Nato
Nato
Nato
INTO NATO
October 2000
NOTE
Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
PREFACE
In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), marking a milestone in their
reintegration into the European mainstream. This enlargement of the alliance
occurred with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate in April 1998, following an
extensive debate on the three Central European countries’ qualifications for
membership. Proponents of enlarging NATO argued that the three countries would
enhance the security of the alliance and would contribute to its ability to carry out its
missions. Opponents feared that the enlargement would entail steep costs for the
United States and its allies, would make the alliance less secure by increasing its
commitments, and would antagonize Russia.
The paper was requested by the Chairman and Ranking Democratic Member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to
provide objective and nonpartisan analysis, it makes no recommendations.
The paper was prepared by John J. Lis and Zachary Selden under the
supervision of Christopher Jehn and R. William Thomas. Delia Welsh compiled the
appendix and drafted Chapter II, and Carolyn Leddy contributed invaluable research
and drafted sections of all three chapters. The authors wish to thank Jeffrey Simon,
Thomas S. Szayna, Daniel N. Nelson, Andrew Michta, Marybeth Ulrich, Paul Gallis,
Julie Kim, and Carl Ek for their insights and assistance. All responsibility for this
work, however, rests with the authors.
John Skeen edited the paper, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Judith
Cromwell prepared it for publication, and Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic
versions for CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).
Dan L. Crippen
Director
October 2000
CONTENTS
SUMMARY vii
II DEFENSE BUDGETS 5
TABLES
FIGURES
BOX
1. Conscription in Europe 7
SUMMARY
In March 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became the latest members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Just as NATO allies had done
three times previously, they extended to the new members their solemn guarantee
“that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all,” as stated in Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty. At the same time, the new allies pledged that they would contribute to the
common defense of the North Atlantic area. Working with NATO, they set out to
upgrade their militaries and to integrate their armed forces with those of the alliance.
This paper examines the progress that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have made toward integrating into NATO. It looks at their progress in
restructuring their militaries, training their personnel, adopting NATO doctrine,
modernizing outdated equipment, and generally developing the capability to fight
alongside and communicate with existing NATO forces. It also gauges their current
contributions to NATO’s operations in the Balkans and other activities. Finally, it
examines the improvements that NATO itself has pledged to carry out in the three
countries to facilitate the alliance’s activities.
Some measures indicate that the new allies are moving toward making
appropriate contributions to the alliance. Poland and the Czech Republic have
viii INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
increased their defense budgets relative to gross domestic product (GDP) to about the
average for the other European NATO members. All of the new allies are
contributing personnel to Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo at levels that are
comparable to those of similarly sized long-standing NATO members. All three have
successfully created Western-style command structures and are taking steps to
modernize their forces.
Although the new allies are progressing along the same lines and facing
similar challenges, their current contributions to the alliance vary widely. Poland, the
largest of the three, brings a military that is twice the size of the combined militaries
of the Czech Republic and Hungary, along with a strong commitment to funding its
armed forces. The Czech Republic is increasing its defense budgets and has already
exceeded some of its spending goals. Hungary spends the least on defense, but it
does provide a key strategic position that has already aided NATO in its efforts to
stabilize the Balkans. On balance, Poland is better positioned than either Hungary
or the Czech Republic to play a substantial role in the alliance.
DEFENSE BUDGETS
Defense spending fell in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia following the end of
the Warsaw Pact. Expressed as a share of GDP, between 1989 and 1997 it fell from
2.5 percent to 2.3 percent in Poland, from 2.8 percent to 1.4 percent in Hungary, and
from 2.6 percent to 1.7 percent in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic.1
in 1997 to $802 million in 1999, and Czech spending grew from $860 million in
1997 to $974 million in 1999. Defense spending as a share of GDP is now 2.1
percent in Poland, 1.7 percent in Hungary, and 2.2 percent in the Czech
Republic—levels comparable to the average of 2.0 percent for the other European
members of NATO (see Summary Figure 1).
Before joining the alliance, Hungary and the Czech Republic both pledged to
increase the share of national income that they devote to defense by 0.1 percent a
year. Specifically, Hungary agreed to an increase from 1.4 percent in 1997 to 1.8
percent in 2001, and the Czech Republic agreed to go from 1.7 percent in 1997 to 2.0
percent in 2000 (which it has exceeded). By 2003, Hungary is expected to spend $1
billion on defense, and the Czech Republic $1.2 billion. Polish defense budgets are
projected to reach $4.1 billion in 2003, 2.3 percent of GDP. Poland and Hungary are
both enjoying strong economic growth, while the Czech Republic is just starting to
recover from a recession, which could affect its ability to further increase its defense
spending.
