Genderlect 2
Genderlect 2
Genderlect 2
Semiotic tradition
Interpretive
Socio-psychological tradition
Genderlect Styles
of Deborah Tannen
384
CHAPTER 31: Genderlect Styles 385
2. Telling a Story
Along with theorists Clifford Geertz, Michael Pacanowsky, and Walter Fisher (see
Chapters 19 and 24), Tannen recognizes that the stories people tell reveal a great
deal about their hopes, needs, and values. Consistent with men’s focus on status,
Tannen notes that men tell more stories than women do—especially jokes. Telling
jokes is a masculine way to negotiate status. Men’s humorous stories have a can-
you-top-this? flavor that holds attention and elevates the storyteller above his
audience.
When men aren’t trying to be funny, they tell stories in which they are heroes,
often acting alone to overcome great obstacles. On the other hand, women tend to
express their desire for community by telling stories about others. On the rare
occasions when a woman is a character in her own narrative, she usually describes
herself as doing something foolish rather than acting in a clever manner. This
downplaying of self puts her on the same level with her hearers, thus strengthening
her network of support.
3. Listening
A woman listening to a story or an explanation tends to hold eye contact, offer
head nods, and react with yeah, uh-huh, mmmn, right, or other responses that indi-
cate I’m listening or I’m with you. For a man concerned with status, that overt style
of active listening means I agree with you, so he avoids putting himself in that
submissive, or one-down, stance. Women conclude that men aren’t listening, which
is not necessarily true.
When a woman who is listening starts to speak before the other person is
finished, she usually does so to add a word of agreement, to show support, or to
finish a sentence with what she thinks the speaker will say. Tannen labels this
Cooperative overlap cooperative overlap. She says that from a woman’s perspective, cooperative overlap
A supportive interruption is a sign of rapport rather than a competitive ploy to control the conversation. She
often meant to show also recognizes that men don’t see it that way. Men regard any interruption as a
agreement and solidarity
power move to take control of the conversation, because in their world that’s how
with the speaker.
it’s done. Those who win the conversational game can take a don’t-talk-while-I’m-
interrupting-you stance and make it stick. Tannen concludes that these different
styles of conversation management are the source of continuing irritation in
cross-gender talk. “Whereas women’s cooperative overlaps frequently annoy men by
seeming to co-opt their topic, men frequently annoy women by usurping or switch-
ing the topic.”13
4. Asking Questions
Tannen thinks that men and women also annoy each other with their different ways
of asking questions—or not asking them. When we were first married, my wife Cheri
and I set out on a trip from Chicago to Muskegon, Michigan, to visit friends. I
glanced at a map before the trip—today’s GPS was the stuff of science fiction back
then—and noted that I needed to take I-94. About an hour into the trip, Cheri
encouraged me to stop and ask for directions because the road we were on didn’t
388 CULTURAL CONTEXT
seem familiar to her. Knowing that we were on I-94, I confidently declined her
request. But when I saw signs for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, I was finally persuaded
to stop at a gas station. To my horror, I discovered that I-94 went up both sides of
Lake Michigan. I was driving up the wrong side. Cheri and I can laugh now about
our late arrival in Muskegon, but when she tells the story, she always emphasizes
my stubborn refusal to stop and ask for directions.
According to Tannen, men don’t ask for that kind of help. Every admission of
ignorance whittles away at the image of self-sufficiency that is so important to a
man. “If self-respect is bought at the cost of a few extra minutes of travel time, it
is well worth the price,” she explains.14 In my case, I gained no self-respect at a
cost of several hours of travel time. But I’m still not fond of asking others for
directions.
Women ask questions to establish a connection with others. Even a five-minute
stop at a gas station to check the best route can create a sense of community,
however brief. Tannen notes that when women state their opinions, they often tag
them with a question at the end of the sentence: “That was a good movie, don’t
Tag question you think?” Tag questions soften the sting of potential disagreement that might drive
A short question at the people apart. They are also invitations to participate in open, friendly dialogue. But
end of a declarative to men, they make the speaker seem wishy-washy.
statement, often used by
Ever since You Just Don’t Understand was published, Tannen has entertained
women to soften the sting
of potential disagreement
questions during television interviews, radio call-in shows, and discussions following
or invite open, friendly lectures. Women almost always seek more information or offer their own experi-
dialogue. ences that validate her insights. That’s now true for men as well. But when the book
was riding high on best-seller lists, men would often pose questions that seemed
designed to bring her down from her high horse or to establish their own expertise.
