
As the world transitioned towards a post-Cold War era, deriving a new meaning and scope for
the US alliance structure in Asia became a point of focus for various administrations. The
region moved towards greater autonomy, economic prosperity, democratisation and
interdependence. As the post-Cold War years witnessed an era which was relatively devoid of
superpowers competing for greater influence, attention towards security ties relaxed for a
while. Particularly, with the commencement of the dot com revolution and globalisation, Asia
of missile tests in 1993-1994 and the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 brought a renewed
sense of realism regarding the emerging security challenges facing the region. Especially, the
nuclear threat unfolding on the Korean peninsula propelled the three countries to not only
strengthen their security ties, but also institutionalise them, and creating better negotiating
mechanism for coordinating respective strategies (US Department of State).

The 1994 Defense Trilateral Talks (until 2002) involved mid-level ministers from these three
countries with the nuclear threat as the main agenda. But it was the 1999 Trilateral
Coordination & Oversight Group (TCOG) that formally established a diplomatic channel for
reviewing the nuclear situation of DPRK and reaffirmed the importance of coordination
between the three countries and upholding Agreed Framework between US and DPRK of 1994
(US National Archives and Records Administration). The TCOG policy was actively led by
the US as a means to involve Japan and South Korea in key regional initiatives. The trilateral
partners
be instrumental in maintaining long term stability within the region (Cossa 2000)
role in steering the direction of the trilateral group became more important than ever.
Eventually, domestic factors strained the trilateral consensus on DPRK, for example the
the face of limited reciprocity by Pyongyang, this move by Seoul risked exacerbating the task
of managing relations with US and Japan (Levin and Han 2002). As the threat from Pyongyang
increased, the rationale for greater defense cooperation and reassessing strategies crystallised
at various levels. The Bush administration decided to:
implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities;

verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and
(The White House 1999)
nuclear ambitions. In 2003, the Six Party Talks officially commenced, involving the US, North
plutonium and uranium enrichment- (US Department of State 2005). This

forum not only replaced TCOG but also witnessed China in a proactive diplomatic role.
However, throughout the 2000s, the Bush administration led the dynamism for cooperation as
tackling multi-layered threats from terrorism took top priority. As America focused on
proactively engaging with global threats and welcomed greater participation of troops stationed

in various parts of the world, the need for the two important Asian allies to deeply engage in
these plans became evident. Within this context, the trilateral cooperation gained attention from
n and South Korea

faced domestic challenges in their bilateral relations stemming from conflicting historical
narratives, the comfort women issue and territorial disputes (Dokdo/Takeshima islands), the
two countries were able to sustain regular bilateral defense cooperation. The American push
for closer defense coordination led to a working level trilateral interaction. The three countries
began Defense Trilateral Talks in 2008 which involved defense representatives of all the three
countries, though at the time these meeting were off radar (Sneider et al 2016).
However, unlike the North Korean issue, there was a difference of opinion between the three
countries. Throughout the 2000s, even as Japan-China relations were plagued with issues
related to historical injustice and territorial disputes (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands), deeper
economic ties with Beijing and revolving door politics obstructed Tokyo from undertaking a
stern stance towards China. Whereas, South Korea was hesitant to use its alliance with US to
balance China with the fear of being stuck between two powerful states (Sneider et al 2016).
Reducing the focus of US foreign policy on the Middle East region and shifting its attention
towards the Asia Pacific, the Obama ad
- diplomatically,
economically and strategically (Clinton 2011). During this time, the focus of the trilateral
relationship began widening beyond North Korea. The 2010 Trilateral statement included
issues like climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maritime
security, freedom of navigation and increasing trilateral coordination (US Department of State
2010). However, even as the triad formed consensus on security matters, Japan-South Korea
relations reached new lows during the decade of 2010s. The impact of these bilateral
disagreements was felt by the triad.
The August 2011 ruling, by a South Korean constitutional court that the nation needs to do

all these issues were addressed under the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations (Yonhap News
Agency 2011)
forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese government. Survivors and civic groups
have recurrently protested against the Japanese government for the lack of resolution of past
war crimes. This issue remains sensitive to date as it deals with collective identity, collective
memory, and colonial experiences. The 2011 verdict led to pressure by public and judiciary on
South Korea and Japan, creating a complex diplomatic challenge for bilateral relations. In
2012, as Shinzo Abe and Park Geun-
heads of governments, political disagreement
colonial aggressions in South Korea and China have always been a delicate subject even though
their relations with Tokyo normalised in 1965 and 1972, respectively. PM Abe entered office
with the intention of r
Japanese soldiers who died in World War II (including convicted war criminals) became a
constant bone of contention between Japan and its East Asian neighbours.
In 2013, PM Abe made a statement in the Japanese parliament that:
international community...Things that happened between nations will look differently

(McCurry 2013)
Such statements not only added to the worries of a resurgence of Japanese nationalism, but
were also viewed to be insensitive by the public in South Korea (Bong 2015). On the other
hand, in the quest to strengthen her domestic foothold, President Park Geun-hye held an anti-
Japan stance throughout her term and refused to hold a formal summit with her Japanese
counterpart (Moon and Won). The president believed that there was little impetus for holding
(Williamson 2013).
Eventually, during the 2014 Nuclear Security Conference in Hague, the three countries were
able to hold a meeting due to American intervention (The White House 2014), the first such
talk between PM Abe and President Park. President Obama was successful in maintaining this
momentum as they signed the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement the same year that
created an avenue for authorities from the three countries to share classified information,

especially on missile and nuclear activities of Pyongyang (US Department of State 2014). The
next year as well, ministers from the three countries met for two-day security talks and
recommitted to working level consultations for intelligence sharing (US Department of State
2015).
In a bid to repair the strained relations, Tokyo and Seoul came to an understanding on the
comfort women issue in December 2015. The Japanese government expressed:
(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015)
The government also decided to pay $8.3 million to South Korea as a way to fund the victims
(BBC 2015). The Obama administration had placed pressure on both the countries to resolve
the comfort women issue through diplomatic channels and hence was pleased when a
consensus was reached (Moon and Won 2017). However, domestically President Park Geun-
hye faced a storm of criticisms as public believed that the accord was flawed and lacked
sincerity (Kim 2015). Furthermore, as President Park was embroiled in a corruption scandal
and the public continued to stage protests 1, the bilateral ties failed to recover. The lack of
political will in South Korea to improve ties with Japan after the accord was signed, and public
disapproval of the accord, was viewed as a breach of trust, eventually leading to Japan
cancelling talks with South Korea on currency swap in January 2017 (Reuters 2015).
The Indo Pacific Strategy and Diverging Opinions
foreign policy was not only limited but also guided b

In the early months of his presidency, US foreign policy was reactionary in its approach and
focused on fulfilling campaign promises like quitting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), Paris Agreement, and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Still, the president and
1
In 2017 when the second Statue of Peace representing the victims was installed by civic groups in front of the
Japanese consulate in Bussan, it led to Japan recalling top two Korean diplomats. The first statue was installed
in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011 and since then has created rifts in the relationship.

his team of experts had zeroed in on two threats that faced America- China and North Korea.
Economically, Trump considered China as the greatest US threat that had become a
powerhouse at the expense of American industries. Furthermore, a possible Chinese order that
would utilise its economic and military assets to displace the US-led order was seriously
considered by the administration (US National Security Strategy 2017). At the same time,
Nort
cities was viewed as a plausible concern. However, at the same time, the Trump administration
lacked a cohesive overarching strategy that could incorporate these specific national security
and foreign policy agendas.
Out of the many US allies, Japan was the most proactive in fostering a personal relationship
with President Trump. Prime Minister Abe was the first foreign counterpart that met the
President elect in 2016 to build confidence, before he took the oath in January 2017 (Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017)
stance on issues like Japan free riding the security alliance and unfair trade practices over the
support for the Indo-

(Fodale 2020 & Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). During
-Pacific (FOIP), a place where sovereign and independent

nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and
thrive in fre (US Embassy & Consulate in Vietnam 2017)
FOIP became the missing strategy needed by the Trump administration to execute their plans
egy. Understandably,
continued to sour over the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute with increased maritime presence of
the former in Sea of Japan, apart from consistent nuclear tests of North Korea (2016-2017),
Japan saw FOIP as a moment to strengthen the alliance with US. The two leaders met and
cemented their understanding on FOIP particularly in three areas: 1) establishing values of rule
of law and freedom of navigation; 2) pursuing economic prosperity by improving regional

connectivity; and, 3) committing towards peace & building maritime law enforcement (Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017). Furthermore, as an important strategic facet to the FOIP
strategy, America, Australia, Japan and India renewed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or
(Abe)
deeply depended on the resilience of its alliance network. Some of the aims laid out by the
Trump administration were: to strengthen capabilities and will of Quad countries & South
Korea; create a quadrilateral security framework in the region with US, Japan, Australia &
India as hubs; encourage South Korea to play bigger role in the region beyond the Korean
peninsula; and, empower Japan to become a pillar of the Indo-Pacific security architecture (The
White House 2017).
However, South Korea had reacted in a reserved manner to FOIP. The Moon Jae-in
administration prioritised North Korea and found FOIP detrimental to inter-Korea relations
(Kang 2021). Also, Seoul preferred to have greater autonomy in drafting its policies on China,
rtner (Kang 2021). FOIP shared many tenets with President
Moon Jae-
were later upgraded to

(South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs ). Irrespective of the
more focused o
(THAAD) in 2016, NSP represented a geostrategic and geo-economic shift in South Korean
foreign policy as it tried to hedge ties with US and China (Lim 2019 & Seo 2021). Furthermore,
(Yeo 2020). As Japan intensified its association with

US, South Korea recognised the vulnerabilities that could follow by being involved in a US-
China competition (Yeo and Koga, Pacific Forum 2021). Ultimately, with the risk of being
isolated in the region, South Korea cautiously decided to work with the US and strengthen
compatible factors of FOIP and NSP. With the goal of creating synergy between the two
policies that focused on transparency, inclusiveness and openness, South Korea and United

States vowed to cooperate on a wider range of issues (South Korea Ministry of Foreign
Affairs).
As US-Japan and US-South Korea relations progressed at differing pace, Japan-South Korea
relations hit a new low. This time, the issue of historical grievances and conflict over narratives
not only created a diplomatic challenge but also spilled over in trade and security relations of
the two countries. In 2018, a court in Seoul passed an order stating that Nippon Steel
Corporation and Sumitomo Metal Corp (5401.T) should compensate four surviving South
Koreans for forced labour during Japanese rule over the Korean peninsula (Shin 2019). Japan,
in response, removed Seoul as a preferred trade partner from the white list, the only Asian
country on the list (Pham 2019). South Korea accused Japan of initiating a trade war with
President Moon Jae-
attempts to harm our economy the Korean Government also has countermeasures with which
(Pham 2019). South Korea removed Japan from the list of trusted trade partners
furthering the trade row (Seung 2019). In December 2018, Japan accused ROK navy destroyer
of allegedly locking its target radar on a Japanese P-1 surveillance plane. Japan called this
(Kajimoto and
Shin 2019). In January 2019, South Korea accused Japan of conducting a flight which was at
(VOA News 2013). The
same year South Korea voiced its desire to withdraw from the General Security of Military
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan, a crucial intelligence sharing pact and further
deepened the wedge between Seoul and Tokyo. Japan protested and accused South Korea of
letting trade disputes impact security relations (Shin and Takenaka 2019). GSOMIA has been
a major symbol of the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral defense cooperation amidst growing
pressure, South Korea decided to save the GSOMIA with Japan, at the eleventh hour before
the agreement was due to expire (Yoshida and Sugiyama 2019 & Hyung 2019).
Since 2018, the understanding that demarcated converging aspects of Japan-South Korea
bilateral relations from historical disagreements was deeply compromised. Domestic politics
and downward spiralling of public opinion has played a role in the erosion of this
understanding, unlike seen in the history of the relations since normalisation. Anti-Japan
sentiments in South Korea become an important source of nationalism, pivotal for electoral

politics, and President Moon Jae-in incorporating this in his domestic agenda not only impacted
Japan-South Korea relations but also the triad (Schoff and Lee 2019). Furthermore, even as
FOIP aimed to create a better geo-strategic environment for strengthening the alliance,
also hampered trilateral cooperation. For example, President Trump playing down North
reigning source of the North Korean threat presented a cause for concern and a looming
perception gap between Washington DC and its Asian allies (Browne 2019). Also, even though
PM Abe tried to utilize diplomacy to gain heightened agreement with President Trump, Japan
was continuously side-lined whenever the Japanese abduction issue was brought up during
Trump-Kim meetings signalling the limits of US-Japan bonhomie (Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2017).
Renewing the Trilateral Alliance & Forging Possibilities
President Joe Biden entered office with the intent to rectify American missteps during the
Trump era, even though the administration decided to continue the Indo Pacific Strategy (IPS),
albeit with some changes. Firstly, the officials polished the language of their message to the
region that was not solely focused on likeminded countries, as some viewed the Quad as an
exclusionary (democratic) grouping (Grossman 2021). The willingness to cooperate with allies
and partners was reiterated. Also, recognising flaws of American democracy helped in creating
an inclusive Indo-Pacific narrative (US Department of Defense 2021). Secondly, the Biden
but rather addressed the pressing threats faced by countries in the region. One of the first visits
made by the top officials of the administration was to Japan and South Korea as a way to mend
diplomatic bridges, re-instilling faith of allies in their alliance with US, and reinvigorating the
trilateral cooperation. Secretary of State, Anthony J Blinken, and Secretary of Defense, Lloyd
J Austin, participated in US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) and US-ROK
Foreign & Defense Ministerial (2+2) talks with the Indo-Pacific region as an important point
of discussion (US Department of State 2022). Thirdly, building on the collective abilities of
allies and partners while focusing on shaping the regional architecture became a bigger agenda
than solely focusing on China (Phua 2022). The administration was able to gauge the regional
anxiety of countries like South Korea and ASEAN over the binary policy options for them as
a result of US-China competition. The administration paid particular attention to rectifying its

past rhetoric
(The White House
2022). And lastly, Biden elevated the strategic position of trilateral alliance within the IPS and
committed to:
regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply chain issues and
will seek to coordinate our regional
Since the early months of the presidency, mending relations between Tokyo and Seoul became
one of the top foreign policy priorities for the Biden administration. When President Moon Jae-
in met President Biden in 2021, the joint statement voiced the:
portance of ROK-US-
protecting shared security and prosperity, upholding common values, and bolstering the rules
According to experts, the mention of the trilateral relationship in the joint statement was
bilateral matters in a way that does not impact the triad (Glosserman 2021). Moreover, the
change of leadership in Japan and South Korea created a hope for better bilateral relations. In
-line approach, the new Japanese PM, Fumio Kishida, held a
moderate ideology even though the party (LDP) he belongs to remains right wing (Harris
2021) -yeol, entered
-Japan bilateral
(The Mainichi 2022). After
symbolically inviting the Japanese foreign minister to his inauguration ceremony with the
desire to reset the relations, the two:
States is needed more than ever in the current international situation where the rules-based

international order is being threatened, and they have no time to spare in improving Japan-
(Kyodo News 2022)
These developments helped in creating a favourable diplomatic environment for President

- -
US stance and intention to deepen ties with likeminded countries in the Indo-Pacific further
helped in making the visit a
invitation to join the Quad and considering participation in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic
towards the Indo Pacific strategy (The Korea Times 2022 & Yonhap News Agency 2022).
FOIP with Tokyo showcasing interest for joining the IPEF. The trip was also important as US
their defense budget,
a step to make the alliance more equitable (The Mainichi 2022).
activities in the East China Sea, and reports of North Korean plans for testing its seventh
nuclear weapon, the need for boosting ties between trans-Atlantic and Asian partners was
realised by US and NATO countries. In a rare move, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand, or the Asia Pacific Partners 4 (AP4), were invited to attend the 2022 NATO summit
in Madrid (The Japan Times 2022). Recognizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific region for
global affairs amidst intensified strategic competition between US, China and Russia, this
invitation was beyond the optics of messaging. NATO-AP4 meeting focused on the Ukraine
war and strengthening ties between the Indo-Pacific and NATO with an understanding that
(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022). This meeting was also
an opportunity for Japan and South Korea to gather greater European support in tackling the
North Korean threat.
Parallel to the NATO gathering, US-Japan-South Korea held trilateral talks for the first time
since 2017. With an eye to deepen the security relationship, the leaders acknowledged that the
-Japan and US-South Korea alliances need to be upgraded as
(The Japan Times 2022).
President Biden highlighted the significance of the trilateral cooperation for achieving the

(Tanaka 2022). Beefing up the deterrence ability of the trilateral alliance amid the shifting
geopolitics of the region was the larger takeaway of the meeting.
Conclusion
The trilateral alliance has been a product of navigating disagreements and building the logic
for cooperation over the years as the regional security landscape evolved. In many ways, the
US-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance became a reality when US-Japan and US-South Korea
defense relations managed to develop common security perceptions. The alliance came to life
in the years after the Cold War era with the need to respond to regional threats, particularly
Japan and South Korea has been a foreign policy goal vis-à-vis strategic pursuits in Asia.
American security commitments to the region are interlinked to Japan and South Korea, not
only from a conceptual standpoint, but also on an operational level (Sneider 2016). During the
Cold War years, America saw the issues embedded in the historical relationship of Japan and
South Korea as a hurdle for greater security cooperation. With the hope that these bilateral
differences would be sorted out over the years, America avoided intervening and being
pressurised to side with either of the allies. However, Washington realised that addressing these
matters is critical for the better functioning of the triad. But as these wartime issues flared and
imperative than ever. The American diplomatic nudge for resolving these issues, and
occasionally steering the triad towards their shared security understanding, have helped in the
sustenance of the trilateral. Furthermore, as the scope of the triad expanded beyond North
Korea, it has been viewed as a critical framework within the US Indo-Pacific strategy.
For Japan and South Korea, their security interests have overlapped much more than that with
United States, and yet there persists a lingering mistrust in the relationship. North Korea
short range missile abilities which were
downplayed by the Trump administration over the threat of long-range missiles and nuclear
emboldened maritime activities as a matter of serious national threat, whereas Seoul has
struggled to mould a policy that is immune to the great power politics. As domestic politics
continue to leverage historical animosity for building the tenets of nationalism, and widening

public perceptions of each other, rebuilding the trust within the Japan-South Korea relation
remains a challenge for the trilateral alliance. Japan has made a clear distinction between
ty to do the
same. For South Korea, the wartime issues remain integral to their socio-political history that
encompasses larger debates on national identity and represents collective national desire for
war crimes resolution. Hence, insightful political leadership by the two countries, that could
balance these matters while upholding core security agreements, would be critical for the
ongoing momentum within the triad. At the same time, there remains wide areas of
convergence for the two countries apart from the North Korea threat like interest at maintaining
a rules-based order, strengthening democratic resilience in the region, finding the means to
bolster regional infrastructure, and freedom of navigation. Importantly, the Biden
to rebuild the Indo-Pacific strategy beyond the China narrative and
adopting an inclusive discourse has helped in making FOIP palatable for countries like South
Korea.
Irrespective of the difference of opinion regarding FOIP, the multilateral facet of the concept
furthers the objective of the triad. As the three countries continue to forge the fate of the
trilateral, this era marks a test for the resilience of the US alliance network in the region.

