Scientific Journals Zeszyty Naukowe

Maritime University of Szczecin Akademia Morska w Szczecinie

2014, 40(112) pp. 58–66

ISSN 1733-8670

Analysis of IWRAP mk2 application for oil and gas operations

in the area of the Baltic Sea in view of fishing vessel traffic

Remigiusz Dzikowski, Wojciech Ślączka

Maritime University of Szczecin, Faculty of Navigation
70-500 Szczecin, ul.Wały Chrobrego 1–2, e-mail: {r.dzikowski; w.slaczka}@am.szczecin.pl

Key words: safety, risk management

Abstract
The paper discusses issues of the assessment of collision risk in vicinity of oil and gas production facilities
located in the southern Baltic Sea. The authors have used IWRAP mk2 application to assess the probability of
collision, focusing on the impact of fishing vessels. The analysis has been performed at the Research Centre
for Ship Operation Risk Analyses, Maritime University of Szczecin.

Polish oil and gas industry in the Baltic Sea b) jackup – mobile drilling rigs;
area c) jacket – stationary unmanned production
The exploitation of underwater resources by rigs.
Polish companies takes place in Poland’s economic – exploration and exploitation wells are estab-
zone. In the complex process of subsea exploita- lished in licensed areas; exploitation wells are
tion, the extraction of oil and/or gas is one of the used for oil and gas extraction as well as injec-
last stages. Starting from the development of a geo- tion of deposit water and seawater filtered to op-
logical model of production sites making use of timize the production;
geophysical survey, the operations include the as- – transfer of gas via an underwater pipeline to
sembly and fixing of drilling and production plat- Władysławowo;
forms and underwater systems of pipelines and – transshipment from a buoy near the Baltic Beta
networks, seaborne transport of hydrocarbons to rig and carriage of oil by the mt IKARUS III to
land, movement of drilling rigs to new locations Gdańsk;
and periodical reconstruction of existing wells. – continuous supplies to the rigs by offshore ves-
Given below are upstream activities related to the sels and supervision provided by standby ves-
oil and gas production and operation and mainte- sels; at present, the vessels employed for the
nance of existing wells located in the Polish eco- purpose are the tugs Granit, Bazalt and Kambr
nomic zone: and support ships Aphrodite I and Sea Force;
– exploration is performed by: – jackup rigs towage to new drilling locations;
a) seismic reflection survey vessels Polar Duke – submarine work: diving and maintenance, use of
and St. Barbara that carry out 3D seismic remotely operated vehicles.
survey within the licensed area of exploration Exploration and production in the Polish sea ter-
in fields B21 and B16 (Fig. 1), and drilling of ritory cover about 29,000 km2. LOTOS Petrobaltic
exploration holes; licences for the search and identification of hydro-
b) drilling holes for geophysical survey and carbon deposits comprise eight fields with a total
measurements, executed by Petrobaltic Lotos area of 8,200 km2 in the eastern part of the Polish
Petrobaltic rigs. offshore region.
– production performed by various types of rigs: The capital group LOTOS Petrobaltic also has
a) jackup – stationary producton rigs; four licences for the extraction of oil and gas from

58 Scientific Journals 40(112)

 Analysis of IWRAP mk2 application for oil and gas operations in the area of the Baltic Sea in view of fishing vessel traffic

Fig. 1. Licenced areas of oil/gas production within the southern Baltic [1]

