Dot 68238 DS1-1

FTA Report No.
0231
Research Report
and Findings:
Specifications
and Guidelines
for Rail Tunnel
Design,
Construction,
Maintenance,
and Rehabilitation
PREPARED BY
Anna Rakoczy, Stephen Wilk, MaryClara Jones

Transportation Technology Center, Inc.
A subsidiary of the Association of American
Railroads
OCTOBER
20
22
COVER PHOTO
Courtesy of Adobe Stock, #93577898
DISCLAIMER
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of
information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. The United States
Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because
they are considered essential to the objective of this report. The opinions and/or recommendations expressed herein do
not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Research Report
and Findings:
Specifications and
Guidelines for Rail
Tunnel Design,
Construction,
Maintenance,
and Rehabilitation
OCTOBER 2022
FTA Report No. 0231
PREPARED BY
Anna Rakoczy
Stephen Wilk
MaryClara Jones
Transportation Technology Center, Inc.
A subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads
55500 DOT Road
Pueblo, Colorado 81001
SPONSORED BY
Federal Transit Administration
Office of Research, Demonstration and Innovation
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
AVAILABLE ONLINE
https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/research-innovation
MetricConversion
Metric
Metric Conversion Table
Conversion Table
Table
SYMBOL WHEN YOU KNOW MULTIPLY BY TO FIND SYMBOL
LENGTH
in inches 25.4 millimeters mm
ft feet 0.305 meters m
yd yards 0.914 meters m
mi miles 1.61 kilometers km
VOLUME
fl oz fluid ounces 29.57 milliliters mL
gal gallons 3.785 liters L
ft3 cubic feet 0.028 cubic meters m3
yd3 cubic yards 0.765 cubic meters m3
NOTE: volumes greater than 1000 L shall be shown in m3
MASS
oz ounces 28.35 grams g
lb pounds 0.454 kilograms kg
megagrams
T short tons (2000 lb) 0.907 Mg (or "t")
(or "metric ton")
TEMPERATURE (exact degrees)
o 5 (F-32)/9 o
F Fahrenheit Celsius C
or (F-32)/1.8
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION ii

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Research Report and Findings: Specifications and Guidelines for Rail Tunnel Design, 5b. GRANT NUMBER
Construction, Maintenance, and Rehabilitation
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES [www.transit.dot.gov/research-innovation/fta-reports-and-publications] [https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/research-

innovation] [https://doi.org/10.21949/1527644] Suggested citation: Federal Transit Administration. Research Report and Findings: Specifications
and Guidelines for Rail Tunnel Design, Construction, Maintenance, and Rehabilitation. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of
Transportation, 2022. https://doi.org/10.21949/1527644.
14. ABSTRACT
Industry needs related to rail tunnel design, construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation were identified by reviewing past tunnel
incidents and discussions with multiple transit agencies. Compilation of past tunnel incidents includes available reports published by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and other U.S. and European agencies. The tunnel structural design section covers geotechnical
exploration/investigation, geometrical requirements and clearances, load and load combination, structural material and design considerations,
waterproofing, and seismic design. Selection of tunnel type is based on geometrical configurations, ground conditions, type of crossing, and
environmental requirements, and ground/structure interaction is important in the design process. Good knowledge of the expected geological
conditions is essential. Tunnel structural components should satisfy many limit states: (1) service limit state as restriction on stress, deformation,
and crack width under normal service conditions; (2) fatigue and fracture limit state as restriction on stress range; (3) strength limit state to
ensure strength and stability; and (4) extreme event limit state to ensure the structural survival of a tunnel during a major earthquake, flood,
tsunami, collision, blast, or fire. Special consideration is given to waterproofing systems and seismic design.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Rail transit tunnel, tunnel structures, design, rehabilitation, safety
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
ABSTRACT OF PAGES
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Unlimited 132
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Executive Summary
4 Section 1 Introduction
5 Section 2 Industry Need
13 Section 3 Review of Tunnel Literature
69 Section 4 Data Collection
78 Section 5 Site Visits
103 Section 6 Standards Gap Analyses: Structural, Construction, Support
Systems, Inspection & Maintenance, and Rehabilitation
110 Section 7 Conclusions and Findings
113 Appendix A Data Collection Form
121 Appendix B Fire Curves
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION vi

LIST OF FIGURES
19 Figure 3-1 Single and double track railroad tunnels (AREMA, Chapter 1, Part 8)
30 Figure 3-2 Cut-and-cover tunneling method – Crenshaw/LAX line from above
31 Figure 3-3 Mined tunneling method
31 Figure 3-4 Tunneling method using TBM
32 Figure 3-5 Example of SEM
32 Figure 3-6 Example of immersed tunneling method – Fehmarn Tunnel construction
33 Figure 3-7 Example of jacked box tunneling method – Liberty University Tunnel,
first jacked box tunnel in U.S.
46 Figure 3-8 Longitudinal ventilation controlling smoke and hot gases
(AASHTO 2016)
46 Figure 3-9 Backlayering of smoke in tunnel where backlayer length is L
(modified from AASHTO 2016)
47 Figure 3-10 Extractive ventilation controlling smoke and hot gases
(AASHTO 2016)
51 Figure 3-11 Photograph of the RTP (DHS 2014)
69 Figure 4-1 Year of service or construction of rail transit tunnels in U.S.
70 Figure 4-2 Age of rail transit tunnels in U.S.
70 Figure 4-3 Percentage of tunnels that have been rehabilitated
71 Figure 4-4 Percentage of tunnels with each rail mode
71 Figure 4-5 Percentage of tunnels constructed with each construction method
72 Figure 4-6 Number of transit agencies with tunnels performing tunnel
inspection at different time intervals
72 Figure 4-7 Percentage of transit agencies with tunnels that have risk assessment
plans
73 Figure 4-8 Types of structural design manuals and number of agencies using
them
74 Figure 4-9 Number of structural design manuals used and number of agencies
using them
74 Figure 4-10 Types of manuals for supporting system design and number of
agencies using them
75 Figure 4-11 Number of supporting system design manuals used and number of
agencies using them
75 Figure 4-12 Types of inspection manuals and number of agencies using them
76 Figure 4-13 Number of inspection manuals used and number of agencies using
them
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION vii

76 Figure 4-14 Types of maintenance and rehabilitation manuals and number of
agencies using them
77 Figure 4-15 Number of maintenance and rehabilitation manuals used and
number of agencies using them
79 Figure 5-1 Custom-built plate-handling vehicle inside the fabrication building
carries steel plate used for reinforcement (bart.gov)
81 Figure 5-2 Warm Springs extension alignment
83 Figure 5-3 Nest in future concrete wall of WSX tunnel
85 Figure 5-4 Proposed Crenshaw/LAX line
86 Figure 5-5 Proposed Crenshaw/LAX line, 60-ft deep braced excavation at
Mariachi Plaza (courtesy of LA Metro)
87 Figure 5-6 Simplified diagram of principle of face support during TBM
excavations (courtesy of LA Metro)
88 Figure 5-7 TBM tunnel (courtesy of LA Metro)
89 Figure 5-8 HDPE membrane installed in station area
93 Figure 5-9 Example of leakage and corrosion on beam (view from station)
96 Figure 5-10 Leak on tunnel wall, deteriorated concrete, and exposed rebar
96 Figure 5-11 Leak on tunnel ceiling, efflorescence confirms salt in water
97 Figure 5-12 Deteriorated concrete columns
98 Figure 5-13 Example of spalling concrete from tunnel ceiling
98 Figure 5-14 Example of deteriorated steel columns
121 Figure B-1 Various fire temperature curves
LIST OF TABLES
17 Table 3-1 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Geotechnical Exploration and
Investigation
20 Table 3-2 Load Designations (AASHTO LRFD)
20 Table 3-3 Load Combinations (AASHTO LRFD)
21 Table 3-4 Load Combinations (LA Metro Rail)
23 Table 3-5 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Load and Load Combinations
23 Table 3-6 Other Literature That Addresses Structural Load
25 Table 3-7 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Structural Materials
26 Table 3-8 Allowable Infiltration
28 Table 3-9 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Seismic Design
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION viii

28 Table 3-10 Other Literature That Addresses Seismic Design
37 Table 3-11 Infrastructure Support System Topics Covered by Various Standards
37 Table 3-12 Energy Support System Topics Covered by Various Standards
54 Table 3-13 Potential Consequences from Each Tunnel Threat (APTA 2015)
54 Table 3-14 Matrix of Threats and Mitigations (APTA 2015)
59 Table 3-15 Inspection Types and Their Purpose
103 Table 6-1 Main Standards for Rail Tunnels
105 Table 6-2 Additional Documents for Structural Design of Rail Transit Tunnels
106 Table 6-3 Additional Documents for Construction of Rail Transit Tunnels
107 Table 6-4 Documents That Address Supporting Systems of Rail Transit Tunnels
108 Table 6-5 Documents for Maintenance and Inspection of Rail Transit Tunnels
109 Table 6-6 Documents That Can Be Adopted for Rail Transit Tunnel
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION ix

Abstract
Industry needs related to rail tunnel design, construction, maintenance, and
rehabilitation were identified by reviewing past tunnel incidents and discussions
with multiple transit agencies. Compilation of past tunnel incidents includes
available reports published by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
and other U.S. and European agencies. The tunnel structural design section
covers geotechnical exploration/investigation, geometrical requirements
and clearances, load and load combination, structural material and design
considerations, waterproofing, and seismic design. Selection of tunnel type is
based on geometrical configurations, ground conditions, type of crossing, and
environmental requirements, and ground/structure interaction is important
in the design process. Good knowledge of the expected geological conditions
is essential. Tunnel structural components should satisfy many limit states: (1)
service limit state as restriction on stress, deformation, and crack width under
normal service conditions; (2) fatigue and fracture limit state as restriction on
stress range; (3) strength limit state to ensure strength and stability; and (4)
extreme event limit state to ensure the structural survival of a tunnel during a
major earthquake, flood, tsunami, collision, blast, or fire. Special consideration
is given to waterproofing systems and seismic design.
This report was prepared for the Center for Urban Transportation Research
(CUTR) by Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), a subsidiary of the
Association of American Railroads (AAR), Pueblo, Colorado. It is based on
studies conducted by TTCI with the direct participation of CUTR to criteria
approved by them. The contents of this report imply no endorsements
whatsoever by TTCI of products, services, or procedures, nor are they intended
to suggest the applicability of the test results under circumstances other than
those described in this report. The results and findings contained in this report
are the sole property of CUTR. They may not be released by anyone to any
party other than CUTR without the written permission of CUTR. TTCI is not a
source of information concerning these tests, nor is it a source of copies of this
report. TTCI makes no representations or warranties, either express or implied,
with respect to this report or its contents. TTCI assumes no liability to anyone
for special, collateral, exemplary, indirect, incidental, consequential, or any
other kind of damages resulting from the use or application of this report or its
contents.
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION x

Executive Summary
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), with support from the Center
for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR) at the University of South Florida,
was tasked by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to research areas of
transit safety risk, identify existing specifications and guidelines for rail transit
tunnel design, construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation, and perform
a gap analysis to establish the need for additional standards, guidance, or
recommended practices to support and further the safe operation of the
nation’s public transportation industry.
The project objectives include: (1) performing an extensive literature review to

summarize and compare current specifications, guidelines, and standards for
rail transit and road tunnels in the United States (U.S.) and other countries, (2)
performing a gap analysis to determine deficiencies in the current standards,
and (3) providing recommended voluntary standards and guidance documents
that can be utilized in the industry to mitigate areas of risk associated with rail
tunnels. The Task 1 report covered the first two objectives and this final report
covers all three objectives.
Industry needs were identified by reviewing past tunnel incidents and

discussions with multiple transit agencies. The compilation of past tunnel
incidents includes available reports published by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and other U.S. and European agencies. These reports
generally involve rare but high-risk events such as fires and flooding and
emphasize public safety. A summary of needs obtained through discussions
with U.S. transit agencies emphasizes the current practices in day-to-
day operations. The industry needs findings include the need for working
fire detection, ventilation, and emergency egress along with coordinated
emergency response plans that can be used by trained personnel. The findings
from the transit agency discussions include the need for more comprehensive
guidelines for daily inspections and potential technologies that could be
utilized.
An additional literature search was conducted to compile a list of existing

design, construction, inspection, and maintenance standards and guidelines for
railway and roadway tunnels. A comparison of standards was also completed.
This review shows that multiple applicable standards and guidelines exist for
rail transit agencies, but they do not always address the rail tunnels directly.
Both European (railway) and U.S. (roadway) standards for emergency egress
and fire exits could potentially serve as a baseline for future supporting system
standards. The design, construction, inspection, and maintenance manuals are
typically standards or guidelines of best practices.
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The tunnel structural design section covers geotechnical exploration/

investigation, geometrical requirements and clearances, load and load
combination, structural material and design considerations, waterproofing,
and seismic design. The selection of tunnel type is based on the geometrical
configurations, ground conditions, type of crossing, and environmental
requirements. The ground/structure interaction is important in the design
process. Good knowledge of the expected geological conditions is essential.
The report presents many geological investigation methods and references to
reports and supplementary documents. Tunnel structural components should
satisfy many limit states: (1) the service limit state as restriction on stress,
deformation, and crack width under normal service conditions; (2) the fatigue
and fracture limit state as restriction on stress range; (3) the strength limit
state to ensure strength and stability; and (4) the extreme event limit state to
ensure the structural survival of a tunnel during a major earthquake, flood,
tsunami, collision, blast, or fire. Special consideration in the report is given to
waterproofing systems and seismic design.
The tunnel construction section covers tunnel shape, excavation methods,

initial support systems, tunnel lining, and ventilation during the construction.
Many excavation methods are available for railroad tunnel construction, and
the type typically depends on the depth, subsurface condition, surrounding
structures, and cost. Several construction methods are described in the report:
cut-and-cover; mined tunneling; Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM), Sequential
Excavation Method (SEM), also known as New Austrian Tunneling Method
(NATM); immersed tunneling; and jacked box tunneling.
The supporting system section covers two primary documents regarding

the standards and regulations related to fire and risk assessment in tunnels.
The first document is the road tunnel standards published by the National
Fire Protection Association (NFPA).1 The second document is the rail transit
tunnel regulations published by the European Union.2 The codes have different
scopes and focus on different topics. Specifically, the NFPA code focuses on
fire prevention or mitigation and the European Union Safety in Railway Tunnels
(SRT) – Technical Specification for Interoperability TSI (SRT TSI) codes focus on
passenger evacuation.
The tunnel security and risk assessment section presents various standards,
guidelines, and regulations regarding tunnel security and risk along with tunnel
support systems. These two areas are combined because tunnel supporting
systems are typically required for security and risk reasons.
1
NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), NFPA 502: Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other
Limited Access Highways, 2010.
2
EU (European Union), Commission Regulation (EU) No 1303/2014 of 18 November 2014 concerning
the technical specification for interoperability relating to “safety in railway tunnels” of the rail
system of the European Union. Brussels, Belgium, 2014.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The next section covers data collection on the rail transit tunnels in service in
the U.S. and practices used by U.S. transit agencies. The results show that at
least 17 transit agencies have tunnels and utilize a wide range of inspection
practices and manuals for design, inspection, and maintenance. The purpose
of the data collection was to (1) determine which standards are being used and
(2) summarize general tunnel characteristics, such as age, condition, shape,
construction method, and so on. The range of inspection frequencies in tunnels
varies from one week to six years, and some agencies did not provide this
information. The most common inspection manual used by transit agencies
is the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)/Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) Tunnel Inspection Manual. Other manuals used by transit agencies include
the Tunnel Operations, Maintenance, Inspection, and Evaluation (TOMIE)
Manual, Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspection Manual, and Agency
Standards.
Five transit agencies were selected to visit and to discuss their current practices
related to new tunnel design and inspection and maintenance of existing
tunnels. The following transit agencies were visited: San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(LA Metro), MTA-New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority (MBTA), and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA). Some visits focused on new tunnel design and others on
the inspection and maintenance of existing tunnels and rehabilitation/retrofit.
Topics discussed for new structures included geotechnical aspects, structural
type, and challenges during construction. The discussion for existing tunnels
focused on the inspection techniques and frequencies, common inspection
findings, and recommendations for new design tunnels.
The literature review, site visits, and data collection support analysis of the
needs and gaps in rail transit tunnel design, construction, maintenance, and
rehabilitation standards. Summary tables are provided for each main topic and
available standards, guidelines, and reports.

Section 1 Introduction
Railroad tunnels are an integral part of the rail transit industry and critical for
the movement of passengers and freight commodities across cities in the U.S.
They are alternatives for crossing under a body of water or traversing through
physical barriers such as mountains, existing roadways, railroads, or facilities.
In addition, tunnels are a viable means to minimize potential environmental
impacts from traffic congestion, such as air quality, noise pollution, or visual
intrusion; to allow alternatives for pedestrian movement; to protect areas of
special cultural or historical value, such as conservation of districts, buildings,
or private properties; or for other sustainability reasons, such as avoiding the
impact on the natural habitat or reducing disturbance to surface land.
However, the existing tunnel infrastructure inventory consists of many tunnels

exceeding 100 years of age and represents choke points that can produce severe
disruption to passenger mobility if a fire or security incident occurs. Tunnels
also represent significant financial investments with challenging design,
construction, and operational issues. Planning for a tunnel requires multiple-
disciplinary involvement and assessments. In many cases, the uniqueness
of tunnels leads to specialized research studies for each individual project,
especially geotechnical investigations of ground conditions, which are critical
for proper planning of a tunnel. For example, the selection of alignment,
cross-section, and construction methods is influenced by the geological and
geotechnical conditions, as well as the site constraints that will always be
unique for a specific project.
Life expectancies of tunnels are significantly longer than those of track

components or roads. Therefore, special attention should be dedicated to
inspection and maintenance. Tunnel inspection requires multiple-disciplinary
personnel familiar with the various functional aspects of a tunnel, including
civil/structural, mechanical, electrical, drainage, and ventilation, as well as
some operational aspects such as signals, communication, fire-life safety,
and security. If the inspection finds any issues within a tunnel structure or
supporting systems, simple to more complex maintenance processes must be
performed. If large-scale repairs and upgrades are required, the tunnel will be
subject to a complex retrofit or rehabilitation project.
This research was undertaken to determine which standards, guidelines, and

manuals exist for rail transit tunnels, to identify current gaps of knowledge,
and to develop rail tunnel recommendations for the transit industry. Task
One focused on the literature review and compilation of existing standards,
guidelines, and recommended practices, and Task Two focused on knowledge
gaps and potential recommendations.

Section 2 Industry Need
This section includes a list of general industry needs identified through the
review of available reports and recommendations from previous tunnel
incidents and discussions with transit agencies. While the scope of the
subsequent literature review will be more extensive than that addressed in this
section, identifying transit agency needs regarding tunnels provides direction
and insight into potential knowledge gaps.
The compilation includes available reports published by the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and other U.S. and European agencies.
These reports generally involve rare but high-risk events, such as fires and
flooding, and emphasize public safety. A summary of the day-to-day operational
needs identified through discussions with U.S. transit agencies is also included.
NTSB Reports
NTSB investigated the following three tunnel incidents. While passenger rail is
the focus of the report, freight rail and roadway incidents are also included due
to the low amount but high impact nature of tunnel incidents. Each description
contains a summary of the incident and corresponding NTSB recommendations.
WMATA L’Enfant Plaza Station Smoke Accident (NTSB 2016)

On January 12, 2015, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) had an electrical arcing and smoke accident between the L’Enfant
Plaza station and the Potomac River in Washington, DC.3 Train 302, with about
380 passengers onboard, stopped in the tunnel after encountering heavy smoke
and was unable to return to the station before losing power to the electrified
third rail. Some passengers on Train 302 self-evacuated and others were
assisted by first responders from the District of Columbia Fire Department and
Emergency Medical Services. The incident resulted in 1 fatality, 91 injuries,
and $120,000 of property damage. The NTSB investigated the incident and
published a report on May 3, 2016.
The probable cause of the incident was summarized in the report as follows:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the

probable cause of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (WMATA) L’Enfant Plaza station electrical arcing and
smoke accident was a prolonged short circuit that consumed
power system components resulting from the WMATA’s ineffective
inspection and maintenance practices. The ineffective practices
3
NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority L’Enfant
Plaza Station Electrical Arcing and Smoke Accident, NTSB/RAR-16/01. Washington, DC, 2016.

SECTION | 2
persisted as the result of (1) the failure of the WMATA senior

management to proactively assess and mitigate foreseeable safety
risks, and (2) the inadequate safety oversight by the Tri-State
Oversight Committee and the Federal Transit Administration.
Contributing to the accident were WMATA’s failure to follow
established procedures and the District of Columbia Fire and
Emergency Medical Services Department’s being unprepared to
respond to a mass casualty event on the WMATA underground
system.
Specific issues that led to or exacerbated the problem included:
• Electrical arc tracking due to improperly constructed power cable

connector assemblies and aided by the presence of contaminants and
moisture.
• Water intrusion had been ongoing prior to the accident.
• Tunnel washing and insulator cleaning was discontinued prior to the
accident.
• The train entered the tunnel 10 minutes after the smoke detector in the
tunnel activated and 7 minutes after another train reported smoke in the
tunnel.
• Ventilation fans were not operated until 10 minutes after train stoppage
and multiple defective fan components prevented optimal removal of
smoke, leaving only two of four fans working. Additionally, the WMATA Rail
Operations Control Center (ROCC) train control operators were not trained
on strategies for the proper use of fans.
• Ventilation systems in the train were not properly turned off, allowing
smoke to enter train cars. No procedure was developed for this event.
• A lack of emergency lighting in the tunnel and conduit and junction boxes
on the tunnel wall above the walkway were safety hazards to passengers
evacuating through the tunnel.
Due to this incident, several safety recommendations were made to multiple

parties, including FTA, U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), American
Public Transit Association (APTA), WMATA, the mayor of the District of Columbia
and its office of unified communications, and the fire and emergency medical
services department.
The following safety recommendations were made to FTA:
• R-15-7: Audit all rail transit agencies that have subway tunnel environments
to (1) assess the state of repair of tunnel ventilation systems, (2) assess
written emergency procedures for fire and smoke events, (3) assess
training programs to ensure compliance with these procedures, and (4)

SECTION | 2
verify that rail transit agencies apply industry best standards, such as
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130,4 Standard for Fixed
Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, in maintenance procedures
and emergency procedures.
• R-16-01: Issue regulatory standards for tunnel infrastructure inspection,
maintenance, and repair, incorporating applicable industry consensus
standards into those standards.
• R-16-02: Issue regulatory standards for emergency egress in tunnel
environments.
The safety recommendations given to the other parties primarily consisted

of ensuring supporting systems are in good repair, developing inspection and
maintenance practices, installing new fire and smoke detection systems, and
coordinating communication of various parties during an emergency. The
responses have not yet been judged by NTSB and are considered open.
In a national public safety plan,5 FTA addresses part of NTSB recommendation

R-15-7 by highly recommending that transit agencies follow the NFPA 1306
standards along with Recommended Fire Safety Practices for Rail Transit
Materials Selection.7
Howard Street Tunnel Fire (NTSB 2004)

On July 18, 2001, a CSX freight train derailed 11 of 60 cars while passing through
the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, Maryland.8 The derailed cars consisted
of four tank cars and one carrying tripropylene (a highly flammable gas used
in cleaning agents, lubricants, and oils) was punctured and caught on fire. The
fire spread to surrounding cars creating heat, smoke, and fumes that prevented
tunnel access for several days and caused a water main located above the
tunnel to break, flooding the tunnel with millions of gallons of water. The total
cost of the accident was estimated at $12 million, and the initial cause of the
derailment is unknown.
Some potential derailment scenarios were suggested, including sand in the

tunnel, wide-gauge track, track geometry, and track structure defects. Water
intrusion was also considered a potential factor. Recommendations to CSX
included maintaining historical documentation of maintenance activities
affecting the Howard Street Tunnel and increasing coordination with the
4
NFPA, NFPA 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, Quincy, MA, 2017.
5
FTA, National Public Transportation Safety Plan, Washington DC, 2017.
6
NFPA 130, op. cit.
7
USDOT (U.S. Department of Transportation), Recommended Fire Safety Practices for Rail Transit
Materials Selection, Washington, DC, 1998. https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/
safety/recommended-fire-safety-practices-rail-transit-materials-selection.
8
NTSB, CSX Freight Train Derailment and Subsequent Fire in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore,
Maryland, on July 18, 2001, Railroad Accident Brief, NTSB/RAB-04/08, Washington, DC, 2004.

SECTION | 2
City of Baltimore. One of the recommendations to the City was to update

emergency preparedness documents to include hazardous materials discharge
response procedures specific to tunnel environments, as well as infrastructure
information on the Howard Street Tunnel. The majority of the responses by CSX
and the City of Baltimore were deemed acceptable.
While the fire occurred on a freight line carrying material that would not be
present along transit lines, the need for maintenance records and emergency
preparedness is relevant to all types of tunnels and crisis situations.
Bay Area Rapid Transit District Fire (NTSB 1979)

On January 17, 1979, two cars on a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) transit train
caught fire while moving through a tunnel under San Francisco Bay.9 Forty-two
individuals were evacuated from the burning train through emergency doors
into the gallery walkway located between the two single-track tunnels and into
a waiting train in the adjacent tunnel. The incident resulted in 1 fatality of a
firefighter, 44 smoke-related injuries, and $2,450,000 of property damage. NTSB
investigated the incident and published a report on July 19, 1979.
The NTSB investigation determined the probable cause of the accident was the
breaking of a collector shoe assembly on the train when it struck a line switch
box cover, which had fallen from an earlier train. The report also mentioned
inadequate coordination between BART and the Oakland and San Francisco fire
departments, inadequate following of an emergency response plan, a lack of
passenger carbody design to limit or prevent fire from entering the interior, the
release of smoke from the tunnel into the gallery walkway from open doors, and
the plastic materials used in the construction of the transit cars produced heavy
smoke and toxic fumes.
NTSB made several recommendations to the BART district, APTA, and Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) (currently FTA), including but not
limited to:
• R-79-42: Revise emergency procedures to clarify the necessity of unloading

passengers immediately from a stopped burning train in the Transbay Tube
and other long tunnel locations.
• R-79-44: Revise Transbay Tube emergency fan and damper procedures to
prevent smoke from engulfing an entire train and/or entry into the gallery.
• R-79-53: Review and revise as necessary vehicle inspection procedures and
emergency evacuation guidelines for APTA members to correct deficiencies
noted in this investigation.
9
NTSB, Bay Area Rapid Transit District Fire on Train No. 117 and Evacuation of Passengers while in the
Transbay Tube, Railroad Accident Report, NTSB-RAR-79-5, Washington, DC, 1979.

