ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power Ed 1

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2023
This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the
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ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power

Edition 1, 2023
Sponsor:
Chief of Air Force
Developers:
Air and Space Power Centre
Doctrine Directorate
Publishers:
Directorate of Information, Graphics and eResources
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ADF INTEGRATION DOCTRINE
ADF Air Power

3 Series | Operations
Edition 1
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Australian Defence Force – Integration – 3 ADF Air Power, Edition 1 is

issued for use by the Australian Defence Force and is effective
forthwith.
Angus J Campbell, AO, DSC

General
Chief of the Defence Force
Department of Defence
CANBERRA ACT 2600
05 December 2023
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Preface
1. Military doctrine describes fundamental principles that guide
actions by armed forces to achieve their objectives. While
authoritative, doctrine requires judgement in application.
2. Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine describes principles

that guide the employment and operational effectiveness of an
integrated force. ADF doctrine publications are designed to concisely
describe these principles, and so promote coordinated actions in
support of missions and the commander’s intent. ADF doctrine
publications are written at several levels—capstone, philosophical,
integration and application.
3. Aim. ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power aims to provide a common,

baseline of understanding for air power practitioners and those
working alongside ADF air power, in the planning, integration and
employment of ADF air power contributions as part of an integrated
force or as contributions to national or multinational forces.
4. Audience. This publication is written for all ADF members

and those outside of the ADF who will work alongside ADF air power.
Specifically, this publication is focused on new members of a joint
staff and other personnel at the rank of O3-O4(E) and E3-E4(E) as a
part of their development of Defence mastery.
5. Scope. This publication, centred on ADF air power, is one of

a set of five domain publications drawing from the ADF-C-0
Australian Military Power and ADF-P-3 Campaigns and Operations. It
focuses on the understanding of air power and its characteristics, the
contributions it can make to an integrated force and its employment
considerations. This publication assists with strategic, operational and
tactical integrated planning; improving command and control of ADF
air power; and in contributing to Defence training and education.
6. Acknowledgment of Country. Defence acknowledges the

Traditional Custodians of the lands, seas and air in which we live,
work and train. We pay our respects to their Elders past and present.
We also pay our respects to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
men and women who have contributed to the defence of Australia in
times of peace and war.
ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 iii
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7. Cultural Disclaimer. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

people are advised that this document may contain images or
content referring to deceased persons. It may also contain words or
descriptions that may be deemed culturally insensitive. The term
'Indigenous' is used throughout this document to refer to Aboriginal
and/or Torres Strait Islander Peoples.
8. Imagery Disclaimer. Some of the images in this publication

have been digitally altered to meet personnel security requirements.
iv ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1
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Amendments
The content of this publication has been derived from general
principles and doctrine contained in other relevant publications,
Defence manuals, and allied publications and agreements. Every
opportunity should be taken by users of this publication to examine
its content for applicability and currency. The Doctrine Directorate
invites assistance from you, the reader, to improve this publication.
Please report any deficiencies, errors or potential amendments.
Proposals to amend ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power may be sent to:
Deputy Director Doctrine

Joint Warfare Development Branch
Russell Offices
PO Box 7909 | Canberra BC | ACT 2610
Amendment Chapter(s) Amendment Effected date

number
ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 v
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Doctrine publication hierarchy

The hierarchy of ADF doctrine, and the latest electronic versions of all
ADF doctrine publications, are available on:
Defence Protected Environment Defence Doctrine Library

(http://drnet/vcdf/ADF-Doctrine/Pages/ADF-Doctrine-
Library.aspx)
and
Defence Secret Environment Defence Doctrine Library

(http://collab.defence.gov.au/vcdf/org/FDD-FID-
MSCD/CITEB/doctrine/SitePages/home.aspx)
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Contents
Authorisation ii
Preface iii
Amendments v
Doctrine publication hierarchy vi
Contents vii
List of figures xi
Chapter 1 – 1
Understanding air power 1
Introduction 1
Operational context 2
Air power practitioners 3
Airmindedness 4
Domains 5
Nature of the air domain 5
Ubiquity 6
Obstacles 6
Boundaries 6
Weather 7
Attributes of the air domain 7
Speed 8
Range 8
Altitude 8
Considerations for the use of the air domain 10
National interest considerations 10
Legal and ethical considerations 11
Technological considerations 11
Human considerations 12
Air power 13
Air power characteristics 14
Agility 15
Reach 17
Persistence 19
Resilience 20
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Payload 24
Navy and Army aviation 25
Chapter 2 – 27
Generating air power 27
Introduction 27
Air power preparedness 27
Air power contributions framework 29
Air power contributions – control of the air 30
Counter air 31
Offensive counter air 31
Defensive counter air 33
Air power contributions – air mobility 34
Air logistics support 35
Airborne operations 35
Air-to-air refuelling 36
Aeromedical evacuation 36
Air power contributions – air intelligence and ISR 37
Air ISR 38
Processing, exploitation and dissemination 39
Air intelligence 40
Air domain awareness 40
Air power contributions – strike from the air 41
Offensive air support 41
Strategic attack 43
Maritime strike from the air 44
Electronic attack from the air 45
Air power contributions – air command and
control 46
Airspace management and control 46
Air battle management 48
Air contribution to targeting 48
Personnel recovery 49
Theatre air control 49
Air power contributions - airbase operations 50
Airbase roles 51
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Airbase functions 52
Air power contributions – air power technical
support 54
Aviation medicine 54
Aviation safety 54
Electronic warfare support 55
Cyber operations support 56
Relationship between the air power contributions 57
Chapter 3 – 58
Integrating air power 58
Introduction 58
Integration framework 58
Continuum of integration 60
Air power practitioner integration 60
Social mastery 61
Technical mastery 63
Defence mastery 64
Service integration 66
Generation and preparedness 67
Service exercises 67
Service activities 69
Technical support 70
Air power considerations for joint force
integration 70
Air-maritime integration 72
Air-land integration 73
Air-space integration 75
Air-cyber integration 76
National and multinational integration 78
Joint planning as the integrator 79
Chapter 4 – 80
Employing air power 80
Introduction 80
Agile operations 81
Adaptive basing 82
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Adaptive support and sustainment 84

Agile manoeuvre 85
Resilient and agile command, control,
communications, computers and intelligence 85
Protection through agile signature management 86
Cross-skilled teams 86
Australian Defence Force warfighting functions 87
Command 87
Joint Force Air Component Commander 89
Joint force air component headquarters 91
Multinational air command and control 92
Situational understanding 92
Airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance 94
Airbase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 94
Force generation and sustainment 94
Force generation 94
Sustainment 95
Force projection 96
Air mobility 97
Force projection teams 98
Air combat 99
Force protection 99
Passive defence and deception 100
Manoeuvre 103
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 103
Personnel recovery 104
Integrated air and missile defence 104
Force application 105
Integrated interdiction and manoeuvre 106
Air apportionment and tasking 107
Uncrewed aircraft systems 107
Planning the employment of air power 108
Glossary 109
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List of figures
Figure 1.1: Military air power, a single component of an integrated
force which, in turn, is a single component of national
power ................................................................................................ 3
Figure 1.2: People, the foundation of air power ......................................... 4
Figure 1.3: Domains of the operational environment,
interdependent with the information environment ......... 5
Figure 1.4: Brownout, caused by low level flight in dusty areas ........... 6
Figure 1.5: Ability to operate above obstacles and weather .................. 7
Figure 1.6: Capacity to achieve high speed flight ...................................... 8
Figure 1.7: Considerations for the use of the air domain ..................... 10
Figure 1.8: National and international airspace ........................................ 11
Figure 1.9: Chief of Air Force and Warrant Officer - Air Force join
with local Air Force and indigenous members from
the Wulgurukaba Traditional Custodian Group to
celebrate the opening of the Yarning Circle at RAAF
Base Townsville, June 2023 ..................................................... 12
Figure 1.10: Gender, a human consideration of the air domain ......... 13
Figure 1.11: Air power support to a humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief operation ........................................................... 14
Figure 1.12: Linking the nature and attributes of the air domain to
the characteristics of air power ............................................. 15
Figure 1.13: Increased persistence through air-to-air refuelling ........ 20
Figure 1.14: Air power includes the ability to safely recover a
seriously damaged aircraft ...................................................... 21
Figure 1.15: Precise effect through airdrop of stores ............................. 24
Figure 1.16: Embarked aviation generated, prepared and
employed as an integral part of maritime power ........... 25
Figure 1.17: Army aviation, as a part of a combined arms live fire
activity............................................................................................. 26
Figure 2.1: Preparing a P-8A Poseidon for operations........................... 28
Figure 2.2: Air power contributions framework ........................................ 29
Figure 2.3: Control of the air spectrum ........................................................ 30
Figure 2.4: Mobile air defence radar system .............................................. 33
Figure 2.5: Crew members of a special purpose aircraft ....................... 35
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Figure 2.6: Air-to-air refuelling ....................................................................... 36

Figure 2.7: Relationship between ISR and the intelligence cycle ....... 37
Figure 2.8: An operator from No 83 Squadron conducting mission
analysis ........................................................................................... 39
Figure 2.9: ARH Tiger helicopters conducting armed reconnaissance
........................................................................................................... 42
Figure 2.10: Arming an F-35A Lightening II aircraft for strategic
attack............................................................................................... 43
Figure 2.11: Arming a Navy Seahawk for anti-submarine warfare .... 44
Figure 2.12: EA-18G Growler aircraft seen from the ramp of a C-17A
........................................................................................................... 45
Figure 2.13: Mobile air operations team ..................................................... 47
Figure 2.14: RAAF Base Tindal. An example of a main base ................ 51
Figure 2.15: Emergency response and aerodrome recovery
exercise ........................................................................................... 53
Figure 2.16: Multinational maintenance support ..................................... 55
Figure 3.1: Air power interoperability ........................................................... 59
Figure 3.2: Air power continuum of integration ....................................... 60
Figure 3.3: Defence Values ............................................................................... 61
Figure 3.4: Defence, an integral part of Australian society ................... 62
Figure 3.5: Developing multinational gender, peace and security
partnerships .................................................................................. 63
Figure 3.6: Aircraft maintenance, an example of technical mastery .. 64
Figure 3.7: Warrant Officer of the Air Force, championing Defence
mastery within the senior enlisted leadership team ...... 65
Figure 3.8: Opportunities for multinational education and
relationship building ................................................................. 66
Figure 3.9: Military aviation represented at the Australian
International Airshow '23 ......................................................... 69
Figure 3.10: Scientific studies supporting air power capabilities ....... 70
Figure 3.11: Indicative theatre air command and control
organisation .................................................................................. 71
Figure 3.12: Integrated air power support for naval combatants ...... 72
Figure 3.13: National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile system .......... 74
Figure 3.14: Rocket launch through the air domain ............................... 76
Figure 3.15: Multinational cyber operations .............................................. 77
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Figure 3.16: Air power contribution to national humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief operations ........................... 78
Figure 3.17: Opportunities for multinational cooperation with
Australia's regional neighbours ............................................. 79
Figure 4.1: Agile operations validation activity ......................................... 82
Figure 4.2: Practising the security of a contingency operating site .. 83
Figure 4.3: Deployable airfield repair and recovery capability ............ 84
Figure 4.4: Agile operations reliance on air mobility .............................. 85
Figure 4.5: Cross-skilled people, central to agile operations ............... 86
Figure 4.6: Aviators, understanding the command of air power ........ 88
Figure 4.7: Apportioning air power to operational priorities............... 89
Figure 4.8: Maritime personnel rescue capability .................................... 90
Figure 4.9: Senior Australian officer appointed as the Coalition
Forces Air Component Commander, Coalition Air
Operations Centre ...................................................................... 92
Figure 4.10: Air intelligence underpinning situational
understanding.............................................................................. 93
Figure 4.11: Ability to operate from austere locations .......................... 95
Figure 4.12: Air mobility supporting force projection ............................ 97
Figure 4.13: Preparing water supplies for a contingency location .... 98
Figure 4.14: Operating inside a hardened bunker .................................101
Figure 4.15: Explosive ordnance reconnaissance ...................................102
Figure 4.16: Aircraft refuelling in a simulated chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear threat environment .................103
Figure 4.17: Shipborne air and missile defence system .......................104
Figure 4.18: Integrated force application ..................................................106
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Chapter 1 –
Understanding air power
Executive summary
 Air power is the total strength of a nation's capability to
conduct and influence activities in, through and from the
air to achieve its objectives.
 Air power is one form of military contribution to an
integrated force. Those involved in its application must
have professional mastery across its theory and practice.
 Airmindedness encapsulates how air power practitioners
apply their intellect, emotions, motivation and leadership
to air power.
 Air power leverages technology to exploit the air domain
attributes of speed, range and altitude.
 The characteristics of air power—agility, reach, persistence,
resilience and payload—provide a construct to assess and
appreciate the relative advantage, or limitations, of air
power in an operational context.
Introduction
1.1 Domain understanding forms a part of the basis for an
individual's Defence mastery and is assessed throughout their career.
The application of air power requires a foundational understanding
of air power theory, including that of the air domain and its
attributes, considerations for its use and the attendant characteristics
of air power.
1.2 This chapter aims to provide a framework through which air

power can be planned and evaluated for its potential effectiveness in
an operational context. However, central to this aim is the
fundamental understanding that air power is just one form of military
contribution to an integrated force and that those involved in its
application must have professional mastery across all elements of
military theory and practice.
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Operational context
Plainly put, military power alone is inadequate for

conflict, and national power, devoid of military power,
is inadequate for competition.
Externally, the ADF must be integrated with a broad
range of departments, agencies, allies and partners,
industry, and academia. By combining the power of the
ADF with that of others, the range of options available
to Government is substantially increased. Achieving
these integrate effects will require an ADF skilled at
operating across the continuum of cooperation,
competition and conflict.
Concept APEX, October 2023
1.3 This opening quote defines the challenge facing the

Australian Defence Force (ADF) today. To achieve the national
objectives established by the Australian government, the ADF must,
first and foremost, be an integrated force capable of projecting
military power across the spectrum of competition, and in
conjunction with all other elements of national power. This integrated
force, in turn, will draw upon the prepared and sustained elements of
military power (ie maritime, land, air, space and cyber), tailored to
match the challenges of the operational environment.
1.4 However, military power is complex and it is unrealistic to

expect an individual to have professional mastery of all the
constituent systems, capabilities and limitations. Hence, the ADF
divides the operational environment into domains to allow for the
practicalities of capability management, resource apportionment,
force generation, professional mastery and command.
1.5 This separation by domains and the resulting elements of

military power does not, however, extend to operational employment
through campaigns and operations where an integrated force must
plan and execute under a multi-domain construct (see ADF-C-0
Australian Military Power and ADF-P-3 Campaigns and Operations).
1.6 Air power, as for all elements of military power, is a building

block of an integrated force and most effectively contributes to
campaigns and operations when integrated into that force. It brings
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unique contributions and challenges to an integrated force and must

be represented by those with a deep understanding of the theory
and practice of air power.
Figure 1.1: Military air power, a single component of an integrated

force which, in turn, is a single component of national power
1.7 This publication, like air power itself, is one component of the
doctrinal foundation of an integrated force. This doctrine is an
important element of the practitioner's technical and Defence
mastery of military power, but it must be read in conjunction with all
other ADF doctrine. This is key to the multi-domain professional
mastery required of all ADF personnel underpinned by the ADF's
values and societal expectations (see ADF-P-0 Character in the
Profession of Arms, ADF-P-0 Culture, ADF-P-0 Military Ethics and
ADF-P-0 ADF Leadership).
Air power practitioners

1.8 The ADF uses the collective terms sailor, soldier, and aviator
to describe personnel within each of the Services. As these terms are
Service-specific, and as air power crosses Service boundaries, air
power practitioner will be used as the collective term for those
involved in the development, planning and employment of air power,
as a part of an integrated force—members of the profession of arms.
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1.9 While air power practitioners principally represent air power

within an integrated force, they must also be skilled in the joint
leadership required of all ADF personnel.
Figure 1.2: People, the foundation of air power
Airmindedness
1.10 People are the foundation upon which air power is built.
People decide how aspects of technology and force structure are
developed, employed, sustained and maintained. Airmindedness
encapsulates how air power practitioners apply their resources—
intellect, emotions, culture, motivation and leadership—to the
application of air power in an integrated force.
1.11 Airmindedness is both a collective and individual

phenomenon. Collectively, airmindedness represents everything from
a national awareness of the broad benefits of aviation through to
how air power specifically enhances organisational capabilities and
outcomes. Individually, airmindedness can be as simple as a passion
for flight through to the development and application of complex
aviation skills and knowledge.
1.12 Airmindedness is achieved through training, education,

personal development, culture, organisational values and experience
gained across a range of air power related activities. Airmindedness
includes an individual's social and Defence mastery.
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Domains
The ADF uses domains to coordinate the raising,

training and sustaining of military power.
ADF-C-0 Australian Military Power, Edition 1
1.13 For integrated campaigns and operations, every operational

environment is comprised of all of the domains, interwoven and
interdependent with the information environment (see Figure 1.3).
For additional detail on the domain construct within the ADF, see
ADF-C-0 Australian Military Power and ADF-P-3 Campaigns and
Operations.
Figure 1.3: Domains of the operational environment, interdependent

with the information environment
Nature of the air domain

1.14 The air, beginning at the Earth's surface and extending
upward to where its effects upon air operations is negligible, is the
physical medium that forms the foundation for the air domain.
air domain
 The envelope of air surrounding the Earth, where density,
pressure, temperature, natural obstacles and weather
systems are the dominant environmental factors.
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Ubiquity
1.15 The air domain, by its nature, is ubiquitous: that is, it exists
over the entirety of the Earth’s surface through to the edge of space.
It can theoretically facilitate access between any two points on the
earth's surface via a path through the air.
Obstacles
1.16 While the air domain is ubiquitous, there are obstacles that
can impede flight operations. Natural terrain can impede travel from
one point to another, depending on the technological performance
of the aviation system. Temperature, pressure and air density
decrease with altitude, so can also create natural obstacles for crewed
flight which must be overcome by technology (eg life support
systems).
1.17 Similarly, flight operations close to the ground can cause

crew spatial disorientation through events such as sand storms,
whiteout (caused by snow), brownout (caused by dust) or smoke
haze.
Figure 1.4: Brownout, caused by low level flight in dusty areas
Boundaries
1.18 In the terrestrial context, there are physical boundaries that

delineate the air, land and maritime domains. For space, the
commonly accepted boundary is 100 kilometres above sea level,
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known as the Kármán line. However, this boundary is best thought of

as the point when the atmospheric effects on air power end
(eg aerodynamic lift). As the cyber domain permeates all of the
domains, there is no boundary between the air and cyber domains.
Weather
1.19 Weather can dramatically change the atmospheric conditions

necessary to sustain safe flight and operate sensors effectively. Low
cloud, fog and rain may impede visibility while thunderstorms, and
the rapidly rising or falling air currents which usually accompany
them, can affect the flight control or even structural integrity of an
aircraft.
1.20 Lightning, hail and icing can also have a catastrophic impact
on aircraft frames, electronic systems and aerodynamics. Weather
can, however, have some positive impacts on air power in certain
circumstances, such as using it to avoid detection or to increase
operational performance.
Figure 1.5: Ability to operate above obstacles and weather
Attributes of the air domain