fields B3, B4, B6 and B8. At present, crude oil is The interaction between vessel traffic stream
produced in field B3, while in field B8 preparatory and offshore facilities results in collisions. Four
work is in progress. The map below shows areas such collisions, resulting in major production rig
with licences for exploration and production damage, are indicated below:
(Fig. 1). i. 1988: Osberg B – jacket rig sank after a colli-
Recent years have witnessed an increasingly fast sion with the submarine U27. The crew was
rate of identifying new deposits in licenced areas. transferred to an accommodation vessel moor-
Production has been intensified by starting up un- ing by the rig;
manned rigs and installation of new jackup rigs. ii. 1995: the Reint en route to Aalborg crashed in-
Geophysic reflection survey is also extending, to a rig, despite attempts to protect the rig by
while the existing geological models of hydrocar- a standby vessel;
bon deposits are being verified. iii. 2004: a supply vessel, 5000 ton displacement,
sailing at 7.3 knots struck the Vest Venture rig;
Influence of vessel traffic on upstream both were severely damaged;
activities iv. 2005: in foggy weather, a 5600 ton supply ves-
Statistical data analysis shows that vessel traffic sel proceeding at 6 knots collided with the
does affect the safety of offshore facilities. Ship- Ekofisk rig, which sustained serious damage.
ping routes and fishing grounds are getting closer The World Offshore Accident Database, estab-
to oil/gas production areas, consequently risks of lished and maintained by Det Norske Veritas
collision, close quarter situations or fishing gear (DNV), contains information on marine accidents
related hazards increase. Surface and underwater since 1970. Our analysis making use of that data-
infrastructure, pipelines and wells in particular, are base focused on collisions with mobile offshore
liable to damage. Table 1 classifies craft that may units. A closer look at statistics shows that both
participate in collisions with offshore facilities. jacket and jack-up platforms, such as those operat-
Of the two types of traffic, one group includes ships ed in the southern Baltic, are vulnerable to colli-
passing near an oil field or do work unrelated to sions and other accidents. 53.1% of dangerous
upstream sector activities, e.g. fishing. The other events involve jacket and jack-up rigs. This is due
group comprises vessels engaged in offshore activi- to the mobility of jack-up platforms which relative-
ties. ly frequently are moved from one site to another.

Zeszyty Naukowe 40(112) 59

 Remigiusz Dzikowski, Wojciech Ślączka

Table 1. Categories of vessels that may be involved in collisions with offshore facilities
TypeType
Subtype Remarks
of traffic
of ship
Merchant Container ships, bulk carriers, ro-ro & lo-ro ships, Commercial passages at distances recommended by
vessels general cargo ships, oil / gas / product tankers the master or enforced by traffic safety zones
Vessels moving Warships Surface and submarine ships
in vicinity Fishing Those proceeding to fishing grounds and engaged
Fishing vessels and boats
of offshore craft in fishing near offshore activity sites
facilities, Passenger Ships manoeuvring at some distance from offshore
Passenger ships, cruise ships, ferries
not involved ships activity areas
in upstream Ships entering the security zone of offshore opera-
activities Yachts Sailing ships, yachts, small tourist ships
tions
Offshore Ships moving to other offshore areas, towing plat-
Stand-by and supply vessels, tankers, tugs
traffic forms, flotels, ships supplying other fields
Standby vessels supervising an area These ships monitor a specific area or facility
Supply vessels Frequent cargo and supplies handling operations
Offshore Vessels actively participating in upstream activi-
Vessels
involved traffic ties, such as AHTS (Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessels performing various functions within the
Vessel), diving, seismic survey vessels, flotels, offshore industry
in upstream
floating cranes, cable layers and so forth
activities
Tankers Collect crude oil and gas
Drilling Mobile rigs co-operating with stationary and jacket
MODU – Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
rigs rigs creating risk of collision

Causes of collisions with an offshore facilities

Collision with a vessel not engaged Collision with vessel

in upstream activities area engaged in upstream
activities area

Technical Poor work organisation and

Intended collision
causes isufficient personnel awareness
1. Incopetence and lack
of experience of the
Shipboard Comunication Errors in Health issues, personnel, particulary
Loss of propulsion