REFERENCES
Abe, Shinzo."Asia's Democratic Security Diamond." Project Syndicate . 27 December 2012.

https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-
shinzo-abe
"Comfort Women: Japan and South Korea hail agreement." BBC. 28 December 2015.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35190464
Bong, Youngshik. "ROK and US Views on the Foreign Policy of Abe Administration."
Rozman, Gilbert. Asia's Alliance Trianngle: US-Japan-South Korea at a Tumultuous Time .
Palgrave Macmillan : New York , 2015. 265.
Browne, Ryan. "New North Korea missile poses threat to allies, but doesn't bother Trump."
CNN. 16 August 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/16/politics/north-korea-us-missile-
improve/index.html
Cha, Victor. Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia . New Jersey :
Princeton University Press, 2016.
Clinton, Hillary. "America's Pacific Century." Foreign Policy . 11 October 2011.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
Cossa, Ralph A. "US-ROK-Japan: A "Virtual Alliance" Makes Sense ." Korean Journal of
Defense (2000): 67-86.
Fodale, Hannah. "Resolved: Abe's Investment in his Relationship with President Trump has
advanced Japanese interests." CSIS. 30 January 2020. https:/www.csis.org/analysis/resolved-
abes-investment-his-relationship-president-trump-has-advanced-japanese-interests
Glosserman, Brad. "What was unsaid hovers over the Biden-Moon summit." Japan Times .
25 May 2021. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/05/25/commentary/world-
commentary/biden-moon-summit/

Grossman, Dennis. "Biden's Indo-Pacific Policy Blueprint Emerges." RAND. 23 August

2021.
https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/08/bidens-indo-pacific-policy-blueprint-emerges.html
Harris, Tobias. "Fumio Kishida's principles are about to be put to the test." Foreign Policy. 4
October 2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/04/fumio-kishida-new-japanese-prime-
minister-ldp/
Hyung, Kim Tong. "South Korea will keep its military intelligence pact with Japan-for now."
The Diplomat. 23 November 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/south-korea-will-keeps-
its-military-intelligence-pact-with-japan-for-now/
"Japan-
2015. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000365.html
"Prime Minister Abe Held a Meeting with the President-Elect of the United States." Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs . November 18 2017.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/na/na1/us/page3e_000622.html
"Confluence of Two Seas Speech by H.E Mr Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the
Parliament of the Republic of India." Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 22 August 2007.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html
"Japan-US Working Lunch and Japan-US Summit Meeting." Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs . 6 November 2017. https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000699.html
"Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea." Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 1

June 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/index.html
"NATO Asia-Pacific Partnerfs (AP4) Leaders' Meeting." Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs .
29 Junde 2022. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/ki/page1e_000413.html

Jo, Hyeran and Jongryn Mo. "Does the United States Need a New East Asian Anchor? The
Case for US-Japan-South Korea Trilateralism ." Asia Policy (2010): 67-100.
Kajimoto, Tetsushi and Hyonhee Shin. "Japan accuses South Korea of 'extremely dangerous'
radar lock on plane." Reuters . 21 December 2018. <, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
japan-defence-southkorea-idUSKCN1OK11O >
Kang, Song. South Korea and France's Indo Pacific Strategies: Potential Partnership and
Challenges . PARIS: IFRI , 2021.
Kim, Jack. "South Korean comfort women protest against accord with Japan." Reuters . 30
December 2015. https://www.reuters.com/article/southkorea-japan-comfortwomen-
idINKBN0UD0I620151230
"Japan's Foreign Minister, next South Korean counterpart vow to mend ties," Kyodo News.
20 May 2022. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/05/4d0035f501ba-update1-japan-
foreign-minister-in-s-korea-for-president-yoons-inauguration.html
Levin, Norman D and Yong Sup Han. Sunshine in Korea: The South Korean Debate over
Policies Toward North Korea. Santa Monica: RAND, 2002.
Lim, Darren J. "Chinese Economic Coercion during the THAAD Dispute." The Asan Forum .
28 December 2019. https://theasanforum.org/chinese-economic-coercion-during-the-thaad-
dispute/
McCurry, Justin. "Japan will not revise apologies for past military conduct in Asia, officials
say." The Guardian . 8 May 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/08/japan-
apologies-military-conduct-asia
Moon, Chung In and Young hur Won. "A South Korean Perspective: Trilateral Cooperation:
The Devil's in Domestic Politics." Global Asia (2017): 46-50.

Pham, Sherisse. "South Korea accuses Japan of waging economic war." CNN. 2 August
2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/08/02/business/japan-south-korea-trade-war/index.html
Phua, Amanda Trea. "Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy flips the switch on geopolitical rivalry."
East Asia Forum . 3 March 2022. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/15/bidens-indo-
pacific-strategy-flips-the-switch-on-geopolitical-rivalry/
"South Korea says will monitor situation after Japan suspends FX swap talks." Reuters . 6
January 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-swaps-idUKKBN14Q087
Roehrig, Terrence. Japan, United States and South Korea Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence
After the Cold War . New York: Columbia University Press , 2007.
Schoff, James and Paul K Lee. "Navigating Rocky Japan-South Korea Relations." Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace . 25 June 2019.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/25/navigating-rocky-japan-south-korea-relations-
pub-79367
Seo, Andrew. "South Korea's new Southern Policy and ASEAN-ROK Relations." The
Diplomat . 28 July 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/south-koreas-new-southern-
policy-and-asean-rok-relations/
Seung, Kang Yoon. "Seoul drops Tokyo from list of trusted trade partners." Yonhap News
Agency. 18 September 2019. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20190917008500320
Shin, Hyonhee and Kiyoshi Takenaka. "South Korea to scrap intelligence-sharing pact with
Japan amid dispute over history." Reuters. 22 August 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-labourers-idUSKCN1VC0WR
Shin, Hyonhee. "Friction likely as Korean court orders Nippon Steel to compensate WWII
workers." Reuters . 30 October 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-
laborers-idUSKCN1N32TS

Sneider, Dan. "Advancing US-ROK Trilateral Cooperation: A US Perspective." National

Bureau of Asian Research. 2016 March 2016. https://www.nbr.org/publication/advancing-u-
s-japan-rok-trilateral-cooperation-a-u-s-perspective-brief/
Sneider, Daniel, Yul Sohn and Yushihide Soeya. US-ROK-Japan Trilateralism: Building
Bridges and Strengthening Cooperation . Washington : The National Bureau of Asian
Research , 2016.
Snyder, Daniel. "The United States and Northeast Asia: The Cold War Legacy." Shin, Gi
Wook and Daniel Sneider. Cross Currents: Regionalism ans Nationalism in Northeast Asia.
California: Walter H Shorstein Asia Pacific Center , 2007. 312.
Sohn, Yul. "Relocating Trilateralism in a Broader Regional Architecture: A SOUTH Korean

Perspective." The National Bureau of Asian Research . 2016 March 2016.
https://www.nbr.org/publication/relocating-trilateralism-in-a-broader-regional-architecture-a-
south-korean-perspective-brief/
"ROK-ASEAN Relations Overview." South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs . 2022.

https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_5466/contents.do
"ROK-US Discuss New Southern Policy, and Indo Pacific Strategy." South Korea Ministry
of Foreign Affairs . 24 August 2018.
https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=320040
Tanaka, Miya. "Japan, South Korea eye deeper security ties in 1st summit in five years."
Kyodo News. 30 June 2022. https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/06/2ffd70487d6e-
japan-s-korea-us-hold-1st-3-way-summit-since-2017.html
"Japan to join NATO Summit for the first time as China challenge looms." The Japan Times.
29 June 2022. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/29/national/japan-nato-china/

"Japan, US, South Korea eye deeper security ties in first summit in five years." The Japan
Times . 29 June 2022. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/29/national/japan-sk-us-
talks/
"Yoon says will positively review joining Quad if invited: Report." The Korea Times . 2022
April 26. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/04/120_328012.html
"South Korea, Japan business leaders call for future oriented ties." The Mainichi . 9 May
2022. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20220509/p2g/00m/0in/039000c
"Japan may neet to boost defense costs to $80 bil: Think Tank." The Mainichi . 31 May 2022.
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20220531/p2g/00m/0na/067000c
"Final Declassified US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific." The White House. 5
January 2021. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-
Declass.pdf
"Statement by the President." The White House . 13 June 2001. https://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-4.html
"Remarks by the President, President Park of Republic of Korea, and Prime Minister Abe of
Japan." The White House . 24 March 2015. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/03/25/remarks-president-obama-president-park-republic-korea-and-prime-
minister
"Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Indo-Pacific Region." The White House . 24
August 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-
remarks/2021/08/24/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-indo-pacific-region/
Department of State. 12 October 1999. <https:// https://1997-

2001.state.gov/regions/eap/991012_northkorea_rpt.html>

"US Indo Pacific Strategy." The White House . February 2022.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
"US-ROK Leaders' Joint Statement." The White House . 21 May 2021.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-
joint-statement/
"Secretary of Defense Remarks at the 40th International Institute for Strategic Studies
Fullerton Lecture." US Department of Defense . 27 July 2021.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/2708192/secretary-of-defense-
remarks-at-the-40th-international-institute-for-strategic/
"US-Japan-South Korea Hold Trilateral Talks." US Department of State. 17 April 2015.

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/604481/igphoto/us-japan-south-
korea-hold-trilateral-security-talks/
"Remarks by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs." US Department of State
. 2 March 2004. https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/30093.htm
"Trilateral Statement Japan, Republic of Korea and United States." US Department of State .
6 December 2010. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/12/152431.htm
"Signing of Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile
Threats Posed by North Korea." US Department of State . 28 December 2014.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/605331/signing-of-trilateral-
information-sharing-arrangement-concerning-the-nuclear-an/
"Travel to Tokyo, Seoul and Anchorage." US Department of State . 15-21 March 2021.
https://www.state.gov/secretary-travel/travel-to-tokyo-seoul-and-anchorage-march-15-19-
2021/

"Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit." US Embassy & Consulate in

Vietnam. 10 November 2017 . https://vn.usembassy.gov/20171110-remarks-president-trump-
apec-ceo-summit/
"Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group Meeting." US National Archives and Records
Administration . 1999. < https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10504977>
"US National Security Strategy 2017." The White House. 18 December 2017.
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf
"South Korea: Japanese Warplane made Threatening Pass Over Naval Vessel." VOA News .
23 January 2013. https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-says-japanese-warplane-made-
threatening-pass-over-naval-vessel/4755261.html
Williamson, Lucy. "South Korea President Park: 'No Purpose' to Japan talks." BBC. 4
November 2013. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24768298
Yeo, Andrew and Kei Koga. "Japan and South Korea's Alternative Paths in the Indo-Pacific."
Pacific Forum. 25 March 2021. https://pacforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/PacNet17-
2021.03.25.pdf
Yeo, Andrew. "South Korea and the Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy." CSIS. 20 July
2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-korea-and-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy
"Court says Seoul's inaction over formedr comfort women unconstitutional." Yonhap News
Agency . 30 August 2011. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20110830007951315
"Yoon says South Korea's participation in IPEF is only natural." Yonhap News Agency . 23
May 2022. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220523004200315

Yoshida, Reiji and Satoshi Sugiyama. " South Korea to scrap intelligence sharing pact with
Japan amid dispute over history." Reuters. 22 November 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-japan-labourers-idUSKCN1VC0WR

ASEAN Centrality and the Indo-Pacific: Finding a Convergent Reality?
Eerishika Pankaj
Abstract
The Indo-Pacific is loosely articulated as a broad-based framing concept. It is a mega-
region defined differently by each of its proponents based on national interest. As a
geographic reality, the boundaries of the region have seen myriad interpretations, differing
-
European Union (EU) and UK. China, meanwhile, has largely rejected the concept, even
as democratic stakeholder states have promoted focused ventures, strategies, and visions
among all actors in the region has emerged in the form of their commitment to upholding
Centrality -Pacific definition shows a nuanced

strategy to build autonomy in dealing with the region while attempting to ensure a balance
of power in an increasingly multipolar Asia. This paper will seek to focus on the
importance ASEAN holds in the Indo-Pacific by analysing why its centrality is espoused
by all stakeholders involved. This paper will argue how ASEAN holds immense promise
potentially provide the basis for a common conceptualization of its geography.
Key Words: ASEAN, Indo-Pacific, Quad, China
Introduction
The adoption of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical concept has seen consistent growth over the
past decade; the renaming by the United States of its strategically important Pacific Command
(PACOM) as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) marking a key milestone,
showcasing changing realities and interests in the region by democratic stakeholder powers
(George 2018). This re-christening showed the growing importance of India in the region while
also highlighting the connect between the Indian and the Pacific oceans, wherein Delhi plays
-sharing and geographic
security coverage especially vis-à-vis key maritime routes for economic and military chains.
As the regions importance has grown, the geopolitical theatre of opportunity and conflict has
moved Eastwards into Asia, wherein differences in perception of what constitutes the Indo-
Pacific geographically as well as ideologically have further complicated cooperation and
competition narratives.
40
Seong 2019), core debates over the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific began to emerge in
the past decade as some of the foremost lines of misalignment between nations, be it partner
states or rival powers. For instance, we see divergences in the geographic ideation of the Indo-
Pacific amongst the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) partner-states of India, US, Japan
and Australia based on areas of strategic nati -
Address at Shangri La Dialogue 2018), thereby including the Gulf region and the Indian Ocean
littorals. Delhi -Pacific concept covers the broadest range of the region, more than that
of the US, Japan and Australia.
For the US, the geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific was clearly defined in the 2017 National
Security Strategy coast of India to the western shores of the United
the Pacific Ocean has largely overseen its engagement in the region even though more recently,
a deeper focus on -
-Pacific outlook and laid

the groundwork for a revitalized Quad. This vision drew a diamond connecting Japan, India,
from the Asia-

Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2015)
Beyond the misalignment in defining the region by Quad states themselves, the notion of Indo-
Pacific has seen challenges to its ideation. China whose revolutionary revisionism in the
region has greatly if not directly affected the emergent need for cooperation has rejected the
Indo-Pacific concept as an on-
(Medcalf 2019 50 & Birtles 2018). Moreover, China sees the Indo-Pacific as a western concept,
India-centric fo
acceptance of the same by other Asian powers, with countries like South Korea despite being
a US ally and a vital partner to India only recently beginning to warm up to the notion after
years of appeasement vis-à-vis Beijing to protect their national and economic interests.

-
most used diplo-speak in the world of International Relations academia at present, there has
been a plethora of activity that has created partnerships in the region; the Quad being a prime
example. -
states is their goal of building a free, open, inclusive and rules-based order across the region
(The White House 2021). The term Indo-Pacific presents a bona fide territorial outlook that
allows the Quad to engage each other on matters of security, strategy and economics. In
addition, the diversity of proponents and their geographic constructs negates a claim that the
Indo-Pacific is a Western-oriented concept. Rather, the Indo-Pacific is similar to a
and international politics among various players (Medcalf 2020 34). Keeping such a notion in
mind, it is all the more important to note what specific convergences emerge between all
players of the region in their varied lenses vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. The adherence to
upholding centrality of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one such
guiding area of mutual convergence, with China, the Quad and even European players such as
France committing to the same.
Decoding ASEAN Centrality
The release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in June 2019 marked a key
development in the regional power dynamics (ASEAN 2019). As the US-China rivalry grew,
to it by players of the region. The need to re-focus on neutrality and leadership by ASEAN in
critical to maintaining security balance in the Indo-Pacific. The AOIP allowed ASEAN to set
an agenda for cooperation, especially as ASEAN members remain most vulnerable to great
power politics of the region, even as China and India among others are dialogue partners of
the body. Caught between US-China and India-
AOIP was on functional economic collaboration as well as maritime domain protection.
clarification to truly understand what the concept is and is not, especially as it remains largely
undefined (Acharya 2017 276). As opposed to what is the general belief, ASEAN centrality
is certainly not a totally novel or new term. It is connected with a number of comparable

ideas: ASEAN as the "pioneer", the "driver", the "planner", the "institutional center" of local
processes in the Indo-Pacific (or, the Asia-Pacific) locale which must be connected to the
notions behind the very establishment of the regional body in 1967.
A second well-known but misguided judgment about ASEAN centrality is that it is about
ASEAN itself. ASEAN centrality must be viewed in line with the bigger elements of
regionalism and territorial design in the region, now and in the past. The "centrality" of ASEAN
in regional cooperation reflects the reality of regional development and is consistent with
global development trends, especially as ASEAN remains the most cohesive representative
group of countries in East Asia. Unity within ASEAN is critical to peace in the region, making
the institution stand for values larger than its structural limits.
Thirdly, ASEAN centrality is believed to be the restrictive workmanship of ASEAN members

themselves- this is incorrect (Connelly 2022). ASEAN centrality is as much a result of external
players in Southeast Asia as ASEAN members themselves. For instance, the invocation of the
term in itself is connected more with the elements of great power politics that emerges in the
region than it is with the concept of promoting internal ASEAN unity (Ciorciari 2017 254).
Ultimately, in its most immediate and restricted sense, ASEAN centrality implies that ASEAN
lies, and should stay, at the centre of the Asia (or Indo-Pacific) provincial foundations,
particularly the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence
Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asian Summit (EAS) (Natalegawa 2019 128).
ASEAN looks to provide the institutional stage on which the more extensive Indo-Pacific and
Asian regional organizations are secured; hence, its centrality as a fulcrum. A connected
importance of ASEAN centrality is that ASEAN is the first original gathering in Asia and looks
to infer that Southeast Asia is at the centre point of Asian regionalist discussions and
cooperations over changing dynamics and collaboration in Asia.
According to the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN seeks to establish cordial ties with other nations as
well as sub-regional, regional, and international organisations and institutions. It also wants
to engage in mutually beneficial dialogue with them. Through the grant of the formal status of
dialogue, sectoral dialogue, and development partnerships, ASEAN has laid down the
framework for broadening and strengthening its relationships with external parties. In order to
promote regional cooperation and maintain its central position in regional cooperation

mechanisms, ASEAN continues to maintain 'centrality'. Ten years after its formation in the late
1970s, ASEAN came to the realisation that relationships with international partners were
essential for economic advancement, market access, technology transfer, and development aid.
With the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the unification of all Southeast Asian nations
by the late 1990s, the region's overall potential was further enhanced by the presence of
established peace and stability. It was then that ASEAN importance began to grow; almost a
dozen nations wanted to collaborate with the organisation which posed a challenge for the
group which was already struggling with handling domestic issues.
Today, by virtue of having Dialogue Partnerships with Australia, Canada,