SECTION | 2
• R-79-54: Promulgate regulations establishing minimum fire safety

standards for the design and construction of rapid transit vehicles.
Other recommendations involved addressing the cause of the fire, upgrading

transit materials to better resist fire, and modifying the emergency response
plan with the Oakland and San Francisco fire departments. NTSB deemed
that the BART district responded acceptably to R-79-42 and R-79-44 and that
APTA responded acceptably to R-79-53. The UMTA reaction to R-79-54 was
deemed unacceptable. As an author note, the development of NFPA 13010 (dated
2017 and first published in 1990) addresses many of these issues and is used
currently by many transit agencies.
Other Notable Tunnel Incidents

This section addresses other incidents that were either not investigated by
NTSB or occurred in countries other than the United States. Both railway and
roadway tunnel incidents are included.
Road Tunnel Fires

Multiple road tunnel fires between 1999 and 2001 contributed to the push
for tunnel safety assessment in Europe. These fires occurred in tunnels that
connected two European countries in which the length of the tunnels and the
difficulty of responder communication contributed to delayed emergency
response.
• On March 24, 1999, the Mont Blanc Tunnel fire resulted in 39 fatalities
and many injuries due to a fire originating in a truck carrying flour and
margarine. The Mont Blanc Tunnel is a 7.3-mile (11.6-km) single-bore tunnel
with bidirectional traffic that connects France and Italy. The truck in which
the fire started stopped in the tunnel and the temperature quickly rose to
1,832°F (1,000°C). Both fire detection systems were delayed from a lack of
alarm on the French side and a turned-off alarm on the Italian side due to
false alarm issues. The airflow in the tunnel was believed to be traveling
from Italy to France, allowing truckers and passengers on the Italian
side to escape but engulfing the French side in toxic smoke. An Italian
operator decided to introduce oxygen instead of extraction, which fueled
the fire and compounded the adverse effects on the French side. Another
contributing factor was known ventilation deficiencies that had not been
repaired before the incident.
• On May 29, 1999, a fire in the Tauern Road Tunnel resulted in 12 fatalities
and 42 injuries. The Tauern Road Tunnel is a 4-mile (6.5-km) single-bore
tunnel in Austria. The fire started due to collision between a truck and
a stationary vehicle waiting at a traffic signal. This incident eventually
10
NFPA 130, op cit.

SECTION | 2
involved 60 vehicles. Investigations suggest eight victims died from the

collision and four died from the fire.
• On October 24, 2001, the St. Gotthard Tunnel fire resulted in 11 fatalities
and many injuries. The St. Gotthard Tunnel is a 10.6-mile (17-km)
single-bore tunnel with bidirectional traffic that connects two towns in
Switzerland. The fire started when a truck collided with another truck
carrying tires, igniting the tires and leading to toxic black smoke and
temperatures reaching 1,832°F (1,000°C). An investigation found the safety
systems worked well, and recommendations were made to reduce traffic
flows through the tunnel.
Partly due to these fires, the European Union passed directive 2004/54/EC on
April 29, 2004,11 on road tunnel safety. Additionally, the European Union passed
directive 2008/168/EC on safety in railway tunnels on July 3, 2008, and it was
updated November 18, 2014, with Commission Regulation No. 1303/2014.12
Channel Tunnel Fires (United Kingdom/France)

The Channel Tunnel, a 32-mile (50-km) tunnel connecting the United Kingdom
and France, has experienced multiple fires since being put into service,
with three notable fires occurring in 1996, 2006, and 2008. The tunnel is the
longest undersea tunnel and consists of three bores; the two outside tunnels
accommodate rail traffic and the middle tunnel is used as an emergency escape
route.
The 1996 and 2008 fires closed the Channel Tunnel for 7 and 16 hours,
respectively. Both incidents occurred on trains carrying heavy goods vehicles
and resulted in minor passenger injuries due to smoke inhalation. The 2006
fire resulted in a minor shutdown time. The authors of this report are unaware
of any action taken in response to these fires. The lack of fatalities during the
tunnel fires was partially attributed to the three-tunnel layout of the Channel
Tunnel, as opposed to a single-tunnel system such as the Mont Blanc, Tauern
Road, and St. Gotthard Tunnels.
Gerrards Cross Tunnel (Buckinghamshire, England)

On June 30, 2005, the Gerrards Cross Tunnel near Buckinghamshire, England,
collapsed during construction. No trains were in the tunnel during the collapse,
but it could have resulted in dozens, if not hundreds, of deaths if the collapse
had occurred at a different time. The cause of the collapse was attributed to
uneven backfilling, which created higher loads on the crown and not enough fill
on the sides.
11
EU, Directive 2004/54/EC on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the Trans-European Road
Network. Brussels, Belgium, 2004.
12
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.

SECTION | 2
The authors of this report are unaware of any push for additional regulations
after the incident; however, it gives an example of how improper construction
techniques can result in tunnel collapses.
Tunnel Security Incidents

Multiple tunnel security incidents have also occurred in past decades from
terrorist attacks. These incidents can be especially catastrophic because of the
preplanned nature and motivation to affect the maximum number of people.
• The July 7, 2005, London bombings were a series of coordinated terrorist

suicide bomb attacks in London, United Kingdom, targeting civilians
traveling on the city's public transport system during the morning rush hour.
Four Islamic terrorists separately detonated three bombs in quick succession
aboard London Underground trains across the city and later detonated
a fourth bomb on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. The train
bombings occurred on the Circle Line near Aldgate and Edgware Road and on
the Piccadilly line near Russell Square. Fifty-two people were killed and more
than 700 were injured in the attacks, making it Britain's deadliest terrorist
incident since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, as well as the country's first-ever Islamist suicide attack.
• On February 6, 2004, a bomb linked to Chechen separatists exploded inside
a crowded Moscow subway station during morning rush hour. The incident
involved 39 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. The incident resulted in
enhanced security in Moscow and other Russian cities.
• On February 18, 2003, a suspected suicide from self-immolation produced
an arson fire in the Jungangno Subway Station in Daegu, South Korea. The
incident started with a mentally unstable man throwing flammable liquid
inside a subway car and igniting it. The fire spread due to flammable seats
and other internal furnishings. A power failure trapped passengers inside
the remaining five cars. The incident resulted in 198 fatalities, 147 injuries,
and more than 50 people missing. In response, the South Korean president
promised to install emergency lighting, increase the number of exit signs,
make car interiors flame resistant, and heighten security.
• On March 20, 1995, a sarin gas attack was coordinated by religious
extremists in Tokyo, Japan. The incident involved 12 fatalities and the
exposure of 5,000 to 6,000 people to sarin gas. The attack was coordinated
by 10 people working in two groups to release the gas on five trains. The
religious sect had enough gas to kill 4.2 million people, but the subway
network air filtering system attributed to limiting the fatalities to 12.
Tunnel Flooding
Tunnel flooding from rainstorms, hurricanes, or dam breaks can cause damage
exceeding billions of dollars. In recent decades, two significant subway flooding

SECTION | 2
events occurred in the United States: the Chicago flood in 1992 and Hurricane
Sandy in New York City in 2012 (DHS 2014).13
The Chicago flooding was caused by piling driven into the Chicago River bottom
producing a leak in the tunnel causing damage to city property estimated at
nearly $2 billion. The damage from flooding due to Hurricane Sandy is estimated
to be tens of billions of dollars.
Subway and tunnel flooding is considered a significant risk in the upcoming

century due to rising seawater levels and the number of subway systems near
coastal areas. High-risk storms such as Hurricane Sandy are anticipated to become
more common in the upcoming century, so prevention measures and technologies
are important for mitigating the damage from these increased risk events.
Discussions with Transit Agencies

The incidents previously listed typically involve fire and other scenarios
that require emergency response. Because they directly involve the safety
of passengers, employees, and emergency responders, they often result in
regulatory standards. These can include but are not limited to:
• Use of materials that can withstand fire temperatures and not contribute to
toxic smoke and gases
• Adequate installation of ventilation and agency employee knowledge of
best practices for ventilating tunnels during fire, smoke, or gas incidents
• Adequate measures to ensure passenger egress from tunnels and
emergency responder access points
• Adequate emergency response plans for agencies and emergency
responders and proper communication between these parties
• New technologies to mitigate against flooding risks
While emergency response in rare but high-risk events is a significant focus, the
industry has additional daily operational needs. The following list was compiled
based on discussions with U.S. transit agencies:
• Inspection and maintenance guidelines that agencies can use for tunnel
structure integrity and supporting systems
• Dynamic movement from train vibrations or seismic events
• New technologies that can be implemented to improve tunnel safety and
that could be used for inspections
DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security), Resilient Tunnel Project, DHS Science and Technology
13
Directorate 508, July 2014.

Section 3 Review of Tunnel Literature
This section presents a literature review of existing U.S. and international
standards, guidelines, and recommendations regarding transit tunnels.
The objective is to determine what standards exist, how different standards
compare, and to identify current knowledge gaps.
The project team compiled multiple sources to understand existing standards,

guidelines, and recommended practices. These sources include roadway tunnel
standards and standards from international sources, as both are relevant to
railway tunnel standards in the United States.
The literature review is divided into six sections based on the topics:
• Tunnel Structural Design

• Tunnel Construction
• Tunnel Supporting Systems
• Tunnel Security and Risk Assessment
• Tunnel Maintenance and Inspection
• Tunnel Rehabilitation
The tunnel structural design section covers geotechnical investigations of

ground conditions, geometrical requirements, and cross-section elements.
Many methods for structural design and materials are available and are
described in this section. All applicable loads and load combinations needed for
structural design are also listed.
The construction section covers common construction methods: cut-and-cover,

shield driven, bored, jacked, immersed tube, drill and blast, and Sequential
Evacuation Method (SEM). Additional aspects of construction, such as
temporary support and ventilation during the construction, are also described.
Tunnel supporting systems play a significant role in ensuring the safety of

passengers, personnel, and emergency responders inside a tunnel during an
incident. Supporting systems include but are not limited to fire detection,
ventilation, and passenger egress. This section and the tunnel security and risk
assessment section overlap because supporting systems are often required for
security and emergency response.
The tunnel security and risk assessment section describes agency planning
for and response to incidents instead of the equipment that will be used
(supporting systems). This also incorporates security and emergency response.
The tunnel maintenance and inspection section covers maintenance activities,

inspection requirements, procedures for inspection reports, and tunnel

SECTION | 3
evaluation. It also describes potential issues within a tunnel and repair

methods.
Tunnel Structural Design

Railway tunnel design incorporates the initial planning and design stages
of tunnel construction. Many structural design methods and materials
are available, but all structures must be designed for specified limit states
considering all applicable loads and load combinations.
Tunnel design is strongly dependent upon the geological setting, site

conditions, and construction methodology. The ground/structure interaction is
important in the design process. According to the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Load and Resistance Factor
Design (LRFD), tunnels should be designed for specified limit states to achieve
the objectives of constructability, safety, and serviceability, with due regard to
issues of inspectability, maintenance, and economy:14
The specified 150-year design life is appropriate for the design of tunnel
geotechnical features and soil-structure-interaction-systems given high
capital costs of rehabilitation and replacement and the likely importance to
the transportation network. Internal structures such as roadway slabs and
suspended ceilings as well as system components, such as signs, piping, and
their supports; communication and signal devices; and ventilation equipment
that are more easily replaced, may have design lives assigned to them by the
Owner.
According to LA Metro Rail Design Criteria and New York City Transit Authority
(NYCT) Structural Design Guidelines DG452a, the tunnel structures are to be
designed for 100 years. The criteria that must be met include crack width and
crack control, concrete composition, waterproofing, and corrosion control of
rebar and structural steel.
The AASHTO LRFD tunnel structural components should satisfy the following
limit states:15
• The service limit state as restriction on stress, deformation, and crack width
under regular service conditions.
• The fatigue and fracture limit state as restriction on stress range as a result
of repetitive machinery or ventilation loads at the number of expected
stress range cycles.
14
AASHTO (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials), LRFD Road Tunnel
Design and Construction Guide Specifications, Publication Code LRFDTUN-1, First edition, 2017.
15
Ibid.

SECTION | 3
• The strength limit state taken to ensure that strength and stability, both
local and global, are provided to resist the specified statistically significant
load combinations that a tunnel and its component parts are expected to
experience in its design life.
• The extreme event limit state taken to ensure the structural survival of a
tunnel during a major earthquake, flood, tsunami, collision, blast, or fire, or
when an immersed tunnel is subject to sinking vessels or anchor drag loads
possibly during, or in conjunction with, a scour event.
According to AASHTO LRFD, the selection of the type of tunnel should be

based on the geometrical configurations, ground conditions, type of crossing,
and environmental requirements. The choice for a tunnel location should be
supported by an analysis of alternatives, which is typically completed during the
planning and National Environmental Policy Act phase of tunnel projects.
Geotechnical Exploration/Investigation
The first step for railway tunnel design will always be geotechnical investigation
of ground conditions. Geotechnical investigations are critical for proper planning
of a tunnel. Selection of the alignment, cross-section, and construction methods
is influenced by the geological and geotechnical conditions, as well as the site
constraints. Knowledge of the expected geological conditions is essential.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Technical Manual for Design

and Construction of Road Tunnels – Civil Elements16 presents what should be
considered for the selection of the tunnel profile:
• Avoid locations where potential ground movements or settlements could

cause surface problems to existing utilities or surface facilities. Mitigation
measures should be accounted for.
• Be aware of the presence of active or inactive faults.
• Consider the soil and rock properties and their anticipated behaviors
during excavation.
• Consider the presence of contaminated materials, special existing
buildings and surface facilities, existing utilities, or the presence
of sensitive installations such as historical landmarks, educational
institutions, cemeteries, or houses of worship.
American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA)

Manual for Railway Engineering (Chapter 1, Part 8)17 specifies the following
common practices:
16
FHWA (Federal Highway Administration), Technical Manual for Design and Construction of Road
Tunnels – Civil Elements, Publication No. FHWA-NHI-10-034, December 2009.
17
AREMA (American Railway Engineering Maintenance-of-Way Association), Manual for Railway
Engineering, Chapter 1 – Roadway and Ballast, Part 8 – Tunnels, 2017.

SECTION | 3
• Geotechnical Data Report (GDR)

• Geotechnical Baseline Report (GBR)
• Geotechnical investigation
• Soil sampling and rock coring
• Horizontal directional coring
• Pilot tunnel
• Field testing
• Laboratory testing
• Rock mass classification and analysis
FHWA’s technical manual for tunnels18 and AASHTO’s LRFD road tunnel guide19
provide phases of the geotechnical investigation program:
• Phase 1 – Information Study

• Phase 2 – Surveys and Site Reconnaissance
• Phase 3 – Geologic Mapping
• Phase 4 – Subsurface Investigations
• Phase 5 – Environmental Issues
• Phase 6 – Seismicity
• Phase 7 – Additional Investigations during Construction
• Phase 8 – Geospatial Data Management System
Geotechnical reports required for planning, design, and construction of road

tunnels, including GDR, presents all the factual geotechnical data; Geotechnical
Design Memorandum (GDM), presents interpretations of the geotechnical
data and other information used to develop the designs; and GBR defines
the baseline conditions on which contractors will base their bids. Applicable
manuals and guidelines for geotechnical exploration and investigation are listed
in Table 3-1.
18
FHWA-NHI-10-034, op. cit.
19
AASHTO LRFDTUN-1, op cit.

SECTION | 3
Table 3-1 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Geotechnical Exploration and
Investigation
Document Applicability
FHWA-NHI-10-034, December 2009, Technical Manual for Design
Direct application
and Construction of Road Tunnels – Civil Elements
AASHTO LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide
Direct application
Specifications, First Edition, 2017
AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 8, Part 11 – Lining
Direct application
Railway Tunnels
Essex, Randall J. Geotechnical Baseline Reports for Underground Supplementary
Construction: Guidelines and Practice. New York: ASCE, 1997 information
Raines, Gregory L. Geotechnical Investigations for Mechanical Supplementary
Tunneling. American Society for Civil Engineering. information
International Society for Rock Mechanics (ISRM). Bedrock
Supplementary
Classification System. Basic Geotechnical Description of Rock
information
Masses, 1980.
International Society for Rock Mechanics (ISRM). Bedrock
Classification System. “Suggested Methods for the Quantitative
Supplementary
Description of Discontinuities in Rock Masses,” International
information
Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences & Geomechanics
Abstracts 15: 319–68. 1977.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Geophysical Exploration for
Supplementary
Engineering and Environmental Investigations. EM 1110-1-1802,
information
August 1995.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Geotechnical Investigations. Supplementary
EM 1110-1-1804, January 2001. information
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Laboratory Soils Testing. Supplementary
EM 1110-2-1906, November 1980, updated August 1986. information
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Soil Sampling. EM 1110-1-1906, Supplementary
September 1996. information
U.S. Federal Highway Administration. Geotechnical Earthquake Supplementary
Engineering. FHWA H1-99-012, December 1998. information
U.S. Federal Highway Administration. Geotechnical Supplementary
Instrumentation. FHWA H1-98-034, October 1998. information
U.S. Federal Highway Administration. Subsurface Investigations. Supplementary
FHWA HI-97-021, November 1997. information
Geometrical Requirements and Clearance

The geometrical requirements and recommendations of new road/rail
tunnels include horizontal and vertical alignments and tunnel cross-section
requirements. Clearances for railway tunnels will be dependent on tunnel
shape, car type, widths of drainage ditches, escape walkways, track separation,
and track curvature.

SECTION | 3
FHWA-NHI-10-03420 describes all cross-section elements for road tunnels,

including:
• Travel Lane and Shoulder

• Sidewalks/Emergency Egress Walkway
• Tunnel Drainage Requirements
• Ventilation Requirements
• Lighting Requirements
• Traffic Control Requirements
• Portals and Approach
AASHTO LRFD21 specifies that a minimum walkway width of 3 ft 6 in (1.07 m)

should be provided outside the shoulders or, when no shoulders are present,
outside the roadway. The walkway should be raised above the roadway by a
minimum of 6 in (0.15 m) to be protected from oncoming traffic. The requirements
of NFPA 50222 must be considered when dimensioning shoulders and walkways.
The AREMA Manual23 does not provide recommendations, leaving it up to the

designers to ensure the clearance is sufficient for the specific tunnel. It does
provide a minimum standard for both single and double track (Figure 3-1).
20
21
AASHTO LRFDTUN-1, op. cit.
22
NFPA 502, op. cit.
23
AREMA Manual 2017, Chapter 1, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
Figure 3-1 Single and double track railroad tunnels (AREMA)24
The European Union Safety in Railway Tunnels – Technical Specification for

Interoperability (SRT TSI)25 Section 4.2.16 states that a width of 2 ft 7.5 in (0.8 m)
and clearance of 7 ft 4.5 in (2.25 m) for escape walkways be considered during
tunnel geometric design.
Load and Load Combinations

The tunnel structures should be designed for specified limit states considering
all applicable loads and load combinations. AASHTO LRFD26 defines all the load
factors for various loads comprising a load combination. Table 3-2 lists load
designations and Table 3-3 describes load combinations per AASHTO LRFD.
24
Ibid.
25
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.
26

SECTION | 3
Table 3-2 Load Designations (AASHTO LRFD)

Permanent Loads Transient Loads
CR = force effects due to creep AD = anchor drop
DC = dead load of structural components and AP = air pressure
nonstructural attachments BL = force effect due to blast
DW = dead load of wearing surfaces and utilities BR = vehicular braking force
EH = horizontal earth pressure load CE = vehicular centrifugal forces
ES = earth surcharge including foundation surcharges CS = construction loading
EV = vertical pressure from soil and rock tunnels EQ = earthquake load
PI = loads due to piping systems inside the tunnel FI = force effect due to fire
PS = secondary forces due to post-tensioning IA = attachment dynamic load allowance
SE = effect of settlement of tunnel structure IM = vehicular dynamic load allowance
SH = force effects due to shrinkage LL = vehicular live load
LS = live load surcharge
PL = pedestrian live load
LS = live load surcharge
PL = pedestrian live load
SS = ship sinking
TG = force effect due to temperature gradient
TU = force effect due to uniform temperature
WA = water load
WAf = water load due to flooding
WAt = transient water load
Wtsu = water load due to tsunami
Table 3-3 Load Combinations (AASHTO LRFD)

Load Combinations (AASHTO LRFD)
Basic load combination relating to permanent ground loading conditions that develop over time
Strength T-I
after the completion of construction, and to the normal vehicular use of structure.
Load combination relating to the temporary ground loads imposed during tunnel excavation.
Strength T-II Also related to construction imposed loading on segmental tunnel linings and immersed tunnel
segments during fabrication, transportation, handling, and erection or placement.
Extreme Event T-I Load combination including earthquake.
Extreme Event T-II Load combination relating to ship grounding/sinking, anchor drop, flood, tsunami, blast, or fire.
Load combination relating to flood or tsunami used to check the resistance of the underground
Extreme Event T-III
construction to the effects of buoyancy.
Load combination relating to permanent ground loading conditions that develop over time after
Service T-I
completion of construction and the normal vehicular use of the structure.
Load combination relating to service level water loads used to check the resistance of the under-
Service T-IA
ground construction to the effects of buoyancy.
Load combination relating to the temporary ground loading conditions that develop during
Service T-II
construction.
Fatigue T-I Fracture and fatigue load combination related to infinite load-induced fatigue life.

SECTION | 3
LA Metro Rail specified more load cases within the Live Load LL group that are
specific for rail tunnels:
• Weight of heavy rail vehicle (HRV)

• Weight of heavy rail crane car (HP)
• Weight of light rail vehicle (LRV)
• Weight of light rail maintenance car (LP)
Also, other specifics to the rail operation load were defined, such as:
• Derailment loads (DR)

• Dynamic load allowance (IMV, IMH)
• Centrifugal force (CE)
• Longitudinal force (LF) due to acceleration and deceleration (for example,
emergency braking and BR), restraint of continuous welded rail (CWR), and
rail bumping posts
• Down drag force (DD)
• Rail fracture (RF)
• Railroad or vessel collision load (CV)
Table 3-4 describes load combinations used in the LA Metro Rail standard.
Table 3-4 Load Combinations (LA Metro Rail)

Strength I Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway without wind.
Strength II Load combination relating to use of owner-specified permit vehicles without wind.
Strength III Load combination relating to non-operational use of the guideway with high velocity wind.
Strength IV Load combination relating very high dead load to live load force effect ratios.
Strength V Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway with operational wind.
Strength VI Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway with emergency braking (BR).
Load combination relating to operational use of guideway during the maximum design earthquake
Extreme Event I
(MDE) seismic event for connection of superstructure to substructure only (See Metro SSDC).
Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway with the operational design
Extreme Event IA
earthquake (ODE). See Appendices A and B.
Load combination relating to operational use of guideway during a vehicle or a railroad collision
Extreme Event II (CT). (Vehicle and railroad collisions are considered separate events and should not be applied
simultaneously. See Section 5.2.16)
Extreme Event III Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway during a derailment.
Extreme Event IV Load combination relating to a rail fracture.
Service I Load combination relating to operational use of the guideway with operational wind.
Load combination intended to control yielding of steel structures and slip of slip-critical
Service II
connections due to live load.
Load combination for longitudinal analysis relating to tension in prestressed concrete structures
Service III with the objective of crack control and to principal tension in the webs of segmental concrete
girders.

SECTION | 3
Load combination relating only to tension in prestressed concrete substructures with the objective
Service IV
of crack control.
Service V Load combination relating only to control of uplift and concrete tension during derailment.
Load combination relating only to segmental bridges, with no live loads and full temperature
Service VI
gradient.
Fatigue and fracture load combination relating to repetitive live load and dynamic response for
Fatigue I
transit and roadway vehicles.
Fatigue and fracture load combination relating to repetitive live load and dynamic response for
Fatigue II
transit and roadway maintenance and permit vehicles.
LA Metro Rail specified Special Design Considerations for tunnels and,

particularly, a vertical vibration section. It recommended performing an
analysis of the dynamic interaction between the vehicles and the guideway
structure to avoid resonance and provide passenger comfort. The specifications
state: “To limit vibration amplification due to the dynamic interaction between
the superstructure and the rail car(s), the first-mode natural frequency of
vertical vibration of each simple span guideway should generally be not less
than 2.5 hertz, and no more than one span in a series of three consecutive
spans should have a first-mode natural frequency of less than 3.0 hertz. Special
analysis shall be performed for any bridge or for superstructures having a first
mode of vertical vibration less than 2.5 hertz or for the condition when more
than one span in a series of three consecutive spans has the first mode of
vibration less than 3.0 hertz.”27
NYCT Structural Design Guidelines (DG 452A)28 defined train axle loads on subway
tracks. Also, the guidelines provide tables with maximum values of shear,
moment, and floor beam reaction due to train load on various span lengths
from 6 to 100 ft (1.8 to 30 m). In addition, the impact and centrifugal forces (if
applicable) should be added to the dead load and train load.
Other applicable manuals and guidelines for load and load combinations are
listed in Table 3-5 and additional literature addressing structural load is listed in
Table 3-6.
27
LA Metro Rail Design Criteria Section 05 Structural/Geotechnical.
28
NYCT (New York City Transit), DG 452A Structural Design Guidelines: Subway and Underground
Structures, Issue No. 3, November 24, 2015.

