356 [Fes. 10, 1940) ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED [Vol. 1 OHAPELTON v. BARRY URBAN DISTRIOL COUNCIL. {Courr or Aprrzan (Slesser, MacKinnon and Godderd, LJJ.), January 30, 1940.) Boitment Liability, of ouner—Hlire of deo ohair—Conditions negativing Uability—Conditions on notice exhibited where ohaire otacked—Further conditions on ticket, ‘The respondent council provided deck chairs for porsons desiring to use thern on the beach. ‘The vacant chairs were stacked up on the beach, and beside them was a notice reading aa follows: ‘ Barry Urban Distriot Counoll. Cold Knap. Hire of chairs. 2d. por session of 3 hours.” ‘The appellant received two euch chairs from the attendant and, upon Payment of the feo, two tlokets, which ho immediately put in hig pooket without examina On the back of the tickets ‘words were printed: "... The Counoil will not be liable for any aooldent or damage arising from hire of chair.” ‘The canvas of the chair which the appellant used gave way and he was injured — Hxtb: in the circumstances, the appellant was entitled to assume that all the conditions of hire were contained in the notice near the stack of chairs, and was not bound by tho condition printed on the back of the ticket. He was, therefore, entitled to recover damages in respect of his injuries, NOTE, The basls of the decision here is that the ticket is # mere voucher or receipt and given’ to the hirer merely for the purpose of being shown at @ later time to prove payment or the time of the commencement of the hiring. It is said to be entirely distinguishable from a railway tloket which contains upon it the terms upon which the railway company agree to carry the passenger. ‘As to Lissizzry or Baron, ce HALSBURY, Hailsham Hdn., Vol, 1, pp. 757-760, pares, 1241-1248 ; and ron Casns, oe DIGEST, Vol. 8, pp. 72-75, Nos. 138-148.) Cases referred to 1 (1) Parker v, South Hastern Ry, o., Gabell v. Same (1877), 2 O.P.D, 416; 8 Digest 129, 866; 40 L.J.Q.B, 768; 86 L.T. 840. (2) Thompeon v. London, Midland db Scottish Ry. Oo., [1080] 1 K.B, 41; Digost Supp.; 98 LJ.K.B, 615; 141 LT, 82, (8) Hendoreon v. Stevenson (1875), L.R. 2 Bo, & Div, 470; 8 Digesb 127, 8665 82 LT. 709, (A) Harrie v, Great Western Ry. Oo, (1876), 1 Q.B.D, 5185 8 Digest 199, 8655 45 LJ.Q.B, 720; 84 Lit, 647, (8) Nunan v, Southern Ry. Co,, (1024) 1 K.B, 288; Digest Supp. ; 03 LIK.B. 140; 180 LT, 131, (6) Hood v, Anchor Line (Henderaon Brothers), [1918] A.O, 887 5 8 Digest 104, 696 5 87 L.J.P.O, 1865 119 L.T, 684, (1) Wathine v, Rymitt (1888), 10 Q.B.D. 178 ; 8 Digest 88, 198; 62 L.J.Q.B, 121 ; 48 Lit, 420. Arraat, by the plaintiff from a judgment given by His Honour Jupaz L, 0, Tuomas at Berry County Court on Aug, 15, 1980. The action was for damages for personal injury caused by the negligence of the defendant counoil, their servants or agents, The facts, which were not disputed, ore fully set out in the judgment of Susssar, LJ. The question was whether or not in law the plaintiff had adequate notice of the condition disclaiming liability for accident. Carey Hvane for the appellant, HOA] OHAPELTON v, BARRY U.D.O, 387 BB, Ryder Richardson (for Griffith Williams, on war service) for the respondents. Evans ; The existence of conditions was not mentioned on tho front of the ticket. The contract was constituted by the plaintiff’s assent to the conditions, which were on the notice board, and did not include @ disclaimer of liability. {Counsel referred to Henderson v. Stevenson (3) and Harris v. Great Western Ry. Co, (4). He was stopped by the court.) Richardson : The front of the ticket gives no indication of what the hirer gets for his money. ‘He is obliged to turn to the back. When he does ao, he cannot help seeing the disclaimer of liability. [Counsel referred to Anson’s Law or Conrnaor, 19th Edn., p, 19.] Although the question whether or not all reasonable steps have been taken to give notice of the conditions is » question of fact, in answering which the court must look at all the circumstances, it is for the court to decide as a matter of law whether or not there is evidence that notice was given: Parker v. South Eastern Ry. Co. (1). If the material term is in the document which contains the contract, it does not matter how slightly it is brought to the notice of the other contracting party, He is in any event bound by it: Nunan v. Southern Ry. Co. (6). This devision was approved by Sanxny, LJ., in Thompson v. London, Midland & Scottish Ry. Co. (2). Every oitizen must expect to enter into contracts in