Comprehensive

Emergency
Management
A Governor’s Guide

National Governors’ Association

Center for Policy Research
Washington, D.C.

This publication printed for

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
May 1979
Hilary Whittaker is director, National Governors’ Association Emergency Preparedness Project.

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the U.S.
government.

March 1979

© 1979 by the National Governors’ Association, Washington, D.C. Permission to quote from or
reproduce materials in this publication is granted when due acknowledgment is made.

Printed in the United States of America.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washinton, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 008-040-00079-6
 CONTENTS
Preface

1. Current Emergency Management in the United States 1

Federal Emergency Programs 2

State Emergency Management, 1978 3

2. What Is Comprehensive Emergency Management? 11

Types of Emergencies 12
Emergency Management Phases 12
Federal-State-Local Partnership 13
Organizational Involvement in Varied Types of Emergencies 15

3. Role of the Governor in Comprehensive Emergency Management 27

The Governor’s Policy 28

Establishing a CEM Program 31
Appointing a Comprehensive Emergency Manager 33

4. Monitoring Comprehensive Emergency Management 35

The Governor’s Report 36

Annual CEM Evaluation 37

5. Obtaining Federal Assistance in Emergencies 43

Accuracy 43
Timing 44
Gauging 45
Communications 46

6. Summary 49

Appendix A: NGA Comprehensive Emergency Management Policy 51

Appendix B: The Governor’s Emergency Report 55

 PREFACE

The governor answered the phone at 3 a.m. It was his friend the mayor of
Wetcreek, excitedly reporting that twenty-seven people who were marooned in
trees were in danger of drowning in rapidly rising flood waters. Urgent help was
needed. The governor ordered Civil Air Patrol search and rescue teams to the
scene and requested a prompt situation report. When he had not received a report
by 7 a.m., the governor called the Civil Air Patrol and was informed that the
search and rescue squad had found some escaped cats from a boarding kennel
that had been treed in the heavy rain. The kennel attendant was new on the job
and had frantically called a schoolmate, the mayor’s son, for assistance. The
press ate it up when they heard about it.

This example illustrated two important points: governors must have the facts, and they must
know emergency management procedures before acting.

Had the governor called his emergency services office (SEO), it would (or should) have checked
with the highway patrol, the local emergency services coordinator, and the weather service for
the facts. A couple of calls would have avoided an embarrassing situation.

Governors have learned the hard way not to jump the gun when calls first come in.
IMMEDIATE, CORRECT DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS ARE GOVERNORS’ FIRST NEED IN
EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT.

Emergencies can strike at any time, with either minor or monumental human, economic, and
political consequences. The technological, social, and political developments of the twentieth
century are compounding and expanding the range of traditional natural hazards that states must
manage:

 Billions of dollars are spent annually by states and municipalities on emergency response and
recovery.
 Five hundred million dollars is spent each year on federal disaster aid to states where about
fifty presidentially declared disasters and emergencies occur.
 Two, three, or more sizable hazardous materials accidents, explosions, and train derailments
occur daily in the United States.
 Ten to fifteen thousand people a year die from burns alone, largely in residential fires, but
also in fires associated with natural disasters and industrial accidents.
 Fire accounts for $11 to $12 billion in losses annually.
 Thirty-five percent of the U.S. population and thirty-nine states are at major or minor
earthquake risk.
 Two to three billion dollars a year is spent on earthquake-resistant construction.
 One hundred eleven acts of domestic terrorism occurred in 1977, of which fifty-eight were
bombing threats.
Governors, who are responsible for the safety and welfare of the people of their states, are in a
unique position to coordinate state, local, and federal resources in preventing avoidable hazards,
mitigating and preparing for unavoidable disasters, responding to them, and recovering from
emergencies of all kinds.

There are, however, an inordinate number of conceptual, organizational, procedural, legislative,

and leadership roadblocks that have hampered states’ ability to manage emergencies and
disasters.

Governors of the United States, its commonwealths, and territories have become increasingly
concerned about the lack of a national policy for managing natural, man-made, and attack
emergencies. This lack of a comprehensive national policy for emergency management, coupled
with a dispersion of emergency management responsibilities among numerous federal agencies,
has compounded states’ problems.

This concern prompted the National Governors’ Association to form a Subcommittee on Disaster
Assistance in 1977 to urge the president to establish a new Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and to undertake a comprehensive one-year project to analyze and make
recommendations about the states’ problems in managing all types of emergencies.