China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom and the US beyond its eight ASEAN member states (Brunei, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), it is
indeed the most expansive and successful regional bodies functioning in Asia. Importantly,
ASEAN also has Sectoral Dialogue Partnerships with Norway, Pakistan,
Switzerland and Turkey as well as Development Partnerships with Chile,
France, Germany and Italy.
vessel via which to align the future of the region, while also becoming a model to imbibe for
other subregional groupings. ASEAN centrality is the most ambitious and elaborate projection
of a subregional body to project itself on a more extensive local and global stage while
maintaining its neutrality (Emmers 2001 352).
be it via Dialogue or Development partnerships have
a political miracle. Its members bring together nations that have wide-ranging contrasts; for
instance, high GDP countries like Singapore and low GDP states like Myanmar. Numerous
religious and ethnic groups are represented in the region's demographics, which vary widely.
For instance, Indonesia and Singapore are among the most religiously varied nations in the
world, whereas Cambodia, which has a majority of Buddhists, and Vietnam, which has a
majority of Muslims, are relatively homogeneous (Cooperman et. al. 2014 15-16).
Archipelagos and continental land masses with low plains and rugged hills make up the
landscape of ASEAN (Council on Foreign Relations 2022).
-continental, further cementing its

with each

other for more than 40 years ("The European Union and ASEAN."). In 1972, the European
Economic Community (EEC) became the first organisation to forge informal connections with
ASEAN. Relationships were formalised at the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in
1977, and they became institutionalised with the March 1980 signing of the ASEAN-EEC
Cooperation Agreement. Critically, the EU-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership was upgraded to a
Strategic Partnership at the 23rd EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 2020, showing continuous
growth in relations which now have verticals ranging across politics, security, defense,
economics, community building, and COVID-19 responses, as well. Momentum continued
with the signing of the first bloc-to-bloc air transport deal in 2021, the EU-ASEAN
Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement.
Convincing Southeast Asian nations that the EU can be a more comprehensive partner and not
merely a lender of ASEAN projects will be one of the EU's tasks for 2022 (Hutt 2022). For
instance, talks for a thorough digital accord may begin between the EU and ASEAN. The
ambitious "Digital Masterplan 2025" from ASEAN was issued in January, and the EU has also
identified connectivity, digital governance, and partnership as one of its top goals in its Indo-
Pacific strategy. Such holistic growth in ties will also, importantly, allow deeper synergy
-Pacific Strategy released in 2021 especially in
avenues of sustainability, supply chain resilience, and digital connectivity.
Finding Indo-Pacific Convergence
Such united emphasis on ASEAN centrality by various powers highlights the critical role
ASEAN holds in promoting peace and collaboration in the region. Much like the Indo-Pacific
construct itself, the notion of ASEAN centrality remains undefined. Yet, stakeholders who are
unable to find convergence on their Indo-Pacific definitions have found a common cause to
the immense promise ASEAN holds in both shaping the f

response to shared threats and potentially providing the basis for a common conceptualisation
of its geography.
The Quad, heralded as the premier Indo-Pacific grouping of present times, has been attempting
to bring together like-minded democracies of the region while China has termed the grouping
exclusive clique Cold War mentality and bloc politics
and

pull, ASEAN centrality which to China ensures a non-West led ideological or military vision
in the region provides much scope for binding the Indo-Pacific for constructive dialogue. The
Zealand, Vietnam, Israel
and Brazil for a meeting with the Quad during the pandemic despite not much development
of the concept
focus instead should be to live up to its AS
find appeal in the Quad boosting their institutions (Laksmana 2020 110).
In this context, building on the AOIP, ASEAN must come together to promote a holistic and
collaborative Indo-Pacific that continues to strengthen its centrality. A focused strategic policy
approach to implementing the AOIP which has at last blueprinted the Association's notion
of and strategy for the Indo-Pacific wherein the Pacific and the Indian Ocean districts have
been viewed as the most critical geopolitical and geoeconomics areas is needed. The
centrality of ASEAN has been underlined in the midst of the internationally relevant challenges
that this locale is experiencing; by ASEAN Centrality, the AOIP shows that it wants to retain
its central role in the developing territorial design in Southeast Asia and encompassing areas.
The point hence is not just making new components or supplanting existing ones; rather, it is
expected that the AOIP will improve ASEAN's Community building process and reinforce, as
well as give new energy to existing ASEAN-driven instruments like EAS and ADMM+ (Saha
2019).
China has continued to remain the top trade partner and one of the highest infrastructure aid
been largely normative. The same has now been redefined into a more strategic arc that
provides ASEAN long-tern autonomy from great-power politics (Acharya). For instance,
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) first ideated and
implemented during the Cold War was reaffirmed in 2020 amidst intensifying US-China
rivalry in the region (Southgate 2021 32). The ZOPFAN Declaration encapsulated ASEAN's
desire to maintain Southeast Asia's independence and neutrality. ZOPFAN accommodated
different strategic viewpoints within ASEAN while evading the legal ramifications of the
neutrality principle. Neutrality is frequently cited as a crucial component in ASEAN's success,
despite the fact that no agreement was ever achieved on ZOPFAN's exact use.

Following a protracted period of external meddling in the form of Western and Japanese
colonialism and US-Soviet Great Power security competition, ZOPFAN was originally
founded as a result of a shared aspiration for regional autonomy among the states of Southeast
Asia. The recent reaffirmation of ZOPFAN by ASEAN is a sign of the region's growing
volatility as a result of US-China superpower rivalry and ASEAN's growing concerns about
being involved in a potential "new Cold War" in Asia. ASEAN's declarations endorsing
ZOPFAN must hence be seen as another kind of risk management that positions ASEAN
equally (read, neutrally) between the Great Powers and serves as a protective measure. Hedging
usage becomes more and more unsustainable as balanced behaviour takes its place, especially
as the post-COVID 19 period brings in recognition of unsuccessfu
from China.
As this notion regains footing, it is also important for ASEAN to concurrently build strong
confidence-building measures as well as transparent rules of governance of military
deployments. A revamped and stronger ZOPFAN should be well articulated and included in
the AOIP to ensure robust implementation. It would also allow ASEAN the room to work on
more directly accountable for actions affecting the peace architecture of the region.
Continuing Challenges and Changing Narratives
Although it did so as a periphery power, ASEAN has faced major power competition in the
past. Now, the primary arena of rising great power rivalry is Southeast Asia itself. In order to
become a significant regional participant, the Southeast Asian region has come a long way.
However, ASEAN's method of operation and its sporadic inability to get its act together have
frequently prompted critiques and worries about its cohesion and position in the developing
regional geopolitics. The Quad's long-term consequences for ASEAN have also not been
ignored (Yhome 2020). ASEAN's "convening strength" in the developing regional architecture
may eventually be undermined by the Quad's growing importance. Viewed as "parallel"
mechanisms to ASEAN-led conferences, the idea of "Quad Plus" comprising the four Quad
members and other partners from the Indo-Pacific region has also caused tensions in strategic
communities. However, these should be looked at as avenues of cooperation rather than
competition, drawn along the focus on democracy and ASEAN Centrality; the continued
mentions of the latter by the Quad countries individually and as a group also highlights an
attempt at presenting unity.

up with centrality is pivotal to

ASEAN's prosperity as a local coalition and basic to its pertinence in the global field. Besides,
through ASEAN centrality, a rules-based order in the region is advanced and grown, thus
diffusing likely pressure and struggle between big and small states (Emmers 2018 279). For
instance, disagreements over China, in particular Beijing's assertive behaviour in the South
China Sea, where several ASEAN member nations have been embroiled in maritime territorial
disputes with China, have challenged ASEAN unity and called into doubt the regional bloc's
centrality.
ASEAN centrality builds on the possibility that ASEAN has the ability to play a main role in
regional plan setting. It likewise puts a premium on ASEAN's capacity to be a pioneer, driver,
and centre of territorial drives in relating with its external partners while advancing, most
importantly, ASEAN's own advantages. Similarly, the need for ASEAN to conduct more multi-
track diplomacy avenues focused on the Indo-Pacific is critical; this will work towards an
academic and institutional reclaiming of the Indo-Pacific idea, allowing the terminology to
become more ingrained with the analytic assessments pertaining to the region.
Hence, simply put, ASEAN centrality is characterised as ASEAN's role in the territorial
security design and regional order to mitigate power dynamics between, and among, outer
powers that have interests in the locale. In any case, the declaration of this centrality draws
strength from a politically firm, decisively sound, and monetarily prosperous, ASEAN. These
will act as areas of strength for ASEAN in implementing its centrality job. However, there are
impediments to such success. ASEAN's cohesion, rationality and ties within ASEAN are
showing breaks (Teodoro 2016). The present challenges are essentially not quite the same as
what the organisation confronted when the ASEAN was established in 1967, accentuated after,
but present since before the COVID-19 pandemic. The rise of middle powers like Australia,
Japan, India and South Korea must now be considered more greatly in the region. Even as these
middle powers seek to institutionalise great powers via ASEAN-led mechanisms (Emmers
2018 42), owing to their continued allegiance to ASEAN centrality, there emerges a power
imbalance within the region which is already struggling to accommodate the demands of
powers.

Furthermore, the Sino-US contention is only deepening separation points inside ASEAN as
countries are compelled to pick sides. The more modest ASEAN member states, due to their
reliance on China, represent a difficult arc in balancing ASEAN centrality. This has been a
long-present problem, witnessed more clearly when in 2012 at the Phnom Penh ASEAN
meeting, ASEAN failed to give a joint statement as a r
permitting any mention of the South China Sea (SCS) debate in it (
Then in 2016, ASEAN foreign ministers issued and retracted a
communique on the SCS (Panda). Nonetheless, we have now seen a clearer position by
ASEAN against China, especially vis-à-vis the SCS, which highlights the changing bilateral
balances between ASEAN states and China. Yet, individual ASEAN States (and even
Initiative (BRI), causing rifts especially as
BRI holds great appeal for countries like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (Ujvari 2019).
Importantly, the rise of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific and Asia such as Quad, AUKUS,
Australia-Japan-India (AJI) and Japan-US-India (JAI) has compromised existing ASEAN
security systems like EAS, ADMM+ and ARF (Ha 2022 11). Concurrently, two significant
ASEAN Dialogue Partners, the US and India, have exited the ambit of recently new financial
gatherings the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Importantly, even as ASEAN attempts to build economic and trade independence via such
large- est trading partner since 2009
(Xinhuanet 2021)
time in a row in 2022 ( .
The ASEAN must build a convergent response to shared threats with its Dialogue partners,
therein providing the basis for a common conceptualisation of its geography. Despite
challenges, there remains immense scope for ASEAN to build itself as a regionally owned and
regionally driven grouping for the Indo-Pacific, moving beyond the Quad. ASEAN enjoys
deeper trust, stronger cultural ties, and grander partnerships as compared to the minilaterals of
US bilaterals begin to imbibe a more rationale outlook which keep economic security and
militarist security independent, the room for ASEAN to grow in the Indo-Pacific only expands.
As US and China focus attention onto Taiwan, ASEAN must build itself as a balancer of peace
in Southeast Asia and beyond; especially one that smaller and developing countries can rely
on. India, Japan and China remain integral partners to the ASEAN framework but keeping in

mind the three countries own multifaceted ties in mind, the Association should be allowed to
build itself as a body for open dialogue aimed for a shared vision of a prosperous, rules-based
Asian Century.

REFERENCES
"ASEAN talks fail over South China Sea dispute", Al-Jazeera, July 13, 2012,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/7/13/asean-talks-fail-over-south-china-sea-dispute.
-Pacific." ASEAN, June 23, 2019,

https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/.
"Brief Status of China-ASEAN Economic and Trade Cooperation in 2021." Embassy of the
People's Republic of China in Negara Brunei Darussalam, January 29, 2022, bn.china-
embassy.gov.cn/eng/zwgx/202201/t20220129_10636735.html
"China-ASEAN trade skyrockets by 85 times in three decades." Xinhuanet, July 30, 2021,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-07/30/c_1310095612.html
2022.", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, February 14, 2022,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202202/t20
220214_10642170.html
"Overview." ASEAN, https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-

community/outward-looking-community/external-relations/.
The White House, March 12,

2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-
leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/#:~:text=1.,free%20and%20open%20Indo-
Pacific.
The White House, December

18, 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-
18-2017-0905.pdf.
- Diplomatic Bluebook 2020,

Affairs, 2020,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2020/html/feature/f0104.html

Ministry of
External Affairs, June 18, 2018, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+Ju
ne+01+2018
Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012,

shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog.
Acharya, Amitav. "ASEAN and the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific." East Asia Forum,
December 29, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/29/asean-and-the-new-
geopolitics-of-the-indo-pacific/.
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 39,

no. 2, 2017, pp. 273 79. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44683769.
Birtles, Bill. "China mocks Australia over 'Indo-Pacific' concept it says will 'dissipate'". ABC
Net, March 8, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-08/china-mocks-australia-over-
indo-pacific-concept/9529548.
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 39,

no. 2, 2017, pp. 252 58. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44683766.
Connelly, Aaron, "The often-

2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/the-often-overlooked-meaning-of-asean-
centrality
Emmers, Ralf. "The Role of Middle Powers in Asian Multilateralism." Asia Policy, vol. 25
no. 4, 2018, p. 42-47. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/asp.2018.0060.
f the Balance of Power Factor within the ASEAN Regional

Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 275 91. JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798546.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/26545299.
- The
Hindu, 31 May 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-pacific-command-
renamed-us-indo-pacific-command/article24043314.ece.
-Pacific Minilaterals to
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27130806.
Híjar- - Rossiter, A., &

Cannon, B. J. (Eds.), Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (pp. 78-93), 2020,
Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003009269
Laksmana, Evan A. " Whose Centrality? ASEAN and the Quad in the Indo-Pacific." Journal
of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Mar/12/2002599864/-1/-1/0/6-
LAKSMANA.PDF/TOC.pdf
-Pacific with Chinese Characterist Politique Etrangère, no. 3

(Fall 2019): 49 61, https://www.cairn-int.info/abstract-E_PE_193_0049--the-indo-pacific-
with-chinese.htm#.
Medcalf, Rory. Indo-

Region. 2020, Manchester University Press.
Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable

Development, no. 13, 2019, pp. 128 35. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48573774.
Panda, Ankit. "ASEAN Foreign Ministers Issue, Then Retract Communique Referencing
South China Sea." The Diplomat, June 15, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/asean-
foreign-ministers-issue-then-retract-communique-referencing-south-china-
sea/#:~:text=In%202012%2C%20at%20their%20Cambodia,in%20the%20South%20China%
20Sea.

-Pacific outlook: An analysis." Observer Research

Foundation, June 28, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/aseans-indo-pacific-
outlook-an-analysis-52542/
Southgate, Laura Political

Science, 73:1, 31-47, 2021, DOI: 10.1080/00323187.2021.1967762
Teodoro, Joycee A. "Distracted ASEAN? Where To For ASEAN Centrality?", Foreign

Services Institute, December 2016, https://fsi.gov.ph/distracted-asean-where-to-for-asean-
centrality/
Egmont Institute,
2019. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21387.
turning back." World Economic Forum, 11 October, 2019,

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/10/has-world-entered-asian-century-what-does-it-
mean/.
CFR.org Editors. "What is ASEAN?" Council on Foreign Relations, 11 April, 2022,

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean#chapter-title-0-2.
Cooperman, Alan et. al. "Global Religious Diversity." PEW Research Center, 4 April, 2014,
https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2014/04/Religious-
Diversity-full-report.pdf
Hutt, David. "What to expect from Europe-ASEAN relations in 2022." DW, 12 January 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/what-to-expect-from-europe-asean-relations-in-2022/a-60396659
"The European Union and ASEAN." Delegation of the European Union to the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 26 July 2022,
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/asean/european-union-and-asean_en?s=47
eat power competition." Observer

Research Foundation, 20 October 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/asean-
centrality-and-the-emerging-great-power-competition/

-Pacific: Shaping a New Regional Security
Order?
Dr Ladhu Ram Choudhary
Abstract
The rapidly evolving power equations, and great power rivalry, in the Indo-Pacific create
unique and demanding conditions for all stakeholders in the region. In this fluid context,
regional and extra-regional actors are expressing competing visions of a regional security
order. As an important regional power, India has shown interest in this process, in order to
help shape the emerging Indo-Pacific security order. However, it faces multiple challenges
in achieving these objectives. It is observably adjusting its internal and external policies to
diplomacy (DD) towards a shared understanding of regional security norms. This article
en by the quest for shaping a new regional security
order which can accommodate visions of both regional and extra-regional stakeholders. The
cooperation mechanisms, surveying debates and declarations pertaining to maritime
-Pacific engagement is gradually evolving to

empower the capacities of the regional partners, institutionalising inter-operability, and
assisting key actors for building cooperative regional security architecture, thereby
stabilising the regional security environment.
Key Words: Indo-Pacific, Defence Diplomacy (DD), Indian Navy, Norm Entrepreneur,
Regional Security Order (RSO)
Introduction
The Indo-Pacific region is gaining prominence with emerging great power rivalry in the region.
The region is also witnessing rise of polarisation, populism, extremism, and backlash politics.
China is exploiting these tendencies and asserts its economic and strategic weight to flout
international law, established practices, and democratic credentials. The rise of
authoritarianism, violent non- ctics are disrupting and
posing challenges to the international liberal order(s). To enhance the survivability of liberal
international order, the international community needs to ensure greater equity in cooperative
mechanism being imagined for the accommodation of smaller states in the region (Colgan
2019). In this pursuit, future international order(s) are bound to get more regionalised and
fragmented (Tang 2018) According to Shiping Tang, this would motivate nation-states to
cooperate for making new governing rules and norms. Consequently, it would cement
55
Order?
(Tang 2018). Fundamentally, a new international order is unfolding through bottom-up

oriented statecraft and engagement to make new rules and governing mechanisms (Tang 2013)
(Tang 2018).
The strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific has a significant bearing on India
the security order in the Indo Pacific region. Indo-Pacific is a geopolitical construct in the
making to connect Indian and Pacific Ocean from the east coast of Africa to the west coast of
America, including several littoral countries. However, the region has contested connotations
that vary from state to state. Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined an Indian conception of
Indo-Pacific as follows:
The Indo-Pacific is a natural region. It is also home to a vast array of global
great oceans in both the geographical and civilisational sense. Inclusiveness, openness
and ASEAN centrality and unity, therefore, lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific.
India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed
the Indo-Pacific Region is, therefore, a positive one (Ministry of External Affairs of
India 2018).
This vision for Indo-Pacific asserts the creation, and sustaining, of a regional security order as
encompasses five key pillars prosperity and security for all, cooperative capacity building for
peace and security through dialogue, building consensual norms and rules for ocean
governance, inclusive freedom of navigation and collective action against defaulters and
trespassers, and enhancing maritime connectivity for sustainable development for Indian
Ocean Region (IOR), and beyond (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2015).

Order?
To achieve this vision for Indo-Pacific, India has reoriented the scale and scope of its DD to
advance defence cooperation, reassure small Island and littoral states, and moderate the
aggressive posturing of revis
regional security order (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2019). Historically, India has
contributed significantly to shape international/regional order(s) through normative values and
- delegitimising imperialism and racial

discrimination, seeking democratisation of the UN, advocating for just and equal nuclear order,
and attempting to devise mechanisms for bridging disparity between the global North and
South (Hall 2017).
the last few decades there
(Hall 2017).
From the above-mentioned theoretical standpoint and context, this paper advances the
visualise and practice the Indian vision of the Indo-Pacific order. Ind
Defence and Security related Capacity Building (DSCB), Defence Aid and Export (DAE),
organising bilateral and multilateral exchanges, and assisting in disasters and crises. The four
roles of DD produce four corresponding regional security norms endure equity, enabled
partners, institutionalised inter-operability, and become a credible responder through pooled
information, respectively. India has been pursuing these to build a just and equal regional
security order based on shared understanding, accommodating aspirations of regional and extra
regional players to institutionalise regional cooperative security architecture.
The article is divided into three sections; the first section focuses on a conceptual foundation
establishing the link between DD, norms entrepreneurship, and regional security orders; the
and, the third section analyses the nature and impact of these norms in building a new regional
security order. It concludes that sustained engagement with Indo-Pacific countries leads to

Order?
inclusive rule-based regional security order through ideating and assisting for mutual security
concerns.
Defence Diplomacy: A Vehicle for Norm Entrepreneurship and Building Regional

Security Order
The DD is an important tool for norms entrepreneurship to build regional security order(s).
These are interrelated concepts as illustrated below in Figure 1. Historically, diplomacy in
general, and DD in particular is a key institution to entrepreneur, bandwagon, and cascade
international/regional norms for seeking stability and shaping order. DD activities reconstitute
security norms and order through changing perceptions of warfare and engaging nations for
disarmament, deterring aggressors, and detecting avenues for employing militaries for
humanitarian assistance (Thomas 2021).
In short, DD facilitates creation and proliferation of new security norms. Thus, as can be
(1998). The process

of crafting these standards of appropriate behaviour is defined as norms entrepreneurship in a
given context (Finnermore and Sikkink 1996).
entrepreneurs can alter people [it implies to any actor, state, organization, etc.] to the existence
(1996). In the context of
international norms dynamics, norm entrepreneurship is defined as deliberative and sustainable
dialogue to create shared social purpose, maintain shared vision, and change intersubjective
understanding, practices, and principles to manage conflicts and enable collective security and
cooperation (Sunstein 1996).
This results in constituting, regulating, and legitimising an order; and, norms infuse collective
consciousness, constraints freedom of action, and streamlines cognitive sense about complex
realities (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In this way, norms play three important functions
through state socialisation regulative, constitutive, and legitimising (Ibid).

