IM1030

04.12.2019

HEMA: NEW RETAIL COMES TO GROCERY

Researcher Wenshuo Cui Online grocery shopping was the fastest growing e-commerce sector in
prepared this case under the many countries. In 2017, the annual growth of global e-commerce
supervision of Professor Ralf grocery shopping reached 30%, with 52% growth in China, 41% in
W. Seifert as a basis for class South Korea, 8% in the UK and 7% in France.1
discussion rather than to
illustrate either effective or However, online grocery was the least penetrated e-commerce sector.
ineffective handling of a In 2018, the largest digital grocery sales were in South Korea, Japan and
business situation. the UK with 8.3%, 7.1% and 6% of total digital sales, respectively.2 Part
of the reason for this low penetration rate was the unique challenge of
perishability and timeliness in online grocery sales, which caused a
considerable amount of complexity and pressure in the supply chain.
For example, products had to be chilled at different temperatures, and
they were often not very stackable. Moreover, meeting customers’
requirements for fast delivery at low prices further diminished the
already razor-thin margin, which meant it was difficult to achieve
profitability in the online grocery business. 3 Despite this, many
considered it the next frontier of e-commerce.4

There were two basic distribution models for online groceries: In the
centralized distribution model, online orders were fulfilled from
dedicated distribution centers; in the store fulfillment model, existing
stores served as localized miniature fulfillment centers for picking and
shipping online orders. The fundamental challenge in both approaches
was to keep the logistics costs of online orders sufficiently low as to
both entice consumers to shop online and maintain profitability.

As a result of compromises that had to be made with both models,

mergers and acquisitions were common – retailers hoped to make up for
the shortcomings in their distribution strategies. For example, Marks &
Spencer acquired a 50% stake in Ocado to expand its online food
delivery capabilities,5 and Amazon paid a hefty price for Whole Foods
in order to build its physical presence.6

Against this backdrop, Alibaba, China’s biggest online company and

one of the world’s largest retailers, 7 set up Hema Xiansheng
supermarket in 2015 in an attempt to integrate offline and online in what
Alibaba described as “New Retail.” Four years on, Hema’s “hybrid”
distribution strategy seemed to be working. The company had 171
stores in 22 cities and 20 million annual active users. Its revenues had
increased by 300%, with 61% online sales, up from 51% in 2018.8 But
was this model sustainable?
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Challenges in Fulfilling Online Grocery Sales

Despite all the attempts to revolutionize online grocery, the two basic distribution models
remained almost unmodified: the centralized distribution model for exclusively online grocers
such as UK online grocer Ocado, and the store fulfillment model for traditional grocery
conglomerates like UK brick-and-mortar grocer Tesco (refer to Exhibit 1).

In the centralized distribution, or hub-and-spoke model, online orders were fulfilled from
dedicated distribution centers. In the store fulfillment model, the existing store footprint served
as localized miniature fulfillment centers for picking and shipping online orders.

In both approaches, the fundamental challenge was to keep the logistics costs of online orders
sufficiently low as to both entice consumers to shop online and maintain profitability. Most
grocers were barely profitable, so it would be even more challenging to deliver groceries to
customers cheaply and quickly, 9 while managing the constraints of product fragility and
temperature. With thin margins, the grocery business model relied on volume and economies
of scale.10 With online grocery orders, however, each order had to be fulfilled individually.
This meant that each delivery translated into additional cost for retailers, and economies of
scale could hardly be exploited.11

To attain some degree of economy of scale, speed of delivery was often sacrificed in both
distribution models. Most retailers delivered according to reserved time slots, which pooled
orders together to better utilize the refrigerated delivery van. In addition to longer waiting time
and less flexible delivery, order pooling also affected product freshness. Overall, this triggered
a vicious cycle, especially with the centralized distribution model: Order pooling decreased
customer satisfaction and the number of orders, which in turn resulted in higher delivery cost
due to the lower density of orders.