SECTION | 3
Table 3-5 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Load and Load Combinations
AASHTO LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications, First Edition, 2017. Direct application
LA Metro Rail Design Criteria Section 05 Structural/Geotechnical. Direct application
NYCT DG 452A Structural Design Guidelines: Subway and Underground Structures Issue No. 3,
Direct application
November 24, 2015.
Minimum Design Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE/SEI 7-16),
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), describes the means for determining dead, live, soil, Supplementary
flood, tsunami, snow, rain, atmospheric ice, earthquake, and wind loads, and their combinations information
for general structural design.
Design Loads on Structures during Construction (ASCE/SEI 37-14), American Society of Civil Supplementary
Engineers (ASCE). information
Supplementary
International Existing Building Code and Commentary, International Code Council, ICC IEBC-2015.
information
California Building Code, Title 24, Part 2 (Volumes 1 & 2 - Includes Parts 8 & 10), International Code Supplementary
Council, ICC CBC-2016. information
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Engineering and Design, Tunnels and Shafts in Rock. Supplementary
EM 1110-2-2901, May 1997. information
Concrete Structures under Impact and Impulsive Loading. Information Bulletin No. 187, Supplementary
International Federation for Structural Concrete, August 1988. information
Table 3-6 Other Literature That Addresses Structural Load

Barton, N., R. Lien, and J. Lunde. “Engineering Classification of Rock Masses for the Design of Supplementary
Tunnel Support.” Rock Mechanics 6 (4), 1974. information
Bickel, J. O., T. R. Kuesel, and E. H. King, eds. Tunnel Engineering Handbook, Second Edition. Supplementary
New York: Chapman & Hall, 1996. information
Bieniawski, Z. T. Engineering Rock Mass Classifications: A Complete Manual for Engineers and Supplementary
Geologists in Mining, Civil, and Petroleum Engineering. New York: Wiley, 1989. information
Choi, Sunghoon. Tunnel Stability Under Explosion. New York: Parson Brinckerhoff Incorporated, Supplementary
2009. information
Russel, H. A. “ITA Guidelines for Structural Fire Resistance of Road Tunnels.” Routes/Roads 324, Supplementary
October 2004. information
Structural Materials and Design Consideration

Tunnel structural components should be designed to resist load combinations
and conform to the requirements of the LRFD specifications. The structural
behavior of components constructed from concrete, steel or steel in combination
with other materials, and wood should be investigated for each stage that may
be critical during construction, handling, transportation, and erection, as well as
during the service life of the structure of which they are a part.

SECTION | 3
LA Metro Rail Design Criteria29 provide details about structural materials, for
example:
• Minimum compressive strength of concrete to be 4,000 psi (27.6 MPa)

for aboveground and underground reinforced concrete cast-in-place
structures; 6,000 psi (41.4 MPa) for prestressed concrete; 5,000 psi (34.5
MPa) for precast prestressed concrete members.
• Reinforcing steel must conform to AASHTO M 31 for billet steel bars or
ASTM A706 for low-alloy steel bars and additional requirements listed.
• Prestressing steel strand ASTM A416 (AASHTO M 203) (low relaxation), high
strength steel bar ASTM A722 (AASHTO M 275).
• Refer to AISC Manual of Steel Construction: Load and Resistance Factor
Design,30 latest edition, Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325
or A490 Bolts for use of bolts in snug-tightened, pretensioned, and slip
critical joint applications.
• Structural steel channels, angles, MC shapes: ASTM A36 or ASTM A50,
structural steel W shapes for building frame: ASTM A992; structural steel
tube: ASTM A500 Gr B; structural steel pipe: ASTM A53 Gr B; for uses
requiring higher steel strengths or where economically justifiable: ASTM
A242, A441, A514, A572, A588.
Similar requirements are provided in NYCT Structural Design Guidelines,31 for

example:
• Minimum compressive strength of cast-in-place concrete should be 4,000

psi (27.6 MPa), and for precast concrete should be 5,000 psi (34.5 MPa).
• Minimum compressive strength of shotcrete concrete should be 4,000 psi
(27.6 MPa), and for fill materials concrete should be 2,000 psi (13.8 MPa).
• Reinforcing steel must conform to ASTM A706 or ASTM A615, Grade 60.
• Structural steel channels, angles, MC shapes: ASTM A36 or ASTM A572,
structural steel W shapes for building frame: ASTM A992; structural steel
tube: ASTM A500 Gr B; structural steel pipe: ASTM A53 Gr B; structural
plate: ASTM A36, A572, A786, A606, A607, A653.
• Steel to steel fastening should be ASTM A325 or A490 bolts. Additional
details are provided for nuts, washers, threaded rods, and steel studs.
Other applicable manuals and guidelines for structural materials are listed in
Table 3-7.
29
LA Metro Rail, op. cit.
30
AISC (American Institute of Steel Construction), Steel Construction Manual: Load and Resistance
Factor Design, Third edition, 2001.
31
NYCT DG 452A, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
Table 3-7 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Structural Materials

Document Main Topic
American Concrete Institute’s Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete (ACI 318-08) Reinforced and
and Commentary, 2008 prestressed concrete
American Concrete Institute’s ACI-224R-01: Control of Cracking in Concrete Structures,
Concrete
ACI Committee 224, 2002.
Precast/Prestressed Concrete Institute’s PCI Design Handbook: Precast and Prestressed
Prestressed concrete
Concrete.
Smith, D. D. Fiber Reinforced Concrete for Precast Tunnel Structures. New York: Parson Fiber-reinforced
Brinckerhoff, Inc., 2011. concrete (FRC)
American Concrete Institute’s ACI 506.5R-09: Guide for Specifying Underground Shotcrete,
Shotcrete
ACI Committee 506, 2009.
AISC Steel Construction Manual, 15th Edition, 2017. Steel structures
American Welding Society’s Structural Welding Codes D1.1 and D.5, ASTM Standards Steel structures
American Welding Society’s Structural Welding Code – Steel, American National Standard Code
Steel structures
AWSD1.1/D1.1.
ASCE-SEI Design of Wood Structures Wood structures
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Other
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Other
Waterproofing
Waterproofing must be designed to resist the anticipated hydrostatic pressures
and negative effects of groundwater infiltration. There are two basic types of
waterproofing systems: drained (open) and undrained (closed).
Open waterproofing systems (drained) allow groundwater inflow into a tunnel

drainage system. The open system is commonly used in rock tunnels where
water infiltration rates are low. The open waterproofing system generally allows
for a more economical secondary lining and invert design, as the hydrostatic
load is greatly reduced or eliminated.
Closed waterproofing systems (undrained), often referred to as tanked systems,

extend around the entire tunnel perimeter and aim to exclude the groundwater
from completely flowing into the tunnel drainage system. Thus, no groundwater
drainage is provided and secondary linings must be designed for full hydrostatic
water pressures. These systems are often applied in permeable soils where
groundwater discharge into the tunnels would be significant.
Waterproofing systems may include:
• Water stops (treatment of penetrations)

• Gaskets
• Membrane waterproofing
• Liquid applied waterproofing

SECTION | 3
Permanent walls that do not have applied waterproofing, along with slurry
walls, secant pile walls, and tangent pile walls used as the temporary support of
excavation, should be subject to the permissible leakage criteria.
Permissible leakage criteria must be given in the contract specifications to

determine the acceptability of the construction. The tunnel drainage system
should be designed to accommodate the project leakage criteria. Criteria
generally include a measured infiltration of volume/ft2/day and a maximum
flow at any single point. Typical criteria range from 0.0002 to 0.01 gal/ft2/day,
with 0.02 gal/minute of flow from any single leak. The owner must establish
the required leakage criteria for long-term management of incoming water, the
selected structural system and associated number of joints, and constituent
components of the groundwater, including groundwater chemistry and
contaminants. For immersed tunnels, no dripping or visible leakage from a
single location will be permitted.
The allowable water infiltration values listed in Table 3-8 are based on criteria
obtained from the International Tunneling and Underground Space Association
(ITA), Singapore’s Land Transport Authority, Singapore’s Public Utilities Board,
Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Rail Corporation, and the German Cities Committee,
as well as criteria used by various projects in the United States (e.g., Washington
D.C., San Francisco, Atlanta, Boston, Baltimore, Buffalo) and others abroad
(Melbourne, Australia, Tyne & Wear in the UK, and Antwerp, Belgium) for both
highway and transit tunnels.
Table 3-8 Allowable Infiltration

Tunnels ≤ 0.002 gal/ft2/day
Underground public space ≤ 0.001 gal/ft2/day
The WMATA Standard Specifications (Section 7) allow for water leakage at rates
of 0.08 to 0.14 gallons per 250 linear feet of tunnel, depending on the type of
tunnel structure. Earlier tunnel designs did not incorporate a waterproofing
membrane within the final tunnel liner construction nor in the station area.
Significant water infiltration and corrosion were common problems with the
previous design. WMATA adopted the new waterproofing method in 1983/1984
as part of a construction contract value engineering change proposal when
it decided to utilize the SEM, also known as New Austrian Tunneling Method
(NATM), for the Outer B Route.
Installation of this system begins with a smooth substrate layer of geotextile

material attached to the tunnel crown and side walls by a steel nail and a PVC
washer disk assembly. The geotextile material serves two functions: (1) to
provide a drainage path for water infiltration that is directed to a collection
system and (2) to provide a protection barrier between the initial liner surface

SECTION | 3
and the waterproofing geomembrane. Once the geotextile material is securely

fastened, the synthetic geomembrane (comprised of a PVC sheet material) is
wrapped around the tunnel crown and sides and heat welded to the previously
installed PVC washer disk assemblies. Membrane material is overlapped a
minimum of 6 in (0.15 m), and the seams are heat welded.
At final cast-in-place liner construction joints and certain other locations, PVC
water stop is attached to the membrane by heat welding. The water stop is used
to define discrete liner segments (typically 50 ft long). After the waterproofing
geomembrane has been installed, grout pipes are placed at specified locations
prior to pouring the final concrete lining. The final concrete liner is then poured
directly against the installed waterproofing system. If water intrusion later
becomes a problem, these pipes can be accessed to inject a grout material that
will seal the leak and provide an additional waterproof barrier.
The permanent concrete liner is protected from water intrusion by the

geomembrane and the geotextile. The geomembrane acts as an impervious
barrier and the geotextile serves to capture the water. The intercepted water
flows to the bottom of the tunnel sides where it is transported by a special
drain collection system. This water control system has resulted in significantly
drier tunnel sections on the Outer B Route. More details about this system can
be found in “Waterproofing and Its Effect on Operation and Maintenance of
Underground Facilities,” FTA scope, March 1998.
Seismic Design
The tunnel structures should be designed to accommodate the deformations
imposed by the ground. The structure must provide a high level of assurance
for protection of life safety during and after a maximum design earthquake
(MDE), or a safety evaluation earthquake (SEE). This earthquake produces
the maximum level of ground motion for which a structure is to be designed
or evaluated. The structure must also provide a high level of assurance of
continued operation during and after a functionality evaluation earthquake
(FEE).
• Determination of Seismic Environment

– Earthquake fundamental
– Ground motion hazard analysis
– Ground motion parameters
• Factors That Influence Tunnel Seismic Performance
– Seismic hazard
– Geologic conditions
– Tunnel design, construction, and condition

SECTION | 3
• Seismic Performance and Screening Guidelines of Tunnels

– Screening guidelines applicable to all types of tunnels
– Additional screening guidelines for bored tunnels
– Additional screening guidelines for cut-and-cover tunnels
– Additional screening guidelines for immersed tubes
• Seismic Evaluation Procedures – Ground Shaking Effects
– Evaluation of transverse ovaling/racking response of tunnel structures
– Evaluation of longitudinal response of tunnel structures
• Seismic Evaluation Procedures – Ground Failure Effects
– Evaluation for fault rupture
– Evaluation for land sliding or liquefaction
Applicable manuals and guidelines for seismic design are listed in Table 3-9 and
supplementary documents are listed in Table 3-10.
Table 3-9 Applicable Manuals and Guidelines for Seismic Design

National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP). NEHRP Requirements, latest version. Direct application
AASHTO, LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications. Direct application
Supplementary
AASHTO, LRFD Bridge Design Specifications.
information
Supplementary
AASHTO, Guide Specifications for LRFD Seismic Bridge Design.
information
AREMA, Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 9 – Seismic Design for Railway Structures
General guidelines
(Part 1.6.6 - Tunnels and Track Protecting Sheds).
LA Metro Rail Design Criteria Section 05. General guidelines
Caltrans, Seismic Design Criteria Version 1.7 April 2013 (minimum seismic design requirements
General guidelines
for bridges).
NYCT, Structural Design Guidelines, DG 452A. General guidelines
Supplementary
Virginia State Building Codes and Regulations, VA-USBC 2009.
information
Table 3-10 Other Literature That Addresses Seismic Design

Improved Seismic Design Criteria for California Bridges: Provisional Recommendations. Applied Supplementary
Technology Council, Report ATC-32, California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), 1996. information
Seyed-Mahan, M. Procedures in Seismic Analysis and Design of Bridge Structures, release II draft. Supplementary
Caltrans Division of Structures, California Department of Transportation, 1996. information
Idriss, I. M., and J. I. Sun, User’s Manual for SHAKE91: A Computer Program for Conducting Supplementary
Equivalent Linear Seismic Response Analyses of Horizontally Layered Soil Deposits. Center for information
Geotechnical Modeling, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of
California at Davis, 1992.

SECTION | 3
Youd, T. L., and I. M. Idriss, eds. Proceedings of the NCEER Workshop on Evaluation of Liquefaction Supplementary
Resistance of Soils. Technical Report NCEER-97-0022, National Center for Earthquake Engineering information
Research, 1997.
Wang, J. Seismic Design of Tunnels: A Simple, State-of-the-Art Design Approach, William Barclay Supplementary
Parsons Fellowship, Parsons Brinckerhoff, Monograph 7, 1993. information
U.S. Department of Transportation, Seismic Design Considerations for Mass Transit Facilities, Supplementary
Publication No. DOT-T-94-19, 1994. information
Tunnel Construction
Railway tunnel construction incorporates the physical construction process
of the tunnel. This section includes tunnel construction methodologies and
relevant aspects for tunnel construction.
The common types of construction methods include cut-and-cover, shield

driven, bored, jacked, immersed tube, drill and blast, and Sequential Evacuation
Method (SEM). The tunnel’s exterior shape usually changes with changes in
the tunnel construction method or to accommodate greater stresses at depth.
Some tunnels may have different shapes along their length because the ground
conditions change along their length. For example, a tunnel could start out
using shallow cut-and-cover techniques, but as it penetrates deeper into the
subsurface and crosses under obstacles, other tunneling methods may be used,
such as SEM, drill and blast, or even Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) methods.
The construction methodology is dictated by:
• Ground condition
• Required clearance
• Economics
• Environment and available land around the portals
• Risk
Many rail tunnel construction aspects are similar to those typically used for
road tunnel construction, so the material either overlaps or is similar. A notable
exception is clearance, as that aspect is railroad specific. Another exception
is tunnel finish, as the aesthetic of the tunnel finish is not as important for
railroads as for roadways.
Tunnel Shape
The shape of railroad tunnels can vary and will depend on the depth, subsurface
conditions, and surrounding structures. The existing literature does not specify
or recommend tunnel shapes but lists the various types and typical situations in
which each tunnel shape is used.32

SECTION | 3
There are three main shapes of highway tunnels—circular, rectangular, and

horseshoe (or curvilinear). The shape of the tunnel is mainly dependent on
the method used to construct it and on the ground conditions. For example,
rectangular tunnels are often constructed by the cut-and-cover method, the
immersed method, or jacked box tunneling. Circular tunnels are generally
constructed using either TBM or drill and blast in rock. Horseshoe configuration
tunnels are generally constructed using drill and blast in rock or SEM/NATM.
Tunnel Excavation Method

Many excavation methods are available for railroad tunnel construction.
The excavation type used typically depends on depth, subsurface condition,
surrounding structures, and cost. As with tunnel shape, the existing literature
does not specify or recommend tunnel excavation methods but lists the various
methods and typical situations in which each excavation method is used.
• Cut-and-cover tunnels (Figure 3-2) are built by excavating a trench,

constructing the structure in the trench, and covering it with soil. The
tunnels may be constructed in place or by using prefabricated sections.
Figure 3-2 Cut-and-cover tunneling method – Crenshaw/LAX line from above

SECTION | 3
• Mined tunnels (Figure 3-3) are built utilizing mechanical excavating

equipment or blasting without disturbing the ground surface. These
tunnels are usually labeled according to the type of material being
excavated.
Figure 3-3 Mined tunneling method
• Bored tunnels are constructed using TBMs without disturbing the ground
surface.
• Rock tunnels are excavated through the rock by drilling and blasting, by
mechanized excavators in softer rock, or by using rock TBMs (Figure 3-4). In
certain conditions, SEM is used.
Figure 3-4 Tunneling method using TBM

SECTION | 3
• Soft ground tunnels are excavated in soil using a shield or pressurized

face TBM (principally earth pressure balance or slurry types) or by mining
methods known as SEM (Figure 3-5).
Figure 3-5 Example of SEM
• Immersed tunnels (Figure 3-6) are made from very large precast concrete
or concrete-filled steel elements that are fabricated in the dry, floated
to the site, placed in a prepared trench below water, connected to the
previous elements, and then covered up with backfill.
Figure 3-6 Example of immersed tunneling method – Fehmarn Tunnel construction

SECTION | 3
• Jacked box tunnels (Figure 3-7) are prefabricated box structures jacked
horizontally through the soil using methods to reduce surface friction.
Jacked tunnels are often used for shallow depths where the surface must
not be disturbed, such as beneath runways or railroad embankments. By
using this method, flat tunnel structures can be built underneath existing
infrastructure without affecting traffic on the surface.
Figure 3-7 Example of jacked box tunneling method - Liberty University Tunnel,
first jacked box tunnel in U.S.
Initial Support Types

Tunnels excavated by TBM use precast concrete segmental linings. These linings
may be either a one-pass precast concrete segmental lining or a two-pass
precast concrete segmental lining with a cast-in-place concrete final lining. The
open-type, or main beam, TBM does not install concrete segments. Instead, the
rock is held up using ground support methods such as ring beams, rock bolts,
shotcrete, steel straps, ring steel, and wire mesh.
Tunnels excavated by SEM use combinations of lattice girders, shotcrete, bolts,

dowels, or self-drilling anchors (SDAs). Engineers have the option of designing
different cast-in-place concrete or shotcrete final linings for defined reaches
of the tunnel. Generally, the internal geometry of the tunnel remains constant,
but lining thickness, reinforcement bar size, and spacing can be adjusted for
different loading conditions.
Tunnels excavated using conventional mining methods, including SEM, use

combinations of bolts, dowels, friction rock stabilizers, SDAs, steel ribs, lagging
or lattice girders, and shotcrete. AASHTO LRFDs specify minimum length and

SECTION | 3
maximum spacing for rock reinforcement,33 gravity wedge analysis to determine

anchor loads and orientation,34 and reinforced roof arch.35
Tunnel Lining
Lining railway tunnels is important for maintaining the structural tunnel
integrity and preventing the negative effects of groundwater infiltration.
Tunnel linings are structural systems installed after excavation to:
• provide ground support

• maintain the tunnel opening
• limit the flow of groundwater and/or gas
• support appurtenances
• provide a base for the final finished exposed surface of the tunnel
Tunnel linings are designed as compression members, considering the

combined interaction of axial and moment load effect. Tunnel linings are
designed for the second-order effects due to elastic deformations. Segmental
linings are designed for the load effects resulting from construction tolerances.36
The selection of liner type will depend on multiple variables, including

geotechnical material and quality, groundwater, costs, and aesthetics.
Much of the existing literature emphasizes liners:
• AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering Chapter 8, Part 1137 – Covers cast-in-
place concrete and shotcrete with steel sets
• LA Metro Rail – Cast-in-place concrete, precast segmental concrete,
fabricated steel, and shotcrete38
SRT TSI39 Section 2.4.1.2(a) states that the integrity of the tunnel lining must
be maintained during a fire to allow for the safe evacuation of passengers.
SRT TSI Section 2.4.1.2(b) states the same but for the tunnel’s structure. More
information about fire resistance of tunnel structures is presented in the Tunnel
Supporting Systems section of this report.
Tunnels are often lined with concrete and internal finish surfaces. Some rock
tunnels are unlined except at the portals and in certain areas where the rock is
33
USACE (U.S Army Corps of Engineers), Rock Reinforcement, EM 1110-1-2907, Washington DC,
February 1980.
34
USACE, Tunnels and Shafts in Rock, EM 110-2-2901, Washington DC, May 1997.
35
Bischoff, J. A., and J. D. Smart. “Method of Computing Rock Reinforcement System which is
Structurally Equivalent to an Internal Support System,” Proceedings of the 16th Symposium of Rock
Mechanics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, September 22-24, 1975, 179-184.
36
37
AREMA, Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 8, Part 11 – Lining Railway Tunnels, 2017.
38
LA Metro Rail, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
less competent. In this case, rock reinforcement is often needed. The following
types of linings are described in more detail in FHWA’s technical manual for
tunnels:40
• Cast-in-Place Concrete
• Precast Segmental Lining
• Steel Plate Lining
• Shotcrete Lining
• Selecting a Lining System
LA Metro Rail has established the general requirements and design procedures
for tunnel linings utilizing FHWA’s technical manual for tunnels,41 Chapter 10 –
Tunnel Lining, current edition, which incorporates LRFD.
The TOMIE Manual42 recommends tunnel linings to have the following attributes:
enhance visibility, be fire-resistant, not generate toxic fumes during fire,
attenuate noise, and be easy to clean.
Refuge niches are another aspect that can be included in tunnel linings. In the
AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering, refuge niches are described as openings
within the tunnel lining that can be used to store equipment and people
temporarily. Chapter 8, Part 11 (Section 8.11.27)43 states that refuge niches
should be placed at intervals of 200 ft (60 m) and staggered with opposite sides
so the spacing of niches is approximately 100 ft (30 m) apart. The niche size
should protect people and maintenance equipment. However, material should
not be stored in refuge niches.
Ventilation during Construction

Proper ventilation of railway tunnels during tunnel construction or
rehabilitation is necessary as improper ventilation can lead to severe physical
injury and death for workers. A buildup of carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide,
and other gases such as methane can be emitted from diesel engines. Gasoline
engines are not permitted in tunnels due to gas and explosion risk.
Chapter 12, Part 4 of the AREMA Manual44 specifies that hazardous materials
arise as problems in two instances: design and construction. Hazardous soil
materials must be properly identified, transported, and removed. Gases must
39
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.
40
41
Ibid.
42
FHWA, Tunnel Operations, Maintenance, Inspection, and Evaluation (TOMIE) Manual, Publication No.
FHWA-HIF-15-005, July 2015.
43
44
Ibid, Chapter 12, Part 4.7 Rail Transit – Tunnels.