This guide highlights the findings of the NGA Emergency Preparedness Project study,
recommends an approach to comprehensive state emergency management, and offers pertinent
management advice and tools based on hard-won experience in a variety of states.

Case histories based on actual experience, as told by governors, their aides, and state emergency
office directors, appear as insets throughout the text. These case histories both illustrate and
augment the surrounding text. The outcomes of cases describing comprehensive emergency
management are hypothetical, as this practice is not yet implemented in most states.

Intended for governors and their staff aides, this guide is concerned with emergency
management. It is one of a series of five companion publications of the NGA Center for Policy
Research. The others are listed, with capsule descriptions, inside the back cover.

We wish to acknowledge the spirit of cooperation and helpfulness extended by governors,

executive aides, state budget and planning officers, state emergency services directors, and other
staff in twenty-five states across the nation. Appreciation and thanks are also extended to
national and local emergency-related organizations, local elected and appointed officials,
representatives of the research community, and many public interest groups. The high degree of
interest and cooperation received reflects the concern of all in improving emergency
management.

Special thanks are due Nevada Governor Mike O’Callaghan, chairman of the NGA
Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance. His expert advice, not only from a governor’s viewpoint,
but also as an experienced regional director of the former Offices of Emergency Planning and
Preparedness, was invaluable. The advice of subcommittee members George Jones, representing
Virginia Governor John Dalton; Milton Mitnick, representing Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen;
Hayden Haynes, representing Oklahoma Governor David L. Boren; and State Representative Bill
Stewart, representing Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp, was also extremely helpful.
George Jones wrote the declaration summary in this guide and originally conceptualized the need
for the NGA project.

NGA General Counsel John Lagomarcino, who acted as staff advisor to the project, gave
invaluable advice and support. Others whose work contributed substantively to the concepts in
this manual are: Vernon L. Wingert, project associate director; Hugh Russell, evaluation
consultant; Jim Morentz, research consultant; and Edmond F. Rovner, legal consultant.

Appreciation is extended to DCPA Director Bardyl Tirana, his special assistant for liaison,
Angela Novello, and Plans and Operations Director John McConnell, who provided the funding
and gave unstinting support to the project staff.
1. CURRENT EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES

The governor’s office manager routed a new U.S. Geological Survey map of
seismic zones to the special assistant for natural resources, who was uncertain
about which communities would be most vulnerable. So he sent the map to the
state geologist, who added possible fault lines and placed them on subdivision
maps. These were sent, in turn, to state legislators and local municipalities.
Several legislators from hazard zones proposed a statute requiring real estate
agents to disclose the fault lines to potential property buyers. The real estate
industry, however, discredited the map as theoretical and influenced key
legislators to bottle up the bill in committee. Local city councils, which also
reviewed the maps, could not decide on needed action. Eventually, the matter was
dropped.

Lack of decisive follow-up on federal research provided to states often happens when
RESPONSIBILITIES ARE FRAGMENTED. The USGS sent the material to the states, but did
not have authority to make operational recommendations. The state geologist felt he had met his
responsibility when he disseminated more detailed information. The Land Use Planning Office
and other pertinent agencies were not consulted, and the complex set of technical, economic, and
public policy concerns involved remained unaddressed.

A state comprehensive emergency manager with governor’s clout could have established a
mitigation management plan and monitoring system, coordinated consideration of the matter
from all angles, and developed plans and follow-up for this and other potential hazards.

Although most legislation enables a broader approach, both federal and state government have
managed disasters mainly in terms of preparedness* for and response* to expected disaster
events. For example, Pennsylvania emphasizes flood preparedness; Texas and Florida have
developed hurricane response plans and procedures.

At the federal level, preparedness for attack and preparedness for natural disasters have usually
been administered by separate agencies. Currently, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
(DCPA) in the Department of Defense and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
(FDAA) in the Department of Housing and Urban Development share lead roles. Many
fragmented services are provided by some thirty other agencies. Efforts to coordinate the
management of man-made disasters are just beginning.

*
For a discussion of these terms, see Chapter 2, pp. 1213.

1
Although individual agencies, notably the U.S. Fire Administration (formerly the National Fire
Prevention and Control Administration), have done much to develop prevention and mitigation*
programs for certain kinds of emergencies, little has been done until this year (1978) to integrate
mitigation and long-term recovery* activities into a coordinated emergency management
program. The same is true at the state level.

Only recently has the combination of technological hazards and rising personnel and equipment
costs demanded that governments at federal, state, and local levels coordinate their resources for
emergency mitigation and long-term recovery, in addition to preparedness and response. These
same forces require the broadest use of available resources to meet needs without increasing
costs.

