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Case Study

Polaris Industries Inc.: Global Plant Location

In September 2010 Suresh Krishna, vice president of operations and integration at Polaris Industries Inc., a
manufacturer of all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), Side-by-Sides,1 and snowmobiles, sat in his office in Medina,
Minnesota, deliberating the recommendation he was developing for a new plant to manufacture the
company’s Side-by-Side vehicles. (See Exhibit 1 for pictures of Polaris vehicles.)
EXHIBIT 1 Polaris vehicles.
The economic slowdown in the United States had put considerable pressure on Polaris’s profits, so the
company was considering whether it should follow the lead of several of its competitors and open a facility in
a country with lower labor costs. China and Mexico were shortlisted as possible locations for the new factory,
which would be the first Polaris manufacturing facility located outside the Midwestern United States. By the
end of the year Krishna needed to recommend to CEO Scott Wine and the board of directors whether Polaris
should build a new plant abroad or continue to manufacture in its American facilities.

POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC.

Established in 1954, Polaris was a manufacturer of high-performance motorsport products, including ATVs,
Side-by-Sides, and snowmobiles. (See Exhibit 2 for Polaris sales by product.) With nearly $2 billion in
sales in 2010, it was a strong player in the $10 billion power sports market alongside competitors Yamaha,
Honda, Arctic Cat, Ski-Doo, and Harley Davidson.
EXHIBIT 2 Polaris sales by product.

Polaris’s customers were primarily located in North America (85 percent); its international customers were
concentrated in Europe. Foreign markets were becoming increasingly important to Polaris; international
revenue had grown 21 percent in 2010, and was forecasted to grow even more in 2011. Polaris products were
sold through 1,500 distributors in the United States and 1,000 distributors in the rest of the world.

Polaris’s heritage was deeply rooted in the power sports industry. The company introduced its first
snowmobile in the 1950s and its first ATV in 1985. Between 1985 and 2010 Polaris sold more than two million
ATVs. In 1992 Polaris entered the personal watercraft market, but it lacked a sustainable distribution system
and exited the business in 2004. In 1998 the company introduced the first Side-by-Side off-road vehicle
(ORV), which was expected to surpass ATV sales during 2011. Also in 1998, Polaris entered the parts,
accessories, and apparel segment, which grew significantly over the next decade. Finally, Polaris also
introduced its first on-road vehicle in 1998—a motorcycle with the brand name “Victory”—to compete with
Harley Davidson. Combined, these products were forecasted to bring in $2.2 billion revenue in 2011. Polaris’s
total revenue grew more than 20 percent in 2010 and was expected to grow 8 to 11 percent in 2011.
Polaris was the dominant player in the ORV market based on market share. In 2010 ORVs Page 450
accounted for 69 percent of Polaris’s sales, with Side-by-Sides comprising the majority of sales in
this segment. Looking ahead, the company was excited by the potential growth in emerging markets. From
Latin America to Asia, Polaris had begun to invest heavily in marketing to increase awareness of its brand. For
example, in China the company placed off-road image advertising in racing and extreme sports enthusiast
publications. Similarly, in Latin America Polaris was leveraging its brand in the utility vehicle space to
penetrate the substantial agricultural industries.

MANUFACTURING
In 2010 all of Polaris’s manufacturing operations were located in the northern Midwest. In addition to its
corporate headquarters in Medina, Minnesota, and product development and innovation center in Wyoming,
Minnesota, Polaris operated three manufacturing facilities in Roseau, Minnesota; Osceola, Wisconsin; and
Spirit Lake, Iowa. Roseau, the birthplace of the Polaris snowmobile, housed research, development, and
manufacturing for the snowmobile, ATV, and Side-by-Side divisions. Roseau also included a small state-of-
the-art injection molding plant that produced plastic parts for the Roseau and Spirit Lake factories. As
demand grew for ATVs and on-road vehicles, Polaris established an additional manufacturing facility in 1994
at Spirit Lake. This facility produced select ATV, watercraft, and Victory motorcycle models. Osceola was
primarily an engine and components supplier for the other two facilities.

All other components were sourced through more than 450 global suppliers. In 2010 Polaris sourced almost
40 percent of its components and materials from outside the United States, up from 30 percent in 2008. The
company was also increasing low-cost country (LCC) sourcing, almost doubling its LCC spend to
approximately 24 percent in 2010.