Order?
Therefore, the security-seeking-actors [state or regional organisations] use DD to influence

existing structures highlighting salient key security issues and finding solutions through
strategic dialogue (Flockhart 2006, Laksmana 2012). Thus, the shift and transformation of
normative ideas determines the shape of international/regional structures. For instance,
Andrew Carr and Daniel Baldino illustrate how Australia uses DD to frame, institutionalise,
and internalise certain security norms in the Indo-Pacific (2015). Martha Finnemore and
ions, and beliefs about appropriate
(1996).
From this vantage point, joint military exercises and strategic partnerships help in the creation
of security norms for member states. Sustained engagements develop shared vision and
perspectives, shed misunderstandings, and promote mutual trust and confidence on common
strategic and security concerns. In this vein, India uses DD to promote, frame, and legitimise
its vision of security order in the Indo-Pacific. This has proceeded in four phases of norm
entrepreneurship incentivising cooperative partnership, institutionalising mechanisms for it,
socialising participants, and accommodating new members and reforms.
(Jha 2011). P. V. Rao argues that Indo-Pacific states are keen to
(Rao 2022) -
Pacific.
ducation and training to friendly nations,

defence exports, friendly military exchanges and visits, conferences and workshops, and joint
exercises (Jha 2011). It gained prominence in the post-Cold War era with intensified bilateral
and multilateral defence dialogues and cooperation. These activities nurtured cooperative
security thinking and architecture (Dutta 2009). Roby Thomas, a former Indian naval officer,
asserts that DD develops new political language to devise cooperative mechanism between
various political entities (Thomas 2021). Before examining these assertions, it is important to

Order?
understand the competing visions of the Indo-

DD in the region.
Defence
Diplomacy
Regional Security Norms

Order Entreprenuership
Figure 1: Conceptual relationship between variables

(Source:
Indo-Pacific Regional Security Order: Competing Visions
The conception of regional orders is more a result of mental maps than geographical proximity,
cultural commonalty, or formal agreements. It emerges, transforms and submerges with
changing power dynamics. Notwithstanding, regional order necessitates building communities,
forming collective identities, creating peace zones, and functional links to contain conflicts and
preserve peace and prosperity (Rana 1977). It can be interpreted as a set of values, principles,
cultural traits, identities, and ideologies that help in the construction of an order within spatio-
temporal conditions. Thus, the concept of region varies with great powers and emerging
regional powers, as does the concept of regional order (Alagappa 2003).
In this context, the Indo-Pacific is an evolving regional security order in the 21 st century.
- -
South Pacific Cooperation (ASPAC) forum in 1964 to contain China and the USSR (Ministry
of External Affairs of India 2019). Further, it has been a ground for convergence of security
interests of the U.S.-China-Japan-ASEAN in the late 1970s aligning to counter Soviet influence
in the region (Menon 2021). This strategic alignment concluded with the end of the Cold War,

Order?
when priorities of the partners differed, thus pursuing different pathways. Contemporarily, the
growing influence of China has forced its immediate neighbours and great powers to form new
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) along with the String of Pearls Strategy, are a few examples.
nal Security Advisor (NSA) and an acclaimed scholar on China,
Shivshankar Menon, underlines that Chinese assertion in the Indo-Pacific is ambitious, non-
negotiable and unilateral (Menon 2021)
through consultation, be it neighbours or peripheral states like Japan, Indonesia, India,
Vietnam, and South Korea.
regional actors to sustain peace and security within the Asia-Pacific region by constructing
Indo-Pacific as one geostrategic space (Muni 2019). From 2007 onwards, the US devised
collective and multilateral strategies for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific from 2007
onwards (Mohan 2012). Later, President Trump spoke about Indo-Pacific at APEC summit
(2017), with Pacific Command being renamed as Indo-Pacific Command (Ministry of External
Affairs of India 2019)
4th Indian Ocea -Pacific has been tossed around in
(Ministry
of External Affairs of India 2019). Therefore, major stakeholders visualise scope and Indo-
Pacific strategy differently (Roy-Chaudhary and Sullivan de Estrada 2018). Moreover,
differences of nature, rationale and scope in shaping Indo-Pacific RSO vary in content and
intent between the US, China and India, as summarised in Table 1.
Parameters The US China India

Goals Shared Vision Shared Destiny Shared
Understanding
Nature Open and Free Fair and Just Just, equal and
inclusive

Order?
Scope Rule-based Extra-regional Engage and

universal power out accommodate
engagement extra-regional
powers
Ways Collective Engaged Enabling the
capability building multilateralism for regional actors
win-win to all
Means Flexible and Collective security Institutionalised
modernised and common Cooperative
alliances for development security
integrated
deterrence
Table 1: Variation in Conceptualising Indo-Pacific RSO

(Source: -zhong, 2022; Hall, 2020).
-Pacific RSO as key players are making efforts to change

the existing security and strategic norms for building a new security order. The remaining part
-Pacific Regional Security Order: A Historical Overview
India is ideating, observing, and moderating developments in the Indo-Pacific since the
civilisational era (Hall 2022). S. D. Muni and Rahul Mishra (2019) have outlined seven phases
-Pacific engagement Ancient Hindu-Buddhist influences (till 12th Century),
Islamic Interactions (12-16th Century), British rule and freedom movement (1600 to 1947),
Nehruvian era (1947-1964), post-Nehru Phase (1964-1992), Look East Phase (1992-2014), Act
East Phase (2014-present).
Early Indian Thinking and Indo-Pacific RSO
Indi
spheres. The early engagements provided ideational and normative foundations to the Indian

Order?
concept exploring cultural, civilisational, and political linkages. For instance, an Indian
historian, Kalidas Nag, elucidates, India and the Pacific world had evolved together with
fundamental principles of fellowship and universal well-being since many centuries (Ghoshal
1942). Similarly, the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, imagined the concept of
Indo-Pacific regional order as:
The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as a nerve centre of
the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an
important influence there. India will also develop as the centre of economic and
political activity in the Indian Ocean, in Southeast Asia and right up to the Middle East.
Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which
is going to develop rapidly in future (Nehru 2004)
During the late 1940s, Indian maritime thinker, K. M. Panikkar, visualised the need for
According to him, this regional council
general development of political freedom, social consciousness, economic progress and

betterment of livin -Pacific region (Panikkar
1945). In the first of the 20th century, certain Indian political leaders advocated the setting up
2021).
complexities of the Cold War limited its ability to shape the regional order of Asia-Pacific until
the 1990s (Menon 2021).
geopolitical vision conceived different versions of regional orders (Ministry of External Affairs
2022). For instance, Zorawar Daulet Singh (2019)
alternative regional orders, establishing zones of peace and mitigating security dilemma in Asia
and globally; whereas, Indira Gandhi focused on building India-centric regional orders,
restraining and limiting involvement of external powers at sub-regional level.

Order?
Later, India played a key role in institutionalising the Indian Ocean Rim Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in 1997 (Mukherjee 2014). However, India reluctantly
discussed security related i
(Chacko 2014). Along with this, emerging Chinese influence
Indo-Pacific policy and strategy. For instance, variables such as ideational continuity,
pragmatic normative considerations, evolving balancing tactics, changing role conception are
(2003). Moreover, these
civilisational and cultural linkages as well as strategic necessities rationalises the need to
eneur in the region.
In this endeavour, the political leadership and strategic elites play a critical role constituting
four security norms through DD in the Indo-Pacific region. The thrust areas of cooperation are
capacity building through education and training, facilitating defence industry and state
apparatus, and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. The
following sub-sections analyse key roles of DD and its norms entrepreneurship. Table 2
summarises key roles and its normative contribution to shape Indo-Pacific RSO.
Defence and Security Related Capacity Building to Endure Equity
defence capacity building initiatives under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
Programme (ITECP), Special Aid Programme and International Military Training Cooperation
(IMTC), are aimed at building foundations for regional cooperation and construct common
values (Roy-Chaudhary 2019). It ranges from providing defence related consultancy,
education, and training, to defence reforms and institution building. Therefore, it is considered
neighbouring states and the Indian Ocean littoral countries, given its geopolitical positioning,
pool of experts, and professional military institutions and ethos (Ministry of Defense 2022).
deployed to various
Indo-Pacific countries for professional education, training and maritime domain awareness

Order?
(Ministry of External Affairs 2013). Moreover, India has been sending teams of military
experts to establish defence institutions in friendly countries on the Indian Model. The military
training of personnel of Indo-Pacific countries has substantially uplifted their capabilities,
enhanced reliance of these partner countries on India, and reduced dependency levels on China.
Further, India has been providing technical assistance for maintenance and repairs to Russian
aircrafts used by various Indo-Pacific countries since 1994 (Ministry of Defense 2022). Since
then, these countries have been discussing and deepening defence cooperation under various
strategic partnership agreements to receive defence aid and export. The Malaysia India Defence
Cooperation Meeting (MIDCOM) framework is a case in point. Thus, DD recognises the needs
of a country and provides appropriate capacity building measures.
Defence Aid and Export to Enable Partners
-2022
-18 (Nair
2021). Majority of this has been to countries of the Indo-Pacific region. Export orders includes
mostly non-lethal defence products
Helicopter, SU Avionics, Bharati Radio, Coastal Surveillance Systems, Kavach MoD II
Launcher and FCS, Spares for Radar, Electronic System and Light Engineering Mechanical
(Jha 2011).
India has established bilateral defence cooperation with several countries to deepen defence
relations. For instance, India and Singapore have had several defence agreements since 2007
to facilitate use of military facilities on payment basis as well as establishing joint ventures for
defence R&D and production (Philip 2022). India has been exporting arms to Myanmar since
1949. For instance, in 1950, it exported six Dakota airplanes to Myanmar in the wake of its
Karen crisis. They have been undertaking joint operations and sharing intelligence in counter-
-1991, DD has revitalised relations
through sale of military hardware and training for operating sophisticated defence equipment

Order?
2017-2021 (Jha 2011) osting

of its military attaches to Vietnam; this was upgraded by offering defence technologies to
overhaul its defence infrastructure, extending to various domains of military from guerrilla
warfare to naval and air defence. In June 2005, India exported 150 tonnes of warship
components and other spare parts to Vietnam (Sahu 2020). Indian and Vietnamese navies are
coordinating the establishment of satellite imagery stations worth $0.5 million along with use
of civilian nuclear technology.
elations with Indonesia have been revived through various MoUs and
agreements for supplying defence related products, technologies, and joint training and
operations since 1990s (Peri 2018). Since 2007, the two countries have been engaged in
military-to-military dialogues, producing several defence technologies and weapons in critical
areas such as cyber security and network centric warfare.
India has signed logistics support agreements with various countries of the Indo-Pacific
region.1 India also provides line of credit (LoC) for enhancing defence capabilities; for
instance, it has given a $500-million LoC to Bangladesh for enabling its defence acquisition
capabilities. C. Raja Mohan illustrates that India has provided major defence support to the
ASEAN countries to deal with regional conflicts and power confrontation (Mohan 2013).
enabled partners through providing logistics and other operational supports (Chawla 2022).
Bilateral and Multilateral Joint Exercises to Institutionalise Inter-operability
-
Indian Navy harnessed the opportunity by undertaking multilateral confidence-building
measures (Mohan 2012). It has articulated its DD to convince the neighbours about its benign
stature in the Indian Ocean region. More importantly, joint exercises, frequent port calls and
naval exchanges have created transparency, and a shared sense of responsibilities in the Indo-
Pacific (Roche 2019). Joint exercises have advanced operational effectiveness and
interoperability on common regional problems such as piracy, terrorism, and humanitarian

Order?
assistance. These efforts contribute to build bridges with regional countries (Sachar 2003).
Official declassified data reveals that India has institutionalised more than 30 bilateral and
multilateral naval exercises that cover diverse maritime spaces and countries. Figure 2 depicts
exercises spotlights institutionalisation of interoperability as a key objective (Ministry of

Defense 2022). The Malabar exercise with the US Navy and Milan Exercises with other navies
of Southeast Asia and IOR were key initiatives for shaping regional security order. These are
2022).
According to the official statement of the Indian Navy on the 25th edition of the Malabar, the
-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare
drills, and other manoeuvres and tactical exercises Strategic analyst,
Prashanth Param -Pacific
defence cooperation
(The Diplomat 2016)
Mil
enable doctrinal learning in the maritime domain, through professional interaction between
(Ministry of Defense 2022). A formal naval officer, Abhijit Singh, argues that
-traditional
maritime arenas (Singh 2018).
The joint military exer
R. S. Vasan (2022). Commodore Vasan further states, collective aim of these exercises is
e -

Order?
Figure 2:
(Source: Gateway House Research: https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/indo-pacific-
4.png)
The official statement on the 11th

and advanced exercises were undertaken in all three dimensions of naval operations to enhance
compatibility, interoperability, mutual understanding, and maritime cooperation amongst the
(The Hindu 2022). It strengthens regionalisation and interregional cooperation
in the Indo-Pacific region, and underlines the benign role of Indian Navy and its diplomatic
outreach. It also fosters bonds of friendship for security and prosperity. These joint exercises
underline attaining security by cultivating trust and confidence among strategic partners and
friends. As naval power is inherently flexible, versatile, and unobtrusive, joint exercises have
facilitated the emergence of several other bilateral and multilateral engagements as shown in
figure 2.
Assistance in Disasters and Crises to Institutionalise Credibility and Pooled Information
disasters and crises. India has been using naval force for humanitarian assistance through co-

Order?
opting and fostering partnerships. After providing crucial assistance during the 2004 tsunami,
the Indian Navy established a Directorate of Foreign Cooperation in its Naval Headquarter
(NHQ); India considers the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions as
maritime variants of UN Peacekeeping missions (Ministry of External Affairs 2019). The
Indian Navy has undertaken a range of complex Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
(HADR) operations in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond (Ministry of Defense 2022). In this way,
India has devised an alternative rationale for use of naval power and need for maritime
information sharing.
India has built a coastal radar system for surveillance in Maldives, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Seychelles, Indonesia, Myanmar, Mauritius, and Thailand (Bagchi 2019). The information
received from the satellite system is processed at the Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram,
jointly managed by the navy and coast guard, since December 2018. It is a regional cooperative
security initiative in the IOR (Ministry of Defense 2022). India appoints the International
Liaison Officers (ILOs) that facilitates a multitude of cooperative security mechanisms from
capacity enhancement to information sharing in the Indo-Pacific.
(Muralidharan 2019). Since 2015,

the Indian governme - -military
commercial shipping) information sharing agreements to extend its maritime outreach to
institutionalise credible connects (Gopal 2020). Under the SAGAR project, India is proactively
engaging
(Ministry
of Defence 2022).
t has strengthened its partnership
These roles have made the IN a responsible maritime power, since it keeps the threat level low
by preventing and containing emerging threats. Further, this norm entrepreneurship would

Order?
intensify cooperation in critical and emerging technologies sector in the Indo-Pacific as

visualized by QUAD partners. For instance, it helps in technical standardisation, resilient
technology supply chain and figuring out operational feasibilities.
Roles Norms Implications for RSO

Defence and Security Endure equity Consolidating shared
related capacity understanding
building
Defence Aid and Enabled partners Bolstering trust and confidence
Export
Joint exercises Institutionalised Minimising operational
interoperability unpredictability and
uncertainty
Humanitarian Credible first Ensuring favourable and
Assistance and Disaster responder positive maritime environment
relief (HADR) and
pooled information
system
Table 2:
(Source:
Analysing Nature and Impact of Strategic Norms on Regional Security Order
-Pacific had made phenomenal progress from being an

- n the region
(Mohan 2009).
(Menon 2021).
polycentric world order and seek issue-based coalition (Menon 2021).
In this regard, naval power has enormous potential to influence political and security dynamics
properly employed (Booth 1977). With this frame of reference, the Indian Navy has played a

Order?
central role in shaping regional order in the IOR and beyond (Parmar 2020). Years of sustained
engagement through multiple channels have resulted in establishing communication systems,
formalising institutional structures, improved confidence-building measures, and better
understanding on a range of traditional and non-traditional maritime security issues (Devare
2006). For instance, a former Deputy National Security Advisor illustrates how India has
intensified its DD to shape favourable strategic neighbourhood and security order in the Indo-
Pacific and beyond (Gupta 2019).
Cambodia based newspaper, The Phnom Penh Post,

exercises with ASEAN countries have increased significantly in the last thirty years, promoting
solidarity and harmonious security (Sochan 2022). Further, the newspaper report asserts that
the established defence coop
-Pacific (Sochan
2022).
-Pacific countries reiterate its

intentions to strengthen existing bonds for building cooperative security order (Peri 2018).
(Mohan 2012), it does however, facilitate construction of ideational and normative

frameworks to organise interactions and rule-making procedures.
and beyond
through port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, operational exercises and
technical support arrangements, in order to establish a cooperative framework that promotes
mutual understanding and enhances security and stability in (Ministry of Defense
n.d.). The Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS - 2015) joint military exercises contributes
to improve operational skills, to projection of capabilities, to imbibe best practices and
procedures, to enhance doctrinal learning, to promote benign role and to develop mutual trust,
comradeship and respect (Ministry of Defense n.d.).

Order?
Contextually, Malabar, Milan and SAGAR are the architect for organising the Indo-Pacific
RSO in multiple ways. First, these joint exercises and policies contribute towards freedom of
navigations in Strategic Choke points, such as Malacca Strait. Second, these exercises establish
equality between small and large sophisticated navies as they operate on the same platform,
thereby facilitating mutual learning. Third, it has broken maritime isolation of many regional
countries; put differently, it provides avenues for new maritime regionalisation. For example,
during Milan 2006, Myanmar shed its maritime isolation and allowed visits to their ports and
maritime sites. Fourth, it contributes to inventing a common maritime security vocabulary by
sustaining cooperation in the nautical commons.
For instance, one of the major contributions of the Milan is conceptualisation of the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) (2008) (Jha 2011). This platform is instrumental in seeking
regional cohesion on local problems of littoral island countries; therefore, it is a key platform
intentions of the extra-regional powers (Prakash 2010).
Commander David Catterall, incumbent commanding officer of USS Fitzgerald of the Pacific
-minded navies that
sharing a common vision of a more stable, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, to operate and
(Rahmat 2022). Chief of Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Michael
Noonan, who attended the 11th edition of the Milan exercise, asserted that this exercise
vided valuable opportunities to build relationships and mutual understanding among
(Herring 2022).
(Singh 2018).
The theme of DD has evolved over the years, from conventional and customary to complex
and advanced operational exchanges; from promotion of cooperation in maritime security and
humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) to international cooperation in naval
warfare strategy, 2+2 Dialogue, and strategic partnership. Most of these initiatives have
overlapping and reinforcing objectives. This weaves a complex interdependence between the
nation-states based on shared security norms.