1.21 The utility of the air domain can be exploited to form the
three key attributes—speed, range and altitude.
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Speed
1.22 Technology, including aerodynamic design and advanced

propulsion systems, enables aviation systems to attain and sustain a
range of speeds, from a hover to supersonic flight. Should an aircraft
need to move quickly between objectives, then a higher speed is a
definite advantage. Conversely, if an aircraft needs to remain in close
proximity of an objective, then a hovering helicopter or even a
balloon may be far more useful than supersonic flight.
Figure 1.6: Capacity to achieve high speed flight
Range
1.23 New technologies are enabling greater speed and endurance

of the air platform, and thus the achievement of longer range, in a
shorter timeframe. Range is typically limited by aircraft design and
constrained by the endurance of the human occupants. The use of
uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) has vastly increased the potential
range of an aircraft given that the limitations of human physiology
can be removed from the design.
Altitude
1.24 Aviation systems can exploit the vertical dimension of the air
domain, theoretically up to the limit of the atmosphere. Altitude is,
however, also limited by the performance capabilities of the aviation
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system and the endurance of the human occupants. While high

altitude is achievable, it is not always desired and must suit the task.
For example, a lower altitude is often required for the sensors used in
anti-submarine warfare.
Historical example
Exploiting the air domain on Mars
On 19 April 2021, NASA successfully completed the first controlled,

powered flight by an aircraft on another planet—Mars. Mars has an
atmosphere that is much thinner than Earth’s made up of 95
percent carbon dioxide. The resulting air density is only one
percent that of Earth. Hence, generating adequate lift is much more
of a challenge even if the gravity on Mars is one third of Earth's.
A solar-powered, dual-rotor craft, Ingenuity was originally designed
to fly up to five metres above the ground and for up to 90 seconds
per flight. However, it proved it could achieve far greater
performance during initial tests. With solar power, the flight
endurance of the aircraft is not limited by available power, rather
by the heating of the motors which increases by 1°C every second.
Ingenuity exploited altitude to provide an increased perspective of

the Martian surface so as to ensure that the Perseverance rover
could avoid hazardous obstacles that may permanently impede its
mission. Ingenuity carried a piece of fabric from the wing of the
1903 Wright Flyer.
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Considerations for the use of the air domain

1.25 Capstone doctrine (see ADF-C-0 Australian Military Power)
outlines eight considerations for the use of the domains—the
national interest, legal frameworks, fundamental inputs to capability,
human endurance, operational access, economics, importance of
alliances and partnerships, and culture. Due to the unique nature of
air power, these considerations need to be framed and understood
specifically for the air domain (see Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7: Considerations for the use of the air domain
National interest considerations
1.26 Nations rely upon international air travel, civilian or military,

for global access and economic prosperity. Where this includes
routes that cross national borders, such access may be impacted by
political barriers within the air domain, which restrict the freedom of
navigation.
1.27 To overcome such barriers, standing agreements between

nations may be established to ensure aviation access in line with
national interests. For example, the Convention on International Civil
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Aviation, better known as the Chicago Convention, establishes rules

of airspace, aircraft registration, safety and security, and details the
rights and obligations of signatories in relation to air travel.
Legal and ethical considerations
1.28 Air power is significantly shaped by a legal and ethical

framework for military operations (eg law of armed conflict) to which
Australia and most other nations adhere. For the air domain, this
consideration is complex given the ability for force projection from
much greater stand-off ranges, often outside visible range of the
intended target and often with greater lethality.
1.29 Air sovereignty. International law recognises the legal status

of national airspace directly above a state’s territory including its
territorial sea, archipelagic and internal waters as being sovereign to
that state (see Figure 1.8). International Civil Aviation Organisation
procedures permit civilian aircraft to enter another state’s airspace
without diplomatic clearance. Military aircraft, however, are expected
to seek permission to enter another state’s airspace, except during an
in-flight emergency. This may be via a specific diplomatic clearance
or general permission granted by an agreement between nations.
Figure 1.8: National and international airspace
Technological considerations
1.30 Exploitation of the air domain is inextricably linked to

technology. Aviation systems are a system-of-systems extending
from the platform, through support systems, to airbases and people.
Each of these comes with its own technology, operating profile and
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constraints, and must be equally considered in the generation,

employment and sustainment of air power.
Human considerations
1.31 While air power relies on technology to exploit the air

domain, it is ultimately the people that will shape the application of
air power.
1.32 Culture and beliefs. As air power practitioners, our culture

and beliefs are shaped by society and our individual experiences.
However, our resulting behaviours and practices may be different to
that of our partners or adversaries and we must remain conscious
and tolerant of these differences, especially when establishing
effective alliances and partnerships.
Figure 1.9: Chief of Air Force and Warrant Officer - Air Force join
with local Air Force and indigenous members from the Wulgurukaba
Traditional Custodian Group to celebrate the opening of the Yarning
Circle at RAAF Base Townsville, June 2023
1.33 Gender. Air power practitioners are often the first contact the
ADF has with a host nation where the gender and cultural norms
within each society or cultural group may differ. Understanding the
dynamics of a population, through the consideration of specific
gender needs, influences, priorities, strengths and capacities within a
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society, will help underpin command and power projection through

the air domain.
1.34 For additional detail on the role of gender in campaigns and

operations, see ADF-A(J)-3 Gender, Peace and Security.
Figure 1.10: Gender, a human consideration of the air domain
1.35 Physiology. While crewed aviation systems can be

specifically designed to provide the necessary level of life support to
its occupants and thus overcome limits in human physiology, human
endurance remains a key consideration for the planning and
application of air power.
Air power
air power
 The total strength of a nation's capability to conduct and
influence activities in, through and from the air to achieve
its objectives.
1.36 ADF air power, as an integral component of the nation's air

power, is the use of aviation systems to exploit the air domain for
military effect, in line with national objectives.
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1.37 Air power has the capacity to ultimately project lethal force,
from the air, against the full range of adversary targets. However, air
power can also be employed, for example, to move people and
cargo, often being the initial face of the ADF in a humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operation, bringing the initial
life-saving stores to an affected nation.
Figure 1.11: Air power support to a humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief operation
1.38 ADF air power can also contribute to national objectives

outside of a campaign or operation. ADF air power shapes the
operational environment through targeted Service activities and
further contributes to deterrence through its demonstrated
preparedness.
Air power characteristics

1.39 The characteristics of air power shape the contributions it
makes as part of an integrated force, national and multinational
efforts. They are derived from the nature and attributes of the air
domain. These characteristics are not necessarily unique to air power,
nor are they intended to stand alone. They are complementary and
overlapping both with each other and with the characteristics of the
other forms of military power.
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Figure 1.12: Linking the nature and attributes of the air domain to
the characteristics of air power
Agility
agility
 The ability to move quickly and easily to react to changes
in the operational environment. Note: Agility encompasses
the ability to transition responsively and flexibly between
tasks.
1.40 Air power is inherently agile; that is, it has the potential to
react relatively quickly to changes, such as emerging objectives and
threats, in the operational environment. This includes changing from
one task to another potentially across multiple areas of operation
within, or even between, theatres. Some systems are also able to
prosecute different objectives at the same time. This agility, typically
a factor of technology and training, can allow a smaller force to carry
out a range of tasks that may otherwise require employing a number
of dedicated systems.
1.41 Agility of air power can also be instrumental in complicating

the adversary's understanding of the area of operations and
subsequent opportunities for targeting by becoming less
operationally predictable (eg shifting away from static airbases).
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Historical example
Australian Air Task Group deployment to Al Minhad airbase
The Australian air component was formed in early September 2014,

with the decision to deploy an Air Task Group (ATG) comprising
some 400 personnel, six F/A-18F Super Hornets, one E-7A
Wedgetail, and one KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft.
With only two weeks of pre-deployment preparation to bring
together disparate capabilities for service in a complex operating
environment, the ATG departed Australia on 21 September, arriving
at Al Minhad Airbase, United Arab Emirates two days later.
At the time of the commitment, the E-7A and KC-30A were still
only at initial operational capability and the Super Hornets had only
achieved full operational capability in December 2012. The ATG
rapidly integrated into the coalition force structure and
commenced its first air operations just two weeks after arrival.
Over six rotations, the ATG conducted 2,700 strikes from the air
sorties and transferred more than 45,000,000 litres of fuel to
Australian and allied air assets. The Wedgetail also became a highly
sought-after airborne control asset.
This deployment reflected the professional mastery of air and

ground crews alike, and demonstrated air power's responsiveness
to move people, assets and supplies at short notice.
1.42 Responsiveness. Responsiveness, as a subset of agility,

represents air power's ability to exploit speed, range and altitude to
be able to rapidly contribute to the desired effects. Whether that be
the dynamic retasking of an airborne asset or the ability to scramble
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assets to respond to a new task. For example, an aircraft can use

altitude to safely loiter above an objective, out of the range of
ground fires, to be best positioned for a quick response to an
emerging target. Air power can also contribute to the rapid
deployment or redeployment of military capabilities from one part of
a theatre of operations to another, or in between theatres, thus
enabling timely responses to changing situations. When time is
essential, especially for military effects needed over a significant
distance, air power often provides the most viable option due to its
responsiveness.
1.43 Flexibility. Flexibility, as a subset of agility, represents air

power's capacity to dynamically change between multiple missions
(eg from offensive counter air to strategic attack). In some cases, an
aviation system may have the capacity to conduct multiple missions
concurrently (eg an EA-18G Growler engaging an air-to-air target
while concurrently suppressing an adversary's air defences through
electronic attack). The level of flexibility of an aviation system is
reliant upon its design, configuration of the payload and the ability of
those who operate it. If the aircraft is not carrying the necessary
payload (eg sensors or weapons) or if the crew is not qualified across
the required range of missions, then this may limit the level of
flexibility available for that sortie. As aviation systems have become
more technologically advanced, their ability to be configured to
contribute to, or switch between, different tasks during a single
mission has not always been enhanced. Some modern aviation
systems have become so specialised that significant effort is required
to prepare them for different missions.
Reach
reach
 The distance over which a military capability or system can
contribute to desired effects.
1.44 The reach of an aviation system is a direct result of the

system design and is typically the sum of the individual range of the
aircraft and of its payload—cargo, fuel, sensors, communications and
weapons. Reach is not unique to air power; however, leveraging the
potential for range and altitude in the air domain can provide notable
advantages for achieving desired effects over large distances.
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Historical example
Mount Sinjar
In early August 2014, after months of conflict across Iraq, the

Islamic State had turned their attention to the Yazidis—a Kurdish
speaking, religious minority living in northern Iraq. Facing capture
and death, 30,000 Yazidis fled the Islamic State onslaught,
becoming trapped on Mount Sinjar without food, water or shelter.
In addressing the growing humanitarian crisis, and potential
genocide, the US-led coalition had to rely upon air power to
respond with air strikes against Islamic State forces and air mobility
to deliver critically needed supplies to the embattled Yazidis.
On the first night of the mission, transport aircraft, escorted by
strike aircraft, dropped 28,224 packaged meals and 5,800 litre of
fresh drinking water. During the subsequent six nights of intensive
operations, the allied air effort managed to deliver a further
100,000 packaged meals and 130,000 litres of fresh water, until the
Yazidis' escaped from Mount Sinjar.
Significantly, these supplies were sufficient to sustain the trapped
people while the air strikes enabled Kurdish Peshmerga troops to
help the Yazidis leave Mount Sinjar.
The threat meant that air supply was the only viable option for
proving relief to the Yazidis. Only air power could reach them in
this environment and in the time frame required.
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1.45 The physical positioning of an aviation system, relative to an

objective, is another key factor with respect to reach. As this
positioning is in three dimensions, altitude will be a factor for the
range of airborne systems, particularly where line of sight is a design
constraint. Where the positioning of an aviation system does not
provide the required reach to achieve the desired effect, then forward
positioning of that system within the theatre of operations becomes
a consideration, allowing it to achieve the necessary range.
1.46 Perspective. Perspective, as a subset of reach, describes the

physical way a force views the operational environment and is
normally linked to visual and sensor horizons. Physical perspective is
enhanced by the increased field of view made possible through
altitude; however, may be restricted by terrain, weather and human
obstacles and might not always provide the ideal view of the
operational environment. Deception techniques like camouflage or
spoofing of electronic signals may likewise negatively impact the
perspective from the air. There will also be circumstances where the
perspective available through other domains, or in combination with
them, will be more useful for a particular operational situation. For
example, the preference for land perspective in creating situational
understanding in a dense urban environment.
Persistence
persistence
 The ability of Defence elements to maintain an enduring
effect within an area of operations. Note: This can be by
the continued existence of the Defence element within the
area, or by the continuance of an effect through revisiting
the objective.
1.47 Current technology limits the time aviation systems can

remain in an area, even with air-to-air refuelling, often exacerbated
by the endurance limitations of the human operators involved. The
effect a single aviation system can create is transient, limited both
temporally and geographically.
1.48 Through a planned rotation of aviation systems, or by

repeating missions as required, albeit not necessarily back-to-back, a
posture of relative permanence is maintainable. This has the potential
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advantage of creating a persistent effect, within a defined area,

without the need for a protracted physical presence.
Figure 1.13: Increased persistence through air-to-air refuelling
1.49 Technological developments increasingly mitigate the

impermanence of airborne systems, through increased endurance
and advances in air-to-air refuelling. Further, the use of UAS removes
the limitations brought by the endurance of the aircrew; however, the
endurance limitations of the ground operator still remain, albeit
sometimes easier to resolve.
Resilience
resilience
 Adaptive capacity of an entity to resist being affected by a
risk event, to maintain vital functions and to return to
normal condition as rapidly as possible.
1.50 The interdependency between humans and technology

within an aviation system presents many areas of potential fragility.
However, this should not be confused with the aviation system’s
survivability or durability, as mitigation of the fragilities associated
with an aviation system may serve to enhance its resilience.
1.51 Aviation systems are very complex and designed with clear
and specific engineering requirements. Airborne platforms are usually
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built to be as light as practicable, often unprotected frames, densely

packed with mission systems including propulsion, fuel and avionics,
all of which are vulnerable to technical issues or damage from
external sources.
Figure 1.14: Air power includes the ability to safely recover a

seriously damaged aircraft
1.52 By exploiting speed and altitude, for example, the aviation

system can remain outside the reach of an adversary’s anti-aircraft
weapons. The use of low observable technologies can reduce
detection, while tactics and self-defence systems can also contribute
to aircraft survivability. Multi-redundant hydraulics and electric
systems can ensure that a level of technical damage can be sustained
without becoming immediately catastrophic to the aircraft, crew or
mission. Resilience can also be introduced through the technical
regulation of maintenance systems where systems can be authorised
to fly despite some degradation.
1.53 Often, human limitations within a system bring a more

dynamic source of fragility. The consistent need for high levels of
technical expertise, coupled with often stressful and harsh operating
environments, serve to increase the risk of human error within an
operating environment which may also be hostile to human life.
These human factors can be mitigated, to some degree, through
training and conditioning.
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Contemporary example
Human fragility in remote air operations
As combat aircraft became more capable of operating from higher

altitudes, operators found themselves increasingly dislocated from
the reality of their targets. Advances in precision-guided munitions
have compounded this dislocation even further, with operators
now able to strike adversary targets without ever seeing them.
A contemporary example of these risks is evident in the growing
use of uncrewed combat aircraft systems which allow for lethal
combat effects to be decided upon from well outside a theatre of
operations—even from a home base—where operators and
decision-makers are able to return to their families after their shift
in an active operational theatre comes to an end each day.
This split reality can be very confronting, requiring operators to
immerse themselves in the reality and pressures of military
operations while at work, then adjust to normal family life
immediately after. This potential fragility of our people needs to be
fully understood and carefully managed.
1.54 Dependency on information. Aviation systems are highly

dependent on information whether that be in the mission briefing,
inflight or embedded within sensor or weapon systems. The air
power construct of centralised command, distributive control and
decentralised execution relies on having sufficient and timely
information to support decision making at all levels and in line with
the commander's intent—a key tenet of the ADF's mission command.
1.55 Dependency on airbasing. Airbases, as capability systems,

are critical contributors to the ability of aviation systems to
manoeuvre throughout the area of operations, and are therefore a
key element of an integrated force. While airbases have, historically,
been large-scale, fixed establishments with complex lines of logistics
and communications, the contemporary operating environment
requires a more agile and adaptive basing approach. This approach
allows for the larger, vulnerable basing to remain remote from the
area of operations by exploiting a network of airbases and
contingency locations, including sufficient resilience to defend and
recover from damaging events. In some cases, however, the risk of an
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adversary targeting and subsequently attacking an airbase may be

further mitigated by the short duration of the airbase activation,
remaining ahead of the adversary's decision and act cycle.
Historical example
Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019-20
The Australian summer of 2019–20 brought with it one of the most

devastating bushfire seasons on record. Affecting over 46 million
acres, 3,500 homes and thousands of people, it represented a
major humanitarian crisis that lasted almost nine months. Under
Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019-20, the ADF provided a range of
assistance to the state governments, including air support.
State-chartered water bombing aircraft became dependent upon
the operational and logistics support of local ADF bases, thus
increasing the reach and responsiveness of those aircraft.
HMAS Adelaide anchored off the coast of Eden, and HMAS Choules
anchored off the coast of Mallacoota, also provided essential
basing support to both air and maritime assets to facilitate the
evacuation of residents cut off by the fires. ADF air assets were also
used for fire spotting and to increase the perspective of
commanders who flew over the affected areas.
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Payload
payload
 The mission specific sensors, weapons, electronic warfare
systems, fuel, people and cargo that is carried, operated
and/or delivered by an aviation system.
1.56 The employment of air power is typically linked to the

payload (eg mission specific sensors, weapons and cargo). The
payload will also determine the range of desired effects to which the
aviation system can contribute during a mission—this is known as the
agility of the system.
1.57 While air power typically does not have the load-carrying
capacity of other military assets (eg a Navy ship), in some operational
contexts a smaller payload delivered responsively may better
contribute to the desired effects than a larger payload deployed later.
Air power may also be the preferred means of delivering personnel or
equipment to an objective area that is difficult, or dangerous, to
reach via land or sea.
Figure 1.15: Precise effect through airdrop of stores
1.58 Precision. Precision is the ability to employ lethal or

non-lethal force and achieve effects accurately, with discrimination
and proportionality. Precision typically involves use of the aviation
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system's payload to create the desired effect while minimising

undesired effects, such as collateral damage, thus achieving a
strategic or ethical imperative to discriminate between legitimate
targets and their surrounds. Although the precise application of force
is achievable through all of the domains, the combination of air
power’s agility and reach enables it to contribute discriminate effects
rapidly, over relatively large distances. However, air power's precision
is not limited to the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The
achievement of precise effects can be through, for example, the
accurate delivery of personnel or equipment via airdrop, or the
precise and timely information on targets of interest, so as to
maintain situational understanding and support decision making.
Navy and Army aviation

