RPC Reyes

CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal Law, defined.

Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes,
treats of their nature, and provides for their punishment. (12 Cyc. 129)
Crime, defined.
Crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law
forbidding or commanding it. (I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Rawle's
Third Revision, 729)
Sources of Philippine Criminal Law.

1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its amend ments.
2. Special Penal Laws passed by the Philippine Commission, Philippine

Assembly, Philippine Legislature, National As sembly, the Congress
of the Philippines, and the Batasang Pambansa.
3. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law. No
common law crimes in the Philippines.

The so-called common law crimes, known in the United States and
England as the body of principles, usages and rules of action, which do not rest
for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the
legislature, are not recognized in this country. Unless there be a particular
provision in the penal code or special penal law that defines and punishes the
act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by
its com
mission. (See U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599, 604)
Court decisions are not sources of criminal law, because they merely
explain the meaning of, and apply, the law as enacted by the legislative
branch of the government.
l
CRIMINAL LAW IN GENERAL
Limitations to Enact Criminal Legislation
Power to define and punish crimes.

The State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish
crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure. States, as a part of
their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating and denning
criminal offenses. (People vs. Santiago, 43 Phil. 120, 124)
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the
attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively
charged by the common will of the members of society to look after, guard and
defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and the
liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights. (U.S. vs.
Pablo, 35 Phil. 94, 100)
Limitations on the power of the lawmaking body to enact

penal legislation.
The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution imposes the following
limitations:
1. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Art.

Ill, Sec. 22)
2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. (Art. Ill, Sec. 14[1])
The first limitation prohibits the passage of retroactive laws which are
prejudicial to the accused.
An ex post facto law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than

the law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
2
CRIMINAL LAW IN
GENERAL Constitutional Rights of
the Accused
(5) assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done
was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which

he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay
Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 429, 431)
Congress is also prohibited from passing an act which would inflict

punishment without judicial trial, for that would constitute a bill of attainder.
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts

punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. (People vs.
Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382, 395)
Example:
Congress passes a law which authorizes the arrest and
imprisonment of communists without the benefit of a judicial trial.
To give a law retroactive application to the prejudice of the

accused is to make it an ex post facto law.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight
years and one day to ten years, imposed by Presidential Decree No.
818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing checks
committed on or after October 22, 1985. That increased penalty
does not apply to estafa committed on October 16, 1974 because it
would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive
application is prohibited by Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal
Code and Section 12, Article IV (now Sec. 22, Art. HI, of the
1987 Constitution). (People vs. Villaraza, 81 SCRA 95, 97)
The second limitation requires that criminal laws must be of general

application and must clearly define the acts and omissions punished as crimes.
Constitutional rights of the accused.

Article III, Bill of Rights, of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
following rights:
3
CRIMINAL LAW IN
GENERAL Constitutional Rights of
the Accused
1. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their

cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administra tive bodies.
(Sec. 16)
2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. (Sec. 14[1])
3. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required. (Sec. 13)
4. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
(Sec. 14[2])
5. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. (Sec. 17)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. (Sec. 12[1])
No torture, force, violence; threat, intimidation, or

any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
4
Statutory Rights of the Accused
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec 12[2])
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(Sec. 12[3])
6. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. (Sec. 19[1])
7. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act. (Sec. 21)
8. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
(Sec. 11)
Statutory rights of the accused.

Section 1, Rule 115, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:
1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond

reasonable doubt.
2. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
3. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of
the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment, xxx
4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to
cross-examination on matters covered by direct exami nation. His
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
5. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
6. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial, x x x
5
Characteristics of Criminal Law
7. To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of

witnesse s and production of other evidence in his behalf.
8. To have a speedy, impartial and public trial.
9. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by
law.
Rights of the accused which may be waived and rights

which may not be waived.
A right which may be waived is the right of the accused to confrontation
and cross-examination. A right which may not be waived is the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which

may be waived and rights which may not be waived is that those rights which
may be waived are personal, while those rights which may not be waived
involve public interest which may be affected. (2 Moran, Rules of
Court, 1952 Edition, 748)
Characteristics of criminal law.

Criminal law has three main characteristics: (1) general, (2) territorial,
and (3) prospective.
I. GENERAL, in that criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn
in Philippine territory. (Art. 14, new Civil Code)
In a case where the accused contended that being an American citizen, he
cannot be prosecuted for, much less convicted of, the crime of illegal possession
of firearms, because it is a constitutional right of the citizens of the United
States of America "to keep and bear arms" without any need of
applying and securing a government license therefor, the Court of Appeals
held:
"The Philippine s is a sovereign stat e with the obligation

and the right of every government to uphold its laws and maintain
order within its domain, and with the general jurisdiction to
punish persons for offenses committed within its territory,
regardless of the nationality
6
of the offender. (Salonga and Yap, Public International

Law, p. 169) No foreigner enjoys in this country
extra-territorial right to be exempted from its laws and
jurisdiction, with the exception of heads of states and diplomatic
representatives who, by virtue of the customary law of nations, are
not subject to the Philippine territorial jurisdiction." (People vs.
Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027)
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not

affected by the military character of the accused.
U.S. vs. Sweet

(1 Phil. 18)
Facts: Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the Philippines.

He assaulted a prisoner of war for which he was charged with the crime
of physical injuries. Sweet interposed the defense that the fact that he was
an employee of the U.S. military authorities deprived the court of the
jurisdiction to try and punish him.
Held: The case is open to the application of the general principle
that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or
other special character of the person brought before them for trial,
unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general

courts martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
Civil courts have jurisdiction over murder cases committed by persons
subject to military law. The civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
military courts or general courts-martial over soldiers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Civil courts have jurisdiction over the offense of malversation (Art. 217)
committed by an army finance officer. (People vs. Livara, G.R. No. L-6021,
April 20, 1954)
Even in times of war, the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the military courts or general courts-martial over soldiers of the
Philippine Army, provided that in the place of the commission of the crime no
hostilities are in progress and civil courts are functioning. (Valdez vs. Lucero,
76 Phil. 356)
7
The Revised Penal Code or other penal law is not

applicable when the military court takes cognizance of the
case.
When the military court takes cognizance of the case involving a person
subject to military law, the Articles of War apply, not the Revised Penal Code
or other penal law.
"By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area

from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, the accused,
who were civilians at the outbreak of the war, became members of
the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War." (Ruffy, et al. vs. Chief
of Staff, et al., 75 Phil. 875)
Jurisdiction of military courts.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:
"Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical
persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense,
as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected,
in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: Provided, That
the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or
direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be
tried by the proper civil courts.
"As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall

be limited to those denned in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92,
and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
"In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the
court-martial may take into consideration the penalty prescribed
therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local
government ordinances."
The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are
considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act
No. 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the
8
Articles of War, to wit: those under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95
to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes
or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the Regional Trial
Court cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdic tion over those
charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64
(Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General Article) of the
Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses
or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the
military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses. (Navales, et. al.
vs. Abaya, et. al, G.R. Nos. 162318-162341, Oct. 25, 2004)
The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a

bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same
offense.
A court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a
criminal, not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain
conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the accused for the same offense,
because the latter would place the accused in double jeopardy. (Marcos and
Concordia vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 246)
Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by

military com mission.
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen though of a Japanese father, and
associating himself with Japan in the war against the United States of America
and the Philippines, committed atrocities against unarmed and
non-combatant Filipino civilians and looted Filipino property. He is, indeed, a
war criminal subject to the jurisdiction of the military commission. (Cantos
vs. Styer, 76 Phil. 748)
Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines establishing
a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules
9
and regulations governing the trial of war criminals is valid and

constitutional, the President of the Philippines having acted in conformity
with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which
are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an
exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-in-Chief of all our
armed forces.
"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation
of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be
disposed of as in time of war." A military commission "has jurisdiction
so long as a technical state of war continues." This includes the period of an
armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of peace.
(Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, et al., 83 Phil. 171; Cowles, Trial of War Criminals
by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association, June, 1944)
Exceptions to the general application of Criminal Law.

There are cases where our Criminal Law does not apply even if the crime
is committed by a person residing or sojourning in the Philippines. These
constitute the exceptions.
The opening sentence of Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code says that the
provisions of this Code shall be enforced within the Philippine Archipelago,
"except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application."
Article 14 of the new Civil Code provides that penal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and
to treaty stipulations.
Treaties or treaty stipulations.

An example of a treaty or treaty stipulation, as an exception to the
general application of our criminal law, is the Bases Agreement entered into by
and between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
on March 14, 1947 (which expired on 16 September 1991), stipulating that
"(t)he Philippines consents that the United States have the right to
exercise jurisdiction over the fol
lowing offenses:
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base, except where
the offender and the offended party are both
10
Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United

States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the
Philippines;
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed
forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a
member of the armed forces of the United States; and
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed
forces of the United States against the security of the United
States."
Under the Agreement between the United States of America and the
Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Treatment of United States Armed
Forces Visiting the Philippines which was signed on 10 February 1998
("RP-US Visiting Forces Accord"), the Philippines agreed that:
(a) US military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the
Philippines all criminal and disciplinary juris diction conferred on
them by the military law of the US over US personnel in RP;
(b) US authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with

respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
US punishable under the law of the US, but not under the laws of
RP;
(c) US military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction over US personnel subject to the military law of the
US in relation to: (1) offenses solely against the property or
security of the US or offenses solely against the property or person
of US personnel; and (2) offenses arising out of any act or omission
done in performance of official duty.
Law of preferential application.

Example of a law of preferential application.
Rep. Act No. 75 may be considered a law of preferential
application in favor of diplomatic representatives and their domestic
servants.
11
It is a law to penalize acts which would impair the proper

observance by the Republic and inhabitants of the Philippines of the
immunities, rights, and privileges of duly accredited foreign diplomatic
representatives in the Philippines. Its pertinent provisions are:
"SEC. 4. Any writ or process issued out or prosecuted by any
person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or
justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any
foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any
domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is
arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized or
attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the
same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and
every officer concerned in executing it, shall, upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of
not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court."
Exceptions:
"SEC. 5. The provisions of Section four hereof shall not apply to

any case where the person against whom the process is issued is a citizen
or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the
service of an ambassador or a public minister, and the process is founded
upon a debt contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall the
said section apply to any case where the person against whom the process
is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public minister,
unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City of Manila,
who shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his
office. All persons shall have resort to the list of names so posted in the
office of the Chief of Police, and may take copies without fee."
Not applicable when the foreign country adversely affected does not provide
similar protection to our diplomatic representa tives.
"SEC. 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable

only in cases where the country of the diplomatic or consular repre-
12
CRIMINAL LAW IN
GENERAL Characteristics of
Criminal Law
sentative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly

accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of the Republic of the
Philippines by prescribing like or similar penal ties for like or similar
offenses herein contained."
Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws by

virtue of the principles of public international law.
The following are not subject to the operation of our criminal laws:
(1) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state.

(2) Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resi dent, and
charges d'affaires.
It is a well-established principle of international law that diplomatic

representatives, such as ambassadors or public ministers and their official
retinue, possess immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the country of their
sojourn and cannot be sued, arrested or punished by the law of that country. (II
Hyde, International Law, 2nd Ed., 1266)
A consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of

an ambassador or minister.
It is well-settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and
regulations of the country to which he is accredited.
(Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 250)
In the absence of a treaty to the contrary, a consul is not exempt from
criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides.
Consuls, vice-consuls and other commercial representatives of foreign
nations do not possess the status of, and cannot claim the privileges and
immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International
Law, Sec. 249)
II. TERRITORIAL, in that criminal laws undertake to punish crimes
committed within Philippine territory.
The principle of territoriality means that as a rule, penal laws of the
Philippines are enforceable only within its territory.
13
Extent of Philippine territory for purposes of criminal law.

Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the provisions of said
code shall be enforced within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone.
Article I of the 1987 Constitution provides that the national territory
comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including
its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of
the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
Exceptions to the territorial application of criminal law.

The same Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that its provisions
shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of the Philippines against those
who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the

Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the Government
of the Philippines;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into the
Philippines of the obligations and securities mentioned in the
preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in

the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the
law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code.
III. PROSPECTIVE, in that a penal law cannot make an act punishable in a
manner in which it was not punishable when committed. As provided in
Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code, crimes are punished under the
laws in force at the time of their commission.
14
Different Effects of Repeal of Penal Law
Exceptions to the prospective application of criminal laws.

Whenever a new statute dealing with crime establishes con ditions more
lenient or favorable to the accused, it can be given a retroactive effect.
But this exception has no application:

1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pend ing
actions or existing causes of action. (Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 463,
470-471)
2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal under Rule 5, Article 62,

Revised Penal Code. (Art. 22, RPC)
Different effects of repeal of penal law.