Order?
Within the Indian strategic thinking community, even the prospects of a trilateral calibrated
cooperation between India-China-US have been explored to avoid confrontation in the Indo-
Pacific (Mehta 2015). From an Indian perspective, Malabar, Milan and SAGAR are key
security initiatives of India to counter aggressive maritime posturing or unilateral initiatives in
Indo-Pacific, rather than getting conformational and making military alliances.
engage in multilateral military diplomacy in the region.
Put differently, DD enables strategic dialogues to set an agenda for future security governance
framework (such as relevant institutions, laws and codes appropriate to requirements) which
identify an agenda and then establish rules for conduct, therefore creating potential
(Carr 2019). Thus,
-Pacific RSO by cultivating
security norms. Further, these norms building initiatives would enhance the prospects of
-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness
advocated for enhancing maritime security by establishing cooperative norms for maritime
connectivity, preservation of maritime resources, management of natural disasters, legal
settlement of disputes, and legitimising trade facilitating regimes (Government of India 2021).
Despite normative progressions, India is facing certain internal and external limitations to
cascade these regional security norms. On the internal front, India needs to develop
comprehensive conceptualisation of maritime security and its operational aspects (Gopal
2021). It needs to integrate maritime security concerns in its national security discourse and
architecture. A former Indian naval officer argues that India is lagging behind in the
development of a maritime governance system to cope with emerging maritime challenges
(Rao 2021). India needs to adopt adequate legislation to govern federal coastal maritime issues,
distribution of responsibilities of the Union and the nine coastal states, and allocation of
appropriate funds, as well as other laws on maritime issues such as piracy law. Moreover, India

Order?
ng industry also
needs political attention in order for it to reach world-class standards.
On the external front, India must engage the irritants in the Indo-Pacific to build a cooperative
charm offensive in the region.
presence (Kurlantzick 2006). Further, the China-Pakistan nexus limits as well as provokes
(Tarapore 2021). Therefore, to counter Chinese narrative and
material incentives, India needs to upgrade the scale and scope of its DD.
Conclusion
-Pacific DD demonstrates its quest to develop shared values and understanding of
regional security order by building trust and dissipating potential conflicts. Joint exercises
expand strategic choices of the states, between hegemonic, competitive, power-driven China
and benign, cooperative, values-
a norms entrepreneur in the IOR. However, this sustained role can be extended to the Indo-
Pacific through norm bandwagoning and norm cascading. Therefore, India and other allies
need more politico-diplomatic investment to drag poor and authoritarian regimes away from
Chinese influence. Therefore, the proponents of liberal international order must increase their
.

Order?
REFERENCES
Aagappa, Muthiah. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford,
2003; Tan, Seng and Amitav Acharya. Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests
and Regional Order, M. E. Sharpe, NY, 2004
Acharya,
Working Paper no. 4, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, July 1999,
pp, 3 7.
The
Times of India, 21 January 2019, New Delhi.
Booth, Ken. Navies and Foreign Policy. Routledge, London, 1977.

Car -Pacific norm entrepreneur? Australia and
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, vol. 11, no. 1, 2015, pp. 30-47.
C -Pacific: understanding ideational change and continuity

Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 4, 2014,
pp. 433-452
C ,
2022. https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=797&h=Contribution-of-MILAN-
Exercises-to-Indiaandrsquo;s-Outreach.
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 42,

no. 2, 2019, pp. 85-98.
Devare, Sudhir. India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006.
D Cooperation Initiatives in Meeting the Foreign

Journal of Defence Studies, vol. 3, no. 3, 2009, pp. 31-47.

Order?
Flockhart, Trine (2006),

European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006, pp. 89-118.
F
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4, 1998, p. 891.
Ghoshal, Journal of the

Greater India Society, vol. IX, no. 1, 1942, pp. 39 41.
Go
Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime
Foundation of India, vol. 16, no. 2, 2020, p. 5
https://amti.csis.org/indias-conceptualization-of-maritime-
security/#:~:text=India's%20maritime%20strategy%20document%20delineates,time%20role
%20of%20the%20navy.
Government of India/ Press Information Bureau Press Release, English translation of Prime
remarks at the UNSC High-Level Open Debate on Maritime Security:
A Case For International (August 9, 2021), 09 August 2021, available
at https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PMO=3&PRID=1744170, and
UNSC, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2021/15 dated 09 August
2021, available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/220/62/PDF/N2122062.pdf?OpenElement
https://www.vifindia.org/directorremarks/2019/september/30/talk-on-role-of-defence-
diplomacy-in-shaping-favourable-strategic-neighbourhood.

Order?
- Security
Challenges, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 27-31; Yi-
1 June 2022,
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/21/a-vision-of-regional-order-by-china-security-
development-and-prosperity/.
Ha International Affairs, vol. 93, no.

1, 2017, pp. 113-131.
H Defence News, 10 March

2022, https://news.defence.gov.au/international/navy-unites-partners-exercise-milan.
I
https://indiannavy.nic.in/content/first-training-squadron
I
https://indiannavy.nic.in/operations/11.
I
https://indiannavy.nic.in/content/overseas-operations
Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence ( Indian

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/ifc-ior/about-us.html.
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Docum
ent_25Jan16.pdf.
th
In Edition of India-Indonesia
https://indiannavy.nic.in/content/35th-edition-india-indonesia-
coordinated-patrol-1.

Order?
Jh Journal of Defence
Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, 2011, p. 47.
Kaushik,
The Indian Express, 31 August 2021
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/malabar-exercise-of-quad-nations-why-it-matters-
to-india-7472058/
K Current History,
September 2006, 270-276,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Kurlantzick_SoutheastAsia_China.pdf. Accessed 14 July
2022.
L Defence
Asian Security, vol. 8, no. 3, 2012, pp. 251-270.
Malhotra, Aditi. India in the Indo-

Towards Southeast and East Asia. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Toronto, 2022.
Mehta,
Claibrated Cooperation USA-China- Naval War College Journal, Vol. 27, 2015,
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/themes/indiannavy/images/pdf/resources/Article_
12.pdf.
Menon, Shivshankar. India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present. Penguin, New Delhi,
2021, p. 163.
Ministry of External Affairs.

Media Center, 01 June 2018, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_Jun
e_01_2018. Accessed 2 July 2022.

Order?
Media Center, 03 Sept. 2019, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-

Statements.htm?dtl/31915.
Mi
Media Center, 12 March 2015, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-
Statements.htmdtl/24912/Prime_Ministers_Remarks_at_the_Commissioning_of_Offshore_P
atrol_Vessel_OPV_Barracuda_in_Mauritius_March_12_2015.
M Media
Center, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IORA_new.pdf.
M -
https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-Malaysia_Relations.pdf.
M https://www.ddpmod.gov.in/defence-
exports.
Ministry of De -national exercise Milan-

February 2022,
M -
of Advantage, A Report of ICRIER Wadhwani Chair in India US Policy Studies, ICRIER:
New Delhi, Aug 2013, pp 45-46.
Mohan, C. Raja. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Carnegie

Endowment, Washington DC, P. 217. 2012.
M
ISAS Working Paper, No. 81, 11 Aug. 2009
M Policy Brief,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Aug 2014. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/PB_140903_India-Net-Security.pdf.

Order?
Muni, S. D. and Rahul Mishra.

Policy, Sage, New Delhi, 2019.
M Indian Defence
Review, vol. 34, no. 3, July-September 2019, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-
indian-navy-as-an-instrument-of-foreign-policy/.
N
6, 2021, p. 28-29, https://www.aeromag.in/Magazines/9536290067.pdf. Accessed 31 July
2022.
Nehru, Jawaharlal. The Discovery of India. 2004 ed., Penguin Random House, New Delhi.
Digital page -677.
Pa Pacific Affairs, vol. 18,

no. 3, 1945, p. 251
-Pacific
The Diplomat, 12 June 2016 https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-malabar-
exercise-an-emerging-platform-for-indo-pacific-cooperation/.
P
the Indo- https://maritimeindia.org/towards-shaping-a-favourable-
and-positive-maritime-environment-in-the-indo-pacific/#_ftn4
Pa
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CL No. 622, October-
December 2020, https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/the-indian-navys-maritime-
outlook-the-path-walked-since-independence/.

Order?
Peri, - The Hindu, 10 June 2018,

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/rise-in-india-asean-naval-
games/article24130015.ece
P The Print, 8 July 2022,

https://theprint.in/defence/indias-defence-exports-touch-rs-13000-cr-private-sector-leads-
way-with-aerospace-manufacturing/1031096/.
Pr The Indian Express, 18 May 2010,

https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/from-sea-to-shining-sea/. Accessed 18 July
2022.
-Pacif
International Affairs, vol. 96, no. 1, 2020, pp. 75-93
- Janes, 1 March 2022,

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-navy-debuts-at-india-led-exercise-milan
Rao, P. V. . Routledge, New Delhi,

2022.
R The WEEK, 20 April, 2021,

https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2021/04/20/opinion-india-finally-gets-a-maritime-
security-coordinator.html.
R
International Studies, December 1977, P. 493
Roche, Elizabeth.
Mint, 18 April 2019, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/joint-navy-exercises-bolster-
india-s-role-as-regional-security-provider-1555526667931.html. Accessed 27 July 2022.

Order?
Sa - IPCS,
22 July 2020 http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5708. Accessed 16 July,
2022.
ORF Commentaries, 2018,

https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-has-no-reason-to-be-angry-about-indias-naval-
exercise-milan-beijing-still-controls-the-region/
Singh, Zorawar Daulet. e Cold

War, Oxford, 2019, pp. 21-22.
So - The Phnom
Penh Post, 18 May 2022, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national-politics/asean-india-
naval-exercise-planned-promote-solidarity. Accessed 31 July 2022.
S Columbia Law Review, vol. 96, no. 4,

1996, p. 909.
Roy- -
Survival, vol. 60, no. 3, 2018, pp. 181-194.
Roy-Chaudhary, Rahul, . Foreign

Service Institute, New Delhi.
Sa
Strategic Analysis, vol. XXVII, no. 3, July-Sept 2003,
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_jul03/sa_jul03sab01.html#txt5 accessed 31 July
2022.
S The Hindu,
06 March 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/multilateral-naval-exercise-milan-
concludes-in-visakhapatnam/article65193406.ece. Accessed 16 July 2022.

Order?
The Washington Quarterly, vol. 41,

no. 4, 2018, pp. 117-131
T
Lowy Institute, May 6, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/crisis-
after-crisis-how-ladakh-will-shape-india-s-competition-china.
Thomas, Roby. Indian Defence Diplomacy: A Handbook. KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2021.
Vasan, R. S. . Vasan, Chennai, July 26, 2022.

Prospects for Minilateralism in the Western Indian Ocean
Gulshan Sachdeva
Abstract
Traditionally, New Delhi has cooperated with the East and South African countries
bordering the Indian Ocean within the broader framework of South-South Cooperation. Now
within the Indo- s
strategic engagement with the countries of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) has increased.
This has been reflected through commercial and development interactions and maritime
security cooperation. The India- Africa
policy has further sharpened these engagements.
multilateral engagements and explores scope for a minilaterals involving India, a few of its
major strategic partners and some key countries from the region. The paper argues that
existing triangular development cooperation interactions in the WIO could be extended to
trade and commerce, infrastructure connectivity and maritime cooperation in the form of
possible minilaterals.
Key Words: Indo-Pacific, minilateralism, Western Indian Ocean
Introduction
Due to the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean within the context of contemporary Indo-
(WIO) region has emerged as an important area of engagement for India. Many other powers
including China are also active in the region. Most definitions of the WIO region include
Comoros, French Indian Ocean territories (Mayotte and Reunion), Kenya, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Mauritius, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa and Tanzania.
Traditionally, India has dealt with countries in the WIO region mainly bilaterally within the
broader policy of South-South Cooperation (SSC). More recent ties could also be explained
within the context of India-Africa Forum Summits and ten guiding principles of Prime Minister
Rim Association (IORA). New Delhi has also cooperated with major powers like South Africa
within Group of 20 (G20), Brazil- Russia- India- China-South Africa (BRICS), and India-
Brazil-South Africa (IBSA). Maldives is a member of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC). As India occupies a key position in the Indian Ocean, it is
keen to take more maritime responsibilities in the WIO. The region is vulnerable due to piracy,
radicalisation and terrorism. Through maritime cooperation, New Delhi is also playing an
important role in shaping the maritime security architecture in the WIO. This is done through
84
conducting anti-piracy patrols, bilateral maritime cooperation and coordination with
the WIO countries is also through capacity building progarmmes, and lines of credit through
development cooperation activities. In recent years, many development projects are also being
implemented through triangular cooperation with the United Kingdom, United States and
Japan. With the United States, India is working in Kenya and Mozambique. A strong
partnership is emerging with the United Kingdom in Kenya and Tanzania. With Japan, a broad
understanding is developing through implementation of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
(AAGC). As there is a limited engagement in the WIO region through minilateralism so
far, the paper looks at possibilities of minilateral cooperation in specific areas of action.
Contextualising WIO Region through historic India-Africa Ties and Contemporary

Indo-Pacific Narrative
In recent years, the WIO region has become important for Indian strategic calculations. Its
significance, however, needs to be situated within the broader India-Africa relations and
contemporary narrative on the Indo-Pacific. The interplay of these two factors will help us
understand current dynamics and possible new alignments in terms of new regional or
between India and Africa are well documented (Sharma, 2007; Taylor, 2012). storical
role against colonialism, neo-colonialism and apartheid also strengthened these bonds. Over
decades, both have shared a common understanding on a large number of crucial global issues.
In most cases, both have been on the same side in global negotiations to make the international
economic order more equitable and friendly to the countries from the South. In the last three
decades, particularly after the end of the Cold War, both India and Africa have changed
significantly. Still, the importance of both for each other has not declined. Both have young
populations, growing economies and a lot of development experiences to share. To a large
extent, India-Africa economic developments in the last few decades could be incorporated
within the broader concept of South-South Cooperation (SSC).
Compared to earlier decades, growth performance in Africa in the last two decades has been
remarkable. In the 1990s, average economic growth in Africa was slower than global growth
and much lower than other developing countries. For the period between 2001 and 2008,
growth in Africa accelerated. It was about six per cent per year, which was very close to fast

growing developing countries in Asia and elsewhere. As a result of many factors including
declining global growth and volatility in primary product prices, African growth for the period
since 2009 has come down to about 3 percent per year. Although lower than India and other
Asian developing countries, this is still slightly higher than the average global growth. Overall,
African growth performance in the last twenty years illustrate huge economic potential in the
coming years. To a significant extent growth in the first decade of twentieth century was
resulted from high prices of primary products. However, many other sectors including
wholesale and retail trade, telecommunications, financial services, construction etc. played an
important role. The resurgent Africa has expressed its ambition through Agenda 2063 and its
15 flagship projects.
Africa with its recent growth history, young population and plenty of success stories in
agriculture, telecommunications, consumer markets, banking etc is much more confident today
than any time in the recent past. Many of the fastest growing economies of the world are in
Africa. When there are clear trends towards protectionism in the world, Africa has taken a
bold step in the opposite direction by launching the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) in 2019. As almost every country in the continent is a member, this will be the
largest free trade area in the world by number of countries. The idea is to create an Africa-wide
market for goods and services as well as promotion of movement of capital and people
(Hartzenberg, 2019). Despite a large number of regional economic groupings within Africa,
intra-regional trade is low. It is hoped that AfCFTA will promote higher trade and economies
of scale for African companies. Within these changing dynamics, a new development
partnership is being built between India and Africa. It is based on solid historical closeness as
well as new economic dynamism in both Africa and India.
As a result of economic changes in Africa and India, bilateral trade has increased from about
$ 5.5 billion in 2001-02 to about $70 billion in 2018-19. It increased to about $52 billion in
2010-11 and peaked at about $72 billion in 2014-15. This improvement in trade was also
in 2002. This was an initiative to improve trade and investment ties with Africa. Similarly, the
India-Africa Summit initiative was started in 2008. In addition, the Duty Free Tariff
Preferences (DFTP) initiative for Least Developing Countries (LDCs) by the Indian
government also might have helped bilateral trade. The scheme is now extended to 98% of
The trade

with Africa is still concentrated on a limited number of products. About three-fourth of African
exports to India are natural resources and primary commodities. Similarly about 40% of Indian
exports are pharmaceuticals and refined petroleum products (Afreximbank and Exim India,
2018). As a result of global slowdown, bilateral trade came down to $52 billion in 2016-17. It
improved again and reached about $70 billion in 2018-19 ( figure 1).
Figure 1: India-Africa Trade, 2001-02 to 2018-19 (US$ billions)
80
71.5 69.7
70
62.7
60
51.6 51.9
50
40
30
20
11.9
10 5.5
0
2001-02 2005-06 2010-11 2014-15 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Database
The coastal Eastern and Southern African countries of the WIO region are becoming important
trade partners. The Western Africa has emerged as a major trading partner of India, mainly
because of petroleum imports from Nigeria and gold from other countries. In the Southern
region (including South African Customs Union (SACU) and other countries, South Africa is
a major market for India. Trade with Eastern Africa has also improved. Major exports are
pharmaceuticals, petroleum products and vehicles. Imports include coal, metals, and
vegetables. Main trading partners from the region include Tanzania, Mozambique, Kenya,
Ethiopia and Mauritius (Sachdeva, 2020).

vernment of India Database
Apart from trade, investment linkages with Africa are also becoming stronger. And within
India-Africa economic relations, the WIO region is playing a key role. Although Indian policy
makers have emphasized success in this area at every forum, the real situation is rather
2019). These figures are correct but bulk of these investments are made in the WION region,
particularly in Mauritius. As Mauritius is a tax haven, a large part of this money is round tripped
back to India (Chakrabarty, 2018). Between 2012 and 2016, Mauritius accounted for about
86% of total Indian FDI to Africa. Excluding Mauritius, only a few African countries have
received large investments from a limited number of big public or private companies. Second
major recipient is another WIO nation, Mozambique. This is due to large public sector
investments by India in the oil, gas and coal sector. Third important recipient is South Africa,
another country from WIO. This is due to investments made by TATA group of companies in
the hotel industry, steel, IT sector and consumer goods (Chaudhry, Tomar and Joshi, 2018).
While looking at two-way investments from Africa, technically the WIO region is a major
top investor with $160 billion investment. This was 26% of total investments made in India
during this period. Other important investors from the WIO were South Africa (about $590

million), Seychelles ( $218 million), Mozambique ( about $16 million) (MOCI, 2022). So, the
India-Africa investment story is basically India-WIO region investment story.
Although the concept of Indo-Pacific is still evolving, it has already become a powerful
narrative in the last few years. Diplomatically, countries are trying to define its relevance in
various ways. Depending on the national interests and strategic priorities countries are
defining geographical boundaries of the Indo Pacific. However, the centrality of that narrative
is to build some coalitions, forums, platforms which can somehow balance the impact of rising
and assertive China. And within this narrative, India becomes important. First, because of its
important role in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is a key component of the Indo Pacific
construct and India plays an important role in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, compared to other
countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) or trilateral security pact between
Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS), India is not an alliance partner of the United States.
So far, the major focus of the narrative has been towards East and Southeast Asia, perhaps
mainly because of concentration of actions to rebalance China. However, for India, the WIO
part of the Indo-Pacific narrative is equally important. Through various strategies and
announcements, Indian policy makers are also giving significant attention to the WIO part of
the Indo-Pacific story.
Infrastructure Connectivity
Although the Indo-Pacific narrative has been dominated by strategic arrangements, the real
competition is emerging in connectivity strategies. Despite the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) dominating discussions in the last few years, there are many other important initiatives
which are at different stages of implementation. Apart from the ASEAN connectivity plan,
Japan, India, South Korea and other countries have their own designs. The EU announced its
own Europe-Asia connectivity and Global Gateway strategy. The Quad nations have formed
their own infrastructure partnership. The G7 and G20 have also outlined their principles for
sustainable connectivity. The frameworks of these plans differ in terms of their origin,
priorities, resource commitments and partnerships. All have strong Indo-Pacific or BRI
dimensions.
Every major infrastructure can be looked at from various perspectives. The developmental
aspect clearly highlights the economic benefit of the project for participating countries.