Percentage of G DP
3.0
O ther European NA TO
Poland
A llies (Avg.)
2.5
2.0
Czech Republic
1.5
H ungary
1.0
0.5
0.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and NATO.
x INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
look beyond pure measures of spending and gauge the willingness of the new allies
to assume these tasks. In general, the new allies are taking on the burdens of
membership and contributing to NATO missions. They are contributing troops to the
Kosovo force and the Bosnia Stabilization Force at levels comparable to those of
other NATO allies of similar size. They are also helping to reach out to aspirants to
NATO by hosting Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and thus further expanding
the “zone of stability” that the alliance creates.2
Integration into NATO will require the three new members to do more than increase
their defense spending. U.S. and NATO officials point out that Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic also must train their personnel to exercise leadership and
initiative and to speak English, the functional language of the alliance. They also
must create and maintain highly ready and mobile units that can participate in NATO
missions beyond the alliance’s territory. Although all three countries face steep
modernization costs to replace obsolete or inadequate equipment, NATO has stated
that the new allies can defer purchases of expensive items such as fighter aircraft for
several years while they focus on procuring items deemed more essential to
integration, such as field radios, networked computers, navigation aids, and “identify
friend or foe” devices for aircraft.
Poland
Poland has made the greatest progress of the three new allies toward integrating its
military into NATO, according to analysts who have examined the efforts of all three
countries. Experts point to Poland’s larger defense budgets, detailed modernization
plan, and strong political support for the alliance in concluding that the country is
likely to contribute significantly to European security. While Poland faces challenges
in restructuring its forces, some observers already compare the Polish military
favorably with those of longtime NATO members such as Greece and Turkey.
In July 1999, the Polish government approved a set of regulations that will
reorganize its top military leadership along the lines of the U.S. Joint Staff. Current
plans call for drastically cutting the number of officers, particularly those in the higher
ranks, while doubling the number of sergeants by 2003. Altogether, the military is
projected to shrink from 200,400 in 2000 to 180,000 in 2003. Poland has pledged
2. Partnership for Peace is a NATO program that facilitates exchanges between NATO and non-NATO
militaries in Europe and coordinates joint exercises and training. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic were PfP members before joining NATO. PfP members are not covered by NATO’s
collective defense guarantee.
SUMMARY xi
four brigades for NATO’s high-readiness reaction forces and two divisions for the
main defense forces.
Hungary
Hungary’s geographic location allows the alliance to project stability into the most
volatile part of Europe. The country already has hosted NATO forces for operations
in Bosnia, and it is making a contribution to the ongoing NATO missions in Kosovo
and Bosnia that is comparable to the contributions of similarly sized allies such as
Portugal. Furthermore, military leaders have put forth a vigorous reform program.
Some analysts, however, point to Hungary’s small defense budgets, outmoded
equipment, and lack of a political commitment to improve the situation as indicators
that the country may not be prepared to shoulder a proportional share of the burdens
of membership in NATO.
Experts cite the Czech Republic’s specialized units, increasingly professional forces,
and modern communications system as signs that the Czech military will be able to
contribute to NATO forces in proportion to its size. But potential pitfalls loom,
particularly the challenge of maintaining government support for defense spending
and a potential “brain drain,” as talented young officers leave the military for the
private sector.
In addition to the national contributions, there are also common costs of enlargement
that NATO has agreed to bear as an alliance. According to a NATO study, these
programs will cost about $1.5 billion over the 10 years from 1999 through 2008.
3. Immediate reaction forces would be the first to be deployed during a crisis. Rapid reaction forces
would follow within in a few days.
xii INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
Those programs cover four broad issues: communications systems, an integrated air
defense, reception facilities for reinforcements, and training and field exercises.
When Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in March 1999, it marked a milestone in their transformation.
Ten years earlier, the three Central European countries had set in place the bloodless
revolutions that replaced communist governments and command economies with
democracy and free markets. For most of the ensuing decade, they sought to
reestablish the links to Western Europe that had been severed by the Nazi invasion
and Soviet occupation. In this sense, their admission to the Western alliance
signified a reentry into the European mainstream.
Of course, it is not enough for the three new allies to gain the security
provided by NATO’s umbrella; they must themselves contribute to the security of the
alliance. They must understand how other allies’ militaries operate and be able to
shoulder a proportional share of the burdens. And while they need not field the same
equipment as the other allies, they must be able to contribute modern, capable
military forces.
