GR No.

160261, November 10, 2003 action [within one year from filing of the first verified impeachment
Francisco vs. HR complaint].

Facts To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate impeachment
On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint proceedings because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says "The House x x
against C.J. Davide, Jr., among others. The House Committee on Justice x shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," this
voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003 for being insufficient in is a misreading and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis
substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not been sent to the by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding.”
House in plenary.
(Impeachment; Judicial Review; One-Year Bar)
The following day and just nearly 5 months since the filing of the first
complaint, a second impeachment complaint was filed by respondents Facts:
house representatives. -On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
against the respondents House of Representatives, et. al., (the House) most "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
of which contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex
unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the Const. which T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was
provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003.
official more than once within a period of one year.”
-The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
The House argues: the one year bar could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the
first impeachment complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which has “the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly -To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
mean "to file" because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment the Constitution.
by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of -Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
the House.4 Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
“initiated”. with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
Issue (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI Jr.
of the Const.?
-This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Ruling Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed Members of the House of Representatives.
that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint.5 The vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of -Pertinent to the impeachment proceedings, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was of the House Impeachment Rules provide:
already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus, under the one “Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. – In
year bar on initiating impeachment proceedings,] no second verified cases where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed
 by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
against an impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee on judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution against discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
the date the House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
said Committee that the verified complaint and/or resolution, as the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. government branch or instrumentality.

In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
or endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
the Secretary General. Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. – Within cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.” one-syear bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.

-Petitioners then went to the SC via petition for Certiorari/Prohibition to The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
stop a purported unconstitutional impeachment. sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable
-Respondents’ contentions: (1) impeachment is a political action which standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident through the power of judicial review.
arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review; (2) the one-year bar prohibiting the initiation of Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
seven Associate Justices had not been “initiated” as the House of as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
Issues: powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
(1) Whether or not questions relative to impeachment are beyond the scope
of judicial review; (2) Yes.
(2) Whether or not the one-year bar prohibiting the initiation of From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae
impeachment proceedings against the same officials applies under the briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt
circumstances; that the term “to initiate” refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
(3) Whether or not the provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint.
House Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that
Ruling: the word “initiate,” appearing in the constitutional provision on
(1) No. impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when
to initiate all cases of a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
impeachment. x x x action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the follow. x x x x
same official more than once within a period of one year” refers to
two objects, “impeachment case” and “impeachment proceeding.” Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
"to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the
legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above- quoted first In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by
provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the one-year period.
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a (3) Yes.
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated: (1)
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a the filing or endorsement before the Secretary- General of the House of
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the (5) of Article XI as they give the term “initiate” a meaning different from
House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an “filing.”
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is
successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not

initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by
the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done.
The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
G.R. No. 143855: September 21, 2010
The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed
REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., the passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release
PROSPERO AMATONG, ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. of certain loans.
GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI AND
FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies
JR. (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY or combinations in restraint of trade.
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE MEDALLA Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and
(SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT Industry Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development
AUTHORITY), GOV. RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission
(CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION), Chairman Lilia Bautista countered that:
Respondents. COMMUNALITY OF RA 8762
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke
ABAD, J.: the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the
disbursement of public funds.
FACTS:
On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000.
It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not
them to do so under four categories. self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of
citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade foreign investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens
business with the same rights as Filipino citizens. certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and
when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of discretion of the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality not prohibit Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners
of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds: into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution ISSUES:
which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of
Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote 1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise challenge the constitutionality of R.A. 8762
against unfair competition and trade policies.
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail
trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of 1. POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to
business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make
economy. such a challenge.

Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers HELD:
and sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a
unemployment. court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing
refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict
will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law. safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus -

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical
either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of
question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and
nontraditional plaintiffs when the public interest so requires or the matter Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain
is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile
of paramount public interest. or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door
selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing
2. POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state activities.
policies in the Constitution are not self-executing.

As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of

the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are
not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give
rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires

the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy
of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply
to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic
policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to
pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing
the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the
Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open
certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of
reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed
such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But
as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened
any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the
implementation of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the
retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and
IBP vs. Zamora In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000 power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
Facts: totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation
in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
Held: visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the
calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial
law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
SANTIAGO VS COMELEC Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. While the void.
Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot ISSUE:
exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2)
implementation. R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment
to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .
FACTS:
Jesus Delfin filed with a petition with Comelec to amend the Constitution HELD:
so as to lift the term limits of elective officials via People's Initiative. NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago and others opposed the petition on the subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
ground that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC
passed. They also argued that RA No. 6735, which was relied upon by Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
Delfin, contained no provision regarding amendments to the Constitution. initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.

ISSUE: RATIO:
Whether or not RA No. 6735 which intended to include the system of Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No.
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is inadequate to cover that 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
system. in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the
RULING: matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
Yes. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. future law.
While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after
implementation. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII. Moreover, RA No. 6735 is Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards
(COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of used in the immediately preceding election.
Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin
asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735
signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have
1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution
to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number.
time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,
No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the
hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, MANILA HOTEL Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, OFFICE OF constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997 being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of
BELLOSILLO, J. the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive
being violative of the Constitution. of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

FACTS:
GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
decided to sell through public bidding issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Two bidders participated: Art 12
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy the shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share. planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, Manila Prince percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share. Perhaps apprehensive that Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, Manila Prince came operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
ISSUE:
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Whether GSIS is mandated to abide the dictates of the Constitution on
Filipinos.
National Economy and Patrimony.

RULING: The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals
bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide and priorities.
that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it
has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of
the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee, respondents are mandated to abide
by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997 country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
FACTS that is unfair.
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the xxx xxx xxx
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization [T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments,
1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this
domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended constitutional policy:
that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO
Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing
footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external
First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky
“effectively controlled by Filipinos.” or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from
ISSUE undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from public utilities.
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized? The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and
“trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional
RULING as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and
Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are
establishing the WTO.] “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby
demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust
participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed,
and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
and privatized. tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. policy of laissez faire.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, xxx xxx xxx
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles
business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor,
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides
out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the
Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in
the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and

overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making
it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism
“by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may
even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national
interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal
reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify
its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our
own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid
exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial
or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a
matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether
the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and
economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in
electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
Article II generally not self-executing; Exception promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved
quality of life for all.
BFAR Employees Union v. COA
GR. No. 169815 Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
August 13, 2008 development.

This case is regarding the disapproval of the Comission on Audit on the 2. The DA Undersecretary has no authority to grant any allowance to the
Food Basket Allowance granted by BFAR to its employees. employees of BFAR. Section 4.5 of Budget Circular No. 16 dated November
28, 1998 states:
Facts:
The BFAR Employees Union Requested to the BFAR Central Office for All agencies are hereby prohibited from granting any food, rice, gift checks,
Food Basket allowance, for the reason that they could hardly sustain to or any other form of incentives/allowances except those authorized via
cope with the basic needs due to to the high cost of living. The BFAR and Administrative Order by the Office of the President.
Department of Agriculture Undersecretary approved the request for
Authority to Grant a Gift Check or the Food Basket Allowance in the total In the instant case, no Administrative Order has been issued by the Office
amount of P1,322,682.00 (P10,000.00 each to the 130 employees of BFAR of the President to exempt BFAR from the express prohibition against the
Region VII). The allowance was released to the employees. grant of any food, rice, gift checks, or any other form of incentive/allowance
to its employees.
On post audit, the Commission on Audit – Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City disallowed the grant of
Food Basket Allowance, ruling that it had no legal basis and violated the
General Appropriations Act of 1999. The BFAR moved for reconsideration
and prayed for the lifting of the disallowance, arguing that the grant would
enhance the welfare and productivity of the employees. COA-LAO denied
the motion. The petitioner appealed to the COA-LAO but denied the
decision, and likewise denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the disallowance is unconstitutional as it is in
conflict with the fundamental principle of the State enshrined
under Sections 9 and 10, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the approval of the DA Undersecretary can
authorize the release of the Food Basket Allowance.