all sorts of ciroumstances, and it is his fault if ho does not acquaint himself with their conditions: Hood v. Anchor Line (Henderson Brothers) (6). It is for the court to decide as a fact whether or not the contract in question is of a kind in which the display of conditions ought reasonably to be expected: Watkins v. Rymill (7). Evans was not called upon in reply. Suesser, L.J.: ‘Chis appeal, which must be allowed, arises out of un action brought by one David Chapelton against the Barry Urban District Council, and it raises & question of some importance to tho very large number of people who are in the habit of using deck chairs to ait by the seaside at holiday resorts. On June 3, 1989, Chapelton went on to tho boach at a place named Cold Knap, which is within the area of the Barry Urban District Council, and wished to sit down in a deck chair. There is a café known as Bindle’s Café on the beach, and by the side of Bindle’s Café there was a pile of deck chairs, By the side of the deck chairs there was a notice in the following terme : 3 pany ‘Urban District Council. Oold Knap. Hire of chairs, 2d, per session of urs. Then followed words which said that the publio wore respectfully requested to obtain tickets for their chairs from the chair attendants, and that those tickets must be retained for inspection. Having taken two chwirs from the attendant—one for himself, and one for a Miss Andrews, who was with him—Chapelton received two tickets from the attendant,358 (Fux, 10, 1940] ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED [Vol. 1 glanced at them, ond slipped them into his pooket, He said in the court below that he had no idea that there were any conditions on those tickets, and that he did not know anything about what was on the back of them. He then said that he took the ohairs to the beach and put them up in the ordinary way, setting them up firmly, as he said, and that, when he eat down, he had the experience, which many of us have had from time to time, of going through the canvas, Unfortunately, he had @ bad jar, the result of which was that he suffered injury and had to see a doctor, and in respect of that injury he brought his action, ‘The county court judge had found that, if he had been satisfied that the plaintiff had had a valid legal claim, he would have been entitled to the sum of £50 in addition to the special damages claimed. Ho also found that the accident to the plaintiff was due to negligence on the part of the defendants in providing chair which was unfit for use, and which gave way in the manner stated. Nevertheless, he found in favour of the defendants, by reason of the fact that on the ticket which was handed to Chapelton when he took the chair there appeared these words : Available for 3 hours. ‘Time expires whore indicated by out-off and should bo retained and shown on request. ‘council will not be liable for any accident or damago arising frora hire of chair, As I read the county court judge's judgment—and we have had the advantage of a note taken by counsel for the appellant—in addition to the summary reasons which the county court judge gives for his decision, he eaid that the plaintiff had sufficient notice of the special contract printed on the ticket, and was, accordingly, bound by the same, That is to say, os I understand it, the county court judge has treated this case as a case similar to the many oases which have been tried in reference to conditions printed on tickets, and more particularly, on railway tickets, and has come to tho conclusion that the local authority made an offer to hire out this chair to Chapelton only on certain conditions, which appeared on the ticket—namely, that the council would not be responsible for any accident which arose from the use of the chair—and they say that Chapelton hired the chair on the basis that that was one of the terms of the contract between him and themselves, the local authority. Questions of this sort are always questions of difficulty, and are very often largely questions of fact, In the class of oase where it is said that there is a term in the contract frosing railway companies, or other providers of facilities, from Hebilities which they would otherwise inour at common law, it is a question of how far that condition has been made @ term of the contract and how far it has been sufficiently brought to the notice of the person entering into the contract with the railway company, or other body, and there are numerous authorities on that point. In my view, however, the