Judicial Ethics Cases (March 12, 2024)

CASE: Bar Matter 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing reforms In the bar
Examinations Through Amendments to rule 138 of the rules of court, 9 March 2010

Bar Matter No. 1153

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010

"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through
Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).

- The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:

SEC. 5 Additional Requirement for Other Applicants — All applicants for admission other than those referred
to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they
have completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in
a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the
foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar
examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university duly
recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private
international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing:

● (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree;
● (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
● (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school
duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6 Pre-Law — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by the
proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion
of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a foreign
law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course. The Clerk of
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law
schools in the country."
CASE: In re: Bar examinee Haron S. Meling and for disciplinary action as a member of the Philippine
Shari’s Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendez, B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004

Facts: June 8, 2004 In the matter of disqualification of bar examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 BAR
Examinations and for disciplinary actions as a member of the Philippine Shari’a BAR, Atty. Froilan R.
Melendrez, petitioner.

Whether Meling’s act of concealing his criminal cases upon filing for a petition to take the BAR would bar his
good moral character

Petitioner, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, filed to the Office of the Bar Confidant a petition to disqualify Haron Meling
to take 2002 Bar examination and impose a disciplinary penalty as a member of Philippine Shari’a Bar. On the
ground that Meling concealed his 3 Pending Criminal Cases and during one instance the respondent allegedly
uttered derogatory words against to the petitioner. In addition, Meling allegedly used the phrase “ attorney” in his
communication.

However, his defense on the non-disclosure of the 3 pending criminal cases that filed against him by the
petitioner is hereby closed and terminated due to the reason that it is already settled upon the opinion of the
retired judge and their former professor. In this regard, the court ordered that if Meling Passed the Bar he
was not entitled thereto to take oath and sign the rolls of Attorney

Kaso wala sya kapasa kaya naging moot and academic (We fully concur with the findings and
recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the
Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys,
moot and academic.)

Issue:

WON, Meling’s concealment of his 3 pending criminal cases upon filing to the BAR, would allow him to ascertain
his good moral character

Held:

The court held that Meling is charged with non-disclosure by the reason of the concealment of the three pending
cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations. Because only a competent court on his
discretionary power to render judgment of whether or not a certain case was dismissed or suspended, not the
retired judge nor a law professor. Given that the case is still pending it is a requirement to disclose the same for
the court to ascertain of his good moral character. The pending cases is not the merit of the case but, the act of
concealment constitutes dishonesty.

According to the Bar Matter 1209, it is been held that Good Moral Character is not a subject term that constitute
good reputation, but an object term who the person really is. The standard of personal and professional integrity
is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty. The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against
him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a
lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.

In addition for the use of “Attorney” as to his communication Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is,
he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.
As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court.

OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
dismissed by reason of moot and academic. Further Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar is ripe which he
shall suspended until further orders from the Court
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical
injuries uponhim in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February
11, 1993, the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18 1993. The period
of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned
to supervise him. Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he
passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a
petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his
probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last for more than 10 months.

[The court stressed that the practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified…

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far
as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning]

ISSUE:

Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Since the original period of probation granted by the trial court had expired, the Court directed Argosino to submit
evidence demonstrating that he has purged himself of the deficiency in moral character

He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a
different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES: [from the statements of the court]

· The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character, with special
education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

· Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.

· All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar.

· Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must be
a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.

· Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was possessed of good moral character.
· Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the
application for permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

DECISION:

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider
de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may
be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of
the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant
period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence
to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant,

vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

A. C. No. 4680 (august 29, 2000)

SUMMARY:

Lawyers accused of tampering with election votes are found guilty of misconduct and
breach of trust, resulting in a fine and a warning for future offenses. Complaint for disbarment against
lawyers Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon. The allegation that the respondents tampered
with the votes received by complainant Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. in the May 8, 1995 elections.
Respondents were members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers. They are accused of violating their
lawyers' oath and breaching public trust. Complainant alleged that the respondents manipulated the
votes in favor of certain senatorial candidates and reduced his votes. The irregularities included
padding of votes, double recording of returns, and discrepancies in the tabulation of votes.