Ruling
1. On the issue of Constitutionality, it was ruled that the social justice
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are merely statements of principles
and policies. To give them effect, legislative enactment is required.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services,
Oposa v. Factoran principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already
GR 101083, 224 SCRA 792 [July 30, 1993] formulated and expressed in legislation. Petition granted.

Facts.
Concerned over the continued deforestation of the country, petitioners, all
minors represented by their parents, instituted a civil complaint as a
taxpayers’ class suit “to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of
Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.”
They pray for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements
(TLA) in the country and to order the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to cease and desist from approving new TLAs.
On motion of then DENR Sec. Factoran, the RTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of a cause of action. Factoran avers that the petitioners raise an
issue political (whether or not logging should be permitted) which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches. Petitioners, claiming to
“represent their generation as well as the generation yet unborn”, allege
their fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated
by the granting of said TLAs.

Issues.
(1) Do petitioners have a cause of action “to prevent the misappropriation
or impairment of Philippine rainforest” and “arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape
of Mother Earth”?
(2) Do the petitioners have a locus standi to file suit?

Held.
(1) Yes. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. xxx Thus, the
right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as
the DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.

(2) Yes. The case is a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and the
petitioners are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for filing of
a valid class suit are present. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. We find enough averments to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights on which reliefs may be granted.
The case cannot be thus said to raise a political question. What is
WILSON P. GAMBOA, Petitioner, -versus- FINANCE SECRETARY
MARGARITO B. TEVES In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered
G.R. No. 176579, EN BANC, June 28, 2011 by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The
111,415 PTIC shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the
CARPIO, J. outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be
owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate
in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine
his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale
controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the of 12 million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares
articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, of PLDT. With the sale, First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT
preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However, increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common
preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates
deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits
matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40
investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders. percent.
In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares
can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of In 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction,
the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC
of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is shares.
invalid.
ISSUE:
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to Whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, refers to the total common shares only and not to the total outstanding
the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to of PLDT, a public utility. (Yes)
vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such
preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or RULING:
management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987
election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
of directors. authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
FACTS: associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least
In 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which granted sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor
PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that
American company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
outstanding common shares of PLDT to Philippine Telecommunications Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall
Investment Corporation (PTIC). encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body
In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons, of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and
the owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of.
 managing officers of such corporation or association must be is equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements between
citizens of the Philippines. the foreign principals and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted,
there is, therefore, a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the
Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must Constitution
therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate
authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must in the control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through
be owned by Filipino citizens. his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the
In the earlier case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, petitioner Fernandez who articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares,
claimed to be a stockholder of record of PLDT, contended that the term preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However,
"capital" in the 1987 Constitution refers to shares entitled to vote or the preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is,
common shares. Fernandez explained thus: deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on other
The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely
utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders.
shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares, considering that In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares
it is through voting that control is being exercised. x xx can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of
the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles
Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing of incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is
limitations and restrictions on fully nationalized and partially invalid.
nationalized activities is for Filipino nationals to be always in
control of the corporation undertaking said activities. Otherwise, if Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to
the Trial Court's ruling upholding respondents' arguments were to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights,
be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership structure the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%) common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to
common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks. vote in the election of directors, then the term capital shall include such
Following the Trial Court's ruling adopting respondents' preferred shares because the right to participate in the control or
arguments, the common shares can be owned entirely by foreigners management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the
thus creating an absurd situation wherein foreigners, who are election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public utility the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election
corporation. of directors.

Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted

to apply to both the beneficial ownership and the controlling
interest.

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation

in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to
ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e., common shares.
Furthermore, ownership of record of shares will not suffice but it
must be shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner
PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting interests of
foreigners which would gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the
acquisition of SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA vs EDUARDO ERMITA traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose)
G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011 territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or
Carpio enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime
zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine international law.
Territory.
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA ET AL, Petitioners, -versus-
FACTS: HON. EDUARDO ERMITA ET AL
R.A. 3046 was passed demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines. After five decades, RA 9552 was passed, amending RA 3046 to Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones
Sea (UNCLOS). The new law shorterned one baseline, optimized the and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group and the areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the
Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction
applicable maritime zones. to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the new law on the ground living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental
that: it reduces the Philippine maritime territory, in violation of Article 1 shelf (Article 77).
of the Constitution and it opens the country’s waters to maritime passage
by all vessels, thus undermining Philippine sovereignty. Respondents, on FACTS:
the other hand, defended the new law as the country’s compliance with the In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic
terms of UNCLOS. Respondents stressed that RA 9522 does not relinquish baselines of the Philippines was enacted (Baselines Law). This law was
the country’s claim over Sabah. meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February
ISSUE: 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona, et al. questioned the validity of RA 9522
Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional. as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national
territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of ISSUE:
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use Whether or not RA 9522 is constitutional. (YES)
rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles
from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], RULING:
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the
to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
coasts. regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it
increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered
with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it
covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522,
and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our
maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. If any, the baselines law is
a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space
and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights.
JAMES M. IMBONG -versus- HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
Executive Secretary, fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. This
G.R. No. 204819, EN BANC, April 8, 2014 cannot be done. Evidently, with the addition of the word “primarily,” in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes
MENDOZA, J. Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: The State shall protect
in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the consciousness among them. Contrary to the OSG’s position, these
RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually provisions are self-executing. At this point, the Court is of the strong view
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The provision in Section 9
itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
fertilization. injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
FACTS: EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
(RH Law), because, among others, it violates the right to life of the unborn. planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
intra- uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of NOTE: We recommend reading the full text of this case as it involves many
both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. issues aside from general principles and state policies.

ISSUE:
Whether or RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. (NO)

RULING:
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non- abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution
in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. A reading of the
RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law
itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization.