1.59 Air power is not exclusive to an air force. In Defence, each
Service is assigned responsibility for generating and preparing
allocated capabilities, designed to meet Australia’s national
objectives. Air power is, therefore, as much an integral part of Navy
and Army capability as it is for the Air Force.
Figure 1.16: Embarked aviation generated, prepared and employed

as an integral part of maritime power
1.60 Air Force aviation will typically, but not exclusively, operate at
the theatre level, commanded through an air component whereas
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Navy and Army aviation will operate at a more tactical level, with
command delegated accordingly. For example, Navy aviation will
normally be an embedded element of a naval combatant and under
that combatant's command, while Army aviation will typically form as
an integral part of a combined arms team.
Figure 1.17: Army aviation, as a part of a combined arms live fire

activity
1.61 Therefore, for a full appreciation of Navy and Army aviation

in the context of ADF air power, the content of this publication must
be read alongside the maritime and land counterpart doctrine
publications. This ensures that the contributions, generation,
integration and employment of Navy and Army aviation are fully
considered in their operating context.
1.62 For more detail on the generation, integration and

employment of Navy and Army aviation, see ADF-I-3 ADF Maritime
Power and ADF-I-3 ADF Land Power respectively.
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Chapter 2 –
Generating air power
Executive summary
 Air power contributions are generated in accordance with
Defence preparedness requirements.
 Air power contributes to an integrated force through
control of the air; air mobility; air intelligence and ISR; strike
from the air; air command and control; airbase operations
and air power technical support.
 Air power practitioners, as joint force planners, are key to
ensuring that the air power contributions are matched to
operational scenarios and structure of an integrated force.
Introduction
2.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) conducts campaigns and
operations only as an integrated force. This integrated force is
constructed by integrating those prepared ADF force elements,
identified and assigned during planning, that are specific to each
campaign and operation. Typically, this force will only represent a
portion of the ADF's total capabilities.
2.2 This chapter examines air power as contributions to an

integrated force, starting with its preparedness. The air power
contributions framework presented in this chapter provides a
capability management structure aligned with likely employment of
air power within an integrated force.
Air power preparedness

2.3 For air power, the force design process will determine the
operating characteristics of each aviation system and result in the
range of advantages and limitations that need to be considered in
planning. Similarly, force design will determine the sustainment
required across the range of operating environments.
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2.4 Unlike other ADF force elements, air power does not
generally have sufficient assets or personnel to allow the dedicated
separation of the force into three areas—preparation, operations and
recuperation. Air power must, therefore, be meticulously managed to
ensure operations, training and other task priorities are met,
including any readiness and sustainment requirements.
Figure 2.1: Preparing a P-8A Poseidon for operations
2.5 There are also key differences in the sustainability of aviation

systems and associated ground support (eg airbases). Aviation
systems are dependent on their technological support requirements
(eg maintenance schedules) and the currency of air and ground
crews. However, aircraft and aircrews can be readily rotated, typically
placing the onus for major maintenance and crew training back on
the Service. For the ground support upon which aviation systems are
dependent in theatre, rotation is not as readily accessible, so the
sustainability periods will typically be much longer and needs to be a
key element of any operational planning.
2.6 Service chiefs are also responsible for any change of force
posture for allocated air power capabilities, ensuring equipment and
personnel are readied for the requirements of the projected
campaigns or operation tasks. This will include aviation systems,
aircrew, ground personnel and associated ground support. In some
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cases, this may require the increased level of airbase support services
gained through Defence or contracted providers.
Air power contributions framework

2.7 It is the responsibility of the Services and Groups to generate
the full range of ADF capabilities in accordance the preparedness
directive and to maintain the ability to sustain them once assigned to
an integrated force. Therefore, air power is best thought of in terms
of how it can contribute to the campaign and operational outcomes
of an integrated force, rather than what roles and missions air power
can conduct in isolation.
2.8 The air power contributions framework (see Figure 2.2) forms
the management framework for the generation and preparedness of
air power, organising air power into its capability elements and
contributions.
Figure 2.2: Air power contributions framework
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Air power contributions – control of the air

2.9 Control of the air is a measure of the ability to conduct
operations in the maritime, land and air domains without interference
from adversary air power and air defence capabilities. Control of the
air is normally one of the first priorities of an integrated force. It is
especially important whenever the adversary is capable of
threatening friendly forces from the air, thus inhibiting a joint force
commander’s ability to conduct operations. It is important to
understand that this control is not an end in itself; it is an enabler for
integrated effects, in particular, freedom of manoeuvre.
2.10 The relative degree of control is typically categorised within a

spectrum ranging from parity, where neither adversary can claim
control over the other, through to air superiority and then air
supremacy (see Figure 2.3). Typically, the level of control required
needs only be sufficient geographically and temporally, to enable the
manoeuvre of friendly forces and the engagement of adversary
forces. For example, to enable successful execution of joint missions
such as strike from the air, the desired degree of control is typically
air superiority.
Figure 2.3: Control of the air spectrum
2.11 Air parity. Air parity is that degree of the control of the air
where freedom of manoeuvre in the maritime, land and air domains
is contested without clear advantage between the air power and air
defences of opposing forces. It is a situation in which both friendly
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and adversary maritime, land and air operations may encounter

significant interference by the opposing force's air and missile
capabilities.
2.12 Air superiority. Air superiority is that degree of the control

of the air which permits freedom of manoeuvre in the maritime, land
and air domains by one force over another without prohibitive
interference by the air power and air defences of the opposing force.
2.13 Air supremacy. Air supremacy is that degree of the control

of the air which permits freedom of manoeuvre in the maritime, land
and air domains by one force over another without effective
interference by air power and air defences of the opposing force. Air
supremacy cannot guarantee that an opposing force will not inflict
some damage or losses, particularly given the extensive proliferation
of small arms weapons and portable air defences.
Counter air
2.14 Counter air operations aim to ensure freedom to manoeuvre,

freedom to attack and freedom from attack. Additionally, counter air
capabilities can deter hostile adversary action by providing a credible
military threat to their manoeuvre and attack capabilities. The counter
air mission integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain
and maintain control of the air and protection of forces by
neutralising or destroying threats from across all of the domains that
directly or indirectly challenge control of the air.
Offensive counter air
2.15 Offensive counter air (OCA) encompasses a range of

offensive air activities to destroy, degrade, neutralise or disrupt
adversary air power, or to contain it as close to its source as possible.
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OCA operations seek to dominate the adversary's airspace and

prevent the launch of threats, resulting in greater freedom from
attack and increased friendly freedom of action. It encompasses:
a. Attack operations. Attack operations are intended to

destroy, disrupt, or degrade counter air targets on the
ground to prevent adversary employment of air and missile
capabilities. This may be accomplished through kinetic or
non-kinetic actions. The main goal is to prevent enemy
employment of air and/or missile capabilities before they can
bring lethal effects to bear, and accords with the Counter
Force layer of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD)
doctrine (see ADF-I-3 Integrated Air and Missile Defence).
The effect of OCA attack may also be realised though other
domain or components as part of the joint targeting cycle
(eg special forces raids on the adversary's airfields).
b. Suppression of enemy air defence. Suppression of enemy

air defence (SEAD) operations aim to neutralise, destroy, or
degrade enemy surface-based air defences by destructive or
disruptive means. SEAD requirements may vary according to
mission requirements, system capabilities and threat.
c. Fighter escort. Fighter escort provides dedicated protection

sorties by air-to-air capable fighters in support of other air
operations over the adversary's territory. Fighter escort may
also be used in a defensive role to protect aircraft such as a
high-value airborne asset (eg airborne early warning and
control aircraft).
d. Fighter sweep. Fighter sweep is an offensive mission by

fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy the adversary's aircraft
or targets of opportunity in a designated area. The nature of
the air and missile threat and the commander's objectives are
the primary determinants regarding the employment of
fighter sweep missions versus attack operations.
2.16 While OCA can utilise capabilities from across all of the
domains, air power offers a principal advantage of being able to
engage the adversary's air assets well outside of the engagement
range of friendly forces. It is important to understand that this control
is not an end in itself; it is an enabler for integrated effects.
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Defensive counter air
2.17 Defensive counter air (DCA) encompasses active and passive

defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, destroy or
make ineffective adversary forces attempting to attack or to
penetrate friendly airspace (ie over or near friendly forces). It includes
the protection of territory, personnel and materiel against the
adversary’s air power, thereby preventing the adversary from
achieving an advantage through the air.
Figure 2.4: Mobile air defence radar system
2.18 DCA operations can be conducted in conjunction with, or

independent of, OCA operations. Effective OCA greatly reduces the
DCA requirement, freeing assets for more offensive operations.
However, some degree of DCA is normally necessary in every
operation and may be the only means to counter air and missile
threats due to political constraints.
2.19 Active air and missile defence. Active air and missile
defence (AMD) aims to suppress an adversary’s air power through
direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces
and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
anti-aircraft artillery, electromagnetic warfare, sensors etc.
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2.20 Passive air and missile defence. Passive AMD aims to

minimise the effectiveness of adversary air and missile activity by
enhancing the survivability of friendly forces and installations. Passive
AMD measures include camouflage, concealment, deception,
dispersion and the use of protective construction.
Air power contributions – air mobility

2.21 Air mobility is the ability to move personnel, materiel or
forces using airborne platforms. Air mobility forces are integral to the
success of most integrated operations, as they are critical for the
deployment, sustainment and redeployment of forces to, from or
within a theatre of operations. Air mobility further encompasses
airborne activities that support combat forces to manoeuvre about
the battlefield under the control of a ground commander.
2.22 Air mobility enables the conduct of military and national

operations across the full spectrum of competition. Notably, air
mobility can provide considerable advantages where a high level of
responsiveness is required and when surface obstacles or threats
need to be avoided. Intra-theatre air mobility facilitates rapid air
movement of forces and supplies within a theatre of operations—this
enables a small force to be effective over a large geographical area.
Inter-theatre air mobility enables the ADF to conduct or contribute to
operations in support of Australian national security objectives in the
broader geo-strategic environment.
2.23 As air mobility’s reach is global, theatre demands for

resources must be balanced with national priorities. Air mobility
must, therefore, be commanded and controlled at the highest level
so as to allow the appropriate prioritisation and apportionment.
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Air logistics support
2.24 Air logistics support (ALS) is an air activity, other than

airborne operations, air-to-air refuelling or aeromedical evacuation,
conducted to deploy, distribute or recover personnel, materiel or
forces. ALS is conducted through internal carriage of personnel and
cargo in fixed and rotary wing aircraft, dropped out of an aircraft or
as an underslung load carried by a helicopter.
2.25 Special purpose missions. Special purpose missions provide

safe, reliable, connected and protected air transportation for national
leadership in direct support of national security objectives. Special
purpose missions are dedicated to transporting members of the
Australian government, approved senior officials and foreign
dignitaries and therefore require a higher level of mission assurance.
Figure 2.5: Crew members of a special purpose aircraft
Airborne operations
2.26 Airborne operations are conducted within an active theatre of

operations to deliver or extract combat ready forces and their logistic
support into or from a contested objective area. Airborne operations
often require specialised personnel, systems, tactics and procedures.
2.27 Air assault. An air assault is the manoeuvre of forces

(ie combat, combat support and combat service support) in vertical
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lift aircraft as part of a combined arms team under the command of

an Air Manoeuvre Force Commander. Air assault may include a
deliberately contested landing or an operation in which assault forces
manoeuvre to engage the adversary's forces to seize and hold key
terrain.
Air-to-air refuelling
2.28 Air-to-air refuelling (AAR) is the replenishment of an aircraft

by another, while both are in flight. AAR can significantly enhance the
reach, endurance and persistence of combat and non-combat
aircraft, including air mobility and airborne control assets. AAR as a
force multiplier is a high demand and highly valued contributor to an
integrated force and coalition partners.
Figure 2.6: Air-to-air refuelling
Aeromedical evacuation
2.29 Aeromedical evacuation (AE) encompasses the movement of

injured or ill personnel under the supervision or care of aeromedical
evacuation qualified medical personnel to, and between, treatment
facilities by air transportation. This may be via fixed or rotary wing
aircraft.
2.30 An airbase will also contribute to the aeromedical evacuation

system (AES) through the provision of stabilisation and staging of AE
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patients, and the sustainment of AE capability including AE qualified

personnel.
Air power contributions – air intelligence and ISR

2.31 Intelligence is the range of activities, processes and outputs
that relate to the directed acquisition, processing and dissemination
of information about threats, opportunities, vulnerabilities and
operating environments. Intelligence is an integrated function carried
out through constant activity across all of the domains.
2.32 There is a link between intelligence, and intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. However, ISR is not
part of the intelligence cycle, rather it supports the collection phase
of that cycle (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Relationship between ISR and the intelligence cycle
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2.33 For more detail on ADF intelligence and the relationship

between the constituent elements, see ADF-P-2 Intelligence.
Air ISR
2.34 Air ISR is an activity that synchronises and integrates the

direction, planning and operation of airborne collection capabilities
with the processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) systems.
Air ISR has the ability to collect on a range of different intelligence
disciplines such as signals intelligence, imagery intelligence and
acoustic intelligence.
2.35 Airborne collection operations are conducted during either

reconnaissance or surveillance missions. Reconnaissance missions are
specifically flown to obtain information about the threat or the
operating environment. Surveillance missions consist of the
systematic observation of places, persons or things from the air.
2.36 The ability of airborne assets to operate above the area of

interest enables an expansion in the perspective of airborne ISR
systems and a corresponding increase in the dimensions of the
observable battlespace. This is the major distinguishing feature
between airborne ISR and its sea- and land-based counterparts. The
benefit of the increased perspective provided by an airborne asset
will ultimately be determined by the capabilities of the aviation asset,
the sensor performance and the situation in which the asset is
employed.
2.37 Planning air ISR operations requires the ability to pair the
sensor to target in order to ensure the effective use of available
resources. Ensuring the maximum exploitation of air ISR capabilities is
a specialist air intelligence function. It encompasses an understanding
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of the nature and configuration of the aviation systems, of national

and allied intelligence systems, and the value of opportunistic
collection.
Processing, exploitation and dissemination
2.38 Processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) is an activity

and mechanism within an ISR system that enables timely
transformation of collected data, extraction of meaning from that
data, fusion with national and allied ISR enterprise perspectives, and
the transmission of the derived information to those that require it.
The PED of airborne collection refers to the process and systems by
which collected information and raw data is processed into
information, exploited and disseminated to systems or people that
will take action on it.
2.39 The PED capability encompasses the equipment that receives,

processes, relays and stores or transmits collected data and the
communications systems architecture and associated bandwidth that
moves collected data to an exploitation centre. For example, No 83
Squadron receives and exploits processed data from airborne and
space-based assets, turns it into a usable form and disseminates the
intelligence to the decision makers.
Figure 2.8: An operator from No 83 Squadron conducting mission

analysis
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Air intelligence
2.40 Air intelligence contributes to strategic level situational

understanding and decision-making, thus it enables operational and
tactical level activities. It is focused on providing assessments to a
commander or air power practitioners on the threat, adversary
capabilities, patterns of activities and future intentions. Air
intelligence is essential to the effective employment of air power
assets, sensors and systems in integrated operations and to enable
the targeting function, especially when involving the employment of
air-launched, precision-guided munitions.
2.41 Air intelligence activities during periods of cooperation build

the foundations for effective decision making for shaping, deterrence
and response. This is achieved by applying a unique air perspective to
monitor an operating area, maintain situational understanding of the
air domain, guide tactics development, assist capability development,
and provide indicators and warnings analysis.
2.42 During periods of escalating tension, air intelligence enables

the air domain component of the joint intelligence preparation of the
operating environment, mission planning, threat warning and
broader situational understanding.
Air domain awareness
2.43 Air domain awareness is the effective understanding of

threats associated with the air domain that could impact the security,
safety or economy of the nation. The information produced through
the conduct of ISR and disseminated through the network that links
ISR assets and supported commanders, enhances a commander’s
situational understanding. It also assists the commander in achieving
the decision superiority necessary for operational success.
2.44 Achieving such understanding requires close coordination

with allies and partners to integrate the intelligence, information,
surveillance data and analysis related to the air domain in order to
facilitate a shared situational understanding. Secure networks and
facilities are essential to enable this integration. This air domain
awareness supports a multitude of users across the full spectrum of
aviation security and defence activities, including prevention,
response and recovery.
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Air power contributions – strike from the air