Historically, many regional infrastructure projects within their regional cooperation or regional
integration frameworks in Europe and Asia were primarily advocated for their economic
benefits. In the last two decades, however, many of the large infrastructural projects of
strategies have also been monitored very closely through the prism of geopolitics. This has
oad Strategy (NSRS), Russian
dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China led BRI. Similarly, the BRI has been
looked at primarily from a geopolitical perspective by India, United States and some other
countries. As Russia-China bonhomie has grown, both are trying to integrate their
infrastructure strategies. Similarly, the EU, Japan and the United States are trying to build
connectivity partnerships with like-minded countries, either bilaterally or through G7
grouping.
Within the WIO region, geopolitics of maritime connectivity is becoming a major concern,
particularly for India. The importance of the Indian Ocean for China has increased significantly
in recent years due to its expanding trade, energy transport and investments. Sea lanes of
communication running through Malacca Strait, Persian Gulf, Arabian sea, Indian Ocean and
South China Sea are important for China for its increasing energy and raw material needs.
Indian Ocean littorals are also becoming important due to increasing investments by Chinese
companies in the region as well as Chinese citizens living and working in these areas (US China
Commission, 2016). For China, maritime expansion is also part of its strategy of economic
integration of different regions of the Indo-Pacific with the Chinese economy ( Sachdeva
2021). As a result, China has started increasing its footprint in the Indian Ocean. Within South
and Southeast Asia it has made investments in strategic ports. However, it is not just South
-thirds of the w
China is also dispatching an increasing
number of surface warships and submarines to the Indian Ocean region.
As commercial ports could be converted

South Asia has already troubled many Indian policy makers and analysts (Suri, 2017). India
considers itself as a leading player in the Indian Ocean and at present has a considerable
advantage over China. Although a peaceful maritime environment in the WIO region is
important for China for its economic expansion, this area may see increasing competition from
India and others. China, however, would like to project these investments as purely

commercial ventures and perhaps would welcome further Indian investments in WIO ports
which will improve its own connectivity with the region.
Chinese maritime connectivity challenges have pushed India to have its own strategy. It has
s in the Indian Ocean by acquiring privileged access to bases in
the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Oman, and Iran; conduct joint naval
exercises in the East and South China Seas; sign logistics exchange agreements with the United
States, Singapore, and France to gain access to naval bases in the Indo-Pacific, and launch an
In addition, it has upgraded its
development cooperation programs with the littorals, and to revive old cultural trade routes in
the Indian Ocean, New Delhi also announced its own doctrine called SAGAR (Security and
Growth for All in the Region).
Although many European countries, US and Japan were always heavily involved in
infrastructure projects financing, the BRI has pushed many geopolitical worries. Dual use of
infrastructure projects is always possible. Any port or airport can be used both for business as
well as military purposes. These worries have also led to competing infrastructure strategies.
The increasing profile of the BRI is pushing many promoters of these plans in the Indo-Pacific
to work out convergence strategies based on transparent behaviour, sustainable financing and
quality infrastructure. Japan is now partnering with the EU and India for sustainable
connectivity and Asia-Africa Growth Corridor respectively. It has also agreed to work with the
US and Australia. India has established a connectivity partnership with the EU.
As a response to the BRI, many official statements and speeches from the Quad nations as well
as from the EU refer to global norms, financial responsibility, transparency, debt burdens,
environmental sustainability and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity etc (MEA,
2017). These are all indirect references to Chinese infrastructure projects in the region. These
issues are now routinely mentioned at all bilateral and multilateral meetings including at the
G7 and G20. The EU has also started raising some of these concerns during its global
engagements and has also come out with its own connectivity and Indo-Pacific strategies.
The Quad nations have been working together or separately to pursue their connectivity

assistance, empowering regional partners with evaluative tools, and will promote sustainable
they have also emphasized the
supporting open, fair, and transparent lending practices in line with
international rules and standards for major creditor countries, including on debt sustainability
he White
House, 2021).
synchronised with infrastructure connectivity. As outlined by Mishra (2019), India have

developed various cooperation mechanisms with the WIO countries. These include Combined
Maritime Forces (CMF), Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), Djibouti
Code of Conduct (DCoC), and Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in
Madagascar. Similarly, bilaterally, India has developed significant cooperation maritime
issues. The cooperation is taking place in the forms of, conducting anti-piracy patrol, training
of naval personnel, defence officers, and civilian personnel engaged in maritime
administration, conducting Hydrographic Surveys and WIO nations developing basic
capabilities in hydrography etc. Due to limited resource allocation, time overruns and weak
coordination, the impact has been limited. (for details see Mishra 2019). Moreover, India also
collaborates with WIO nations through Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian
Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Since Chinese strategic activities in the region are also
supported by its broader BRI projects, India also needs to link these activities with
infrastructure connectivity projects. Since maritime infrastructure financing may involve
significant resources, India may need to find like-minded partners to implement some of these
projects in the WIO region.
The UK-India Roadmap 2030 ( MEA 2021) has talked about expl
connectivity between India and the UK and seek synergies between our cooperation on
connectivity projects with third countries including in the Indo-
busy negotiating bilateral trade agreement at the moment, no major connectivity initiative in
any third country has been announced so far. The WIO region is certainly one area where India
and the UK can work together in maritime connectivity or related fields. Similarly, in the
context of Indo-Pacifi
develop new partnerships in various formats with like-minded countries in the region and

implementation of the India-

-
by Prime Minister Modi in 2019. Seven pillars of the IPOI include maritime security; maritime
ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction
and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade connectivity and
maritime transport (MEA 2020).
India-WIO Development Partnership
Today development partnership with African countries occupies an important position in

Indian strategy and its external economic policy. To some extent this might have been
influenced by the growing Chinese profile in the region. Indian development partnership is
clearly manifested through the institutional mechanisms built over decades as well as specific
neighbourhood and Africa broadly appear within the framework of South -South
Cooperation (SSC). The Indian development activities abroad broadly include lines of credit
(LOCs), capacity-building programmes and grant assistance projects. By March 2020, the
EXIM Bank had signed 288 LOCs covering more than sixty countries in Africa, Asia, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Latin America, with credit commitments of
around US$ 29.6 billion (India Exim Bank, 2019). A large number of these LOCs are with
African countries. Within the WIO region, the Indian government has provided LOCs worth
about US$ 5 billion so far. Major LOC recipient countries in the WIO region include Maldives
($ 1330 million), Tanzania ($1115 million) Mauritius ( $954 million), Mozambique ($772
million) Kenya ( $206 million), Comoros ($ 42 million) and Seychelles ($16 million) (Exim
Bank Database, nd). Another $ 500 million LOCs are under negotiation. These include a $300
million metro project in Mauritius, 100 million defence related projects in Madagascar and
$100 million for upgradation projects in Maldives. In recent years, India has also initiated
triangular cooperation with other partners in Africa. In partnership with the US, India has
agreed to work jointly in agriculture related projects in Botswana, DR Congo, Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (USAID, n.d.).
With Japan, India has initiated an infrastructural project called Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
(AAGC). The AAGC will work through development cooperation projects, quality
infrastructure and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacities and people to people

partnership. The project will be aligned with development priorities of African countries. The
priority projects will be in the areas of health and pharmaceuticals, agriculture, disaster
management and skill development and connectivity . Similar triangular projects are also being
explored with the EU. Some have argued that individual member states of the EU like Germany
could also work with India on triangular projects in Africa (Wagner, 2019).
Traditionally, India used to be very important recipient of British aid. This relationship is
totally transformed now. In the last two decades, this relationship has grown into global
partnerships for development, particularly in Africa. In recent years, the UK government
agencies have supported many of the triangular projects implemented through the Indian
government, civil society or the private sector. To institutionalise many of these actions, the
Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and DFID
Some of the major initiatives include
DFID-TERI Partnership ( 2011-15), Knowledge Partnership Programme ( 2012-16), Strategic
Health and Nutrition Partnership ( 2013-18), Innovative Ventures and Technologies for
Development ( 2013-19), Global Research Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security, Health
& Women ( 2013-20), Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa (SITA Africa, 2014-
2020). Some of these projects were also implemented in the WIO region including in Kenya
and Tanzania ( For details see Mittal, 2020 and Paulo 2018).
Possible Minilateralism in the WIO
The post-pandemic and post-Ukraine war world may be a different world altogether. The world
order was already in transition. These two developments have accelerated this change. The
western world order under the leadership of the United States is already weakened. China is
expanding and asserting. Many European nations are talking about strategic autonomy.
However, suspicions about Beijing are also growing. Multilateral institutions including the
WHO, WTO and the UN, have proved less effective during the pandemic, trade tensions and
Ukraine war. Due to limited effectiveness of regional and multilateral institutions, there has
been a rise of minilateral institutions. These smaller groups have advantage over broader
regional and multilateral forums due to limited like-minded membership and focussed agenda
( see Singh and Teo 2020 ) Similar to many other countries, India has also started using
minilateral engagements as part of its foreign policy tools.

The Indo-Pacific region has seen establishment of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

(Quad); Australia-France-India trilateral ministerial dialogue; Australia, India and Indonesia
trilateral; Malabar naval exercisers; and the Australia, UK and the USA (AUKUS). These
minilaterals deal not just with security related matters but also issues like climate change,
supply chain resilience, infrastructure, critical technologies and health issues (Rajagopalan
2021). This has been clearly the case with the Quad. In an attempt to rebalance
assertive rise, the focus of these groupings has been mainly East and South East Asia. There is
economic interests are clearly linked with the WIO region, it has improved its bilateral
engagements significantly. It also has a strong strategic partnership with South Africa. Besides,
wherever possible, it has aligned its activities with multilateral agencies. Due to strong Chinese
and Russian presence, objectives of BRICS grouping may be entirely different from the
objectives of the Indo-Pacific narrative. The IBSA grouping works within the broader context
of South-South Cooperation but not directed towards any particular region of the world.
Since the WIO region is becoming important, India may like to work with like-minded partners
-
alignment format, it is ready to work with different sets of players in various parts of the
world. Going by the activities of recent years, there is a potential to work for a few minilaterls
involving India, France, South Africa, Mauritius, Maldives, Kenya, Tanzania, Japan, UK and
the USA.
A large number of bilateral and multilateral activities in the area of maritime security are
already happening in the WIO region. There is already certain bilateral and multilateral
institutional framework in operation in the area of counter piracy operations. It may not be easy
to formulate a superior minilateral format say involving India, UK, France and one or two key
countries like Somalia. However, in case of maritime capacity building initiative, minilataral
format could provide some extra benefits.
The other area in which a minilateral setting could be useful is development cooperation. So
far, most of the development assistance programmes are either bilateral or triangular
cooperation in which normally a country from the North partners with a Southern country to
implement projects in a developing country. As mentioned earlier, India has already started

this kind of cooperation with the UK and the USA in some of the countries in the WIO. An
imaginative minilateral involving say India, South Africa, UK, France as well as specific WIO
courtiers could be formed. This will be an interesting combination of countries working
together to achieve larger SDG goals in the WIO. India and the UK have already established a
strong cooperation in this area including in some of the countries in the WIO.
Infrastructure connectivity minilateral could be another useful way of countries working

together in the WIO. In the emerging Indo-Pacific economic architecture, almost every
important country in the region has its own connectivity plans, either individually or part of
multilateral frameworks. Within the changing geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region,
these connectivity strategies have also become an important part of national or regional
strategies. This kind of initiative could also provide some alternatives to the WIO countries
which are attracted by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Broadly India has been working
with the European Union through connectivity partnership and with Japan through Asia Africa
Growth Corridor. The Quad nations have formed their own infrastructure partnership. The G7
and G20 have also outlined their principles for sustainable connectivity. Within the WIO an
imaginative infrastructure minilateral could be formed between India, UK, France, Mauritius,
Maldives etc. Due to the geographical location within the Indian Ocean, immediate focus is
likely to ports, special economic zones and other maritime infrastructure.
India, UK and some of the WIO countries could also concentrate on health and education
matters. India and UK have successfully collaborated in vaccine development and both have
provided vaccines to many of the countries in the region. A large number of students from the
WIO countries are also attracted towards the UK and India.
Many of the issues discussed above are cross cutting issues. For example development
cooperation, infrastructure connectivity and maritime capacity building cannot be discussed in
isolation. So it might be useful to identify potential countries and many of these issues could
be put together on the minilateral agenda. Overall, the minilaterals in the WIO could be formed
in three different ways. In the first category India and the UK could work out specific issues
with key countries where they have strong historical linkages like Kenya, Maldives, Mauritius
and South Africa. In the second category India, UK and France could work out within a more
extended circle. A larger minilateral for a particular sector like infrastructure connectivity
could also be worked with other like-minded countries like Japan and the USA.

Conclusion
Within the Indo-

WIO region has emerged as an important area of strategic engagement for New Delhi.
Historically, India has dealt with the East and South African countries bordering the Indian
Ocean within the broader framework of South-South Cooperation. The India-Africa summit
of these interactions have happened through IORA, G20, BRICS, IBSA and SAARC. As
maritime security cooperation has become an important area of concern, India has upgraded
bilateral maritime cooperation with almost all WIO countries and also started participating in
multilateral initiatives. It has also developed cooperation mechanism with CMF, CGPCS,
DCoC and RMIFC. Similar to the Southeast and East Asia part of the Indo-Pacific, there is
also a need to work out for some minilateral arrangements in specific areas viz. maritime
security cooperation, physical infrastructure, development cooperation and health and people
contacts. Most of these issues are identified by India-UK Roadmap 2030 as well as under
India-France Roadmap on the Blue Economy and Ocean Governance. India and UK are already
working together in the area of development cooperation through triangular cooperation in
some of the countries in the WIO region. By bringing maritime security and infrastructure
connectivity into India-UK cooperation in the WIO region, the scope can be widened. While
working with South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania, this could become an important
minilateral in the WIO region of the Indo-Pacific. The scope can be further widened with
expanding partnership to France and Japan. Coming of these powers together will provide
proper legitimacy, resources and geopolitical backing to the grouping.

REFERENCES
Afreximbank [The African Export-Import Bank] and Exim India [Export Import Bank of
India]. Deepening South-
Investment. Cairo: Afreximbank, 2018.
Chakrabarty, Malancha. Indian Investments in Africa: Scale, Trends, and Policy

Recommendations. ORF Occasional Paper No 142. New Delhi: Observer Research
Foundation, 2018.
Chaudhry, Divya, Priyanka Tomar and Pallavi Joshi. Deconstructing Indian Overseas Foreign
Direct Investments: Historical & Contemporary Trends. Oxfam Discussion Papers, 2018,
Retrieved from https://icrier.org/pdf/Deconstructing_Indian_Overseas_FDI.pdf
What is Expected
https://www.wita.org/blogs/the-african-continental-free-trade-area-agreement-what-is-
expected-of-ldcs-in-terms-of-trade-liberalisation/
- Inside Policy, Part-1,

16 March 2018, Retrieved from https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/china-india-nautical-games-
indian-ocean-part-one-mohan-malik-inside-policy/
esperson's Response to a Query on

Retrieved from
https://mea.gov.in/media-
briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of
+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum
MEA [Ministry -
2020, Retrieved from https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf

MEA [Ministry of E -UK Future Relations

Launched during India- Retrieved from
https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/33838/Roadmap+2030+for+IndiaUK+future+relations+launched+during
+IndiaUK+Virtual+Summit+4+May+2021
MEA [Ministry of External Affairs]of India. France Joint Statement during the Visit
Retrieved from https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/35279/IndiaFrance_Joint_Statement_during_the_Visit_of_Prime_Ministe
r_to_France
MEA [Ministry of Extern -Japan Summit Joint Statement

Partnership for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Post-
Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/34991/IndiaJapan+Summit+Joint+Statement+Partnership+for+a+Peacefu
l+Stable+and+Prosperous+PostCOVID+World
Mishra, Abhishek. India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean,
ORF Occasional Paper No 221. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2019.
Mittal, Prachi.
Comparative Analysis, ORF Issue Brief No 337. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation,
2020.
rnment of
India. June 2022, Retrieved
from https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/FDI_Factsheet_June_2022.pdf
Paulo, Sebastian. India as a Partner in Triangular Development Cooperation: Prospects for

the India-UK Partnership for Global Development, ORF Working Paper. New Delhi: Observer
Research Foundation, 2018.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. Explaining the Rise of Minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific, ORF
Issue Brief No 490, New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2021.
Sachdeva, Gulshan. India-Africa Development Partnership Dynamics, FIDC Discussion Paper

#3, New Delhi: FIDC/RIS, 2020.
Grand Strategy: A Roadmap to Global Power, New York: NYU Press, pp 146-173. 2021.
South African Journal

of International Affairs, vol 4, no. 2, 2007, pp.13-20.
Singh, Bhubhindar and Sarah Teo, eds. Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN, Routledge. 2020.
Suri, Gopal.
, New Delhi: Vivekanand International Foundation, Pentagon Press, 2017.
International Affairs, vol. 88, no. 4, 2012, pp. 779-798.
The White House. Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, 24 September 2021, Retrieved from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-
from-quad-leaders/
Tirumurti , T. S. Remarks by T.S. Tirumurti, Secretary (ER) at Africa Day Roundtable

Discussion in IDSA, New Delhi, 29 May 2019, Retrieved
from https://idsa.in/keyspeeches/remarks-shri-ts-tirumurti-india-africa-partnership
US China Commission. US-China Economic & Security Review Commission 2016 Report to
the Congress, Washington: US Government Publishing House, 2016.
Wagner, Christian. . SWP Research Paper No. 9. Berlin: German Institute

for International and Security Affairs, 2019.