This paper examines the progress that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic have made toward integrating into NATO. It considers what the conditions
were when the Berlin Wall fell, what these countries accomplished in the ensuing
decade, and how they plan to fund their continuing integration into NATO. It then
looks at their progress in restructuring their militaries, training their personnel,
adopting NATO doctrine, modernizing outdated equipment, and generally developing
the capability to fight alongside and communicate with existing NATO forces. It also
gauges their current contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and other
activities of the alliance. Finally, it examines the improvements that NATO itself has
pledged to carry out in the three new member countries to facilitate the alliance’s
activities.
Providing its advice and consent in April 1998, the U.S. Senate approved the
protocols admitting the Central European countries to NATO with the understanding
that the three countries would make the alliance more secure and that enlarging the
alliance would not place an undue financial burden on U.S. taxpayers. NATO’s own
study placed the common costs at $1.5 billion over 10 years, to be divided among the
allies through the alliance’s military and infrastructure budgets. Because the United
2 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
States pays almost a quarter of each budget, the expected cost for this country is
about $400 million through 2008. While modest relative to the overall defense
budget, that sum is a significant contribution nonetheless.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all stated that they favor
further enlargement to integrate their neighbors into a common European defense and
to create a larger “zone of stability” beyond their own borders. Historically, Central
Europe has been a region of instability, a source of contention between empires, and
the flash point for two world wars. The new NATO members look at the example
of France and Germany, which have enjoyed more than 50 years of peace following
three wars in the previous 80 years, and see the alliance as an umbrella that promotes
stability and prosperity. Whether another round of enlargement that takes in
countries bordering Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic comes to pass may
well hinge on how this first round is viewed.
During the Cold War, Moscow dictated security and defense strategies for its allies,
including concentrating troops along western borders. With the collapse of the Berlin
Wall, the Central European countries confronted the task of building new military
organizations to serve the national interest and not the aims of the now-defunct Soviet
CHAPTER I FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO 3
Union. However, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact did not mean the immediate
end of Soviet influence in Central European militaries; in fact, the legacy continues
to hamper reforms.
The Soviet military model, which served as the basis for the Hungarian, Polish,
and Czech armed forces during the Cold War, is still deeply embedded in their
organization and mentality. Some military analysts characterize this “intellectual
legacy” of Soviet rule as the greatest challenge to reform efforts. Soviet doctrine
emphasized absolute reliance on orders, making it difficult to complete assigned
tasks without detailed instructions from superiors. This reliance on superior authority
clashes with Western procedures, which allow much more initiative by junior officers.
In the latter half of the 1990s, the new allies drew up comprehensive
programs of military reform focusing on modernizing and restructuring forces to
overcome the Soviet legacy. Such programs emphasize retraining officers and
noncommissioned officers in modern Western strategy, tactics, and operations.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are being challenged to transform their
militaries into lighter forces capable of rapid deployment. While the state of the new
allies’ restructuring of their armed forces varies, all are organizing according to
NATO’s configurations of corps, brigades, and battalions.
4 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
The new allies are taking many steps toward making proportional
contributions to NATO. However, they face the significant obstacle of overcoming
the 50-year legacy of the Warsaw Pact and its lingering effects on doctrine,
leadership, and training.
CHAPTER II
DEFENSE BUDGETS
In their negotiations to join the alliance, the new allies agreed to increase defense
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). In particular, the Czech
Republic pledged to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2000, and Hungary
pledged 1.8 percent by 2001. Poland pledged to increase defense spending to 3
percent of GDP, but Polish officials now say that that is a long-term goal over the
next 15 years and that near-term budgets will remain in the range of 2.1 to 2.4
percent. All three countries appear to be on track to meet or exceed those goals (see
Table 1).
Depending on economic performance, the new allies may have more funds
available for defense. But there are constraints on their spending imposed by their
desire to join the European Union (EU). To be eligible, the three countries will have
to reform their political and economic systems to conform to the EU’s criteria for
democratic and legal stability, a functioning market economy, and the administrative
responsibilities of membership. In addition, they must meet the EU’s requirement
to keep deficit spending under 3 percent of GDP.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Ministries of Defense of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the Economist Intelligence Unit; and
the U.S. Department of Defense.