SECTION | 3
be detected using air quality detection systems and removed using ventilation
techniques.
Chapter 1, Part 8 of the manual45 has requirements for ventilation during

construction or rehabilitation. These include:
• Airflow requirement of 100 cubic feet per minute (cfm) per total equipment
diesel brake horsepower plus 200 cfm per person in tunnel.
• Linear air velocity requirement is 60 feet per minute.
• Carbon monoxide requirement is below 20 parts per million (ppm),
nitrogen dioxide below 5 ppm, less than 20% for any flammable gas such as
methane, and between 19.5 and 22% for oxygen.
More information about ventilation in emergencies is described in the following

section.
Tunnel Supporting Systems

This section includes a summary of the topics contained within each regulation
or standard. If multiple regulations or standards cover a topic, a brief
comparison between the topics is made.
General Overview of Standards/Regulations

This overview covers three primary documents regarding the standards
and regulations concerning fire and risk assessment in tunnels. The first
two documents—NFPA 130 and NFPA 502—cover fire and other emergency
standards for general fixed guideways and roadway tunnels. The third
document—SRT TSI—includes transit tunnel regulations published by the
European Union. Standards and regulations from individual European countries
exist, but the general European code is used because of its extensiveness.
The NFPA 13046 code focuses on passenger rail stations, trainways, and
vehicles, emphasizing enclosed trainways, which would cover rail transit
tunnels. The NFPA 50247 code focuses on general highway locations with limited
access, which would cover roadway tunnels. Both NFPA documents cover fire
protection and fire and life safety requirements. The scope of the SRT TSI48
includes preventing or mitigating the risks related to evacuation or rescue
operations following a tunnel-specific railway incident. This means the codes
have different scopes and focus on different topics. Specifically, the NFPA codes
focus on fire prevention or mitigation, and the European SRT TSI codes focus on
passenger evacuation. However, there are common sections in these codes and
much overlap.
45
Ibid, 2017, Chapter 1, op. cit.
46
NFPA 130, op. cit.
47
NFPA 502, op. cit.
48
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
An overview of the topics contained in the three documents is displayed in

the following tables: Table 3-11 presents the infrastructure subsystem topics
covered and Table 3-12 presents the energy subsystem topics.
Table 3-11 Infrastructure Support System Topics Covered by Various Standards

Topic NFPA 130 NFPA 502 SRT TSI
Exits and Technical Rooms 6.3 - 4.2.1.1
Fire Resistance of Tunnel Structure 6.2 7.3 4.2.1.2
Fire Reaction of Building Materials 6.2 - 4.2.1.3
Fire Detection 6.4.4 7.4 4.2.1.4
Evacuation Facilities and Escape Walkways 6.3 7.16 4.2.1.5, 4.2.1.6
Fire Fighting Points 6.4.5 7.10 4.2.1.7
Emergency Communication and Train Control 10 7.5 4.2.1.8
Table 3-12 Energy Support System Topics Covered by Various Standards

Topic NFPA 130 NFPA 502 SRT TSI
Segmentation of Overhead Line or Conductor Rails - - 4.2.2.1
Overhead Line or Conductor Rail Grounding - - 4.2.2.2
Electricity Supply 6.4.8 12.4 4.2.2.3
Electrical Cables - 12.2 & 12.3 4.2.2.4
Reliability of Electrical Installations - 12.5 4.2.2.5
Emergency Lighting 6.3.5 12.6 4.2.1.5
Chapter 12 of the AREMA Manual49 is still in development, but it could eventually

serve as a broad guideline for transit tunnel safety procedures and equipment.
The following topics are anticipated to be covered: (1) train and car capacity,
(2) crisis management, (3) fire, (4) loss of power, (5) train crash, (6) flooding,
(7) emergency evacuation, (8) security (passenger safety and trespassers),
(9) maintenance requirements (lighting, material storage, track capacity for
maintenance, foot walk or other access for personnel), and (10) mechanical
systems (HVAC, plumbing, maintenance access), utilities needed to support
tunnel operations, and communication and train control. Many of these sections
being developed will be relevant to tunnel supporting systems.
Infrastructure Support Systems

The infrastructure support systems section covers the necessary equipment
and design for fire safety and passenger egress. All three documents cover the
infrastructure support system extensively.
49

SECTION | 3
Exits and Technical Rooms

Technical rooms are enclosed spaces with doors for access/egress inside or
outside the tunnel with safety precaution installations, which are necessary
for at least one of the following functions: self-rescue, evacuation, emergency
communication, rescue and firefighting, signaling and communication
equipment, and traction power equipment.
SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.1 states that unauthorized access should be prevented
to technical rooms, and emergency exits should be locked from the outside
but always allowed to open from the inside.50 NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 do not
cover this topic specifically, but the egress specifications in the documents are
detailed in the next section.51
From discussions with transit agencies, an additional industry need is to ensure

these exits self-close to reduce the escape of smoke or gases.
Evacuation Facilities and Escape Walkways

Evacuation facilities and escape walkways allow passengers, employees, and
emergency responders to egress or access the area of a tunnel in which there
is an incident. All three documents cover evacuation facilities and escape
walkways. Evacuation facilities are also referred to as safe areas. NFPA 130
Section 6.3 states that exits should be located every 2,500 ft (762 m) with cross
passages every 800 ft (244 m) if cross passages are used in lieu of emergency
exit stairways. Other specifications are fire ratings of the exits, the inclusion
of self-closing doors, and the size of escape walkways. NFPA 502 Section
7.16 states that exits should be located every 1,000 ft (300 m) and specifies
signage, survivability timeframe, walking surfaces clearance and slippage, and
emergency doors.
SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.5 states that safe areas should be located every 0.62 mi (1
km) and specifies size, length of survivable conditions, egress, door clearance,
communication, lighting, and signage. SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.6 states that escape
walkways should be of a certain size and have handrails.
Fire Resistance of Tunnel Structures

It is imperative to ensure the tunnel structure integrity remains after a fire to
prevent a tunnel collapse. Both NFPA 50252 and SRT TSI53 cover fire resistance
of tunnel structures. NFPA 502 Section 7.3 states the tunnel structure must
withstand exposure by the Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) time-temperature curve or
other recognized standard, meaning no permanent damage is allowed after
50
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.
51
NFPA 502, op cit.
52
Ibid.
53
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
120 minutes. The fire curves are described in Appendix B of this report. SRT
TSI Section 4.2.1.2 states that tunnel lining and surrounding structures must
withstand temperatures of fire for sufficient periods. This period must be in
accordance with evacuation scenarios included in the emergency plan. SRT
TSI Section 2.4.1.2(a) states that the integrity of the tunnel lining should be
maintained during a fire to allow for the safe evacuation of passengers. SRT TSI
Section 2.4.1.2(b) states the same but for the tunnel structure.
The SRT TSI requirements are more general, in which the fire resistance should
be determined based on location, type of traffic, and so on. The NFPA standards
assume a tanker truck of 50 m3 of fuel with a fire load of 300 megawatts
that lasts for 120 minutes, which is an assumption for road trucks and not
necessarily applicable for railway vehicles. The SRT TSI guidelines suggest using
the EUREKA curve (see Appendix B).
The International Tunneling Association’s Guidelines for Structural Fire Resistance

for Road Tunnels (May 2004) is another resource that covers guidelines for road
tunnel structure fire resistance.
Fire Reaction of Building Materials

Ensuring the integrity of non-structural components is not necessary to avoid
a collapse but to ensure that supporting systems keep working during a fire for
safety reasons. Additionally, burning non-structural components can help fuel
the fire and release toxic gases.
NFPA 130 Section 6.2 is dedicated to fire resistance and preventive measures
during construction. This includes the use of standpipes during construction
(6.2.1), types of material that can be used for each construction method (6.2.2),
walkways (6.2.6), and multiple other railway components. NFPA 220, Standard
on Types of Building Construction, is a common reference for fire resistance of
construction materials.
NFPA 502 provides fire protection and life safety requirements for road tunnels,
such as protection of structural elements, fire detection, communication
systems, traffic control, fire protection, tunnel drainage system, emergency
egress, and electrical and emergency response.
SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.3 states that construction products and building elements
inside tunnels should comply with 2000/147/EC standards. These products
include liners and all other non-structural products. NFPA 502 does not cover
this topic.
Fire Detection
Fire detection systems are installed in tunnels to quickly communicate to the
operations control center and emergency responders that a fire is present

SECTION | 3
within a tunnel. All three documents cover fire detection. NFPA 130 Section 6.4.4
states that automatic heat and smoke detectors should be installed at traction
power substations and signal bungalows. NFPA 502 Section 7.4 states manual
and/or automatic alarms should be present depending on tunnel length and
type. For tunnels with manual fire alarms, the alarms should be present every
300 ft (90 m) and at every cross-passage and means of egress. These alarms
should be installed, inspected, and maintained in compliance with NFPA 72,
National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code. Automatic fire detectors should be able
to locate fire within 50 ft (15 m) and correspond to tunnel ventilation zones.
SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.4 states that fire detectors in technical rooms are required
for tunnels longer than 0.62 mile (1 km) and that they should alert infrastructure
managers in case of fire.
The International Fire Code (IFC)54 provides minimum regulations for fire
prevention and fire protection systems using prescriptive and performance-
related provisions.
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Research Report

83655 compiled a list of available fire detection and warning systems to detect
smoke, gases, heat, and flames. NCHRP Report 836 recommends that detection
system type selection should be based on the fire safety goals and overall fire
safety strategy. The list includes:
• Linear (line-type) Heat Detection (LHD): These devices come in analog,

digital, and fiber-optic versions. Recent tests show LHD devices can
detect tunnel fires to a desired accuracy within 90 seconds by changes in
semiconductor resistance (analog), component melting (digital), or light
scattering (fiber optics). While these devices are proven to be long-lasting
and reliable, they can be impacted by airflow, require replacement after a
fire, and require long cables in long tunnel environments.
• CCTV (closed-circuit television) video image smoke detection: These
devices detect fires by changes in brightness, contrast, edge content,
loss of detail, and motion. Advantages include being able to be used for
other purposes (security, smoke detection), covering large areas, tracking
moving vehicles, and assisting emergency responders in better planning a
response. Disadvantages include nuisance alarms, so multiple detections
or confirmations are required before setting an alarm.
• Flame detectors: These devices sense fires by the amount of radiant
energy they emit and include ultraviolet (UV), infrared (IR), ultraviolet-
infrared (UVIR), or multiple wavelength IR systems. These systems have
the advantage of working well in harsh environments; new systems have
International Code Council (ICC), International Fire Code (IFC), 2015.
54
Maevski, I., Guidelines for Emergency Ventilation Smoke Control in Roadway Tunnels, National
55
Cooperative Highway Research Program, NCHRP Research Report 836, Transportation Research
Board, 2017.

SECTION | 3
video cameras attached for visual confirmation and can detect fires
within 60 seconds (the fastest based on current testing). Disadvantages
include nuisance (false) alarms from welding, lightning, and so on, and a
long detection range that allows a fire to be detected by multiple devices,
making it difficult to determine the exact fire location.
• Spot-type heat detectors: These devices are more traditional and
include many types such as duct smoke detectors, projected beam-type
smoke detectors, and heat detectors. Advantages include being readily
available, not requiring specialized contractors, and being inexpensive.
Disadvantages include difficulties with reducing nuisance alarms to detect
fires quickly.
Using two or more alarm systems enhances fire detection capabilities and
tunnel fire safety. Care should be taken when using automatic devices, as
conditions can rapidly change.
Fire Fighting Points

For longer tunnels, typical firefighting equipment cannot access the tunnel;
therefore, built-in firefighting points, also referred to as standpipes, are
necessary to combat fires. All three documents address firefighting points.
NFPA 130 Section 6.4.5 requires standpipe and hose systems every 800 ft (244
m), fed from two locations, identifiable, and able to supply at least one hour of
water. NFPA 502 Section 7.10 states that firefighting points are mandatory in
Type C (1,000–3,280 ft; 305–1,000 m) and D (>3,280 ft; > 1,000 m) tunnels and
should be part of an integrated system. Specifics will vary on the tunnel type.
Additionally, the firefighting point should be capable of supplying water at the
necessary capacity for a minimum of an hour. Hose connection types should be
communicated to the local fire departments.
SRT TSI Section 4.2.7 states the number of firefighting points be determined
based on the tunnel length and type of rolling stock. These firefighting points
should be equipped with sufficient water supply and accessible to emergency
response units.
Emergency Communication and Train Control

During an incident, communication between the railway crew, passengers,
or emergency responders with the operations control center is important
for coordination and efficient response. Both NFPA 502 and SRT TSI cover
emergency communication. NFPA 130 Section 10.4 and NFPA 502 Section 7.5
state that two-way radio systems should be installed in tunnels. SRT TSI Section
4.2.8 states that emergency communication be located in tunnels over 0.62 mi
(1 km) and ensure fixed and mobile communication in safe areas.

SECTION | 3
Train control technologies are important for reducing the number of incidents
within tunnels. Chapter 12 Section 4.7.3.12 of the AREMA Manual mentions
coordinating signals between equipment rooms, trackside equipment, and
emergency communications. In addition, there should be an equipment room
with emergency communication capabilities and emergency telephones along
escape walkways.
Energy Support Systems

Energy support systems cover the necessary equipment to supply electrical
power to the tunnel. This topic is addressed by both NFPA 502 and SRT TSI;
however, SRT TSI has additional topics that are solely related to train transit.
NFPA 130 only addresses emergency lighting and does not have a section on
energy support systems.
Energy Segmentation of Overhead Line or Conductor Rails

SRT TSI Section 4.2.2.1 states that traction energy supply should be divided
into sections not exceeding 3.1 mi (5 km) if the signaling system allows for the
presence of more than one train. NFPA 502 emphasizes motor vehicle road
tunnels and does not cover energy segmentation.
Overhead Line or Conductor Rail Grounding

SRT TSI Section 4.2.2.2 states that grounding devices should be provided at
tunnel access points. Groundings can be portable or fixed installations that are
manually or remotely controlled. NFPA 502 emphasis is on motor vehicle road
tunnels.
Electricity Supply
Keeping a backup electricity supply is imperative to ensure supporting systems
have the power to function as intended during emergencies if the primary
power source shuts down. NFPA 130 Section 6.4.8 and NFPA 502 Section
12.4 state that emergency power must be in accordance with Article 700
of NFPA 70.56 NFPA 130 states that emergency lighting, protective signaling
systems, emergency communication systems, and the fire command center
should be covered. NFPA 502 states that emergency power should cover the
following: emergency lighting, tunnel closure and traffic, exit signs, emergency
communication, tunnel drainage, emergency ventilation, fire alarm and
detection, closed-circuit television (CCTV) or video, and firefighting. SRT
TSI Section 4.2.2.3 states that the electricity supply should be sufficient for
emergency response.
56
NFPA, NFPA 70: National Electrical Code (NEC), 2017.

SECTION | 3
Electrical Cables
As with the electricity supply, ensuring the electric cables are protected and
working during an emergency is imperative to maintaining power for support
systems to function as intended. NFPA 502 Section 12.2 states that all cable and
conductors should be moisture resistant and heat resistant with temperature
ratings that correspond to the conditions of application. Additionally, all wiring
should be listed as fire-resistant and low smoke-producing. NFPA 502 Section
12.3 states that cables and conductors should be protected through metallic
armor/sheath, metal raceways, electric duct banks embedded in concrete, or
other approved methods. The cabling in certain locations, such as supply air
ducts, should have fire-resistant and low smoke-producing characteristics. SRT
TSI Section 4.2.2.4 states that all exposed cables must have low flammability,
low fire spread, low toxicity, and low smoke density characteristics.
Reliability of Electric Installations

Ensuring the electrical installations remain working during an emergency is
also important for the supporting systems to function as intended. NFPA 502
Section 12.5 states that electrical systems of tunnels exceeding 0.62 mi (1 km)
should have redundant facilities for monitoring and control. SRT TSI Section
4.2.2.5 states that electrical installations for safety should be protected against
damage arising from mechanical impact, heat, or fire. Additionally, these
installations must have an alternative power supply after failure of main power
supply for a length determined in emergency response plans.
Emergency Lighting
Tunnel lighting during an emergency is needed for passenger egress. NFPA 130
Section 6.3.5 states that the illumination of emergency walkways should be
2.7 lx or greater, and exit lights, essential signs, and emergency lights should
be in accordance with NFPA 70. NFPA 502 Section 12.6 states that electrical
systems should be in accordance with NFPA 70,57 NFPA 110,58 and NFPA 11159
and that emergency lights, exit lights, and essential signs should be included
in the emergency lighting system and powered by an emergency power
supply. Additional standards include wiring, no greater than 0.5 seconds of
light interruption, illumination levels between 1 and 10 lx, and maximum-
to-minimum illumination ratios of 40 or less. SRT TSI Section 4.2.1.5 states
that for tunnels greater than 0.31 mi (0.5 km), emergency lighting must
guide passengers and staff to a safe area and have an alternative power
supply. Additional topics include lighting location, the position of lights, and
illuminance of at least 1 lx.
57
ibid.
58
NFPA 110: Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2010.
59
NFPA 111: Standard on Stored Electrical Energy Emergency and Standby Power Systems, 2016.

SECTION | 3
Other relevant documents for lighting and emergency lighting are ANSI/IEEE-
ANSI C2,60 ANSI/IES RP-22,61 CIE 88:2004,62 and CIE 193:2010.63 Two documents by
the Illuminating Engineering Society include:
• IES LM-50 – Lighting Measurements–50 provides a uniform test procedure

for determining, measuring, and reporting the luminance characteristics of
roadway lighting installations.
• IES RP-22 – Recommended Practices–22 provides information to assist
engineers and designers in determining lighting needs, recommending
solutions, and evaluating resulting visibility at vehicular tunnel approaches
and interiors.
Electrical Safety
The following codes are relevant to electrical safety:
• NETA MTS-2011 – The International Electrical Testing Association (NETA),

Maintenance Testing Specifications were developed for those responsible
for the continued operation of existing electrical systems and equipment
to guide them in specifying and performing the necessary tests to ensure
these systems and apparatuses perform satisfactorily, minimizing
downtime and maximizing life expectancy.
• NFPA 70 – National Fire Protection Association 70 covers installing electric
conductors and equipment within or on public and private buildings or
other structures; conductors and equipment that connect to the electricity
supply; other outside conductors and equipment on the premises; and
optical fiber cables and raceways.
• NFPA 70B – National Fire Protection Association 70B is recommended
practice for electrical equipment maintenance for industrial-type electrical
systems and equipment but does not intend to duplicate or supersede
instructions that electrical manufacturers normally provide.
• NFPA 70E – National Fire Protection Association 70E addresses employee
workplace electrical safety requirements necessary for the practical
safeguarding of employees.
Ventilation
During an incident that releases heat, smoke, or other toxic emissions, a
ventilation system is necessary to provide a non-contaminated environment
for passenger evacuation and to facilitate firefighting and rescue operations.
60
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), IEEE-ANSI C2-2017, National Electric Code
Lighting, 2017.
61
IES (Illuminating Engineering Society), ANSI/IES- RP-22, Standard Practice for Tunnel Lighting, 2011.
62
CIE (Commission Internationale de L’Eclairage), Guide for the Lighting of Road Tunnels and
Underpasses, Technical Report CIE 88:2004, 2004.
63
CIE, Emergency Lighting in Road Tunnels, Technical Report CIE 193:2010, 2010.

SECTION | 3
There are multiple types of ventilation systems that have specific benefits and
downsides, depending on the tunnel characteristics. This section discusses
ventilation during emergencies; ventilation in non-emergency situations is
discussed in the Tunnel Construction section of this report.
The authors are unaware of standards for tunnel ventilation during transit
tunnel operations because natural ventilation from the piston effect of the
passing train is generally considered sufficient for electrically powered vehicles
(third rail). Tunnels with operations of diesel-powered vehicles may require
different ventilation needs. Ventilation may also be used during inspection and
maintenance on an as-needed basis.
NFPA 130 and NFPA 50264 cover emergency ventilation requirements for road
tunnels and can be supplemented by NCHRP Report 836,65 which states that
the best practices mentioned do not apply to railway tunnels. However, both
the NFPA 130 and NCHRP 836 documents can serve as a foundation for what is
required for railway tunnels. The authors are unaware of European standards,
as SRT TSI does not cover emergency ventilation.
There are three major forms of railroad tunnel ventilation: (1) piston effect with
an open-ended tunnel, (2) piston effect with a portal gate, and (3) mechanical
ventilation with a portal gate (AREMA). TOMIE66 suggests five main types of
ventilation: natural, longitudinal, semi-transverse, full-transverse, and single-
point.
The AASHTO recommendations state that longitudinal ventilation and

extraction ventilation are commonly used for roadway tunnels. The ventilation
type to use will depend on the individual tunnel characteristics, such as tunnel
length, type of traffic, unidirectional or bidirectional traffic, and so on.
The longitudinal ventilation concept directs smoke inside the tunnel in the
opposite direction of egress by completely pushing the smoke to one side
of the fire (preferably applied to non-congested unidirectional tunnels). It
introduces air into or removes smoke and gases from the tunnel at a limited
number of points, primarily by creating longitudinal airflow through the
length of the tunnel from one portal to another. This can be accomplished
by injection, central fans, jet fans, nozzles, or some combination. The system
must generate sufficient longitudinal air velocity, called critical velocity, to
prevent backlayering of smoke. A diagram of longitudinal venting is illustrated
in Figure 3-8 and a diagram of backlayering is displayed in Figure 3-9. NFPA 502
states that longitudinal systems must (a) prevent backlayering by producing
a longitudinal air velocity that is calculated based on critical velocity in the
64
NFPA 502, op. cit.
65
NCHRP Report 836, op. cit.
66
FHWA-HIF-15-005, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
direction of traffic flow, and (b) avoid disruption of the smoke layer initially by
not operating fans that are located near the fire site, and operating fans farthest
from the site first.
Figure 3-8 Longitudinal ventilation controlling smoke and hot gases (AASHTO 2016)
Figure 3-9 Backlayering of smoke in tunnel where backlayer length is L (modified from
AASHTO 2016)
The extraction ventilation concept extracts smoke at the fire location by

keeping the smoke stratification intact, leaving relatively clean and breathable
air suitable for evacuation underneath the smoke layer to both sides of the fire
(applicable to bidirectional or congested unidirectional tunnels and is typically
achieved by zoned transverse ventilation or single point extraction). Extraction
ventilation typically requires exhaust ventilation ducts and a system capable of
localizing hot gases and smoke and extracting them at the fire location using
exhaust fans rated for high temperatures.
A diagram of transverse extractive venting is illustrated in Figure 3-10. NFPA

50267 states transverse or reversible semi-transverse systems must (a) maximize
the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone that contains the fire and minimize
the amount of outside air introduced by a transverse system, and (b) create a
longitudinal airflow in the direction of traffic flow by operating the upstream
ventilation zones in maximum supply and the downstream ventilation zones in
the maximum exhaust.
67
NFPA 502, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
Figure 3-10 Extractive ventilation controlling smoke and hot gases (AASHTO 2016)
NFPA 130 states that mechanical emergency ventilation systems should be

provided for an underground or enclosed trainway that is greater than 1,000
ft (305 m). The design objectives of the emergency ventilation system are to
(1) provide a tenable environment along the path of egress from a fire incident
in enclosed trainways, (2) produce sufficient airflow rates within enclosed
trainways to meet a critical velocity, (3) be capable of reaching full operational
mode within 180 seconds, (4) accommodate the maximum number of trains that
could be between ventilation shafts during an emergency, and (5) maintain the
required airflow rates for a minimum of one hour but not less than the required
time of tenability.
The design also should incorporate fire scenarios and fire profiles; station and
trainway geometries; the effects of elevation, elevation differences, ambient
temperature differences and ambient wind; a system of fans, shafts, and devices
for directing airflow in stations and trainways; a program of predetermined
emergency response procedures capable of initiating prompt response from
the operations control center during a fire emergency; and a ventilation system
reliability analysis that, as a minimum, considers electrical, mechanical, and
supervisory control subsystems.
NFPA 502 states the design objectives of an emergency ventilation system

should be to control and extract smoke and heated gases as follows: (1) a
stream of non-contaminated air is provided to motorists in paths(s) of egress in
accordance with the anticipated emergency response plan, and (2) longitudinal
airflow rates are produced to prevent backlayering of smoke in a path of egress
away from a fire. The design should consider heat release rates, smoke release
rates, and carbon monoxide release rates, all varying with a function of time.
The operational risks associated with the type of vehicles expected to use the
tunnel should also be considered.

SECTION | 3
Requirements of NFPA 502 include but are not limited to:
• Tunnel length that emergency ventilation is required

• Ventilation systems should be sized to meet requirements with one fan out
of service
• Standards for smoke control, fans, dampers, sound attenuators, and
controls
Chapter 12 Part 4 of the AREMA Manual68 states that fire is considered the worst
type of crisis because the confined nature of a tunnel can trap passengers,
heat, and gases. Underground transit tunnels must provide ventilation plants
for bidirectional air movement and meet required flow characteristics. These
plants must communicate so they can blow smoke in the opposite direction
of the evacuation route. Fire mains and access for firefighters must be
incorporated into the design.
Other documents relevant to emergency ventilation include the National

Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Synthesis 415,69 Design Fires
in Road Tunnels, and the World Road Association (PIARC) Integrated Approach to
Road Tunnel Safety.70
Supplementary information can be found in NFPA 92B,71 Standard for Smoke

Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces, and Air Movement and
Control Association’s Fan and Air System Applications Handbook.72
In addition to emergency ventilation, proper ventilation of railway tunnels

during construction and service is important, as improper ventilation can lead
to severe physical injury and death for workers or stranded passengers during a
train malfunction. Train use can lead to the accumulation of exhaust gases and
heat in long tunnels. Additionally, excessive heat can cause the locomotive to
cease to function.
Nitrogen dioxide is the prominent air contaminant from diesel locomotive

engines. This gas tends to rise and accumulate at the top of the tunnel, above
the train and any walking persons. However, a significant portion will remain in
the lower part of the tunnel.
Chapter 1 Part 8 Section 1.8.7.1 of the AREMA Manual lists the following
thresholds for air contaminants:
68
69
Maevski, I. Design Fires in Road Tunnels. National Cooperative Highway Research Program, NCHRP
Synthesis 415, Transportation Research Board, 2011.
70
World Road Association-PIARC, Integrated Approach to Road Tunnel Safety R07, 2007.
71
NFPA 92B: Standard for Smoke Management Systems in Malls, Atria, and Large Spaces, 2015.
72
AMCA (Air Movement and Control Association International), AMCA Fan and Air System Applications
Handbook, June 2012.