2.45 The use of overwhelming force through a strike from the air
lies at the heart of the ability of air power to influence the behaviour
of adversaries and the strategic course of events. Strike can deter
adversaries, disrupt their activities or defeat them by destroying their
leadership, resources and capabilities.
Offensive air support
2.46 Offensive air support (OAS) involves those air operations

conducted against adversary installations, facilities and personnel to
directly assist in the attainment of operational or tactical objectives.
This may include the destruction of the adversary's resources or the
isolation of the adversary's military forces.
2.47 A joint force commander uses OAS to shape the battlespace

for future operations, create windows of opportunity for decisive
action, restrict the adversary’s freedom of action and disrupt the
cohesion and tempo of the adversary’s operations.
2.48 Close air support. Close air support (CAS) is an air activity
conducted against hostile targets that are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require detailed integration with the fire
and movement of those forces. The aim of CAS is to neutralise or
disrupt an adversary who is engaged, or about to engage, with
friendly ground or amphibious forces. CAS complements land force
ground attack capabilities with significant firepower to coerce
adversary forces. Consequently, intensive air-land integration and
coordination is critical to accurately identify targets and minimise the
risk of fratricide. Close air support can be crucial to the success and
survival of land forces.
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2.49 Deep air support. Deep air support (DAS) encompasses air
actions against an adversary's targets at such a distance from friendly
forces that detailed integration of each mission with fire and
movement of friendly forces is not required. DAS consists of the
following:
a. Air interdiction. Air interdiction (AI) is an air activity

conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or destroy an
adversary’s capability before it can be brought to bear
effectively against friendly forces. Air interdiction targets
adversary elements such as personnel, lines of
communication, command and control nodes, logistics and
supporting systems at ranges beyond which an adversary can
engage friendly forces. These missions respond to known
targets, briefed in advance.
b. Armed reconnaissance. Armed reconnaissance (AR)

missions locate and attack targets of opportunity (ie enemy
materiel, personnel, and facilities) in assigned general areas
or along assigned ground communication routes, and not for
the purpose of attacking specific briefed targets. AR provides
the commander with an economy of force to cover and
defend terrain not suited to other forces.
Figure 2.9: ARH Tiger helicopters conducting armed reconnaissance
c. Strike coordination and reconnaissance. Strike

coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) missions acquire,
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report and coordinate the destruction of targets. SCAR

aircraft may discover adversary targets and provide a target
mark or talk-on for other AR missions, or accurately locate
targets for AI missions. This mission is generally different
from a reconnaissance mission in that SCAR missions locate
and coordinate target destruction and will typically be armed
with systems that better enhance target designation. SCAR
does not normally require a forward air controller or terminal
control (eg a joint terminal attack controller).
Strategic attack
2.50 Strategic attack is an offensive air activity designed to employ

air power to create specific strategic effects that damage, neutralise
or destroy an adversary’s will, warfighting capabilities or any other
capacity opposed to one’s interests. These operations are aimed at
an adversary’s fundamental ability to wage war, by attacking their
structures or organisations. Targets may include centres of gravity,
such as leadership and command elements, critical war production
resources or key supporting infrastructure.
Figure 2.10: Arming an F-35A Lightening II aircraft for strategic

attack
2.51 In this context, strategic describes the effect, not the location,
distance to the target, type of weapon system or the delivery
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platform. It is most effective when a wide array of targets is attacked

simultaneously, causing maximum effect and placing significant
stress on an adversary’s processes and limiting their ability to adapt
and react.
Maritime strike from the air
2.52 Maritime strike from the air encompasses the engagement of

surface and sub-surface combatants by aviation assets, be it by fixed
or rotary-wing aircraft.
2.53 Anti-submarine warfare. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is

the component of undersea warfare which encompasses the search,
location, tracking and, ultimately, the attack on submarines. Theatre
ASW, in the ADF context, is predominately performed by fixed-wing
maritime patrol aircraft designed to detect, supress and/or destroy
the adversary's submarines, independently, and at range from other
friendly forces. This is distinct from force or direct support ASW which
is primarily performed by a maritime task group’s organic sensors,
weapons systems and rotary wing, along with fixed wing, ASW assets
directly supporting the task group.
Figure 2.11: Arming a Navy Seahawk for anti-submarine warfare
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2.54 Anti-surface warfare. Anti-surface warfare (ASuW) air

missions aim to detect and engage the adversary's maritime surface
forces. The type of support provided by aviation systems depends on
their capabilities, but can include detection, location, identification,
tracking and, ultimately, the attack of the adversary's surface
combatants.
Electronic attack from the air
2.55 Electronic attack (EA) is that division of electronic warfare

involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy or
anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment
with the intent of degrading, neutralising or destroying an
adversary's combat capability. EA is considered a form of fires. It can
involve the transmission of electromagnetic energy to create false
targets and deceive enemy systems; overwhelm enemy receivers with
jamming, thereby preventing the reception of valid targets or signals;
or physically damage the systems with high-power levels (eg high
powered microwave energy).
Figure 2.12: EA-18G Growler aircraft seen from the ramp of a C-17A
2.56 Airborne EA encompasses the use of aviation systems for the

neutralisation and/or degradation of the adversary's target radars
and/or communications links, to create a survivable environment
within the electromagnetic spectrum that facilitates friendly force
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manoeuvre. Airborne EA includes the use of a specialised platform

(eg EA-18G Growler) as an integrated escort within a strike package,
or operates independently against specific adversary systems, to
facilitate friendly force manoeuvre.
2.57 EA from the air exploits air power's characteristics (eg agility
and precision) to apply effects to multiple targets in the battlespace
in quick succession (eg electronic warfare radar, communication
coordination of integrated air defence systems, surface-to-air target
tracking radar). Airborne EA integrated into an integrated force's
scheme of manoeuvre can increase own-force survivability and
lethality when coordinated with other force application methods.
Air power contributions – air command and control

2.58 While integral to theatre command and control, air command
and control brings to an integrated force skilled air power
practitioners, effective decision support systems and a network of
distributed control nodes (eg Theatre Air Control System). Air
command and control is designed to contribute to the overall
command and control of an operation by ensuring air power
elements are effectively synchronised across all objectives and areas
of operation—creating unity of effort for air operations.
Airspace management and control
2.59 Adequate access to, and the safe and efficient use of,
airspace is fundamental to ADF training, maintenance of
preparedness and conduct of operations. It continues across the
spectrum of competition and requires coordination between the
military and civilian agencies responsible for air traffic management.
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2.60 Airspace management is the design, allocation, integration

and regulation of airspace, including the application of airspace
usage procedures to ensure the airspace is appropriate for the
mission or activity. It provides the safe, effective and flexible use of
airspace for legitimate military and civilian operations. Airspace
control is the real-time or near real-time implementation of the
airspace management procedures governing airspace usage in order
to mitigate operating risk and enhance the use of the airspace.
2.61 Air navigation service provider. Defence, as a certified air

navigation service provider, is authorised to provide the safe and
effective air navigation services to air traffic during all phases of
operations (ie approach and aerodrome). Air navigation services—air
traffic management, communication navigation and surveillance
systems, meteorological services for air navigation and aeronautical
information services—are provided through airbase air traffic services
(ABATS) and through mobile air operations teams (MAOT) for
deployed locations. A MAOT will provide airspace control to allow
force elements to safely operate aircraft and weapon systems within
the airspace control area with maximum freedom, consistent with the
degree of risk acceptable to the commander.
Figure 2.13: Mobile air operations team
2.62 Joint airspace control cell. The joint airspace control cell
(JACC), located within the Air Operations Centre (AOC) at
Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC), performs the
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ADF's theatre airspace management tasks on behalf of the ADF's

standing Airspace Control Authority (Director General - Air). The JACC
designs, allocates, integrates, coordinates and regulates the
temporary and permanent military airspace volumes and airspace
usage procedures for ADF operations, exercises and Service activities.
Air battle management
2.63 Air battle management is the control of military air

operations, including the control and coordination of integrated air
and missile defence, offensive counter-air, strategic attack, close air
support and other warfighting or supporting air activities. Using a
combination of airborne, fixed and mobile ground systems, air battle
management encompasses tactical control of friendly aircraft in both
air-to-air and air-to-ground engagements including long-range
surveillance.
2.64 The air battle management system represents the fusion of

information from across all of the domains to create a shared
situational understanding of the battlespace that facilitates rapid air
response to threats. The air battle management system is, however,
just one part of the greater joint battle management system.
Air contribution to targeting
2.65 Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets

and matching the appropriate response to achieve the desired effect.
Targeting takes into account international and Australian national
law, national and strategic objectives, operational requirements and
capabilities, and ethical imperatives.
2.66 Targeting is inherently an integrated force function to which

air power contributes specialist capabilities and personnel who are
integral to the identification and engagement of targets by aviation
systems. Air intelligence specialists bring a comprehensive
understanding of aviation systems and weapons, critical to
minimising collateral damage.
2.67 The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) tasks

units to conduct focused ISR collection and the PED of collected data,
fuse tactical and national intelligence feeds, assist in identifying and
matching targets to air power capabilities, and contribute to combat
assessment. Air component targeting staff are responsible for
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developing, nominating and prioritising targets to enable offensive

counter air and strike from the air operations.
2.68 Air power offers considerable advantage in the dynamic

engagement of targets. For example, engagement of on-call targets
and authorised targets of opportunity beyond those identified in the
daily Air Tasking Order (ATO). By exploiting air power's agility and
reach, targets can be dynamically engaged beyond the reach of
maritime and land forces.
2.69 Targeting of dynamic targets, however, involves more risk

due to the short window of opportunity to achieve the desired effect,
often against high value targets. Targeting staff, air intelligence staff
and target engagement authorities must be aware of the limited and
fleeting nature of the intelligence to support this form of targeting,
and be able to make rapid, informed decisions based on the available
information and operational objectives. For more detail on ADF
targeting and the targeting cycle, see ADF-I-3 Targeting.
Personnel recovery
2.70 Personnel recovery (PR) encompasses military, diplomatic

and civil efforts to effect the recovery of isolated personnel
(personnel in a situation requiring them to survive, evade, resist or
escape). Personnel recovery may be from permissive, uncertain or
hostile environments and often requires contributions from across all
of the domains.
2.71 Air power can directly contribute to a search and rescue

operation or support a special operations recovery effort, as well as
providing command support. The JFACC may be appointed, by Chief
of Joint Operations (CJOPS) as the Joint Personnel Recovery
Commander. If so, then in addition to the extant operational
command of air component assets, the JFACC may be delegated
tactical command of force elements that are engaged in the recovery.
For more detail on personnel recovery, see ADF-I-3 Personnel
Recovery.
Theatre air control
2.72 The Theatre Air Control System (TACS) consists of a number

of control nodes intended to distribute control, decentralise
execution and allow for mission success, even if communication with
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a higher headquarters is lost. The TACS nodes are adaptively

established, structured and positioned to effectively control air power
across the theatre and at the tactical levels. For more detail on the
Theatre Air Control System, including the Air Operations Centre, see
ADF-A(A)-0 Theatre Air Control System.
Air power contributions - airbase operations

2.73 Air power is dependent upon effective airbase operations.
This requires agile airbasing, in the right locations, with essential
support personnel, adequate base utilities and services. An integrated
force must have the freedom to operate across a network of airbases
and contingency locations while facing a variety of threats.
airbase
 A defined area containing an aerodrome and infrastructure
that supports air power activities.
2.74 The effort required to establish, maintain and secure an

airbase often makes them ideal choices for concentrating command
and control elements, preparing integrated and partnered forces for
operations and for hosting a wide range of critical support and
sustainment functions. However, this also makes them more
vulnerable to adversary air and missile threats.
2.75 Air power contribution to an integrated force scales with the

size and complexity of the airbase—from strategic hubs outside the
theatre of operations, through to staging points within the theatre.
The ADF's ability to operate from different airbases or non-traditional
contingency operating sites increases air power resilience and
survivability.
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Airbase roles
2.76 Airbases are flexible in their employment and may be

configured to perform varying roles based on resourcing and
operational requirements. There are five main basing roles
commensurate with the agile operations approach.
2.77 Main sustainment base. A main sustainment base (MSB) is

an airbase that can function as home base for one or more operating
units of a particular aircraft type. These bases will have the resident
industry services necessary to provide deeper level maintenance
support to resident aircraft types.
2.78 Main base. A main base (MB) functions as the home base for
one or more operating units of a particular aircraft type. It will not
have the resident industry services necessary for deeper level
maintenance for home-based aircraft types.
Figure 2.14: RAAF Base Tindal. An example of a main base
2.79 Main operating base. A main operating base (MOB) is an

airbase, aerodrome or seaport located within the theatre of
operations that has a mature support organisation; has stores of war
reserve materiel; and is capable of receiving and operating
augmentation equipment, supporting organisations and non-unit
materiel during contingency or wartime operations.
2.80 Forward operating base. A forward operating base (FOB) is

a location used to support operations without establishing full
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support facilities. A FOB will be in, or contiguous to, a joint force area
of operations.
2.81 Contingency operating site. A contingency operating site

(COS) is an adaptive basing location that supports a tailored footprint
of operations for a prescribed, non-permanent duration. Locations
may include major airports, regional or private aerodromes or road
locations that will offer a spectrum of austerity or organic support,
matched to the required missions.
Airbase functions
2.82 The level of support provided by an airbase will differ

depending on the role, threat and location. The contribution
provided by airbase operations will be made up of the identified
airbase functions, noting that not all are required for each airbase.
2.83 Aerodrome engineering. Aerodrome engineering includes

the provision of airbase works, utilities and environmental
management in accordance with Australian and local laws and
regulations.
2.84 Airbase logistics support. Airbase logistics support includes

the ADF, Defence or civil contractors, providing goods and services
that directly support operations (eg catering).
2.85 Airbase operations support. Airbase operations support

includes providing operational support activities and services directly
related to air power systems and airbase assets. Air power technology
continues to advance, so suitable support facilities, at all security
levels, are essential to airbase operations.
2.86 Airbase protection. Airbase protection includes the

measures taken to protect airbase personnel, infrastructure and
aircraft against acts that may degrade the ability to support air
operations. This can include an agile approach to using a network of
airbases and contingency operating sites, to complicate the
adversary's targeting options.
2.87 Airbase safety. Airbase safety includes the provision of

aviation and ground safety, whether in Australia or on deployed
airbases, in accordance with environmental, workplace health and
safety protocols.
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2.88 Command and control. Command and control includes the

exercise of authority and direction by a designated airbase
commander over attached forces. Command and control also relies
on a sophisticated array of communication systems to ensure that
information flows seamlessly between all relevant parties, enabling
safe and successful air operations.
2.89 Emergency response and aerodrome recovery. Emergency

response and aerodrome recovery encompasses those services
intended to respond to an aerodrome incident and re-establish
operations as soon as practicable thereafter.
Figure 2.15: Emergency response and aerodrome recovery exercise
2.90 Health support. Health support includes providing agile and

scalable aerospace health capabilities to an integrated force. This
includes health services to prevent attrition of capability through
disease and non-battle injury, and providing of emergency response.
2.91 Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance on an airbase includes providing
situational understanding, using a range of base sensors, to detect
any potential threats to, or attacks on, the airbase.
2.92 Network operations. Network operations include providing

and assuring airbase cyberspace infrastructure to meet operational
objectives at all security classification levels.
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2.93 For more detail on airbase roles and functions, see ADF-I-3
Airbase Operations.
Air power contributions – air power technical support

2.94 Aviation systems are complex and require highly technical
support systems, not all of which are readily deployable into a theatre
of operations. As a result, technical support to an integrated force
can be accessed through reachback services.
Aviation medicine
2.95 The Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM) provides specialist

aerospace medicine support to optimise the performance, health and
safety of aircrew and controllers as the human dimension of the
weapons system.
2.96 IAM deliver aeromedical training to enhance the recognition

and response to the physical challenges of flight, provide
operationally relevant aeromedical advice and apply medical
certification so that Commanders have the information necessary to
make decisions within a risk based aviation safety framework.
Through reachback, IAM is also available to support deployed
Commanders by delivering responsive aeromedical advice.
Aviation safety
2.97 The Chief of Air Force (CAF) is appointed as the Defence

Aviation Authority and is accountable to the Secretary of Defence
and the Chief of the Defence Force for regulating and overseeing all
aspects of Defence aviation. In turn, CAF has a comprehensive,
tri-Service, aviation safety organisation.
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2.98 When an aviation system is deployed as part of an integrated

force, there is a requirement for that system to continue to operate in
accordance with the Military Certificate of Airworthiness and be
maintained in accordance with the approved publications.
Circumstances can arise, however, where an engineering decision is
required to allow the aircraft to operate where it does not meet its
original design standards—for example, the fitment of a
foreign-sourced aircraft part.
2.99 Where the engineering decision exceeds the authority of

those deployed with the aviation system, then reachback into the
aircraft's engineering organisation, Defence or contracted, is required
before the aircraft can be operated. This engineering support can
also endorse the use of foreign engineering staff, equipment and
facilities through a cross recognition of skills and certification.
Establishing global support programs for aircraft can overcome
potential interoperability issues in maintenance.
Figure 2.16: Multinational maintenance support
Electronic warfare support
2.100 ADF aviation systems require mission data loads to optimise

sensor performance, enable automation such as sensor fusion, and
programmable on- and off-board threat countermeasure responses.
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Development, verification and validation of mission data loads can be

a long process, depending on the availability of intelligence and the
complexity of the intended operating area. Therefore, early
assessment of electronic warfare and mission data operational
support requirements is necessary to enable optimal platform
survivability and lethality.
2.101 Joint Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit (JEWOSU)

provides intelligence support to the ADF Reprogramming enterprise
via analysis, reporting and dissemination of electronic warfare and
electronic order of battle data. ADF aviation systems mission data
loads are produced and verified by a network of reprogramming
laboratories at JEWOSU (located at Defence Science and Technology
site, Edinburgh), No 80 Squadron (located at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida) and the Naval Air Warfare Centre Weapons Division (located
at Point Mugu, California).
2.102 Platform mission system data loads can be optimised for the
dynamic operational environment via deployed or reachback support
capability dependent upon the deployed footprint and
communications connectivity. JEWOSU, through the Australian
Airborne Countermeasures Team, can also develop countermeasures,
validate the performance of electronic warfare self-protection
systems and tactical responses for ADF aviation systems, and
provides operational commanders with advice on platform
survivability.
Cyber operations support
2.103 Support of complex aviation platforms typically includes a

number of standalone information and communication technology
(ICT) systems unique to that platform. These ICT systems need to be
hardened to protect them from cyber threats.
2.104 Through No 462 Squadron, for example, aviation support ICT

systems can be hardened for their operating environment. The
squadron can support in-location (ie through deployed personnel)
and remote (ie through reachback) incident response to restore a
system to its certified baseline following an incident, noting that
deployed systems can require administrators from Defence Strategic
Communications (ICT Operations) to restore and intervene with a
resolution due to that organisation having access to the contract
support required to resolve some issues. Specialist personnel can also
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be engaged to discover an adversary and counter their network

infiltration, so as to assist with mission assurance.
Relationship between the air power contributions