However, the section of the RH-IRR allows “contraceptives” and recognizes

as “abortifacient” only those that primarily induce abortion or the
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioner, -versus-. EXECUTIVE
PAQUITO N. DEPARTMENT DEFENSE VOLTAIRE When talks of the eventual independence of the Philippine Islands gained
DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OCHOA ground, the U.S. manifested the desire to maintain military bases and
G.R. No. 212426, EN BANC, January 12, 2016 armed forces in the country. The U.S. Congress later enacted the Hare-
Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933, which required that the proposed constitution
SERENO, C.J. of an independent Philippines recognize the right of the U.S. to maintain
the latter's armed forces and military bases. The Philippine Legislature
In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, we reiterated rejected that law, as it also gave the U.S. the power to unilaterally
this guiding principle: designate any part of Philippine territory as a permanent military or naval
base of the U.S. within two years from complete independence.
it [is] safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face.
The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was The U.S. Legislature subsequently crafted another law called the Tydings-
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding McDuffie Act or the Philippine Independence Act of 1934. Compared to the
thereof. old Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, the new law provided for the surrender to the
Commonwealth Government of "all military and other reservations" of the
In this case, the phrase being construed is "shall not be allowed in the U.S. government in the Philippines, except "naval reservations and
Philippines" and not the preceding one referring to "the expiration in 1991 refueling stations." Furthermore, the law authorized the U.S. President to
of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United enter into negotiations for the adjustment and settlement of all questions
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, relating to naval reservations and fueling stations within two years after
troops, or facilities." It is explicit in the wording of the provision itself that the Philippines would have gained independence. Under the Tydings-
any interpretation goes beyond the text itself and into the discussion of the McDuffie Act, the U.S. President would proclaim the American withdrawal
framers, the context of the Constitutional Commission's time of drafting, and surrender of sovereignty over the islands 10 years after the
and the history of the 1947 MBA. Without reference to these factors, a inauguration of the new government in the Philippines. This law
reader would not understand those terms. However, for the phrase "shall eventually led to the promulgation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
not be allowed in the Philippines," there is no need for such reference. The
law is clear. No less than the Senate understood this when it ratified the The original plan to surrender the military bases changed. At the height of
VFA. the Second World War, the Philippine and the U.S. Legislatures each
passed resolutions authorizing their respective Presidents to negotiate the
FACTS: matter of retaining military bases in the country after the planned
The presence of the U.S. military forces in the country can be traced to withdrawal of the U.S. Subsequently, in 1946, the countries entered into
their pivotal victory in the 1898 Battle of Manila Bay during the Spanish- the Treaty of General Relations, in which the U.S. relinquished all control
American War. Spain relinquished its sovereignty over the Philippine and sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, except the areas that would
Islands in favor of the U.S. upon its formal surrender a few months later. be covered by the American military bases in the country. This treaty
By 1899, the Americans had consolidated a military administration in the eventually led to the creation of the post-colonial legal regime on which
archipelago. would hinge the continued presence of U.S. military forces until 1991: the
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) of 1947, the Military Assistance
When it became clear that the American forces intended to impose colonial Agreement of 1947, and the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) of 1951.
control over the Philippine Islands, General Emilio Aguinaldo immediately
led the Filipinos into an all- out war against the U.S. The Filipinos were Soon after the Philippines was granted independence, the two countries
ultimately defeated in the Philippine- American War, which lasted until entered into their first military arrangement pursuant to the Treaty of
1902 and led to the downfall of the first Philippine Republic. The General Relations - the 1947 MBA. The Senate concurred on the premise
Americans henceforth began to strengthen their foothold in the country. of "mutuality of security interest," which provided for the presence and
They took over and expanded the former Spanish Naval Base in Subic Bay, operation of 23 U.S. military bases in the Philippines for 99 years or until
Zambales, and put up a cavalry post called Fort Stotsenberg in Pampanga, the year 2046. The treaty also obliged the Philippines to negotiate with the
now known as Clark Air Base.
U.S. to allow the latter to expand the existing bases or to acquire new ones a new framework for their defense cooperation and the use of Philippine
as military necessity might require. installations. One of the proposed provisions included an arrangement in
which U.S. forces would be granted the use of certain installations within
A number of significant amendments to the 1947 MBA were made. With the Philippine naval base in Subic. On 16 September 1991, the Senate
respect to its duration, the parties entered into the Ramos-Rusk rejected the proposed treaty.
Agreement of 1966, which reduced the term of the treaty from 99 years to
a total of 44 years or until 1991. Concerning the number of U.S. military The consequent expiration of the 1947 MBA and the resulting paucity of
bases in the country, the Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement any formal agreement dealing with the treatment of U.S. personnel in the
provided for the return to the Philippines of 17 U.S. military bases covering Philippines led to the suspension in 1995 of large-scale joint military
a total area of 117,075 hectares. Twelve years later, the exercises. In the meantime, the respective governments of the two
U.S. returned Sangley Point in Cavite City through an exchange of notes. countries agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced level.
Then, through the Romulo- Murphy Exchange of Notes of 1979, the parties The military arrangements between them were revived in 1999 when they
agreed to the recognition of Philippine sovereignty over Clark and Subic concluded the first Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
Bases and the reduction of the areas that could be used by the U.S.
military. The agreement also provided for the mandatory review of the As a "reaffirm[ation] [of the] obligations under the MDT," the VFA has laid
treaty every five years. In 1983, the parties revised the 1947 MBA through down the regulatory mechanism for the treatment of U.S. military and
the Romualdez-Armacost Agreement. The revision pertained to the civilian personnel visiting the country. It contains provisions on the entry
operational use of the military bases by the U.S. government within the and departure of U.S. personnel; the purpose, extent, and limitations of
context of Philippine sovereignty, including the need for prior consultation their activities; criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction; the waiver of certain
with the Philippine government on the former' s use of the bases for claims; the importation and exportation of equipment, materials, supplies,
military combat operations or the establishment of long- range missiles. and other pieces of property owned by the U.S. government; and the
movement of U.S. military vehicles, vessels, and aircraft into and within
Pursuant to the legislative authorization granted under Republic Act No. the country. The Philippines and the U.S. also entered into a second
9, the President also entered into the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement counterpart agreement (VFA II), which in turn regulated the treatment of
with the U.S. This executive agreement established the conditions under Philippine military and civilian personnel visiting the U.S. The Philippine
which U.S. military assistance would be granted to the Philippines, Senate concurred in the first VFA on 27 May 1999.
particularly the provision of military arms, ammunitions, supplies,
equipment, vessels, services, and training for the latter's defense forces. Beginning in January 2002, U.S. military and civilian personnel started
An exchange of notes in 1953 made it clear that the agreement would arriving in Mindanao to take part in joint military exercises with their
remain in force until terminated by any of the parties. Filipino counterparts. Called Balikatan, these exercises involved trainings
aimed at simulating joint military maneuvers pursuant to the MDT.
To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the
Philippines and the U.S. next entered into the MDT in 1951. Concurred in In the same year, the Philippines and the U.S. entered into the Mutual
by both the Philippine and the U.S. Senates, the treaty has two main Logistics Support Agreement to "further the interoperability, readiness,
features: first, it allowed for mutual assistance in maintaining and and effectiveness of their respective military forces" in accordance with the
developing their individual and collective capacities to resist an armed MDT, the Military Assistance Agreement of 1953, and the VFA. The new
attack; and second, it provided for their mutual self-defense in the event of agreement outlined the basic terms, conditions, and procedures for
an armed attack against the territory of either party. The treaty was facilitating the reciprocal provision of logistics support, supplies, and
premised on their recognition that an armed attack on either of them would services between the military forces of the two countries. The phrase
equally be a threat to the security of the other. "logistics support and services" includes billeting, operations support,
construction and use of temporary structures, and storage services during
In view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the an approved activity under the existing military arrangements. Already
Philippines and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense extended twice, the agreement will last until 2017.
and security relationship. Termed as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security, the countries sought to recast their military ties by providing
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct Members of the Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of
activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not the Transitory Provisions, the full text of which reads as follows:
transmitted to the Senate on the executive's understanding that to do so SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
was no longer necessary. Accordingly, in June 2014, the Department of between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for the or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
agreement to enter into force in the two countries. treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
the result of intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the course of treaty by the other contracting State.
almost two years. After eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of
National Defense and the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the It is quite plain that the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
agreement on 28 April 2014. President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified intended to add to the basic requirements of a treaty under Section 21 of
EDCA on 6 June 2014. The OSG clarified during the oral arguments that Article VII. This means that both provisions must be read as additional
the Philippine and the U.S. governments had yet to agree formally on the limitations to the President's overarching executive function in matters of
specific sites of the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement. defense and foreign relations.

Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign
constitutionality of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows
in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate, not an executive the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely
agreement. aims to implement an existing law or treaty.