1. If the repeal make s the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law
shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent
or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or
existing causes of action.
2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be applied.
3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act which
was penalized under the old law is no longer punishable, the crime
is obliterated.
When the repeal is absolute the offense ceases to be crimi

nal.
People vs. Tamayo

(61 Phil. 225)
Facts: The accused was prosecuted for and convicted of a violation

of an ordinance. While the case was pending appeal, the ordinance was
repealed by eliminating the section under which the accused was being
prosecuted.
Ruling: The repeal is absolute. Where the repeal is absolute, and
not a reenactment or repeal by implication, the offense
ceases to be criminal. The accused must be acquitted.
15
But repeal of a penal law by its reenactment, even without a

saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability. (U.S. vs. Cuna, 12
Phil. 241)
When the new law and the old law penalize the same
offense, the offender can be tried under the old law.
U.S. vs. Cuna

(12 Phil. 241)
Facts: The accused was charged with selling opium in violation of

Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission. During the pendency of the
case, Act No. 1761 took effect repealing the former law, but both Act No.
1461 and Act No. 1761 penalize offenses against the opium laws.
Ruling: Where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an of fense
repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does
not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to
try, convict, and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law
prior to its repeal.
The penalty prescribed by Act No. 1761 is not more favorable to the
accused than that prescribed in Act No. 1461, the penalty in both Acts being
the same.
When the repealing law fails to penalize the offense

under the old law, the accused cannot be convicted
under the new law.
People vs. Sindiong and Pastor

(77 Phil. 1000)
Facts: The accused was prosecuted for neglecting to make a return

of the sales of newspapers and magazines within the time prescribed by
certain sections of the Revised Administrative Code. Said sections of the
Revised Administrative Code were repealed by the National Internal
Revenue Code which does not require the making of return of sales of
newspapers and magazines.
Ruling: The court loses jurisdiction where the repealing law wholly
fails to penalize the act denned and penalized as an offense in the
old law. The accused, charged with violations of the old law prior to the
repeal, cannot be legally prosecuted after such repeal.
16
The provisions of said sections of the Revised Administrative Code

were not reenacted, even substantially, in the National Internal Revenue
Code.
A person erroneously accused and convicted under a

repealed statute may be punished under the repealing
statute.
The accused was charged with having failed to pay the salary of
Cabasares whom he employed as master fisherman in his motor launch from
June 26 to October 12, 1952. He was convicted under Com. Act No. 303, which
was repealed by Rep. Act No. 602, approved on April 16, 1951, and became
effective 120 days thereafter. The subject-matter of Com. Act No. 303 is entirely
covered by Rep. Act No. 602 with which its provisions are inconsistent. It was
held that the fact that the offender was erroneously accused and convicted
under a statute which had already been repealed and therefore no longer
existed at the time the act complained of was committed does not prevent
conviction under the repealing statute which punishes the same act, provided
the accused had an opportunity to defend himself against the charge brought
against him. (People vs. Baesa, C.A., 56 O.G. 5466)
A new law which omits anything contained in the old law

dealing on the same subject, operates as a repeal of
anything not so included in the amendatory act.
T he Agricultura l Land Reform Code supersede d the Agricultural
Tenancy Law (except as qualified in Sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code
instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to certain
conditions indicated in Section 4 thereof. It is significant that Section 39 is not
reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose Section 172 repeals
"all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions. Under the
leasehold system, the prohibition against pre-threshing has no more raison
d' etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as
prescribed in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of
Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated in R.A. No. 6389 which took effect on
September 10, 1971. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis cessat
ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases), applies to this
case. (People vs.
Almuete, 69 SCRA 410)
17
Construction of Penal Laws
Self-repealing law.
The anomalous act attributed to Pedro de los Reyes as described in
the information is undoubtedly a violation of Republic Act No. 650 being a
"material misrepresentation in any document required" by said Act "or the
rules and regulations issued thereunder" and was committed while said Act
was in force. It was punishable under Section 18 of said Act with fine or
imprisonment, or both, and with forfeiture of the goods or commodities
imported in violation thereof. (Sec. 18, R.A. No. 650) But since Rep. Act No.
650 expired by its own limitation on June 30, 1953, the forfeiture therein
provided could no longer be subsequently enforced. And, as correctly stated by
the Undersecretary of Justice in his Opinion No. 138, dated July 22,1953,
"the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs to proceed with
the forfeiture of goods and commodities imported in violation of the Import
Control Law was lost and that all proceedings of forfeiture, as well as criminal
actions pending on June 30, 1953, abated with the expiration of Republic Act
No. 650."
The falsification or misrepresentation allegedly committed on the import

license could no longer be a basis for the penalty of forfeiture at the time of the
release of goods. Where an act expires by its own limitation, the effect is the
same as though it had been repealed at the time of its expiration; and it is a
recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the repeal of a law carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal. (People vs. Jacinto,
C.A., 54 O.G. 7587)
Construction of penal laws.

1. Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and
liberally in favor of the accused. (U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil.
243; People vs. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 728) The rule that penal statutes
should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only
where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its
interpretation. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is
no room for the applica
tion of the rule. (People vs. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664)
2. In the construction or interpretation of the provisions of the Revised

Penal Code, the Spanish text is controlling,
18
because it was approved by the Philippine Legislature in its

Spanish text. (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668)
People vs. Garcia

(94 Phil. 814, 815)
Facts: Accused Garcia was prosecuted for having sold tickets for
"Have" races of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, in violation of Act
4130, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 301, which penalizes any
person who, without being a duly authorized agent of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes, sold tickets of said corporation. The tickets sold by
the accused were different from, and not, the tickets issued by said
corporation. The law relied upon does not include "Have" tickets
for Sweepstakes races.
Held: The accused must be acquitted, the act imputed to him not
being punished by Act 4130, as amended.
No person should be brought within the terms of criminal statutes who is

not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is
not clearly made so by the statute. (U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
People vs. Mangulabnan

(99 Phil. 992, 998)
Facts: During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits

fired his gun upward in the ceiling, not knowing that there was a person
in the ceiling of the house. The owner of the house who was up in the
ceiling was hit by the slug that passed through it and was killed.
Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code provides, according to
its English text, that the crime is robbery with homicide "when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery the crime of homicide shall have
been committed."
The Spanish text of the same provision reads, as follows: "Cuando
con motivo o con ocasion del robo resultare homicidio."
Held: In view of the Spanish text which must prevail, the crime
committed is robbery with homicide, even if the homicide supervened by
mere accident.
While the English text of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code
seems to convey the meaning that the homicide should be
19
intentionally committed, the Spanish text means that it is sufficient that the
homicide shall have resulted, even if by mere accident.
Other cases of incorrect translation of the Spanish text

into the English text.
1. "sosteniendo combate" into "engaging in war" in Art.
135. (People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90, 95-96)
2. "sufriendo privacion de libertad" into

"imprisonment" in Art. 157. (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172, 174)
3. "nuevo delito" into "another crime" in the

headnote of Art. 160. (People vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499, 504)
4. "semilla alimenticia" into "cereal" in Art. 303. (People

vs. Mesias, 65 Phil. 267, 268)
5. "filed" in the third paragraph of Art. 344 which is not found in the
Spanish text. (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665, 668)
- oOo -
20
THE REVISED PENAL CODE
(Act No. 3815, as amended)

AN ACT REVISING THE PENAL CODE
AND OTHER PENAL LAWS
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same.
PRELIMINARY ARTICLE - This law shall be known as The Revised Penal

Code."
BOOK ONE
General Provisions Regarding the Date of En
forcement and the Application of the Provisions of this
Code, and Regarding the Offenses, the Persons Liable
and the Penalties
Preliminary Title
DATE OF EFFECTD7ENESS
AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THIS CODE
History of the Revised Penal Code.

This Code is called "Revised Penal Code," because the Committee
which was created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department
21
HISTORY OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
of Justice, dated October 18, 1927, composed of Anacleto Diaz, as

chairman, and Quintin Paredes, Guillermo Guevara, Alex Reyes and Mariano
H. de Joya, as members, was instructed to revise the old Penal Code, taking
into consideration the existing conditions, the special penal laws and the
rulings laid down by the Supreme Court.
The Committee did not undertake the codification of all penal laws in
the Philippines. What the Committee did was merely to revise
the old Penal Code and to include in the draft the other penal laws related to
it.
The Revised Penal Code does not embody the latest progress of criminal
science, as the results of the application of advanced and radical theories "still
remain to be seen."
The old Penal Code, which was revised by the Committee, took effect in
the Philippines on July 14, 1887, and was in force up to December 31, 1931.
In the case of U.S. vs. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321, 323, the

Supreme Court traced the history of the old Penal Code, as fol lows:
"The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directed the execution
of the royal decree of September 4, 1884, wherein it was ordered that the
Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as amended in accordance with the
recommendations of the code committee, be published and applied in the
Philippine Islands xxx . (This law) having been published in the
Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective
four months thereafter."
The Revised Penal Code, as enacted by the Philippine Legisla ture, was
approved on December 8, 1930. It took effect on January 1, 1932. Felonies and
misdemeanors, committed prior to January 1, 1932, were punished in
accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission, as
directed by Art. 366 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Revised Penal Code consists of two books.
The Revised Penal Code consists of two books, namely: (1) Book One,
and (2) Book Two.
22
DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Art 1 REVISED
PENAL CODE
Book One consists of two parts: (a) basic principles affecting criminal
liability (Arts. 1-20), and (b) the provisions on penalties including criminal and
civil liability (Arts. 21-113).
In Book Two are defined felonies with the corresponding penalties,

classified and grouped under fourteen different titles (Arts. 114-365).
Date of Effectiveness.
Articl e 1. Time when Act takes effect. — This Code shall take effec t o n
the first da y o f January , ninetee n hundre d and thirty-two .
The Revised Penal Code is based mainly on principles of

the classical school.
This Revised Penal Code continues, like the old Penal Code, to be based
on the principles of the old or classical school, although some provisions o f
eminentl y positivisti c tendencie s (thos e having reference to the punishment of
impossible crimes, juvenile delinquency, etc.) were incorporated in the present
Code.
Two theories in Criminal Law.

There are two important theories in criminal law: (1) the classical
theory, and (2) the positivist theory.
Characteristics of the classical theory.

1. The basis of criminal liability is human free will and the purpose of the
penalty is retribution.
2. That ma n is essentiall y a moral creatur e with an absolutely free
will to choose between good and evil, thereby placing more stress
upon the effect or result of the felonious act than upon the man,
the criminal himself.
3. It has endeavored to establish a mechanical and direct proportion
between crime and penalty.
23
Art. 2 APPLICATION OF ITS PROVISIONS
4. There is a scant regard to the human element. (Basic Principles,

Rationale, p. 2, by the Code Commission on Code of Crimes)
Characteristics of the positivist theory.

1. That man is subdued occasionally by a strange and morbid
phenomenon which constrains him to do wrong, in spite of or
contrary to his volition.
2. That crime is essentially a social and natural phenomenon, and as
such, it cannot be treated and checked by the application of
abstract principles of law and jurisprudence nor by the imposition
of a punishment, fixed and determined a priori; but rather
through the enforcement of individual measures in each particular
case after a thorough, personal and individual investigation
conducted by a competent body of psychiatrists and social
scientists.
(Basic Principles, Rationale, pp. 2 and 3, by the Code Commission on

Code of Crimes)
Art. 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provide d i n the treatie s

and law s o f preferentia l application, the provisions o f this Code shall be
enforce d no t onl y withi n the Philippine Archipelago , including its
atmosphere , its interio r water s and maritim e zone , but als o outside o f its
jurisdiction, against thos e who :
1. Shoul d commit an offens e whil e on a Philippine shi p o r airship;

2 . Shoul d forg e o r counterfeit any coi n o r currenc y not e o f the
Philippin e Islands o r obligations a nd securitie s issue d by the
Government o f the Philippine Islands;
3 . Shoul d be liabl e fo r acts connecte d wit h the introduction int o thes
e Islands o f the obligations and securitie s mentione d i n the
preceding number ;
4. While being publi c officers or employees, should com m it an offens e
in the exercis e o f thei r functions; o r
24
APPLICATION OF ITS PROVISIONS
Art. 2
5. Shoul d commit any o f the crime s against nationa l securit y and the
la w o f nations, defined i n Titl e One o f Boo k Tw o o f this Code .
Scope of the application of the provisions of the Revised