SECTION | 3
• Airflow of 100 cubic ft per minute (cfm) per total equipment diesel brake
horsepower plus 200 cfm per person in tunnel.
• Minimum linear airflow velocity is 60 ft/minute.
• Air quality alarms should be set if the following requirements are exceeded:
20 parts per million (ppm) for carbon monoxide, 5 ppm for nitrogen
dioxide, 20% for methane or other flammable liquid, and an oxygen level
below 19.5% or above 22%.
Section 1.8.7.2 of Chapter 1 Part 8 adds that there should be a ventilation

system for long tunnels.
Fixed Fire Fighting Systems

While not required by NFPA 130, NFPA 502, or SRT TSI, fixed firefighting systems
(FFFS) are available for tunnels. The purpose of these systems is to slow, stop,
or reverse the fire growth rate or otherwise mitigate the impact of fires (NFPA
502). However, there are advantages and disadvantages of FFFS, and all factors
should be considered before installation and implementation. It is noted that
the efficiency of water-based FFFS depends on the size and type of fire, nozzle
type, sprinkler location, and water discharge rate.
Some advantages of FFFS are protecting tunnel users and structure and
supporting rescue and firefighting in the early stages of a fire. Some
disadvantages include reduced visibility, destruction of smoke stratification, a
slippery environment, and possible reduction in ventilation effectiveness. Due
to the interaction between ventilation and FFFS, the two systems should be
coordinated to prevent reduced effectiveness of both systems during a fire. Two
types of water-based FFFS systems per NCHRP Report 83673 include:
• Deluge sprinklers – These devices are essentially sprinkler heads that

suppress fires mainly by surface cooling.
• Water mist – These devices spray a mist that suppresses fires by dilution
and gas cooling.
Fusible link or high expansion foam sprinkler systems are also available but less
common.
Drainage
Drainage should be considered during all phases of the tunnel life span to
prevent the negative effects of groundwater. In case of toxic or flammable
materials spills, proper drainage prevents the material from spreading.
NFPA 130 does not mention drainage. NFPA 520 states that a tunnel drainage
system should be provided to collect, store, or discharge effluent from the
73

SECTION | 3
tunnel, or to perform a combination of these functions. This includes designing

a drainage collection system to capture and minimize the spread of liquids. In
addition, the drainage system should have the capacity to prevent flooding.
Chapter 8 of the AREMA Manual74 states that vertical and diagonal openings,
trench drains, PVC, or iron pipe drains should be installed between the concrete
lining and rock whenever groundwater is encountered to port water away from
the tunnel structure. This drainage should consider groundwater constituents to
discourage the formation of precipitates or adverse chemical reactions that may
plug or damage the drainage system.
Track Structure Safety Standards

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has general track safety standards in
49 CFR 21375 and railroad bridge-specific standards with the Track and Rail and
Infrastructure Integrity Compliance Manual.76 However, no FRA document has
specific regulations for tunnels.
Rolling Stock Systems

The rolling stock is important for tunnel safety because the greater risk of a
rolling stock catching fire and emitting toxic gases, the more dangerous tunnel
fires can be for passengers, employees, emergency responders, and the tunnel
structure itself. The scope of this report does not detail the regulations and
standards for rolling stock. However, rolling stock standards exist, including the
European Union’s Rolling Stock - Locomotives and Passengers TSI77 and U.S.
standards provided in NFPA 130.78
Technologies to Aid Supporting Systems

The continuous advancement in technology and computing power allows new
solutions to aid supporting systems.
Flooding
The flooding of the New York City subway system during Hurricane Sandy
resulted in damages upward of $10 billion. As a result, new technologies to
mitigate flooding damage have been proposed and tested. While hurricanes and
storms represent the primary motivation, flooding from other sources such as
dam breaks also apply.
74
AREMA Manual, 2017, Chapter 8, op. cit.
75
FRA, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 213 – Track Safety Standards. 49 CFR 213, October 2011.
76
FRA, Track and Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Compliance Manual, Volume IV, Chapter 1, Bridge
Safety Standards, January 2015.
77
EU 1302/2014, op. cit.
78
NFPA 130, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
The difficulty in stopping floodwater in subway tunnels is ensuring all the

entrances—portals, ventilation shafts, emergency exits, stairwells, elevator
shafts, man covers, and son on—are appropriately sealed with a system that
can be stored on site using minimal storage volume, deployed quickly, stored
again after use, and that provides the required reliability to maintain flooding
protection during the entire duration of the storm or event.
One technology currently being tested during the assembly of this report
is a Resilient Tunnel Plug (RTP) developed by ILC Dover, working with the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and West
Virginia University. The Plug is essentially a resilient balloon stored near the
track that rapidly inflates to plug the tunnel when activated (Figure 3-11). While
the RTP was originally designed for subway floods, it could also be used to
mitigate against the spread of smoke, fire, and chemical/biological agents.
Spinoff technologies from the RTP, which uses high-strength Vectran® fabric,
involve gates, walls, and covers for stairwells, portals, and other entrances.
Figure 3-11 Photograph of the RTP (DHS 2014)
The current solution of flood gates, when employed, creates a water-tight

barrier that seals the entire portal to the tunnels. The full closing operation may
take approximately 30 minutes; therefore, the portable systems could be a good
quick backup.

SECTION | 3
Video Surveillance
Video surveillance can play many roles in tunnel security by detecting and
identifying trespassers, smoke, and fires. Advances in CCTV and video analytics
allow specialized detection systems to optimize security. These can include
object detection and classification, which allows the video analytic software
to differentiate between trains, animals, and human trespassers, determine
direction flow, and count people to help aid emergency response.
Multiple companies provide video analytic systems. To date, the authors are
unaware of any best practices for these types of systems that can be used for
transit tunnels.
Tunnel Security and Risk Assessment

This literature review section presents various standards, guidelines, and
regulations regarding tunnel security and risk along with tunnel support
systems. These two areas are combined because tunnel supporting systems
are typically required for security and risk reasons. This section offers a general
overview of existing standards and guidelines, detailed descriptions of the
topics addressed by each standard and/or guideline, and some other notable
aspects of tunnel security and risk.
Safety Operations and Emergency Response

In 2005, FHWA, AASHTO, and NCHRP sponsored a scanning study of equipment,
systems, and procedures used in European tunnels. The study concluded
with nine recommendations for implementation. These recommendations
encompassed conducting research on tunnel emergency management that
includes human factors; developing tunnel design criteria that promote optimal
driver performance during incidents; developing more effective visual, audible,
and tactile signs for escape routes; and using a risk-management approach to
tunnel safety inspection and maintenance. The study’s nine recommendations
are listed below:79
• Develop universal, consistent, and more effective visual, audible, and

tactile signs for escape routes.
• Develop AASHTO guidelines for existing and new tunnels.
• Conduct research and develop guidelines on tunnel emergency
management that includes human factors.
• Develop education for motorist response to tunnel incidents.
79
International Technology Scanning Program, Underground Transportation Systems in Europe: Safety,
Operations, and Emergency Response, Report No. FHWA-PL-06-016, June 2006. https://international.
fhwa.dot.gov/uts/uts.pdf.

SECTION | 3
• Evaluate effectiveness of automatic incident detection systems and

intelligent video for tunnels.
• Develop tunnel facility design criteria to promote optimal driver
performance and response to incidents.
• Investigate one-button systems to initiate emergency response and
automated sensor systems to determine response.
• Use risk-management approach to tunnel safety inspection and
maintenance.
• Implement light-emitting diode lighting for safe vehicle distance and edge
delineation in tunnels.
Security
Tunnels present themselves as threat targets for a wide range of antisocial
activities for various reasons. These reasons can range from vandalism and
trespassing to terrorist attacks because some tunnels represent a chokepoint in
a transportation system.
Risk analysis and management are essential for any underground project.
Major risk categories include construction failures, public impact, schedule
delay, environmental commitments, failure of the intended operation and
maintenance, technological challenges, unforeseen geotechnical conditions,
and cost escalation.
It its Recommended Practice for tunnel security, APTA (2015) lists the following
potential threats:80
• Explosive
• Chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR)
• Improvised incendiary device (IID), fire, arson
• Sabotage
• Cyber attack
• Maritime accident
Table 3-13 and Table 3-14 list threats and the associated consequences
produced inside a tunnel structure. The tables also list potential mitigation
techniques for each threat (from APTA 2015).
APTA, Tunnel Security for Public Transit, APTA Standards Development Program Recommended
80
Practice APTA SS-SIS-RP-16-15, Washington, DC, March 2015.

SECTION | 3
Table 3-13 Potential Consequences from Each Tunnel Threat (APTA 2015)
Extended
Structural Extended
Fire/ Utility Public
Threats Flooding Integrity Contamination Loss of
Smoke Disruption Health
Loss Use
Issues
Explosive (small, large) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
CBR ✓ ✓ ✓
IID, Fire, Arson ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sabotage ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Cyber ✓ ✓
Maritime Incident ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 3-14 Matrix of Threats and Mitigations (APTA 2015)

Threats
Mitigation Measure IID Fire/ Maritime
Explosives CBR Sabotage Cyber
Arson Incident
Access control systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Anti-vehicle barriers ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Barriers and fencing ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Clear zones ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Crime prevention through environmental
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
design
Designated zones ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Electronic security systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Emergency egress ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Entry control ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Fire detection systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Fire suppression systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Intrusion detection systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Layered protection ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Security patrols ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Security and emergency response
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
policies and procedures
Security and emergency lighting ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sensitive security information ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Signage ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Standoff distance ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Video surveillance systems ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Walkways ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

SECTION | 3
In addition, APTA (2015) recommends an integrated security system, a

coordinated security plan with relevant agencies, and security training
exercises.
Other documents that have recommendations on tunnel security are the AREMA
Manual for Railway Engineering (Chapter 12.4) and SRT TSI.
Some tunnel security designs include emergency call stations (ECS), global
positioning systems (GPS), automated vehicle locator (AVL), positive train
control (PTC), and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA).
Chapter 12.4 of the AREMA Manual treats security differently from safety, as
security involves preventing undesired access or undesired acts by individuals
with antisocial intent. Mitigations typically involve locks, alarms, and making
access difficult.
Two additional sources include:
• FHWA – Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security, Blue-Ribbon

Panel on Bridge and Tunnel Security, Federal Highway Administration, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Washington, DC, April 1999.
• Transit Cooperative Research Program and National Cooperative Highway
Research Program – Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure, TCRP
Report 86/NCHRP Report 525, Vol. 12,Transportation Research Board,
Washington, DC, November 2006.
Emergency Response Plan

Developing emergency response plans and practicing emergency response are
imperative for reducing the risks of emergency situations in tunnels. Multiple
incidents can occur in tunnels; thus, agencies responsible for operations should
have emergency response plans for the following incident types, if applicable
(NFPA 130, 2017):
• Fire or smoke conditions within the system structures, including stations,

guideways, and support facilities
• Collision or derailment involving rail vehicles on the guideway, rail vehicles
with privately owned vehicles, intrusion into the right-of-way from adjacent
roads or properties
• Loss of primary power source resulting in stalled trains, loss of illumination,
and availability of emergency power
• Evacuation of passengers from a train to all right-of-way configurations
under circumstances where assistance is required
• Passenger panic

SECTION | 3
• Disabled, stalled, or stopped trains due to adverse personnel/passenger

emergency conditions
• Tunnel flooding from internal or external sources
• Disruption of service due to disasters or dangerous conditions adjacent to
the system, such as hazardous spills on adjacent roads or police activities
or pursuits dangerously close to the operational systems
• Hazardous materials accidentally or intentionally released into the system
• Serious vandalism or criminal acts, including terrorism
• First aid or medical care for passengers on trains or in stations
• Extreme weather conditions, such as heavy snow, high or low
temperatures, sleet, or ice
• Earthquakes
• Any other emergency as determined by the authority having jurisdiction
Due to the complex nature of emergencies and the multiple agencies that must
participate, many agencies must participate and coordinate in developing or
approving emergency response plans. These agencies include the following
(NFPA 130, 2017):
• Ambulance services
• Building department
• Fire department
• Medical service
• Police department
• Public works
• Sanitation department
• Utility companies
• Water supply
• Local transportation companies
• Red Cross, Salvation Army, and similar agencies
NFPA 130 covers minimum requirements for emergency response plans,

including a list of emergency incidents to be prepared for, the scope of the
emergency response plan, a list of participating agencies, and training. In
addition, it lists requirements for the operations control center, including but not
limited to proper qualification and training; the ability to directly communicate
with all the participating agencies and record all conversations; and protection
from fire and attacks. NFPA 502 covers similar topics, but additional references
and standards are in NFPA 156181 and NFPA 502 (Annex F).82
SRT TSI Section 4.4.2 states that an emergency plan should (1) be developed
under the direction of the Infrastructure Manager, in cooperation with the

SECTION | 3
emergency response services and the relevant authorities for each tunnel; (2)
be consistent with the self-rescue, evacuation, firefighting, and rescue facilities
available; and (3) include detailed tunnel-specific incident scenarios adapted to
local tunnel conditions.
The AREMA Manual Chapter 12.4 lists many tunnel crises: stalled trains, loss of
power, derailments, collisions, and fires. Coordinated egress and emergency
escape routes should be designed into tunnels to evacuate passengers.
SRT TSI83 covers two main types of incidents. The first type is called “hot”
incidents and covers fire, an explosion followed by fire, or emission of toxic
gas and smoke. These incidents are especially dangerous, as there is a time
constraint on passenger evacuation because of the hostile environment. The
second type is called a “cold” incident and covers collisions, derailments, and
fires that have been extinguished. These incidents are dangerous but do not
have the same time constraints of “hot” incidents. However, passenger panic in
a “cold” incident can lead to dangerous scenarios.
Tunnel Maintenance and Inspection

Maintenance
Railway tunnel maintenance incorporates the standard practices to maintain
the tunnel quality over the lifespan of the tunnel. This section includes tunnel
inspection, monitoring, and maintenance activities. Maintenance typically refers
to a wide range of activities that can involve simple tasks to more complex
processes. While tunnel rehabilitation, large-scale repairs, and upgrades can be
considered a part of a maintenance program, they are separated in this report
and can be referenced in the subsequent section.
Several guidelines and standards provide details about potential defects,

maintenance methods, and repair strategies.
The AREMA Manual (Chapter 1, Part 8) specifies the following potential defects:
concrete spalls, rock falls, drainage, icing, and timber sets. Further details
about tunnel inspection checklists can be found in the AREMA Bridge Inspection
Handbook.84
SRI TSI Section 4.5 covers maintenance rules for railway tunnels. This
includes identifying elements subject to wear, failure, aging, or other forms of
deterioration or degradation; specifying the limits of use of elements subject to
deterioration and describing measures to prevent this deterioration; identifying
elements relevant to emergencies; and periodic checks of the emergency
equipment to ensure proper functioning.
83
EU 1303/2014, op. cit.
84
AREMA Bridge Inspection Handbook, Chapter 11 – Tunnel Inspection, 2010.

SECTION | 3
The TOMIE Manual85 provides details about tunnel operation, maintenance,

inspection, and evaluation.
An effective tunnel maintenance program helps reduce costs, decreases the

number of tunnel closures, increases public safety, and ensures adequate
levels of service. Maintenance activities range from simple tasks to complex
endeavors, as indicated in the hierarchy below:
• Removing debris, snow, and ice

• Washing tunnel structures, flushing drains, tightening bolts, and changing
light bulbs
• Servicing equipment, painting fixtures, and restoring pavement
• Tests, verifications, measurements, and calibrations
• Planned interventions
• Unplanned interventions
• Rehabilitation (large-scale repairs and upgrades are implemented)
Tunnel operation can be divided into two parts—normal operation and

emergency response. Listed below are examples for both aspects of operation.
• Normal operating procedures: maintaining traffic flows, tunnel traffic

closures, studying weather conditions, clearing roadway hazards,
inspecting critical areas, checking functional systems, servicing
equipment, clearing of tunnel facility, maintaining vehicles and equipment,
completing daily logs and checklists, processing work orders, and checking
information, evaluation sensors, and meters.
• Emergency response: impacts and collisions – remove vehicles, clear
debris, repair pavement, inspect tunnel damage; fires – emergency
ventilation measures, rapid detection; floods – pump systems; and
earthquakes – structural damage, leaks.
Ideally, the maintenance strategies of a tunnel facility should strike a balance

between preventive maintenance and on-demand maintenance. If safety or
structural concerns are identified in the process of carrying out maintenance
tasks, then the defects should be addressed.
Inspection
Tunnel inspection requires multiple-disciplinary personnel familiar with various
functional aspects of a tunnel, including civil/structural, mechanical, electrical,
drainage, and ventilation components, as well as some operational aspects
such as signals, communication, fire-life safety, and security components. The
inspectors should be certified and know inspector responsibilities.
85

SECTION | 3
FHWA developed the National Tunnel Inspection Standards (NTIS),86 the TOMIE87
Manual, and the Specifications for National Tunnel Inventory (SNTI)88 to help
safeguard tunnels and to ensure reliable levels of service on all public roads. The
NTIS contains the regulatory requirements of the National Tunnel Inspection
Program (NTIP); the TOMIE Manual and SNTI have been incorporated by reference
into the NTIS to expand upon the requirements. The TOMIE Manual is a resource
for aiding the development of tunnel operations, maintenance, inspection,
and evaluation programs; it provides uniform and consistent guidance. The
SNTI contains instructions for submitting the inventory and inspection data to
FHWA, which will be maintained in the National Tunnel Inventory (NTI) database
to track the conditions of tunnels throughout the United States. The general
requirements of the program can be summarized as follows:
• Performing regularly scheduled tunnel inspections

• Maintaining tunnel records and inventories
• Submitting tunnel inventory and inspection data to FHWA
• Reporting critical findings and responding to safety and/or structural
concerns
• Maintaining current load ratings on all applicable tunnel structures
• Developing and maintaining a quality control and quality assurance
program
• Establishing responsibilities for the tunnel inspection organization and
qualifications for tunnel inspection personnel
• Training and national certification of tunnel inspectors
As detailed in Table 3-15, inspection types can be separated based on their

priority: initial, routine, damage, in-depth, and special.
Table 3-15 Inspection Types and Their Purpose

Inspection
Purpose
Type
Establish the inspection file record and the baseline conditions for the
Initial
tunnel.
Comprehensive observations and measurements performed at regular
Routine
intervals.
Assess damage from events such as impact, fire, flood, seismic, and
Damage
blasts.
In-depth Identify hard-to-detect deficiencies using close-up inspection techniques.
Special Monitor defects and deficiencies related to safety or critical findings.
86
FHWA, Rule 80 FR 41349, 23 CFR Part 650, National Tunnel Inspection Standards, 2015.
87
88
FHWA, Specifications for the National Tunnel Inventory, Publication No. FHWA-HIF-15-006, July 2015.
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/inspection/tunnel/.

SECTION | 3
Inspection techniques depend on the type of components/systems to be in-

spected and can be arranged by engineering discipline:
• Civil/Structural elements
– Steel: corrosion, cracks, buckles and kinks, leakage, protection system
– Concrete: scaling, cracking, delamination, spalling, joint spall, pop-outs,
mud balls, efflorescence, staining, honeycomb, leakage
– Timber: decay, insects, checks/splits, fire damage, hollow area, leakage
– Masonry structure: masonry units, mortar, shape, alignment, leakage
– Liners
– Other structural: roof girders, columns and piles, emergency corridors,
interior walls, portals
– Ceiling: hangers and anchorages, roof, ceiling girders, slabs and panels
– Tunnel invert structures: slabs, girders, and slabs on grade
– Joints and gaskets
– Miscellaneous structural cracks: connections, doors, windows and
frames, stairs, roof, floors, brackets and supports, machinery pedestals,
finishes
• Mechanical systems
– Tunnel ventilation: fan motors, fan drive system, fan shaft bearing, fan
drive coupling, local fan controls, dampers and damper drives, sound
attenuators
– Tunnel drainage: pumps, sump pumps
– Emergency generator systems, flood gates
– Miscellaneous mechanical system: plumbing, HVAC
• Electrical systems
– Power distribution and emergency power
– Lighting and emergency lighting
• Fire detection
• Air-quality monitoring
• Cameras and safety systems
• Communications
• Fire systems
• Communication systems
• Finishes and protective coating
All general field inspection/repair notes, consisting of a chronology of events,

must be kept in a bound field book or electronic recording device such as a
tablet. The information contained in the field book should include notes on
safety issues and discussions with contractors, operations personnel, and other
interested parties. Entries into the field book must be chronological by date and

SECTION | 3
time and consist of clear, concise, factual notification of events and appropriate
sketches. Field records, notes, and the inspection database must be maintained
in one location.
The three types of field notes required for effective inspection of tunnels are:
• General notes in field books

• Documentation of defects on field data forms
• Documentation of defects by photographs/video
The NTIS 23 CFR Part 650 Subpart E89 is a minimum standard for the proper
safety inspection and evaluation of all highway tunnels in accordance with
23 U.S. Code § 144(h) and the requirements for preparing and maintaining an
inventory in accordance with 23 U.S. Code § 144(b).
Frequency of inspection based on 23 CFR Part 650 Subpart E include:
• Initial inspection prior to opening to traffic to the public.

• Routine inspection must be conducted at regular 24-month periods. For
tunnels needing inspection more frequently than 24-month intervals,
criteria must be established to determine the level and frequency at
which these tunnels are inspected, based on a risk analysis approach that
considers such factors as tunnel age, traffic characteristics, geotechnical
conditions, and known deficiencies.
• Certain tunnels may be inspected at regular intervals up to 48 months.
Inspecting a tunnel at an increased interval may be appropriate when
past inspection findings and analysis justify the increased inspection
interval. At a minimum, the following criteria should be used to determine
the level and frequency of inspection based on an assessed lower risk:
tunnel age, time from last major rehabilitation, tunnel complexity, traffic
characteristics, geotechnical conditions, functional systems, and known
deficiencies. A written request that justifies a regular routine inspection
interval between 24 and 48 months must be submitted to FHWA for review
and comment prior to the extended interval being implemented.
Damage, in-depth, and special inspections may use non-destructive testing or

other methods not used during routine inspections at an interval established
by the program manager (for example, ultrasonic inspection or electromagnetic
inspection of steel components). In-depth inspections should be scheduled for
complex tunnels and certain structural elements and functional systems when
necessary to ascertain the condition of the element or system fully; hands-on
inspections may be necessary at some locations.
89
FHWA, Rule: 80 FR 41349, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
To track the conditions of tunnels throughout the United States and to ensure
compliance with NTIS, FHWA established an NTI database to contain all
the initial tunnel inventory and inspection data. The preliminary inventory
includes data items described in the specifications for the NTI (incorporated by
reference, see 23 CFR § 650.515) for all tunnels subject to NTIS by December 11,
2015.
NTI is an inventory of all highway tunnels subject to NTIS that includes the
preliminary inventory information, reflects the findings of the most recent
tunnel inspection conducted, and is consistent and coordinated with the
specifications for NTI.
The Specifications for National Tunnel Inventory (SNTI) is used to collect

inventory items such as tunnel identification, age and level of service,
classification, geometric data, inspection, load rating and postings, navigation,
and structure type. The SNTI inventory items require the item name,
specification, commentary, examples, format, and alpha-numeric identification.
The specification contains descriptions of each inventory item and provides a
series of explanations in the commentary section.
Other references include the following:
• NCHRP Project 20-07/Task 26190 report summarizes current inspection

practices for 32 highway and 11 transit tunnel owners. The report compiled
information on inspection stages, procedures, and inspector qualifications.
Best practices were also included for safety and emergency response
system testing.
• NCHRP Project 20-07/Task 27691 report establishes best practices for the
repair of existing tunnel elements. The report focuses on structural and
drainage repairs and provides detailed recommendations on the steps of
the rehabilitation process.
• Chapter 11 of the AREMA Bridge Inspection Handbook92 provides
information about safety precautions related to tunnels, such as lack of
light throughout the tunnel, wildlife, and emergency inspections due to
fire, floods, earthquakes, and derailment. It also lists tunnel inspection
aspects that should be addressed related to the external environment,
internal tunnel safety, drainage, natural gas, portals, and main tunnel
structure (tunnel shaft). The tunnel inspection checklist includes soil/rock
stability, clearances, drainage, tunnel floor, and conditions of structural
components.
90
NCHRP, Best Practices for Implementing Quality Control and Quality Assurance for Tunnel Inspection,
NCHRP Project 20-07, Task 261 Final Report, October 2009.
91
NCHRP, Development of Guidelines for Rehabilitation of Existing Highway and Rail Transit Tunnels,
NCHRP Project 20-07, Task 276 Final Report, July 2010.
92
AREMA Handbook, op. cit.