in manoeuvring the
Loss of control

equipment errors watchkeeping fatigue, alcohol

ship;
2. Insufficient familiarisa-
1. Incopetence of per- 1. Incopetence 1. Incopetence 1. Bad work tion with ship’s equip-
sonnel handling the of personnel; of personnel; organisation; ment operation;
equipment; 2. Language 2. No procedures and bad 2. Personnel 3. Vessel not under
2. Power supply interrup- problems; work organisations; too tired; command;
tion (blackout); 3. Technical 3. No supervision; 3. Abuse of 4. Communication errors;
3. No procedures for problems in 4. Errors in handling / alcohol; 5. Technical restrictions
adjustment, calibra- communication; taking over the watch; 4. Lack of of platforms,
tion and familiarisa- 4. Ineffective 5. Insufficient bridge supervision e.g. position for
tion with equipment; communication; manning; ul/loading facielities;
4. Insufficient knowladge 5. No communica- 6. Insufficient guidelines 6. Complex character
of equipment limita- tion for voyage execution; of work;
tions, overconfidence; 7. Incorrect voyage 7. Insufficient knowledge
5. Non-intutive handling planning and supervi- of hydro-meteorolo-
of equipment; sion of voyage plan, gical conditions;
6. Misinterpretation of e.g. lack of navigational 8. Poor visilibity;
situation in restricted warnings, or tools for 9. Unknown location
visibility monitoring ship’s posi- of equipment in the oil
tion field

Fig. 2. Causes of collisions with offshore facilities [own study]

Such movement means platforms have to be towed The movement of a jack-up rig consists of
between oil fields, sometimes jack-ups are estab- a number of activities: unloading of drilling equip-
lished over a jacket rig to reconstruct a well or per- ment, preparation of the platform for lowering
form maintenance work. onto the sea surface, pulling up the legs, towage,

60 Scientific Journals 40(112)

 Analysis of IWRAP mk2 application for oil and gas operations in the area of the Baltic Sea in view of fishing vessel traffic

re-establishment of the platform on the seabed and The probability of collision of offshore facilities
fitting it with drilling equipment and gear. The is obtained from the estimation of geometric proba-
complexity of the process increases the probability bility accounting for human error. The commonly
of dangerous events. Apart from risks of collision used geometric model incorporated in the IWRAP
during operation, the probability of accidents in- application is Petersen’s model [2], which divides
creases during un/loading operations and transport collisions into two variants:
of drilling equipment, diving works, drilling. Of all 1. Collisions along vessel’s route: during overtak-
the collisions with offshore facilities, those with ing or passing when vessels are on opposite
jacket platforms and mobile jack-ups are most fre- courses;
quent. The total number of collisions with mobile 2. Collisions of vessels on crossing courses: in are-
facilities amounted to 280, while permanent instal- as where courses are converging, crossing or the
lations were involved in 209 accidents in the years route turns.
1970–2014. Although the most collisions recorded
were those with units working in oil fields, the seri-
ous accidents causing loss or serious damage to the
facility have been those involving a passing vessel.
According to statistics, the most frequent cause
of collision is human error or technical factor. Fig-
ure 2 schematically presents causes of collisions.

Methodology for probability analysis

of offshore facility collisions in the
southern Baltic
Estimation of the probability of collision of an
offshore facility operating in the Baltic Sea can be
divided into a number of functional elements, i.e. Fig. 3. A model of vessel’s collision with an offshore rig [3]
probability analyses of: Here is a model of a vessel-platform collision:
a) collisions of units / facilities during the supply
CF  N  Fd  P1  P2  P3  P4 (1)
process;
b) collisions of service-providing vessels with off- where
shore facilities; CF – frequency of collision with a platform in an
c) collisions of geophysical survey vessels; assumed time interval, e.g. one year;
d) collisions of vessels passing near an oil field N – yearly number of vessels crossing the area of
with units engaged in field operations; platform operation, including fishing craft;
e) damage to underwater infrastructure, such as Fd – geometric probability of an event in which
pipelines, wells, risers, flowlines; a vessel is moving along a line crossing the
f) collisions of tugs towing jack-up platforms. platform position (Fig. 3);

Fig. 4. Model of collision of a vessel with a platform or vessels operating in an oil field [own study]