Core Challenges of the Centralized Distribution Model

Centralized distribution was more efficient in terms of order picking, achieved by using highly
automated warehouses. For example, Ocado’s warehouse in Andover aimed to process 3.5
million items per week. 12 Furthermore, the elimination of physical store removed the
intermediate step between customers and retailers, which meant lower costs and fresher
products. Coupled with economies of scale from large order pooling, centralized distribution
could potentially achieve great cost savings, as demonstrated by Ocado’s positive profit
margin in 2013 and 2016.13

However, the cost savings came with the compromise of longer delivery routes, which resulted
in less flexible and slower delivery for customers. Furthermore, automation equipment in the
warehouse required large capital investment and represented significant supply chain risk. For
example, Ocado’s Andover warehouse was badly damaged by a fire in 2019, affecting more
than 10% of Ocado’s total volume and resulting in 400 job cuts.14

In addition, the lack of a physical presence meant this model was also inherently harder for
consumers to adopt, since most consumers still preferred to physically see and choose their
groceries. 15 16 17 This barrier of trust presented an enormous challenge in acquiring and
building a viable base of repeat customers, which eroded the costs saved by efficient
warehouses. The low order density resulted in longer delivery distance and hence higher
transportation costs.
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Core Challenges of the Store Fulfillment Model

The store fulfillment model was superior in terms of customer experience. It had the
advantages of faster and more flexible delivery by utilizing the existing expansive and deep
footprint of store networks. Moreover, compared with centralized distribution, this model, with
its physical presence, had the intrinsic ability to foster trust and acquire customers, since
customers had more confidence in a brand when they could see the products for themselves.
With the stores serving as gateways, there was potential for in-store customers to be converted
to online in the long run with high quality of service. Furthermore, using existing stores for
online delivery allowed retailers to amortize the fixed costs of operating brick-and-mortar
stores. This could also mean a more flexible network because the need for capital investment
for expansion was lower.

However, one important downside of the store fulfillment model was the manual order
preparation process – not only was it inefficient but it also had a physical upper limit due to
the inevitable interference with regular customers and limited available shelf space.
Furthermore, products were generally arranged to maximize the experience and basket of
physical shoppers, but this was not optimized for manual order picking. It was also notoriously
difficult to ascertain accurate store inventories and on-shelf availability (OSA), creating a high
risk of promoting products online that were not actually available in-store.

Overview of Alibaba and Hema

Alibaba was China’s biggest online company and one of the largest retailers in the world.18 Its
vision was slightly different from that of its American counterpart Amazon. Alibaba’s mission
was “to make it easy to do business anywhere.” Until recently, Alibaba had mainly focused on
building platforms that linked consumers with sellers, especially small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).19

Alibaba’s New Retail and Hema

In 2016 Alibaba introduced its New Retail strategy, which was essentially the holistic
integration of online and offline retail, driven by digital technologies such as data analytics
and artificial intelligence. As Jack Ma, Alibaba’s founder, noted:

“The era of e-commerce will end soon. In the next decade or so, there will be no such thing as
e-commerce; there will only be New Retail.”20

As a result, Alibaba started engaging in a series of efforts to acquire offline retailers, including
China’s largest electronics retailer Suning (which owned 80% of Carrefour China), 21
hypermarket chain RT-Mart22 and small operator Intime Group.23 With more than $10 billion
invested in offline retail since 2016, 24 Alibaba had a dominant position in China’s retail
landscape, directly or indirectly owning multiple entities that spanned every product sector.

Apart from the offline retailers Alibaba owned, Hema was created as a completely new entity
to be the pioneer of New Retail. In other words, Hema was created as the testing ground for
aggressively innovative concepts. Hema was the very first attempt at Alibaba’s strategic plan
for digital transformation of offline retail (refer to Exhibit 2).
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Overview of Hema Xiansheng

Hema Xiansheng (official English name: Freshippo) was established in late 2015 as Alibaba’s
flagship investment in its New Retail strategy. Hema Xiansheng, phonetically translated to
“Mr Hippo,” but the literal translation was “packaged fresh and raw.” This revealed Hema’s
primary focus: fresh food products, especially fresh meat and seafood. Currently, these product
categories were mostly bought through wet markets in China (73%), with only 22% bought
through supermarkets and 3% through e-commerce channels.25 This was because Chinese
consumers preferred the practice of price bargaining and deemed products from wet markets
to be “straight from the farm” fresh.26 Furthermore, another reason for choosing fast-moving
consumer goods (FMCG) as the first New Retail project was the “consumption upgrade” in
China, whereby consumption of premium products skyrocketed with rising disposable
income.27