Persons involved:

LLORENTE (respondent)- City Prosecutor of Pasig City (served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as
provided by law.)

SALAYON (respondent): Election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was

PIMENTEL (complainant)- a Senator (also a candidate for the Senate election)

SENATORIAL CANDIDATES: Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan,
Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon.

FACTS (full case):

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya
P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath in
connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the
May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Complainant, now a senator, was also a
candidate for the Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 2 respondents tampered with the
votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate
of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce
Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo
Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while,
on the other hand, petitioner's votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enrile's votes were in excess
of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice
recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents'
knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public
trust and of their lawyers' oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs
was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the
canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest
mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held

December 4, 1998: the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred
pursuant to Rule 139-B, §13, in relation to §20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit.

March 11, 1999: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on , but his motion was denied in a
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999.

On June 4, 1999: he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(c).

January 8, 1998: COMELEC dismissed complainant's charges for insufficiency of evidence.

August 15, 2000: Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents are guilty of misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the
lawyer's oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of
Canvassers.

RULING:

YES, respondents are guilty of misconduct serious breach of trust, and violation of the
lawyer's oath. The evidence presented by the complainant, as well as the evidence taken judicial
notice of by the court, was more convincing and worthy of belief than that offered by the respondents.
The irregularities in the canvassing of the election returns were not mere mathematical errors but
a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of the
complainant.The respondents certified the Statements of Votes (SoVs) as true and correct despite the
apparent discrepancies and variations in the tabulation of votes. By doing so, the respondents
committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated their
oath of office as lawyers.

In legal proceedings involving members of the bar, establishing liability requires only a clear
preponderance of evidence. It is essential for lawyers to uphold honesty in all aspects of their
professional conduct, whether in private or public matters. Government-employed lawyers bear a
heightened responsibility to uphold the fundamental principle of honesty due to the inherent trust placed
in public office. The court levied a fine of P10,000.00 on each respondent as punishment for their
misconduct, accompanied by a caution that future infractions would be met with more severe
consequences.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

Facts:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.

Ferdinand A. Cruz is a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz,
Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19
governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for
continuation of trial.

On February 13, 2002, petitioner Ferdinand filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone.

The MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ferdinand filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

The RTC, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of the mentioned Criminal Case, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio (an attorney appointed by the
court to defend an indigent defendant, in a criminal action) , there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that
therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

Ferdinand filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. He argues that nowhere does the law provide that
the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997
which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of
a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Ferdinand then directly filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. (Petition for certiorari refers to argue
that a lower court has incorrectly decided an important question of law, and that the mistake should be fixed to
prevent confusion in similar cases.)

Issue:

Whether a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor before an inferior
court without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Ruling:

Yes, a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor before an inferior court
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective
of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer
before inferior courts.

In this case, Ferdinand expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138.
In Sec. 34 of Rule 138, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed. While in Rule 138-A provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.

Therefore, a third-year law student, like Ferdinand A. Cruz can appear as a private prosecutor before an inferior
court without the supervision of a member of the bar as an agent or friend of a party litigant.

Notes:

➔ Sec. 1 of Rule 138-A stated that a law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.
➔ However, in Resolution in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified that the rule in inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer if the issues and procedure
are relatively simple.
➔ The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality"
➔ SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
➔ The term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Ratio:

o Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

o The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of Section 34 of Rule 138, which allows non-lawyers
to appear as agents or friends of a party litigant before inferior courts.

o The Court clarified that Rule 138-A, which governs the appearance of law students before courts, should
not be applied in this case because Cruz's appearance was based on Section 34 of Rule 138.

o The Court also emphasized that the civil aspect of the criminal case is deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless there is a reservation, waiver, or prior institution of the civil aspect.

o Since none of these exceptions apply in this case, Cruz has the right to intervene and prosecute the civil
aspect as a private prosecutor.

Other Issue of Ferdinand:

Ferdinand further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the
crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an
enemy country, and crime against popular representation.

The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Ferdinand is correct in stating that there is no reservation, waiver, nor the prior institution of the civil aspect in a
Criminal Case, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action,
and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

Therefore, the Supreme Court also granted that Ferdinand may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect of the
case.
Atty. Julito Vitriolo, Precillana Honorica et al., v. Atty. Felina Dasig

A.C No. 4984 April 1, 2003

Facts: The administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, a Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) official primarily originating from key CHED figures.