Federal Emergency Programs

New Deal social programs in the 1930s initiated piecemeal federal assistance to natural disaster
victims. Since then a patchwork of agencies, departments, and councils has been established by
executive orders, acts of Congress, administrative delegations, and reorganization plans. They
have been largely temporary in nature, responding to specific disasters. In 1950, two separate
federal civil defense and disaster relief acts were passed. Attack response and natural disaster
response have been conceptually and legislatively separated ever since.

Federal financial assistance to state and local jurisdictions for civil defense programs was begun
in 1958. At that time, the Federal Civil Defense Act was amended to provide federal matching
(50/50) funds for “personnel and administrative” expenditures for civil defense preparedness.
Attack preparedness was mandated as a joint federal-state-local responsibility.

The Council of State Governments recommended model state civil defense legislation in 1958.
Most states have adopted it either wholly or in part. On the basis of this legislation, local and
state governments implemented emergency programs for both attack and natural disaster
preparedness. A serious conflict emerged, however, between the different orientations of the
model state legislation on the one hand and restrictive civil defense attack preparedness and
funding provisions on the other.

States, which must deal with all kinds of emergencies with limited personnel, have found it very
difficult to handle disasters effectively when they have to coordinate with multiple federal
agencies, each with its own mandate and restrictions. Governors, therefore, have become
increasingly concerned about the lack of a comprehensive national policy and organization for
all types of emergencies. They began to voice their concern through NGA in 1977.

On June 9, 1978, after strong resistance from some of the federal agencies concerned, President
Carter submitted Reorganization Plan Number Three to Congress. He did so because of strong
pressure for the plan from civil defense and emergency services organizations, state and local
officials, and public interest groups, among which NGA played a lead role.

A new Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will be created in early 1979. Its
director will report to the president and chair an emergency management committee comprising

2
the assistants to the president for national security affairs, domestic affairs and policy, and
intergovernmental relations, and the director of the Office of Management and Budget. FEMA
will include the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) from the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, the U.S. Fire Administration from the Department of Commerce, and the
Federal Emergency Broadcast System’s oversight responsibility from the Office of the President.

Other agencies and programs to be consolidated into FEMA include the Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency from the Department of Defense, the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration from HUD, the Federal Preparedness Agency from the General Services
Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program from
Commerce, the Dam Safety Coordination Program and Earthquake Hazard Reduction Office,
both from the Executive Office of the President, and two emergency functions not assigned to
any agency: Federal Response to Consequences of Terrorist Incidents and Coordination of
Emergency Warning. Federal emergency preparedness and response organizational development
is capsulized in Figure 1.

This is the first time that mitigation, response and preparedness programs are being stressed in a
coordinated manner at the federal level, and it is hoped that FEMA may also develop strong
long-term recovery coordination programs. FEMA can provide the foundation for a
comprehensive national emergency management system wherein federal, state, and local
emergency management organizations become equal partners.

State Emergency Management, 1978

At the same time governors were urging federal consolidation, they also initiated a study of state
emergency management by the NGA Center for Policy Research. The Defense Civil
Preparedness Agency funded the project and the NGA Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance
provided advisory guidance.

State emergency offices reported a total of 1,242 emergencies in the first half of 1978, compared
to 1,461 incidents in the past five years. Their figures also indicate that man-made emergencies,
such as hazardous materials accidents, utilities failures, pollution, and terrorism, are dramatically
increasing. Man-made emergencies represent two-thirds (819) of the cases this year alone, in
contrast to one-fifth (291) of the cases dealt with during the past five years.

The figures in Table 1 indicate events that have been reported to state emergency services
offices. We cannot be sure how well they represent the number of emergencies that actually
occurred throughout the United States, its commonwealths, and territories during this period. But
the figures do reflect a changing trend in the type of emergencies reported. This trend requires a
parallel change in emergency management procedure.

These figures strongly indicate that states should examine their capacity to deal with man-made
and civil hazards in addition to natural disasters. In fact, the 1977-78 chairman of the National
Governors’ Association, Governor William G. Milliken of Michigan, and the subcommittee
chairman, Governor Mike O’Callaghan, have called for the establishment of an office to
coordinate hazardous materials accidents management within FEMA.