The first Hema store opened in January 2016, with minimal marketing and almost zero media
presence. According to Hema’s general manager, the company’s initial expansion was
extremely careful, even “stealthy.”28 This was because Hema was the “pathfinder of New
Retail”; in other words, there was a lot of trial and error of the overall concept. Several years
on, many people still questioned Hema’s model.29 Nonetheless, Hema gained traction quickly
due to its visibly innovative concepts. According to China Chain Store & Franchise
Association, Hema ranked 18th in the 2018 ranking of FMCG (Supermarket/Convenience
Store) in China (refer to Exhibit 3). In terms of annual revenue growth, Hema topped the list
with 300% growth, far ahead of brands such as Walmart (0.3%) or Metro (4.9%).30 Notably,
Alibaba also owned a major stake in RT-Mart, a hypermarket chain with the second largest
revenue in China.

The Alibaba Investor Day presentation 2019 highlighted a few key figures:31

 171 Hema stores covering 22 cities in China

 20 million annual active users, 60% annual user retention rate and RMB 3,000 average
annual spending per top consumer (consumers who contributed around 80% of Hema’s
revenue)

 61% online sales, up from 51% in 2018

 13% same store sales growth compared with 2018

 30% decrease in operating cost compared with 2018

 483 direct procurement agricultural product sources, with 329 contract sources and 154
licensed sources

 33 room temperature and multi-function warehouses, 11 central kitchens and processing

centers and 4 seafood temporary feeding facilities (refer to Exhibit 4)

 Approximately 3,000 to 6,000 SKUs (stock-keeping units) per store.

Hema’s Strategy
As a pioneer in reforming online grocery retail, Hema targeted the affluent population in China.
Hema described its typical consumer profile as women aged 25 to 42 with annual household
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income of RMB 270,000 (~US$38,000).32 More detailed customer portraits included young
adventurers, affluent middle class and exquisite “SoHoer” (refer to Exhibit 5).

Moreover, Hema placed great emphasis on high-frequency purchases, namely fresh food
products, as the entry point into cultivating the habit of grocery shopping online. This was
because Chinese consumers were especially sensitive to the quality of fresh products, which
would induce a halo effect that could improve the overall perception of Hema and result in
more customer traffic.33

Hema’s Offline-to-Online Conversion: Get Customers through the Door

One fundamental challenge for purely online grocery platforms was cultivating the habit of
shopping for groceries online and building a viable base of repeat customers. Similar to
traditional grocers like Tesco, Hema’s physical stores primarily aimed to attract customers into
the store to cultivate trust, possibly converting them to online sales in the long run (refer to
Exhibit 6). However, Hema went one step further by capitalizing on viral marketing.

Each Hema store featured a large

space for live seafood, especially
eye-catching products such as
Alaskan King Crab. Seafood
consumption was proliferating as a
result of rising income in China: the
affluent population incorporated
more premium seafood into their
staple diet, and the less wealthy
coveted seafood on special
occasions, such as Chinese New
Year. 34 Consequently, a massive
amount of viral content on social
media sites such as TikTok and
WeChat was created by early visitors
Widely publicized picture of Jack Ma’s first public
to Hema, and most of the content was
appearance in Hema holding a red king crab.
about the striking seafood products.
Source: see references.
Furthermore, for a small processing
fee (~US$3) Hema offered a cooking service in the restaurant area for products bought in-store
(especially for seafood products, as seen in the integrated restaurant-seafood area in Figure 1).
Some stores even had robot-enabled restaurant areas, where robots delivered the dishes instead
of waiters. This allowed customers to personally pick live seafood that could be cooked and
consumed immediately, which gave consumers the opportunity to sample the products.
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Figure 1: Schematic layout of

Hema's Yizhuang branch in
Beijing with an area of
9,000m2 (not to scale)

Source: Created by author

This viral phenomenon even made Hema shops into tourist attractions that spun off social
media figures and travel blogs, which shared content like “Travel Tips for Hema,” “What to
Eat in Hema with RMB 100” and “Cost Saving Tips for Hema,” especially for travelers whose
home city did not yet have Hema.

The ideal scenario for Hema was for a customer to be lured into the store by the fancy displays
of live seafood and eccentric robots running around the restaurant delivering food. The
customer then picked out a few products, especially those that they were concerned about
buying online, and had them prepared at the restaurant. They tried out the food, felt satisfied
with the quality, and ordered more either right away or when they got home.