Indo-Pacific: Contemporary Understanding of the Strategic System and its Attributes
Shrey Khanna
Abstract
The transformation of the Asian geostrategic landscape, with the rise of India and China,
has led to the emergence of the -
Consequently, as the Indo-Pacific has replaced the Asia-Pacific as a strategic region in the
mind-map of policymakers, it has become prudent to conceptualise the region as a strategic
system and outline its key attributes. This paper explores contemporary understanding of
the Indo-Pacific as a strategic system and examines its multipolar configuration. It also
highlights the major attributes of this emergent strategic system the common threat of
Chinese revisionism, a regional impulse for the Indo-Pacific, its continental dimensions, and
to explain the dynamics
of emerging regional security architecture in Asia.
Key Words: Indo-Pacific, Strategic System, Multipolarity, Indo- Rise
Introduction
In the twenty-first century, the rise of India and China has caused a profound shift in Asian
geopolitics. This transformation of the Asian geostrategic landscape has tremendous
-
-Pacific as a
strategic system has naturally coincided with the decline of the Asia-Pacific concept from the
global geostrategic discourse. The Asia-Pacific emerged as a geo-economic region that
experienced rapid economic growth after the late 1980s. Japan and Australia promoted the term
to draw them closer to the United States and the economically burgeoning East Asia (Soesastro
& Drysdale 2009). This eventually led to the inauguration of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. Thereafter, with increased economic interdependence in
the region, dialogue for security cooperation gradually followed economic cooperation
(Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama 2002, 69-94). Rory Medcalf describes the Asia-Pacific as a transient
keep Washington engaged across the Pacific even as the end of the Cold War gave it a reason
The 1993 Market building reforms in China significantly increased its dependence on the
Indian Ocean to transport the energy, resources and trade essential to its prosperity. Similarly,
its economic and
101
strategic interests with ASEAN nations. As Pardesi (2020) highlights, the rise of China and
India established the strategic need to rethink Asia in Indo-Pacific terms (124-146). In this
G-
significant backlash in the US and led to a reformulation of American strategic priorities in the
emphasising the growing role of regional powers like India, Japan, and Australia in regional
geopolitics. This shift was also captured in then-
-
emerged and integrated theatrei
The gradual phasing out of the Asia-Pacific reflects this transformation of Asia and heralds the
re-emergence of a larger Asia in the form of the Indo-Pacific (Pardesi 2020, 124-146). Thus,
the Indo-Pacific strategic system in which threats in one part are bound to affect the security
and energy infrastructure across the Indian Ocean were an Indo-

Malacca dilemma. In this context, it has been arg -Pacific project carried the
seeds of its own demise: such a region could not be complete without China, yet China could
The first official documentatio -

Defence White Paper; its profile increased further in June 2017 during Prime Minister
sponsible stewards in the Indo- -US
or the
and called for peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes (Ministry of External
visit to the Indo-Pacific region,
-
m of navigation and overflight and to decisively deal with

the threats posed by transnational organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime, and territorial
expansion in the region (The White House 2017). It was this unequivocal acceptance of the

Indo-Pacific framework by the ruling superpower which made it central to the global
geostrategic discourse.
Contemporary Understandings of the Indo-Pacific as a Strategic System
e in
terms of its internal structure and process to be meaningfully differentiated from a wider
-
interrelationship of politico-military interaction capacity, strategic perceptions of the regional
as a social entity, having its own rules of inclusion and exclusion, with its identity defined in
the world of regions.
institutional orders that have characterised Asia and Europe for the past half cen
creation of a regional system in the Pacific area to support the regional economic integration
of Japan and its Asian neighbours resulted in a Japanese proposal in 1965 to establish the
Pacific Free Trade Area encompassing the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
While the proposal did not materialise, various academic and semi-official initiatives, started
in 1969, led to the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in 1980 to explore and advance
free trade and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
their call for multilateralism to conform to loc

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) formation in July 1994 reflected the desire among
-
multilateral institutions (Acharya 1997, 15). In this regard, the end of the Cold War played an
ASEAN and
Vietnam, Russia and Japan, and China and Russia began searching for common ground and
encouraged multilateral approaches to security issues (Acharya 2013, 232). However, the

decision-
denominator, and consequently, could only rationalise the obstacles to multilateralism rather
than resolve them (Acharya 1997, 16).
meant that regional powers like Japan and Australia began conceptualising an alternative
geostrategic framework to offset the threats posed by the shift in the regional balance. The
possible disruption to the stable balance in Asia was initially captured in the 2001 US
littoral from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan represents a particularly challenging
(Department of Defense 2001, 4). The interlinkage of the East Asian littoral with the Indian
Ocean was also all
in global maritime focus from the Atlantic- -Indian
of India, 2004, 91).
The organic growth of the Indo-Pacific in global strategic discourse also rests on the ongoing
process of Easternisation the relative shift of power and wealth from the West to Asia
of the world economy shrank by 10.33 percentage points, more than the combined loss of the
region increased from US$275 billion in 2010 to US$423 billion in 2019 (constant 2015
dollars), marking an increase of more than 50% in a decade (IISS 2020, 227).
The Indo-Pacific is seen as a multipolar system marked by the presence of regional powers
such as India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam, along with two major powers the US
and China. However, it is important to distinguish between the balanced and the unbalanced
multipolar systems. The unbalanced multipolar systems are the ones with three or more great
power
potential hegemon, a state must have by some reasonably large margin the most formidable
(44-45). On

rather evenly among the great powers, or at least between the two most powerful states in the
-270).
Imagining a balanced multipolar Indo-Pacific is primarily rooted in the regional insecurity with
the unbalanced subsystems of Asia. A regional balance is different from a dominant balance as
the latter affects the former much more than the change in regional balance affects the dominant
balance. Thus, during the Cold War, the Soviet-US balance was a dominant balance which
affected the regional balances of the Middle East, the Indian Subcontinent, and South-east Asia
(Bull 2012, 98-99). On the other hand, due to the bipolar configuration of the Soviet-US
balance, the ability of regional geopolitics to affect superpower behaviour remained limited.
Thus, the Suez Crisis of 1956 or the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971 did not affect the
dominant Soviet-American balance as much as they were affected by Superpower intervention.
The victory of North Vietnam over South Vietnam also did not alter the dominant Soviet-US
balance, even as it changed the regional balance of power in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the
creation of Bangladesh in 1971 shifted the South
little impact on the overall dominant balance. Among the subordinate balances of the Indo-
Pacific strategic system in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia the presence of China
as a potential hegemon with the preponderance of power over regional powers makes these
regional subsystems unbalanced.
behavior required for the maintenance of a balance-of-power system -216). The

geostrategic configuration of East Asia as an unbalanced multipolarity explains why Japan has
emerged as a foremost proponent of the balancing construct of the Indo-Pacific (Friedberg
1993, 5-33). In 2007, Japanese Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, in his address to the Indian
the Pacific and the Indian Oceans
spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and
Thus,
freedom, democracy and human rights, as well as common strategic interests (Abe 2007). Then
in his 2012 article in Project Syndicate, he interlinked the peace, stability, and freedom of
navigation in the Pacific Ocean with that of the Indian Ocean. Further, he categorically stated
-Japanese relations, Japan must first anchor its ties on the other side of
To this end

India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons
Abe 2012).
disputed boundary with India in Jammu, Kashmir, and Arunachal Pradesh stretch its influence
n, as emphasised through its
South Asian balance. Therefore, the rise of China and the strengthening of the Sino-Pak axis
have created a dyad in the region hitherto
-Pacific framework signifies an increasing preference for a
multipolar balance of the Indo-Pacific over the increasingly unbalanced nature of dyadic
competition with China in South Asia. Thus, when the pivot to Asia was announced in 2012,
India welcomed the US policy even as its cherished notions of strategic autonomy made the
accommodation of the US approach difficult 1.
Nonetheless, with the rise of the Indo-Pacific, the Indian position on the South China Sea has
intervention by extra-regional powers and encourage bilateral dispute resolution mechanisms

(Gupta 2014). However, with acceptance of the strategic framework of Indo-Pacific, India
began to express the necessity of the rules-based order and the necessity of freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea also become an important component of its
joint declarations with other Indo-Pacific powers (The White House 2014; Ministry of External
Affairs 2016). Further, the Indo-
behaviour in South Asia as can be seen in its facilitation of the US in its relationship with states
like Sri Lanka and the Maldives, both of which have been traditionally considered as within
ms in the South
China Sea, notably the conclusion of an agreeable Code of Conduct, first agreed upon in 2002,
if we secretly like it", quoted in Ri -hearted about the U.S. rebalance towards
Foreign Policy. 14 Aug. 2012. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/14/why-india-is-so-half-hearted-about-
the-u-s-rebalance-towards-asia/

illustrate the dangers of a severely unbalanced multipolarity of Southeast Asia. The apparent
limitation of the ARF, APEC and the East Asian Summit to move from rudimentary
confidence-building measures towards preventive diplomacy has provided the impetus to the
rise of the Indo-
security architecture has led to n-aligned leader Indonesia to push for its
conception of the Indo-Pacific (Heydarian 2020). Its efforts during the ASEAN Summit in
Bangkok in June 2019 led to the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP).
e Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, not as contiguous
-Pacific
framework to th
in its security architecture, is a significant shift in Southeast Asian geopolitics.
uth Asia
is the most important factor in imagining a multipolar Indo-Pacific. The systemic shocks to
regional balance in the South Asia-Indian Ocean Region, Southeast Asia and East Asia due to
erable fear among regional
-270). The
balancing phenomenon associated with unbalanced systems can be seen with the growing
clamour to adopt the framework of the balanced multipolarity of the Indo-Pacific. The creation
of Indo-
a multipolar balance the dominant balance, which includes not only the US and China but also
regional powers like India, Japan, Australia and ASEAN. The presence of regional powers,
such as India, Japan, and Australia means that even as China continues its path toward
economic development and military modernisation, the Indo-Pacific would remain a balanced
China-
Attributes of the Indo-Pacific Strategic System
Threat of the Chinese Revisionism

Other than a structural pull of the Indo-Pacific, a significant attribute exists in the form of
regional push for the multipolar Indo- nd military rise has been
associated with its increased assertiveness on the India-China border, in the South and the East
China Sea, and with its wolf-warrior diplomacy.
seded by
assertiveness Shourie (2013) contends that the post-

Joshi (2011) traces Chinese escalation of territorial
-161);
Similarly, Garver
(2016) contends that the spike in Chinese intrusions and coercion in Japanese territorial water
Xuetong (2014) assess that around late 2008, the policy started changing when China moved
of keeping a low profile (taoguangyanghui) to a more active
-184). Desai (2021) argues that
under President Xi, the shift in policy crystallised into an ideology with a broad set of global
interests and the political will to pursue them.
with a disputed boundary with India; a willingness

to invade Taiwan; competing for sovereign claims with Japan over Senkaku Islands; and the
increasing capability to - that
-be hegemons have elicited the most intense balancing behaviour

by the
nations such as the US and Australia balance against China within an Indo-Pacific framework
expansionist claims in its neighbourhood is one of the most important

attributes of the Indo-

The Japanese PM, Shinzo Abe, in his 2012 article in the Project Syndicate, confessed that he
risdiction in the waters surrounding the islands
restricted Freedom of navigation for others (ibid). These fears of Chinese assertiveness led him
for his proposal of the
Quadrilateral Diamond initiative with India, Australia and the US.
In the aftermath of the withdrawal of the United States from TPP, Vietnam repetitively sought
reassurance from America that it would play a role in maintaining freedom of navigation in the
-
Beijing from further changing the status quo in disputed areas in SCS (Grossman 2018). To
counter Chinese activities, Vietnam has also started reclaiming work in eight of the ten rocks
it occupies in Spratly Island, West London Reef, and Sin Cowe Island (Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative 2019).
-
has increasingly been worried because of Chinese assertiveness on the basis of the nine-dash
line. In 2016, there were a series of clashes between the Indonesian Navy and Chinese fishing
the Indonesian military signed an MoU with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to
provid
ional
maritime power in the Indo-Pacific. To this end, a large-scale programme of naval
modernisation has been undertaken (Agastia 2017). In 2018, during the visit of the Indian
Prime Minister, Indonesian President Widodo announced the Shared Vision of India-Indonesia
Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and resolved to achieve a rules-based and inclusive
Indo-Pacific (Ministry of External Affairs 2018).
The regional actors sufficiently feel the Chinese threat, real or imaginary. In Southeast Asia,
thi

nuclearisation of the Indo-Pacific. The US withdrawal from Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)
eaty but
2018). Thus, while announcing its withdrawal, Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, called upon
-Pacific Command when he told reporters that the US intends to

install ground-based medium-range missiles in Asia (Gibbons-Neff 2019).
In the absence of the necessity of an Indo-Pacific framework, the prospect of a Nuclear Pivot
would have faced significant opposition from ASEAN, particularly from the champions of
signing of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) in 1995. The
Indo-Pacific framework influences AS
dominant balance over the threat of a regional arms race. Seemingly irritated, the Russian
Ambassador to ASEAN has called such disregard for the change in strategic balance by
maritime and territorial sovereignty. It is the spectre of Chinese fait accompli(s) in the region
that shapes the strategic behaviour of regional powers rather than the general shift of relative
power. For example, when India conducted its nuclear weapons test in 1998, ASEAN was
remarkably muted in its criticism even as US allies such as Japan and Australia raised strong
criticism. Further, at the Manila summit in July 1998, some ASEAN countries such as
Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia reportedly urged Japan and Australia to adopt a
more benign attitude towards India (Rehman 2009, 114-143).
makes the prospect of a Sino-centric order a survivalist threat to the regional actors. The desire
for a rule-based order implies the existence of the threat to commonly accepted rules in the
Indo-
parallel with its revisionist aspirations, this aspect of Chi

becomes clear. Therefore, a localised anti-China push as well as a structural pull gives Indo-
Pacific its peculiar configuration and guides the strategic behaviour of the regional powers.
This explains the growing convergence between the US and its treaty allies but also the
increasing alignments among regional powers in the Indo-Pacific region.
Regional Impulse for the Indo-Pacific
-
-Pacific.
The official enshrinement of the Indo-Pacific as a unified strategic th
region (Demir 2018, 45-65). Pardesi (2020, 139) argues that the American pursuit of the
-
-
attention and resources away from the Sino-
-
the understanding of the Indo-

from outside obscures the pervasiveness of the Indo-
-74).
The Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic construct differs from the Cold War hegemonic constructs
like NATO, SEATO or Warsaw Pact. Though the term has been constructed from the outside
ide the
region and has been popularised by regional actors like Japan, Australia, and India. The
intensified strategic discussion involving Indian and Japanese think-tanks in 2006 over the
d Asia-Pacific constructs
(Khurana 2017). This led to the publication of a paper in Strategic Analyses by Indian Navy
-
space stretching from the littorals of East Africa and West Asia, across the Indian Ocean and
-153). Thereafter,

common strategic interests. Further, the 2009 Australian Defence
Australia 2009, 37). It is important to note that when the regional powers began thinking in
terms of a two- -
region with a proposed G-2 with China in 2009.
s rise became clearer, the Indo-Pacific gained its value in regional

-
formulation became noticeable by 2011 12 (Scott 2013, 425-
Ambassado
the Indo-
hese 2012, 2). This
-
Similarly, by 2011, the Indo-Pacific gained significant currency in Indian strategic discourse.
-
Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, highlighted the Indo-Pacific
increased usage by major Indian think tanks, the Indo-Pacific became part of the governmental
vocabulary in dealing with regional strategic realities (Scott 2019, 195-214). In Japan, the
return to power of Shinzo Abe in December 2012, saw an increased inclination to strategise
along the Indo-Pacific. By 2013, even a non- -Pacific
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
Pacific Ocean (Witular, 2014).
-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the US withdrawal in

January 2017 again highlighted regional support for the Indo-Pacific integration. The TPP was
create the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor through a multilateral trade framework with US
allies and partners around the Pacific Rim, excluding China (Perlez 2015). The TPP was an

-222).
Thus, after the US withdrawal from the TPP, Japan assumed the leadership role and galvanised
the remaining 11 members to conclude the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in March 2018.
Similarly, even as the Trump Administration enforced protectionist policies against allies and
adversaries alike, the Indo-Pacific remained central to the geostrategic outlook of regional
powers: Japan unveiled its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy during the Africa Summit in
2016; India led the opposition to the inaugural BRI forum in 2017; and, Australia released its
2017 white paper which framed an Indo-Pacific strategy to achieve a favourable balance in the
-Delhi-
a joint strategy for the Indo-
(Mohan, Medcalf & Tertrais 2018).
After initial emphasis on the Pacific and Asia-Pacific, the US reimported the Indo-Pacific
rhetoric into its strategic discourse in September 2017, when in his meeting with the Indian
Defence Minister, US Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, highlighted the need for a strong rules-
based order in the Indo-Pacific (Department of Defense 2017). Since then, the Indo-Pacific
discourse has seen a constant uptick. Thus, during his November 2017 Asia tour, President
-
National Security Strategy 2017. Further, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between
Australia, India, Japan and the US was resuscitated in November 2017 to promote the concept
of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Quad was first formed in 2007 but disintegrated soon after
facilitated the re-emergence of Quad. Arguably, what differentiates Quad 2.0 from its
predecessor is the presence of a well-developed strategic construct of the Indo-Pacific in the
geostrategic imagination of regional powers. Therefore, while Quad 1.0 had a vague premise
of countering China, Quad 2.0 instead focuses on maintaining a strategic balance in a
multipolar Indo-Pacific. This allows the regional powers
of the Indo-Pacific rather than a deliberate anti-China coalition.
It has been argued that the increased usage of Indo-Pacific terminology among regional powers
some cross-fertilisation, rather than a

organic growth in the early stages of the conceptualisation of the Indo-Pacific, the post-2017
coordination between the regional powers is striking. The Chinese technological giant, Huawei,
critical infrastructure, eventually banning it in July 2018 (Bryan-Low & Packham 2019). It
then shared the findings of its signals intelligence with the US which initiated a global
movement against Huawei. By the end of 2019, most US allies had banned Huawei from
participating in 5G trials in their countries. US and Japan have also partnered to provide high-
quality energy infrastructure for emerging Indo-Pacific clients. If Australia took a lead in
raising the dangers of Huawei 5G technology, it is India that raised concerns over Chinese app
American operation to a US-based entity.
The construct of Indo-Pacific grants significant agency to regional powers to influence the
future of a multipolar Asia. Rather than being an externally imposed regional construct, the
bottom-up demand for the Indo-Pacific ensures multipolarity. In a desire for such a multipolar
order, the US has been a follower of the regional push for the logic of the Indo-Pacific.
Continental Dimension of the Indo-Pacific
The strong support towards the Indo- Japan,

Australia, and the US has given the strategic region a predominant maritime orientation.
07, and
Defence White Paper in 2009, have shaped the development of a strong maritime identity for
the Indo-Pacific. Further, the importance of ASEAN centrality in the regional geopolitics, as
well as the US involvement as an offshore balancer in the region, contributes towards the
maritime identity of the Indo-Pacific. However, unlike the predominantly maritime
imagination of the geo-economic Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific also has a prominent
continental dimension.

The India-China interactions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas have
an important bearing on the Indo-Pacific geopolitics. This aspect of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics
was evident during the 73-day long India-China standoff at Doklam in June 2017. As China
increased its military and diplomatic pressure, India hosted the largest ever Malabar exercise
in July 2017 in the Bay of Bengal with the US and Japan (The Hindu, 2017). New Delhi also
moved ahead into resuscitating Quad, after years of recalcitration, in November 2017 with the
US, Japan, and Australia. Similarly, after the Sino-Indian border flareup in 2020, New Delhi
recalibrated its commitment to the balancing construct of the Indo-Pacific. Thus, since May
2020, following the skirmishes between the Indian Army and the PLA in Ladakh, India has
enhanced its external balancing in the Indo-
the US in the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago; second-ever ministerial meeting of the Quad;
invitation to Australia to join the Malabar exercise; summit level meeting of the Quad leaders
in Washington; and, the finalisation of the sale of Brahmos missiles to the Philippines, among
others.
In so far as India-
of the most significant elements of its Indo-Pacific stra
facilitate the US influence in Sri Lanka and the Maldives is a significant departure from its
traditional policy of limiting the intervention of external powers in South Asia. This acceptance
of the balancing nature of the Indo-Pacific in New Delhi indicates a growing operationalisation
of the concept as an integrated strategic system between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.
-
operational since the rise of the British Empire. The British Empire, with its rule over the Indian
Subcontinent had strong Indo-Pacific interests. Pardesi (2020) contends that an integrated
he Indian Ocean and the
Thus, Indian resources were instrumental in the British conquest of Burma, victory in the
Opium Wars, and power projection in and around China. The imperial importance of India was
a-
began to be imagined from London (128).