3
 Figure 1
FEDERAL EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL EMERGENCY COUNCIL (NEC)

(In White House from 1933 to 1939; placed in Executive
Office of the President in 1939)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(established in 1947)
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (OEM)
(Executive Office of the President)
1940-50
OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE
PLANNING (OCDP)
1948-49

Partial functions
FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION (FCDA) transfer OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE LIAISON
(White House) (OCDL)
1950-58 1949-50

OFFICE OF DEFENSE AND CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION (ODCM)

OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE MOBILIZATION (OCDM)
(ODCM, 1958; name changed to OCDM in 1958, independent agencies)
1958-61

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING (OEP) OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE (OCD)

(White House) 1961-72
1961-68

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (OEP) #1 DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

(Executive Office of the President) AGENCY (DCPA)
1968-73 1972-78

GENERAL SERVICES HOUSING AND URBAN

ADMINISTRATION (GSA) DEVELOPMENT (HUD)

OFFICE OF PREPAREDNESS (OP) #2 FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

1973-75 ADMINISTRATION (FDAA)
1973-78

#3 FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (FPA)

1975-78

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)

1978

#4 DAM SAFETY COORDINATION

(Executive Office of the President) #8 FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION
1977 (Housing and Urban Development)
1968
#5 EARTHQUAKE HAZARD REDUCTION PROGRAM
(Executive Office of the President)
1978
#9 NATIONAL FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
ADMINISTRATION
(Commerce)
#6 CONSEQUENCES MANAGEMENT IN 1974
TERRORISM
(Executive Office of the President)
#10 NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE COMMUNITY
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
#7 WARNING AND EMERGENCY BROADCAST
(Executive Office of the President) (Commerce)
4 1977 1973
All states have emergency office (SEOs) which plan for, and coordinate responses to, natural
disasters and possible attack. Few SEOs, however, coordinate technological hazards, energy and
materials shortages, or long-onset natural disasters such as droughts and internal disturbances.
Not one comprehensively coordinates mitigation and long-term recovery for all risks. Overall,
SEOs coordinate response to only 40 percent of all emergencies that occur.

The majority of governors (72 percent) and SEO directors (71 percent) interviewed consider
response to natrual disasters as the SEO’s responsibility. All consider attack, whether nuclear or
conventional, as adjutant-general and National Guard matters. If an attack occurred, however,
many National Guard units and adjutants-general would be federalized, leaving the SEO to
coordinate civilian protection. Federalization could pose a management continuity problem in
some states with a high percentage of mililtary reservists on SEO staffs. Response to
technological hazards and civil disorders is assigned to various offices most (80 percent) of the
time. State response operations are thus split by types of emergencies.

Table 1
STATE EMERGENCY INCIDENCE TRENDS
1978
1973-78 (January-June)
Natural Events
Wind, water, rural fire, snow and ice 1,082 339
Drought and range infestion 69 78
Land movement 19 6
1,170 423
Man-Made Events
Urban fire 75 38
Utilities failures, explosions, air crashes, oil spills 70 65
Pollution, epidemics 37 51
Radiation 102 87
Terrorism, civil disorder 7 25
Hazardous materials accidents ----- 550
Energy shortages ----- 3
291 819
Total 1,461 1,242

The governors and SEO directors interviewed see preparedness and response as the
responsibility of the SEO, rather than mitigation and recovery. These latter two functions are
viewed as federal responsibilities to be carried out by block (not categorical, which are too
limiting) grants to states. Governors and SEO directors are not sure, however, about what state
office should administer such grants. Thus emergency operations appear to be fragmented at
both the federal and the state level by type of emergency, by phases of management, and by
organizational involvement.

Nonetheless, the study found direct management links between types of disasters and the four
phases of emergency activity. Practical mitigation activities should reduce the probability of
some disasters and ameliorate the effects of them all. Preparedness activities should reduce the

5
probability of deaths, injuries, and property damage caused by emergencies. Immediate response
and long-term recovery measures, if managed in the context of overall state community
development planning, can speed return to normalcy and contribute materially to state
development.

Lessons learned from recovery activities are often not used in mitigating consequences of future
disasters because state legislators and planners are seldom involved in any continuous way. It is
evident that the close links between mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery are not
adequately understood.

The lack of understanding of the relationship between preparedness and response on the one
hand and recovery and mitigation on the other, and the kinds of talents needed to manage all four
phases, may be a key factor behind differing viewpoints among emergency services operations
run by adjutants-general and civilian divisons. The NGA study showed that a variety of skills are
needed in a comprehensive emergency management set-up:

 Preparedness and response personnel need a fast-action, authoritative, operational, and

decision-making approach to their work. They need systems-planning skills, training skills,
and technical expertise.
 Mitigation and long-term recovery personnel, by contrast, require analytic, evaluative, and
policymaking skills. They also require political acumen and knowledge of the state
development plan.