2.105 Air power contributions are presented as different entities;
however, they should never be viewed as standing alone. They do not
offer singular solutions for an operational problem nor do they
necessarily act independently from each other or from the
contributions of other arms of military power.
2.106 Air power practitioners, as integrated force planners, are key

to ensuring that air power contributions are matched to operational
scenarios so that they maximise integrated force effectiveness, in
support of theatre objectives and national efforts.
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Chapter 3 –
Integrating air power
Executive summary
 The ADF operates as an integrated force, drawing upon the
prepared and sustained contributions of military power.
 Aviation systems need to operate safely and effectively
with other military force elements, Defence and
non-Defence entities, and as part of an integrated force or
in partnered operations.
 The level of integration achievable by air power is
ultimately underpinned by strategic-level decisions
regarding preparedness and capability investment.
 People are a core component of an integrated force,
deciding how all aspects of technology and force structure
are developed, employed, sustained and maintained.
Introduction
3.1 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) operates as an integrated
force, drawing upon the prepared and sustained contributions of
military power. While capabilities are generated and managed within
a domain, an integrated force is multi-domain and all elements must
be designed to seamlessly work together for best effectiveness.
3.2 In this chapter we will examine the practice of air power

through the opportunities and challenges of integrating air power
capabilities up to, and including, the joint force. While military air
power continues to plays an important role at the national and
multinational levels, it is beyond the scope of this publication as
all-domain integration is a joint force challenge.
Integration framework
3.3 The degree of integration able to be achieved by air power is
ultimately determined by strategic-level decisions regarding
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preparedness and capability investment. The latter underpinning the

interoperability across the aviation, support and sustainment systems.
3.4 Integration represents the highest level of interoperability

across the technical, procedural and human dimensions and may be
facilitated through common systems, procedures, processes, training
and education (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Air power interoperability
3.5 At the compatible level, aviation systems may not be

technically common, but this can often be mitigated by similar
procedures, processes, training and education. The deconflicted level
of interoperability is reserved for partnerships where forces need to
work collectively but also be separated geographically or temporally
due to a lack of interoperability across the dimensions.
3.6 Aviation systems must be able to operate safely and

effectively with other military force elements, Defence and
non-Defence entities and be integrated as part of a joint force or in
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partnered operations. Ideally, air power is integrated across the joint

force, national and international partners.
Continuum of integration
… the ADF will always be ‘on’ or ‘preparing for’

operations and activities. The culture of a peacetime
deployment or the ‘rest and recreational’ port visit must
be a thing of the past in both the lexicon and
philosophy of the military. A competition strategy
means the ADF will be working to win in competition
with any adversary that may seek to challenge or
oppose Australia—24 hours a day, seven days of the
week for decades and potentially forever.
ADF-P-3 Campaigning in Competition, Edition 1
3.7 It is no longer appropriate to separate the activities of the

Service, including the individual, from that of the joint force. Air
power integration is a continuum starting within a distinct domain
with the generation of the air power practitioner through to the joint
force's integration with national and multinational forces (see
Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Air power continuum of integration
Air power practitioner integration

3.8 People are the core component of air power capability and
an integrated ADF. They decide how all aspects of technology and
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force structure are developed, employed, sustained and maintained.

Furthermore, Defence's values (see Figure 3.3), identity, culture,
customs and traditions reside in, and are nurtured by, air power
practitioners.
Figure 3.3: Defence Values
3.9 The people who build the social structures within Defence
and create the norms and values embody the foundation and
legitimacy of the ADF as an organisation. The role of people is a
powerful factor to consider when analysing the foundation of an
integrated force and its ability to employ air power.
3.10 Professional mastery. Professional mastery reflects the

culmination of social, technical and Defence mastery along with an
individual's culture, experiences, training, education and personal
development. Air power practitioners need to not only be technically
adept, they also must be strategically aware and understand the
place of air power in an integrated force and their responsibilities to
Government and society.
Social mastery
3.11 Military operations often present ethically challenging

situations that demand a greater depth of maturity and leadership.
While operational and international law are the start point for air
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power decision making, personnel also require a robust

understanding of the moral codes and ethical frameworks required to
resolve the challenges across a diverse range of operating scenarios.
Figure 3.4: Defence, an integral part of Australian society
3.12 Social mastery encompasses the human element of the

profession of arms, gained through the personal development of the
individual including relationship management and teamwork. Social
mastery begins on enlistment where air power practitioners first
experience Defence values, culture and ethics as a foundation for
their professional mastery of air power.
3.13 For an air power practitioner, opportunities for personal

development provide for self-learning and adaptability, thereby
advancing the individual's emotional and social intelligence.
Individuals are encouraged, and sometimes sponsored, to undertake
studies that contribute to their professional mastery.
3.14 Air power practitioners may elect to develop niche skills that
directly support the success of ADF campaigns and operations. For
example, mastery of a second language can bring linguistic
capability, which enables effective communication with other nations.
Similarly, a specialist understanding of gender, peace and security
can assist the commander in focusing military missions by adapting
to the social context of the operating environment.
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3.15 For more detail on Defence's approach to social mastery, see

ADF-P-0 Military Ethics; ADF-P-0 ADF Leadership; ADF-P-0 Character
in the Profession of Arms; and ADF-P-0 Culture.
Figure 3.5: Developing multinational gender, peace and security

partnerships
Technical mastery
3.16 Technical mastery is the combination of an individual’s

training, knowledge, experience and skills that ensures their ability to
carry out employment functions with a high level of competence. It
provides air power practitioners with the ability to act with certainty
in an uncertain environment by instilling instinctive procedures,
processes and knowledge.
3.17 Air power requires a capability edge achieved through an

extensive investment in technology and in the training of personnel
to develop and employ that technology. The professional
development of an air power practitioner, however, is not limited to
their technical competence. It also requires the development of
generalist expeditionary skills—the foundation of agile air power
operations.
3.18 Within the ADF, technical mastery includes a program of

professional development which aims to give individuals the skills
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and experience necessary to employ air power across a range of

missions. From an interoperability perspective, air power can leverage
ongoing partner exchanges, both overseas and in Australia. These
exchanges underpin the continued interoperability with our partners,
particularly across operating tactics, techniques and procedures.
Figure 3.6: Aircraft maintenance, an example of technical mastery
Defence mastery
3.19 On enlistment, the focus of professional mastery is biased

toward social and technical mastery. As air power practitioners, both
officers and enlisted, progress through their career there is an
increased emphasis on Defence mastery. In particular, the
development of their organisational awareness, judgement and
critical thinking.
3.20 Defence mastery captures the essence and unique

characteristics of working within the Defence environment and the
professional of arms. For air power practitioners, this begins with the
basic understanding of the air domain and the way it shapes, and is
shaped by, the operational environment. This is followed by
understanding air power and how it contributes to Australia's
national power. As the individual gains experience, their foundational
understanding evolves to include a stronger appreciation of how
different aspects of Defence, including air power, integrate to achieve
greater effects.
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3.21 The increased emphasis on Defence mastery through an

individual's career brings with it a shift from training to education as
a key tool. Through education, the air power practitioner is prepared
for uncertainty and complexity by developing knowledge,
adaptability, judgement and creativity. This basic wherewithal to
apply acquired air power knowledge and experience to emerging
situations is a key contribution of the air power practitioner.
Figure 3.7: Warrant Officer of the Air Force, championing Defence

mastery within the senior enlisted leadership team
3.22 The ADF offers a number of advanced opportunities for air

power education as part of an individual's career progression.
Placements on foreign staff colleges and courses, for example, allows
not only for the access to knowledge or experience not readily
available in the ADF, but also the opportunity for air power
practitioners to develop professional relationships that may underpin
future multinational operations.
3.23 The Air and Space Power Centre (ASPC), for example, directly
underpins Defence mastery for air power practitioners. Through the
development of ADF doctrine, the ASPC adds to the library of domain
understanding with products being embedded into training and
education throughout an individual's career. The Centre's
sponsorship of fellowships, both local and regional, and higher
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education (eg PhD research) also provide an individual with avenues

to develop their critical thinking, problem solving and
communication and bring that expertise back to the generation,
preparedness and employment of air power.
3.24 Placements and fellowships allow for air power practitioners

to not only advance their education within the ADF's air power
environment but also promote common understanding and
application of air power along with the development of professional
relationships, which further increases interoperability.
Figure 3.8: Opportunities for multinational education and

relationship building
Service integration
3.25 While the Service's role is principally to generate and prepare
contributions to the joint force, it also carries out other directed tasks
and activities. Like the air power practitioner, the Services contribute
to a range of tasks that can shape the operational environment by
demonstrating Australia's air power capabilities, supporting
campaigns and operations, and furthering partner relationships.
However, achieving the Service's directed tasks draws from the same
limited set of aviation resources as operations and so these tasks
require balancing against operational priorities.
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Generation and preparedness
3.26 Materiel acquisition decisions for air capabilities establish the

technical baseline and the potential for interoperability of the
aviation systems. The Services are then responsible for generating
and preparing those air power capabilities for integration into the
joint force, in accordance with preparedness directives.
3.27 The generation and preparation of credible air capabilities

can play a role in shaping the operational environment. Advanced air
power systems add a level of national deterrence, and hence stability,
in Australia's region. Aviation systems are principally developed for
the defence of our nation; however, they can also provide support to
our allies and partners.
3.28 Force generation and preparedness of aviation systems also

comes with the requirement to sustain those capabilities when
deployed. This results in a large organisation of deployable and
home-based support, potentially spread throughout an area of
operations. For example, agile operations use a network of airbases
and contingency locations that need to be identified and sustained,
often requiring the support from local business or the
pre-positioning of stores cache in line with the expected functions.
Service exercises
3.29 Service exercises are a critical part of training and education

for military power, across the continuum of integration at the domain
and joint force levels. They provide an incremental framework for
progressively preparing air power elements, through collective
training, for integration into the joint force. This can be cross domain
in concert with other elements of military power or in air power
specific, multinational exercises such as Exercise PITCH BLACK.
3.30 Development of cross-domain skills necessitates training

activities involving forces from each of the domains. For example, air
may support a land exercise through which close air support and
coordination of joint fires are practised. At the international level,
Service-led, air power exercises develop and practise interoperability
with our partners and provide mutually benefiting force generation
activities. They are also a source for developing associated tactics,
techniques and procedures, which are key for interoperability.
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Historical example
Exercise PITCH BLACK
Exercise PITCH BLACK is a biennial warfare exercise hosted by the

Air Force, held in Northern Australia, primarily at RAAF Bases
Darwin and Tindal. The aim of the exercise is to practice offensive
counter air and defensive counter air combat, in a simulated war
environment. It consists of a red team and a blue team based at
separate locations, with one attacking the other.
Through Exercise PITCH BLACK, the Air Force demonstrates its
commitment to building professionalism and enhancing military
relationships for the safe and effective conduct of air operations
with regional and partner nations. The exercise features a range of
realistic, simulated threats which can be found in a modern
battlespace environment and is an opportunity to test and improve
force integration, utilising one of the largest training airspace areas
in the world. The first PITCH BLACK exercise took place in 1981
between different Air Force units, with the international elements
first appearing in 1990 with Singapore's participation.
In 2022, Australia hosted approximately 2500 personnel and
100 aircraft with participants from Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Service activities
3.31 In addition to raise, train and sustain activities and providing

contributions to an integrated force, the Services can carry out air
activities that directly support national objectives. These activities
include domestic and international engagements, all of which directly
contribute to shaping the operational environment.
3.32 Domestic engagement. Air power is reliant upon a network

of Australian airbases and domestic support for force generation and
operations. Civilian contractors, for example, provide essential airbase
support services, aviation system maintenance and supply
capabilities. A program of domestic engagement is important for
maintaining support services and local goodwill. Air power
engagement with the community includes flypasts, air shows and
airbase open days—all important aspects of strategic communication.
Figure 3.9: Military aviation represented at the Australian

International Airshow '23
3.33 International engagement. Military-to-military relationships

throughout our region and with our international partners are
fundamental in enabling an integrated force. Air power contributes to
these relationships through a program of international engagement
encompassing activities such as senior officer engagement
(eg Service Chief counterpart visits), air staff talks between air forces,
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air power events (eg air and space power conferences), personnel
exchanges and training programs.
Technical support
3.34 Services provided by technical support organisations are

designed to meet aviation needs across the ADF including deployed
forces. This includes technical support that can dynamically aid
interoperability by allowing rapid adaptation of air power weapon
systems; for example, the clearance of allied armament for use on
Australian aircraft.
Figure 3.10: Scientific studies supporting air power capabilities
Air power considerations for joint force integration

3.35 The joint force must integrate seamlessly both within itself
and with national and international partners. Technical integration
can be procured; however, it is through the people, processes and
procedures that complete integration is achieved, or where
limitations can be mitigated.
3.36 To fully understand integration requirements, it is necessary

to first position the respective component battle rhythms within an
integrated force context. The air tasking cycle typically commences
after the broader manoeuvre planning has already occurred for both
land and naval forces.
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3.37 Therefore, air power practitioners are required to assist the

supported components in their planning by codifying the possible air
power contributions and constraints throughout concept of
operations (CONOPS) development, inclusive of any associated
targeting priorities. This is a key driver in determining the air power
organisation required to support other component and task force
commanders. Figure 3.11 summarises the relationship between the
theatre air command and control organisation elements discussed
further throughout this chapter. For more detail on the theatre air
control system, see ADF-A(A)-0 Theatre Air Control System.
Figure 3.11: Indicative theatre air command and control organisation
3.38 Joint Air Component Coordination Element. Common to

integration of air power across all of the domains is the
establishment of the Joint Air Component Coordination Element
(JACCE). The JACCE is the Joint Force Air Component Commander's
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(JFACC's) senior representative to a supported component or task

force commander. The JACCE provides responsive and professional
operational-level air power advice to the supported commander on
behalf of the JFACC, and helps convey the supported commander's
priorities to the JFACC. JACCE planning staff will also assist in
CONOPS development for the supported component on behalf of,
and as agents of, the Air Operations Centre (AOC).
Air-maritime integration
3.39 Air and maritime forces, while principally operating within

their own domain, have the capacity to utilise and create effects in
each other's domains. Naval combatants have the ability to engage
targets in the air domain (eg air and missile defence) or to transit the
air domain to strike maritime or land targets. Similarly, air assets may
be tasked to protect friendly surface or subsurface forces or to
prosecute targets in the maritime domain, whether in direct support
to a naval combatant or at the theatre level.
3.40 Central to air-maritime integration is establishing liaison

elements both within the AOC and the Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander (JFMCC) organisation. These air and
maritime liaison elements will report to, and remain structurally part
of their parent command, but become functionally part of the
headquarters to which they are attached.
Figure 3.12: Integrated air power support for naval combatants
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3.41 The actual size and disposition of these elements will depend
upon the operation. Liaison positions provide a direct link between
applicable air and maritime headquarters to ensure the full planning,
integration and disclosure of any potentially conflicting tasks.
3.42 Importantly for coalition operations, the liaison functions

must mirror the functional outputs of the contributing force elements
and not necessarily those of our partners. For example, the United
States (US) Navy provides much of the air power for its own fleet
operations whereas the Australian Navy cannot. Hence, air-maritime
liaison functionality will be very different to our US counterparts.
3.43 Naval and amphibious liaison element. The Naval and

Amphibious Liaison Element (NALE) is the maritime component
commander’s representation within the AOC and is responsible for
coordinating and integrating detailed support requirements
throughout the Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle.
3.44 Naval air component coordination element. The Naval Air

Component Coordination Element (Naval ACCE) is the JFACC's liaison
staff within the maritime component and is responsible for planning
offensive air support, air defence and amphibious activities. The
Naval ACCE is also responsible for coordinating air and airspace
support requirements for the maritime component. The handover of
liaison functions to the NALE will occur around commencement of
the ATO cycle (ie the move from planning to detailed coordination).
Note that air power practitioners may also serve in the Theatre
Anti-Submarine Warfare (TASW) cell under the JFMCC and undertake
liaison functions with AOC staff.
Air-land integration
3.45 The achievement of integrated joint force objectives means

that air and land power will regularly operate within each other's
domains through either independent or coordinated missions. Land
power is able to create effects in the air domain or transit the air
domain to engage land, maritime and air targets; for example,
surface-to-surface missile systems.
3.46 Air power has an effect within the land domain, be it in direct
support (eg close air support) or at a distance from friendly forces
(eg strategic attack). Furthermore, air and land power coordinate
actions to effect the required level of control of the air. This may
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include the suppression of the adversary's air power and air defences
to facilitate the manoeuvre of land forces.
Figure 3.13: National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile system
3.47 Communication between aviation assets and land forces is

critical, especially where dynamic redirection of air power is required
or for the deconfliction of joint fires. Air-land integration relies on
clear command and control as well as interconnected information
systems. Liaison elements established between air and land
commanders and their headquarters are an essential part of air
planning, command and control.
3.48 Air support operations centre. The Air Support Operations