The Treaty of Chushul signed between Qing China and the Sikh Empire in September 1842
reflected the unity of strategic Asia as it came just a month after the signing of the treaty of
Nanking. The treaty terminated the Sino-Sikh War and stipulated that both sides would
recognise ancient boundaries between Ladakh and Tibet and trade in tea and cloth would
continue like before (Department of Information & International Relations of Tibet, 1952).
This reflected the concerns of both Qing China and the Sikh Empire over the rise of British
India under the East India Company which was attempting hegemony in the subcontinent as
well as in the maritime stretch of the Indo- the
British Empire operated its own version of Indo-
y of the events of the 19th and 20th Century
In the 21st -
-front war due to the
operationalisation of the Karakoram Highway, and the strategic ramifications of the China-
Pakistan economic corridor, upon Indian sovereignty highlight the continental dangers faced
by New Delhi. Therefore, unlike the maritime priorities of other Indo-Pacific powers, the
-Pacific an
important continental dimension.
Indo-
This rise of China has highlighted the questionable nature of the US security guarantees in the
region. The Chinese seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 showed
willingness to safeguard Taiwan in the event of the Chinese invasion has also been called into
question (Carpenter 2020). On the other hand, an alternative ordering principle has been
peaceful, an
relations, and European-

Thus, -
-235).

Certain strategic thinkers such as Kishore Mahbubani contend that the European balance of
power approach i
increasing economic and technological development, has imparted it the confidence to
-building to realise their

Pacific impulse (Mahbubani 1995, 105-120).
The narrative of a Sino-centric hierarchical system presents a fait accompli to the regional
power,
-s -35). Further,
amnesia to forget the ways i

(Buzan & Segal 1995, 82-14). Similarly, Aaron Friedberg (2000) argues that the alleged culture
of conciliation and conflict avoidance has failed to prevent numerous civil and inter-state wars
involving China, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam (147-160).
Scholars like Zhang (2014) also expose the limits of the utility of the tribute system in
understanding historical East Asian politics. The propagation of the tribute-system narrative
misleads
-50). Importantly,
the projections of a tribute system onto the future security arrangements in East Asia overlook
the dynamics of the Westphalian nation-state system prevailing in the region. In the age of
competing nationalisms, the respect for Chinese preponderance cannot transpire into a
hierarchical subordination to China. Therefore, states like India and Vietnam may agree that
China as a preponderant power enjoys higher status, but this does not lead them to believe that

the Chinese nation is superior to theirs. That both of these states have fought border wars with
China over the question of territorial sovereignty is illustrative of this fact.
Therefore, the increase in anti-

assertiveness in the South China Sea. Thus, anti-China protests have periodically rocked states
like Vietnam and the Philippines; further, a persistent anti-China sentiment is on the rise in
states like India and Indonesia (BBC 2014). The Pew Poll survey 2019 pointed out this sharp
-Pacific nations (Pew Research Center
2019). The survey showed that in the Indo-
might be bad for their country, up from 43% in 2007. In contrast, the attractiveness of US
power in the region has been corroborated by the 2018 PEW survey, which showed that 73%
of Asian respondents represented by polls taken in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Australia favoured the United States as the leading global power versus 12%
for China (Delaney 2018).
The regional preference for the rule- -Pacific stems from the
since the Second World War. It produced unprecedented growth for many nations including
the region has provided a favourable strategic context to the ongoing process of Easternization.
Similarly, Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama (2002) note that US hegemony is acceptable to the extent
that it is institutionalised through bilateral alliances and regional agreements (69-94).
The growing US-Vietnam strategic partnership is a prime illustrator of why regional powers
r a Sino-centric order (Alagappa 1991, 269-
305). In its thousands of years of history, Vietnam has fought only one war against the United
States, but seventeen against the Chinese (Rachman 2016). In November 2017, President
and open Indo-Pacific strategy in Vietnam. This was
followed by a landmark port call of the USS Carl Vinson at Da Nang in March 2018 the first

-
with Ch
strategic preferences in the Indo-Pacific.
In the post-cold war period, fears of US departure from Southeast Asia were quite prominent
(Acharya 2013, 230-33). The ASEAN felt grave suspicions about the prospects of a unilateral
Japanese security posture which could have provoked China, thereby creating a new security
Asia-Pacific and the creation of ARF in 1992. The rise of China as a military power, however,
brings the prospects of the dreaded great power rivalry to the doorstep of ASEAN. This change
ty, as the
unipolar moment has given way to a multipolar Indo-Pacific. In this regard, the adoption of the
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks the recent attempt to bed out the ASEAN centrality
in the emerging security architecture of the Indo-Pacific.
The construct of the multipolar Indo-

strategic discourse Zhongguo, the Central state to
the re-emergence of a geostrategic region between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans 2. In the
Indo-Pacific framework, China is just one of the great powers in the system, not the system
itself. The inclusion of India in contemporary strategic Asia also fractures the Sinocentric
discourse as historical Indian polities were not a part of the Sinocentric world (Pardesi 2020,
139). In the Indo-
instructive to note that the US legitimacy in the region rests not only on its soft power but as
an underwriter of regional security architecture. The growing regional alignment with the US-
- elf is not a
discourse in the South China Sea. The legitimacy of the US centrality in the regional security
architecture is
an important attribute of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
2 The use of the term Zhongguo by the Chinese state to represent itself in the contemporary world was not in use
as a formal name by the end of the nineteenth century. Its use in the past was intended to confer legitimacy to
the ruling regime. To construct the Chinese nation-state, modern nationalists adopted the idea of Zhongguo as
the Central State which further made it central to modern Chinese identity. See Hayton, Bill. The Invention of
China. Yale University Press, 2020.

Conclusion
The Indo-Pacific construct provides a loose unity of purpose to the regional powers like India,
Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN. By acknowledging the geostrategic space of the Indo-Pacific
-
-
was unveiled by Japanese PM Abe in Africa in August 2016. Then, during Prime Minister
open Indo-
Indo- -Pacific strategy in 2017, the phrase became synonymous with
the efforts to promote regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the terminology of the
- -Pacific in the
regional perception and underlines the need for a rule-based order in the multipolar strategic
system.
The Indo- lenges the India-

underscore the
need to safeguard regional stability from the growing appetite of a potential hegemon. The
growing efforts to institutionalise numerous minilateral and multilateral arrangements in the
Indo-Pacific are indicative of this fact. However, the domination of China in the Indo-Pacific
discourse, and its absence from the nascent regional institutionalisation process, continues to
underline the necessity of peculiar regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

REFERENCES
E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 22
Aug. 2007. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html
Abe Project Syndicate, 27 Dec. 2012.

shinzo-abe
an Asia- NBR Analysis, vol 8, no.

2, 1997. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/144385/vol8no2.pdf
Acharya, Amitav. The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region.

Cornell University Press, 2013.
The
Diplomat. 22 Nov. 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/3-years-later-where-is-indonesias-
global-maritime-fulcrum/
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 12, no. 4, 1991, pp. 269 305.
Allison, Graham, Blackwill, Robert, & Wyne, Ali. s

Insights on China, the United States, and the World. Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, 2013.
https://www.amti.csis.org/island-tracker/vietnam/
-
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27403851

Bryan- Australia led the US in its global war against Huawei.

The Sydney Morning Herald. 22 May 2019. https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/how-
australia-led-the-us-in-its-global-war-against-huawei-20190522-p51pv8.html
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Fourth Edition.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
es for World Politics: An English

International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation,
edited by T.V. Paul, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 22-46.
The National Interest,

no. 39, 1995, pp. 82-84.
- The
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 71, no. 1, 2012, pp. 33 55.
The Cato Institute. 22

Sept. 2020. https://www.cato.org/commentary/how-far-us-willing-go-defend-taiwan
C
CNBC. 18 July 2017. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/18/indonesia-increases-
maritime-defense-in-south-china-sea.html
Foreign Policy. 11 Oct. 2011.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
South China Morning Post. 13 Oct. 2018.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168399/united-states-or-china-world-
leader-asians-overwhelmingly
Rising Powers Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 2, 2018, pp. 45-65.

001,
https://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1325283/
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=814130
Department of Information & International Relations, Central Tibetan Administration.

Political Treaties of Tibet (821 to 1951). 1952. https://tibet.net/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/political-treaties-of-tibet...pdf
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-
POWER-REPORT.PDF
Civilian and Military Developments in

The Takshahsila Institution. 6 Dec. 2021, https://takshashila.org.in/takshashila-
discussion-document-civilian-and-military-developments-in-tibet/
International
Security, vol. 18, no. 3, 1993, pp. 5-33.
Fri
147-160.
Garver, John. China's quest: the history of the foreign relations of the People's Republic of
China. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Gibbons- The
New York Times. 3 Aug. 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/asia/us-missiles-
asia-esper.html
https://www.ssri-
j.com/MediaReport/Document/AustraliaDefenceWhitePaper2009.pdf
2013.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167267/Australia%20A%20Strategy%20for%20National%20Se
curit.pdf
Government of India. Indian Maritime Doctrine, First Edition. Ministry of Defence (Navy),
2004.
Foreign Policy. 19 Oct. 2018.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/19/to-balance-china-call-vietnam-malaysia-
philippines/amp/
d Vietnam's Latest Defense White

War on the Rocks. 31 Dec. 2019.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/how-to-read-vietnams-latest-defense-white-paper-a-
message-to-great-powers/
Gupta, Shishir. The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte. Hachette
India, 2014.
ino-American
rivalry in the Indo- The Brookings Institution. 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/fp_20200427_strategic_crossroads.pdf
Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon
and Schuster, 1996.
IISS. The Military Balance 2020. Routledge, 2020.

y: the
future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia- International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific, vol. 2, no. 1, 2002, pp. 69-94.
I -à- The Jakarta

Post. 8 Oct. 2020. https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2020/10/08/strategic-stability-
vis-vis-asean-a-strange-formula.html
https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31915
Current History, vol. 110, no.

735, 2011, pp. 156 161.
International Security, vol. 27, no. 4, 2003, pp. 57-85.
Katzenstein, P.J. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. Cornell
University Press, 2005.
- National
Maritime Foundation. 2017.
https://www.maritimeindia.org/View%20Profile/636215922419657386.pdf
Strategic Analysis, vol. 31, no. 1, 2007, pp. 139-153.
Foreign Affairs. 2020.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2020-06-04/lee-hsien-loong-endangered-asian-
century
Survival, vol. 37, no. 1, 1995, pp. 105-120.

Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.
-
New Regional Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific: Drivers, Dynamics
and Consequences, edited by P. Chacko, Routledge, 2016.
Medcalf, Rory. Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China won't Map the Future. La Trobe
University Press, 2020. Kindle.
-US Joint Statement during the visit

of Prime Minister to USA (The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/26879/IndiaUS_Joint_Statement_during_the_visit_of_Prime_Minister_to
_USA_The_United_States_and_India_Enduring_Global_Partners_in_the_21st_Century
United States and

http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/28560/United_States_and_India_Prosperity_Through_Partnership
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2018, May 30). Shared Vision of India-
Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Retrieved December 11, 2019 from
https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/29933/Shared_Vision_of_IndiaIndonesia_Maritime_Cooperation_in_the_
IndoPacific
- Indian Express. 8 May

2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/emmanuel-macron-india-france-
relations-paris-delhi-canberra-axis-malcolm-turnbull-narendra-modi-5167221/
Asia Policy, no. 22, 2016, pp. 193-222. https://www.nbr.org/publication/securitizing-the-tpp-

in-japan-policymaking-structure-and-discourse/

- Review of International
Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1994, pp. 53-74. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097357
Nye, Joseph. Is the American Century Over? Polity Press, 2015.
-Off Highlights Growing Indonesia-China

The Diplomat. 21 June 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/a-third-2016-
natuna-stand-off-highlights-growing-indonesia-china-tensions/
- Australian
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2, 2020, pp. 124-146.
- The New York

Times. 6 Oct. 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/world/asia/trans-pacific-
partnership-china-australia.html
PEW Research Center. (2019). Positive evaluations of China declining in the Asia-Pacific.
Retrieved December 14, 2020 from https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/12/05/chinas-
economic-growth-mostly-welcomed-in-emerging-markets-but-neighbors-wary-of-its-
influence/pg_2019-12-05_balance-of-power_0-08/
U.S. Department
of State. 2 Aug. 2019. https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-
2019/
Posen, Barry. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars. Cornell University Press, 1984.
Rachman, Gideon.
and beyond. Other Press, 2016. Kindle.
Asian Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 2009, pp. 114-143.

o- Indian Express. 29 Oct. 2011.

https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/mapping-the-indopacific/
ndo-
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 13, no. 3, 2013, pp. 425-448.
https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct009
- New Directions in India's Foreign

Policy: Theory and Praxis, edited by Harsh Pant, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Shambaugh, David. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford University Press, 2013.
Shourie, Arun. Self-Deception: India's China Policies. HarperCollins Publishers India, 2013.
East Asia
Forum. 6 Dec. 2009. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/12/06/thinking-about-the-asia-
pacific-community/
-
2019. https://asean.org/asean-outlook-indo-pacific/
The Hindu. "Malabar 2017: Spectacular end to Naval drill", 17 July 2017.
https://thehindu.com/news/national/malabar-2017-spectacular-end-to-naval-
drill/article19297253.ece
The -
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement;
T
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-
summit-da-nang-vietnam/

Var IPCS Special Report no. 127,

May 2012. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/143064/SR127-
AustraliaandIndiaintheAsianCentury.pdf
Journal of International Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 1967, pp. 215-231.
The Jakarta Post. 14 Nov. 2014.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/14/presenting-maritime-doctrine.html
The Chinese
Journal of International Politics, vol. 7, no. 2, 2014, pp. 153 184.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027

BOOK REVIEW:
A GAME FOR THE AGES:
Rohit Kumar V
and the process of negotiation from the preparation to the post-agreement stage will become
This excerpt, taken from the concluding chapter, titled
With six core chapters dissecting one case study each, the author weaves together a narrative
from 1949 to the present time, ensuring to select only those cases as illustrations where closure
in negotiations has been achieved. The book brings into deliberation how different heads of the
Singh and Modi, Gokhale does not hesitate to draw strict inferences on their merits and
-a-vis China
have evolved from lacking strategic thinking during the Nehruvian era to building a core
foundation of foreign policy through the Rajiv and Vajpayee era; and finally countering
Chinese negotiations and obtaining substantial gains during the Manmohan and Modi era.
significant milestone in the diplomatic relations between the two countries. He elaborates how
India, through the early years, became susceptible to the Chinese negotiation methods owing
to the difference in diplomatic experience between them. While India had to wipe the slate
clean and begin afresh with its foreign services, post-independence, the CCP was astute enough
to retain former front-line diplomats from the previous regime as foreign policy consultants.
This gave China an advantage that it exploited to the fullest. The quickness with which the
the Chinese strategically play their cards, and ensure they attained their desired goals without
130
BOOK REVIEW: A GAME FOR THE AGES
ceding any ground in negotiations. Gokhale further cements that Nehru was so adamant to win
over the Chinese goodwill, that he shut out any logical or sound suggestions provided to him
by his deputy and other diplomats on how to approach the matter more sensibly. In the process,
he mentions, , making this approach taken in
the recognition of PRC a
Following the bungled attempt with which India carried out its recognition process of PRC, the
book turns its attention to the Tibet dilemma that the two states faced. Gokhale highlights how
the Chinese were able to strategically maneuver their plans for the invasion of Tibet, countering
the threat from the United States, whom they believed could assist Tibet in gaining
independence. China and India had clear individual objectives for Tibet. India held that it de-
facto replaced Great Britain regarding all treaty rights and obligations, thus making an
argument for maintaining the status quo through the McMahon Line. Mao and China, on the
other hand, were keen on invading the Tibetan region since the liberation of Sichuan and
Xinjiang. Gokhale highlights how Mao never had a positive opinion of the Indian government
to adopt a double-edged strategy, one being to counter potential India-US collusion and the
the same, China was ab

tensions between the Tibetan and Chinese governments in an amicable fashion. It is through
this case study that Gokhale highlights the artless and naïve strategy adopted by India against
China, as in the end, India was depicted as the major roadblock in stalling the peace process
and held liable for the invasion as an outcome, by the Chinese media.
-nit narratives of the six case studies, each of

which carries the potential to be a stand-alone work by itself. The author builds a case for how
India revisited and redefined its negotiating stratagem under the Vajpayee and subsequent
governments and then proceeds to do good on this declaration by substantially backing it
through illustrations of certain successful outcomes that India was able to attain. Tackling the
Pokhran crisis; overcoming the NPT & NSG roadblocks through to the US-India 123 Deal, and
the resilience shown in the listing of Masoor Azhar Alvi under the 1267 Sanctions Committee,
are the few other case studies he elaborates on intensively in the book.
Through the US-India 123 deal, Gokhale highlights how China conducted negotiations on three
levels. On one hand, the Chinese repre

-Jinping to M.K Narayanan. While on the other,
of the NSG to stand up for the principle of non-proliferation. It is at this juncture in the book
that Gokhale highlights how India understood why the Chinese always conducted their
negotiations from the shadows, playing the role of puppet master, rather than being in the
limelight.
China for an extensive period, Ambassador Vijay Gokhale holds an illustrious career under his
belt. If anything, this book is a graceful trimming of illusions and reaffirmation of the cold and
hardline approach which China has adopted in its dealings with India, historically. Over the
years, there have been several engaging works on how these two South Asian countries pursued
their foreign policies through negotiations. However, more often than not, they are tinted with
a partisan perspective, given that most of these pieces originate from the West, where China is
viewed as a smaller-growing power, in comparison to it being the bigger power when seen
thro
fills by providing intricate insights accompanied by insider accounts into how the two nations
have historically conducted their negotiations. Given the dynamic geopolitical climate of the
Indo-
the book does well in highlighting specific facets of the Chinese negotiating stratagem, it also
adds to its larger underlying theme, of
other has evolved over the years.

REFERENCES
Gokhale, V. (2021). The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India. Penguin Random House India
Private Limited.

PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IPC Journal Main

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IPC Journal Main

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

IPC Journal Main

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

© 2022 COUNCIL FOR STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE RESEARCH

3, PRATAP SINGH BUILDING

EDITORIAL AND WEB ASSISTANT

PROF. C. RAJA MOHAN

The INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW is a peer-reviewed journal produced by the Council for

ASEAN CENTRALITY AND THE INDO-PACIFIC: FINDING A CONVERGENT REALITY?

INDIA S DEFENSE DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: SHAPING A NEW REGIONAL SECURITY

PROSPECTS FOR MINILATERALISM IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN

INDO-PACIFIC: CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC SYSTEM AND ITS

BOOK REVIEW 130

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 1

integrity, and the eq

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 3

but political leadership is the art of convincing the world.

For the 21st

region, free of force or coercion.

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 5

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 6

It is an idea whose time has come.

and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and later as

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 7

Traditionally, any grouping of countries, geographical regions or entities is founded on some

The Indo-Pacific Formulation by the West

The earliest espousal of the Indo-

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 9

Interestingly, the US strategy also mentions the Euro-Atlantic as a complementary region to

The Two- Science of Military

strong and strategic support within a greater spatial scope to maint

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 10

Contrasting Strategic Visions for the same Region

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 11

The document expects traditional and non-

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 12

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 13

Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007, MOFA, Government of Japan,

, , (Eds) Ashley Tellis,

World Meteorological Organisation,

- Government of France, February 2022,

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 14

The EU Strategy for

rd International Hydrographic Organisation, 1953,

-Pacific Region: Germany Europe Asia: Shaping the 21st

ASEAN China Centre, 03 October

Institut de Realtions Internationales et

- The White House,

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 15

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 16

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 18

implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities;

plutonium and uranium enrichment- (US Department of State 2005). This

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 19

n and South Korea

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 20

In 2013, PM Abe made a statement in the Japanese parliament that:

international community...Things that happened between nations will look differently

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 21

(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015)

The Indo Pacific Strategy and Diverging Opinions

foreign policy was not only limited but also guided b

THE INDO-PACIFIC REVIEW, ISSUE 1 VOLUME 1 OCTOBER 2022 22