Even though she understands that public face is crucial to men, she identifies with
the words of a wife in a short story: “I’d have been upset about making the mistake—
but not about people knowing. That part’s not a big deal to me.” Her husband
replied, “Oh, is it ever a big deal to me.”15
5. Conflict
After his divorce, Rob Reiner decided to direct the film When Harry Met Sally, a
humorous depiction of the relationship between a man (Billy Crystal) and a woman
(Meg Ryan). Nora Ephron wrote the script and, after interviewing Reiner, used him
as the inspiration for Harry’s character. The film became a classic after its release
in 1989, and is listed among Bravo’s “100 Funniest Movies.” Reiner’s divorce pro-
vided the grist for an argument between Harry and Sally, in which Harry blows up
at their friends Jess and Marie and then storms out of the room. After making an
excuse for his behavior, Sally goes to him to try to calm him down.
Harry: I know, I know, I shouldn’t have done it.
Sally: Harry, you’re going to have to try and find a way of not expressing every
feeling that you have every moment that you have them.
Harry: Oh, really?
Sally: Yes, there are times and places for things.
Harry: Well the next time you’re giving a lecture series on social graces, would
you let me know, ’cause I’ll sign up.
Sally: Hey. You don’t have to take your anger out on me.
CHAPTER 31: Genderlect Styles 389
Harry: Oh, I think I’m entitled to throw a little anger your way. Especially when
I’m being told how to live my life by Miss Hospital Corners.
Sally: What’s that supposed to mean?
Harry: I mean, nothing bothers you. You never get upset about anything.
This scene illustrates Tannen’s description of much male–female strife. Since they
see life as a contest, many men are more comfortable with conflict and are therefore
less likely to hold themselves in check. By trying to placate Harry and excuse his anger
toward their friends, Sally responds in what Tannen believes is an equally typical fash-
ion. “To most women, conflict is a threat to connection—to be avoided at all costs.”16
The dialogue illustrates another feature of conflict between men and women.
As often happens, Sally’s attempt to avert a similar outburst in the future sparks
new conflict with Harry. Tannen says men have an early warning system that’s
geared to detect signs that they are being told what to do. Harry bristles at the
thought that Sally is trying to limit his autonomy, so her efforts backfire.
6. Nonverbal Communication
Curiously, Tannen doesn’t extend the connection–status distinction to the ways in
which men and women communicate nonverbally. Susan Pease Gadoua, a licensed
marriage counselor who writes a regular column for PsychologyToday.com, finds it
difficult to analyze the way men and women talk to each other without including
the nonverbal component. Based on her years of experience helping married cou-
ples, she’s learned to anticipate a common scenario when she sees a man and a
woman trying to get over a serious fight or navigate a rift in their relationship.
Each partner has a different way of wanting to resolve the problem: women want
to talk things out and perhaps make love later (when they feel more connected);
men want to connect by making love and (maybe) talking later.17
Gadoua recalls one husband who told her that all of his marital problems would
be solved if only he and his wife could go away for a whole weekend and dedicate
the entire time to sex. His wife saw this solution as a superficial gesture that wouldn’t
solve anything. Deborah Tannen might see it as a way for the husband to score in
a never-ending game of who’s on top. The husband’s solution seems like a classic
acting out of one of the early rules that boys learn at play—communicate to assert
your identity. The wife’s solution reflects one of the rules girls learn—connect
through conversation. Sadly, Gadoua observes that when women want to connect
and men want to have sex, it’s often the case that neither activity takes place.
must be traced back to early childhood. Is it plausible to suggest that boys and girls
as young as 7 are already segregated and using conversational styles that will follow
them into adult life? Many linguists and communication scholars believe the answer
to that question is yes. They refer to the segregated groups to which boys and girls
belong as speech communities.18
Speech community Julia Wood summarized the concept of a speech community this way: “[A] speech
A community of people community exists when people share understandings about goals of communication,
who share understandings strategies for enacting those goals, and ways of interpreting communication.”19
about goals of
Tannen’s conclusion that the second-grade boys and girls she observed were “two
communication, strategies
for enacting those goals,
different species” certainly matches up with the idea that they were from distinct
and ways of interpreting speech communities. But these communities don’t appear out of thin air. To get
communication. insight into their origins, we need to look back to the preschool years.