On 10 November 2015, months after the oral arguments were concluded Again we refer to Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution:
and the parties ordered to file their respective memoranda, the Senators SECTION 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
adopted Senate Resolution No. (SR) 105. The resolution expresses the between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
"strong sense" of the Senators that for EDCA to become valid and America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
effective, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
concurrence. treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so
requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
ISSUE: national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign treaty by the other contracting State.
military bases, troops, or facilities?
It is only in those instances in which the constitutional provision is unclear,
RULING: ambiguous, or silent that further construction must be done to elicit its
The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign meaning. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. Commission on Elections, we
military bases, troops or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in reiterated this guiding principle:
by the Senate - a clear limitation on the President's dual role as defender it [is] safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon
of the State and as sole authority in foreign relations. its face. The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how
it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole authority in understanding thereof.
foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly limits his ability in
instances when it involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or In this case, the phrase being construed is "shall not be allowed in the
facilities. The initial limitation is found in Section 21 of the provisions on Philippines" and not the preceding one referring to "the expiration in 1991
the Executive Department: "No treaty or international agreement shall be of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities." It is explicit in the wording of the provision itself that
any interpretation goes beyond the text itself and into the discussion of the Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
framers, the context of the Constitutional Commission's time of drafting, approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
and the history of the 1947 MBA. Without reference to these factors, a binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
reader would not understand those terms. However, for the phrase "shall Senate or by Congress.
not be allowed in the Philippines," there is no need for such reference. The
law is clear. No less than the Senate understood this when it ratified the [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
VFA. without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has
been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history
Lastly, the President may generally enter into executive agreements we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects
subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights,
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate. patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and
navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
It would be helpful to put into context the contested language found in validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Article XVIII, Section
25. Its more exacting requirement was introduced because of the previous That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. In fact, the
experience of the country when its representatives felt compelled to framers specifically deliberated on whether the general term
consent to the old MBA. They felt constrained to agree to the MBA in "international agreement" included executive agreements, and whether it
fulfilment of one of the major conditions for the country to gain was necessary to include an express proviso that would exclude executive
independence from the U.S. As a result of that experience, a second layer agreements from the requirement of Senate concurrence. After noted
of consent for agreements that allow military bases, troops and facilities in constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas quoted the Court's ruling in Eastern
the country is now articulated in Article XVIII of our present Constitution. Sea Trading, the Constitutional Commission members ultimately decided
that the term "international agreements" as contemplated in Section 21,
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no
without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this longer needed.
jurisdiction. That power has been alluded to in our present and past
Constitutions, in various statutes, in Supreme Court decisions, and during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. They cover a wide
array of subjects with varying scopes and purposes, including those that
involve the presence of foreign military forces in the country.

As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally

assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with
the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with
other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the
Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation;
initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states
and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements;
promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and
settles international disputes with other states.

One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their

validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence.
This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading
(1961), viz:
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, et al. vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C.
ENRIQUEZ, et al. ISSUES:
G.R. No. 225973, EN BANC, November 8, 2016 1. Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. NO.
Peralta, J. 2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions. NO.

In Belgica, et al., v. Han. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr, the Court provides that the 3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
requisites for judicial inquiry are: administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. YES.
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; 4. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion. NO.
validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest 5. Whether the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate
opportunity; and the Constitution and domestic and international laws37. NO.
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
6. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from
In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former
President to interment at the LNMB. NO.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have
the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question 7. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the
that is not a justiciable controversy. In allowing the interment of Marcos remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into
at the LNMB, a land of public domain devoted for national military an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as
cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national back to and interred in the Philippines. NO.
healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise
of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that RULING:
political question is outside the ambit of judicial review. Procedural Grounds
No Justiciable controversy. In Belgica, et al., v. Han. Exec. Sec. Ochoa, Jr,
FACTS: the Court provides that the requisites for judicial inquiry are: (a) there
Before winning the Election, President Duterte publicly announce that he must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
would allow burial of President Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
(LNMB). question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In this case,
N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential,
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB). An "actual case or controversy" is one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
issued the directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General for dispute. Related to the requisite of an actual case or controversy is the
the funeral honors and Service and other courtesies for the late President. requisite of "ripeness," which means that something had then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
Hence this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. Those national life after 27 years from his death and 30 years from his ouster.
areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch. As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime, some
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political of petitioners decry re- traumatization, historical revisionism, and
questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review. disregard of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners' argument is
founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National Pantheon
However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by intended by law to perpetuate the memory of all Presidents, national
Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the heroes and patriots.
judiciary the power to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part As for the Legislators, they failed to specifically claim that it will encroach
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. on their prerogatives as legislators. Violated exhaustion of administrative
remedies principle. Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of
the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek
that is not a justiciable controversy. In allowing the interment of Marcos the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means
at the LNMB, a land of public domain devoted for national military of administrative processes available.
cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the
healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek
of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
political question is outside the ambit of judicial review. Secretary of National Defense. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with
the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no Department of National Defense (DND).
standing. Petitioners have no legal standing to file such petitions because
they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed
under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot
As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of public simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such to
funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the be filed first in RTC who can try not only facts but also questions of Law.
LNMB by either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws
or jurisprudence. Substantive Grounds
President’s decision is in accordance with Constitution, Law or
For IBP members, suffice it to state that the averments in their petition- jurisprudence. Petitioners argued that the burial of Marcos at LNMB not
in-intervention failed to disclose such injury, and that their interest in this only rewrites history but also condones abuses during Martial Law.
case is too general and shared by other groups, such that their duty to Moreover, they argued that ratification of the Constitution is a clear
uphold the rule of law, without more, is inadequate to clothe them with condemnation of the Marcos’ alleged heroism.
requisite legal standing.
Tanada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the Constitution are not self- executing. In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of
issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law
significance to society, or of paramount public interest. The interment have should be passed by the Congress. Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art.
no profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of our XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec.
3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does
in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to
human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill- National Pantheon.
gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct
or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB. Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still,
petitioners' allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of the reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of
President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, " which is public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each
identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, is and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle
likewise not violated by public respondents. Under the Faithful Execution of separation of powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based
Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" on the grant of authority to the President under existing laws and
to carry into execution the law. regulations. The act in itself does not confer upon him the status of a "hero.”
(a misnomer) Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and
The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in "state honors," without showing proof as to what kind of burial or honors
nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative
construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power.
b. On R.A. No. 10368
Consistent with Sect. 17, Art. VII, the burial does not contravene R.A. No. Petitioners argued that R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-
289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by 375 by implicitly disqualifying Marcos' burial at the LNMB because the
petitioners. legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily
declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator.
a. On R.A. 289
R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial
burial place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition
national heroes and patriots. It created a Board to implement the law. on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law
President Quirino approved its site in East Avenue, Quezon city but this beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim- oriented
was later revoked by President Magsaysay in Proclamation No. 42 and perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a provision
declared said lot for national park purposes. specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB as a "reparation"
for the HRVV s, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent and should
Petitioners argued that due to his human right violations etc, of Marcos he remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not
cannot be a source of inspiration and emulation to future generations as there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the
required for internment in the LNMB under R.A. 289 and that AFP legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would be
Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the law and should not violate tantamount to judicial legislation.
its spirit and intent. Moreover, petitioners maintain that public
respondents are not members of the Board on National Pantheon, which is It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal,
authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the deceased whether express or implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or
Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots. AFP Regulations G 161-375: It is a well-settled rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect
Petitioners are mistaken since failed to provide for legal and historical a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
basis that LNMB and National Pantheon is the same. This is not at all inconsistent and repugnant with the
unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial
place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of
President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The
President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal
may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a 105 strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the
showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. desecration of national shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity
through digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise, and
c. On International Human Rights Laws committing unbecoming acts within their premises. R.A. No. 10066 also
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or destroy the original
rights of the HRVV s to "full" and "effective" reparation, which is provided features of, or undertake construction or real estate development in any
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), national shrine, monument, landmark and other historic edifices and
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and structures, declared, classified, and marked by the NHCP as such, without
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights the prior written permission from the National Commission for Culture
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law and the and the Arts.
Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity. As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA, the NHCP manages,
maintains and administers national shrines, monuments, historical sites,
The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural value. Excluded,
impunity, call for the enactment of legislative measures, establishment of however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military memorials and
national programmes, and provision for administrative and judicial battle
recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes, that
are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties,
covenants and other international laws. They do not entail new monuments declared as national shrines, which have been under the
international or domestic legal obligation. administration, maintenance and development of the Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND. This includes the LNMB.
The Philippines, through its Constitution and judicial remedies i.e. writs
of habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data, is compliant with its b. LNMB
international obligations. Even the Executive Branch issued LNMB was created after World War II. President Magsaysay issued
administrative and executive orders to this effect. Proclamation No. 86, which changed the name of Republic Memorial
Cemetery to Libingan Ng Mga Bayani. On July 12, 1957, President Carlos
Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not be P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423, which reserved for military
instantly revised by single resolve if President Duterte to bury Marcos at purposes, under the administration of the AFP Chief of Staff, the land
LNMB. Together complementing the powers and functions of Human where LNMB is located. On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No.
Rights Victim’s Claim Board and the HRVV Memorial Commissions, the 208, which excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military
National Historical Commission is mandated to determine all factual reservation and reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the
matters relating to official Philippine history and popularize it. administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the DND.
Under PD. 1076 the PVAO - through the Military Shrines Service (MSS),
The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done which was created to perform the functions of the abolished NSC.
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal President Aquino issued the Administrative Code and retained the PVAO
bias. under DND. PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military
shrines.
Petitioners contend that the burial will desecrate the revered national
shrine where remains of country’s great citizens are interred for Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite
inspiration and emulation. the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not
expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The
a. National Shrines proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase
As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical "and others which may be proclaimed in the future as National Shrines"
shrines (or historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and is erroneous because: PD 208 predated PD 105; following the canon of
revered for their history or association as declared by the NHCP. P.D. No. statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a
site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery
eminent leaders of the nation." (P.D. 105); Since its establishment, the plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, military personnel, a
While P.D. No. 1 dated September 24, 1972 transferred the administration, veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his
maintenance and development of national shrines to the NHI under the contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use
DEC, it never actually materialized. Pending the organization of the DEC, requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses
its functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public
the PVAO in July 1973. Eventually, on January 26, 1977, Marcos issued services rendered. Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have
P.D. No. 1076. Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was inspired by his desire for
national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the
Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed
and hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every factual allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative,
mortal remains interred therein. The "nation’s esteem and reverence for the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of
her war dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is
issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the
interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the factual basis of their claim.
physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
military shrine. c. AFP Regulations on LNMB