Penal Code.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be enforced not only
within the Philippine Archipelago, but also outside of its juris diction in certain
cases.
The five paragraphs of Art. 2 treat of the application of the Revised Penal
Code to acts committed in the air, at sea, and even in a foreign country when
such acts affect the political or economic life of the nation.
In what cases are the provisions of the Revised Penal Code

applicable even if the felony is committed outside of the
Philippines?
They are applicable in the following cases:
1. When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine

ship or airship.
The Philippine vessel, although beyond three miles from the

seashore, is considered part of the national territory.
Thus, any person who committed a crime on board a Philippine

ship or airship while the same is outside of the Philippine territory can
be tried before our civil courts for violation of the Penal Code.
But when the Philippine vessel or aircraft is in the territory of a
foreign country, the crime committed on said vessel or aircraft is subject
to the laws of that foreign country.
A Philippine vessel or aircraft must be understood as that which is
registered in the Philippine Bureau of Customs.
It is the registration of the vessel or aircraft in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of its owner, which makes
it a Philippine ship or airship. A vessel or aircraft
25
which is unregistered or unlicensed does not come within the purview

of paragraph No. 1 of Art. 2.
Thus, if a crime is committed ten miles from the shores of the
Philippines on board a vessel belonging to a Filipino, but the same is not
registered or licensed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines,
paragraph No. 1 of Art. 2 is not applicable.
The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime of theft

committed on the high seas on board a vessel not registered or licensed in
the Philippines. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614)
2. When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency

note of the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the
Government.
Thus, any person who makes false or counterfeit coins (Art. 163)
or forges treasury or bank notes or other obligations and securities (Art.
166) in a foreign country may be prosecuted before our civil courts for
violation of Art. 163 or Art. 166 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. When the offender should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into the Philippines of the obligations and securities
mentioned in the preceding number.
The reason for this provision is that the introduction of forged or

counterfeited obligations and securities into the Philippines is as
dangerous as the forging or counterfeiting of the same, to the economical
interest of the country.
4. When the offender, while being a public officer or employee, should

commit an offense in the exercise of his functions.
The crimes that may be committed in the exercise of public
functions are direct bribery (Art. 210), indirect bribery (Art. 211),
frauds against the public treasury (Art. 213), possession of prohibited
interest (Art. 216), malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217),
failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art. 218), illegal use of
public funds or property (Art. 220), failure to make delivery of public
funds or property (Art. 221), and falsification by a public officer or
employee committed with abuse of his official position. (Art. 171)
26
Art. 2
When any of these felonies is committed abroad by any of our

public officers or employees while in the exercise of his functions,
he can be prosecuted here.
5. When the offender should commit any of the crimes against the
national security and the law of nations.
The crimes against the national security and the law of nations are
treason (Art. 114), conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art.
115), espionage (Art. 117), inciting to war and giving motives for reprisals
(Art. 118), violation of neutrality (Art. 119), correspondence
with hostile country (Art. 120), flight to enemy's country (Art.
121), and piracy and mutiny on the high seas. (Art. 122)
The crimes punishable in the Philippines under Art. 2 are

cognizable by the Regional Trial Court in which the charge
is filed.
The crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein
under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court in which the charge is first filed. (Rule 110, Sec. 15[d], Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure)
Regional Trial Courts (formerly CFI) have original jurisdic tion

over all crimes and offenses commited on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country on board a ship or warcraft of any kind registered
or licensed in the Philippines in accord ance with its laws. (Sec. 44[g], Judiciary
Act of 1948, Rep. Act No. 296)
IMPORTANT WORDS AND PHRASES IN ART. 2

1. "Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application."
This phrase means that while the general rule is that the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be enforced against any
person who violates any of its provisions while living or sojourning
in the Philippines, the exceptions to that rule may be provided by
the treaties and laws of preferential applications, like the RP-US
Visiting Forces Accord, the Military Bases Agreement between the
Republic
27
3pW2!»
of the Philippines and the United States of America, and the

provisions of Rep. Act No. 75.
2. "its atmosphere."
The sovereignty of the subjacent State,

and therefore its penal laws extend to all the air space which
covers its territory, subject to the right of way or easement in
favor of foreign aircrafts.
3. "interior waters."
The phrase "interior waters" includes creeks, rivers, lakes
and bays, gulfs, straits, coves, inlets and roadsteads lying wholly
within the three-mile limit.
4. "maritime zone."
The States by means of treaties have fixed its length to three
miles from the coastline, starting from the low water mark.
It includes those bays, gulfs, adjacent

parts of the sea or recesses in the coastline whose width
at their entrance is not more than twelve miles measured in a
straight line from headland to headland, and all straits of less
than six miles wide.
For those straits having more than that width, the space in
the center outside of the marine league limits is considered as open
sea. (Opinion of Attorney General, Jan. 18,1912)
Crimes committed on board foreign merchant ship or

airship.
Just as our merchant ship is an extension of our territory, foreign
merchant ship is considered an extension of the territory of the country to
which it belongs. For this reason, an offense commited on the high seas on
board a foreign merchant vessel is not triable by our courts. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1
Phil. 614)
Continuing offense on board a foreign vessel.

But a continuing crime committed on board a Norwegian merchant
vessel sailing from Formosa to the Philippines, by failing
28
Art. 2
to provide stalls for animals in transit in violation of Act No. 55, is triable in the
Philippines.
The offense of failing to provide suitable means for securing animals

while transporting them on a (foreign) ship from a foreign port to a port of the
Philippines is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines when the
forbidden conditions existed during the time the ship was within territorial
waters, regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship
sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas. (U.S. vs. Bull, 15
Phil. 7)
Offense committed on board a foreign merchant vessel
while on Philippine waters is triable before our court.
Since the Philippine territory extends to three miles from the headlands,
when a foreign merchant vessel enters this three-mile limit, the ship's officers
and crew become subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. The space within 3
miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay is within territorial waters. (U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 17-18)
Rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard

foreign merchant vessels.
There are two rules as to jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard
merchant vessels while in the territorial waters of another country.
French Rule. — Such crimes are not triable in the courts of that country,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory or the
safety of the state is endangered.
English Rule. — Such crimes are triable in that country, unless they
merely affect things within the vessel or they refer to the internal management
thereof.
In this country, we observe the English Rule.
According to the French theory and practice, matters

happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquility of
the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiceable only by the courts of
the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant
vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew against
29
another. Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claimed by Great

Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (U.S.
vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7, 14)
Do the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime

of homicide committed on board a foreign merchant
vessel by a member of the crew against another?
Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are
to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the
offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction.
It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the two

jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly
depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must
concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that
if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way, the
consul has no right to interfere to prevent it. (Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper
of the Common Jail, 120 U.S. 1, cited in People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729,
731-732)
Crimes not involving a breach of public order committed on

board a foreign merchant vessel in transit not triable by our
courts.
Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign merchant vessel in transit is
not triable in Philippine courts, because that fact alone does not constitute a
breach of public order. The reason for this ruling is that mere possession of
opium on such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring about
in this country those disastrous effects that our law contemplates avoiding. But
said courts acquire jurisdiction when the tins of opium are landed from the
vessel on Philippine soil. Landing or using opium is an open violation of the
laws of the Philippines. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573, 577-578)
When the foreign merchant vessel is not in transit because the Philippines
is its terminal port, the person in possession of opium on board that vessel is
liable, because he may be held guilty of illegal importation of opium. (U.S. vs.
Ah Sing, 36 Phil. 978, 981-982)
30
Art. 2
Smoking opium constitutes a breach of public order.

Smoking opium aboard an English vessel while anchored two and
one-half miles in Manila Bay constitutes a breach of public order, because the
primary object of the law in punishing the use of opium is to protect the
inhabitants of this country against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of
such drug. And to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. Philippine courts have jurisdiction over crimes constituting a
breach of public order aboard merchant vessels anchored in Philippine
jurisdictional waters. (People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729, 733)
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over offenses

committed on board foreign warships in territorial waters.
In case vessels are in the ports or territorial waters of a foreign country, a
distinction must be made between merchant ships and warships; the former are
more or less subjected to the territorial laws. (See U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil.
7; U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573; and People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729)
Warships are always reputed to be the territory of the country to which

they belong and cannot be subjected to the laws of another state. A United
States Army transport is considered a warship. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. 614)
Extra-territorial application of Republic Act No. 9372.

Rep. Act No. 9372, otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of
2007" which was passed into law on 6 March 2007 has extra territorial
application.
Section 58 of Rep. Act No. 9372 provides that subject to the provision of
an existing treaty of which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary
provision of any law of preferential application, the provisions of the Act shall
apply:
(1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in the Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters,
maritime zone and airspace of the Philippines;
31

limits of the Philippines, commit any
of the said crimes on board
(2) Philippine ship or airship;
to individual persons who commit

any of said crimes within any
embassy, consulate or diplomatic
(3) (4) premises belonging to or occupied
by the Philippine government in an
official capacity;
to individual persons who, although

physically outside the territorial
(5) (6) limits of the Philippines, commit
said crimes against Philippine
citizens or persons of Philippine
descent, where their citizenship or
ethnicity was a factor in the
to individual persons who, although commission of the crime; and
physically outside the territorial to individual persons who, although
limits of the Philippines, commit,
conspire of plot any of the crimes
limits of the Philippines, commit
denned and punished in the
said crimes directly against the
Act inside the territorial limits of
Philippine government.
the Philippines;
to individual persons who, although
32
Title One
FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Chapter One
FELONIES
Art. 3. Definition. — Acts and omissions punishabl e by l a w ar e felonie s

(delitos).
Felonie s ar e committe d no t onl y by means o f deceit (dolo) b ut

als o by means o f fault (culpa).
Ther e is deceit whe n the ac t is performe d wit h deliberat e intent; and

ther e is fault whe n the wrongful ac t results from imprudence , negligence , lac
k o f foresight, o r lack o f skill.
Felonies, defined.
Felonies are acts and omissions punishable by the Revised Penal Code.
Elements of felonies.
The elements of felonies in general are:
1. That there must be an act or omission.
2. That the act or omission must be punishable by the Revised Penal
Code.
3. That the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo
or culpa. (People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990,
183 SCRA 309, 324)
33
Art. 3 FELONIES
IMPORTANT WORDS AN D PHRASES IN ART. 3.
Meaning of the word "act."

By act must be understood any bodily movement tending to produce
some effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the same be
actually produced, as the possibility of its production is sufficient. (See People
vs. Gonzales, supra)
But the act must be one which is defined by the Revised Penal Code as
constituting a felony; or, at least, an overt act of that felony, that is, an external
act which has direct connection with the felony intended to be committed. (See
Art. 6)
Example of felony by performing an act.

A took the watch of B with intent to gain and without the consent of the
latter. The act of taking the watch of B, with intent to gain, constitutes the
crime of theft.
Only external act is punished.

The act must be external, because internal acts are beyond the sphere of
penal law. Hence, a criminal thought or a mere intention, no matter how
immoral or improper it may be, will never constitute a felony.
Thus, even if A entertains the idea of killing B, as long as he does not

commence the commission of the crime directly by overt act, A is not
criminally liable.
Meaning of the word "omission."

By omission is meant inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty
which one is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or
performance of an act.
Examples of felony by omission:

1. Anyone who fails to render assistance to any person whom he finds
in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, is liable for
abandonment of persons in danger. (Art. 275, par. 1)
34
FELONIES
Art. 3
2. An officer entrusted with collection of taxes who voluntarily fails to

issue a receipt as provided by law, is guilty of illegal exaction. (Art.
213, par. 2[b])
3. Every person owing allegiance to the Philippines, without being a
foreigner, and having knowledge of any conspiracy against the
government, who does not disclose and make known the same to the
proper authority, is liable for misprision of treason. (Art. 116)
It will be noted that in felonies by omission, there is a law re quiring a

certain act to be performed and the person required to do the act fails to
perform it.
The omission must be punishable by law.

Becaus e there is no law that punishe s a person who does not report to
the authorities the commission of a crime which he witnessed, the omission to
do so is not a felony.
People vs. Silvestre and Atienza

(56 Phil. 353)
Facts: Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct par

ticipation and Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of
arson by the Court of First Instance.
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz
and his wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with
the appellants herein after supper, Martin Atienza told said couple to
take their furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it.
Upon being asked by Nicolas and Antonia why he wanted to set fire to
the house, he answered that it was the only way he could be revenged
upon the people of Masocol, who, he said, had instigated the charge of
adultery against him and his co-defendant, Romana Silvestre. As Martin
Atienza was at that time armed with a pistol, no one dared say anything
to him, not even Romana Silvestre, who was about a meter away from
her co-defendant. Alarmed at what Martin Atienza had said, the couple
left the house at once to communicate with the barrio lieutenant,
Buenaventura Ania, as to what they had just heard Martin Atienza say;
but they had hardly gone a hundred arms' length when they heard cries
of "Fire! Fire!" Turning back they saw their home in flames. The
fire destroyed about forty-eight
houses.
35
Art. 3 FELONIES
Romana listened to her co-defendant's threat without raising a

protest, and did not give the alarm when the latter set fire to the house.
Held: Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere
silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, is not punishable.
Romana Silvestre was acquitted.
"Punishable by law."
This is the other element of a felony. This is based upon the maxim,
"nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege," that is, there is no
crime where there is no law punishing it.
The phrase "punished by law" should be understood to mean "punished

by the Revised Penal Code" and not by a special law. That is to say, the term
"felony" means acts and omissions punished in the Revised Penal Code, to
distinguish it from the words "crime" and "offense" which are
applied to infractions of the law punished by special statutes.
Classification of felonies according to the means by which

they are committed.
Art. 3 classifies felonies, according to the means by which they are
committed, into (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies.
Thus, the second paragraph of Art. 3 states that felonies are committed
not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
Intentional felonies and culpable felonies distinguished.