To support its production capabilities in and around the northern United States, Polaris had three warehouse
facilities in Minnesota for raw materials, export processing, and distribution. When demand for parts, apparel,
and accessories exceeded the company’s warehouse capacity in 1997, a new distribution center was opened
in Vermillion, South Dakota. In addition to its U.S. locations, Polaris also owned and operated regional sales
and distribution centers in Winnipeg, Canada, and in Northern Europe and Australia.

REDESIGNING THE SUPPLY CHAIN

Krishna had to consider the tradeoff between manufacturing and transportation costs when redesigning the
supply chain for Side-by-Side products. On one hand, manufacturing in markets with low labor costs could
result in significant savings. Although labor rates in traditional LCCs such as China were rising, U.S.-based
labor was still more costly. On the other hand, with oil prices rising steadily, Krishna knew transportation costs
would be far lower if he kept production close to customers.

Senior management at Polaris was also concerned about a manufacturing talent gap in the United States.
Over the past twenty years, decreased funding for community colleges and trade schools had resulted in
technical workers becoming increasingly difficult to find. Moreover, young trade school graduates were less
interested in moving to the locations where Polaris operated, which were small towns with only one large
employer. By comparison, well-trained technical talent was relatively easy to find in many South American
and Asian countries.

Lastly, Polaris expected much of its future sales growth would come from overseas markets, particularly
emerging markets. There were multiple ways to enter these markets, including acquisitions and joint
ventures, but building a facility in an emerging market could potentially help Polaris capture future demand.

CHOOSING A MANUFACTURING LOCATION

Krishna and his team considered several options for optimizing the manufacture of Side-by-Sides and the
design of the supply chain. They concluded that the best options were either to continue production in
existing American factories or to build a new plant in China or Mexico.
Beyond the specific pluses and minuses of each location, Krishna needed to consider the following Page 451
in making a final decision:

• The majority of demand for Side-by-Sides was in the southern United States. The states with the highest
share of sales volume in 2010 were Texas and California.
• Side-by-Sides were high volume-to-weight/low value-to-weight products, which meant that shipping costs
accounted for a large fraction of their retail price.
• Polaris’s senior management placed a high value on ease of communication with its manufacturing plants
and believed that in-person interaction among managers, design engineers, and production staff was a
key driver of the company’s long-term product innovation.
• If Polaris moved production of Side-by-Sides abroad, the company planned to lay off sixty workers at its
Roseau plant. Each worker would be paid a one-time severance of $20,000.
• Given the weak economic environment, Polaris assumed that demand for Side-by-Sides would remain flat
for the next five years.

Data on labor costs, production costs, transportation costs, capital expenditures, and exchange rates for each
location are included in Exhibit 3 through Exhibit 6 .

EXHIBIT 3 Labor assumptions.

Monthly Wages Annual Wage Growth (%)

China (CNY) Mexico (MXN) China (CNY) Mexico (MXN)
1999 649.5 2,392.0
2000 729.2 2,910.5 12 22
2001 814.5 3,367.6 12 16
2002 916.8 3,537.5 13 5
2003 1,041.3 3,737.7 14 6
2004 1,169.4 3,858.8 12 3
2005 1,313.1 3,983.8 12 3
2006 1,497.2 4,112.9 14 3
2007 1,740.3 4,246.2 16 3
2008 2,016.0 4,383.7 16 3
United States
Hourly wage $26/hour
Working months/year 12
EXHIBIT 4 Operating metrics by plant location.

Cost per unit

Production cost
U.S. 400 USD
Mexico 4,560 MXN
China 1,950 CNY
Capital expenditures, equipment moving costs, and
startup costs (thousands of US$)
U.S. —
Mexico 9,500
China 10,000
Other
Annual demand for Side-by-Sides 14,500 units
Tariff for China import 5%
Transportation cost (US$)
Shipping cost from China
Cost per unit 190
Side-by-Side units per container 26
Ground transportation cost (US$)
Cost per mile 2.30
Side-by-Side units per truck 26
Miles to Distribution Center
From
From Roseau Monterrey
Tacoma, WA 1,636 2,261
Los Angeles, CA 2,161 1,505
Irving, TX 1,267 437

EXHIBIT 5 Demand assumptions.

Annual Demand
Distribution Center Location (units)
Tacoma, WA 3,650
Los Angeles, CA 7,050
Irving, TX 3,800
EXHIBIT 6 Exchange rate history.