Zeszyty Naukowe 40(112) 61

 Remigiusz Dzikowski, Wojciech Ślączka

P1 – probability of incorrectly prepared voyage areas too. The locations of wind farms will lengthen
plan; routes of fishing vessels from ports to fishing
P2 – probability of improper navigational grounds and vice versa and will densify the traffic,
watchkeeping; mainly in the area of field B-21.
P3 – probability of failing to respond by a plat-
form or standby vessel after a detection of
collision situation or failure to detect such
situation;
P4 – probability of technical equipment failure.
A model of collision of a vessel proceeding in
the traffic stream with an object located within an
oil field can be written as follows:
N a   Qi oQ j Pi , o (2)
i, j

where
Na – possible number of vessels that might collide
with objects found within an oil field in ex-
amined time interval;
Qi – traffic intensity of i vessels; Fig. 5. A network of platforms in the southern Baltic, and
marked gas pipeline [authors’ sketch]
τ – examined time interval;
Qj – traffic intensity of units working within an
oil field;
Pi,o – probability of an event in which a vessel is
moving along a line crossing the oil field;
da – distance between facilities within an oil field
(Fig. 4);
FI,j(z) – functions of probability density distribution
for vessels/units i and j (Fig. 4).

Fishing area in the southern Baltic, planned

wind farm installations and production and
drilling rigs
Figures 5 and 6 present a map with locations of
platforms in the Polish economic zone. The oil field Fig. 6. A chart showing fishing grounds in the region of the
southern Baltic Sea [4]
B-3 (Fig. 5) comprises the Baltic Beta platform,
tanker Ikarus III and unmanned jacket-type plat- It can be seen from figure 6 that upstream sector
form PG-1. Positions of the other platforms depend activities in the Polish economic zone take place
on operations within the fields B-3, B-21, B-23 within fishing grounds. The platforms, supply,
and B-8 (Fig. 5). Their deployment varies depend- seismic and survey vessels as well as subsea infra-
ing on planned exploration and exploitation works. structure are vulnerable to collisions with fishing
As the areas of these works change, so do positions vessels. Collision risks in this region have been
where offshore platforms are to be fixed. Infor- assessed using the IWRAP mk2 application.
mation on their positions and towing operations is
transmitted as navigational warnings by the Hydro- Use of IWRAP mk2 for an analysis
graphic Office of the Polish Navy. Notably, many of collision probability in offshore
small vessels in particular, maneuvering in immedi- production areas
ate vicinity of offshore rigs, do not receive or plot
navigational warnings on their navigational charts, The risk assessment was made at the Research
which raises a collision risk. This also refers to Centre for Ship Operation Risk Analyses, Institute
fishing vessels. of Marine Navigation, Maritime University of
Figure 6 depicts fishing grounds and a marked Szczecin. The IWRAP application allows to select
network of platforms and planned wind farms. vessel routes leading to a given platform. Figure 7
Fields B-21 and B-23 are located within fishing displays traffic routes of supply and standby vessels
areas. Routes of platform supply vessels cross these sailing between Gdańsk or Władysławowo and the

62 Scientific Journals 40(112)

 Analysis of IWRAP mk2 application for oil and gas operations in the area of the Baltic Sea in view of fishing vessel traffic