Centre (ASOC) is a forward element of the Theatre Air Control System
(TACS), normally embedded in a divisional or joint force
headquarters, reporting to the Director AOC. The ASOC is the primary
control agency for execution of air power in direct support of land
operations. As a direct subordinate element of the AOC, the ASOC is
responsible for coordinating air support to meet the ground
commander's intent. The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) perform a
similar function at the brigade or battle group echelon and operate
subordinately to the ASOC.
3.49 Army aviation liaison cell. Where Army aviation units are
operating within the joint force area of operations, an Army aviation
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liaison cell will collocate with the ASOC to ensure full coordination of
Army aviation activities with joint air and airspace operations. This
cell is responsible for ensuring that Army aviation missions are
managed through the air battle plan.
3.50 Special operations liaison element. If special forces

operations are involved, then a Special Operations Liaison Element
(SOLE) may be established, collocated with the AOC, to coordinate air
support to their activities.
Air-space integration
3.51 As previously noted in this publication, the air and space

domains are notionally separated; however, this does not preclude
the need for air and space power to be integrated. The integration of
air and space power enables assured and persistent access by air
elements to space-derived services and products. This access assists
air power in contributing to precision effects. Space enables
monitoring of activities from above the engagement ranges of
conventional weapons, thereby improving situational understanding.
3.52 The altitude advantage of communication satellites enables

the force to extend their connectivity beyond the physical limits of
the Earth's horizon through the provision of a global communications
network with, and without, terrestrial nodes. Space-enabled global
networks are essential for air commanders to integrate with
dislocated units to exchange data and control and control.
Space-based position, navigation and timing satellites underpin air
power’s ability to deliver precision guided weapons.
3.53 Space missions are vulnerable to conventional attack on

ground support and launch facilities; non-kinetic attack through
jamming of the electromagnetic spectrum to degrade or deny
ground-to-satellite links; and exploitation of navigation,
communication or network signals by adversaries. Air power can
provide defensive support to space systems and provide offensive
counter space effects against an adversary’s terrestrial space
elements.
3.54 Space power uses the air domain for the launch phase of
space operations, utilising both military and civil launch platforms.
This may include the launch of anti-satellite capabilities from the sea,
land or air. These launches are deliberately planned in advance and
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require clear separation from other air operations. Equally, space

debris falling back through the air domain requires separation
management.
3.55 Air-space integration relies upon clear command and support

arrangements. The use of reciprocal liaison positions within the air
and space components will ensure the full visibility, priority and
coordination of operations.
Figure 3.14: Rocket launch through the air domain
Air-cyber integration
3.56 Cyber is a global domain, within the information

environment, permeating the other four domains (maritime, land, air
and space), consisting of cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum. Cyberspace consists of all interconnected communication,
information technology and other electronic systems, networks and
their data, including those which are separated or independent. The
electromagnetic spectrum is the range of frequencies of
electromagnetic radiation.
3.57 Information is data in context. Integrating information

operations into air operations improves decision speed, the efficacy
of responses to unforeseen events and the options available for
influencing actions in the battlespace. The benefit of integrating
information and air operations is that it creates options to use the air
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domain to extend the range of information activities and effects

beyond the reach of the existing infrastructure.
3.58 The integration of informational power with air power can

improve ADF operational effects imposed on an adversary’s will,
understanding and capabilities. These benefits come with new risks,
and air planners need to consider the risks to joint operations from
the informational effects generated by air power. Similarly,
information planners must consider the risks of planned
informational effects on air power. The primary effect designed for
one domain may trigger collateral effects in the information and
operational environments, further compounding the planning risks
and consequences.
Figure 3.15: Multinational cyber operations
3.59 Cyber support to air power operations has the ability to not
only disrupt an adversary's information system but also feed it false
information, leaving it unclear to the adversary whether the system
has simply failed or is the subject of an attack. The key lies in
synchronising cyber and air attack. For example, inserting false tracks
into an air defence system could reduce the risk to air platforms while
causing the adversary to expend weapons ineffectively.
3.60 Aircraft can provide a faster means to rapidly deliver an

informational effect. Air missions can be planned, deployed, and
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executed to seek and acquire information that is not readily

achievable with the current disposition of sensor systems and
information networks.
National and multinational integration

3.61 Recent history provides numerous examples of where air
power has been a critical aspect of national and multinational
campaigns and operations.
Figure 3.16: Air power contribution to national humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief operations
3.62 At the national level, the joint force has to be interoperable

with both government departments and non-government
organisations as a part of national force projection. Air power needs
to be actively considered and represented throughout this
integration process to ensure that operational risks are identified and
mitigated. For example, working with the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Defence identified that their stores were often
packed on commercial pallets which were not compatible with ADF
aircraft. Through regular liaison, this schedule risk was mitigated by
working collaboratively to prepack stores on ADF pallets.
3.63 At the multinational level, countries and governments

mobilise to create coalitions focused on achieving aligned objectives.
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While these coalitions include options across all instruments of

national power, the military effort will typically be a key component.
Therefore, interoperability between multinational forces using both
kinetic and non-kinetic means, requires significant effort.
3.64 Liaison and engagement at the individual and Service level

sets the foundation for this interoperability which is further refined
through joint force and national activities.
Figure 3.17: Opportunities for multinational cooperation with

Australia's regional neighbours
Joint planning as the integrator

3.65 The joint planning approach integrates discrete force
elements into a design for the joint force. The synergy of the joint
force design generates an effect that is greater than the sum of the
individual force elements.
3.66 Joint planning is a critical step in matching military capability

to the joint effect required to achieve national objectives. Air power
contributions to the joint force are best realised when air power
practitioners are engaged throughout the planning process, bringing
their professional mastery to achieving operational objectives. For
more detail on joint planning, see ADF-P-5 Planning .
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Chapter 4 –
Employing air power
Executive summary
 Effectively employed, air power forms a critical part of an
integrated force in delivering the Australian Defence Force
warfighting functions: command, situational
understanding, force generation and sustainment, force
projection, force protection and force application.
 The agile operations approach for air power encompasses
a lethal and resilient combination of mobile forces
operating from fixed and contingency airbases.
Air forces are dependent on an array of technologies

that require highly trained personnel who can quickly
set up what amounts to an airborne military ecosystem:
airborne radar stations to provide command and
control, fighters to protect and police the skies,
refueling aircraft to keep everyone full of gas,
electronic-warfare planes to keep enemy defenses
suppressed, and a range of intelligence-gatherers and
attack aircraft to locate and destroy enemy forces.
These sorts of combined operations involve hundreds
of aircraft and thousands of people in a tightly
choreographed dance that takes a lifetime to master.
But when managed correctly, these overlapping
operations allow a military to dominate the skies,
making life much easier for the ground or naval forces.
O'Brien, P & Stringer, E,
The Overlooked Reason Russia's Invasion is
Floundering, The Atlantic, 10th May, 2022
Introduction
4.1 The employment of air power capabilities within an
integrated force will differ according to the nature of the campaign
or operation and the assets assigned. Air power will be planned and
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employed to maximise synergy with other elements of military power

in the pursuit of national objectives.
4.2 This last chapter will address the practice of employing air
power, as a part of an integrated force, utilising the air power
contributions. Applying the agile operations approach, it will discuss
the considerations and challenges for employing air power through
the Australian Defence Force warfighting functions (ADFWF).
Agile operations
4.3 In the contemporary operating environment, potential
adversaries are increasingly capable of projecting military power over
greater distances with mass, precision and speed. As a result, the
Australian Defence Force's (ADF's) airbases, which are typically large
and centralised physical structures with fixed and easily targetable
infrastructure, are no longer the sanctuaries for air power that the
nation has relied on since the end of the Second World War.
… it is easier and more effective to destroy an enemy’s

aerial power by destroying his nests and eggs on the
ground than to hunt his flying birds in the air.
Giulio Douhet
The Command of the Air, 1921
4.4 An agile posture increases deterrence by being strategically

predictable, but operationally unpredictable. Strategic predictability
comes from ensuring potential adversaries are left under no
misapprehension about our ability and resolve to assure survivable,
resilient and enduring air power operations. Operational
unpredictability is enabled through military posture and the agility of
air power across pre-determined locations, increasing the number of
locations an adversary must target.
4.5 Agile operations aim to create a more resilient force posture

to mitigate the threat to air power’s dependency on a limited number
of airbases and the concentration of platforms, supporting
infrastructure and aviation services. This concentration is particularly
at risk due to the threat from pervasive intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems and long range precision fires. In
response, agile operations entail lethal and resilient combinations of
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signature managed, light footprint mobile forces. These forces

operate from a network of basing infrastructure to enable distributed
and flexible air operations, while preserving the ability to rapidly
aggregate and deliver lethal effects in support of decisive operations.
4.6 Where air elements must be concentrated to provide a

deterrent or defensive effect, agile operations also permit their rapid
dispersal for the period of an enemy attack and subsequent re-
aggregation. Agile operations, therefore, focus air power on being
light, lean and flexible as its operating approach and mindset, while
retaining the destructive, offensive potential inherent in air power.
Figure 4.1: Agile operations validation activity
Adaptive basing
4.7 Airbases and their supporting infrastructures are essential for

projecting and sustaining air power. Airbases, and aircraft whilst on
the ground, are vulnerable to a broad range of threats such as:
infiltration and penetrating attacks by armed groups, cyberattacks,
weaponised and/or swarming uncrewed aircraft systems, mortar or
ground launched rocket attacks, aerial delivered missiles and bombs,
or hypersonics.
4.8 An adaptive basing approach to airbase operations is used to

establish a more resilient and responsive posture for the conduct of
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air operations from non-traditional airbases in contested, degraded

and operationally limited environments. The aim is to have air power
operate from a cluster of forward locations, supported by
multi-domain logistics nodes, complimented by forward and
rearward bases.
4.9 Through agile operations, the air component commander can

manoeuvre air power assets to undermine the adversary’s
understanding of friendly intentions. This is intended to deter
aggression, gain an operational advantage through physically
dislocating less mobile ground forces or to respond to adversary
aggression in a way that increases survivability and prepares own
forces for follow on actions. Adaptive basing uses an integrated
network of secure airbases and contingency operating sites (COS) in
the right locations, with adequate support personnel, base utilities
and services.
Figure 4.2: Practising the security of a contingency operating site
4.10 Airbase networks design may differ between areas of

operations or theatres. Airbases can be shaped by the assigned
airbase functions or aircraft, or shaped to seek variety in the
capabilities resident at each airbase within the network.
4.11 The airbase network design will remain fluid over the conduct
of the air campaign and may shift during different phases of that
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campaign. Integration across the network is critical for ensuring the

commander has the combat and enabling capabilities necessary to
generate the required air missions.
Adaptive support and sustainment
4.12 Adaptive support and sustainment ensures the required level

of airbase functions and aerodrome services exist at potential
operating locations, across the network of airbases and contingency
locations. This will include a distribution network for fuel, munitions,
supplies, equipment and material between airbases and contingency
operating sites.
4.13 The ability to reconstitute and repair depleted and/or

damaged consumables, infrastructure and equipment at main
operating bases (MOB), forward operating bases (FOB) and at
contingency locations is intrinsic to air power resilience. Rapid
recovery from incidental or deliberate degradation is essential to
ensuring options for agile manoeuvre are maintained.
Figure 4.3: Deployable airfield repair and recovery capability
4.14 If the number of dispersed airbase and contingency locations

grows across an operational area, plans and systems must be capable
of scaling sustainment. Adaptive logistic systems are required to
support operations, prepared to leverage local and regional
commercial markets to alleviate distribution system stress and to
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provide critical services and equipment to distributed forces.

Adaptive support and sustainment may result in a significant increase
in logistics demand associated with dispersed or agile operations.
Agile manoeuvre
4.15 Agile manoeuvre complicates the adversary's targeting by

either redistributing forces away from concentrated airbases into
multiple operating locations, or by redistributing forces within an
established airbase. However, manoeuvre between airbases and
contingency operating locations requires sufficient coordination of
inter-theatre and intra-theatre air mobility to move the force
elements at the proper time and with sufficient tempo to achieve the
desired effects.
Figure 4.4: Agile operations reliance on air mobility
Resilient and agile command, control, communications,

computers and intelligence
4.16 The philosophy of mission command is foundational to

maintaining combat momentum through agile operations. Resilient
and agile command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence (C4I) encompasses the delegation of authority to control
nodes and redundant, assured communications. Local commanders
are empowered to maintain the initiative and resolve situations based
on their own situational understanding.
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4.17 Intelligence remains central to the success of agile

operations. Situational understanding of the threats allows the
commander to adapt the use of the airbase network, maximising the
effectiveness of projected air power, while minimising the risks to
personnel and operations.
Protection through agile signature management
4.18 Airbases are no longer sanctuaries. Airbases need to be

prepared to defend against the full range of threats from across all of
the domains. This protection will also require an understanding of
own-force signatures including those of supporting and enabling
elements. Effective signature management will incorporate
concealment and deception. Examples include: camouflage, aircraft
decoys, cheap hangars at dispersed locations, low-probability of
intercept emitters and emission control.
Cross-skilled teams
4.19 Agile operations require air power practitioners to

simultaneously support an increased number of locations in a
potentially threatened, austere environment. The ability to function in
an isolated, dislocated environment will require small, cross-skilled
teams to independently generate air power for an integrated force.
Figure 4.5: Cross-skilled people, central to agile operations
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4.20 The use of smaller, cross-skilled and highly mobile, adaptive

combat support and aircraft maintenance teams provides the
commander with the ability to establish, operate and close aircraft
operating sites, when and where required. The ability of cross-skilled
air power practitioners to conduct multiple specialist tasks as well as
generalist expeditionary tasks will enable apportionment of the
minimum personnel footprint to accomplish mission objectives.
Australian Defence Force warfighting functions

4.21 The Australian Defence Force warfighting functions—
command, situational understanding, force generation and
sustainment, force projection, force protection and force
application—are a set of related capabilities and activities grouped to
help commanders integrate, synchronise and direct campaigns and
operations. For more detail on the ADFWF, see ADF-I-3 Campaigns
and Operations.
Command
command
 The authority which a commander in the military Service
lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or
assignment.
4.22 Commanding air power requires astute airmindedness,

professional mastery, culture and values. Commanders must ensure
air power is applied holistically rather than as disparate elements
conducting individual missions. For more detail on the philosophy of
command, see ADF-P-0 Command.
4.23 Principles of air command. Air power is inherently agile and

therefore able to adjust to various demands across a theatre of
operation. It must therefore be carefully commanded and controlled
at the level best placed to ensure optimal outcomes as follows:
a. Centralised command. ADF air power has finite assets,

typically in high demand, which need centralised command
to ensure prioritised objectives are met. Further, the line
between raise, train, sustain and operations is much closer for
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air power, where assigned forces (eg aircraft and crews) can
dynamically switch between operations and Service activities,
potentially between missions. Command of air power is best
accomplished by a senior air power practitioner who
understands the range, and limitations, of air capabilities.
Figure 4.6: Aviators, understanding the command of air power
b. Distributed control. Distributed control enables

commanders to delegate air planning and coordination
activities to dispersed locations or subordinate elements in
order to achieve an effective span of control and create
redundancy. The application of distributed control requires
all control elements of air power to have a shared
understanding of the environment, including the operation's
mission, challenges and acceptable risks, so as to equip them
to exercise initiative and make effective decisions.
c. Decentralised execution. Decentralised execution is the

delegation of authority to foster disciplined initiative at the
tactical level to allow subordinates to exploit fleeting
opportunities in dynamic situations. It is focused on following
broad mission- or effects-based guidance rather than
narrowly defined tasks. It depends on clear communication,
trust, empowerment and disciplined initiative. To achieve
decentralised execution, the air power command and control
elements use clearly communicated commander’s intent to
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empower front-line decision makers (eg strike package

leaders, air battle managers etc) to make effective decisions
during complex and rapidly unfolding operations.
4.24 Centralised command, distributed control and decentralised

execution is fundamental to mission command and agile operations.
Commanders at forward operating bases and contingency locations
need to be empowered and trusted to take decisive action, based on
their local situational understanding, in order to identify and seize
emerging opportunities.
Joint Force Air Component Commander
4.25 The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is the

commander accountable to a joint force commander for the
employment of air assets assigned, attached or made available for
tasking. The JFACC is responsible for recommending air power
apportionment priorities to a joint force commander and then, based
on the apportionment decision, allocating and tasking the air
component's air power capabilities. Where necessary, supporting
arrangements are established between the JFACC and other
component commanders or a Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF),
depending on the priorities set by the joint force commander
(typically the Chief of Joint Operations).
Figure 4.7: Apportioning air power to operational priorities
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4.26 The JFACC represents the centralised command element of

air power, providing the responsiveness to meet tasking across the
theatre and associated range of operations. The JFACC provides
oversight and further guidance during execution of joint air
operations, through the daily orders, including timely adjustments to
the prioritisation and tasking of air power capabilities.
4.27 A joint force commander may assign additional

responsibilities to the JFACC who then becomes the supported
commander. These include the following:
a. Area air defence commander. The Area Air Defence

Commander (AADC) is responsible for integrated air and
missile defence across the joint area of operations. The AADC
executes the area air defence plan and may be delegated
command of maritime and ground-based air and missile
defence capabilities.
b. Joint personnel recovery commander. When designated as

the Joint Personnel Recovery Commander, the JFACC will use
the Air Operations Centre (AOC) to facilitate tasking of
dedicated personnel recovery assets and to coordinate
tasking or redirection of additional ADF assets assigned to
support the execution of the personnel recovery mission.
Figure 4.8: Maritime personnel rescue capability
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c. Airspace control authority. The Airspace Control Authority

(ACA) is the commander designated to assume overall
responsibility for the operation of the airspace control
system. The control of air assets may need to be restrictive,
especially in an operational environment that can transition
quickly from combat to non-combat and back again. For
uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), compliance with the
airspace control system is critical as UAS cannot see and
avoid other aircraft, generally have small radar and visual
signatures and may not have an identification friend-or-foe
capability.
Joint force air component headquarters
4.28 The joint force air component headquarters provides the

JFACC with the staff for the effective functioning of the air
component including the planning, direction, control and
coordination of assigned air power capabilities. This headquarters is
organised into the following key elements:
a. Air staff. The air staff (eg A1, A3 etc) provide the enabling
functions and administration to support the JFACC’s
command responsibilities. The air staff for the theatre air
component are typically drawn from Air Command.
b. Theatre Air Control System. The Theatre Air Control System

(TACS), staffed by embedded members and formed
organisations, provides central planning and command of air
operations while facilitating distributive control and
decentralised execution through the control nodes of the
TACS.
c. Liaison elements. Communication between the JFACC and

supported commanders is critical in ensuring air support is
prioritised to meet theatre and tactical objectives. Whereas
the JFACC typically embeds nodes from the TACS into a
supported commander's organisation, that commander is
encouraged to reciprocally embed liaison elements within the
air component.
4.29 For more detail on the TACS, including the AOC and liaison
elements, see ADF-A(A)-0 Theatre Air Control System.
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Multinational air command and control
4.30 The Australian air command and control system (ie TACS) is
purposefully aligned with that of our major coalition partners so as to
facilitate interoperability. This allows ADF air power commanders and
practitioners to contribute to a Coalition Air Operations Centre
(CAOC) often holding key command positions up to, and including,
that of the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC).
Figure 4.9: Senior Australian officer appointed as the Coalition