Hema’s offline-to-online conversion strategy was rather successful, with more than double the
number of online transactions as offline by July 2018 (refer to Exhibit 7). Hema stores
therefore functioned as more than just supermarkets; they served as gateways to actively
engage and attract customers and potentially build a viable long-term base of online grocery
shoppers.

Hema’s Distribution: The Relentless Pursuit of Speed

The CEO of Hema once stated that if Hema was to keep only one competitive advantage, it
would be its 30-minute delivery time.35 Although the fast delivery service attracted customers,
it also saved costs during last-mile delivery by eliminating the need for refrigerated vans. The
rapid delivery speed meant that fresh products could be kept sufficiently chilled using only
insulated boxes and ice bags, which could be recycled for subsequent deliveries.

However, the offer of free 30-minute delivery with no minimum order had two restrictions. It
applied only for areas within a 3-km radius of the nearest Hema store, and only for fresh
products; other items such as cosmetics were delivered the following day. Nonetheless,
Hema’s distribution was still eye-opening, especially with the introduction of night delivery
of health and medicine products with the same 30-minute delivery time (only in Beijing and
Shanghai to date).36
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To achieve its promise of delivery within 30

minutes, Hema targeted order preparation
time of under 10 minutes, which left 20
minutes to deliver the order.37 At the heart of
this fast speed was Hema’s automatic
conveyor system running along the ceiling of
every store. Once an online order was placed,
the computer would find the optimal routes
for collecting goods from different product
categories (such as meat, vegetables and
dried food). This would trigger bags of
different colors to be transported by the
conveyor to the respective areas of the store.

Order-picking staff with a portable terminal

displaying the corresponding order
information would be waiting when a bag
reached the docking station. They would take
the bag, find the product and scan it with a
portable reader. The completed bag would
then be loaded onto the dock and transported
Hema’s overhead conveyor system to the warehouse to be combined with other
Source: see references. bags forming the final package for delivery.
The target order preparation time was 3
minutes; order combining took another 3
minutes. An error in any of the steps would
trigger an alarm that prompted staff to
intervene.

By integrating overhead conveyor systems

into the physical stores, Hema essentially
married the store fulfillment and centralized
distribution models by making the stores
double as distribution centers. A few key
Hema’s conveyor docking system benefits of this system were:
Source: see references

 Utilization of overhead space to minimize interference with in-store customers

 Automatic and optimized allocation of tasks for the most efficient process flow
 Only using manual labor at the last step of picking to reduce human error
 Concurrent order preparations distributed to staff in different areas of the store
 Order picking staff were specialized in one product area, ensuring fast retrieval of
products.

Hema’s Integrated Information System: Data-Driven Cost Saving

As an internet company, Hema was designed around data acquisition and data analytics. It
initially obliged customers to pay using the Hema app by only providing self-check-out counters
that integrated Alipay as the sole payment method. But this sparked intense controversy because
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it is illegal to reject cash in China. Hema gave in to the pressure and created cash counters,38 but
in many stores, they are under the guise of “customer service counters.”

Hema’s intention is clear: Requiring customers to check out using the Hema app translated
into an enormous amount of data, which was used in a number of ways:

 Highly personalized product recommendations and marketing: Drawing on

Alibaba’s massive e-commerce platform experience, the Hema app personalized
recommendations in a similar way to Amazon.
 Adjustment of available products: Hema collected data from “search without results”
and used it to introduce or de-list products.
 Inventory and shelf space optimization of individual stores: Together with Hema’s
digital price tags, the shelf space and inventory were flexible and hence dynamically
optimized with the consumer data of each store.

The backbone for handling such massive amounts of data was Hema’s information system,
which integrated systems for warehouse management, delivery dispatch, enterprise resource
planning, accounting and point-of-sale, as well as Alipay and the Hema app. According to
Hema, this system was highly complex and took nine months to develop.39 It also connected
to Alibaba’s other e-commerce platforms such as Tmall and Taobao for data sharing and even
further data analysis to optimize the entire supply chain.