present case docs not come within that category of case at all. I think that the contract here, as appears B oO0A) CHAPELTON v, BARRY U.D.O, (S1zisspn, LJ.) 358 from a consideration of all the ciroumstances, was this. The local authority offered to hire chairs to peraons who wished to use them ta sit upon on the beach. ‘There was a pile of chairs standing ready there for use by anyone who wished to use them, and the conditions on which the local authority offered persons the use of those chairs were stated in the notice which was put up by the pile of chaire—nemely, that the price of using a chair was 2d, per session of 3 hours. I think that that was the whole of the offer which the local authority made in this case. They said, in effect: “We offer to provide you with a chair, and, if you accept this offer and sit in the chair, you will have to pay 2d. por session of 3 hours for that privilege.” I think that, when the plaintiff, in common with other persons who used these chairs, took the chair from the pile—it happened to be handed to him by an attendant, but I suppose that he might well have taken it for himself if the attendant had been on his rounds collecting money, or was otherwise awey—and simply thought that he was liable to pay 2d, for the use of the chair and that the local authority were liable to him for such common law obligations as might arise from their furnishing of the ohair to him. No suggestion of any restriction of the council’s lability appeared in the notice near the pile of chairs. That, I think, is the proper view to take of the nature of the contract in this case. Then the notice contained these further words : ‘Tho public are respectfully requested to obtain tickets properly issued from the automatic punch In thelr prosonce from tho chair ettondanta, ‘The very language of that “respectful request” shows clearly, to my mind, that, for the convenience of the local authority, the public were asked to obtain from the chair attendants tickets—mere vouchers —which were receipts, and which showed how long @ porson hiring » chair was entitled to use that chair. It is wrong, I think, to look at the fact that this particular man obtained his receipt at the same time as he took his chair as being in any way a modification of the contract which I have indicated, ‘This was a general offer to the general publi, and I think that it is right to say that one must take into account here that there was no reason why anybody taking one of these chairs should necessarily obtain a receipt at the moment whon he took hia chair, Indeed, the notice is inconsistent with that, because it ““ respect- fully requests” the publio to obtain receipts for their money, It may be that somebody might sit in one of these chairs for one hour, or two hours, or, if the holiday resort was a very popular one, for any time, before the attendant came round for his money, or it may be that the | attendant would not come ta him at all for payment for the chair, although in that case I take it there would be an obligation upon the person who used the chair to search out tho attendant, like » debtor searching out his creditor, in order to pay him the sum of 2d, for the use of the chair and to obtain a receipt for the 2d. paid. I think that the county court judge has completely misunderstood the860 [Fap, 10, 1940] ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED [Vol. 1 nature of this agreement. I do not think that this dooument was in the nature of a term of a contract at all, and I find it unnecessary really to refer to the different authorities which were cited to us, save that I would just mention a passage in the judgment of Metiisx, LJ., in Parker v. South astern Ry. Co, (1), where he points out that it may be that a receipt or ticket may not contain terms of the contract at all, A but may be a voucher, He says, at p, 422: For instance, if pereon driving through a turnpike-gate recelved a ticket upon ing the toll, he might reasonably assume that the object of the ticket was that by producing It he might bo free from paying toll ab some other tumplko-gate, and might put it in his pooket unread. B I think that the object of the giving and tho taking of this ticket was that the person taking it might have evidence at hand by which he could show that his obligation to pay 2d. for the use of the chair for three hours had been duly discharged, and I think that, in the absence of any qualification of liability in the notice put up near the pile of chairs, O it is altogether inconsistent