SECTION | 3
Inspection Reports
Inspection reports are formal summaries of inspection findings for each
element and system that was inspected. The report should be submitted in
accordance with written procedures established by the tunnel inspection
organization and the owner. The completed report should be furnished to the
tunnel owner, along with any repair recommendations.
Following are examples of elements in an inspection report:
• Critical finding – refers to defects that require immediate action, including

possible closure of the tunnel where safety or structural concerns are
identified using criteria established in NTIS. Upon discovering a critical
finding, the team leader should notify the program manager and the tunnel
owner immediately. A summary of these details can be included in the
inspection report as necessary.
• Priority repair – refers to conditions for which further investigation, design,
and implementation of interim or long-term repairs should be undertaken
on a priority basis (i.e., taking precedence over other scheduled work).
These repairs will improve the durability and aesthetics of the structure or
element and will reduce future maintenance costs. Elements that do not
comply with code requirements are also priorities for repair.
• Routine repair – refers to conditions requiring further investigation or
remedial work. This work can be undertaken as part of a scheduled
maintenance program, scheduled project, or routine facility maintenance.
Items identified in the preventive maintenance program can be put in this
category.
A detailed description of inspection results should be included for the various

tunnel elements:
• Structural and civil inspections – should follow design/construction and

agency cyclic maintenance schedules and procedures. Further, the report
should contain descriptions of various deficiencies, their locations, and
severity. Any special test results, such as concrete strength, freeze-thaw
analysis, or petrographic analysis, should be included with the findings for
the record. Future recommended actions should also be noted.
• Mechanical inspections – should follow manufacturer and agency cyclic
maintenance schedules and procedures. Further, the general condition and
operation of all equipment should be described and the deficiencies noted.
Specialized test results, such as vibration testing and oil analyses, should
be included for the record. Future recommended testing and actions
should also be noted.
• Electrical inspections – should follow manufacturer and agency cyclic
maintenance schedules and procedures. Further, the general condition

SECTION | 3
and operation of all electrical equipment should be described and the

deficiencies noted. Any specialized testing needed to effectively determine
the operational condition of the equipment, such as power distribution
and emergency power, should be included for the record. In addition,
comparisons of light level measured to recommended levels should be
provided to the owner. Remediation work that may accompany testing and
inspection should be included.
Finally, recommendations for repair or rehabilitation of the tunnel components

found to be deficient or that do not meet current code requirements should be
identified. Substantial rehabilitation may require a life cycle cost comparison of
repair options. Repair and rehabilitation recommendations should be broken
down for each main tunnel system into the categories previously described:
critical finding, priority repair, and routine repair.
Evaluation of Tunnels
The cost of maintaining and improving tunnel systems must be balanced
against available funding. Resources are limited for making repairs and
upgrades; therefore, repairs must be evaluated and prioritized to make
informed investment decisions. Evaluations are normally performed after the
inspection data are received. Sound engineering judgment is used to evaluate
the consequences of tunnel system or component failure in terms of overall
safety, service level, and costs. In some instances, supplementary inspections
and testing may be needed where data are lacking. Risk assessment techniques
should include strategies for deploying, operating, maintaining, upgrading, and
cost-effectively disposing of tunnel system components.
Tunnel Rehabilitation
The most significant problem in constructed tunnels is groundwater intrusion.
The presence of water in a tunnel, especially if uncontrolled and excessive,
accelerates corrosion and deterioration of the tunnel liner. Electrical,
mechanical, and drainage systems could also be affected.
Groundwater Intrusion
Groundwater intrusion can be mitigated either by treating the ground outside
the tunnel or by sealing the inside of the tunnel. Selecting the proper repair
procedures and products for the project’s conditions, such as the degree
of leakage into the tunnel from the defect, is key to the success of a leak
containment program. Typically, the tunnel defects that cause leakage are
construction joints, liner gaskets, and cracks that are the full depth of the liner.
• Liner – The most common way to seal a tunnel liner is to inject a chemical
or cementitious grout. The grout can be applied to the outside of the
tunnel to create a “blister” type repair that seals off the leak by covering

SECTION | 3
the affected area. Grout selection depends on the groundwater inflow and
chemical properties of the soil and water.
• • Cracks and joints – The most common method of sealing leaking cracks
and joints is to inject a chemical or particle grout directly into the crack or
joint. This is accomplished by drilling holes at a 45-degree angle through
the defect. The holes are spaced alternately on either side of the defect at
a distance equal to half the thickness of the structural element. The drill
holes intersect the defect and become the path for injecting the grout
into the defect. All holes must be flushed with water to clean any debris
from the hole and the sides of the crack or joint before injection to ensure
proper bonding of the grout to the concrete.
For joints that move, only chemical grout is appropriate. The joint or crack
movement will fracture any particle grout and cause the leak to reappear. In
situations where the defect is not subject to movement and is dry at the time
of repair, epoxy grout can be injected into the defect in the same manner that
concrete is structurally re-bonded.
Structural Repair – Concrete

• Concrete delamination – The repair of concrete delamination and spalls in
tunnels has traditionally been performed by the form-and-pour method
for placing concrete or by the hand application of cementitious mortars
modified by the addition of polymers. Today, the repair of concrete
structural elements is typically performed by two methods: hand-applied
mortars for small repairs and shotcrete for larger structural repairs.
• Shotcrete – The pneumatic application of cementitious products that
can be applied to restore concrete structures. Shotcrete is defined by
the American Concrete Institute as a “mortar or concrete pneumatically
projected at a high velocity onto a surface.” Over the years, developments
in materials and application methods have made the use of polymer
cementitious shotcrete products for repairing defects in tunnel liners of
active highway tunnels cost-effective. The selection of the process type
and material to be applied depends on the specific conditions for tunnel
access and available time for the repair installation. Shotcrete is preferred
to other repair methods since the repair is monolithic and becomes part
of the structure. The shotcrete process allows for rapid setup, application,
and ease of transport into and out of the tunnel daily.
Structural Injection of Cracks

Structural cracks that occur due to structural movement, such as settlement,
and are no longer moving should be structurally re-bonded. Any crack being
considered for structural re-bonding must be monitored to assess if any
movement is occurring. Structural analysis of the tunnel lining should be

SECTION | 3
performed to ascertain if the structural integrity was compromised and if the

subject crack requires re-bonding.
Three types of resin are typically available for injecting into tunnel structural
cracks: vinyl ester resin, amine resin, and polyester resin. Amine and polyester
resins are best suited for the structural re-bonding of cracks in tunnels. Both
resins are unaffected by moisture during installation and will bond surface-
saturated concrete.
Segmental Lining Repair

The most common problem with segmental steel and cast-iron liners is
deformation of the flanges due to steel corrosion. In precast concrete
segments, the issue is related to the physical expansion of the corroded steel
reinforcement acting on precast concrete structures resulting in corner spalling.
The spalling of precast segments and deformation of the flanges of steel/cast
iron segments are due to installation errors or impact damage from vehicles.
In addition, rusting through of the liner plate of steel/cast iron segments
occasionally occurs.
• Precast concrete segmental liner – The repair of spalls in precast concrete

liner segments is performed using a high-performance polymer modified
repair mortar, which is formed to recreate the original lines of the segment.
If the segment gasket is damaged, the gasket’s waterproofing function
is restored by injecting a polyurethane chemical grout, as described
above. Damaged bolt connections in precast concrete liner segments are
repaired by carefully removing the bolt and installing a new bolt, washer,
waterproof gasket, and nut. The bolts must be torqued to the original
specification and checked with a torque wrench.
• Steel/cast iron liner – The repair of steel/cast iron liners varies according
to the type of liner material. Steel, if made after 1923, is weldable, but
cast iron is not. Common defects in these types of liners are deformed
flanges and penetration of the liner segment due to rusting. Deformed
flanges can be repaired by reshaping the flanges with hammers or heat.
Holes in steel liner segments can be repaired by welding on a new plate.
Bolted connections often experience galvanic corrosion caused by
dissimilar metal contact, which usually requires replacing the entire bolted
connection. When the bolted connection is replaced, a nylon isolation
gasket prevents contact between the high-strength bolt and the liner
plate. Repairs to cast iron liner segments are similar to those for steel.
However, since cast iron cannot be welded, the repair plate for the segment
is installed by brazing the repair plate to the cast iron or by drilling and
tapping the liner segment and bolting the repair plate to the original liner
segment. In some instances, it is easier to fill the area between the flanges
with shotcrete.

SECTION | 3
Steel Repair
Structural steel is commonly used at tunnel portals, to support internal
ceilings, columns, and segmental liners, and as standoffs for tunnel finishes.
The most recent version of the American Welding Society’s Structural Steel
Welding Code AWSD1.1/D1.1 should be utilized for the construction of all welded
steel connections. Repairs to rivets and bolting must comply with AASHTO
specifications.
Masonry Repair
The restoration of masonry linings composed of clay brick or ashlar (dimension)
stone consists of repointing deficient mortar. The repointing of masonry joints
involves raking out the joint to a depth of approximately 1 in (2.54 cm). Once the
joint has been raked clean and all old mortar removed, the joints are repointed
with a cementitious mortar or with a cementitious mortar fortified with an
acrylic bonding agent.
Replacement of broken, slaked, or crushed clay brick requires a detailed

analysis to determine the causes and extent of the problem. Once the problem
is properly identified, a repair technique can be designed for the structure.
Caution must be exercised in the removal of broken or damaged brick.
Removing numerous bricks from any one section may cause the wall or arch to
fail. Any repair work on masonry should be performed by competent personnel
with experience in restoring brick and stone masonry.
Unlined Rock Tunnels

Unlined rock tunnels do not require a permanent concrete, brick, or steel lining
since the rock was competent and illustrated sufficient strength with minimal
reinforcement to remain standing. These roadway tunnels are also usually
very short in length. Most have various types of rock reinforcement support,
including rock dowels, rock bolts, cable bolts, and other reinforcement placed
at various angles to cross discontinuities in the rock mass.
Rock reinforcement elements may deteriorate and lose strength due to

the corrosive environment and exposure typical in tunnels, requiring the
replacement and installation of new reinforcement elements. Replacement of
rock reinforcement elements requires a detailed investigation of the structural
geology of the tunnel, which is performed by an engineering geologist or
geotechnical engineer having experience in geologic mapping and rock stability
analysis.
Another more frequent cause for the need to repair unlined rock tunnels is
falling rock fragments, which become loose and drop onto the roadway over
time. There are many ways to prevent this from occurring, the most common
of which is to scale (remove) all loose rock from the tunnel roof and walls

SECTION | 3
periodically by using a backhoe or hoe ram. Other methods include placing

a steel liner roof as a shelter, adding rock bolts and wire mesh to contain the
falling rock fragments, and applying shotcrete to the areas of concern.
Special Considerations for Supported Ceilings and Hangers

Suspended ceilings are generally supported by keyways in the tunnel walls
and by hanger rods attached to the tunnel liner either by cast-in-place inserts
or post-installed mechanical or adhesive (chemical) anchors. FHWA issued a
technical advisory in 2008 strongly discouraging the use of adhesive anchors
for permanent sustained tension or overhead applications. Adhesive anchors
in road tunnels must conform to current FHWA directives and other applicable
codes and regulations.
The inspection of these hangers is important to tunnel safety. A rigorous and

regular inspection program that considers importance and redundancy is
strongly recommended to maintain an appropriate level of confidence in their
long-term performance. During inspections, one method to verify hangers are
in tension is by “ringing” each hanger, which is done by striking it with a mason’s
hammer. A hanger in tension will vibrate or ring like a bell after being struck,
and a hanger not in tension because of a connection or other defect will not
ring. Hangers that exhibit a defect or lack of tension should be inspected and
checked for structural stability.
The repair technique of ceiling hangers depends on the type of defect. If the
hanger rod, clevis, turnbuckle, or connection pins are broken or damaged, they
can be replaced with similar components that match the requirements for the
environment and the strength requirements of the support system.
The repair of loose connections at the tunnel arch is of primary concern. The
recommended repair for failed adhesive anchors is to replace them with
undercut mechanical anchors.

Section 4 Data Collection
To better understand the tunnel practices and standards used for transit
rail tunnels in the United States, TTCI put forth a data collection effort to
U.S. agencies. The purpose of the data collection was to (1) determine which
standards are being used and (2) summarize general tunnel characteristics such
as tunnel age, condition, shape, construction method, and so on. Appendix
A contains the data collection sheet sent to the transit agencies. Of the 37
agencies surveyed, 17 responded indicating they own at least one tunnel.
Data Collection Results

Current Inventory
Results show a wide range of tunnel construction dates, with three tunnels
built in the 1800s and six currently under construction. Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2
present the year when construction was completed and the ages of rail transit
tunnels surveyed in the United States, except for one agency that did not have
the information on hand. About half of the tunnels were built more than 50
years ago, and about 15% were built more than 100 years ago. This illustrates
an almost even split between newer tunnels (less than 50 years old) and older
tunnels (more than 50 years old). Older tunnel infrastructure was likely not
designed to incorporate recent advances in ventilation and firefighting systems,
as advances have gradually improved during the past few decades.
18
15 16
16
14 13
14
Number of Tunnels
12
10
10
8 8
8
5 6
6
4
4
1 1 1
2
0
0
Years in Service
Figure 4-1 Year of service or construction of rail transit tunnels in U.S.

SECTION | 4
18
16
14
14
Number of Tunnels
11 11
12
9 9 10
10
7 8 7
8
6
6
3 4
4
2 1
2
Figure 4-2 Age of rail transit tunnels in U.S.
Rehabilitation
Figure 4-3 shows the percentage of tunnels that experienced some sort of
rehabilitation. The results show about 20% of U.S. rail transit tunnels have been
rehabilitated, 47% have not, and 33% are unknown. The “yes” response includes
both full and partial rehabilitation.
Figure 4-3 Percentage of tunnels that have been rehabilitated
Rail Mode
Figure 4-4 shows the rail mode that passes through each tunnel. Most tunnels
(58%) have heavy rapid rail service. The rest have lower values of light rail (24%)
and commuter rail (15%) service.

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Figure 4-4 Percentage of tunnels with each rail mode
Construction Methods
Figure 4-5 shows various construction methods used by agencies. The
percentages do not add up to 100% because more than 40% of tunnels
had multiple construction methods. The results show the most common
construction method was cut-and-cover, with significant portions constructed
using shield-driven or boring methods.
Figure 4-5 Percentage of tunnels constructed with each construction method

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Inspection Frequencies
Concerning the frequency of tunnel inspections, Figure 4-6 shows that just over
half of transit agencies with tunnels inspect their tunnels within a one- to three-
year range (9 out of 17 = 50%). Two agencies (12.5%) inspect at shorter and
longer intervals than the one- to three-year range.
Figure 4-6 Number of transit agencies with tunnels performing tunnel

inspection at different time intervals
Risk Assessment Plans

Risk assessment plans document the potential risks in a tunnel (e.g., fire,
security, structural, mechanical, and electrical). The plans assess the magnitude
of these risks to the tunnel infrastructure and the safe operation of trains,
passengers, and transit agency. Figure 4-7 shows that about 25% of transit
agencies with tunnels (5 out of 17) have risk assessment plans.
Figure 4-7 Percentage of transit agencies with tunnels that have risk
assessment plans

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Structural Design
Transit agencies with tunnels use a wide range of structural design manuals,
including:
• AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering and AREMA Bridge Inspection

Handbook
• US DOT/FHWA Technical Manual for Design and Construction of Road Tunnels
– Civil Elements
• American Concrete Institute (ACI) code 31893 and PCI Design Handbook94
• AISC Steel Construction Manual95
• Agency standards
These standards are used about equally (Figure 4-8), and many transit agencies
use multiple standards (Figure 4-9) or only their agency standards, which
may be comprehensive and reference the general standards. The 56% of
tunnel agencies without codes (9 out of 16) either do not plan on designing
or constructing new tunnels in the near future or may outsource design to
consulting companies.
Figure 4-8 Types of structural design manuals and number of agencies using
them
93
American Concrete Institute, Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete (ACI 318-14),
Farmington Hills, MI, 2018.
94
Precast/Prestressed Concrete Institute, PCI Design Handbook: Precast and Prestressed Concrete, 8th
edition, Chicago, IL, 2017.
95
American Institute of Steel Construction, Steel Construction Manual, 14th edition, Chicago, IL, 2011.

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Figure 4-9 Number of structural design manuals used and number of agencies
using them
Supporting Systems
For supporting systems design, similar distributions are found in Figure 4-10 and
Figure 4-11, but additional sources are used, such as NFPA 13096 and local codes.
Figure 4-10 Types of manuals for supporting system design and number of
agencies using them
96
NFPA 130, op. cit.

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Figure 4-11 Number of supporting system design manuals used and number of
agencies using them
Tunnel Inspection
The three most common manuals and standards for tunnel inspections are the
FHWA/FTA manual,97 TOMIE Manual,98 and agency standards (Figure 4-12 and
Figure 4-13).
Figure 4-12 Types of inspection manuals and number of agencies using them
97
FHWA/FTA, Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel Inspection Manual, 2005.
98

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Figure 4-13 Number of inspection manuals used and number of agencies using
them
Maintenance and Rehabilitation

Results similar to inspection manuals were found for manuals used for
maintenance and rehabilitation. The FHWA/FTA Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel
Maintenance and Rehabilitation Manual is the most common (Figures 4-14 and
4-15).
Figure 4-14 Types of maintenance and rehabilitation manuals and number of

agencies using them

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Figure 4-15 Number of maintenance and rehabilitation manuals used

and number of agencies using them
Data Collection Summary

The results of the data collection survey give insight into the practices of various
rail transit agencies regarding tunnel design, inspection, maintenance, and
repair. General remarks from analyzing the results are:
• Transit agencies with tunnels have a wide range of tunnel design,

inspection, maintenance, and repair practices.
• Most transit agencies use design, inspection, and maintenance manuals
developed for roadway tunnels.
• Transit agencies with multiple tunnels tend to have their own agency
standards. It is unclear how these standards compare against each other or
against the general guidelines published by FHWA or FTA.

Section 5 Site Visits
This project included selecting five transit agencies to visit to discuss their
current practices for new tunnel design and for inspection, maintenance, and
repair of existing tunnels. Trips were made to both East and West Coasts and
included the following transit agencies: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART), Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LA Metro),
MTA-New York City Transit Authority, Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority (MBTA), and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
Visits were made to new tunnels to gather information about:
• Geotechnical aspects and structural types

• Standards used during design and construction
• Challenges encountered during construction
• Modifications required during construction
Visits to retrofitted tunnels gathered information about:
• Changes in the construction conditions

• Issues related to tunnel inspection and maintenance
• Challenges of aging structures
• Standards used for inspections and rehabilitation
BART
Transbay Tube Overview
The Transbay Tube is a 3.6-mi (5.8-km) BART underwater rail transit tunnel
connecting the Market Street Subway in San Francisco with the West Oakland
Station in Oakland. Construction began in 1965 and the tunnel opened for
operations in 1974.
Geological Investigation
To determine the profile underneath the San Francisco Bay, numerous boring
and test programs were conducted prior to construction. The geological profile
was determined to be heterogeneous with different layers of alluvium and
bedrock.
Structural Design
The Transbay Tube has a concrete liner that is sealed by a 0.625-in (16-mm) steel
shell. The individual sections were connected using welds.

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The tunnels consist of a slab track rail transit line powered by a 1,000-volt third
rail located on the outside of the tunnel away from the corridors. A 2.5-ft
(0.76-m) walkway is located on the side near the inner corridor.
Seismic Retrofit
Water intrusion is an important aspect in every tunnel. If leakage occurs, electrical
issues may arise. The biggest challenge with the Transbay Tube is the variable
stratigraphy underlying the tunnel that can produce a differential site response
during an earthquake and may cause sections of the tunnel to pull apart.
Liquefaction of the backfill material is a concern in that it would cause sections
of the tube to become buoyant and rise. Reduced friction between the tube and
backfill material would also cause added movement at the seismic joints. Further,
inadequate welds holding the sections together may not sufficiently resist the
tensile forces, potentially resulting in ruptures and major leaks.
Therefore, the Transbay Tube has required earthquake retrofitting on its

exterior and interior. The fill packed around the tube was compacted to make
it denser and less prone to liquefaction. Consequently, the distance the tube
would rise due to liquefaction was reduced.
On the interior of the tube, BART began a major retrofitting initiative in March
2013, which involved installing heavy steel plates at various locations inside the
tube that most needed strengthening (in four sections of 1 mi/1.6 km length total)
to protect them from sideways movement in an earthquake. The 3.6 long tons
(4,000 lb), 2.5-in (64-mm) thick plates are bolted to the existing concrete walls and
welded together, end-to-end. Figure 5-1 shows the prefabricated plates.
Figure 5-1 Custom-built plate-handling vehicle inside fabrication building

carries steel plate used for reinforcement (bart.gov)

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The two side layers of the plates were installed in 2013. In December 2016,
BART awarded a $267 million contract to perform further seismic retrofitting.
In this phase, a new steel liner and higher-capacity pumps will be installed to
reduce the possibility of the tube flooding, as the existing pumps would not be
adequate in the worst-case seismic event. Other materials besides steel liners
were considered in this project, but steel liners proved to be the best choice for
the seismic retrofit.
Work is projected to begin in the summer of 2018 and is scheduled to take more
than two years to complete. Service through the tube would be reduced or
eliminated during the first and last three hours of the service day. The project’s
goal is to improve the strength of the structural components of the tunnel to
resist seismic activities.
Supporting Systems
The upper gallery of the Transbay Tube houses the ventilation system typically
used only in emergency situations. Other supporting systems are lighting,
ventilation, drainage pumps, and fire detection systems. The tunnel is also
equipped with an accelerometer-based seismic monitoring system.
Tunnel Maintenance
Since the structure was completed in 1969, minimal maintenance has been
required on the Transbay Tube, except for some minor spalling of the lower
gallery floor concrete, minor leaks, and rusty pumps. Typical and most common
maintenance includes performing regular track maintenance; cleaning out
sumps; cleaning out dust; replacing light bulbs; inspecting pumps for proper
operation; checking upper gallery exhaust dampers for proper operation
(monthly); and performing other low-key activities.
Cathodic protection is used to control the corrosion of the metal surface of the
Transbay Tube. Structural inspection is performed every 24 months using BART
agency standards. Track inspection is performed according to FRA standards.
One of the ongoing challenges of inspection and maintenance is that the

Transbay Tube must remain in service. As a result, inspection and maintenance
activities have a limited window from midnight to 4:00 am, restraining the time
and capabilities for large-scale projects.
Inspections are typically visual-only unless a problem is noted, which would

then involve more in-depth inspection methods, such as ultrasonic or
electromagnetic inspection of steel components.

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Overview of Fremont Central Park Subway in Oakland

Warm Springs/South Fremont is a BART station in Fremont, California. The
Warm Springs Extension is 5.4 mi (8.7 km) of new track connecting the existing
Fremont Station south to a new Warm Springs/South Fremont Station in the
Warm Springs District of the city of Fremont. An optional future station will be
located approximately midway in the Irvington District. The project alignment is
presented in Figure 5-2.
Figure 5-2 Warm Springs extension alignment
The Fremont Central Park subway includes a mile-long tunnel under Fremont
Central Park, an embankment for the BART trackway, two ventilation structures,
and the relocation of recreational facilities within Fremont Central Park. The
contract work area extends from just south of Walnut Avenue, under Stevenson
Boulevard and Fremont Central Park, including a portion of Lake Elizabeth, and
to the east side of the Union Pacific Railroad freight tracks just north of Paseo
Padre Parkway. The site visit focused on the underground subway structure of
the extension.
Prior to subway design, a geological investigation was performed, which
included the following activities:

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• Mud rotary borings with soil sampling.

• Laboratory testing of soil samples – sieve analysis for grain size
distribution, Atterberg limits99 for plasticity, strength testing, and
consolidation testing for embankment settlement.
• Cone penetration tests – specifically used to determine the top of the older
alluvium as it transitions deeper as the alignment progresses toward Lake
Elizabeth, providing continuous interpretation of the soils encountered to
depth.
• Downhole shear wave velocities for seismic design of the cut-and-cover box
– data also used to assist in the grout plug design.
• Monitoring wells – observing groundwater levels during pump testing and
recording seasonal changes.
• Downhole pore water dissipation tests for permeability estimation.
• Pump test – determining the hydraulic conductivity of the young and older
alluvium within Hayward Fault Aquifer.
Construction
Major construction on the Warm Springs Extension (WSX) began in August 2009
with the commencement of the Fremont Central Park Subway Contract. The
Subway Contract was completed in April 2013. Major construction of the design-
build Line, Track, Station, and Systems contract, which began in October 2011,
was completed in the summer of 2016. The Warm Springs Extension opened for
revenue (passenger) service on March 25, 2017, following a period of rigorous
testing and California Public Utilities Commission approval.
Geological challenges during subway construction were related to the high-

water table and mixed soil conditions: sandy young alluvium, rocky older
alluvium, and crossing Lake Elizabeth. Moreover, the park functionality had to
be maintained during construction activities, which limited contractor work
areas.
The cut-and-cover method was used for constructing the subway based on the
geological conditions and depth of the structure (relatively shallow). The lake
depth at the location of the subway is only 6 ft (1.8 m).
Two types of excavation support systems were used during construction: sheet
piles and cement deep soil mixing walls with soldier piles. Before excavation,
a grout plug layer of up to 25 ft thick was constructed below the subway box
structure.
A seasonal work restriction from October to April for Lake Elizabeth work
activities presented a scheduling challenge. In addition, bird nesting (several
99
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atterberg_limits.

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species seen on site) delayed construction. Environmental restrictions

prevented construction work within a specified radius of the nests, so if a nest
was discovered, buffers were placed to reduce, limit, or prohibit access to the
nesting sites. This caused minor delays, but the construction was often able
to be resequenced. An example of a nest in the subway box wall construction
sequence is presented in Figure 5-3.
Figure 5-3 Nest in future concrete wall of WSX tunnel
Structural Design
The design was performed in accordance with BART facility standards. Four
seismic joints in the subway (two at each ventilation structure) were designed to
mitigate potential movements during seismic activities.
The noise due to train operations was analyzed along the track using FTA
criteria. Noise mitigation measures included the use of sound walls and acoustic
wall treatments.
Waterproofing System
The waterproofing system was designed for roof slab, base slab, and walls. It
consists of high-density polyethylene (HDPE) sheet (16 mils), geo-composite
mesh (called miracle mesh), poly rubber gel (minimum 90 mils), and water-
soluble membrane. During construction, the waterproofing system for the
blind side application on the exterior box walls was exposed to sunlight, high
temperatures up to 100°F, and sometimes extensive rain. These extreme
weather conditions caused some sagging of the waterproofing poly rubber gel.
The solution was to eliminate or minimize the waterproofing system exposure
by doing smaller sections and covering them with protective white sheeting that

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reflects sunlight. The waterproofing system on walls that were damaged due to
sunlight was repaired prior to pouring concrete.
Other Systems
The gravity drainage system was designed with pumps located at the low point
of the subway under Lake Elizabeth.
The ventilation system was designed to pull smoke away from passenger egress
routes no matter the location of the fire. The system includes two ventilation
structures, each containing two fans, and it was tested along with the
emergency response drills prior to the subway opening. While it was determined
the piston effect is sufficient for ventilation during operations, the ventilation
system is still often used during rail grinding maintenance.
Emergency egress was designed as part of evacuation routes. BART has an

emergency evacuation plan and fire manual for the tunnel. The City of Fremont
jurisdiction requires emergency response drills four times a year.
The Warm Springs Extension subway is equipped with a seismic alarm system
in the event of quake activity and an automatic train control system to ensure
safety by monitoring train movements. In addition, the subway has a security
system that consists of video cameras, an imaging processing system, and an
intrusion detection system.
Tunnel Maintenance
The Warm Springs Extension was opened on March 25, 2017. The periodic
inspection methods used in the subway include visual inspections, ultrasonic
inspections, and track geometry runs. The interval of inspection depends on the
system requirements.
LA Metro Subway Tunnels

Crenshaw/LAX Line Overview
The Crenshaw/LAX line is under construction as of this writing by LA Metro,
which connects the Expo/Crenshaw Station to the Aviation/LAX Green Line
Station in the Los Angeles, California, metro region. The line will be 8.5 mi (13.7
km) of new track.
Construction began in June 2014 and operations are anticipated to begin in

2019. The line has a total of eight stations, three of which are underground. The
project alignment is shown in Figure 5-4.