platforms, obtained from the Automatic Identifica- Figure 9 presents example arrangements of the
tion System. The program has an option of choos- testing ground. Vessel traffic streams described by
ing types of vessel for collision situations analysis. traffic density have been superimposed on the net-
Figure 8 illustrates the traffic density of selected work of platform positions and supply routes. Plat-
fishing vessels and superimposed platform supply form supply vessels depart from the ports of
routes, marked as firm lines. Gdańsk and Władysławowo, usually heading for
each of the platform in turn. The analyses of colli-
sion probability have been performed for opera-
tional scenarios involving: two platforms, Baltic
Beta and PG-1; three platforms, Baltic Beta, PG1
and one mobile unit; four platforms, Baltic Beta,
PG-1 and two mobile rigs. Collision risks have
been estimated for each of these vessel types:
a. Crude oil tanker;
b. Oil product tanker;
c. Chemical tanker;
d. Gas tanker;
e. Container ship
Fig. 7. Platform supply routes, the tug Kambr – platform sup- f. General cargo ship;
ply and standby vessel – Jan.-March 2014 g. Bulk carrier;
h. Ro-Ro cargo ship;
i. Passenger ship;
j. Fast ferry;
k. Support ship;
l. Fishing ship;
m. Pleasure boat;
n. Other ship.
The analysis results represent total probabilities
of collision situations of vessels:
a. on opposite courses;
b. while overtaking;
Fig. 8. Platform supply network against fishing vessels’ routes
c. on crossing courses;
If any platform is to be relocated, appropriate d. on route turns;
navigational warnings will be broadcast. An exam- e. on convergent routes;
ple radio message is given below. The warnings f. in areas with declared traffic density.
inform about the positions of established platforms Specimen results for diagram 2 (Fig. 9), are giv-
and planned or continued towage. Here is a speci- en in table 1.
men message actually sent by the Hydrographic Table 1 contains analysis results of traffic densi-
Office of the Polish Navy. ty from the first three months of 2014. Depending
NAVIGATIONAL WARNING NO156 on the tested period, the probability of collision in
SOUTHERN BALTIC the platform’s supply network can be estimated for
PLATFORM LOTOS PETROBALTIC IS BEING
each route configuration. Estimated risk of vessel-
TOWED BY THREE TUGS:GRANIT, AKUL AND
URAN FROM POSITION:
platform collision can be obtained by adopting the
LAT:55-10,400’N LONG:017-41,600’E platform position as a waypoint in the IWRAP ap-
TO POSITION: plication. Then traffic densities of vessels on plat-
LAT:55-21,200’N LONG:018-42,500’E form collision courses should be examined. Such
NAVIGATE WITH CAUTION model can be supplemented with data from simula-
The mentioned mobility of offshore units en- tion or expert methods. The following scenarios
gaged in production and related operations changes have been analyzed:
the route patterns of supply vessels, which in turn 1) two platforms in operation in field B–3: Baltic B
affects the probability of collisions. IWRAP mk2 and PG-1 (to date – permanent installations);
has been used to analyze collision probabilities for 2) three platforms in operation: two in field B–3
various configurations of platform positions. and one in a selected field: B-8, B-7 or B-21;

Zeszyty Naukowe 40(112) 63

 Remigiusz Dzikowski, Wojciech Ślączka

1 2

3 4

Fig. 9. Example locations of platforms and traffic density in their operating areas. Traffic density data – Jan.-March 2014
Table 1. Probabilities of collision situations calculated by IWRAP mk2 application
Crude oil tanker
Oil products tanker
General cargoPassenger
ship ship
Fast ferry Support ship Fishing ship Pleasure boat Other ship Sum
Crude oil tanker
Oil products tanker 5,24E-006 3,96E-005 1,67E-006 4,13E-008 3,76E-005 3,15E-006 6,41E-007 7,11E-006 9,50E-005
General cargo ship 3,14E-005 0,00028915 1,40E-005 3,01E-007 0,00022365 2,51E-005 3,96E-006 6,04E-005 0,00064797
Passenger ship 1,30E-006 1,22E-005 4,90E-007 9,79E-009 7,98E-006 8,34E-007 1,25E-007 2,82E-006 2,58E-005
Fast ferry 5,87E-008 4,99E-007 2,21E-008 5,31E-010 3,59E-007 1,77E-008 1,07E-008 6,41E-008 1,03E-006
Support ship 2,77E-005 0,00023185 9,80E-006 2,02E-007 0,00014952 1,83E-005 2,92E-006 4,48E-005 0,00048506
Fishing ship 1,61E-006 2,18E-005 8,02E-007 4,95E-009 1,28E-005 3,35E-006 2,64E-007 7,35E-006 4,80E-005
Pleasure boat 3,87E-007 3,05E-006 1,23E-007 5,23E-009 2,09E-006 2,04E-007 5,39E-008 5,94E-007 6,50E-006
Other ship 5,67E-006 6,73E-005 3,10E-006 3,39E-008 5,05E-005 8,24E-006 7,24E-007 1,67E-005 0,00015229
Sum 7,34E-005 0,00066546 3,00E-005 5,98E-007 0,00048454 5,92E-005 8,70E-006 0,00013973 0,00146165