LNMB is similar to and patterned from Arlington National Cemetary. As AFP Regulations G 161-375 provided, the following persons eligible for
one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries, the Arlington is under interment at the LNMB. The absence of any executive issuance or law to
the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole
Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are established as authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred
national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have served in the U.S. at the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Armed Forces. The areas are protected, managed and administered as Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who
suitable and dignified burial grounds and as significant cultural resources. were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by
As such, the authorization of activities that take place therein is limited to expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of
those that are consistent with applicable legislation and that are AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefore, be sustained for having been
compatible with maintaining their solemn commemorative and historic issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the direction of the Secretary
character. of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law
Government is a self- executing provision of the Constitution and does not has the force and effect of law and, until set aside, is binding upon
require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much executive and administrative agencies, including the President as the chief
less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not executor of laws.
bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos
and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, c.1. Qualifications
Ilocos Norte and free to amend, revoke or rescind it. AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of
clear and unmistakable showing that it has been issued with grave abuse
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Neither could it be
reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete, whimsical,
the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the and capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically To compare, the SC referred to the U.S. Army regulations on Arlington. In
excluding the land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was the U.S., the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense, determines eligibility for interment or inurnment in the Army and death) and non-pension (burial, education, hospitalization, and
national military cemeteries medical care and treatment) benefits as well as provisions from the local
governments. Under the law, the benefits may be withheld if the
As a national military cemetery, eligibility standards for interment, Commission on Human Rights certifies to the AFP General Headquarters
inurnment, or memorialization in Arlington are based on honorable that the veteran has been found guilty by final judgment of a gross human
military service. Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves, rights violation while in the service, but this factor shall not be considered
which are rarely granted, are for those persons who have made significant taken against his next of kin.
contributions that directly and substantially benefited the U.S. military.
C.2. Disqualification
It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described
it, to argue that the word "bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none
since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the LNMB as a national of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations. He was neither
shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor
feature as a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that
and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people buried Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral
there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall
should be treated as a "hero." In fact, the privilege of internment at the not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and
LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
includes not only those who rendered active military service or military- innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be hear
related activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
their significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf "
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). Even the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity cited by
Whether or not the extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted petitioners unequivocally guarantee the rights of the accused. The various
and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose cases cited by petitioners, which were decided with finality by courts here
of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in
indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.
and military-related activities.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and property right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried at
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be interred
military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander-
alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can
Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him be said to have ripen. Until then, such inchoate right is not legally
the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the demandable and enforceable.
awards he received.
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal
While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a protection clause are not met. In this case, there is a real and
human who erred like us. Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former
of Valor awardee and a veteran. President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of
War attach only to the members of the military. There is also no
R.A. No. 6948, as amended, grants our veterans and their dependents or substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine
survivors with pension (old age, disability, total administrative disability, Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and
Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military personnel and
a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and
P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military
memorials, it is also an active military cemetery that recognizes the status
or position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO

expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948,
as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonourably
discharged from military service.

To my mind, the word "service" should be construed as that rendered by a

military person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her
commission, enlistment, probation, training or drafting, up to the date of
his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Hence, it cannot be
conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the
EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonourable separation, reversion
or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only
enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military.
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the
ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation.
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The
Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
  Amendment vs. Revision petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
 Two-partTest
 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES
VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
  Procedure CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM
THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
 Proposal
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
o  Essential Elements of a valid petition
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
 LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Lambino v Comelec Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
The Facts: initiative.

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for
("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this
to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8
Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the
6735"). issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the compel the COMELEC to give due course to their
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least initiative petition.
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least three per In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that
centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt
verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
(Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the
entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
 urging the Court to grant the petition despite the based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution.
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave
temporary devises to implement the system of initiative." abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
The Issues:
On Issue No. 1
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process the Constitution on Direct

  Amendment vs. Revision Proposal by the People

 Two-partTest Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional

 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states:
  Procedure
 Proposal Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
o  Essential Elements of a valid petition twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of
the registered voters therein.
 LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification

The framers of the constitution intended that the people must first see
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago
declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in Two Essential Elements:
essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; 1. The people (MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can
and prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.) must
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's representative can sign on their behalf.
petition. 2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
Rule:
There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional
There is no merit to the petition. requirements in gathering the signatures.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the Logrolling vs Single-Subject / Clause
proposed amendments.
1. Logrolling
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this
Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative 1. When the initiative petition incorporates an
petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a unrelated subject matter in the same petition.
signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when
they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. There is not a single Example:
word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state Transitory Provisions, provides:
that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from
Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court ratification of these amendments, the interim
on 26 September 2006. The signature sheet merely asks a question Parliament shall convene to propose amendments
whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process (Emphasis supplied)

  Amendment vs. Revision 2. Effect: Under American Jurisprudence, the effect

is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
 Two-partTest unrelated subject matter.
 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest
Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida
  Procedure declared:
 Proposal Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
o  Essential Elements of a valid petition responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot
permit. The very broadness of the proposed
 LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification amendment amounts to logrolling because the
electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the
amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation
government. The signature sheet does not show to the
reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The
people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the
asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature
proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The
sheet is not
ballot language in the instant case fails to do that.
the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
The very broadness of the proposal makes it
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
impossible to state what it will affect and effect
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and supplied)
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with
the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. Single-Subject Rule / Clause Modes 1 and 2 apply to both Amendment and Revisions. Mode 3 applies
a. Requires that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall only to Amendment
be clearly expressed in its
Two Steps in the Amendment or Revision of the Constitution (Art. XVII,
title” 1987 Constitution)

Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process 1. Proposal / Submission (See modes of Amendment to, or Revisions
of the Constitution)
  Amendment vs. Revision 2. Ratification – Majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite; 60-90
days
 Two-partTest 1. Congress or Constitutional Convention – 60-90 days after
 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest the approval of such amendment or revision. (Sec 4,
supra)
2. People’s Initiative – 60-90 days after the certification of
  Procedure
the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition. (Sec 4,
 Proposal supra)
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution
o  Essential Elements of a valid petition
Revision vs. Amendment
 LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and
abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of
Three Modes of Amendment to, or Revision of the Constitution (Art. XVII, the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the
1987 Constitution) lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better
carry out the purpose for which it was framed.
1. Congress (Constituent Assembly)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
Upon 3/4 fourths vote of all its members (Sec 1, supra) constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
2. Constitutional Convention the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
Call by 2/3 vote of Congress, or thrown to people by majority vote broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
of Congress (Sec 3, supra) the basic principle involved.