6 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
The Central European nations significantly cut their defense budgets after the
Warsaw Pact crumbled (see Table 2). Hungary's defense spending fell from 2.8
percent of GDP to 1.4 percent between 1989 and 1997. After Czechoslovakia
divided in 1993, defense spending as a share of GDP in the Czech Republic fell from
2.6 percent that year to 1.7 percent in 1997. Poland's decrease in spending as a share
of GDP was less striking. In 1988, Poland spent about 2.5 percent of GDP on
defense; by 1997 that figure had dropped to 2.3 percent. All three nations spend the
largest share of their defense budgets on personnel costs. As these countries make
deep cuts in personnel, they may free up resources for modernization, although the
cost of maintaining a smaller professional military may not be less than the cost of
maintaining a much larger conscript-based force (see Box 1).
Poland
Poland has the largest military and the only navy among the new allies. In relation
to its neighbors, historically it has spent the most on defense and the most as a
proportion of GDP. As Poland prepared itself for membership in NATO, the
government increased defense spending (in 1999 U.S. dollars) from $3.2 billion in
1996 to $3.5 billion in 1997 and almost $3.6 billion in 1998. The increase was
assisted by vibrant economic growth. During the mid-1990s the economy grew at an
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Poland 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1
Hungary 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6
Czech Republica 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.9
United States 5.6 5.0 5.2 4.8 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.3
NATO,
Western Europe 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1
Overall Average
for NATO 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and NATO.
a. The Czech Republic was established on January 1, 1993, when Czechoslovakia divided into Slovakia and the Czech
Republic.
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 7
BOX 1.
CONSCRIPTION IN EUROPE
Most NATO and Warsaw Pact members maintained large numbers of conscripts
in their militaries during the Cold War. Recently, however, many of those coun-
tries have begun to follow the examples of the United States and the United King-
dom and are phasing out conscription.
annual rate of more than 5 percent, although successive Russian economic crises
reduced the demand for Polish exports. Nonetheless, Poland’s GDP is projected to
grow by 4.5 percent in 2000.
Polish defense spending is expected to remain between 2.1 and 2.4 percent
of GDP over the next several years. Given the predictions of economic growth,
Poland is expected to increase its defense budgets (in 1999 U.S. dollars) from $3.4
billion in 1999 to $4.1 billion in 2003 (see Figure 1 and Table 3). More than 13
percent of its fiscal year 2000 defense budget has been devoted to NATO-related
projects, and 10.7 percent has gone to modernization. High popular support for
NATO may also translate into higher military budgets in the future.
Hungary
Defense spending in Hungary is the lowest of the three new allies’, both as a share
of GDP and in terms of total spending (see Figure 1). In general, there is less public
support for the military and for NATO membership than in Poland. Whereas Poles
have historically viewed their military as the protector of the nation, even under
8 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
communist governments, Hungarians have long been wary of their military, which
was widely viewed as an accomplice in the Soviet Union’s domination of Hungary.
The austerity program kept defense budgets lower than those in the Czech
Republic even as the military prepared for membership in NATO, although the
defense budgets increased from $491 million in 1997 to $804 million in 2000 (in
1999 U.S. dollars; see Figure 1 and Table 3). In the 2000 budget, $47 million is
allocated for modernization and improvements specifically to meet the demands of
belonging to NATO.
4 Poland
2
C zech R epublic
H ungary
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of
Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Economist
Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of Defense.
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 9
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from NATO, the Congressional Research Service, the embassies of
Hungary and the Czech Republic, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the
Economist Intelligence Unit, and the U.S. Department of Defense.
Defense spending in the Czech Republic declined from 2.6 percent of GDP in 1993
to 1.7 percent in 1997 before rebounding to 1.8 percent in 1998 in anticipation of
membership in NATO. The country’s 2000 defense budget is $1.02 billion, or 2.2
percent of GDP. Nearly a third of that, 31 percent, is allocated for modernization,
of which 89 percent is designated for NATO-related upgrades. The Czech Republic
inherited about two-thirds of the federation’s military personnel when
Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1993; since then, the Czech government has reduced
the number of active-duty personnel from roughly 106,700 to 61,000 (see Table 4).
During the early years of transition, the Czech Republic was a model of
economic success, posting strong growth rates and low levels of unemployment.