Hema’s Supply Chain Model for Fresh Product: Foster Trust and a “Habit for Hema”

Hema’s sourcing strategy

Hema had three procurement sources (refer to Exhibit 8):

 Global supply: Mainly for seafood products, transported by air freight within 72 hours,
and also for live seafood for temporary storage in tanks in the processing center.
 National supply: Mainly for less perishable products such as fruits and frozen meat,
transported by a combination of air freight and truck.
 Local supply: Mainly for highly perishable products such as vegetables, meat and dairy,
harvested/slaughtered early in the morning and delivered directly to the Hema store
before noon by truck. Hema largely entrusted suppliers with comprehensive quality
assurance; the company performed random quality checks at stores before shelfing.

The foundation of successful customer acquisition and conversion lay in the quality of Hema’s
fresh products, which it obtained via a direct sourcing strategy with no intermediaries, enabling
it to guarantee fresh products at low prices. According to Hema’s CEO:

“Conventional seafood retailers require a gross margin of a least 50% to be profitable because
of the large spoilage along the long supply chain. By direct sourcing, we only need a gross margin
of 20%. Furthermore, with the increase in demand as a result of the price drop, the turnover rate
increases which helps us to maintain the freshness of our seafood products.”40

One of Hema’s most disruptive measures in its sourcing strategy was that it promised zero
slotting fees for all suppliers forever, which was instrumental in building strong relationships


A fee that retailers often charge produce companies or manufacturers to stock their products.
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with its suppliers. Traditionally, there was an imbalance in the power relationship between
retailers and suppliers in China, where retailers possessed absolute dominance of power
(especially in the past), with high slotting fees on-contract and highly unregulated off-contract
fees.41

Alongside zero slotting fees, Hema forged robust partnerships with many Provincial
Departments of Agriculture 42 43 44 − government entities responsible for the overall
agriculture sector − who had the incentive to increase farmers’ benefits. These government
bodies were therefore willing to work with Hema to boost the sale of local agricultural
products, especially in rural regions with a low level of economic development.

By emphasizing product quality and freshness from the source, Hema echoed the “halo effect”
of fresh products to improve the overall perception of Hema. It hoped to drive customer loyalty
and foster a long-term habit of shopping for fresh products online at Hema.

Hema’s private-label products and full traceability program

Private-label products were traditionally used by retailers to increase profit margin and
bargaining power with suppliers. In the UK, for example, Aldi and Lidl had seen rampant
expansion with the strategy of lean selection of private-label products. According to a study
by Nielsen, however, some retailers were moving private-label products toward premium fresh
products, which drove significant growth.45 Compared with the mature European market with
a private-label rate of up to 45%, the average proportion of private-label products in China
was only about 3% to 5%.46 In 2019, more than 10% of Hema’s total volume derived from
private labels,47 and the company announced its goal to increase the proportion to more than
50% by 2021.48

Apart from driving prices down, Hema was investing heavily in private labels to differentiate
itself by providing fresher and more traceable products. In 2018, Hema announced its Full
Traceability Program, which allowed customers to trace the source of fresh products to the
exact minute.49 Some of the available information included time of harvest/butchery/milking,
temperature of the fridge during transportation, supplier’s certification and more (refer to
Exhibit 9). Hema’s private-label brand, Daily Fresh, was the first under this program and
featured different color packaging for each day of the week; these products never stayed on
the shelf beyond one day. In this way, Hema further fostered trust, especially for consumers
who were health conscious and willing to pay a premium.

However, despite Hema’s claim of “more than 1,700 fully traceable products,” closer inspection
of the Hema platform revealed that the Full Traceability Program only covered Hema’s Daily
Fresh products and it was only available in Shanghai. Furthermore, there had been no further
reports on Hema’s traceability program since it was officially announced, and there was a large
amount of incoherent tracing information found on the products under this program.

Discussion Questions
How is Hema’s model different from other online grocery models?

How can Hema turn one-time occasional offline customers into loyal, repeat,
predominantly online clients?