3. People’s Initiative (Initiative on the Constitution) Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
12% of total registered voters, of which 3% of the total registered
voters in each legislative district there in shall sign the petition An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and
(Sec 2, supra) (Sec 3(a) of RA 6735 “The Initiatives and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is
Referendum Act”) to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and
the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the
the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in
implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically
extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the overhauls the entire structure of government and the
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So each specific change will have to be examined case-by-
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well
because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. as how it affects the structure of government, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

  Amendment vs. Revision Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles,

or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
 Two-partTest with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
  Procedure
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
 Proposal constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which
o  Essential Elements of a valid petition do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and
 LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification not revisions.

Where the proposed change applies only to a specific The two-part test to determine whether a change
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other constitutes a Revision or Amendment:
section or article, the change may generally be considered
an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change 1. The quantitative test
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an 1. Whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety'
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not numerous existing provisions.
a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an 2. The court examines only the number of provisions
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
amendment and not a revision. The changes in these 2. The qualitative test
examples do not entail any modification of sections or 1. Inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
articles of the Constitution other than the specific change in the constitution.
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect 2. Whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
the structure of government or the system of checks-and- changes in the nature of our basic governmental
balances among or within the three branches.
plan as to amount to a revision.”
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change
is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word
 3. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of o  Essential Elements of a valid petition
government is a proper subject of inquiry.
4. Examples:  LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification
  A change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
fundamental framework or the fundamental executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
powers of its Branches." government.
  A change in the nature of the basic
governmental plan also includes changes that
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
"jeopardize the traditional form of government
"amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not
and the system of check and balances.
of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and because members of the deliberative body work fulltime
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two when proposed through an initiative, are called
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
provisions in the entire Constitution. vocation" out of such endeavor.
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from
The express intent of the framers and the plain language
presidential to parliamentary, and from a
of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language
of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do
A change in the structure of government is a not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the
On Issue No. 2
present Constitution are reduced into two. This
A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral- There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago
Parliamentary system is a declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process
reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the
present petition.
  Amendment vs. Revision
It is a well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon
 Two-partTest the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
 QualitativeandQuantitativeTest resolved on some other grounds.

  Procedure Assuming that RA 6735 is a valid provision to implement

 Proposal the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the
o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution constitution, the present initiative must first comply with
 Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before  Two-partTest
complying with RA 6735.  QualitativeandQuantitativeTest

Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of   Procedure

RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative  Proposal
on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per o  3 Modes of Amendment, or Revision of the Constitution
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as o  Essential Elements of a valid petition
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."  LogrollingvSingle-SubjectRule/Clause  Ratification

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 In a Minute Resolution of the SC en banc on GR Nos. 174153 and 174299,
August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 issued on Nov. 21, 2006, it further ruled with finality that: “Ten (10)
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated that
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the Constitution thru people’s initiative”! Hence, Comelec Resolution No.
COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together 7796 was issued in 2007 implementing the provisions of RA 6735
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the regarding the conduct of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
On Issue No. 3
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims
as valid. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
in dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform,
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For
electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament
is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone,
to propose further amendments or revisions to the
the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus,
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the
this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in
shift in the form of government. Since the present
PIRMA:
initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA
6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the
electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
Group's initiative will still fail. abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with
Development:
the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Lambino v COMELEC Amendment Process Resolution of June 10, 1997.

  Amendment vs. Revision

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be
administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten
Facts: years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.
sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a
a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for
Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of
charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and
child Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens
asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy.
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family
parties and intended beneficiaries. as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in
the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to
patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy? the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee,
it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor
YES. child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the
child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the
the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.
case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person. CASE DIGEST : CABANAS vs PILAPIL

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-
was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.
mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.
FACTS: The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant,
pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured
best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as
claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to
things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living,
have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in
as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.
remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

Melchora Cabanas vs Francisco Pilapil Issue: WON the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary
58 SCRA 94 – Political Law – Parens Patriae – Strengthening the Family
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan
that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his Held: on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides:
"The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. The property
which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his
work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in
ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is
under parental authority and whose company he lives.

With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not
the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision
arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further
fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the
trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than
in the case of an uncle
G.R. No. 183591 PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. unconstitutional and illegal. Additionally impleaded as responded
the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel (represented by Chairman
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES Iqbal.
 Various parties moved to intervene and were granted to file their
Summarized by Manu and Kim petitions/comments in-intervention.

Important People:
This is a consolidation of a number of cases regarding the issues, mostly in
relation to its constitutionality, surrounding the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government
of the Philippines (GPR) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 1  Aforementioned petitioners and respondents
 Hermogenes Esperon Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
and the issue regarding the extent of the powers of the President in
(PAPP)
pursuing the peace process. The following are the cases that have been  GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
consolidated:

FACTS (In order of chronological events) AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE

MOA-AD
 G.R. 183591 – (23 July 2008) the Province of North Cotabato and
Vice Governor Emmanuel Piñol (Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO)
sought to compel respondents to disclose the MOA-AD and 1. 1996 – the beginning of the long process of GRP-MILF peace
attachments, prohibit the signing, hold a public consultation and negotiations
declare the MOA-AD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
 G.R. 183752 – the City of Zamboanga (Mandamus and Prohibition
2. 18 July 1997 – the GRP and the peace panel signed the Agreement on
and similar injunctive reliefs) prayed that Zamboanga City be
the General Cessation of Hostilities
excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangasmoro
Judicial Entity (BJE) and that the MOA-AD be declared null
and void 3. 27 August 1998 – signed the General Framework of Agreement of
Intent
 G.R. 183893 – City of Iligan (Injunction and Declaratory Relief)
sought to enjoin respondents from signing the MOA-AD and if it
has been signed, from implementing it. Additionally impleaded ES 4. 1999 to early 2000 – numerous municipalities in Central Mindanao
Eduardo Ermita as respondent. were attacked by the MILF which affected the peace negotiations;
 G.R. 183951 - the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al (petition MILF took control of the town hall in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition), prayed to declare null March 2000 and in response, then President Estrada declared an “all-
and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and those out-war” against the MILF
respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD
 G.R. 183962 – Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed a petition for 5. 2001 – President GMA assumed office and suspended the military
Prohibition, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently offense against the MILF and sought a resumption of the peace
enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the negotiations; MILF was first apprehensive but were convinced when
MOA-AD as well as to nullify the MOA-AD for being GMA asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister

1 A rebel group established in March 1984 when it splintered, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim from the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari. It separated on the ground of what Salamat perceived to be a manipulation of the
MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.
 Mahathir Mohammad to help convince them, the MILF convened its 15. 05 August 2008 – scheduled signing date for the final form of
Central Committee seriously to discuss the matter and eventually met Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
with the GRP Tripoli Agreement on Peace (MOA-AD)

6. 28 February 2001 – GRP Negotiating Panel was established through 16. 15, 22, 29 August 2008 – cases were heard on oral argument with the
Executive Order No. 3 s. 2001 following issues discussed:

7. 24 March 2001 – parties met in Kuala Lumpur with talks facilitated a. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
by the Malaysian Government; parties signed the Agreement on the i. Insofar as mandamus is concerned in view of the
General Framework and the Resumption of Peace Talks. The MILF disclosure of the official copies of the MOA-AD
thereafter suspended all its military actions. ii. Insofar as prohibition aspect is concerned if
consultation has become fait accompli with the
8. 20-22 June 2001 – formal peace talks held in Tripoli, Libya the finalization of the draft
outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace b. Whether the constitutionality and legality of the MOA is
Process which contained the following basic principles and agenda on ripe for adjudication;
the negotiations: security aspect, rehabilitation aspect, and c. Whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
ancestral domain aspect (this aspect had a colatilla saying that it amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
“shall be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting”) negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES (d) and
(e)
9. 5-7 August 2001 – second round of peace talks in Cyberjaya, Malaysia d. Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to
which ended in the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the information. If yes, whether prohibition is an appropriate
Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 which led to a ceasefire remedy
between parties e. Whether by signing the MOA the GRP would be binding
itself to:
i. Create and recognize the BJE as a separate state/
10. 7 May 2002 – signed the Implementing Guidelines on the
juridical, territorial, political subdivision not
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli
recognized by law
Agreement 2001
ii. Revise or amend the constitution and existing laws
to conform to the MOA-AD
11. 13 July 2003 – Chairman Salamat Hashim of the MILF passed away iii. Concede/ recognize claim of MILF for ancestral
and subsequently replaced by Al Haj Murad (previously chair peace domain in violation of IPRA
negotiator). His position was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. If yes, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to
bind the GRP
12. 2005 – exploratory talks between parties in Malaysia, to draft the
f. Whether the inclusion of North Cotabato, Zamboanga City,
MOA-AD
Iligan and Isabela and Linamon, Lanao del Norte in the
Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question
13. 23 July 2008 – the Province of North Cotabato file with the Supreme g. Whether not signing the MOA derogates any valid prior
Court and was docketed as G.R. 183591 commitment of the GRP

14. 04 August 2008 – the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 17. 19 August 2008 - Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III filed with the SC
(TRO) commanding and directing respondents and agents to cease and 18. 19 August 2008 – Respondents (through Manifestation by Motion)
desist from formally signing the MOA-AD. Court also required SolGen stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the
to submit to the court and petitioners the official copy of the MOA-AD MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues raised
and thus moved to dismiss the cases
OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD mainland Mindanao; within territorial waters, there is
joint jurisdiction with GRP
 Parties: GRP (used interchangeably with CENTRAL o Indicates sharing of minerals on the territorial waters
GOVERNMENT) and the MILF in favor of BJE. Nothing said about sharing the minerals
 Main body is divided into four (4) strands: CONCEPTS AND in the internal waters
PRINCIPLES, TERRITORY, RESOURCES, AND GOVERNANCE
 RESOURCES
 CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES o BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation/ trade
o Defines Bangsamoro People as natives or original relations with foreign countries and can establish foreign
inhabitants of Mindanao and adjacent islands (including trade missions to other countries
Palawan and Sulu archipelago) at the time of conquest/ o External defense remain the duty and obligation of GRP
colonization and their descendants and spouses o GRP should take steps to include BJE in international
o Not only Moros but included indigenous peoples of meetings and events such as but not limited to ASEAN
Mindanao and adjacent islands (adds that the freedom of events
choice of the IPs shall be respected) o Exploring, producing, obtaining potential sources of energy
o MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro Homeland” jurisdiction and control is under the BJE but in times of
– the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the national emergency, when public interest requires, the
Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of GRP may, for a fixed period and reasonable terms agreed
occupation; both parties acknowledge that ancestral by both parties, assume or direct the operation of such
domain does not form part of the public domain. resources
o Bangsamoro people have a right to self-governance o The sharing between the GRP and the BJE of total
o Describes Bangsamoro as the “First Nation” – suggests production pertaining to natural resources is 75:25 in favor
exclusive entitlement to that designation (departs from of BJE.
Canadian usage – used to refer to their indigenous o BJE may modify or cancel forest concessions, timber
collectively as First Nations – plural) licenses, mining concessions, Mineral Production and
Sharing Agreements (MPSA) Industrial Forest
 TERRITORY Management Agreements (IFMA) and the like, granted by
o Land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, alluvial the GRP, including those issued by the present ARMM.
including aerial domain and atmospheric space embracing
Mindanao- Sulu-Palawan geographic region
o Present geographic area of ARMM including certain  GOVERNANCE
Municipalities in Lanao del Norte voted for in the 2001 o Binds parties to invite a multinational third-party to
plebiscite observe and monitor implementation of
o Outside this, the BJE is to cover other provinces and COMPREHENSIVE COMPACT – a compact to embody
municipalities grouped into Category A (to be subjected to the “details for effective enforcement” and “mechanisms
plebiscite not later than 12 months after MOA-AD signing) and modalities of actual implementation” of the MOA-AD
and B [subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from but explicitly says that the participation of the third party
the signing of a separate agreement – the shall not in any way affect the relationship of the GRP and
Comprehensive Compact] BJE
o BJE shall have jurisdiction (did not say joint with GRP) o Defines relationship of Central Government and BJE as
over all natural resources within its internal waters (15km “associative” [take note of this as this will be an issue
from coastline) and territorial waters from beyond this up tackled later on] characterized by shared authority and
to baselines of RP – South East and South West of responsibility
 o Provides that provisions requiring “amendments to the law/ approval of the challenged action the dispute
existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of is said to have ripened into judicial controversy
the comprehensive compact and upon effecting the even without any overt act. Indeed even a
aforesaid amendments with due regard to the non- singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated law is enough to awaken judicial duty.” Also cites
timeframe to be indicated in the comprehensive compact Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe:
[take note as the legality of this provision is one of the main US SC held that challenge for the
points of the controversy – violates Constitution] constitutionality of the school’s policy on student-
o BJE can build, develop, maintain own institutions led prayers/ speeches before games was ripe even
(banking, education, legislation, judiciary etc.) details will without it happening because it is the policy being
be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive challenged, not the concrete acts per se
compact  When law or act in question is not yet effective
does not negate ripeness; cites New York v.
 Annexed to the MOA-AD are documents containing the lists and United States: action of New York challenging a
maps of the places included under Categories A and B mentioned radioactive waste policy was ripe in order to avoid
under TERRITORY the provision’s consequences

b. LOCUS STANDI
ISSUES AND HOLDING:  Province of North Cotabato, Province of
Zamboanga del Norte, City of Iligan, City of
Zamboanga and petitioners-in-intervention
Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONS HAVE COMPLIED Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view
WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE of the direct and substantial injury that they
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW as LGUs would suffer as their territories are
to be included in the intended domain of the
a. RIPENESS – COURT RULES THAT IT IS RIPE.2 BJE
 Petitions allege acts or omissions by respondents  Petitioners allege that they did not vote for their
exceed their authority by violating their duty inclusion
under EO No. 3, the Constitution and statutes.  Maceda, Binay, Pimentel III would have no
There is a prima facie case for Certiorari, standing for their failure to specify that they would
Prohibition, and Mandamus and thus an actual have rights that will be denied or that there is a
case for controversy ripe for adjudication exists. wastage of public funds BUT court grants them
When an act of a branch of government is standing due to their invocation of the
seriously alleged to have infringed the transcendental importance of the issue
Constitution, it becomes not only the right  Intervenors Drilon and Tamayo can be given
but duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. standing in their claim as tax payers and that
 Concrete acts not necessary; cites Pimentel, Jr. government funds will be used to conduct an illegal
v. Aguirre: “…mere enactment of the questioned