3) four platforms in operation: two in field B–3 and 0.14E-006

two in selected fields: B-8, B-7, B-21 or B-27. 0.12E-006
In the period under consideration, April-June
0.10E-006
2014, four platforms were working: Baltic Beta,
PG-1, Petrobaltic and Lotos Petrobaltic. Each plat- 0.08E-006
form location variant should be examined. Periodi- 0.06E-006
cally, due to reconstruction work and classification
0.04E-006
surveys all examined arrangements are realistic.
It follows from the results that the most inten- 0.02E-006
sive vessel traffic is observed within the operating 0.00E+000
area of field B-3, with two platforms and a tanker. B-3 B-8 B-7 B-21 B-27
The chart below illustrates probabilities of colli-
sions of vessels supplying the platforms for various Areas of platform operation
arrangements of platform positions. The probabili- B-3 1.21832E-05
ties of collision are also presented as functions of B-8 1.91194E-06
encounter types. B-7 1.94064E-06
The above data can be used for an analysis of B-21 7.71398E-07
collision risks depending on the locations of plat- B-27 1.76202E-06
forms and associated arrangements of supply Fig. 10. Probability of collision with platforms located in fields
routes. Other data, presented in figure 14, provide B-3, B-8, B-7, B-21 and B-27

64 Scientific Journals 40(112)

 Analysis of IWRAP mk2 application for oil and gas operations in the area of the Baltic Sea in view of fishing vessel traffic

0.0100 0.000235

0.000230 B3
0.0098 B3
B3-B8
0.000225 B3-B8
0.0096
B3-B7 0.000220 B3-B7

0.0094 B3-B21 B3-B21

0.000215
B3-B8-B7 B3-B8-B7
0.000210
0.0092 B3-B8-B27
B3-B8-B27
0.000205
B3-B8-B21 B3-B8-B21
0.0090
B3-B7-B21 0.000200 B3-B7-B21
0.0088 0.000195

Fig. 11. Probability of collision of supply vessels serving the Fig. 12. Probability of collision of vessels supplying the plat-
platforms located in fields B-3, B-8, B-7, B-21, B-27 forms engaged in fields B-3, B-8, B-7, B-21, B-27 with fishing
vessels.
a basis for the estimation of risks faced by facilities
operated in the oil/gas fields depending on the type Conclusions
of vessels creating threats. The data in the charts
illustrate risks created by fishing vessels. An expanding network of oil and gas production
Analyzing the above data for the impact of fish- facilities in the southern Baltic and planned wind
ing vessels operating in offshore fields we can state farms call for an analysis of risks of collision of
that fishing vessels created greatest collision risks offshore platforms with cargo and fishing vessels.
in fields B-3 and B-21. In fields B-8 and B-7 IWRAP application has proved to be a suitable tool
general cargo ships make up a group imposing for building a relevant risk model.
the highest risk. Although fishing vessels in those Frequent changes of geographical positions of
fields create lower collision risk, in field B-8 they jack-up platforms and related towing operations
are second in terms of collision risk. create collision risk.
1. 2.
0.003394 0.00352
0.00350
0.003392
B3 0.00348
0.003390
B3
B3-B8 0.00346
B3-B8
0.003388 B3-B7 0.00344
B3-B7
0.00342
0.003386 B3-B21 B3-B21
0.00340
B3-B8-B7 B3-B8-B7
0.003384 0.00338
B3-B8-B27 B3-B8-B27
0.003382 0.00336
B3-B8-B21 B3-B8-B21
0.00334
0.003380 B3-B7-B21 0.00332 B3-B7-B21
0.003378 0.00330
3. 4.
0.0000035 0.000490