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In
the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the
intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission
of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another
person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) As stated in Art. 3, the
36
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill.
Felonies committed by means of dolo or with malice.

The word "deceit" in the second paragraph of Art. 3 is not the proper
translation of the word "dolo." Dolus is equivalent to malice, which is
the intent to do an injury to another. (I Wharton's Criminal Law 180)
When the offender, in performing an act or in incurring an omission, has

the intention to do an injury to the person, property, or right of
another, such offender acts with malice. If the act or omission is punished by the
Revised Penal Code, he is liable for intentional felony.
Most of the felonies defined and penalized in Book II of the Revised Penal
Code are committed by means of dolo or with malice. There are few felonies
committed by means of fault or culpa. Art. 217 punishes malversation through
negligence. Art. 224 punishes evasion through negligence. Art. 365 punishes
acts by imprudence or negligence, which, had they been intentional, would
constitute grave, less grave or light felonies.
There are crimes which cannot be committed through impru dence or

negligence, such as, murder, treason, robbery, and malicious mischief.
Felonies committed by means of fault or culpa.

Between an act performed voluntarily and intentionally, and another
committed unconsciously and quite unintentionally, there exists another,
performed without malice, but at the same time punishable, though in a lesser
degree and with an equal result, an intermediate act which the Penal Code
qualifies as imprudence or negligence.
A person who caused an injury, without intention to cause

an evil, may be held liable for culpable felony.
The defendant, who was not a medical practitioner, tied a girl, wrapped
her feet with rags saturated with petroleum and thereafter set them on fire,
causing injuries. His defense was that he undertook
37
Art. 3 FELONIES
to render medical assistance in good faith and to the best of his ability to cure
her of ulcer. It was held that while there was no intention to cause an evil but
to provide a remedy, the defendant was liable for physical injuries through
imprudence. (U.S. vs. Divino, 12 Phil. 175, 190)
Imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action. Negligence indicates a
deficiency of perception. If a person fails to take the necessary precaution to
avoid injury to person or damage to property, there is imprudence. If a person
fails to pay proper attention and to use due diligence in foreseeing the injury
or damage impending to be caused, there is negligence. Negligence usually
involves lack of foresight. Imprudence usually involves lack of skill.
Reason for punishing acts of negligence (culpa).

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts;
it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as
anyone might foresee and for his acts which no one would have performed
except through culpable abandon. Otherwise, his own person, rights and
property, and those of his fellow beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury. (U.S. vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468, 470)
In felonies committed by means of dolo or with malice and

in felonies committed by means of fault or culpa, the acts or
omissions are voluntary.
The adjective voluntary used in the old Penal Code is suppressed in the
definition of felonies in Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. This omission does
not mean that an involuntary act may constitute a felony. As in the old Penal
Code, the act or omission must be voluntary and punishable by law to constitute
a felony. Art. 3 classifies felonies into (1) intentional felonies, and (2)
culpable felonies. An intentional felony is committed when the act is performed
with deliberate intent, which must necessarily be voluntary.
On the other hand, in culpable felony, which is committed when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill, the act is also voluntary.
38
FELONIES
Art. 3
The only difference between intentional felonies and culpable felonies is

that, in the first, the offender acts with malice; whereas, in the second, the
offender acts without malice.
The definition of reckless imprudence in Art. 365 says "reckless

imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results."
Thus, a hunter who seemed to have seen with his lantern something like
the eyes of a deer about fifty meters from him and then shot it, but much to his
surprise, on approaching what he thought was a deer, it proved to be his
companion, performed a voluntary act in discharging his gun, although the
resulting homicide is without malice, because he did not have the intent to kill
the deceased. But the hunter, knowing that he had two companions,
should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable
accident, such as the one that unfortunately occurred on the person of one of his
companions. The hunter was guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence (People vs. Ramirez, 48 Phil. 206)
A criminal act is presumed to be voluntary. Fact prevails over

assumption, and in the absence of indubitable explanation, the act must be
declared voluntary and punishable. (People vs. Macalisang, 22 SCRA 699)
Acts executed negligently are voluntary.
People vs. Lopez

(C.A. 44 O.G. 584)
Facts: Lopez was driving a truck. A girl was crossing the street
during a torrential rain. The girl was struck down by the truck. During
the trial, Lopez claimed that he had no intention of causing injury to the
girl.
Held: Lopez was not accused of intentional homicide, but of having
caused her death by reckless imprudence, which implies lack of malice
and criminal intent. Acts executed negligently are voluntary, although
done without malice or criminal design. In this case, Lopez was not
compelled to refrain or prevented from taking the precaution necessary
to avoid injury to persons.
When there is compulsion or prevention by force or intimidation, there

is no voluntariness in the act.
39
Art. 3 FELONIES
Three reasons why the act or omission in felonies must be

voluntary.
1. The Revised Penal Code continues to be based on the Classical
Theory, according to which the basis of criminal liability is
human free will.
2. Acts or omissions punished by law are always deemed voluntary,
since man is a rational being. One must prove that his case falls
under Art. 12 to show that his act or omission is not voluntary.
3. In felonies by dolo, the act is performed with deliberate intent which

must necessarily be voluntary; and in felonies by culpa, the
imprudence consists in voluntarily , but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material injury
results.
Therefore, in felonies committed by means of dolo, as well as in those

committed by means of culpa, the act performed or the omis sion incurred by
the offender is voluntary, but the intent or malice in intentional felonies is
replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill in
culpable felonies.
Requisites of dolo or malice.

In order that an act or Omission may be considered as having
been performed or incurred with deliberate intent, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do

an act;
(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting
to do the act;
(3) He must have INTENT while doing the act or omitting to do the
act.
1. Freedom. When a person acts without freedom, he is no longer a human
being but a tool; his liability is as much as that of the knife that wounds,
or of the torch that sets fire, or of the key that opens a door, or of the
ladder that is placed against the wall of a house in committing robbery.
40
Thus, a person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is
exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 12, par. 5)
So also, a person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of

an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability (Art. 12, par. 6)
2. Intelligence. Without this power, necessary to determine the morality of

human acts, no crime can exist. Thus, the imbecile or the insane, and the
infant under nine years of age as, well as the minor over nine but less than
fifteen years old and acting without discernment, have no criminal
liability, because they act without intelligence. (Art. 12, pars. 1, 2 and 3)
3. Intent. Intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a mental process, is
presumed and the presumption arises from the proof of the commission of
an unlawful act.
All the three requisites of voluntariness in intentional felony must be

present, because "a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act."
(U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 495)
Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of

intelligence.
One who acts without freedom necessarily has no intent to do an injury
to another. One who acts without intelligence has no such intent.
But a person who acts with freedom and with intelligence may not have
the intent to do an injury to another. Thus, a person who caused an injury by
mere accident had freedom and intelligence, but since he had no fault or
intention of causing it, he is not criminally liable. (Art. 12, par. 4, Revised Penal
Code)
The existence of intent is shown by the overt acts of a per

son.
Where the defendant carried away articles belonging to another and
concealed them from the owner and from the police authorities, denying
having them in his possession, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, it
may be inferred that he acted with intent of gain. Intent is a mental state, the
existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person. (Soriano vs. People,
88 Phil. 368, 374)
41
Art. 3 FELONIES
Intent to kill is difficult to prove, it being a mental act. But it can be

deduced from the external acts performed by a person. When the acts
naturally produce a definite result, courts are slow in con cluding that some
other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil. 691-693; People vs.
Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited in People vs. Lao, 11 C.A. Rep. 829)
Criminal intent is presumed from the commission of an un

lawful act.
People vs. Sia Teb Ban

(54 Phil. 52, 53)
Facts: The accused took a watch without the owner's consent. He

was prosecuted for theft. The accused alleged as a defense that the
prosecution failed to prove the intent to gain on his part, an element of
the crime of theft.
Held: From the felonious act (taking another's property) of the
accused, freely and deliberately executed, the moral and legal
presumption of a criminal and injurious intent arises conclusively and
indisputably, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(See: People vs. Renegado, No. L-27031, May 31,1974,57

SCRA 275, 286)
Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are always presumed to
exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes,
unless the contrary shall appear. (U.S. vs. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92, 93)
But the presumption of criminal intent does not arise

from the proof of the commission of an act which is not
unlawful.
U.S. vs. Catolico

(18 Phil. 504, 508)
Facts: The accused was a justice of the peace. He rendered

decisions in certain cases, each one for damages resulting from a breach
of contract, from which the defendants appealed. As required by law,
the defendants deposited P16.00 and a bond of f*50.00
for each case. It appeared that the sureties on the said bonds
were insolvent and that the defendants did not present new bonds within
the time fixed
42
by the accused as justice of the peace. Upon petition of the plaintiffs, the
accused dismissed the appeals and ordered said sums attached and
delivered to the plaintiffs in satisfaction of the judgment. The accused
was prosecuted for malversation (a felony punishable now under Art.
217).
Held: The act of the accused, in permitting the sums deposited with
him to be attached in satisfaction of the judgment rendered by him, was
not unlawful. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief
that he was acting judiciously and correctly. The act of a person does not
make him a criminal, unless his mind be criminal.
The maxim is: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing to act complained
be innocent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise from
proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that if it is
proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the
accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act
from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act. In the case at bar,
the act was not criminal.
Where the facts proven are accompanied by other facts which show that
the act complained of was not unlawful, the presumption of criminal intent
does not arise.
There is no felony by dolo if there is no intent.

The presumption of criminal intent from the commission of an unlawful
act may be rebutted by proof of lack of such intent.
Thus, a minor who married without parental consent, in viola tion of Art.
475 of the old Penal Code which punished "any minor who shall contract
marriage without the consent of his or her parents," was not liable criminally,
because she proved that she acted without malice. The defendant minor
testified that she believed that she was born in 1879; that so her parents gave
her to understand ever since her tenderest age; and that she did not ask them
concerning her age, because they had already given her to so understand since
her childhood. The presumption of malice was rebutted by her testimony. One
cannot be convicted under Article 475 (similar to Art. 350 of the Revised Penal
Code) when by reason of a mistake of fact there does
43
Art. 3 FELONIES
not exist the intention to commit the crime. (U.S. vs. Penalosa, 1
Phil. 109)
Also, a person who suddenly got up in his sleep, left the room with a
bolo in his hand, and upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him,
wounded her in the abdomen and attacked others, is not criminally liable,
because his acts were not voluntary, for having acted in a dream; he had no
criminal intent. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255)
People vs. Beronilla

(96 Phil. 566)
Facts: The accused was a military major of La Paz, Abra, in 1944.

He received an order from the regional commander of an infantry,
Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to prosecute
Arsenio Borjal for treason and to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury
found Borjal guilty of the charge and the recommendation of the jury
was approved by the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the
execution of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted for murder.
The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned
out to be illegal. As a military subordinate, he could not question the
orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the orders in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on
his part.
Held: Criminal intent was not established. To constitute a crime,
the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty or to consequences, as in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. (U.S. vs.
Catolico, 18 Phil. 507) The accused was acquitted.
Mistake of fact.
While ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith
(ignorantia legis non excusat), ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the
accused from criminal liability (ignorantia facti excusat).
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person
who caused injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable, because he
did not act with criminal intent.
An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal intent

which arises upon the commission of a felonious act. (People
44
FELONIES
Art. 3
vs. Coching, et al., C.A., 52 O.G. 293, citing People vs. Oanis, 74
Phil. 257)
Requisites of mistake of fact as a defense:

1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be.
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be

lawful.
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of

the accused.
Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the

facts of the case.
The defendant swore to Civil Service Form No. 1 before a notary public
that he was never accused of a violation of any law before any court or tribunal,
when in truth and in fact he had been charged with the offense of unjust
vexation in a criminal case before the Justice of the Peace Court. He was
prosecuted for the crime of perjury, for having falsely sworn that he was never
accused of any offense. When he testified in his defense, the defendant claimed
that he answered "No" to the question whether he had been accused of a
violation of any law, because he relied on the opinion of the provincial fiscal
that unjust vexation does not involve moral turpitude and he thought it was not
necessary to mention it in Civil Service Form No. 1. It appeared that he had
been previously prosecuted twice for perjury for having answered "No"
to the same question, and he was acquitted in one case and the information in
the other was dismissed. It was held that in view of the factual background of
the case, the act of the defendant in answering "No" to the question can be
considered only as an error of judgment and did not indicate an intention to
commit the crime of perjury. The defendant was not liable for the crime of
perjury, because he had no intent to commit the crime. (People vs. Formaran,
C.A., 70 O.G. 3786)
In mistake of fact, the act done would have been lawful,

had the facts been as the accused believed them to be.
In other words, the act done would not constitute a felony had the facts
been as the accused believed them to be.
45
Art. 3 FELONIES
Thus, in the cases of U.S. vs. Penalosa and People vs.