Louise Cherry Wilkinson, professor of education, psychology, and communica-
tion sciences at Syracuse University, suggests that separate speech communities begin
with the conversations young boys and girls have with their mothers. She reached
this conclusion when she studied the interactions between moms and kids during a
free-play session. She recruited mothers with a 2-year-old daughter or son to take
part, giving no instructions as to what they should talk about. Along with her col-
league Michael Lewis, Wilkinson transcribed the interactions that took place and
trained coders to analyze the words that were used. The coders didn’t know whether
they were coding interactions between a mother and daughter or a mother and son.20
Wilkinson and Lewis discovered that mothers of girls talked more, asked more
questions, used longer sentences, and were more likely to verbally acknowledge their
daughters’ comments than were mothers of boys. Mothers of boys were more likely
to use directives—telling their sons what to do—than were mothers of girls. Wilkinson
and Lewis speculated that these sorts of differences could set early expectations in
males and females about what type of conversation is most appropriate for them.
The findings suggest that the differences Tannen sees between adult male and female
speech have their roots in the early socialization of children.
women tend to think and speak in an ethical voice different from that of men.22
Gilligan’s view of gender differences parallels Tannen’s analysis of men as wanting
independence and women as desiring human connection. Gilligan is convinced that
most men seek autonomy and think of moral maturity in terms of justice. She’s
equally certain that women desire to be linked with others and that they regard
their ultimate ethical responsibility as one of care.
On the basis of the quantity and quality of feminine relationships, Gilligan
contrasts women who care with men who are fair. Individual rights, equality before
the law, fair play, a square deal—all these masculine ethical goals can be pursued
without intimate ties to others. Justice is impersonal. But women’s moral judgment
is more contextual, more immersed in the details of relationships and narratives.23
Sensitivity to others, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and peacemaking all reflect interpersonal
involvement.
Gilligan’s work arose in response to the theory of moral development of her
Harvard colleague Lawrence Kohlberg, who identified increasing levels of ethical
maturity by analyzing responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas.24 According to
his justice-based scoring system, the average young adult female was a full stage
behind her male counterpart. Women were rated as less morally mature than men
because they were less concerned about abstract concepts like justice, truth, and
freedom. Instead, they based their ethical decisions on considerations of compas-
sion, loyalty, and a strong sense of responsibility to prevent pain and alleviate
suffering. Their moral reasoning was more likely to reflect Buber’s call for genu-
ine I–Thou relationships than Kant’s categorical imperative (see Chapters 6
and 14).
Gilligan is comfortable with the idea that men and women speak in different
ethical voices. But she’s disturbed that when women don’t follow the normative
path laid out by men, “the conclusion has generally been that something is wrong
with women.”25 She points out “the unfair paradox that the very traits that have
traditionally defined the ‘goodness’ of women are those that mark them as deficient
in moral development.”26
Although Gilligan’s theory is more descriptive than prescriptive, the underlying
assumption is that the way things are reflects the way things ought to be. Most
ethical theorists are bothered by the idea of a double standard—justice from some,
care from others. Traditional moral philosophy has never suggested different ethics
for different groups. Yet readers of both sexes report that Gilligan’s theory resonates
with their personal experience.
support should be highly desired in the world of women but of little value in the
competitive world of men. Kunkel and Burleson’s empirical research doesn’t bear
out Tannen’s claim. While it’s true that women often do it better, both sexes place
an equally high value on comforting communication:
Both men and women view highly person-centered comforting messages as most
sensitive and effective; both see messages low in person-centeredness as relatively
insensitive and ineffective. . . . Both sexes view comforting skills as important in
the context of various personal relationships and as substantially more important
than instrumentally focused communication skills.29
On the basis of this shared meaning, Kunkel and Burleson rejected the different-
cultures perspective. They believed it was a myth that had lost its narrative force.
Men and women do understand.
A very different critique comes from feminist scholars. For example, German
linguist Senta Troemel-Ploetz accuses Tannen of having written a dishonest book
that ignores issues of male dominance, control, power, sexism, discrimination, sex-
ual harassment, and verbal insults. “If you leave out power,” she says, “you do not
understand talk.”30 The two genderlects are anything but equal. “Men are used to
dominating women; they do it especially in conversations. . . . Women are trained
to please; they have to please also in conversations.”31
Contrary to Tannen’s thesis that mutual understanding will bridge the culture
gap between the sexes, Troemel-Ploetz believes that “men understand quite well
what women want but they give only when it suits them. In many situations they
refuse to give and women cannot make them give.”32 She thinks it’s ridiculous to
assume that men will give up power voluntarily. To prove her point, she suggests
doing a follow-up study on men who read Tannen’s best seller. Noting that many
women readers of You Just Don’t Understand give the book to their husbands to
peruse, Troemel-Ploetz states that if Tannen’s theory is true, a follow-up study
should show that these men are now putting down their papers at the breakfast
table and talking empathetically with their wives. She doesn’t think it will happen.