Forces Air Component Commander, Coalition Air Operations Centre
4.31 National target engagement authority. When a coalition is

formed, each contributing nation will agree the overall aim and
mission of the operation. However, they will also have national
mandates that will specify what aspects of the operation their military
contribution is willing to partake and under what conditions their
military contribution may engage a target. Australia will establish a
National Target Engagement Authority to approve or disapprove
targets based upon these mandates.
Situational understanding
situational understanding
 The accurate interpretation of a situation and the likely
actions of groups and individuals within it.
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4.32 A successful air operation focuses on being able to out

manoeuvre the adversary. This requires an accurate and timely
understanding of the operational environment and the likely actions
of the actors within—adversaries, neutral parties, friendly entities and
non-combatants. Furthermore, the centralised command, distributed
control and decentralised execution approach for air power requires
commanders to have an accurate situational understanding,
principally derived through a common operating picture. In turn,
commanders need to use their situational understanding to
determine key indicators and warnings that will shape their decision
making, including the manoeuvre and employment of the air power
under their control.
4.33 Air intelligence specialists contribute to the joint intelligence

preparation of the operating environment, mission planning, threat
warning and broader situational understanding. Air intelligence
shapes the employment of air assets, sensors and systems in
integrated operations and provides a targeting function.
4.34 Air intelligence is also critical to the decision making of the

air power commander, whether at the theatre or tactical levels. The
assessment of the adversary's force posture and intent will directly
inform the manoeuvre of air power elements under the agile
operations approach.
Figure 4.10: Air intelligence underpinning situational understanding
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Airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
4.35 Airborne ISR assets are key contributors to situational

understanding as they exploit air power's agility and perspective to
support multiple users and can quickly respond to time sensitive
requests. Airborne ISR aircraft are, however, typically in high-demand
and so their employment must be prioritised against the
commander's information requirements. Any dynamic re-tasking
should be considered only after a full evaluation of the impacts.
Airbase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
4.36 The success of agile operations is predicated on the ability of

friendly forces to manoeuvre throughout the joint area of operations
to minimise threats. Threats may come from the adversary's air,
surface-to-surface or ground based capabilities. At the local level,
appropriate airbase ISR sensors will assist in identifying a threat
before it is realised. This is critical in determining air power posture
and the decisions to manoeuvre forces within the theatre.
Force generation and sustainment

4.37 Generating air power involves the preparation of aviation
systems, including personnel, and the means for their deployment,
recovery and sustainment.
Force generation
force generation
 The process of providing suitably trained and equipped
forces, and their means of deployment, recovery and
sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks,
within required readiness and preparation times.
4.38 Agile force generation is underpinned by the integration of

flying and ground functions into cohesive and readily deployable
units or teams. This enhances flexibility, force disposition and
employment options for an air power commander.
4.39 All air power practitioners need to be trained, educated and

readied in their technical specialisation as well as general
expeditionary skills such as the use of force, tactical combat casualty
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care and basic communications. Examples include: aircrew being

trained and qualified to support the refuelling and re-arming of their
aircraft, or operations support personnel being able to set up and
dismantle the communication systems that they operate.
4.40 Agile force generation will also encompass the ability to

identify, improve and exploit airfields and other suitable locations
that do not have a permanent ADF presence. This relies upon an
effective airbase assessment capability and engagement of local
industry and may include pre-positioning of stores and materiel.
Figure 4.11: Ability to operate from austere locations
Sustainment
sustainment
 The provision of personnel, logistics, and other support
required to maintain and prolong operations or combat
until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission
or of the national objective.
4.41 Operating locations need tailored airbase functions specific

to the role performed from that airbase. Certain airbases or
contingency locations within the airbase network may be designated
and established as maintenance hubs, logistic support or distribution
nodes, transit or fly through bases, fighter forward arming and
refuelling points, diversion or alternate operating locations.
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4.42 Adaptable logistics will be a decisive factor in creating,

maintaining, and sustaining high-tempo, widely dispersed, mobile
operations. Adaptive support and sustainment to airbase operations
extends the survivability, resilience and regeneration of air
capabilities in threatened or operationally limited environments.
4.43 Executing agile operations will be a considerable logistics

challenge, imposing additional costs (eg workforce, consumables,
fuel etc) for the required maintenance and sustainment support
across all aviation systems. Sustainment of the airbase network will
be conducted through theatre level supply chains and force flows
direct to FOBs and COSs. However, FOBs and COSs need only be
stocked with the necessary munitions, fuel, equipment and personnel
to generate finite missions over a short period of time.
4.44 Sustainment within the airbase network will be highly

dependent on mobility. As the ADF's air mobility is limited and in
high demand, attempts should be made to leverage support from
regional mobility resources, such as road transport companies,
private rail operators, shipping companies and commercial aviation
companies to augment military mobility resources. Depending on the
nature of the airbase or contingency location, opportunities for local
contracting should be considered for the supply of fuel, food,
accommodation, consumables, spares, replacement parts and airfield
services.
Force projection
force projection
 The ability to project the military element of national
power in response to requirements for military operations.
Note: Force projection extends from mobilisation and
deployment of forces to redeployment.
4.45 The ability to project force is critical in allowing friendly

forces to exploit the operational environment while denying it to an
adversary. Force projection aims to position or deploy joint forces in
the best possible position for integrated interdiction and manoeuvre
to commence. Force projection, using air power, can range from
deployment of a large force into, or out of, an area of operations or
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the redeployment of small tactical elements within an area of

responsibility.
Air mobility
4.46 Air mobility missions are integral to the success of joint

operations. Air logistics support, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical
evacuation are critical for deployment, air operations, sustainment
and subsequent redeployment.
4.47 The diverse contributions that air mobility can make result in
a small number of aviation systems being in very high demand. The
JFACC, through the AOC, will coordinate and prioritise air mobility to
meet not only campaign and operational objectives, but to also
provide support to other elements of Defence. For example, the
movement of aircraft spare parts into a theatre may fall outside of an
operation but may be critical to the sustainment of an integrated
force within that theatre.
Figure 4.12: Air mobility supporting force projection
4.48 Air mobility request should be in terms of the payload to be

moved rather than requests by specific platform. Given that a single
air mobility platform may have the potential to provide support to a
number of commanders across several areas of operation, centralised
command is the key to successful air mobility planning.
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Force projection teams
force projection team

 Adaptive combat support and aircraft maintenance
personnel, cross-certified and authorised, equipped and
resourced, to perform the necessary airbase capability
functions to dynamically project multiple aircraft types
operating across a network of airbases and contingency
locations.
4.49 Airbase and contingency locations support force projection

through the generation, launch and recovery of multiple aircraft
types. This is achieved by leveraging the cross-skilling of adaptive
combat support and aircraft maintenance personnel in an operating
location, thus minimising the use of large teams of specialist
personnel. These personnel will be required to perform a range of
functions such as refuel, rearm, load and unload, and perform basic
maintenance on a variety of aircraft types.
Figure 4.13: Preparing water supplies for a contingency location
4.50 Adaptive combat support and aircraft maintenance

personnel, with requisite materiel and vehicles, may need to be
decoupled from individual units to form integrated force projection
teams. Personnel in these teams will need to be certified and
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authorised, equipped and resourced, to perform the necessary

airbase capability functions to project the multiple aircraft types
operating across a network of locations.
4.51 Force projection teams may require access to cached stores

such as equipment, fuel, ordnance and deployable aircraft
movements surfaces. Alternatively, they may need to be supported
through the necessary local and global supply agreements and
contracts to use commercial or civilian resources, equipment and
materiel. Where possible, force projection teams should leverage
support from regional resources.
4.52 Where an aircraft becomes non-mission-capable at a

contingency location, a mobile aircraft maintenance and repair team,
typically drawn from a force projection team, would need to be
formed and forward deployed from a MOB or a FOB in order to
repair and recover the platform. Such a recovery may include
operating the aircraft in a degraded state to allow it to be recovered
to a MOB or a FOB which is suitably equipped for the repair.
Air combat
4.53 Air combat forces deploy to prepared FOBs and COSs for
finite periods of time to conduct counter air missions and strike in
response to adversary maritime, land or air incursions into the joint
force area of operations. Once the necessary air missions are
complete and the objectives met, air combat forces redeploy to
MOBs and force projection teams return to their previous level of
readiness.
Force protection
force protection
 All measures to counter threats and hazards to, and
minimise vulnerabilities of, the joint force in order to
preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness.
4.54 The survivability of air power is dependent upon the force's

ability to protect itself from a wide variety of hazards and threats.
These may range from activity-related hazards (eg road traffic
accidents and workplace fires), through environment hazards
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(eg disease and toxic industrial hazards) to kinetic and non-kinetic

fires. Furthermore, the threats may be external (eg direct adversary
action) or internal (eg insider attack).
4.55 Air power is directly dependent upon basing which can offer
both opportunities and challenges driven by the nature and location
of the base. Main operating bases are large, fixed and targetable;
however, their static nature allows for more comprehensive ISR and
defensive systems, active and passive, to be installed. Conversely,
contingency operating sites rely on their short-duration and force
manoeuvre to mitigate against adversary threat. But using such
non-traditional infrastructure will introduce new hazards and may
reduce available risk treatments.
Passive defence and deception
4.56 The use of passive defences will greatly enhance redundancy

and resilience of the airbase while complicating an adversary’s ability
to find, fix, track, target and engage airbases and operating locations.
Force protection engineering, security risk, counter intelligence,
counter surveillance and airbase redundancy assessments will inform
the passive defence, airbase site and risk management plans.
4.57 Early warning. An effective early warning system is critical in

ensuring the airbase continues to undertake normal operations until
it is threatened by adversary attack. On warning of an attack, passive
defence measures, such as dispersal or taking cover in hardened
shelters will be put in place to reduce the effects from an adversary
attack. Connectivity with the TACS or localised sense, warn and locate
systems combined with a wide area alert systems will be essential in
providing timely early warning of air, ground, missile, rocket or
mortar attacks.
4.58 Emissions control. Electromagnetic signature management

and emissions control complicate the adversary’s ability to target
airbases and operating locations and can reduce the effectiveness of
an adversary’s attempt to conduct electronic attack.
4.59 Dispersal. Dispersal of aircraft, vehicles and critical

infrastructure complicates the ability of the adversary to target and
attack air power assets while reducing the number of air power assets
that can be affected in a single attack. Mobility enhances the ability
to disperse air power assets. Mobile air power assets and airbase
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services can deny the ability of an adversary to find, fix, track, target
and engage critical systems at airbases and operating locations.
4.60 Camouflage, concealment and deception. Camouflage,

concealment and deception complicate the adversary’s targeting or
air power assets by hiding the location of aircraft and critical airbase
systems or providing false targets to undermine the adversary’s
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance collection efforts. This
includes the use of multispectral camouflage techniques; aircraft,
vehicle, radar, equipment and building decoys; establishing false
operating locations; using electromagnetic and inflated emitters; and
personnel, vehicle and aircraft movement control.
4.61 Hardening. Strengthening and hardening of equipment and

facilities using design and shielding materials to protect personnel,
equipment, vehicles, aircraft and critical infrastructure can
significantly reduce the effects of small arms fire or blast and
fragmentation from bombs, missiles and rockets. Hardening also
includes the use of field defences such as weapons pits, bunkers,
parapets, air raid or bomb shelters; vehicle and aircraft revetments;
blast walls and blast resistant buildings or shipping containers.
Figure 4.14: Operating inside a hardened bunker
4.62 Recovery and reconstitution. The ability to recover and

reconstitute following an adversary attack is essential in sustaining
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the generation of air missions across the airbase network. Force

projection teams will require capabilities to return operating surfaces,
equipment and facilities to operational condition quickly. This may
require employing combined or civil engineering and construction
capabilities to complete passive defence works or reopen airbases
and operating locations following an attack. The use of deployable
aircraft matting for movement and operating surfaces will increase
the survivability of the airbase and decrease the time required to
return the airbase to full operations. The ability to source spare parts,
repair equipment and trained personnel to recover airbase systems is
essential. Using regional manufacturing capabilities will reduce
reliance on lengthy supply chains.
Figure 4.15: Explosive ordnance reconnaissance
4.63 Redundancy. The use of multiple back-up systems and

alternate operating locations complicates the adversary’s ability to
target the airbase network and requires a simultaneous attack across
multiple nodes to render air operations ineffective. Force projection
teams should be structured and equipped to ensure there is no
critical points of failure across the airbase network, so as to increase
resilience. Supply chain redundancy is essential to ensure continued
projection of air missions across the airbase network.
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Manoeuvre
4.64 The capacity to manoeuvre the force between fixed bases

and contingency locations can also enhance force protection, be it
proactive or reactive. Proactive manoeuvre occurs when assets and
supporting elements move between operating locations to
undermine the adversary's understanding, deter aggression and
enable operational advantage. Reactive manoeuvre is employed in
response to observed, perceived or actual adversary aggression,
using movement and dispersal from likely targets to increase
survivability.
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
4.65 Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazards

have the potential to affect air operations planning; command and
control; and mission execution. Planning should identify, assess, and
estimate the adversary’s CBRN capabilities and intentions and the
most likely options to protect against, counter or mitigate their
effects.
Figure 4.16: Aircraft refuelling in a simulated chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear threat environment
4.66 Air tasking should consider platform-specific CBRN

contamination avoidance or CBRN hazard survivability capabilities
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and limitations. For example, an aircraft exposed to an infectious

disease may result in the platform and crew being isolated and
decontaminated, the latter possibly taking extensive time for the
aircraft itself, possibly rendering it unavailable for the duration.
Personnel recovery
4.67 Force protection also includes the ability to recover

personnel who find themselves separated from friendly forces in a
potentially hostile environment. Personnel recovery missions typically
utilise a wide combination of integrated force assets, including air.
4.68 Air planners must consider the air assets required to

accomplish the mission through dynamic re-tasking of airborne
capabilities or having reserve capabilities at the appropriate level of
readiness. Coordination across all elements of deployed military
power is critical and a Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Centre
is typically established within the air component.
Integrated air and missile defence
4.69 Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) integrates

capabilities and overlapping operations to protect an integrated
force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s
ability to create effects from their air and missile capabilities.
Figure 4.17: Shipborne air and missile defence system
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4.70 IAMD combines counter force and defensive counter air

(DCA) operations to achieve the commander's desired effects. Within
the IAMD approach, offensive counter air (OCA) is commanded by
the JFACC and DCA is commanded by the Area Air Defence
Commander (AADC); however, in the ADF context, this may be the
same person.
4.71 The JFACC is responsible for integration between the OCA

and DCA components of IAMD, noting that the OCA component of
IAMD is not planned and executed in isolation but as part of a wider
offensive effort against a variety of targets. Additionally, OCA
includes missions that contribute to air superiority (eg attacks on the
adversary's airfields) which are not part of the IAMD approach. Only
assets that require theatre-level protection are nominated to the
AADC. Force protection from rockets, artillery and mortars are
generally the responsibility of the local commander, using organic
protection systems.
Force application
force application
 Operational activity representing the conduct of military
missions to achieve decisive effects through kinetic and
non-kinetic offensive means.
4.72 The modern nature of air power is to deliver significant

quantities of kinetic firepower to a precise location. Agile operations
enable the resilience of air power to achieve this aim.
4.73 Force application is the pinnacle warfighting function of air

power, whether that be in support of land and maritime forces
(eg offensive air support) or by directly achieving national objectives
(eg strategic attack). Air power uses both kinetic and non-kinetic
means to break the cohesion of an adversary's fighting system,
thereby preventing an adversary from applying force at their desired
time and place.
4.74 It is worth noting that the force application of air power is

not simply a case of employing the combat air system in isolation,
rather it is always partnered through a system of systems. For
example, conducting a strategic attack within adversary territory may
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require basing from a forward or contingency location able to

facilitate the required reach, force protection through airborne escort
capabilities (eg electronic attack aircraft), air battle management,
air-to-air refuelling etc. The air strike package may also operate in
conjunction with maritime and land forces.
Figure 4.18: Integrated force application
Integrated interdiction and manoeuvre
4.75 Integrated interdiction and manoeuvre involves posturing air

power to accomplish objectives as efficiently as possible. Force
application combines manoeuvre with interdiction. As well as
attacking the physical component, integrated interdiction and
manoeuvre targets the conceptual and moral components of an
adversary’s fighting power.
4.76 The aim of integrated interdiction and manoeuvre is to create

a dilemma for the adversary. If the adversary attempts to counter
friendly manoeuvre, adversary forces may be exposed to
unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the adversary employs
measures to reduce such interdiction losses, then the adversary
forces may not be able to counter the friendly manoeuvre. The
synergy achieved by integrating and synchronising interdiction and
manoeuvre throughout the operational area assists commanders in
optimising leverage at the operational level.
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4.77 Integrated interdiction and manoeuvre comprises control of

the air, strike, targeting and joint fire support to create lethal and
non-lethal effects. Manoeuvre of air combat capabilities is intended
to position them, even temporarily, within the necessary reach of the
adversary's critical vulnerabilities, allowing for a strategic attack to be
executed. Air power has a clear reach advantage for conducting strike
whether effects are focused in the maritime or land domains.
Air apportionment and tasking
4.78 Air power capabilities are generally in high demand, with only
finite quantities available. Through a joint force commander
approved air apportionment decision, the JFACC ensures that the
priority of the air effort is consistent with the operational objectives.
4.79 With the JFACC's approval, scheduled missions can be

re-tasked (eg to attack time sensitive targets) via the dynamic
targeting and execution process. Dynamic execution provides a
responsive use of on-call or dynamically re-tasked missions to exploit
adversary vulnerability that may be of limited duration; however,
dynamic execution may reduce success because of the reduced time
for mission preparation and target analysis.
4.80 Commanders and planners should carefully consider the

balance between effectiveness and the efficiency of keeping a
portion of air assets in reserve when identifying airborne and ground
alert missions. Immediate requests may result from situations that
develop after addressing pre-planned requests in a particular air
tasking period. Threats, aircrew qualifications, weapons load and
fusing should also be considered when re-tasking missions.
Uncrewed aircraft systems
4.81 Uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) technology can provide

commanders with critical capabilities to enhance their situational
understanding to make informed decisions, protect forces, reduce
collateral damage, and achieve objectives.
4.82 For planning and execution, UAS should be treated similarly

to crewed systems with regard to the established doctrinal
warfighting principles. However, given the wide range in UAS size
and operating characteristics, they may need to be planned and
controlled differently. Micro UAS, for example, are typically tactical in
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nature contained within a small operating area and operate for a

relatively short duration. Their use should be controlled in line with
general aviation principles and the tactical operator's risk assessment.
4.83 Larger UAS need to be treated in the same way as their

crewed counterparts; that is, their operations are planned as part of
the air tasking cycle. Compliance with the airspace control order is
critical. These UAS may also be capable of transferring control of the
aircraft or payload between crewed operators while airborne
(eg MQ-28A Ghost Bat). This requires clear transfer of authority and
close coordination amongst all operators and supporting units.
Planning the employment of air power