Beronilla, supra, the accused in the first case believed that she was already of
age when she contracted marriage and the accused in the second case believed
that the orders of his superior officer were legal. Had they been the real facts,
there would not be any felony committed. But even if they were not the real
facts, since the accused acted in good faith, they acted without intent. Hence,
their acts were invol untary.
In mistake of fact, the act done by the accused would have constituted
(1) a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, (2) an abso lutory cause, such as
that contemplated in Art. 247, par. 2, or (3) an involuntary act.
U.S. vs. Ah Chong

(15 Phil. 488)
Facts: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was

afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked
himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone
to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door.
He called out twice, "Who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that
the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again,
"If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door, and
believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and struck
and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Held: Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been
justified in killing the intruder under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, which requires, to justify the act, that there be —
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed, (2)

reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah
Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the
intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to
defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable
means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah
46
FELONIES
Art. 3
Chong gave no provocation at all. Under Article 11 of the Revised

Penal Code, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act
of the person making the defense.
(See: People vs. Mamasalaya, No. L-4911, Feb. 10,1953,92

Phil. 639, 654)
People vs. Oanis

(74 Phil. 257)
Facts: Chief of Police Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Galanta

were under instructions to arrest one Balagtas, a notorious criminal and
escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Proceeding
to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door, simultaneously fired at him with
their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his
identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and not
the wanted criminal.
Held: Both accused are guilty of murder.
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping.
In apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not
permit the captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is
determined to fight the officers of the law who are trying to capture him that
killing him would be justified.
The mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the

part of the accused.
Ah Chong case and Oanis case distinguished.
In the Ah Chong case, there is an innocent mistake of fact without any
fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, because, having no time or
opportunity to make any further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances
to act immediately, the accused had no alternative but to take the facts as they
then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing the deceased.
In the Oanis case, the accused found no circumstances whatever which
would press them to immediate action. The person in the room
47
Art. 3 FELONIES
being then asleep, the accused had ample time and opportunity to ascertain
his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for the accused
to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to
kill Balagtas at sight, but to arrest, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Hence, the accused in the Oanis case were at fault when they shot the
victim in violation of the instructions given to them. They were also careless in
not verifying first the identity of the victim.
Lack of intent to kill the deceased, because his intention

was to kill another, does not relieve the accused from
criminal responsibility.
That the accused made a mistake in killing one man instead of another
cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility, he having acted maliciously
and wilfully. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605)
In mistake of fact, the intention of the accused in

performing the act should be lawful.
Thus, in error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victim,
the principle of mistake of fact does not apply.
Example: A wanted to kill B by shooting him with a pistol.

Thinking that the person walking in dark alley was B, A shot the
person. It turned out that the person killed was C, the brother of A. A
had no intention to kill C. Since the act and intention of A in firing his
pistol are unlawful, A cannot properly invoke the principle of mistake of
fact in his defense.
No crime of resistance when there is a mistake of fact.

One who resists an arrest, believing that the peace officer is a bandit, but
who submits to the arrest immediately upon being informed by the peace
officer that he is a policeman, is not guilty of the crime of resistance to an agent
of the authorities under Art. 151 of the Revised Penal Code, because of mistake
of fact. (See U.S. vs. Bautista, 31 Phil. 308)
48
FELONIES
Art. 3
When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a de

fense.
People vs. De Fernando
(49 Phil. 75)
Facts: The accused, a policeman, was informed that three con victs
had escaped. In the dark, he saw a person going up the stairs of a house,
carrying a bolo and calling for someone inside. The daughter of the
owner of the house was at that time with the accused who fired a shot in
the air. As the unknown person continued to ascend the stairs and
believing that he was one of the escaped convicts, the accused fired
directly at the man who turned out to be the nephew of the owner of the
house.
Held: He is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence. The

victim called for someone in the house. That fact indicated that he was
known to the owner of the house. The accused should have inquired from
the daughter of the owner of the house as to who the unknown person
might be.
The defense of mistake of fact is untenable when the accused is charged

with a culpable felony. In mistake of fact, what is involved is lack of intent on
the part of the accused. In felonies committed through negligence, there is no
intent to consider, as it is replaced by imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight
or lack of skill.
Criminal intent is necessary in felonies committed by

means of dolo.
Criminal intent is necessary in felonies committed by means of dolo
because of the legal maxims —
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make
a man guilty unless his intention were so."
Actus me invito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me
against my will is not my act." (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 499)
Distinction between general intent and specific intent.

In felonies committed by dolus, the third element of voluntari ness is a
general intent; whereas, in some particular felonies, proof of particular specific
intent is required. Thus, in certain crimes against
49
Art. 3 FELONIES
property, there must be the intent to gain (Art. 293 — robbery; Art. 308
— theft). Intent to kill is essential in frustrated or attempted homicide (Art. 6
in relation to Art. 249); in forcible abduction (Art. 342), the specific intent of
lewd designs must be proved.
When the accused is charged with intentional felony,
absence of criminal intent is a defense.
In the absence of criminal intent, there is no liability for intentional
felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime
should be indulged in for the benefit of the accused. (People vs. Pacana, 47
Phil. 48)
If there is only error on the part of the person doing the act, he does not
act with malice, and for that reason he is not criminally liable for intentional
felony.
Criminal intent is replaced by negligence and imprudence

in felonies committed by means of culpa.
In felonies committed by means of culpa, since the doing of or failing to
do an act must also be voluntary, there must be freedom and intelligence on the
part of the offender, but the requisite of criminal intent, which is required in
felonies by dolo, is replaced by the requisite of imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
Such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequence is, in law,

equivalent to criminal intent. (U.S. vs. Catolico, 18 Phil. 507)
But in felonies committed by means of culpa, the mind of the accused is

not criminal. However, his act is wrongful, because the injury or damage
caused to the injured party results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill of the accused.
Therefore, in order that the act or omission in felonies committed by

means of fault or culpa may be considered voluntary, the following requisites
must concur:
(1) He must have FREEDOM while doing an act or omitting to do an act;

(2) He must have INTELLIGENCE while doing the act or omitting to do
the act;
50
FELONIES
Art. 3
(3) He is IMPRUDENT, NEGLIGENT or LACKS FORESIGHT or

SKILL while doing the act or omitting to do the act.
In culpable felonies, the injury caused to another should be

unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act
performed without malice.
People vs. Guillen
(85 Phil. 307)
Facts: Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, stated that he per

formed the act voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but
that it did not make any difference to him if there were some people
around the President when he hurled that bomb, because the killing of
those who surrounded the President was tantamount to killing the
President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the
President, were identified with the latter. In other words, although it was
not his main intention to kill the persons surrounding the Presi dent, he
felt no compunction in killing them also in order to attain his main
purpose of killing the President.
Held: The facts do not support the contention of counsel for
appellant that the latter is guilty only of homicide through reckless
imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela and of less serious
physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carillo and Emilio Maglalang.
In throwing the hand grenade at the President with the inten tion of
killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all
the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with Art. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury
caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939) In
the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified as imprudence
it is necessary that neither malice nor intention to cause injury should
intervene; where such intention exists, the act should be qualified by the
felony it has produced even though it may not have been the intention of
the actor to cause an evil of such gravity as that produced." (Viada's
comment on the Penal Code, Vol. 7, 5th ed., p. 7) And, as was held by
this court, deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil. 232)
51
Art. 3 FELONIES
Mistake in the identity of the intended victim is not

reckless imprudence.
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence. Where such an unlawful act is willfully done,
a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307, citing People vs.
Nanquil, 43 Phil. 232, and People vs. Guia, 54 Phil. 605)
A person causing damage or injury to another, without
malice or fault, is not criminally liable under the Revised
Penal Code.
Since felonies are committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or by
means of fault (culpa), if there is neither malice nor negligence on the part of
the person causing damage or injury to another, he is not criminally liable
under the Revised Penal Code.
In such case, he is exempt from criminal liability, because he causes an

injury by mere accident, without fault or intention of causing it. (Art. 12, par.
4, Revised Penal Code)
Illustration:
Three men, Ramos, Abandia and Catangay, were hunting deer at night.
Ramos carried a lantern fastened to his forehead. Abandia and Catangay were
following him. They saw a deer. Catangay whose gun was already cocked and
aimed at the deer stumbled against an embankment which lay between him
and Ramos. His gun was accidentally discharged, hitting and killing Ramos. It
was held that Catangay was not criminally liable because he had no criminal
intent and was not negligent. (U.S. vs. Catangay, 28 Phil. 490)
The act performed must be lawful.

In the foregoing illustration, the act of aiming the gun at the deer while
hunting is lawful, it not being prohibited by any law.
But the act of discharging a gun in a public place is unlawful. (Art. 155,
Revised Penal Code) In such case, if a person is injured as a result of the
discharge of the gun, the one discharging it in a public place is criminally liable
for the injury caused.
52
FELONIES
Art. 3
The third class of crimes are those punished by special

laws.
There are three classes of crimes. The Revised Penal Code de fines and
penalizes the first two classes of crimes, (1) the intentional felonies, and (2) the
culpable felonies. The third class of crimes are those defined and penalized by
special laws which include crimes punished by municipal or city ordinances.
Dolo is not required in crimes punished by special laws.

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit
the crime is not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law.
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime;
but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
the crime itself. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128)
In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in
the second (intent to perpetrate the act), it is enough that the prohibited act is
done freely and consciously.
People vs. Bayona

(61 Phil. 181)
Facts: Defendant was driving his automobile on a

road in front of electoral precinct No. 4 in Barrio de Aranguel,
Pilar, Capiz. He had a revolver with him. He was called by his friend,
Jose D. Benliro. He alighted from his automobile and approached him to
find out what he wanted. He did not leave his revolver in the automobile,
because there were many people in the road in front of the polling place
and he might lose it. He was within the fence surrounding the polling
place when Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the
Interior, took possession of the revolver defendant was car
rying.
The Solicitor-General was for his acquittal.
Held: The law which defendant violated is a statutory provision,
and the intent with which he violated is immaterial. It may be conceded
that defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the
law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried
his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place,
53
Art. 3 FELONIES
he committed the act complained of, and he committed it wilfully. The

Election Law does not require for its violation that the offender has the
intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the
election.
The rule is that in acts mala in se, there must be a criminal intent;
but in those mala prohibita, it is sufficient if the prohibited act was
intentionally done.
Since the Election Code prohibits and punishes the carrying of a firearm
inside the polling place, and that person did the pro hibited act freely and
consciously, he had the intent to perpetrate the act.
No intent to perpetrate the act prohibited.

If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election
day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of
the law in question, because he had no intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer
in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living
within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms
within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying
firearms within the contemplation of the law. (People vs. Bayona, supra)
In those crimes punished by special laws, the act alone,

irrespective of its motives, constitutes the offense.
U.S. us. Siy Cong Bieng, et al.