Why has genderlect styles received so much criticism? Perhaps because it draws
from both objective and interpretive approaches yet doesn’t satisfy the demands of
either camp. It offers understanding of people, but doesn’t seek to reform power dif-
ferences among them. It’s relatively simple but may not explain the data. Her book’s
aesthetic appeal and practical utility made it a bestseller, but that hasn’t translated
into a community of agreement among scholars. Nevertheless, this controversial the-
ory has inspired both quantitative and qualitative research aimed at supporting or
refuting her claims. Whether she’s right or wrong, Tannen’s work has encouraged
people to think systematically about sex differences in communication.
4. Tannen’s aha factor is similar to Carl Rogers’ standard of basing our knowledge
on personal experience (see Chapter 4). What are the dangers of relying solely
on this indicator?
A SECOND LOOK Recommended resource: Deborah Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand, Ballantine, New
York, 1990.
Conversational style: Deborah Tannen, That’s Not What I Meant! William Morrow, New
York, 1986.
Linguistic microanalysis of conversation: Deborah Tannen, Conversational Style: Analyz-
ing Talk Among Friends, Ablex, Norwood, NJ, 1984.
Gender differences in children’s talk: Deborah Tannen, “Gender Differences in Topical
Coherence: Creating Involvement in Best Friends’ Talk,” Discourse Processes, Vol. 13,
1990, pp. 73–90.
Discourse analysis: Deborah Tannen, Gender and Discourse, Oxford University, Oxford,
UK, 1994/96.
Gendered language in the workplace: Deborah Tannen, Talking from 9 to 5: Women and
Men at Work—Language, Sex, and Power, Avon, New York, 1994.
Gendered language in the family: Deborah Tannen, I Only Say This Because I Love
You: Talking in Families, Ballantine, New York, 2002.
Support of two-culture hypothesis: Anthony Mulac, James Bradac, and Pamela Gibbons,
“Empirical Support for the Gender-as-Culture Hypothesis: An Intercultural Analysis of
Male/Female Language Differences,” Human Communication Research, Vol. 27, 2001,
pp. 121–152.
Communication scholars’ dialogue on two-culture hypothesis: “Reflections on the Differ-
ent Cultures Hypothesis: A Scholars’ Symposium,” Sandra Metts (ed.), Personal Relation-
ships, Vol. 4, 1997, pp. 201–253.
Critique of two-culture hypothesis: Adrianne Kunkel and Brant Burleson, “Social Sup-
port and the Emotional Lives of Men and Women: An Assessment of the Different
Cultures Perspective,” in Sex Differences and Similarities in Communication, Daniel Canary
and Kathryn Dindia (eds.), Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 1998, pp. 101–125.
Critique centering on power discrepancy: Senta Troemel-Ploetz, “Review Essay: Selling
the Apolitical,” Discourse and Society, Vol. 2, 1991, pp. 489–502.
8 Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand, p. 108. 4 Julia T. Wood, “Feminist Standpoint Theory and Muted Group
9 Julia Wood, Gendered Lives, Cengage, Boston, MA, 2009, Theory: Commonalities and Divergences,” Women and Lan
pp. 126–128. guage, Vol. 28, 2005, p. 62.
10 Daniel Maltz and Ruth Borker, “A Cultural Approach to Male– 5 Ibid.
Female Miscommunication,” in Language and Social Identity, 6 Meenakshi Gigi Durham, “On the Relevance of Standpoint Epis-
John Gumperz (ed.), Cambridge University Press, UK, 1982, temology to the Practice of Journalism: The Case for ‘Strong
pp. 196–216. Objectivity,’” Communication Theory, Vol. 8, 1998, p. 117.
11 Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand, p. 48. 7 Julia T. Wood, “Feminist Scholarship and the Study of Relation-
12 Nikhil Swaminathan, “Gender Jabber: Do Women Talk More ships,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, Vol. 12, 1995,
than Men?” Scientific American, July 6, 2007, https://www.scien- p. 110.
tificamerican.com/article/women-talk-more-than-men, accessed 8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind,
July 28, 2017. Macmillan, New York, 1910, pp. 182–188.
13 Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand, p. 212. 9 Friedrich Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” and “The
14 Ibid., p. 62. Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” in The
15 Ibid., p. 72. Marx–Engels Reader, Robert Tucker (ed.), W. W. Norton, New
16 Ibid., p. 150. York, 1978, pp. 701–702, 734–736. See also Sandra Harding,
17 Susan Pease Gadoua, “To Connect, Women Want to Talk and “The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist The-
Men Want Sex—How Do Straight Couples Reconcile?” Psychol ory,” in Sex and Scientific Inquiry, Sandra Harding and Jean
ogy Today, February 7, 2010, https://www.psychologytoday.com/ O’Barr (eds.), University of Chicago, IL, 1987, p. 292.
blog/contemplating-divorce/201002/connect-women-want-talk- 10 Harding, “Comment on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method,’” p. 389.
and-men-want-sex-how-do-straight-couples, accessed July 29, 11 Wood, “Feminist Scholarship,” p. 111.