2 SOLGEN SAYS: NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY THAT IS RIPE 6. Present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted MOA-AD without consulting LGUs affected is a
1. Unsigned MOA AD is just a list of consensus points for further negotiations departure from their mandate under E.O. No. 3
2. Remains to be a proposal that does not create legally demandable rights until the list of operative acts have been complied with
3. He cites the provision on the need for plebiscites (with regard to the additional areas in Annex A and B
4. He also cites that the COMPREHENSIVE CONTRACT is yet to be drafted (with a deadline within 15 months from signing of the MOA-
AD)
5. Law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness
 and unconstitutional plebiscite; transcendental INFORMATION WHEN THEY NEGOTIATED THE
importance argument also gives them standing MOA-AD
 Intervenor Mar Roxas has standing as his premise
is that he is a member of the Senate and a citizen
(public’s right to be informed on the MOA-AD) and a. Constitutional right to information on matters of
has genuine legal interest in the matter in public concern as provided in Section 7, Article III
litigation (personally, we no idea why the last one Bill of Rights as is complimented by Section 284,
gives him standing) Article II, Declaration of Principles and State
 Intervenors Lopez, Ridao, Gomez, and Buxani Policies (“splendid symmetry” in the words of
failed to allege any proper legal interest in the Commissioner Blas Ople)
present petitions
 Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and  It is a self-executory constitutional right (Legazpi
Development and Muslim Legal Assistance v. Civil Service Commission)
Foundation may be prejudiced and therefore they  There can be no realistic perception and
have standing participation by the public of the nation’s
problems nor meaningful democratic decision-
c. MOOTNESS making if the public is denied access of
 COURT RULES THAT PETITIONS ARE NOT information of general interest (Baldoza v. Judge
MOOTED3 Dimaano)
1. Non-signing and eventual dissolution of  The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, and
the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the matters of public concern covered by the right to
petitions. It bears emphasis that the information contemplates inclusion of steps and
signing did not push through due to the negotiations leading to the consummation of the
TRO issued by this Court contract/ transaction (Chavez v. PEA)
2. Cannot be mere consensus points given the  Effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need
nomenclature and need to have it initialed not wait for a passing of a statute. Respondents
by involved parties + far reaching cannot point to the absence of an implementing
constitutional implications legislation as an excuse in not effecting such
3. As discussed, there is a commitment to policy (merely provided for “reasonable
change statutes and possibly amend the safeguards” in the implementation but not a
constitution in order to conform to the necessity for the policy to be in effect)
MOA-AD; consequently, present petitions
are not confined to the terms and b. Three pertinent laws [EO No. 3, Republic Act No.
provisions of the MOA-AD but to other on- 7160 (Local Government Code), and Republic Act
going and future negotiations and No. 8371 (IPRA)] animate petitioner’s right to be
agreements necessary for its realization consulted on the peace agenda corollary to the
4. It is of paramount public interest. constitutional right to information and disclosure.
 E.O. No. 3
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED 1. In the perambulatory clauses (the first
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS WHEREAS clauses in the EO) it is stated
ON PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND THE RIGHT TO that there is a need to enhance
3 Moot and academic argument not applicable if: d. Case is capable of repetition yet evading review
a. There is grave violation of constitution 4 “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
b. Situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved transactions involving public interest.”
c. Constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public
 contribution of CSOs by institutionalizing III. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTENTS OF THE MOA-AD
people’s participation ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
2. Enumerates responsibilities of the PAPP STATUTES
such as conducting regular dialogues with
the National Peace Forum and other peace
partners a. MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and
 Local Government Code Laws as presently worded.
1. Requires all national offices to conduct  Powers of BJE exceed those granted to any LGU
consultations before any project or under present laws
program critical to environment and  The international law concept of association is
human ecology which the MOA-AD falls discussed in length as it is envisioned to be the
under as it vests ownership of a vast relationship between the BJE and the Central
territory to the Bangsamoro people which Government6
could result to the diaspora of a great  Quotes Keitner and Reisman (authors of Free
number of inhabitants from the said Association: The United States Experience): [a]n
environment association is formed when two states of unequal
 IPRA power voluntary establish durable links. In the
1. Entails the observance of prior informed basic model, one state, the associate, delegates
consent of the indigenous cultural certain responsibilities to the other, the principal
communities (ICCs) and indigenous while maintaining its international status as a
peoples (IPs) (under IPRA) state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence. xxx
 PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
1. No consultation/ lack of information –  Free association is understood as an international
cannot invoke “executive privilege” association between sovereigns
doctrine5 since copies of the MOA-AD were
given upon request of the Court anyway  The MOA-AD contains many provisions
2. Lacked prior consent/ informing of ICCs which are consistent with the international
and indigenous peoples IPs (under IPRA) legal concept of association7
3. MOA AD recognition of ancestral domains 1. BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and
seems to delineate ancestral domains trade relations with foreign countries
which IPRA does not grant the Executive 2. Commitment of the Central Government
Department thus respondents clearly to ensure participation of BJE in ASEAN
transcended the boundaries of their events and UN agencies
authority 3. BJE’s right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of
border agreements
4. Sharing of revenues
5. These resemble rights of governments of
the Federated States of Micronesia (an
example of an associated state in the US)

5 This doctrine means the non-disclosure of sensitive information by the Executive, as regards, for example, national security 7 Such as the BJE’s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government
6 “4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared to ensure the BJE’s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions …” the Centre
 3 under RESOURCES in the MOA-AD
states that “the BJE is free to enter into any
 Concept of ASSOCIATION is not recognized economic cooperation and trade relations
in our Constitution with foreign countries: provided however
1. No province, city or municipality has an that such relationships and
“associative” relationship with the understandings do not include aggression
national government against the Government of the Republic of
2. Court says: “even the mere concept of the Philippines x x x”
animating many of the MOA-AD’s
provisions already require for the 3. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution
amendment of constitutional provisions, must also be amended to effect the scheme
such as in Article X8” envisioned in the MOA-AD.

 It violates of a number of articles in the “The State recognizes and promotes the
Constitution rights of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and
1. Article X, Section 20 (defines the powers of
development”
autonomous regions)

Court says that because of the associative

Section 20. Within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of ties between the BJE and the national
this Constitution and national laws, the government, the act of placing a portion of
Philippine territory in a status which in
organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over: international practice has generally
been a preparation for independence,
(1) Administrative organization; is certainly not conducive to national unity.
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
xxx  MOA-AD is also not in consonance with a
number of statutes.
(9) Such other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the
1. Article X Section 3 of the Organic Act of the
general welfare of the people of the region. ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the
(Underscoring supplied) definition of “Bangsamoro people” used in
the MOA

MOA-AD lumps together the identities of

2. It is only the President who has the power
the Bangsamoro with the other indigenous
to enter into treaties9 however, paragraph
peoples living in Mindanao (the Organic

8SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and 9 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs:
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided In our system of government, the President, being the head of state is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect x x x the President is vested with authority to
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao xxx within the framework of this Constitution and the deal with foreign states and governments x x x In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. other states.
 Act of the ARMM distinguishes between defined in civil law as a future and
Bangsa Moro people and Tribal peoples) uncertain event – but of a term. It is not a
question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will be
2. Chapter VII Section 52 of the IPRA lays
effected but WHEN. There is no
down a detailed procedure in the
uncertainty, thus pursuant to this, it is
delineation and recognition of ancestral
mandatory for the GRP to effect the
domains which is not what is in the MOA-
changes to the legal framework.
AD

This is inconsistent with the limits of the

MOA-AD simply states in Paragraph 1
President’s authority to propose
TERRITORY, “[t]he Bangsamoro
constitutional amendments, it being a
homeland and historic territory refer to the
virtual guarantee that the
land mass as well as the maritime x x x
Constitution and other laws will
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan
certainly be adjusted to conform to the
geographic region.”
MOA-AD.

3. Upholding such would be authorizing a

 The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD is usurpation of the constituent powers
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention or the people themselves
1. Paragraph 7 in GOVERNANCE section of through initiative because the only way
the MOA-AD states: that the Executive can guarantee these
amendments is through undue influence
“7. Parties agree that the mechanisms and and interference with the legislative
process. Thus, it should be struck down
modalities for the actual implementation of
as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take
such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
VERDICT:
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon
1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Main and intervening
effecting the necessary changes to the legal
petitions are GRANTED.
framework with due regard to non- 2. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect
derogation of prior agreements and within of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION.
the Comprehensive Compact.”

LAWS CITED:
2. Court opines that this stipulation does not
bear a mark of a “suspensive” condition –
Executive Order No. 3 Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for
Government’s Comprehensive Peace Efforts

The 1987 Philippine Constitution

Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA) (R.A. 8371)

Local Government Code (R.A. 7160)