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Figure 5-4 Proposed Crenshaw/LAX line
Prior to design and construction, geological investigations were carried out that
involved sampling using sonic coring methods. This method is more expensive
than typical sampling, but it was used to obtain higher quality samples using
soil penetration techniques that strongly reduce friction on the drill string
and drill bit due to liquefaction, inertia effects, and a temporary reduction of
porosity of the soil. High-quality soil sampling helps minimize ground surface
settlement, which LA Metro considered a high priority. Samples were obtained
from 4–6 in (102–152 mm) diameter boreholes that extended 20 ft (6.1 m) below
the bottom of the tunnel (80 ft/24.4 m below the surface) to ensure that the
lower layers of soil would not present any problems. Geological investigation
revealed large deposits of natural gas, which had to be dealt with during design
and construction.
Construction
Three excavation methods were used for the underground lines: cut-and-cover,
TBM, and SEM. The cut-and-cover method was used for transition lines that
connect below-grade track to at-grade track and stations. TBM was used to
connect two below-grade stations, and SEM was used for the cross passages in
the TBM tunnel.
The cut-and-cover method presented many issues because the line was planned
directly underneath existing road structures and disruption of traffic flow had

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to be minimized. The cut-and-cover excavation occurred in seven main stages.

The first stage involved installing the south piles, so all traffic had to be moved
to the eastbound lanes. The second stage installed the north piles, so all traffic
moved to the westbound lanes. The third stage involved excavation 12 ft (3.7 m)
below grade. This meant the entire street had to be closed, utilities had to be
supported, and beams and decking installed. Stage four installed timber lagging
to support the excavation. The remaining stages involved installing struts and
incremental excavation downward. Figure 5-5 shows an example of a 60-ft (18.3
m) braced excavation.
Figure 5-5 Proposed Crenshaw/LAX line, 60-ft deep braced excavation at

Mariachi Plaza (courtesy of LA Metro)
One primary environmental issue encountered during construction was

archeological discoveries. If a fossil or artifact is revealed during construction,
a determination is made whether it has a value and if so, it is carefully
excavated and sent to an appropriate location such as a museum. Another
issue encountered during construction was the large number of utility lines
underneath the road structure. These utilities had to be protected or moved. The
cost of construction increased to avoid delays related to relocating the utilities.
The Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM) is used to excavate tunnels with a circular
cross-section through various soil and rock strata. Urban tunneling, such as the
Crenshaw/LAX line, requires the ground surface to be undisturbed. This means

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that ground subsidence and subsequent collapse must be avoided. TBMs with
positive face control, such as earth pressure balance (EPB) machines, were used
in such situations. EPB tunneling reduces the risk of surface subsidence and
voids if operated properly and the ground conditions are well documented.
The machine operates by first excavating the soil in 5-ft (1.5-m) increments. This
is done in a controlled manner that maintains a specified face support pressure,
as shown in Figure 5-6. Afterward, pressure is maintained in the inner tunnel
to reduce changes in the surrounding stress state and a liner is immediately
installed. The purpose is to prevent changes in the stress state of the soil around
the tunnel, therefore minimizing surface settlement.
Figure 5-6 Simplified diagram of principle of face support during

TBM excavations (Courtesy of LA Metro)
To ensure settlement reduction and to avoid sinkholes, the surface was highly
instrumented and minimal settlement was recorded throughout the project.
The only location with settlements above the projected goal was an area in
which the TBM had temporary issues and had to be fixed.
Structural Design
The TBM Crenshaw/LAX tunnel (Figure 5-7) consists of two circular tunnels
with concrete lining and cross passages. LA Metro used its own agency design
standards for the design, with multiple references to the general design
standards such as AASHTO LRFD, ACI, PCI, and AISC. In addition, LA Metro had
a tunnel committee with three experts from academia who provided valuable
comments to the project design.

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Figure 5-7 TBM tunnel (Courtesy of LA Metro)

Waterproofing of the cut-and-cover excavations used an HDPE membrane
(Figure 5-8). The TBM tunnel has double gaskets of HDPE built into the
concrete panels to prevent the infiltration of water and gas into the tunnels.
Multiple pumps are used in case of water infiltration and for system and safety
redundancy.

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Figure 5-8 HDPE membrane installed in station area
Three aspects of vibration due to train movement were considered in the design
process: passenger comfort, adjacent structures that could be affected, and the
natural frequency of supporting systems. A special track design using springs
was implemented to mitigate the potential side effects of track vibration.
Seismic Design
The seismic design keeps the tunnel in the elastic range for an ordinary
earthquake, allowing for minimal plastic hinging in the occurrence of a
maximum design earthquake (MDE) or a safety evaluation earthquake (SEE).
Seismic joints were also incorporated into the tunnel. Tunnel lines were also
designed to be perpendicular to any known faults.
Supporting Systems
The ventilation system includes booster fans installed in ceilings of certain
underground segments for smoke control and four emergency fans installed
in each underground station that can be activated from the rail control center,
stations, or fan rooms. The station emergency fans have two modes: high-
power mode for emergencies and low-power mode for typical use. The low-
power mode is continuously on to vent any dirt, soot, or other contaminants
that are believed to come down from the surface of stations. The fans must be
turned on sequentially during emergencies to avoid overloading the electrical
systems.
The Crenshaw tunnel is equipped with an alarm system to warn of seismic

activity and a train control system to ensure safety. For tunnel security, gates
and alarms are installed as well as high-resolution cameras to detect and track

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trespassers. The emergency response plan will be available after the tunnel is
open for operation.
Inspection and Maintenance

The goal of LA Metro is to keep the new tunnel in a state of good repair.
Structural inspections are anticipated to occur every 24 months, and LA Metro
will hire consultants to conduct the inspections.
MTA–NYCT Subway Tunnels

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCT) subway system is 80 to 100 years old,
and NYCT-CPM Engineering Services is responsible for the capital rehabilitation
of the existing system. MTA Capital Construction agency has been tasked with
managing the design and construction of system expansion projects for the past
14 years, some of which involve new tunnels such as the 7 Line West Extension
and Second Avenue Subway, Phase-I, which opened January 1, 2017.
New Tunnel Overview

Design
NYCT uses its own standards, NYCT Design Guidelines (DG 452A), NY State
Building Code, and NFPA 130 for tunnel structure and supporting systems.
Seismic design criteria are provided in New York State Building Code Chapter 16,
ASCE 7-10, and NYC DOT Seismic Design Guidelines.
The Low Vibration Track is designed to minimize the effect of train-induced

vibrations.
The electrical installation in tunnels is designed according to NYCT Design

Guidelines (DGs), including DGs 254 (Auxiliary Electrical Power, Lighting and
Controls Engineering Design Criteria and Guidelines), 255 (Stray Current
Control Design Guidelines), 256 (Power Substations Engineering Design Criteria
and Guidelines), and 257 (DC Connections Engineering Design Criteria and
Guidelines). NYCT also follows applicable sections of NFPA standards (e.g.,
Emergency Lighting), NEC, and APTA standards.
Communication standards include DG 250 (Communications Engineering Design

Criteria and Guidelines), DG 259 (Fiber Optic Network Design Guidelines), and DG
312 (Flood Resiliency Design Guidelines).
Mechanical standards used for design are NFPA, AMCA, ASHRAE, and NYCT-CPM
Design Guidelines (DGs), 302 (Subway Emergency Ventilation Facilities), 303
(Pump Rooms), and 312 (Flood Resiliency).

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Geotechnical and Environmental Aspects

A typical geotechnical investigation program at NYCT consists of taking
soil borings covering the entire footprint of the proposed alignment at
approximately 100 ft (30.5 m) on centers. Additional borings may be taken at
locations where soil properties are expected to change rapidly. Laboratory tests
and in situ tests are conducted to obtain the required properties.
Environmental investigation follows the Environmental Site Assessment of

New York City Department of Environmental Protection, with Phase 1 being the
search for historical data, Phase 2 site investigation, and Phase 3 remediation.
Parallel to the soil borings is a series of environmental borings to collect water
and soil samples. If contaminated or hazardous material is found, Phase 3
remediation will take place during construction.
Structural Type
The shape of the tunnel is mostly dictated by the construction method. Shallow
construction usually uses the cut-and-cover method, resulting in a rectangular
structure. Construction in rock uses the mining method and usually results in
a cavern structure with an arch ceiling and flat base. Deep construction using a
TBM results in a circular structure.
The tunnel’s liners are cast-in-place or precast liners depending mostly on the
ability to deliver concrete to the location. NYCT’s tunnels typically do not receive
any finish. Stations have architectural finishes.
NYCT has dictated that only PVC waterproofing is to be used.
Supporting Systems
NYCT uses both drained and undrained tunnels. Track drains are installed and
spaced at 50-ft (15-m) intervals within the track bed. Catch basins drain to a
sump. Sumps are provided with three pumps—one emergency and two smaller
pumps.
Passive ventilation from the piston effect due to train movement is used
for daily operations, and mechanical ventilation uses fans and dampers for
emergency situations. Bidirectional axial fans are typically installed to control
fire/smoke in tunnels.
Communication systems include fiber optics, radios, telephones, and

Emergency Alarm/Emergency Telephone (EA/ET).
For train control (signals), the Second Avenue Subway (SAS) Phase 1 is built
with conventional wayside signaling system. SAS Phase 2 will be built with
communication-based train control (CBTC), and MTA-NYCT will retrofit Phase 1
with CBTC.

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Changes in Project during Development Process

The development (design) processes include conceptual, preliminary, and final
phases. Changes are made during each phase of the design process and are
incorporated into the design. This is a standard design process.
Risk Assessment Plan

The SAS Phase 1 Project (not the tunnel itself) has a risk register developed
during the design phase and carried over to the construction phase.
Construction
The biggest challenge is the coordination and integration between contracts
and between trades. Changes during construction usually have cost and
schedule impacts and are performed under change orders.
Maintenance Handbook
Each contract provides Operation and Maintenance (O&M) manuals and
conducts training sessions on all systems installed under the contract.
Emergency Response Plan

NYCT Policy Instruction 10.32.3 describes Procedures for Response to Rapid
Transit Emergencies. Tunnel emergencies are part of the policy. Also, the Office
of System Safety has an Emergency Action Plan that covers tunnels.
Existing Tunnel Overview

Standards Used for Inspections and Rehabilitation
For rehabilitation of tunnel structures, NYCT follows its own standard (NYCT
DG-452/452A, Structural Design Guidelines/Underground Structures), the AREMA
Manual for Railway Engineering where applicable, and ASCE 7 (Minimum Design
Loads and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures).
Inspection Techniques and Frequency

NYCT performs tunnel inspections at one-year intervals. This involves four
groups that inspect the tunnel structures every night during non-revenue hours.
Several other departments inspect different aspects of tunnels, such as lighting,
track, track drainage, traction power, and signals.
Visual inspections are typically performed on foot, but some advanced

techniques are also used in specific circumstances. Ground-penetrating radar
(GPR) and infrared scanning were used in the post-Sandy Montague Tunnel
inspection/rehabilitation with varying degrees of success to locate voids and
trapped water in the liner.

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Inspection Findings and Maintenance

The most common inspection finding is groundwater intrusion in the form of
leakage (Figure 5-9). The tunneling system is located below the water table,
making the leakage difficult to eliminate. The current groundwater intrusion
remedy is chemical grouting of box and horseshoe tunnels. A product known
as No-H2O was successfully used at cast iron rings in Steinway Tubes to stop
minor leakage at ring segment joints and bolts. NYCT is interested in new
waterproofing technology and inspection tools to identify the source of leakage
(location of damaged or deteriorated waterproofing membranes).
In addition to groundwater intrusion, the NYCT tunneling system is exposed

to salt water. Flooding after Hurricane Sandy left behind salt that accelerates
corrosion if wetted. Surface street water that falls through ventilation shafts is
another source of salty water.
Figure 5-9 Example of leakage and corrosion on beam (view from station)
Other inspection findings include missing bolts, concrete spalling, and corrosion
of steel components. The deterioration is more visible near ventilator banks.
After each inspection, the action items are sent to the maintenance group for
repairs. If the items are small and low budget, the in-house group will perform
scheduled maintenance. If the findings are complex and require a higher budget
and more expertise, the project will be awarded to an outside contractor.
Due to operational demands, the challenges for inspection and maintenance are
related to the available time and clearance. It is difficult to perform inspections
in short periods during non-revenue hours. It is also very difficult to obtain
exclusive track rights and construction time for more complex projects. The

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tunnel clearance is often limited, especially in older tunnel structures, which

were not designed with 3-ft (0.9-m) walkways as required in current standards.
Supporting Systems
The most common issue for tunnel supporting systems is security intrusions
from stations and emergency exits.
The communications maintenance in tunnels includes EA/ET and under-river

tube security systems (intercoms, access intrusion control, and laser intrusion
detection).
The tunnel supporting systems that need to be retrofitted or rehabilitated are

fiber optics, radiating antenna/radio systems, telephone cabling, and EA/ET.
The recommendation for new tunnel design from CPM Communications is to

make tunnels larger to allow right-of-way equipment to be installed more easily.
It includes facilities for installing active, powered communication equipment.
Rehabilitation
The primary purpose of structural rehabilitation is to restore structural
elements (steel/concrete— beams, columns, ceilings, walls, etc.) to a state of
good repair and to protect against future deterioration.
Structural repairs, in general, consist of reinforcing existing steel beam and

column elements via the addition of structural steel sections (plates, angles,
channels, etc.) and restoring concrete elements by removing loose/deteriorated
concrete and placing new concrete or patching spalls with repair mortar (e.g.,
epoxy grouting).
New materials are similar and generally compatible with historical materials
(primarily structural steel and concrete). New steel is normally of higher
strength than historic steel; likewise, new concrete, with additives to enhance
durability, control shrinkage, and facilitate placement in remote and difficult-to-
access locations.
Safety concerns with potentially hazardous materials are investigated during

the design phase. All tunnel areas affected by the proposed construction
project are surveyed to determine if asbestos containing materials are present.
Based on survey findings, an asbestos abatement design is developed and
the abatement is performed by NYCT’s indefinite quantities contractor or a
subcontractor hired by the general contractor for a specific project. Lead paint
and power cables that contain lead and insulating oil and light bulbs containing
mercury can also be found within the tunnels. Specifications for the removal
and disposal of these materials are included in the contract documents. Dust
control specifications are incorporated in contracts where there is a potential

SECTION | 5
for silica dust to be generated, such as projects where concrete demolition

takes place.
Recommendations for New Design Tunnels Based on Older

Tunnel Examples
Overall, NYCT tunnels (some more than 115 years old) have performed
remarkably well (i.e., steel-framed cut-and-cover boxes, under-river cast
iron rings), especially the waterproofing. Corrosion is evident where surface
ventilators allow the entry of water (runoff) laden with winter deicing salts into
various box tunnel segments or where waterproofing has been compromised
(e.g., during subsequent projects). For new tunnels, assurance of proper
waterproofing system installation is critical.
MBTA Subway Tunnels

Boston has the oldest continuously working streetcar system in the world.
Streetcar congestion in downtown Boston led to the subways in 1897 and
elevated rail in 1901. The Tremont Street Subway was the first rapid transit
tunnel in the United States (120 years old). Opened in September 1897, the four-
track-wide segment of the Green Line tunnel between Park Street and Boylston
Stations was the first subway in the United States and has been designated a
National Historic Landmark. The downtown portions of what are now the Green,
Orange, Blue, and Red Line tunnels were all in service by 1912. The newest
tunnel was built in 2007.
The subway system has three heavy rail rapid transit lines (Red, Orange, and
Blue Lines) and two light rail lines (Green Line and Ashmont–Mattapan High-
Speed Line, designated an extension of the Red Line).

MBTA is currently developing an inspection handbook for their tunnels. The
agency is using the FHWA/FTA 2005 Tunnel Inspection Manual100 and TOMIE
Manual101 as a background for its handbook.

The inspection frequency varies and is usually limited to visual inspection, with
some tunnels inspected only once every four years. MBTA contracts a consulting
company to perform tunnel inspections. Special inspections are also performed
using GPR and laser scans, but only in restricted locations since the new
technologies are cost prohibitive.
100
FHWA/FTA Manual, op. cit.
101

SECTION | 5

The most common inspection finding is groundwater intrusion in the form of
leakage (Figure 5-10) that creates electrical issues and component deterioration.
The water source depends on the tunnel location, but some leakages leave a
white residue from salty water (Figure 5-11). This brings complications such
as accelerated corrosion and deteriorated concrete (Figure 5-12). Salt water
infiltration is difficult to mitigate. Even if the concrete crack is repaired, the
salt backlog in the small cracks will lead to accelerated corrosion and concrete
deterioration.
Other issues related to tunnel exploitation are brake dust and trash collection,
as both can lead to a fire in a tunnel.
Figure 5-10 Leak on tunnel wall, deteriorated concrete, and exposed rebar
Figure 5-11 Leak on tunnel ceiling, efflorescence confirms salt in water

SECTION | 5
Figure 5-12 Deteriorated concrete columns
Tunnel maintenance includes crack injection to mitigate leaks, patching

spalling concrete (Figure 5-13), coating steel components, or replacing small
steel components that are rusted (Figure 5-14). MBTA has an on-call contractor
performing the maintenance repairs.

SECTION | 5
Figure 5-13 Example of spalling concrete from tunnel ceiling
Figure 5-14 Example of deteriorated steel columns
Rehabilitation
The purpose of rehabilitation is to restore structural elements to a state of
good repair. MBTA is looking for a rating system to help schedule its tunnel
rehabilitation. Some tunnels are already 100 years old and will require major
repairs soon.
MBTA has not performed a full rehabilitation on any of its tunnels. The largest
maintenance work performed was to replace some steel columns that were

SECTION | 5
severely corroded. Future rehabilitation projects will be scheduled based on the

tunnel condition and available budget.
Maintenance and Rehabilitation of Supporting Systems

Different departments are responsible for inspecting and maintaining
supporting systems: the power department for cable inspection, signal
department for communication and signals, railroad engineers for track
inspection, and external companies for ventilation, drainage, and pump
stations. Inspections are performed yearly or biyearly, depending on the
system. Exemptions are the electrical department, which performs inspections
every two years, and life safety inspection, which is performed every five years
and includes inspecting egress and hatches.
MBTA Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Future

Projects
• Design and build tunnels to be waterproof.
• New design should consider how to inspect and maintain the structure.
• Make the clearance bigger for utility structures and maintenance purposes.
• Standards and regulations should not include too many details nor be too
rigorous because they will be too difficult to accomplish and will not work.
• List of materials available for use during a repair along with their
application protocol. The list will help in making repair method decisions.
WMATA Subway Tunnels

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) system of tunnels
is about 50 years old, with the newest tunnel built about 20 years ago.
New Tunnel Overview

Design
WMATA uses its own structural design standards, based on the allowable stress
design (ASD) method. WMATA engineers prefer the ASD method as they consider
it more conservative than the LRFD method.
The old allowable stress design compared actual and allowable stresses,
whereas LRFD compares required strength to actual strengths. The difference
between looking at strengths versus stresses does not present much of a
problem since the difference is normally just multiplying or dividing both sides
of the limit state inequalities by a section property, depending on which way
you are going. However, there are more differences between ASD and LRFD, the
second major difference involving how the relationship between applied loads
and member capacities is handled. The LRFD specification accounts separately
for the predictability of applied loads using load factors applied to the required

SECTION | 5
strength side of the limit state inequalities and for material and construction
variabilities through resistance factors on the nominal strength side of the limit
state inequality. The ASD specification combines the two factors into a single
factor of safety. By breaking the factor of safety into the independent load and
resistance factors (as done in the LRFD approach), a more consistent effective
factor of safety is obtained, which can result in safer or lighter structures,
depending on the predictability of the load types being used.102
The WMATA tunnels are not in a seismic zone so the design does not cover
seismic load.
The shape of a new tunnel is mainly dictated by the construction method.

Shallow construction usually uses the disruptive cut-and-cover method,
typically resulting in a rectangular structure. Deeper, longer structures use
TBM, resulting in a circular shape. If the tunnel is shorter, NATM (New Austrian
Tunneling Method) is used.
The tunnel liners are usually cast-in-place concrete, but there is also a small
percentage of steel liners (~5 %) and precast liners (~5 %). WMATA tunnels do not
receive finish even within the station area.
The risk assessment plan is created during the design and construction phase.
Construction
Every new tunnel project has a general geological consultant to develop a
comprehensive geotechnical study, including a water table profile.
Changes are considered at different stages during the design and construction
process, and if the proposed change is beneficial, it could be implemented.
The biggest challenge during construction was building and extending a

complex tunneling system through differing subsurface strata under the
Washington, D.C., metro area. In addition, tunneling construction faced issues
such as archaeological findings, water breakage, and misalignment. These
challenges usually cause modifications in construction design and methods,
extended schedules, and added costs.
Waterproofing System
The waterproofing system is important in every underground structure.
Depending upon the construction type, different waterproofing systems are
used in WMATA tunnels. For example, the TBM tunnel waterproofing is installed
between two layers of concrete liners (precast concrete initial lining and cast-in-
place concrete final lining). The waterproofing membrane consists of geotextile,
102
https://www.bgstructuralengineering.com/BGDesign/BGDesign05.htm.

SECTION | 5
geomembrane, and geo-drain. If the membrane deteriorates, the leakage will be

released in a designed interior location through a 3-in (76-mm) PVC weep hole.
The weep hole is installed in every unit. If leakage occurs, the location will be
easy to find and the leakage will be easier to mitigate.
Supporting Systems
Every tunnel contains a drainage pipe beneath the track slab that discharges
water by gravity to a drainage pumping station located at the lowest points
in the tunnel profile. Tunnels have passive ventilation shafts to handle the
piston effect from train movement and mechanical ventilation systems
consisting of ducts, shafts, and fans for emergency situations. Fans may be
reversible and centrally controllable to direct the airflow away from stranded
trains. Emergency procedures for trained operational personnel and regular
ventilation maintenance checks, testing, and repairs are essential to ensure fans
work properly during an incident.
Every tunnel is equipped with a security system that includes high-speed

video cameras, intrusion alarms, and gate sensors. Further, security systems
are typically monitored and recorded locally and from central command
stations. The traditional fixed-block train control system of blocks and signals is
maintained.
Emergency Response
Emergency response procedures and an emergency response plan are
prepared for each new tunnel. Emergency response drills are performed in
the tunnel itself and in a training tunnel and train simulator. The tunnel is used
by the agency and other outside fire and rescue agencies. WMATA owns the
training tunnel that was designed to provide a realistic training environment
for fire, police, and emergency response departments from local and national
jurisdictions. Located at the Carmen Turner Facility in Landover, Maryland, the
facility is available for emergency response departments to use in mock fire
and rescue exercises, disaster drills, and other simulations. The tunnel training
facility is the first one built in the United States.

WMATA is using the TOMIE Manual for inspection. Visual inspections are typically
performed by personnel walking through the tunnels, but some advanced
techniques are also used when more complex issues arise in specific locations.

WMATA has a group of qualified inspectors who inspect tunnels every weekend
to ensure that every tunnel in the system has completed a yearly inspection.

SECTION | 5

The most common inspection finding is groundwater intrusion in the form
of leakage, especially in older tunnels constructed without waterproofing
membranes or because the membranes have deteriorated. Tunnels constructed
after 1987 used NATM, also known as SEM (Sequential Excavation Method).
These tunnels have a waterproofing system that performs well, and water
intrusion is not an issue. The TBM tunnel waterproofing is installed between
two layers of concrete liners (precast concrete initial lining and cast-in-place
concrete final lining).
The most typical maintenance performed in the tunnels is related to leak

mitigation, injecting concrete cracks, coating steel liners and components to
protect them from corrosion, and replacing missing bolts. WMATA is satisfied
with its technologies to inject cracks but is interested in new materials and
technologies that could further improve long-term performance.
WMATA is also interested in new technologies that will help estimate steel
component thickness and percentage of corrosion. The steel liner panels are
usually 0.5-in (12.7-mm) thick and the steel ribs are 1-in (25.4-mm) thick. The
corrosion could start on the side that is not visible, making them difficult to
inspect; therefore, a technology that can help estimate the remaining steel
thickness will be valuable for evaluating structures for rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation
WMATA has not performed a full rehabilitation of any of its tunnels. The biggest
maintenance work effort involved replacing structural steel panels that were
severely corroded. WMATA does not have any plans for major rehabilitations in
the foreseeable future.
Recommendations for New Design Tunnels Based on the Older

Tunnel Examples
For new tunnels, WMATA recommends ensuring redundancy of design structure
and supporting systems.

Section 6 Standards Gap Analyses: Structural,
Construction, Support Systems,
Inspection and Maintenance,
and Rehabilitation
The previous sections provided a comprehensive literature review of standards,
guidelines, and best practices for rail transit tunnel structural design,
construction, supporting system design, inspection, and rehabilitation, along
with a data collection analysis studying the documents and practices used
by various rail transit agencies in the United States. This section lists existing
standards and guidelines gaps discovered from the literature review, site visits,
and data collection.
Gap Analysis in Standards

The literature review references multiple standards and recommended
practices available for rail tunnels. However, rail tunnels have unique aspects
that need to be addressed. Therefore, the topics were categorized into the
following:
• Structural Design and Construction

• Maintenance, Inspection, and Rehabilitation
• Supporting Systems
• Security and Risk Assessment
Several documents were selected as the lead documents in each category

(Table 6-1). These documents cover the topic in detail and are often referenced
by other documents in the same category. However, some of the selected
standards are focused on road tunnels instead of rail tunnels. Most of the
selected documents are from the United States and one document is from the
European Union.
Table 6-1 Main Standards for Rail Tunnels

Category Document Comment
Supporting Systems/ Comprehensive document focuses on rail transit passenger
Security and Risk TSI No. 1303/2014 egress with regulations on supporting systems. The standard is
Assessment from the European Union.
Supporting Systems/ Comprehensive document focuses on road tunnel fire safety
Security and Risk NFPA 502103 with standards on supporting systems. The standard is from the
Assessment United States.
Supporting Systems/ Comprehensive document focuses on railway transit fire safety
Security and Risk NFPA 130 with standards on supporting systems. This standard includes
Assessment tunnels and is from the United States.
103
NFPA 502, op. cit.