to attempt to read into it the qualification contended for, In my opinion, thie ticket is no more than a receipt, and it is entirely distinguishable from o railway ticket which contains upon it the terms upon which the railway company agree to corry the passenger. This, therefore, is not, I think, as counsel for the respon- D dents has argued, a question of fact for the county court judge. I think that the county court judge as a matter of law has misconstrued this contract, and, looking at all the ciroumstances of the case, he has assumed that this condition on the ticket, or the terms upon which the ticket was issued, has disentitled the plaintiff to recover. The class HE of case with which Sanxuy, L.J., dealt in Thompson v, London, Midland & Scottish Ry. Co, (2), which seems to have influenced the county court judge in his decision, is a class of case different from that which we have to consider in the present appeal, I think, therefore, that this appeal should be allowed, F MacKuwon, LJ.; I agree thet this appeal should be allowed. ‘The county court judge decided this case relying upon a dictum of Sanxzy, LJ., in Thompson v. London, Midland & Scottish Ry. Co, (2), when he was speaking of a transaction which was totally different from G@ the trangaction in this case. If a man does an act which constitutes the making of » contract, such as taking o railway ticket, or depositing his bag in a cloakroom, he will be bound by the terme of the document handed to him by the servant of the carriers or bailees, as the case may be. If, however, he merely pays money for something, and reccives H @ receipt for it, or doos something which may clearly only emount to that, he cannot be deemed to have entered into o contract in the terms of the words which his creditor has chosen to print on the back of the receipt, unless, of course, the creditor has taken reasonable steps to bring the terms of the proposed contract to the mind of the man. In thisA OA) OHAPELTON v. BARRY U.D.O. (MacKmnor, LJ.) 861 case there is no evidence at all upon which the county court judge could find that the defendants had taken any steps at all to bring the terms of their proposed contract to the mind of the plaintiff. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the defendants could not rely upon the words on the back of tho ticket issued to the plaintiff, and, having admittedly been negligont in regard to the condition of the chair, they had no defence to the plaintiffs cause of action. I agree that this appeal should be allowed. Gopparp, L.J.: I agro. In my view, the oases which deal with railway tickets, cloakroom tickets, or documents issued by bailees when they take charge of goods, have no analogy with this case. In this case, tho appellant paid 2d, in order to have the right to sit on a chair on the beach, He was asked to take a ticket in the form of a receipt for that purpose, and he was given a document which showed nothing on the face of it except the fact that the man had the right to sit on the chair until 7.30 p.m. on the day when the accident occurred and the faot that the ticket was not transferable, I cannot imagine that anybody paying 2d, in those circumstances for the privilege of sitting on @ chair ‘on the beach would think for one moment that there were being imposed upon him some conditions which would limit his ordinary rights, or that the document he received when paying bis 2d. was a contractual doou- ment in any shape or form. I think that the ticket he received was nothing but a receipt for his 2d., a receipt which showed him how long he might use the chair, I think that the county court judge was quite wrong in thinking that Thompson v. London, Midland & Soltish Ry, Co. (2), upon which he seems to have relied, had any bearing on the present oase, One must have regard to the facts of the oase and the general circumstances of the case, In my opinion Thompson v. London, Midland & Scottish Ry. Co. (2) has no bearing at all on this case, T agree that there was no evidence upon which the county court judge could find that the plaintiff was bound by this condition on the ticket, and, therofore, this appeal must succeed. Appeal allowed with costs, Judgment for the plaintiff for £52 28, 6d. with costs, Solicitors: Kingsley Wood, Williams & Murphy, agents for Hdward 7. Davies & Son, Cardiff (for the appellant); Wrentmore & Son, agents for Thos, John & Co., Cardiff (for the respondents). (Reported by Denex H. Krrcnm, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.]