The country fell into a recession in 1997, however, which prevented increases in
defense spending despite increases in the percentage of GDP spent on defense. The
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total 412,000 312,800 305,000 296,500 287,500 283,600 278,600 248,500 241,750 240,650 205,228
Hungary
Professional 30,500 29,700 28,700 22,900 22,000 22,100 21,911 24,099 21,346 20,700 19,800
Conscript 91,900 81,000 65,300 51,100 52,340 51,560 46,350 37,595 34,385 33,000 32,400
Total 122,400 110,700 94,000 74,000 74,340 73,660 68,261 61,694 55,731 53,700 52,200
Czech Republica
Professional 38,049 33,282 30,413 27,800 25,821 25,821 26,163
Conscript 68,630 54,326 43,178 38,000 32,693 31,191 34,717
Total 309,500 285,000 274,500 257,400 217,000 200,700 206,500 206,000 206,800 193,950 186,500
Portugal
Professional 29,100 28,100 24,900 28,500 25,500 37,100 37,100 36,600 36,600 42,060 43,230
Conscript 44,800 47,200 43,100 33,300 32,800 17,600 17,600 17,600 17,600 11,540 6,470
Total 73,900 75,300 68,000 61,800 58,300 54,700 54,700 54,200 54,200 53,600 49,700
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
a. The Czech Republic was established on January 1, 1993, when Czechoslovakia divided into Slovakia and the Czech
Republic.
Czech Republic began to recover from the recession in the last half of 1999, but
economic growth is projected to be only 1.5 percent in 2000.
In contrast to the situation in Poland, there is very little public support for
increasing defense spending to carry out the obligations of NATO membership. As
in Hungary, the armed forces have historically been held in low regard. The ex-
CHAPTER II DEFENSE BUDGETS 11
periences of 1938, when neither Czechoslovakia’s military nor its allies prevented
Germany from dismembering the country, and 1968, when the Soviet Army crushed
liberalization with what many Czechs see as the complicity of the Czech military,
led to skepticism about the utility of the armed forces and about alliances for Czech
security. As a result, there is little interest in defense matters in the Czech
parliament and no strong domestic pressure to increase defense spending.
Total amounts spent on defense give some indication of the resources each of the
new allies is able to bring to the alliance. But those amounts do not indicate how
willing and able each is to actually place its troops in harm’s way for the common
defense. A gauge of this level of commitment is the contribution each of the new
allies is making to NATO’s ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. That
contribution is an important measure because future NATO operations are likely to
be conducted by “coalitions of the willing.”
Despite the difficulties that the new allies face in adjusting to the
requirements of NATO membership, all three are contributing to the missions in the
Balkans by participating in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Bosnia Stabilization
Force (SFOR). In general, the three new allies are contributing about the same
number of troops to those missions as are long-standing NATO allies of similar size
in terms of population and active-duty forces.
The total number of troops from each of the participants in the KFOR
mission varies from month to month depending on rotations but is about 785 for
Poland (one air-assault battalion), 175 for the Czech Republic (one reconnaissance
company), and 325 for Hungary (one guard and security battalion). By comparison,
Spain averages about 960 personnel and Portugal about 325 (see Figure 2).
Although the Czech Republic’s contribution seems less than its comparable allies’,
the Czech army also supplied a field hospital with 98 personnel for humanitarian
relief operations in Albania until late 1999. In terms of the quality of personnel,
General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, notes that all
three new allies have contributed highly disciplined forces that are capable of per-
12 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
Number
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0
Poland Hungary Czech Republic Spain Portugal
forming their mission and are “man for man as effective as those from other NATO
countries.”2
The new allies’ contributions to the SFOR mission present a more mixed
picture. As of June 28, 2000, Hungary had a total of 200 personnel assigned to the
SFOR mission; the Czech Republic had 500. Both sets of forces are comparable to
the Portuguese contingent of 350. Poland had a total of 250 personnel in Bosnia,
far fewer than Spain’s contribution of 1,350. It is important to note, however, that
these totals are a snapshot and may not represent the average number of personnel
over a longer period.
The new allies also participate in other cooperative ventures within NATO.
Poland is a member of the Multinational Corps-Northeast in conjunction with
Germany and Denmark. In addition to hosting the Corps headquarters, Poland
contributes a 17,650-strong mechanized division. Poland also participates both in a
Polish-Lithuanian battalion and in a Polish-Ukrainian battalion. The Czech
Republic does not participate in any such formal alliances within NATO but
recently established a joint commission with Poland to increase cooperation
between the countries’ defense industries. In addition to coordinating
modernization programs, the joint commission aims to expand its membership to
include Lithuania and Slovakia to help them develop NATO-compatible militaries.
Hungary also does not have any formal alliances within NATO but maintains close
military relations with Poland and the Czech Republic.