2017. 12 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
18 William Labov, Sociolinguistic Patterns, University of Pennsylvania Knowledge, Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (trans.), Uni-
Press, Philadelphia, 1972. versity of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984, p. xxiv.
19 Wood, p. 126. 13 Kathryn Stockett, The Help, Amy Einhorn Books/Putnam, New
20 Louise Cherry and Michael Lewis, “Mothers and Two-Year-Olds: York, 2009.
A Study of Sex-Differentiated Aspects of Verbal Interaction,” 14 Ibid., p. 4.
Developmental Psychology, Vol. 12, 1976, pp. 276–282. 15 Ibid., flyleaf.
21 Tannen, You Just Don’t Understand, pp. 120–121, 298. 16 Ibid., p. 386.
22 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 17 Rachel A. Griffin, “Problematic Representations of Strategic
Women’s Development, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, Whiteness and ‘Post-racial’ Pedagogy: A Critical Intercultural
1982. Reading of The Help,” Journal of International and Intercultural
23 Summary statement of Seyla Benhabib, “The Generalized Communication, Vol. 8, 2015, pp. 147–166.
and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg–Gilligan Controversy 18 Interview with Octavia Spencer and Viola Davis on Tavis Smiley,
and Feminist Theory,” in Feminism as Critique, Seyla Benhabib PBS, http://www.pbs.org/video/2194955259, accessed July 7,
and Drucilla Cornell (eds.), University of Minnesota, Minneapo- 2017.
lis, 1987, p. 78. 19 Ibid.
24 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Volume 1: The 20 Julia T. Wood, “Engendered Relations: Interaction, Caring,
Philosophy of Moral Development, Harper & Row, San Francisco, Power and Responsibility in Intimacy,” in Social Context and Rela
CA, 1981, p. 12. tionships, Steve Duck (ed.), Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1993, p. 37.
25 Gilligan, p. 18. 21 Wood, “Feminist Scholarship,” p. 112.
26 Carol Gilligan, “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self 22 Stockett, p. 173.
and Morality,” Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 47, 1977, p. 484. 23 Ibid., p. 304.
27 Tannen, Conversational Style, p. 38. 24 Julia T. Wood, Communication Theories in Action, 3rd ed.,
28 J. W. Santrock, A. M. Minnett, and B. D. Campbell, The Authori Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, p. 212. See also Harding, Whose Sci
tative Guide to Self-Help Books, Guilford, New York, 1994. ence? Whose Knowledge? p. 59.
29 Adrianne W. Kunkel and Brant R. Burleson, “Social Support and 25 Julia T. Wood, “Gender and Moral Voice: Moving from Woman’s
the Emotional Lives of Men and Women: An Assessment of the Nature to Standpoint Epistemology,” Women’s Studies in Commu
Different Cultures Perspective,” in Sex Differences and Similari nication, Vol. 15, 1993, p. 8.
ties in Communication, Daniel Canary and Kathryn Dindia 26 Stockett, p. 418.
(eds.), Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, 1998, p. 116. 27 Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? p. 192.
30 Senta Troemel-Ploetz, “Review Essay: Selling the Apolitical,” Dis 28 Stockett, pp. 8–9.
course & Society, Vol. 2, 1991, p. 497. 29 Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
31 Ibid., p. 491. Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Stud
32 Ibid., p. 495. ies, Vol. 14, 1988, p. 3; Sandra Harding, “Introduction: Stand-
point Theory as a Site of Political, Philosophic, and Scientific
Chapter 32: Standpoint Theory Debate,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, Sandra
1 Sandra Harding, “Comment on Hekman’s ‘Truth and Method: Harding (ed.), Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 4.
Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited’: Whose Standpoint 30 Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? pp. 159, 58.
Needs the Regimes of Truth and Reality?” Signs: Journal of 31 Ibid., p. 59.
Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 22, 1997, p. 384. 32 Wood, Communication Theories in Action, 1st ed., p. 257.
2 Julia T. Wood, Communication Theories in Action, 1st ed., 33 Sonia Sotomayor, “Lecture: ‘A Latina Judge’s Voice,’” The New
Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 1997, p. 250. York Times, May 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/
3 Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking us/politics/15judge.text.html, accessed July 7, 2017.
from Women’s Lives, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991, 34 Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? pp. 149–152.
pp. 269–270. 35 Ibid., p. 270.