How well will Hema’s current model scale if online growth continues (Exhibit 7)?
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Exhibit 1
Summary of Basic Online Grocery Distribution Models

Typical Online Grocery Distribution Model

Source: Authors

Summary Analysis of Ocado’s and Tesco’s Distribution Models

Pros Cons
Centralized distribution Less handling Capital intensive
model
Less damage Slower delivery
No store cost Geographical limitations
Better inventory accuracy Less flexible
Fresher products Longer routes and higher
delivery costs
Store fulfillment model Faster delivery Double handling
Better use of store inventory Extra shipment
More flexible delivery times Interference with shoppers
Lower delivery cost Limited by shelf space
Resilience of network More damages
Allows for click-and-collect Less fresh

Source: Authors
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Exhibit 2
Alibaba’s Ventures in New Retail

Source: Hou, Yi. “Hema – The Pathfinder of Alibaba’s New Retail.” Alibaba Group Investor Day 2018 Presentation, September 17 – 18, 2018.
<https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/presentations/Investor_Day_2018_Hema.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2019).
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Exhibit 3
2018 FMCG (Supermarket/Convenience Store) Ranking in China (Selected Brands)

Ranking Brand Revenue Revenue Number Growth rate

(RMB 10,000, growth rate of stores of stores (%)
including tax) (%)

1 CR Vanguard 10,125,379 -2.3% 3,192 0.9%

2 RT-Mart 9,590,000 0.5% 407 6.3%

3 Walmart China 8,048,950 0.3% 441 0%

7 Carrefour China 4,746,375 -4.7% 302 -5.9%

10 Watson 2,341,500 10.3% 3,608 10.3%

14 Metro China 2,130,000 4.9% 94 2.2%

18 Hema Xiansheng 1,400,000 300% 149 396.7%

Source: “2018 FMCG (Supermarket/Convenience Store) Ranking in China.” China Chain Store and
Franchise Association, May 9, 2019.
http://en.chinashop.cc/public/uploads/20190912/c4a9fb199631e537ef2ccef92c33864e.pdf (accessed
November 11, 2019).
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Exhibit 4
Locations of Hema’s Procurement Sources and Logistic Network

Source: Hou, Yi. “Hema – The Pathfinder of Alibaba’s New Retail.” Alibaba Group Investor Day
2018 Presentation, September 17 – 18, 2018. <https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/presentations/
Investor_Day_2018_Hema.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2019).
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Exhibit 5
Hema’s Target Customer Portraits

Source: Hou, Yi. “Hema – The Pathfinder of Alibaba’s New Retail.” Alibaba Group Investor Day 2018 Presentation, September 17 – 18, 2018.
<https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/presentations/Investor_Day_2018_Hema.pdf> (accessed November 11, 2019)
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2144
2144

Exhibit 6
Overview of Hema’s Offline-to-Online Conversion Model

Source: Author

Exhibit 7
Hema’s Average Monthly Orders per Store in 2018: Online vs Offline

Source: Hou, Yi. “Hema – The Pathfinder of Alibaba’s New Retail.” Alibaba Group Investor Day
2018 Presentation, September 17 – 18, 2018.
<https://www.alibabagroup.com/en/ir/presentations/Investor_Day_2018_Hema.pdf> (accessed
November 11, 2019).
 - 16 -

Exhibit 8
Hema’s Supply Chain Model for Fresh Products

Source: Created by author based on several sources, including Shuai, Ye. “Uniqueness of Hema’s Supply Chain.” Iyio
https://www.iyiou.com/p/70366.html. (accessed November 17, 2019).
 - 17 - IMD-7-2144

Exhibit 9
Example of Hema’s Full Traceability Interface
(Translation by author in red)

Source: Hema App (accessed September 30, 2019)

 - 18 - IMD-7-2144

References

Picture sources

Jack Ma and red king crab, page 5

Source: Najberg, Adam. “Freshippo Supermarket Offers Shoppers a ‘New Retail’ Experience.” Alizila: News
from Alibaba Group, July 17, 2017. https://www.alizila.com/hema-supermarket-offers-shoppers-new-retail-
experience/ (accessed November 11, 2019).

Overhead Conveyor system, page 7

Source: “2018 Freshippo (Hema) Supermarket B-Roll Handout.” Alizila: News from Alibaba Group, May 2, 2018.
https://www.alizila.com/video/2018-hema-supermarket-b-roll-handout/ (accessed November 11, 2019)

Docking station, page 7

Source: “Freshippo Showcases Technology at NRF 2019.” Alizila: News from Alibaba Group, January 15, 2019.
https://www.alizila.com/video/alibabas-freshippo-showcases-technology-at-nrf-2019/ (accessed November 11,
2019).

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3
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chain/
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5
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6
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11
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