For the new Central European allies, integration into NATO entails far more than
increasing defense budgets. The new allies need to overcome shortfalls in
personnel and training, which experts attribute to the legacy of the Warsaw Pact era,
as discussed in Chapter I. This chapter examines the progress that each of the three
new allies is making toward being able to operate alongside the other NATO allies.1
Some analysts note that the overall mentality of officers must change to
emphasize and reward initiative and leadership. Top-heavy militaries laden with
colonels and short on lieutenants need to lose deadweight at the top and be infused
with young officers eager to adapt to new ways of thinking.
1. Much of this information is based on interviews with U.S. scholars and defense analysts who work
with the militaries of the three countries or have studied them in depth, both for the U.S. government
and independently. Particularly helpful were Jeffrey Simon, of the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University (NDU); Thomas S. Szayna, of the RAND Corporation;
Daniel N. Nelson, of the consulting firm Global Concepts; Paul Gallis, Julie Kim, and Carl Ek, of the
Congressional Research Service; Andrew Michta, of Rhodes College; and Marybeth Ulrich, of the
Army War College. In addition, the defense attaché offices at the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech
embassies in Washington, D.C., provided information and insight into their countries’ defense plans.
The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Mission to NATO also provided information about the
programs being funded out of the alliance’s common budgets. Few publications on this topic have
come out since March 1999, when the three countries acceded to NATO, and several of the experts
consulted provided copies of unpublished manuscripts and forthcoming publications for reference in
this paper. CBO particularly relied on Jeffrey Simon, “The New NATO Members: Will They
Contribute?” NDU Strategic Forum, April 1999, and Simon, NATO Enlargement and Central Europe:
A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996); Lorenzo Forcieri, “The
Newcomers: Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary Entering NATO,” (report for the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, April 1999); Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO’s
Metamorphosis and Its New Members,” Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 1998; and David
M. Glantz, “Military Training and Education Challenges in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary,”
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 1998. In addition, the authors consulted classified
U.S. and NATO documents, but all information in this chapter comes from open sources.
16 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
that integrate larger units so they can operate smoothly with their support elements.
In addition, pilots must fly enough hours to maintain their proficiency.
Moreover, the new allies face steep modernization costs to replace obsolete
or inadequate equipment. While they cannot completely avoid this expenditure,
NATO has stated that the purchase of big-ticket items can be deferred for several
years while the new allies focus on procurement deemed more essential to
integration. Such procurement includes field radios, networked computers,
navigation aids, and “identify friend or foe” (IFF) devices for aircraft. Finally,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic must have the facilities to support allied
forces should they be deployed to their territories during a crisis.
cost considerations limit training time. Polish air force pilots, for example, fly less
than 60 hours a year on average, about a third of what U.S. military pilots fly.
According to the 15-year plan, modernization will cost Poland about $7.76
billion through 2012, and $1.26 billion of that is to be spent on improvements to
promote interoperability. For 2000, about $390 million was budgeted for
integration activities and $360 million for modernization (the latter of which
includes a $30 million U.S. loan for foreign military sales). Poland’s modernization
plan emphasizes the acquisition of new or upgraded command, control, and
communications (C3) systems, air defense, antitank systems, helicopters, and
armored vehicles (particularly armored personnel carriers). Poland expects to retain
its 772 T-72 and 116 PT-91 tanks. Facilities for secure communications with
NATO headquarters and allied capitals already have been built. Since the mid-
1990s, Polish officials have expressed their desire to also purchase 100 to 150
fighters comparable with the F-16, but they lack the funding.
American and British advisers are working with the Hungarian military to rewrite
its doctrine along Western models to harmonize its plans and strategy with NATO’s
goals. Hungary plans to cut its force size from 54,000 today to 38,000 in 2003, and
like the other new allies, Hungary is working to eliminate its surplus of senior
officers and to develop a junior officer and noncommissioned officer corps with
leadership skills. The general staff has been reorganized as a U.S.-style joint staff,
with six directorates reporting to a chief who is subordinate to the civilian defense
minister.
Hungarian defense officials admit that the target force goals they agreed to
with NATO prior to joining the alliance will be difficult to reach. (Those goals,
outlining the contribution to the alliance that each member intends to make, are
classified by NATO.) One defense official noted that Hungary promised to meet 14
18 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
of its initial 48 goals by its acceptance in March 1999 but as of June 2000 had
completed only six and was working on 40 others. Hungary now plans to meet only
23 of the goals by 2003, and the government is reviewing its initial proposal. “The
reason is not our commitment; the reason is money,” that official said, a view
shared by outside observers who credit the Hungarian military for putting forth a
vigorous reform program but criticize the government for failing to provide
sufficient funding to carry it out.