(30 Phil. 577)
Facts: Co Kong, while in charge of appellant's store and acting as

his agent and employee, sold, in the ordinary course of business, coffee
which had been adulterated by the admixture of peanuts and other
extraneous substances.
Question: Whether a conviction under the Pure Food and Drugs
Act (No. 1655 of the Philippine Commission) can be sustained where it
appears that the sale of adulterated food products was made without
guilty knowledge of the fact of adulteration.
Held: While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract
justice, men are not and should not be held criminally responsible for
54
FELONIES
Art. 3
acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at

least evil intent, the courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the
greater master of things," to forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of
certain acts, and to make their commission criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer.
It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to
proportions so enormous as to menace the health and safety of the people.
Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the care less and heedless consumers
are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a
difficult task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures
which depend for their efficiency upon proof of the dealer's knowledge or
of his intent to deceive and defraud are of little use and rarely accomplish
their purposes. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws
upon the seller the entire responsibility of the purity and sound
ness of what he sells and compels him to know and to be certain. (People
vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14
Phil. 133)
Reasons why criminal intent is not necessary in crimes

made such by statutory enactment.
The accused was charged with a violation of Section 1 of Act No.
1696 of the Philippine Commission, which punishes any person who shall
expose to public view any flag, banner, emblem or device used during the late
insurrection in the Philippines. Even if the accused acted without criminal
intent, the lower court convicted him. In affirming the judgment of conviction
of the lower court, the Supreme Court said —
"The display of a flag or emblem used, particularly within a recent
period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance of
governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority
just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the
most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any
other fact, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes,
made such by the common law or by statute, in which the
injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt
intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun
and kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon
B's death, but upon the intention with which A consummated the
55
Art. 3 FELONIES
act. If the gun was discharged intentionally, with the purpose of

accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its
security violated; but if the gun was discharged accidentally on the part
of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter, even
though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not
become a danger to society and its institutions until he becomes a person
with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the
death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must
go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at bar, however, the evil to
society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of
the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display
has upon the public mind. In the one case the public is affected by the
intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself." (U.S. vs. Go Chico,
14 Phil. 129)
When the doing of an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered

that the act is injurious to public welfare and the doing of the prohibited act is
the crime itself.
Good faith and absence of criminal intent not valid

defenses in crimes punished by special laws.
It does not matter, for the validity of the conviction of Ongsod, that he is
the owner or borrower, as the proprietary concept of the possession can have
no bearing whatsoever on his guilt, within the intendment and purview of
Republic Act 4 (which amended Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code and Commonwealth Act 56). And it is now beyond question that mere
unlicensed possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction of illegal possession of
firearms, regardless of the intent of the unlicensed holder, since the offense is
malum prohibitum punished by special law, and good faith and absence of
criminal intent are not valid defenses. (People vs. Orquijo, [C.A.] 60 O.G. 836)
(See: Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas, Adm. Matter No. 74-MJ, July 30,
1976, 72 SCRA 168, 171)
Exceptions:
1. Several PC soldiers went to the house of the defendant and asked him
if he had in his possession any unlicensed
56
FELONIES
Art. 3
firearm. The defendant readily answered that he had one but that
said unlicensed firearm was in his possession prior to his turning it
over to the Mayor of Taal in connection with the drive of the
government in the collection of loose firearms. Defendant told the
PC soldiers that he bought the firearm from a stranger with the
purpose of selling it to the PC who were paying for loose firearms.
He even showed to the PC soldiers a letter of the town mayor
authorizing him to collect loose firearms in his barrio.
Held: To implement the policy of the government on loose

firearms, it is imperative that the persons collecting and
surrendering loose firearms should have temporary and incidental
possession thereof, for how can one collect and deliver without
temporarily laying his hands on the firearms? It is for this reason
that we believe that the doctrine of the immateriality of animus
possidendi should be relaxed in a certain way. Otherwise, the
avowed purpose of the government's policy cannot be realized. Of
course, it would be a different story if it is shown that the possessor
has held on to the firearm for an undue length of time when he had
all the chances to surrender it to the proper authorities. (People vs.
Landicho, [C.A.] 55 O.G. 842)
2. When neither of the accused had ever intended to commit the offense
of illegal possession of firearms (U.S. vs. Samson, 16 Phil. 323);
when both believed in good faith that as civilian guards under
Councilor Asa, an MIS agent and a superior officer in the Civilian
Guard Organization, and under the circumstances and facts of this
case, they cannot be held liable for the offense charged because
they never had any intent of violating the law. (People vs. Asa and
Balbastro, [C.A.] 50 O.G. 5853, citing 68 Corpus Juris 39)
3. Where the accused had a pending application for permanent

permit to possess a firearm, and whose possession was not
unknown to an agent of the law who advised the former to keep it
in the meantime, any doubt as to his claim should be resolved in
his favor. (People vs. Mallari, [C.A.] 55 O.G. 1394)
57
Art. 3 FELONIES
4. Where appellant was duly appointed as civilian confidential agent

entrusted with a mission to make surveillance and effect the
killing or capture of a wanted person, and was authorized to
carry a revolver to carry out his mission, he is not criminally
liable for illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Lucero, 103
Phil. 500)
Note: In thes e cases, the accused had no license to possess the

firearms, but in view of the facts and
circumstances, the absence of intent to violate the
law was considered in favor of the accused.
Mala in se and mala prohibita, distinguished.

There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful
from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala
prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal
possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call

for almost unanimous condemnation of its members; while crimes mala
prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibita, the
only inquiry is, has the law been violated? (People vs.
Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil.
132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons
of public policy, as in illegal possession of firearms. (People vs.
Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies denned and

penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are inherently
immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On
the other hand, there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which
were originally defined and penalized by special laws. Among them
are possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and
libel.
The term mala prohibita refers generally to acts made criminal by special
laws.
58
FELONIES
Art. 3
When the acts are inherently immoral, they are mala in se,
even if punished under special law.
People vs. Sunico, et al.
(C.A., 50 O.G. 5880)
Facts: The accused were election inspectors and poll clerks whose
duty among others was to transfer the names of excess voters in other
precincts to the list of a newly created precinct. Several voters were
omitted in the list. Because their names were not in the list, some of them
were not allowed to vote. The accused were prosecuted for viola
tion of Sees. 101 and 103 of the Revised Election Code. The accused
claimed that they made the omission in good faith.
The trial court seemed to believe that notwithstanding the fact that
the accused committed in good faith the serious offense charged, the
latter are criminally responsible therefor, because such offense is malum
prohibitum, and, consequently, the act constituting the same need not be
committed with malice or criminal intent to be punishable.
Held: The acts of the accused cannot be merely mala prohibita —
they are mala per se. The omission or failure to include a voter's name in
the registry list of voters is not only wrong because it is prohibited; it is
wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter and violates one of his
fundamental rights. Hence, for such act to be punishable, it must be
shown that it has been committed with malice. There is no clear showing
in the instant case that the accused intentionally, willfully and maliciously
omitted or failed to include in the registry list of voters the names of those
voters. They cannot be punished criminally.
The Revised Election Code, as far as its penal provisions are concerned,
is a special law, it being not a part of the Revised Penal Code or its
amendments.
Intent distinguished from motive.

Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite
result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and, hence, need not be
proved for purposes of conviction. (People vs. Aposaga, No. L-32477, Oct. 30,
1981, 108 SCRA 574, 595)
An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime
without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. Or, the
59
Art. 3 FELONIES
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily
mean that there is none, but that simply it is not known to us, for we cannot
probe into the depths of one's conscience where it may be found, hidden away
and inaccessible to our observation. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255, 256)
One may be convicted of a crime whether his motive appears to be good
or bad or even though no motive is proven. A good motive does not prevent an
act from being a crime. In mercy killing, the painless killing of a patient who
has no chance of recovery, the motive may be good, but it is nevertheless
punished by law.
Motive, when relevant and when need not be established.

Where the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in
dispute, the motive that may have impelled its commission is very relevant.
(People vs. Murray, 105 Phil. 591, 598; People vs. Feliciano, No. L-30307, Aug.
15, 1974, 58 SCRA 383, 393)
Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to pin a crime on the accused

if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of
identification is convincing. (People vs. Alviar, No. L 32276, Sept. 12,
1974, 59 SCRA 136, 160)
Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the
assailant. It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified.
(People vs. Gadiana, G.R. No. 92509, March 13,1991,195 SCRA
211, 214-215; People vs. Mandapat, G.R. No. 76953, April 22, 1991, 196
SCRA 157, 165)
Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary to
inquire into his motive for doing the act. (People vs. Arcilla, G.R. No.
L-11792, June 30, 1959)
Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic
theories or versions of the killing. (People vs. Boholst Caballero, No. L-23249,
Nov. 25,1974, 61 SCRA 180,191; People vs. Lim,
G.R. No. 86454, Oct. 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 706, 714-715; People vs. Tabije, No.
L-36099, 113 SCRA 191, 197)
Where the identification of the accused proceeds from an unreliable

source and the testimony is inconclusive and not free from doubt, evidence of
motive is necessary. (People vs. Beltran, No. L-31860, Nov. 29, 1974,
61 SCRA 246, 254-255)
60
FELONIES
Art. 3
Where there are no eyewitnesse s to the crime, and where suspicion is

likely to fall upon a number of persons, motive is relevant and significant.
(People vs. Melgar, No. L-75268, Jan. 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 718, 725)
If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of

motive is essential. (People vs. Oquifio, No. L-37483, June 24,1983,12
2 SCRA 797,808)
Proof of motive is not indispensable where guilt is otherwise established
by sufficient evidence. (People vs. Corpuz, 107 Phil. 44, 49)
While the question of motive is important to the person who committed
the criminal act, yet when there is no longer any doubt that the defendant was
the culprit, it becomes unimportant to know the exact reason or purpose for the
commission of the crime. (People vs. Feliciano, No. L-30307, Aug. 15, 1974, 58
SCRA 383, 393)
How motive is proved.

Generally, the motive is established by the testimony of wit nesses on the
acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of
the offense. Such deeds or words may indicate the motive.
(Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642, 649)
Motive proved by the evidence.

Appellant stabbed the deceased. It was established that there were two
suffocating smokes noticed during the progress of the re ligious service of the
Iglesia ni Cristo, which made appellant to go around. Certainly, the
causing.of those smokes, presumably by non members, which
disturbed and interrupted the service, particularly at the time when the
Minister was preaching, is enough motive for any member of the sect to be
offended thereby, particularly appellant who was a member of some
importance. (People vs. Ramirez, 104 Phil. 720, 726)
Disclosure of the motive is an aid in completing the proof

of the commission of the crime.
Thus, the fact that the accused had been losing in their business
operations indicated the motive and therefore the intent to commit arson for
the purpose of collecting the insurance on their stock of merchandise. (U.S. vs.
Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil. 187, 204)
61
Art. 3 FELONIES
But proof of motive alone is not sufficient to support a

con viction.
The existence of a motive, though perhaps an important consideration,
is not sufficient proof of guilt. (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468; People vs.
Martinez y Godinez, 106 Phil. 597) Mere proof of motive, no matter
how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable
evidence from which it may be reasonably deduced that the accused was the
malefactor. (People vs. Macatahgay, 107 Phil. 188, 194)
Even a strong motive to commit the crime cannot take the place of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
innocence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the mainstay of our accusatorial
system of criminal justice. (People vs. Pisalvo, No. L-32886, Oct. 23,
1981, 108 SCRA 211, 226)
Lack of motive may be an aid in showing the innocence of

the accused.
In a case, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant acted while
in a dream and his acts, with which he was charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
Under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the
defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the
fact that the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we
find not only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts. (People vs. Taneo,
58 Phil. 255, 257)
Lack of motive to kill the deceased has been held as further basis for
acquitting the accused, where the lone testimony of the prosecution witness is
contrary to common experience and, therefore, incredible. (People vs.
Padirayon, No. L-39207, Sept. 25, 1975, 67 SCRA 135)
62
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Wrongful Act Different From That Intended Art. 4
Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Crimina l liabilit y shall be in curred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful ac t
done be different from that whic h he intended.
2 . By any perso n performing a n ac t whic h woul d be a n offens e
against persons o r property , wer e it no t for the inherent impossibilit y o f its
accomplishment o r o n account o f the employment o f inadequat e o r
ineffectua l means.
Application of Article 4.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person in the cases men tioned in the
two paragraphs of Article 4. This article has no reference to the manner
criminal liability is incurred. The manner of incurring criminal liability under
the Revised Penal Code is stated in Article 3, that is, performing or failing to do
an act, when either is punished by law, by means of deceit (with malice) or fault
(through negligence or imprudence).
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for

all the consequences which may naturally and logically
result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.
Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the
consequences of his felonious act. But there are cases where the consequences
of the felonious act of the offender are not intended by him. In those cases, "the
wrongful act done" is "different from that which he intended."
In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person committing a felony is
criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious act are not
intended by him.
Thus, where the death of the 6 year-old victim was brought about by the
rape committed by the accused, it is of no moment that she died by accident
when she hit her head on the pavement while struggling, because, having
performed an act constituting a felony, he is responsible for all the
consequences of said act, regardless of his intention. (People vs. Mario
Mariano, 75 O.G. 4802, No. 24, June 11, 1979)
63
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 4
Wrongful Act Different From That Intended
One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural con sequences
of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to produce such
consequences. (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310)
Thus, one who fired his gun at B, but missed and hit C instead, is liable
for the injury caused to C, although the one who fired the gun had no
intention to injure C.
One who gave a fist blow on the head of D, causing the latter to fall with
the latter's head striking a hard pavement, is liable for the death of D,
which resulted although the one who gave the fist blow had no intention to kill
D.
And one who stabbed another in the dark, believing that the latter was
E, when in fact he was G, is liable for the injury caused to G, although the one
who stabbed him had no intention to injure G.
Rationale of rule in paragraph 1 of Article 4.