4.84 Navy, Army and Air Force aviation, while all part of ADF air
power, represent specific, sometimes unique, contributions to an
integrated force. Their effective employment relies upon a body of air
power practitioners, well versed in the breadth of capabilities and
challenges, to be able to suitably represent air power in a joint
planning forum. While components of the joint force, air power
capabilities must be used sparingly, commanded and controlled
commensurate with the intent of a joint force commander and the
objectives of the campaign or operation.
If our air forces are never used, they will have achieved
their finest goal.
General Nathan F Twining
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1957-1960
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Glossary
The source for approved Defence terms, definitions and
abbreviations is the Australian Defence Glossary (ADG), available on
the Defence Protected Environment at
http://adg.dpe.protected.mil.au/. Note: The ADG is updated
periodically and should be consulted to review any amendments to
the data in this glossary.
Terms and definitions

active air and missile defence
Active measures taken to suppress an adversary’s air power
through direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets.
aerodrome
A defined area on land or water (including any buildings,
installations, and equipment) intended to be used either
wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface
movement of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.
agility
The ability to move quickly and easily to react to changes in
the operational environment.
Note: Agility encompasses the ability to transition
responsively and flexibly between tasks.
air assault
Manoeuvre of forces (combat support, combat service
support and combat) in vertical lift aircraft as part of a
combined arms team under the command of an Air
Manoeuvre Force Commander.
air battle management

Control of military air operations that may include the control
and coordination of integrated air and missile defence,
offensive counter air, strategic attack, close air support and
other warfighting or supporting air activities.
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air domain
The envelope of air surrounding the Earth, where density,
pressure, temperature, natural obstacles and weather systems
are the dominant environmental factors.
air domain awareness

The effective understanding of threats associated with the air
domain that could impact the security, safety or economy of
the nation.
air interdiction (AI)

An air activity conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or
destroy an adversary’s capability before it can be brought to
bear effectively against friendly forces.
Note: Although AI is an integrated process, it is conducted at
such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and manoeuvre of friendly
forces is not normally required.
air logistics support (ALS)

An air activity, other than airborne operations, air-to-air
refuelling or aeromedical evacuation, conducted to deploy,
distribute or recover personnel, materiel or forces.
Note: It also includes special purpose airlift and the transport
of very important persons (VIP) in a secure travel
environment.
air mobility
The ability to move personnel, materiel or forces using
airborne platforms.
air parity
That degree of the control of the air where freedom of
manoeuvre in the maritime, land and air domains is
contested without clear advantage between the air power
and air defences of opposing forces.
Note: It is a situation in which both friendly and adversary
land, maritime, and air operations may encounter significant
interference by the opposing air and missile capabilities.
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air power
The total strength of a nation’s capability to conduct and
influence activities in, through and from the air to achieve its
objectives.
air superiority
That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over
another which permits the conduct of operations by the
former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time
and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing
force.
air support operations centre (ASOC)

The primary element within the theatre air control system
(TACS) responsible for the execution of air and space power
in direct support of joint force land component operations.
Notes:
1. Its primary mission is to control air operations forward of
the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and short of the fire
support coordination line (FSCL).
2. Normally co-located with the senior land component
headquarters, the ASOC is directly subordinate to the air
operations centre (AOC) and is responsible for coordinating
and directing air support for land forces at the tactical level.
3. The ASOC maintains battlespace situational awareness
through use of tactical datalinks and exercises both positive
and procedural control through reliable, jam-resistant,
beyond line-of-sight, secure communications networks.
air supremacy
That degree of the control of the air which permits freedom
of manoeuvre in the maritime, land and air domains by one
force over another without effective interference by air power
and air defences of the opposing force.
Notes:
1. Air supremacy cannot guarantee that an opposing force
will not inflict some damage or losses, particularly given the
extensive proliferation of small arms weapons and portable
air defences.
2. Air supremacy may be limited geographically or
temporally.
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air-to-air refuelling (AAR)

The refuelling of an aircraft in flight by another aircraft.
airbase
A defined area containing an aerodrome and infrastructure
that supports air power activities.
airbase air traffic services (ABATS)

The provision of air traffic management, communication
navigation and surveillance systems, meteorological services
for air navigation and aeronautical information services on an
airbase.
airborne operations
An air activity conducted within an active theatre of
operations to deliver or extract combat ready forces and their
logistic support into or from a contested objective area.
Note: This may be achieved by airdrop or air land from
aircraft.
airmindedness
The sum of an individual’s depth and breadth of knowledge
and understanding of the characteristics and employment of
air power.
airspace control
The real-time or near real-time implementation of the
airspace management procedures governing airspace usage
in order to mitigate risk and enhance the flexible use of
airspace.
airspace control authority

The commander designated to assume overall responsibility
for the operation of the airspace control system in their
assigned area.
airspace management
The design, allocation, integration, and regulation of airspace,
including the application of airspace usage procedures to
ensure the airspace is appropriate for the mission or activity.
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anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

Activity conducted to deny an adversary effective use of their
submarines.
anti-surface warfare (ASuW)

Measures taken to defend a maritime force against attacks by
surface based weapons launched from ships and land-based
sites.
area air defence commander (AADC)

The commander responsible to the theatre commander for
the planning and execution of integrated air and missile
defence operations across the joint area of operations.
armed reconnaissance (AR)

An air mission flown with the primary purpose of locating
and attacking targets of opportunity, ie adversary materiel,
personnel, and facilities, in assigned general areas or along
assigned ground communication routes, and not for the
purpose of attacking specific briefed targets.
attack operations
Offensive actions which are intended to destroy, disrupt, or
degrade counter air targets on the ground to prevent
adversary employment of air and missile capabilities.
Note: Attack operations is a subset of offensive counter air.
Australian Defence Force warfighting functions (ADFWF)

Primary warfighting functions of the Australian Defence
Forces' joint force: Command; Situational Understanding;
Force Projection; Force Application; Force Protection; Force
Generation and Sustainment.
close air support (CAS)

Close air support (CAS) is an air activity conducted against
hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces
and which require detailed integration with the fire and
movement of those forces.
Note: The aim of CAS is to destroy, suppress, neutralise,
disrupt, or delay the adversary who is engaged, or about to
engage, with friendly ground or amphibious forces.
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contingency operating site (COS)

An adaptive basing location that supports a tailored footprint
of operations for a prescribed, non-permanent duration.
control of the air

A measure of the ability to conduct operations in the
maritime, land and air domains without interference from
adversary air power and air defence capabilities.
Note: The three levels of the control of the air are: air
supremacy, air superiority and air parity.
counter air
Activities conducted to attain the degree of control of the air
that allows the joint force freedom of action and protection
from adversary air attack.
deep air support (DAS)

Air actions against an adversary's targets at such a distance
from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission
with fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
Note: Deep air support consists of air interdiction; armed
reconnaissance; strike coordination and reconnaissance.
Defence mastery
The balanced and continual development in the fields of
cognitive abilities, profession of arms, and national security
policy and strategy.
defensive counter air (DCA)

Active and passive defensive measures designed to detect,
identify, intercept, and destroy or make ineffective adversary
forces attempting to attack or to penetrate friendly airspace.
Note: These operations include passive and active air and
missile defence.
electronic attack (EA)

That division of electronic warfare involving the use of
electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the
intent of degrading, neutralising, or destroying adversary
combat capability and is considered a form of fires.
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fighter escort
An offensive counter air operation providing dedicated
protection sorties by air-to-air capable fighters in support of
other offensive air and air support missions over an
adversary's territory, or in a defensive counter air mission to
protect high value airborne assets.
fighter sweep
An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and
destroy the adversary's aircraft or targets of opportunity in a
designated area.
flexibility
Capacity to dynamically change between multiple missions.
force application
Operational activity representing the conduct of military
missions to achieve decisive effects through kinetic and
non-kinetic offensive means.
force generation
The process of providing suitably trained and equipped
forces, and their means of deployment, recovery and
sustainment to meet all current and potential future tasks,
within required readiness and preparation times.
force projection
The ability to project the military element of national power
in response to requirements for military operations.
Note: Force projection extends from mobilisation and
deployment of forces to redeployment.
force projection team

Adaptive combat support and aircraft maintenance
personnel, cross-certified and authorised, equipped and
resourced, to perform the necessary airbase capability
functions to dynamically project multiple aircraft types
operating across a network of airbases and contingency
locations.
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force protection
All measures to counter threats and hazards to, and minimise
vulnerabilities of, the joint force in order to preserve freedom
of action and operational effectiveness.
forward operating base (FOB)

A location used to support operations without establishing
full support facilities.
Note: A forward operating base may be used for an extended
time period and is supported by a main operating base.
integrated air and missile defence (IAMD)

The holistic, synchronised application of effects to prevent
launch, defeat threats in-flight and degrade their
effectiveness.
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)

An activity that synchronises and integrates the direction,
planning and operation of collection capabilities and actions,
and of processing, exploitation and dissemination systems.
joint airspace control cell (JACC)

Designs, allocates, integrates, coordinates and regulates
temporary and permanent military airspace volumes and
airspace usage procedures for Australian Defence Force
operations, exercises and day-to-day activities including
raise, train, sustain.
joint force air component commander (JFACC)

The commander within the joint force responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper
employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for
tasking air assets; planning and coordinating air operations;
or accomplishing such operational missions as may be
assigned.
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joint force air component headquarters

Joint headquarters providing the Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) with the staff for the effective
functioning of the air component including the planning,
direction, control and coordination of assigned air power
capabilities.
main base (MB)

Functions as the home base for one or more operating units
of a particular aircraft type.
Note: It will not have the resident industry services necessary
for deeper level maintenance to resident aircraft types.
main operating base (MOB)

An airbase, aerodrome or seaport located within the theatre
of operations that has a mature support organisation, stores
of war reserve materiel, and is capable of receiving and
operating augmentation equipment, supporting
organisations, and non-unit materiel during contingency or
wartime operations.
main sustainment base (MSB)

An airbase that can function as home base for one or more
operating units of a particular aircraft type.
Note: These bases will have the resident industry services
necessary to provide deeper level maintenance support to
resident aircraft types.
offensive air support (OAS)

Those air operations conducted against adversary
installations, facilities, and personnel to directly assist in the
attainment of strategic or operational objectives through the
destruction of the adversary's resources or by the isolation of
the adversary's military forces.
Note: Offensive air support encompasses close air support
and deep air support (air interdiction; armed reconnaissance;
strike coordination and reconnaissance).
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offensive counter air (OCA)

An offensive air activity conducted to destroy, degrade,
neutralise or disrupt adversary air power, or to contain it as
close to its source as possible.
Note: These operations include attack operations,
suppression of enemy air defences, fighter escort and fighter
sweep.
passive air and missile defence

Passive measures taken to minimise the effectiveness of
adversary air and missile activity by enhancing the
survivability of friendly forces and installations.
Note: The measures include detection, camouflage,
concealment, deception, dispersion and the use of protective
construction.
payload
The mission specific sensors, weapons, electronic warfare
systems, fuel, people and cargo that is carried, operated
and/or delivered by an aviation system.
persistence
The ability of Defence elements to maintain an enduring
effect within an area of operations.
Note: This can be by the continued existence of the Defence
element within the area, or by the continuance of an effect
through revisiting the objective.
personnel recovery
Measures to recover isolated personnel.
perspective
The greater field of view and extended horizon for
generating situational awareness attainable through the
altitude, speed, and range inherent within the air domain.
precision
The ability to employ lethal or non-lethal force and achieve
effects accurately, with discrimination and proportionality.
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preparedness
The sustainable capacity to apply capabilities to accomplish
Government-directed tasks.
Note: It describes the combined outcome of readiness and
sustainability.
processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED)

An activity and mechanism within an intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance system that enables timely
transformation of collected data, extraction of meaning from
that data, and the transmission of the derived information to
those that require it.
professional mastery
The measure of the ability of Defence members to execute
their duties, encompassing:
a. their ability to perform these duties in a range of
circumstances;
b. their self-confidence to act autonomously despite risk and
ambiguity; and
c. their understanding of the purpose and consequences of
their actions.
Note: Incorporates the application of Defence, technical and
social mastery.
reach
The distance over which a military capability or system can
contribute to desired effects.
resilience
Adaptive capacity of an entity to resist being affected by a
risk event, to maintain vital functions and to return to normal
condition as rapidly as possible.
responsiveness
The synergy of speed, range and altitude that enables
contributions to desired effects relatively quickly.
situational understanding
The accurate interpretation of a situation and the likely
actions of groups and individuals within it.
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social mastery
The balanced and continual development of leadership,
ethics, character and cultural intelligence in order to
understand, influence and act in the best interests of our
mission and people.
special operations liaison element (SOLE)

A special operations liaison officer supplemented by
additional personnel and equipment to enable direct, secure
communication with the supported special operations
command and control element or force elements.
special purpose mission

Safe, reliable, connected and protected air transportation for
national leadership in direct support of national security
objectives.
Note: Special purpose missions are dedicated to transporting
members of the Australian government, approved senior
officials and foreign dignitaries.
strategic attack
An offensive air activity designed to employ air power to
create specific strategic effects that damage, neutralise or
destroy an adversary’s will, warfighting capabilities or any
other capacity opposed to one’s interests.
strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize or
destroy an objective.
strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR)

Missions to acquire, report and coordinate the destruction of
targets.
suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD)

That activity which neutralises, temporarily degrades or
destroys enemy air defences by a destructive and/or
disruptive means.
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sustainment
The provision of personnel, logistics, and other support
required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until
successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of
the national objective.
technical mastery
The combination of an individual’s training, knowledge,
experience and skills that ensures their ability to carry out a
specific employment function with a high level of
competence.
Theatre Air Control System (TACS)

A system for planning, directing, coordinating and controlling
theatre air operations.
Note: The theatre air control system is the military
component of the national airspace control system (ACS).
uncrewed aircraft system (UAS)

The entire system consisting of the uncrewed aircraft (UA),
Remote Pilot Station (RPS), communications/data links,
networks, launch and recovery systems, and personnel
required to fly/control the UA.
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Shortened forms of words

AADC area air defence commander
AAR air-to-air refuelling
ABATS air base air traffic services
ADF Australian Defence Force
ADFWF Australian Defence Force Warfighting Functions
AE aeromedical evacuation
AI air interdiction
ALS air logistics support
AMD air and missile defence
AOC air operations centre
AR armed reconnaissance
ASOC air support operations centre
ASPC Air and Space Power Centre
ASW anti-submarine warfare
ASuW anti-surface warfare
ATG air task group
ATO air tasking order
CAF Chief of Air Force

CAS close air support
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CONOPS concept of operations
COS contingency operating site
DAS deep air support

DCA defensive counter air
EA electronic attack
FOB forward operating base
HMAS His Majesty's Australian Ship
IAM Institute of Aviation Medicine

IAMD integrated air and missile defence
ICT information and communication technology
ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JACC joint airspace control cell
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JACCE joint air component coordination element

JEWOSU joint electronic warfare operational support unit
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
MB main base
MOB main operating base
MSB main sustainment base
NALE naval and amphibious liaison element
OAS offensive air support

OCA offensive counter air
PED processing, exploitation and dissemination

PR personnel recovery
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance

SEAD suppression of enemy air defences
SOLE special operations liaison element
TACP tactical air control party

TACS theatre air control system
UAS uncrewed aircraft system
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OFFICIAL

© Commonwealth of Australia 2023

Announcement statement—May be announced to the public.

Secondary release—May be released to the public.

All classified Defence information is protected from unauthorised

ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power

ADF INTEGRATION DOCTRINE

ADF Air Power

Australian Defence Force – Integration – 3 ADF Air Power, Edition 1 is

Angus J Campbell, AO, DSC

ii ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

2. Australian Defence Force (ADF) doctrine describes principles

3. Aim. ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power aims to provide a common,

4. Audience. This publication is written for all ADF members

5. Scope. This publication, centred on ADF air power, is one of

6. Acknowledgment of Country. Defence acknowledges the

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 iii

7. Cultural Disclaimer. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

8. Imagery Disclaimer. Some of the images in this publication

iv ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

Proposals to amend ADF-I-3 ADF Air Power may be sent to:

Deputy Director Doctrine

Amendment Chapter(s) Amendment Effected date

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 v

Doctrine publication hierarchy

Defence Protected Environment Defence Doctrine Library

Defence Secret Environment Defence Doctrine Library

vi ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 vii

viii ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 ix

Adaptive support and sustainment 84

x ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 xi

Figure 2.6: Air-to-air refuelling ....................................................................... 36

xii ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

Figure 3.16: Air power contribution to national humanitarian

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 xiii

1.2 This chapter aims to provide a framework through which air

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 1

Plainly put, military power alone is inadequate for

1.3 This opening quote defines the challenge facing the

1.4 However, military power is complex and it is unrealistic to

1.5 This separation by domains and the resulting elements of

1.6 Air power, as for all elements of military power, is a building

2 ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

unique contributions and challenges to an integrated force and must

Figure 1.1: Military air power, a single component of an integrated

Air power practitioners

ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1 3

1.9 While air power practitioners principally represent air power

Figure 1.2: People, the foundation of air power

1.11 Airmindedness is both a collective and individual

1.12 Airmindedness is achieved through training, education,

4 ADF–I–3 ADF AIR POWER – EDITION 1

The ADF uses domains to coordinate the raising,

1.13 For integrated campaigns and operations, every operational

Figure 1.3: Domains of the operational environment, interdependent

Nature of the air domain