SECTION | 6
Category Document Comment

Security and Risk Document contains guidelines and best practices for tunnel
APTA SS-SIS-RP-16-15
Assessment security.
AREMA Manual for
Structural Design and
Railway Engineering, Document provides overall guidelines but lacks details.
Construction
Chapters 1, 8, 9
Comprehensive document contains details about design. The
Structural Design and AASHTO LRFD, 2017, 1st
standard is for road tunnels. Most subjects are also applicable
Construction edition 104
to rail tunnels, but some aspects of rails operation are missing.
Structural Design and
NCHRP Report 611105 Document addresses seismic design.
Construction
Comprehensive document contains details about design and
Structural Design,
rehabilitation. The standard is for road tunnels. Most subjects
Construction, and FHWA-NHI-10-034 106
are also applicable to rail tunnels, but some aspects of rail
Rehabilitation
operation are missing.
Maintenance, Inspection, AREMA Bridge
Document provides overall guidelines but lacks details.
and Rehabilitation Inspection Handbook107
Comprehensive document contains details about design. The
Maintenance, Inspection,
FHWA-HIF-15-005108 standard is for road tunnels. Most subjects are also applicable
and Rehabilitation
to rail tunnels, but some aspects of rail operation are missing.
Minimum standard for highway tunnels. Most subjects are also
Maintenance, Inspection, 23 CFR Part 650
applicable to rail tunnels, but some aspects of rail operation are
and Rehabilitation (2015)109
missing.
Structural Design
The rail transit tunnel structure should be designed for a specified limit state
to achieve the objectives of constructability, safety, and serviceability with
respect to inspectability, maintenance, and economy issues. The first edition
of AASHTO’s LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications,
published in 2017, is the most comprehensive structural design document for
tunnels. Despite being focused on road tunnels, AASHTO provides complete
lists of load and load combinations, design requirements for structural
materials, geotechnical information, initial ground support details, ground
stabilization/improvement, and seismic considerations. Further, the reference
details cut-and-cover structures, mined/bored tunnels, and immersed tunnels.
All these aspects of road tunnel design are largely applicable to rail transit
tunnel design with consideration to the peculiarities of rail loads, vibration, and
egress requirements. The AASHTO LRFD Guide can be adapted for rail transit
tunnel design. Additional documents that focus on specific aspects of rail tunnel
structural design are listed in Table 6-2.
104
AASHTO LRFD, op. cit.
105
NCHRP, Seismic Analysis and Design of Retaining Walls, Buried Structures, Slopes, and Embankments,
NCHRP Report 611, Transportation Research Board, 2008.
106
107
AREMA Handbook, op. cit.
108
109
FHWA 23 CFR Part 650, op. cit.

SECTION | 6
Table 6-2 Additional Documents for Structural Design of Rail Transit Tunnels
Main Topic Documents Applicability
Geometric AASHTO LRFD, 2017, First Edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Requirements
Geometric Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Requirements
Geometric FHWA-NHI-10-034 Technical Manual for Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Requirements Design and Construction of Road Tunnels –
Civil Elements
Geometric AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering, Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Requirements Chapters 1 and 28
Geometric SRT TSI Section 4.2.16 Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Requirements
Structural AASHTO LRFD, 2017, First Edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Component Design
Structural Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Component Design
Structural ACI 318-08 Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural ACI-224R Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural PCI Design Handbook Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural AISC Steel Construction Manual Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural AWSD1.1/D1.1 Structural Welding Guide Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural ASCE-SEI Design of Wood Structures Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Structural ASTM and ANSI Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Component Design
Seismic Design AASHTO LRFD, 2017, First Edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Seismic Design Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Seismic Design NEHRP Requirements Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Seismic Design AASHTO Guide Specifications for LRFD Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Seismic Bridge Design
Seismic Design NCHRP Report 611 Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Seismic Design AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering, Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Chapter 9
Construction
Tunnel construction involves excavating the native material and assembling
the tunnel structure in its desired location. The process is highly variable and
depends on geological conditions and the level of disruption allowed in the
surrounding environment.

SECTION | 6
AASHTO’s LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications,

developed based on the FHWA Technical Manual for Design and Construction
of Road Tunnels – Civil Elements, is the primary document for construction
standards. These two documents describe construction methodologies along
with information about support of excavation, structural system, specific loads
and structural design, groundwater control, and other specific aspects.
Additional documents that focus on specific aspects of construction are listed in

Table 6-3.
Table 6-3 Additional Documents for Construction of Rail Transit Tunnels

Excavation Methods AASHTO LRFD, 2017, 1st edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Excavation Methods Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Initial Supports AASHTO LRFD, 2017, 1st edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Initial Supports Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Tunnel Lining AASHTO LRFD, 2017, 1st edition Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Tunnel Lining Transit Agency Standards Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering,
Tunnel Lining Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Chapter 8
Tunnel Lining SRT TSI, Section 2 Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Tunnel Lining FHWA TOMIE Manual Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Ventilation during AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering,
Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Construction Chapter 12 Part 4 and Chapter 1 Part 8
Support Systems
Supporting systems standards primarily focus on safety to ensure passenger
egress and emergency response access during emergency situations. NFPA
130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems is
recommended as the most relevant supporting system document covering
rail transit tunnels. NFPA 130 is already implemented by many U.S. agencies
or included within their agency standards. NFPA 130 includes fire resistance
of tunnel structures and materials, fire detection systems, firefighting
points, emergency communication and train control, evacuation facilities
and walkways, electrical supply, electrical wiring and installations, security,
emergency ventilation, and emergency response plans. A list of these topics is
shown in Table 6-4.

SECTION | 6
Table 6-4 Documents That Address Supporting Systems of Rail Transit Tunnels
Fire Detection, Firefighting, NFPA 130 Section 6.2 – Fire Resistance of Codes/standards and
and Fire Resistance Tunnel Structures and Materials guidelines fully applicable.
Fire Detection, Firefighting, Codes/standards and
NFPA 130 Section 6.4.4 – Fire Detection
and Fire Resistance guidelines fully applicable.
Fire Detection, Firefighting, Codes/standards and
NFPA 130 Section 6.4.5 – Firefighting Points
and Fire Resistance guidelines fully applicable.
Fire Detection, Firefighting, NCHRP Report 836 Section 5 – Fixed Supplementary Standards
and Fire Resistance Firefighting Systems and Guidelines
Codes/standards and
Electrical System NFPA 130 Section 6.4.8 – Electrical Supply
guidelines fully applicable.
NFPA 130 Section 10 – Emergency Codes/standards and
Emergency Systems
Communication and Train Control guidelines fully applicable.
Emergency Systems – NCHRP Report 836 Section 3 – Tunnel Supplementary standards
Ventilation Emergency Ventilation and Smoke Control and guidelines.
Supplementary standards
Security Systems APTA – Tunnel Security for Public Transit
and guidelines.
While NFPA 130 covers the relevant topics in rail transit tunnel supporting
system design, additional supplementary material that expands upon the NFPA
130 standards may be helpful for agencies. For emergency ventilation, NCHRP
Report 836 (2016)110 on roadway emergency ventilation best practices could
be adapted for rail transit tunnel designs. For security, APTA’s Tunnel Security
for Public Transit (2015) or TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525 (2006) on tunnel
security could be updated. The APTA guidelines primarily list the various security
threats and mitigation techniques but do not detail how the technologies could
be implemented. The TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525111 guidelines could be
updated to reflect recent innovations in tunnel security systems.
Inspection and Maintenance

Railway tunnel inspection and maintenance focus on maintaining tunnel
serviceability over the lifespan of the tunnel. No standards exist specifically
for rail transit tunnel inspection, but a few best practice reports could be used
to formulate recommended practices or standards (Table 6-5). The FHWA/
FTA Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel Inspection Manual and the TOMIE Manual
provide guidelines for road tunnel operation, maintenance, inspection,
and evaluation that can be adopted for rail transit use. SRT TSI Section 4.5
covers maintenance rules for railway tunnels. The AREMA Manual for Railway
Engineering (Chapter 1.8) specifies potential defects in the tunnel and the
110
111
TCRP/NCHRP, Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure, TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525,
Volume 12, Transportation Research Board, 2006.

SECTION | 6
AREMA Bridge Inspection Handbook (Chapter 11 – Tunnel Inspection) provides a

tunnel inspection checklist.
FHWA developed the Specifications for the National Tunnel Inventory (SNTI)112 to
help safeguard tunnels and to ensure reliable service levels on all public roads.
The SNTI contains instructions for submitting the inventory and inspection
data to FHWA, which will be maintained in the NTI database to track tunnel
conditions throughout the United States. It is recommended to follow the FHWA
standard of NTI for rail transit tunnels. A similar approach could be adopted for
FTA’s Transit Asset Management system.
Table 6-5 Documents for Maintenance and Inspection of Rail Transit Tunnels
AREMA Bridge Inspection Handbook, Chapter 11 –
Inspection Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Tunnel Inspection
FHWA/FTA Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel Inspection
Inspection Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Manual
Inspection TOMIE Manual Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Maintenance AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering, Chapter 1.8 Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Maintenance SRT TSI, Section 4.5 Codes/standards and guidelines fully applicable.
Inventory Specifications for the National Tunnel Inventory Supplementary standards and guidelines.
Rehabilitation
Tunnel rehabilitation is performed to ensure proper serviceability, upgrade
tunnels to meet higher specifications, and repair unacceptable tunnel
performance and conditions.
Like inspection procedures, no industry standards are available for rail transit
tunnel rehabilitation. FHWA’s Technical Manual for Design and Construction of
Road Tunnels – Civil Elements is the only document with guidelines about tunnel
rehabilitation, including many methods of structural repairs for concrete, lining,
steel, and masonry. Despite focusing on road tunnels, the FHWA document
would be a good foundation for developing rail transit standards or guidelines.
Summary
A summary of standards and guidelines for all the topics discussed is shown in
Table 6-6. It lists currently available standards and guidelines that rail transit
agencies and construction companies could adopt for design, construction,
support system elements, inspection and maintenance, and rehabilitation of
transit tunnels.
112

Table 6-6 Documents That Can Be Adopted for Rail Transit Tunnel
Codes/ Standards Recommendations/

General Topics Comments
Available Guidelines Available
Standard is ready to be implemented but has missing aspects related to
Structural Design AASHTO LRFD N/A
rail operation.
Standard is ready to be implemented but more construction methods
Construction AASHTO LRFD N/A
could be included.
Supporting System Design NFPA 130 N/A Standard is ready to be implemented.
The report provides relevant information but could be updated to reflect
Supporting System Design N/A Ventilation: NCHRP 836 (2016)
rail transit tunnels.
The APTA guidelines list security technology that could be used
Security: APTA (2015) & TCRP Report 86/ to mitigate various threats but do not provide details about
Supporting System Design N/A
NCHRP Report 525 implementation. The NCHRP 525 guidelines could be updated to reflect
recent security innovations.
FHWA/FTA Highway and Rail Transit
Standards are not available for inspection and maintenance. FHWA
Inspection and Maintenance N/A Tunnel Inspection Manual (2005); FHWA-
guidelines are ready to be implemented.
HIF-15-005, TOMIE Manual (2015)
AREMA Bridge Inspection Handbook, It is recommended to follow the FWHA Specifications for the National
Inspection and Maintenance N/A
Chapter 11 – Tunnel Inspection Tunnel Inventory (SNTI) standard for rail tunnels.
FHWA-NHI-10-034 Technical Manual for Standards are not available for rehabilitation. The FHWA guideline is
Rehabilitation N/A Design and Construction of Road Tunnels ready to be implemented but more could be extended to address issues
– Civil Elements (2009) in aging rail tunnels.

Section 7 Conclusions and Findings
The following conclusions are based on the review of the industry requirements,
literature review, data collection analysis, site visits, and resultant gap analysis.
• Regulations for fire safety and passenger evacuation were made a priority
in the United States after the WMATA smoke incident in 2015 and multiple
road tunnel fires in Europe between 1999 and 2001. Three recent NTSB
recommendations for FTA related to rail transit tunnels are:
– R-15-7: Audit all rail transit agencies that have subway tunnel
environments to (1) assess the state of repair of tunnel ventilation
systems, (2) assess written emergency procedures for fire and smoke
events, (3) assess training programs to ensure compliance with these
procedures, and (4) verify that rail transit agencies apply industry best
standards, such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130
Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems113 in
maintenance procedures and emergency procedures.
– R-16-01: Issue regulatory standards for tunnel infrastructure inspection,
maintenance, and repair, incorporating applicable industry consensus
standards into those standards.
– R-16-02: Issue regulatory standards for emergency egress in tunnel
environments.
• In the United States, there are 102 rail transit tunnels owned by 17 public
transportation agencies. Of these tunnels, half are more than 50 years old,
suggesting an aging infrastructure and potential difficulty in retrofitting
with the current best supporting system practices.
• AASHTO’s LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications is
the most comprehensive structural design document that can be adapted
for rail transit tunnel structural design and construction.
• NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
provides standards mostly for supporting system design.
• Modifications of the Recommended AASHTO Guidelines for Emergency
Ventilation Smoke Control in Roadway Tunnels (2016) to focus on rail transit
tunnels would be a beneficial supplement to NFPA 130 for supporting
system design.
• A handbook of best tunnel security practices could be based on APTA’s
Tunnel Security for Public Transit (2015) and TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report
525 (2006).
• Site visits and agency queries noted tunnel inspection and rehabilitation
are not standardized, but best practices could be based on the TOMIE
Manual and FHWA NHI-10-034 Manual. Practices of rail transit agencies may
113
NFPA 130, op. cit.

SECTION | 7
need to be further reviewed and results incorporated into an industry-wide

best practices handbook.
• Investments in new tunnel construction technologies and comparisons of
existing technologies for waterproofing and tunnel flooding would benefit
agencies.
• Technologies for trespasser detection are rapidly advancing, and a
guidebook of best practices would be beneficial.
Based on the results of the research and the feedback and suggestions of
CUTR’s Transit Safety Standards Working Group, the following findings are
provided for industry consideration.
• Finding 1: Transit agencies should be aware of current and future research

that compares AASHTO LRFD Road Tunnel Design and allowable stress
design (ASD) method for new tunnel designs.
– Data collection results show that transit agencies currently use a variety
of standards. Five transit agencies have their own standards for design
and construction, but there are another 12 transit agencies that do not
have their own standards.
– AASHTO’s LRFD Road Tunnel Design and Construction Guide Specifications
(2017) gives minimum requirements to design a tunnel that will last 150
years. However, the AASHTO guide is relatively new, so there have not
been many projects completed since its release. More research should
be conducted to make an analytical comparison between these two
methods.
– Future research should compare transit agency standards for rail
tunnel design and construction with the new edition of AASHTO LRFD
specifications.
• Finding 2: Transit agencies may consider implementing the latest
version of NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger
Rail Systems as a minimum requirement for new rail transit tunnels.
Infrastructure topics include exits and technical rooms, fire resistance
of tunnel structures, fire reaction of building materials, fire detection,
evacuation facilities and escape walkways, firefighting points, emergency
communication and train control, and emergency ventilation.
– For existing tunnels, the retrofit and rehabilitation of existing rail transit
tunnels should also satisfy NFPA 130 requirements, if possible.
– This may potentially satisfy NTSB recommendations R-15-7 Part 4 and
R-16-02.

SECTION | 7
• Finding 3: Transit agencies should be aware of guidelines or best practices

for emergency ventilation developed by Standards Development
Organization (SDOs), such as NCHRP 836, Guidelines for Emergency
Ventilation Smoke Control in Roadway Tunnels.
– A gap analysis indicates that available industry standards do not have
details about emergency ventilation. NFPA 130 covers the basics of
ventilation but does not have details on the best practices and how to
implement them.
• Finding 4: Transit agencies should be aware of the many guidelines being
developed for tunnel inspection, maintenance, and rehabilitation based on
the Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel Inspection Manual and other available
SDO sources. Guidelines particularly covering the following:
– Minimum inspection frequency.
– Condition-based rating standard for tunnels to help estimate when a
tunnel requires emergent or long-term repair or rehabilitation.
Primary structural rehabilitation purpose – to restore structural
elements to a state of good repair and to protect against future
deterioration.
• Finding 5: Transit agencies may consider creating an industry working
group to exchange knowledge about tunneling systems identified in
Findings 1 thru 5.
– Agencies visited under this project expressed interest in providing a
method for communication and sharing of information among agencies
with tunnels.

Appendix A Data Collection Form

Appendix A – Data Collection Form
Appendix A presents the data collection form sent out to the various rail transit agencies in the U.S.
The sheet is displayed below:
Newly-Constructed and Older Tunnels Data

Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) with support from the Center for Urban Transportation
Research (CUTR) at the University of South Florida (USF) was tasked by the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) in researching standards for designing new rail tunnels, guidelines on assessing
existing tunnel structures, and standards for rehabilitating older tunnel structures. As part of this
effort, TTCI is collecting data from the transit industry on rail tunnels used or owned by agencies.
The FTA has provided TTCI with a list of SSOA program managers (through TSO) to contact about
helping TTCI obtain Rail Transit Agency’s (RTA’s) contacts that could help with this data collection
effort. Please complete a form for each individual tunnel in your agency system.
If technical specifications can be provided in addition to the answers to the questions, please send
them to [email protected].
1. Agency Name: _____
2. Rail Mode(s) of operation (check all applicable):

• Commuter rail service
• Heavy rail service
• Light rail service
• Streetcar service
• Other_____
3. Does your agency own or operate through railway transit tunnel(s) or have plans to own or
operate through railway transit tunnels in the future? (Yes/No) _____
a. If yes, where is the tunnel(s) located? _____

b. What year was the tunnel(s) built or plan to be completed? _____
c. Has the tunnel(s) been through a rehabilitation? If so, when? _____
d. Please provide the following information on the types of tunnels you own: year built
(or estimated completion year), shape, construction method, liner, finish, and any
other specific information (select all applicable).
Estimated Completion Year: _____
Shape:
• Circular
• Horseshoe
• Single-box
FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION

• Double-Box
• Oval
• Other_____
Construction method:
• Cut and Cover
• Shield Driven
• Bored
• Drill and Blast
• Immersed Tube
• Sequential Excavation Method
• Jacked Tunnel
• Other_____
Liner:
• Unlined
• Rock Reinforced (e.g., rock bolts)
• Shotcrete
• Ribbed systems
• Segmental
• Poured concrete
• Slurry Walls
• Other_____
Finish:
• Ceramic
• Porcelain-Enameled Metal
• Epoxy-Coated Concrete
• Coated Cementboard
• Precast Concrete
• Metal
• Other_____
Any other specific information that are applicable: _____
e. Does the tunnel have a risk assessment plan? If yes, please provide the standard(s)
that was used to develop the risk assessment plan. ____
f. Which technical standards/specifications/guidelines are used for inspection (select all

applicable)? If multiple standards are used, please list which standards are used for
each specific aspects of inspection.
• FHWA/FTA Highway and Rail Transit Inspection Manual
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____

g. Which technical standards/specifications/guidelines are used for maintenance (select
all applicable)? If multiple standards are used, please list which standards are used for
each specific aspects of maintenance.
• FHWA/FTA Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel Maintenance and rehabilitation
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____
4. Has your agency designed a new tunnel in the past 10 years, or currently designing a new
tunnel? (Yes/No) _____
a. If yes, please provide the type of tunnel (shape, construction method, liner, finish, and
any other specific information) (select all applicable).
Shape:
• Circular
• Horseshoe
• Single-box
• Double-Box
• Oval
• Other_____
• Cut and Cover
• Shield Driven
• Bored
• Drill and Blast
• Immersed Tube
• Jacked Tunnel
• Other_____
Liner:
• Unlined
• Shotcrete
• Ribbed systems
• Segmental
• Poured concrete
• Slurry Walls
• Other_____
Finish:
• Ceramic

• Metal
• Other_____
b. If yes, which technical standards/specifications/guidelines were used for the

structural design (i.e., planning process, geotechnical investigation, permanent lining,
construction methods, etc.) (select all applicable)? If multiple technical
standards/specifications/guidelines were used, please list which standards were used
for each specific aspect of the structural design.
• AREMA Manuals
• USDOT – FHWA Manuals
• ACI Manuals
• AISC Manuals
• Agency Standards_____
• Other_____
c. Which technical standards/specifications/guidelines were used to design supporting

systems (i.e., communication system, smoke and ventilation system, security system,
etc.) (select all applicable). If multiple standards were used, please list which
standards are used for specific aspects of the supporting system design.
• AREMA Manuals
• USDOT – FHWA Manuals
• ACI Manuals
• AISC Manuals
• Agency Standards_____
• Other_____
d. If yes, are there any design/technical/other aspects that were not covered by any
standards? If so, please list them. _____
5. Does your agency inspect existing railway tunnels? (Yes/No) _____

a. If yes, please provide the age, location, and type of tunnels.
Age: _____
Location: _____
Condition: _____
Use numerically-based system for evaluating transit asset conditions: 5 (excellent), 4
(good), 3 (adequate), 2 (marginal), 1 (poor)
Shape:
• Circular
• Horseshoe
• Single-box
• Double-Box
• Oval
• Other_____

• Cut and Cover
• Shield Driven
• Bored
• Drill and Blast
• Immersed Tube
• Jacked Tunnel
• Other_____
Liner:
• Unlined
• Shotcrete
• Ribbed systems
• Segmental
• Poured concrete
• Slurry Walls
• Other_____
Finish:
• Ceramic
• Metal
• Other_____
b. If yes, what is the frequency of tunnel inspections? _____
c. If yes, which technical standards/specifications/guidelines are used for inspection

(select all applicable)? If multiple standards are used, please list which standards are
used for each specific aspect of inspection.
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____
d. If yes, which technical standards/specifications/guidelines are used for repair (select

all applicable)? If multiple standards are used, please list which standards are used for
each specific aspect of repair.
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____

6. Has your agency rehabilitated an older tunnel in the past 10 years? (Yes/No) _____
a. If yes, please provide the age, location, and type of tunnel.
Age: _____
Location: _____
Shape:
• Circular
• Horseshoe
• Single-box
• Double-Box
• Oval
• Other_____
• Cut and Cover
• Shield Driven
• Bored
• Drill and Blast
• Immersed Tube
• Jacked Tunnel
• Other_____
Liner:
• Unlined
• Shotcrete
• Ribbed systems
• Segmental
• Poured concrete
• Slurry Walls
• Other_____
Finish:
• Ceramic
• Metal
• Other_____

b. Which technical standards/specifications/guidelines are used for evaluation of older
tunnels (select all applicable)? If multiple standards are used, please list which
standards are used for each specific aspect of evaluation.
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____
c. Which technical standards/specifications/guidelines were used for rehabilitation

(select all applicable)? If multiple standards were used, please list which standards
were used for each specific aspect of rehabilitation.
• TOMIE Manual
• Other_____
Please provide contact information in case TTCI has any technical questions regarding the
specifications:
Name: _____
Phone: _____
Email: _____

Appendix B Fire Curves
Appendix B briefly describes various fire curves that are referenced under “Fire
Resistance of Tunnel Structures” in Section 3. The two curves, Rijkswaterstaat
(RWS) and EUREKA (RABT ZTV) curves, were developed in Europe to predict
the temperature within a confined space after a car or train catches on fire. The
RABT ZTV curves were developed from the Eureka project in Germany and have
both a car and train version. The RWS curves were developed in the Netherlands
by the Rijkswaterstaat Ministry of Transport and simulate an oil tanker fire.
A comparison of the curves is illustrated in Figure B-1. While the maximum

temperature is relatively similar, the RWS curve has a greater temperature for
an extended period of time, whereas the RABT ZTV curves drop off at a quicker
rate.
Figure B-1 Various fire temperature curves

114
U.S. Department of Transportation
East Building
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
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FTA Report No.

Anna Rakoczy, Stephen Wilk, MaryClara Jones

SYMBOL WHEN YOU KNOW MULTIPLY BY TO FIND SYMBOL

in inches 25.4 millimeters mm

ft feet 0.305 meters m

yd yards 0.914 meters m

mi miles 1.61 kilometers km

fl oz fluid ounces 29.57 milliliters mL

gal gallons 3.785 liters L

ft3 cubic feet 0.028 cubic meters m3

yd3 cubic yards 0.765 cubic meters m3

NOTE: volumes greater than 1000 L shall be shown in m3

oz ounces 28.35 grams g

lb pounds 0.454 kilograms kg

TEMPERATURE (exact degrees)

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION ii

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES [www.transit.dot.gov/research-innovation/fta-reports-and-publications] [https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/research-

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION v

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION vi

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION vii

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION viii

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION ix

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION x

The project objectives include: (1) performing an extensive literature review to

Industry needs were identified by reviewing past tunnel incidents and

An additional literature search was conducted to compile a list of existing

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 1

The tunnel structural design section covers geotechnical exploration/

The tunnel construction section covers tunnel shape, excavation methods,

The supporting system section covers two primary documents regarding

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 2

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 3

However, the existing tunnel infrastructure inventory consists of many tunnels

Life expectancies of tunnels are significantly longer than those of track

This research was undertaken to determine which standards, guidelines, and

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 4

The compilation includes available reports published by the National

WMATA L’Enfant Plaza Station Smoke Accident (NTSB 2016)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 5

persisted as the result of (1) the failure of the WMATA senior

Specific issues that led to or exacerbated the problem included:

• Electrical arc tracking due to improperly constructed power cable

Due to this incident, several safety recommendations were made to multiple

The following safety recommendations were made to FTA:

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 6

The safety recommendations given to the other parties primarily consisted

In a national public safety plan,5 FTA addresses part of NTSB recommendation

Howard Street Tunnel Fire (NTSB 2004)

Some potential derailment scenarios were suggested, including sand in the

FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 7

City of Baltimore. One of the recommendations to the City was to update

Bay Area Rapid Transit District Fire (NTSB 1979)