The rationale of the rule in Article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). (People vs. Ural, No. L-30801,
March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138, 144)
IMPORTANT WORD S AN D PHRASES IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ART. 4.
1. "Committing a felony."
Paragraph 1 of Art. 4 says that criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person "committing a felony," not merely performing an act. A
felony is an act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal Code. If the
act is not punishable by the Code, it is not a felony. But the felony
committed by the offender should be one committed by means of dolo,
that is, with malice, because paragraph 1 of Art. 4 speaks of wrongful act
done "different from that which he intended."
If the wrongful act results from the imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill of the offender, his liability should be determined
under Art. 365, which defines and penalizes criminal negligence.
The act or omission should not be punished by a special law,
because the offender violating a special law may not have the intent to do
an injury to another. In such case, the wrongful
64
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
act done could not be different, as the offender did not intend to do any
other injury.
Article 4, paragraph 1, is not applicable in this case.

Defendant, who was not a regular medical practitioner, tied a girl,
wrapped her feet with rags saturated with petroleum and thereafter set them
on fire causing injuries. His defense was that he undertook to render medical
assistance in good faith and to the best of his ability to cure her of ulcer. He
admitted applying petroleum but denied causing the burns. Held: While there
was no intention to cause an evil but to provide a remedy, accused was liable for
injuries thru imprudence. (U.S. vs. Divino, 12 Phil. 175)
Note: Defendant did not commit an intentional felony. If at all, he
committed illegal practice of medicine, which is punished by a
special law. Violation of a statute is proof of negligence or
imprudence. Defendant is liable for two offenses: (1)
physical injuries through imprudence; and (2) illegal practice of
medicine.
When a person has not committed a felony, he is not

criminally liable for the result which is not intended.
(a) Thus, one who, because of curiosity, snatched the bolo carried by the
offended party at his belt, and the latter instinctively
caught the blade of said bolo in trying to retain it, is not crimi nally liable
for the physical injuries caused, because there is no provision in the
Revised Penal Code which punishes that act of snatching the property of
another just to satisfy curiosity. (See U.S. vs. Villanueva, 31 Phil. 412)
(b) Thus, also, one who tries to retain the possession of his bolo which was
being taken by another and because of the struggle, the tip of the bolo
struck and pierced the breast of a bystander, is not criminally liable
therefor, because the law allows a person to use the necessary force to
retain what belongs to him. (See People vs. Bindoy, 56 Phil. 15)
People vs. Bindoy

(56 Phil. 15)
Facts: In a tuba wineshop in the barrio market, the accused offered
tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having already
65
Art. 4 CRIMINAL LIABILITY

done so, the accused threatened to injure her if she would not accept.
There ensued an interchange of words between her and the accused, and
Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away from the
accused the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam who lived near the
market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while the
accused and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this
struggle, the accused succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas,
wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio
Omamdam's chest, who was then behind the accused. The accused was
not aware of Omamdam's presence in the place.
Held: There is no evidence to show that the accused injured the
deceased deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. He
was only defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to
wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly legal. The accused
should be acquitted.
Had the accused attempted to wound Pacas during the strug gle, but
instead of doing so, he wounded Omamdam, he would have been liable for the
death of Omamdam, because in attempting to wound another, the accused
would be committing a felony, which is attempted homicide, if there is intent to
kill, under Art. 249 in relation to Art. 6.
2. "Although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
The causes which may produce a result different from that which
the offender intended are: (1) mistake in the identity of the victim; (2)
mistake in the blow, that is, when the offender intending to do an injury
to one person actually inflicts it on another; and (3) the act exceeds the
intent, that is, the injurious result is greater than that intended.
Under paragraph 1, Art. 4, a person committing a felony is still

criminally liable even if —
a. There is a mistake in the identity of the victim — error in personae.

(See the case of People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257)
In a case, defendant went out of the house with the intention of
assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening, defendant mistook
Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted upon him
66
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
a mortal wound with a bolo. In this case, the defendant is criminally

liable for the death of Mapudul. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil. 605)
b. There is a mistake in the blow — aberratio ictus.

Example: People vs. Mabugat, 51 Phil. 967, where the accused,
having discharged his firearm at Juana Buralo but because of lack of
precision, hit and seriously wounded Perfecta Buralo, it was
held that the accused was liable for the injury caused to the latter.
c. The injurious result is greater than that intended — praeter

intentionem.
Example: People vs. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, where the accused,

without intent to kill, struck the victim with his fist on the back part of
the head from behind, causing the victim to fall down with his head
hitting the asphalt pavement and resulting in the fracture of his head, it
was held that the accused was liable for the death of the victim, although
he had no intent to kill said victim.
People vs. Mabugat

(51 Phil. 967)
Facts: The accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts. One day,
the accused invited Juana to take a walk with him, but the latter refused
him on account of the accused having frequently visited the house of
another woman. Later on, the accused went to the house of Cirilo
Bayan where Juana had gone to take part in some devotion. There the
accused, revolver in hand, waited until Juana and her niece, Perfecta,
came downstairs. When they went in the direction of their house, the
accused followed them. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused,
while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver at
Juana but which wounded Perfecta, the slug passing through a part of
her neck, having entered the posterior region thereof and coming
out through the left eye. Perfecta did not die due to proper medical
attention.
Held: The accused is guilty of frustrated murder, qualified by
treachery, committed on the person of Perfecta Buralo.
In People vs. Tomotorgo, No. L-47941, April

30, 1985, 136 SCRA 238, the conduct of the wife of the accused aroused his
ire and
67

incensed with wrath and his anger beyond control, he picked up a piece of
wood and started hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground
complaining of severe chest pains. Realizing what he had done, he picked her
up in his arms and brought her home. Despite his efforts to alleviate her pains,
the wife died. Prosecuted for parricide, he pleaded guilty and was allowed to
establish mitigating circumstances. Passing on his
contentions, the Supreme Court held that the fact that the appellant intended
to maltreat his wife only or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from
liability for the resulting and more serious crime of parricide, (pp.
242, 246)
To the same effect is People vs. Monleon, No. L-36282, Dec. 10,
1976, 74 SCRA 263, where it was held that the case is covered by Article 4 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended, because the maltreatment inflicted by the
accused on his wife was the proximate cause of her death. The accused in his
inebriated state had no intent to kill her. He was infuriated because his son did
not feed his carabao. He was provoked to castigate his wife because she
prevented him from whipping his negligent son. He could have easily killed his
wife had he really intended to take her life. He did not kill her outright,
(p. 269)
Requisites of paragraph 1 of Art. 4.

In order that a person may be held criminally liable for a felony different
from that which he intended to commit, the following requisites must be
present:
a. That an intentional felony has been committed; and

b. That the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. (U.S.
vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310, 319; U.S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil. 14,
19)
That a felony has been committed.

Thus, in the cases of U.S. vs. Villanueva and People vs.
Bindoy, supra, the accused were not held criminally liable, because they were
not committing a felony when they caused the injury to an other.
68
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
No felony is committed (1) when the act or omission is not punishable by the
Revised Penal Code, or (2) when the act is covered by any of the justifying
circumstances enumerated in Art. 11.
An act which is not punishable by the Revised Penal Code is attempting

to commit suicide. (Art. 253)
Therefore, if A, in attempting a suicide, jumped out of the window to kill

himself, but when he dropped to the ground he fell on an old woman who died
as a consequence, A is not criminally liable for intentional homicide. A was not
committing a felony when he attempted a suicide.
One who shoots at another in self-defense, defense of relative, defense of a

stranger, or in the fulfillment of duty is not committing a felony, the act being
justified. (Art. 11, Revised Penal Code)
Hence, if B, who was being fired at with a gun by C to kill him, fired his
pistol at the latter in self-defense, but missed him and instead hit and killed D, a
bystander, B is not criminally liable for the death of D. One acting in
self-defense is not committing a felony.
A policeman, who was pursuing to arrest an armed prisoner who had

just escaped from jail, fired his service pistol at the latter when he refused to be
captured. The slug fired from the pistol of the policeman, after hitting the
prisoner on his right leg, hit and seriously injured a passer-by. The policeman is
not criminally liable for the injury caused to the passer-by, because being in the
fulfillment of a duty he was not committing a felony.
Of course, the act of defense or fulfillment of duty must be exercised

with due care; otherwise, the accused will be liable for culpable felony.
People vs. Salinas
(C.A., 62 O.G. 3186)
Facts: In the afternoon of February 14, 1958, the three accused,

namely: Saturnino Salinas, Crisanto Salinas and Francisco Salinas,
together with two small boys by the name of Tony and Omong,
went to the place of Severino Aquino to get their horses which the latter
caught for having destroyed his corn plants. When Crisanto and the two
boys were already inside the house of Severino Aquino, Crisanto asked,
with signs of respect and in a nice way, Severino Aquino what had the
horses
69
Art. 4 CRIMINAL LIABILITY Wrongful Act
Different From That Intended
destroyed. Thereafter, Saturnino Salinas who was at that time

in front of the house of Severino Aquino in the yard told Severino
Aquino to come down from the house and he (Saturnino) will bolo him to
pieces. Upon hearing the words of Saturnino Salinas, Severino Aquino
was about to go downstairs but Crisanto held him on his waist. In his
struggle to free himself from the hold of Crisanto, he (Severino) moved
his body downwards thus Crisanto subsequently held Severino's neck. At
the moment Crisanto was holding Severino's neck, Mercuria
Aquino who was then sitting on a mat inside the said house stood up and,
carrying her one month old child Jaime Tibule with her left hand and
against her breast, approached Severino and Crisanto. Upon reaching by
the left side of Crisanto, Mercuria tried, with her right hand, to remove
the hand of Crisanto which held the neck of Severino but Crisanto pulled
Mercuria's right hand causing said Mercuria to fall down over her child
Jaime Tibule on the floor of the house and Jaime Tibule was pinned on
the floor by Mercuria's body.
The cause of death (of Jaime Tibule) was "internal

hemorrhage within the skull due to injury of the blood vessels in the
parietal side of the head due to an impact with a hard object."
Held: The accepted rule is that an offender is always liable for the
consequences of his criminal act even though the result be different from
what he intended. (Art. 4, Revised Penal Code) For such liability to exist,
two requisites are necessary, namely, (1) that a crime be committed, and
(2) that the wrong suffered by the injured party be a direct consequence
of the crime committed by the offender. Under the circumstances, it
cannot be said that Crisanto Salinas, in his efforts to prevent Severino
from going down the house to have bloody encounter with his father who
was in the yard, by taking hold of Severino and pulling or jerking the
right hand of Mercuria who tried to free her father from his hold,
committed or was committing a crime. Consequently, it cannot likewise
be said that the death of the child was the direct result of a crime which
Crisanto committed or was in the act of committing.
Any person who creates in another's mind an immediate
sense of danger, which causes the latter to do something
resulting in the latter's injuries, is liable for the
resulting injuries.
During a robbery in a passenger jeepney, one of the culprits told
the women passengers "to bring out their money and not to shout 'or
else there will be shots.'" One of the women jumped out of the
jeepney. Her head struck the pavement. She died as a consequence.
70
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
It was held that "if a man creates in another person's mind an

immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape,
and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a
state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries." (People vs. Page,
77 SCRA 348, 355, citing People vs. Toling, L-27097, Jan. 17, 1975, 62
SCRA 17, 33)
The reason for the ruling is that when the culprit demanded money from
the women, threatening to shoot if they would not bring out their money, a
felony was being committed (i.e., at that stage of execution, attempted robbery
with intimidation which is punishable under Article 294, in relation to Article 6
and Article 51 of the Code).
The Toling case, supra, relying on U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497,
quoted the syllabus, thus: "if a person against whom a criminal assault is
directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily
harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results
by drowning."
Wrong done must be the direct, natural and logical conse

quence of felonious act.
It is an established rule that a person is criminally responsible for acts
committed by him in violation of the law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom. (U.S. vs. Sornito, 4 Phil. 357, 360; U.S. vs.
Zamora, 32 Phil. 218, 226; People vs. Cornel, 78 Phil. 458, 261)
In the following cases, the wrong done is considered the direct,

natural and logical consequence of the felony committed, although
a. The victim who was threatened or chased by the accused with a knife,
jumped into the water and because of the strong current or
because he did not know how to swim he sank down and died of
drowning. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497; People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil.
372)
b. The victim removed the drainage from the wound which resulted in
the development of peritonitis which in turn caused his death, it
appearing that the wound caused by the accused produced
extreme pain and restlessness which
71
Art. 4 CRIMINAL LIABILITY Wrongful Act Different
From That Intended
made the victim remove it. (People vs. Quianson, 62