Several analysts give Hungary high marks for reforming its organizational
structure, but they are less sanguine about the level of training. One expert said, “If
you put a Hungarian unit in the field, they’re going to be incapable.” One report
indicates that conscripts, who make up 60 percent of the personnel, are often idle.
Hungarian defense officials themselves say that the training of pilots is inadequate
because of the limited flying hours imposed by a lack of funding. However, since
1998 Hungary has concentrated training so that some pilots will accumulate 100
hours of flight time per year. As a result, 30 pilots are capable of flying NATO
missions.
Czech officials say that 78 percent of their 60,000-strong military is being made
available for NATO missions, including 14 percent that will participate in the
alliance’s immediate and rapid reaction forces. The Czech Republic is likely to
meet its pledge to make a combat brigade available to the Rapid Reaction Corps by
2002. While one light airborne infantry battalion is considered ready today, the
remainder of the Czech 4th Brigade is not because of equipment shortfalls and
difficulties in attracting enough high-quality officers.
Efforts continue to reform the personnel structure but face serious problems.
“The need for personnel reforms has been there from the beginning,” one scholar
notes, “but the reforms never materialize. The legislation never passes. Junior
officers tell me that if it’s not fixed soon, they’re going to leave.” In essence, the
top-heavy officer corps blocks the career path of Western-trained junior officers.
The first Czech to graduate from West Point, for example, resigned from the
military in 1997 after only five months; of the 75 Czech officers who have spent a
significant amount of time training overseas, he was the 11th to resign. The Czech
Republic recognizes the need for a larger noncommissioned officer corps, which
currently stands at about 2,000, and plans to increase it to 10,000 by 2003.
Conscripts make up nearly half of the military, a proportion expected to drop only
to 40 percent by 2003.
Experts also point out that training remains a problem. Most Czech ground
forces do not conduct training in units larger than companies, which prevents
integrated exercises with support elements. Furthermore, the training of pilots
remains well below Western standards. While the Czech air force has increased its
training recently, low levels of flight hours combined with aging aircraft have led to
a spate of accidents. Czech ground forces have been active in training with other
NATO and Partnership for Peace countries but continue to have poor English
language skills.
1990s, that were driven more by domestic political considerations and occasionally
outright corruption than by strategic considerations.
The situation has improved over the past few years, and Czech budget plans
call for procurement spending to make up 26 percent of the defense budgets over
the next six years, including $225 million in 2000. But there has been little
pressure for greater civilian integration with the defense ministry from the left-of-
center government of Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, and a national security concept
paper released by the ministry in May 1999 was derided by Western analysts for its
lack of detail.
The Czech Republic currently has the least capable air force of the three
new members. It has 40 substandard MiG-21 fighter planes in the supersonic class,
which are expected to be scrapped in 2003. However, Czech officials plan to spend
$1 billion to purchase 72 Czech-made L-159 attack planes. The air force took
delivery of the first two aircraft in April 2000 and expects to receive 19 more by the
end of 2000. The Czech government plans to spend an additional $1.6 billion for as
many as 36 Western fighters, but the size of its defense budgets makes this a long-
term proposition at best. Other planned purchases, which are more affordable,
include radars, night-vision devices, and “smart” munitions. Upgrades are planned
for the Czechs’ existing T-72 tanks, Mi-24 helicopters, and communications
systems.
Most of the costs of defending the new allies will be paid by the countries
themselves. Restructuring and modernization costs must be paid out of national
defense budgets, and each country’s contribution to the alliance will be determined
in large part by how it executes its national defense program. However, there are
also common costs of enlarging the alliance that NATO has agreed to bear
collectively. The United States pays about one-fourth of these costs (see Table 5).
CHAPTER III RESTRUCTURING AND MODERNIZATION 21
Percentage
NSIP Military Civil of Total
By agreement, the U.S. share of NSIP costs is 22.33 percent. Therefore, the
U.S. share of the common costs of enlarging the alliance will be about $400 million
over 10 years. The Congress appropriates funding for the NSIP out of the Military
Construction Appropriations Act. The Clinton Administration, in its fiscal year
2001 budget, identified the incremental cost of appropriations for enlargement as $5
22 INTEGRATING NEW ALLIES INTO NATO October 2000
million in fiscal year 2000 and $12 million in fiscal year 2001. DoD estimates that
enlargement will cost this country $32 million in fiscal year 2002.