0.0000030 B3 0.000485 B3
B3-B8 B3-B8
0.0000025
B3-B7 0.000480 B3-B7
0.0000020 B3-B21 B3-B21
0.000475
0.0000015 B3-B8-B7 B3-B8-B7
B3-B8-B27 0.000470 B3-B8-B27
0.0000010 B3-B8-B21
B3-B8-B21
0.0000005 B3-B7-B21 0.000465 B3-B7-B21

0.0000000 0.000460
Fig. 13. Probability of collision with vessels supplying the platforms operating in fields B-3, B-8, B-7, B-21, B-27 depending on the
type of encounter: 1. on opposite courses, 2. overtaking, 3. crossing courses, and 4. on convergent courses

Zeszyty Naukowe 40(112) 65

 Remigiusz Dzikowski, Wojciech Ślączka

FIELD B-3 FIELD B-8

2.00E-006 4.50E-007
1.80E-006 4.00E-007
1.60E-006 3.50E-007
1.40E-006 3.00E-007
1.20E-006 2.50E-007
1.00E-006
2.00E-007
8.00E-007
6.00E-007 1.50E-007
4.00E-007 1.00E-007
2.00E-007 5.00E-008
0.00E+000 0.00E+000

FIELD B-7 FIELD B-21

2.50E-007 9.00E-007
8.00E-007
2.00E-007 7.00E-007
6.00E-007
1.50E-007 5.00E-007
4.00E-007
1.00E-007
3.00E-007
5.00E-008 2.00E-007
1.00E-007
0.00E+000 0.00E+000

Fig. 14. Probability of collision of various type ships with vessels located in fields B-3, B-8, B-7 and B-21 including fishing vessels

The platforms and gas pipeline are situated in Unia

Europejska
the fishing areas, which entails a risk of damage to Europejski
the installation. Fundusz
Rybacki
Collisions are caused due to high density of ves- Operacja współfinansowana przez Unię Europejską ze środków finansowych Europej-
sel traffic in the examined area and other factors: skiego Funduszu Rybackiego zapewniającą inwestycje w zrównoważone rybołówstwo
Operation co-funded by the European Union from the funds of the European
human error, variable weather conditions, technical Fisheries Fund providing investment in sustainable fisheries
reasons, low quality of voyage planning, insuffi-
cient update of navigational information. References
Analyses based on AIS data do not provide 1. http://www.lotos.pl
completely true probabilities of collisions with fish- 2. PETERSEN P.T.: Probability of Grounding and Collision
ing craft as vessels or boats less than 15 metres Events, Risk and Response. 22nd WEGEMT Gradute
in length are not obliged to carry an AIS system. School, 1995.
3. IWRAP – online manual.
It seems imperative that fishing vessels regularly 4. ANDRULEWICZ E., GAJEWSKI J.: Rozwój energetyki wiatro-
participating in marine traffic should be fitted with wej na Bałtyku w aspekcie oddziaływania na rybołówstwo.
AIS system. Further research shall be based on 2013.
VMS data.
In the future, a probabilistic model of collisions Others
will also be based on expert and simulation tests. 5. GUCMA L.: Wytyczne do zarządzania ryzykiem morskim.
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie,
The papers are financed by the Project No. Szczecin 2009.
00005-61720-OR1600006/10/11 namely “Urucho- 6. KRISTIANSEN S.: MARITIME TRANSPORTATION: Safety man-
mienie Ośrodka Szkoleniowego Rybołówstwa agement and risk analysis. Elsevier Butterworth-Heine-
Bałtyckiego w Kołobrzegu jako nowoczesnego mann, Oxford 2005.
7. VINNEM J.E.: Offshore Risk Assessment. 2007.
narzędzia szkoleniowego” (“The launch of the 8. WOAD – The World Offshore Accident Database, 1970–
Baltic Fisheries Training Centre in Kołobrzeg as 2014, DNV.
a modern training tool”).

66 Scientific Journals 40(112)