Phil. 162)
c. Other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result, as long as the
wound inflicted is dangerous, that is, calculated to destroy or
endanger life. This is true even though the immediate cause of the
death was erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment.
This rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and
practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity
to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential
safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and
injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a
doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open
wide the door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might
escape conviction and punishment. (13 R.C.L., 751, 752; 22 L.R.A.,
New Series, 841, cited in People vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 4)
But where it clearly appears that the injury would not have caused death,
in the ordinary course of events, but would have healed in so many days and
where it is shown beyond all doubt that the death was due to the malicious or
careless acts of the injured person or a third person, the accused is not liable
for homicide. One is accountable only for his own acts and their natural or
logical consequences, and not for those which bear no relation to the initial
cause and are due, for instance, to the mistakes committed by the doctor in the
surgical operation and the treatment of the victim's wound. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, April 2,1903, cited by Viada)
d. The victim was suffering from internal malady. Blow was

efficient cause of death.
The deceased had a delicat e constitution and wa s suffering from

tuberculosis. The accused gave fist blows on the
deceased's right hypochondrium, bruising the liver and producing
internal hemorrhage, resulting in the death of the victim. The accused
was liable for homicide. (People vs. Illustre, 54 Phil. 594)
72
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Blow accelerated death.
The deceased was suffering from internal malady. The accused

gave fist blows in the back and abdomen, producing inflammation of the
spleen and peritonitis, and causing death. The accused was liable for
homicide, because by his fist blows he produced the cause for the
acceleration of the death of the deceased. (People vs.
Rodriquez, 23 Phil. 22)
Blow was proximate cause of death.
The deceased wa s suffering from hear t disease. The accused

stabbed the deceased with a knife, but as the blade of the knife hit a bone,
it did not penetrate the thoracic cavity, but it produced shock, resulting in
the death of the victim. The accused was liable for homicide, because the
stabbing was the proximate cause of the death of the deceased. (People vs.
Reyes, 61 Phil. 341)
e . The offended part y refused to submit to surgical operation.
The offended party is not obliged to submit to a surgical operation

to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of his crime.
(U.S. vs. Marasigan, 27 Phil. 504)
f. The resulting injury was aggravated by infection.
(1) The accused wounded the offended party with a bolo. When the
offended party entered the hospital, no anti-tetanus injection
was given to him and the wounds became infected when he
went out of the hospital. Held: The accused is responsible for
the duration of the treatment and disability prolonged by
the infection. (People vs. Red, C.A., 43 O.G. 5072)
An accused is liable for all the consequences of

his acts, and the infection of a wound he has caused is one of
the consequences for which he is answerable.
(People vs. Martir, 9 C.A. Rep. 204)
But the infection should not be due to the mali
cious act of the offended party. (U.S. vs. De los Santos,
G.R. No. L-13309)
73

(2) Although the wounds might have been cured sooner than 58
days had the offended party not been addicted to tuba
drinking, this fact does not mitigate the liability of the
accused. (U.S. vs. Bayutas, 31 Phil. 584)
(3) The accused attacked the deceased with a bolo. After the
deceased had fallen, the accused threw a stone which hit him
on the right clavicle. The wounds inflicted could not have
caused the death of the deceased. A week later, the deceased
died of tetanus secondary to the infected wound. Held: The
accused is responsible for the death of the deceased. (People
vs. Cornel, 78 Phil. 418)
People vs. Quianson

(62 Phil. 162)
Facts: The accused took hold of a fireband and applied it to the

neck of the person who was pestering him. The victim also received from
the hand of the accused a wound in his abdomen below the navel. While
undergoing medical treatment, the victim took out the drainage from his
wound and as a result of the peritonitis that developed, he died. The
accused claimed as a defense that had not the deceased taken out the
drainage, he would not have died.
Held: Death was the natural consequence of the mortal wound

inflicted. The victim, in removing the drainage from his wound, did not
do so voluntarily and with knowledge that it was prejudicial to his health.
The act of the victim (removing the drainage from his wound) was
attributed to his pathological condition and state of nervousness and
restlessness on account of physical pain caused by the wound, aggravated
by the contact of the drainage tube with the inflamed peritoneum.
U.S. vs. Marasigan

(27 Phil. 504, 506)
Facts: The accused drew his knife and struck at Mendoza. In

attempting to ward off the blow, Mendoza was cut in the left hand. The
extensor tendon in one of the fingers was severed. As a result, the middle
finger of the left hand was rendered useless.
Held: Nor do we attach any importance to the contention of the
accused that the original condition of the finger could be restored by
74
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
a surgical operation. Mendoza is not obliged to submit to a surgical

operation to relieve the accused from the natural and ordinary results of
his crime. It was his voluntary act which disabled Mendoza and he must
abide by the consequences resulting therefrom without aid from
Mendoza.
People vs. Reloj

(L-31335, Feb. 29,1972, 43 SCRA 526, 532)
Facts: The accused stabbed the victim with an ice pick. The victim
was brought to the hospital where a surgical operation was performed
upon him. Although the operation was successful and the victim
seemed to be in the process of recovery, he developed, five (5) days later, a
paralytic ileum — which takes place, sometimes, in consequence of the
exposure of the internal organs during the operation — and then died.
Held: It is contended that the immediate cause of the death of the

victim was a paralysis of the ileum that supervened five (5) days after the
stabbing, when he appeared to be on the way to full recovery. It has been
established, however, that the exposure of the internal organs in
consequence of a surgical operation in the abdomen sometimes results in
a paralysis of the ileum and that said operation had to be performed on
account of the abdominal injury inflicted by the accused. The accused is
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts.
The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the

resulting injury.
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continu ous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred." (Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil.
181, 186, quoting 38 Am. Jur. 695)
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural" refers to an
occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical"
means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and
the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate
cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occured. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
75

the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all

constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate prodecessor.
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the
felonious act of the offended, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or
death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or
changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the
pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica
del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la
constitucion
fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions,
such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para
sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonies act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury
when:
a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed

and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the vic tim.
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to

put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it
does not alter its nature or diminish its crimi nality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for
the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to
the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard.
(Quinto vs. Andres, G.R. No. 155791, March 16, 2005)
How to determine the proximate cause.

At about 2:00 o'clock in the morning while the bus was running very fast
on a highway, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it
fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four of its passengers could not get out of
the overturned bus. It appeared that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak from the tank on the
76
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the
ground under and around it. About ten men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, approached the overturned bus to help those left therein, and almost
immediately a fierce fire started, burning the four passengers trapped inside it.
What is the proximate cause of the death of the four passengers,

the negligence of the driver resulting in the fall into the canal and overturning
of the bus, or the fire that burned the bus?
"x x x. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and

pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle set it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause
of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of x x x (the four
passengers) was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most
handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the
torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence
of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the
witnesses, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that
in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when
77

spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus." That is negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier.
(Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186, 187)
People vs. Luces

(C.A.-G.R. No. 13011-R, July 15, 1955)
Facts: Accused Ramon Luces gave a fist blow on the stomach of

Feliciana, causing her to fall unconscious. She never regained
consciousness and a few minutes thereafter she died. In the autopsy
report, it was found that the probable cause of death was cardiac failure.
The accused contended that the fist blow was not the proximate cause of
Feliciana's death.
Held: Whether Feliciana died as a direct effect of the fist blow, or
as an outcome of the fall that followed the blow, or as a consequence of
the blow and the fall that caused her to lose consciousness, or of heart
failure due to shock caused by the blow and her fall to the ground, the
result would be the same — that the blow was the primary and
proximate cause of her death.
The gravity of the crime does not depend on the more or less
violent means used, but on the result and consequence of the same and if
the accused had not ill-treated the deceased she would not have died.
Known is the Latin maxim that "he who is the cause of the cause, is
the cause of the evil caused."
Note: Ill-treating another by deed without causing any injury, is a
felony under Art. 266 of this Code.
In the case of People vs. Martin, 89 Phil. 18, the accused, who strangled
his wife then suffering from heart disease, was found guilty of parricide even if
the death of his wife was the result of heart failure, because the heart failure
was due to the fright or shock caused by the strangling, which is a felony.
The following are not efficient intervening causes:

1. The weak or diseased physical condition of the victim, as when one is
suffering from tuberculosis or heart disease. (People vs. Illustre
and People vs. Reyes, supra)
78
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
2. The nervousness or temperament of the victim, as when a person dies

in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving
about against the doctor's orders, because of his nervous condition
due to the wound inflicted by the accused. (People vs. Almonte, 56
Phil. 54; See also People vs. Quianson, 62 Phil. 162)
3. Causes which are inherent in the victim, such as (a) the victim not
knowing how to swim, and (b) the victim being addicted to tuba
drinking. (People vs. Buhay and U.S. vs. Valdez, supra; U.S. vs.
Bayutas, supra)
4. Neglect of the victim or third person, such as the refusal by the

injured party of medical attendance or surgical operation, or the
failure of the doctor to give anti-tetanus injection to the injured
person. (U.S. vs. Marasigan and People vs. Red, supra)
5. Erroneous or unskillful medical or surgical treatment, as when the

assault took place in an outlying barrio where proper modern
surgical service was not available. (People vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1)
Those causes, not being efficient intervening causes, do not break
the relation of cause and effect — the felony committed and the re sulting
injury.
People vs. Piamonte, et al.

(94 Phil. 293)
Facts: One of the accused stabbed the injured party with a hunting
knife on October 28, 1951. The injured party was taken to the hospital
and was operated on. The operation did him well, but on December 19,
1951, he contracted a sickness known as mucous colitis which developed
because of his weak condition. He died on December 28,1951.
Is the accused who stabbed the injured party liable for the latter's
death?
Held: The doctors who attended the injured party agreed that his
weakened condition which caused disturbance in the functions of his
intestines made it possible for him to contract mucous colitis, which
shows that while the wounds inflicted were not the immediate cause,
they were however the proximate cause of death. This is enough to
make the accused responsible for the crime charged.
79

Note: The charge was robbery with homicide. The homicide was
committed with malice.
When death is presumed to be the natural consequence of

physical injuries inflicted.
The death of the victim is presumed to be the natural consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted, when the following facts are established:
1. That the victim at the time the physical injuries were inflicted was in
normal health.
2. That death may be expected from the physical injuries inflicted.

3. That death ensued within a reasonable time. (People vs. Datu
Baginda, C.A., 44 O.G. 2287)
It having been established tha t the boy Jundam wa s in good
health on the morning of the incident; that he was whipped, spanked and
thrown against the post by his teacher, his breast hitting it; that he complained
to his mother about the oppressive pain, crying and massaging his breast all the
time; that he was found to have two suspicious bluish spots — a big one on the
breast and another one on the upper left arm; and that he vomitted blood until
he died three days afterwards; and there being no proof of any intervening
cause, the liability of the teacher for homicide necessarily follows from the
premises stated. (People vs. Tammang, 5 C.A. Rep. 145)
Note: Had it been proved, as claimed by the defense, that the boy died of
hydrophobia, that would have constituted an intervening cause,
and the accused would have been acquitted.
Not direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony

committed.
If the consequences produced have resulted from a distinct act or fact
absolutely foreign from the criminal act, the offender is not responsible for such
consequences. (People vs. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
80

RPC Reyes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

RPC Reyes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

RPC Reyes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CRIMINAL LAW

Criminal Law, defined.

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law.

2. Special Penal Laws passed by the Philippine Commission, Philippine

3. Penal Presidential Decrees issued during Martial Law. No

common law crimes in the Philippines.

Power to define and punish crimes.

Limitations on the power of the lawmaking body to enact

1. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Art.

An ex post facto law is one which:

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which

Congress is also prohibited from passing an act which would inflict

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts

To give a law retroactive application to the prejudice of the

The second limitation requires that criminal laws must be of general

Constitutional rights of the accused.

1. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their

The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the

No torture, force, violence; threat, intimidation, or

or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (Sec 12[2])

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or

Statutory rights of the accused.

1. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond

7. To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of

Rights of the accused which may be waived and rights

The reason or principle underlying the difference between rights which

Characteristics of criminal law.

"The Philippine s is a sovereign stat e with the obligation

of the offender. (Salonga and Yap, Public International

As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not

U.S. vs. Sweet

Facts: Sweet was an employee of the U.S. Army in the Philippines.

Civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction with general

The Revised Penal Code or other penal law is not

"By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area

Jurisdiction of military courts.

"Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

"As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall

The prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a

Offenders accused of war crimes are triable by

and regulations governing the trial of war criminals is valid and

Exceptions to the general application of Criminal Law.

Treaties or treaty stipulations.

Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United

(b) US authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over US personnel with

Law of preferential application.

It is a law to penalize acts which would impair the proper

"SEC. 5. The provisions of Section four hereof shall not apply to

"SEC. 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable

sentative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly

Persons exempt from the operation of our criminal laws by

(1) Sovereigns and other chiefs of state.

It is a well-established principle of international law that diplomatic

A consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of

Extent of Philippine territory for purposes of criminal law.

Exceptions to the territorial application of criminal law.

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the