Year CNY/USD MXN/USD

2000 8.28 9.34
2001 8.28 9.66
2002 8.28 10.80
2003 8.28 11.29
2004 9.19 10.90
2005 7.97 10.90
2006 7.61 10.93
2007 6.95 11.16
2008 6.83 13.50
2009 6.77 12.63
2010 6.65 12.40

CNY = Chinese yuan

MXN = Mexican peso
USD = U.S. dollar

China
Polaris’s senior executives were excited about the low costs in China, but labor costs had been rising in the
manufacturing-heavy eastern region; over time the company would likely have to look further inland to find
low-cost labor, which would further increase the length and variability of product transportation. Polaris also
had concerns about its ability to successfully collaborate with a Chinese factory due to time-zone differences
and cultural dissimilarities.

Operating a factory in China would require Polaris to hire sixty new employees on location. It also would
result in a one-time charge of $10 million for capital expenditures, equipment moving costs, and startup costs.
Polaris would have to pay a 5 percent tariff on all production and transportation costs when importing
products into the United States.

Side-by-Sides made in China would be transported to the United States on container vessels, with each
container holding twenty-six vehicles. The cost to ship one vehicle to the United States from China was $190
per unit, or $4,940 per container. Although shipping companies claimed the containers would reach the
United States in about twenty days, in practice shipping time was highly variable, with a range of nineteen to
thirty-three days.

Mexico
Polaris’s senior management saw several qualitative advantages to operating a foreign manufacturing facility
in Monterrey, Mexico. (See Exhibit 7 for map.) Monterrey was relatively close to the United States, which
would allow for easier in-person collaboration between the manufacturing facility and Polaris’s staff. In
addition to geographical proximity, managers believed cultural familiarity would make collaborating with a
Mexican workforce easy. Lastly, although Polaris believed that long-term sales growth would come from
emerging markets in Asia, it also believed that near-term growth would occur in the United
States—particularly in the southern United States, an area close to Monterrey.
EXHIBIT 7 Map of Polaris locations in 2010.

A factory in Mexico would require hiring sixty new employees, the same as in China. Side-by-Sides Page 452
would be shipped to the United States by truck in batches of 26 units at an average cost of $2.30
per mile per batch. Although trucking companies claimed they could cross the U.S. border and deliver the
products in two days, in practice it took between two and seven days.

Capital expenditures, equipment moving costs, and startup costs for a Mexican factory would total
$9.5 million. Under the provisions of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Polaris would pay no
tariffs on imports from Mexico into the United States.

United States
A third option for Polaris’s senior management was to maintain the status quo for production of Side-by-Sides
without incurring additional costs. Polaris had traditionally been associated with a strong “Made in Page 453
America” culture, and management believed that the company’s employees and customers were
proud that all Polaris products were manufactured in the United States. In addition, the proximity to
headquarters and product development facilities enabled managers to collaborate quickly and easily with
design engineers and technical staff in the manufacturing plants.

RECOMMENDING A SOLUTION
As Krishna reviewed the data for each option, he knew he needed to consider qualitative as well as
quantitative factors to find the best solution for Polaris. Should he recommend keeping production in the
United States, or should he recommend siting a new plant in either Mexico or China?

Discussion Questions

1. Which location provides Polaris the greatest cost advantage? Calculate the NPV of the three locations
using a 10% discount rate.
2. Would your recommendation change if the foreign exchange rate increased or decreased by 15%?
3. What other factors should be considered in making this decision?
4. Calculate a weighted scoring model. Decide on qualitative factors that you think are important in this
decision, e.g. location near R&D, quality, loss of intellectual property, and currency risk. Then how much
weight you would attach to factors such as NPV and each of the other factors to total 100%. Then assign a
score (1 to 10) to each factor for each of the three locations. Calculate a total weighted score by
multiplying the weight times the factor score and adding over all factors for each location.
5. Which of the three locations do you recommend and why?

©2012 by the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University. This case was prepared by Ioana Andreas ’12, Sigmund Gee ’12, Ivi Kolasi ’12,
Stephane Lhoste ’12, and Benjamin Neuwirth ’12 under the supervision of Professor Sunil Chopra. Cases are developed solely as the basis for class
discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. No part of this
publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Kellogg School of Management. Reprinted with permission.