· In August 1998, while Atty. Felina S. Dasig held the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs
Service at CHED, she allegedly demanded P20,000 from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher, to expedite the
processing of her application for a name correction. The amount was later reduced to P5,000.

· Between July and August 1998, during Dasig's tenure as Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service
at CHED, she purportedly demanded P18,000 to P20,000 from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, in
exchange for expediting her name correction application.

· In September 1998, while Dasig held the position of Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service at
CHED, she allegedly demanded P5,000 from Rocella G. Eje, a student, to facilitate her application for
a name correction. Additionally, Dasig suggested to Eje that she should register her birth anew, despite a
prior registration.

· Between August and September 1998, during Dasig's tenure as Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs
Service at CHED, she purportedly demanded a substantial amount, later confirmed to be P15,000,
from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, to expedite her name correction application. Additionally, Dasig
suggested to Ng that she should hire a lawyer chosen by Dasig to facilitate the application.

· Complainants accused Atty. Felina S. Dasig of violating her attorney-at-law oath by filing eleven baseless
suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, all of which were subsequently dismissed. This
alleged action undermines the integrity of Dasig's legal practice.

· Additionally, complainants charged Dasig with violating subparagraph b (22), Section 365 of Presidential
Decree No. 807, due to her intentional failure to settle just debts owed to "Borela Tire Supply" and
"Novas Lining Brake & Clutch." This failure was evidenced by dishonored checks and other related
documents.

· Further allegations were made against Dasig, claiming that she instigated a crime against complainants
Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr. It was purported that Dasig ordered her son, Jonathan
Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and threaten the
Coronacions on a specific evening. This incident led to a complaint for grave threats against Dasig and her
son.

· Lastly, complainants alleged that Dasig authored and sent a libelous report to then President Joseph
Estrada, which defamed the names and reputations of eleven CHED Directors. This report was believed to
be an attempt by Dasig to prevent their re-appointment and potentially secure an appointment for herself.

After several attempts to notify Atty. Felina S. Dasig of the charges against her, including sending notifications
to her registered address and office address, which were either unclaimed or received by her authorized agent,
the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation. Despite multiple opportunities, Dasig
failed to submit a response to the charges. Based on the evidence on record, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline concluded that Dasig unlawfully demanded money from individuals with pending applications before
her office at the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). Consequently, the IBP recommended a three-year
suspension from the practice of law. This recommendation was endorsed by the IBP Board of Governors, citing
Dasig's misuse of her public office for personal gain to the detriment of CHED's reputation. As a result, Atty.
Felina S. Dasig was suspended from practicing law for three years.

Major issue: whether Atty. Felina S. Dasig, as an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services at the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED), can be disciplined for misconduct while holding a government position

Ruling: Yes. Firstly, the court scrutinized whether Dasig's actions as a government official could be subject to
disciplinary measures under the purview of legal professional standards. While it's acknowledged that lawyers
in public office may face different challenges compared to those in private practice, they are still bound by the
same ethical obligations as prescribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court emphasized that
the legal profession's integrity should not be compromised regardless of the practitioner's professional setting.

Secondly, Dasig's alleged misconduct, particularly the solicitation of financial payments in exchange for favorable
treatment of pending applications, was evaluated against the standards set forth by the legal profession. The
court took notice on the gravity of Dasig's actions, which not only violated ethical principles but also undermined
the integrity of CHED's processes. By abusing her position for personal gain, Dasig breached the trust placed in
her as a legal professional and public servant.

Furthermore, the importance of upholding the Attorneys Oath, which mandates lawyers to delay no one for
money or malice must be upheld. Dasig's demands for financial consideration in processing applications ran
counter to this fundamental duty and violated the trust bestowed upon her as a member of the legal community.

The decision to disbar Dasig was not taken lightly but was deemed necessary to uphold the standards of the
legal profession and safeguard the public's trust in the justice system. Disbarment serves not only as a punitive
measure against Dasig's misconduct but also as a deterrent to other legal practitioners who may be tempted to
abuse their positions for personal gain.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in
violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.