The programs that NATO plans to implement to integrate the three new
members fall into four broad categories: command-and-control systems (C2), an
integrated air defense, reception facilities for reinforcements, and training.
Command-and-Control Systems
NATO extended its C2 network into the three countries to link the governments and
military headquarters of the Central European allies to NATO headquarters and
other allied capitals. These links include secure fiber-optic cables from Poland and
the Czech Republic to a NATO hub in Germany and a secure satellite connection
for Hungary, which does not border any other NATO country. The establishment of
secure communications links was divided into two phases.
During the first phase, before the Central European countries joined NATO
in March 1999, communications links were put in place to provide a basic
capability. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the alliance’s top decision-making
body, approved funding in February 1999 to build on this basic capability and fully
integrate the Central European allies into NATO’s C2 systems. The alliance
estimates infrastructure costs for the C2 program at $51 million over 10 years and
operations and maintenance costs at $79 million over that same period. The U.S.
share of those 10-year costs is $11.4 million in infrastructure costs and $18.3
million in operating costs.
improvements will deepen the integration of the air-defense system, helping the
alliance gain a complete picture of the skies over the enlarged NATO territory.
NATO estimates that the NSIP will provide $560 million for all costs
related to integrating the three new allies into the NATO air-defense system and
another $21 million over 10 years for air-defense operations in the three countries.
The proposed capabilities for air defense have been approved by the North Atlantic
Council. The U.S. share would be $125 million of the infrastructure costs and $4.9
million of the operating costs.
More limited improvements are planned at the Polish ports of Gdynia and
²winouj³cie and at land facilities in all three countries. The alliance expects to use
existing road and rail links to provide reinforcements for ground forces and plans
only modest improvements at railyards. Improvements to Polish seaports include
the installation of equipment such as compatible water pipe connectors and
electrical sockets so that NATO ships can be unloaded and resupplied there.
To ensure that Polish, Hungarian, and Czech forces are capable of operating with
the other allies, they will have to conduct training exercises together. Although
NATO found that training facilities in the Central European countries were
generally adequate for this purpose, it estimated that it would provide $6 million for
infrastructure improvements and $36 million in operating costs over the period
from 1999 through 2008 to pay for transporting forces from other allies to exercises
in the Central European countries. No funding for training and exercises has yet
been approved. If those plans are carried out, the U.S. share would be $1.3 million
for the infrastructure costs and $8.3 million for the operating costs.
CONCLUSIONS
Of the three new allies, Poland has made the greatest progress toward integrating its
military into NATO, according to analysts who study all three countries. Those
experts point to Poland’s larger population and GDP, 15-year modernization plan,
and strong political support for the alliance in concluding that the country is likely
to contribute significantly to European security. Although Poland faces challenges
in modernizing its forces, some observers already compare the state of the Polish
military favorably with those of longtime NATO members Greece and Turkey.
The Czech Republic and Hungary are generally seen as being able to make
smaller contributions to the alliance than Poland, smaller than even their relative
size would suggest. Both countries lack the level of broad societal support for the
military that is found in Poland. Comparing the Czech Republic and Hungary,
some experts point to the former’s larger defense budget, specialized units, and
superior communications system as indicators that it will be able to make a larger
contribution to NATO forces than the latter. Potential pitfalls exist for the Czech
Republic, though, particularly the challenge of maintaining government support for
defense spending and a potential “brain drain,” as talented young officers leave for
more lucrative jobs in the private sector.
Perhaps the most concrete indicator of how the new allies will contribute to
future NATO operations is the degree to which they participate in existing
operations. All three of the new allies are making roughly proportional
contributions to the ongoing missions in Bosnia and Kosovo compared with other
long-standing NATO members with populations of similar size. Poland has
approximately the same number of troops in Kosovo as Spain has there. Hungary
and the Czech Republic are each contributing about the same number of personnel
as Portugal. The new allies are also taking on the burdens of further expanding the
alliance’s influence by participating in the Partnership for Peace and other
cooperative ventures with countries hoping to join the alliance.
APPENDIX
INFORMATION ABOUT DATA SOURCES
Data on defense spending, active-duty personnel, and population for this paper
came from several sources. Below is a description of those sources and the
methodologies used to compile the information.
Table 4. Armed forces totals are from INSS for the Czech Republic and
Hungary. Poland’s total active-duty figures are from The Military Balance, a
publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Table 5. Data on the contributions to common budgets are from the DoD
publication Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, March 2000.