It should not, then, be a question of whether military or civilian personnel or responders or

planners should run emergency management. The question should be how any given operation
can use both types of skills. The fortunate governor has a manager who has both sets of skills
and infuses an appropriate balance into the emergency management program.

All of these issues lead to the major finding of the NGA study: many state emergency operations
are fragmented. There are two basic causes for this fragmentation: (1) uncoordinated federal
programs encourage state fragmentation, and (2) the strong relationship between long-term
recovery and mitigation of future disasters and preparedness and response to more immediate
disasters is not adequately understood. Little thought has been given to the relationship of all
four phases to one another and to state development planning. Moreover, neither planning roles
nor emergency policy have been delineated or articulated at federal, state, and local levels.

6
 Figure 2
CURRENT STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
(general patterns of fragmentation for all-risk management)

Functions that are GOVERNOR

currently operative

Functions needing 1 to 3 levels down to:

Integration or
coordination

STATE EMERGENCY
OFFICE

MITIGATION PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE RECOVERY

Planning Federal grants
(now ad hoc) (ad hoc)

Budget Legislated dollars

(now ad hoc) (now ad hoc
(Varied lead
(Plans are
agencies manage
Legislature inadequate for man-
man-made
(unaware) made emergencies)
emergencies) Individual state
agency programs
Implementing
involving recovery
authorities
(now ad hoc)
(incomplete and
uncoordinated)

7
 Figure 3
SUGGESTED LINKAGES FOR COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
(coordinating all risks, four phases, with state development plan)

GOVERNOR

LOCAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

CEM DIRECTOR GOVERNMENT
(FEMA coordinator)

`
MITIGATION PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE RECOVERY

Federal grants
State planning
coordination
State budget All-risk
planning, Statewide Legislative
training, and agency initiatives
Legislative
initiatives public coordination
information Coordinated
state agency
Coordinated
planning and
implementive
programs
authority

EMERGENCY SERVICES UNIT

Note: This is a functions linkage diagram. It is not an organizational chart or model.

8
To summarize, the NGA study found that many state emergency management programs are
fragmented and that mere preparedness and response mechanisms are not enough. These must be
coordinated with active mitigation and long-term recovery programs which should be set in the
context of state development plans. The important emergency management criteria which
emerged from the study are: (1) planning, program, and political, as well as response, skills are
needed for successful emergency management; (2) mitigation programs can save lives and
dollars; and (3) states should upgrade their capacity to deal with man-made emergencies by using
existing personnel and resources more extensively.

Figure 2 illustrates general patterns of current state disorganization in the context of

comprehensive emergency management. Figure 3 suggests links that could provide a
comprehensive emergency management program. These two diagrams do not describe a specific
organizational chart; rather, they illustrate important functional and management linkages with
which governors may wish to compare their own operations.

Because the governor had kept faith with a seven-state pact and refused to accede to the
demands of a terrorist group to release twenty convicts, the terrorists dynamited a dam.
The governor was appalled at the human suffering and flood damage. He applied for,
and was granted, a presidential disaster declaration for the six counties hit hardest by
the flood. During several visits to the disaster scene, the governor observed that federal
individual and family grants were delayed, pending Small Business Administration
turndowns, and the one-stop federal assistance centers were falling behind in processing
victims’ claims. He signed vouchers for thousands of dollars for state aid and services to
needy victims. Four years later, many of the vouchers were still unfulfilled.

The governor’s great concern is understandable; it was the only reason he was not held
accountable for his unauthorized vouchers. Human suffering can be best alleviated by mobilizing
and infusing support into already existing public and private assistance organizations at national,
state, and local levels. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE A TEAM EFFORT
BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF RESOURCES.

9
2. WHAT IS COMPREHENSIVE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT?
Shortly after his inauguration, the governor called together his cabinet, state legislative
leaders, and regional and state emergency officers to discuss all the major emergencies
in the state over the past five years, assess the state’s vulnerability to future civil
disorders, plan for natural, man-made, technological, and energy hazards, and set up a
coordinated management structure. When the director of natural resources heard the
public works commissioner describe the coastal plain building codes, he suggested
similar codes might be useful in the tornado-prone northern area. The director of
transportation also suggested that road safety codes be updated for transporting
hazardous materials cargoes across interstate highways. The speaker backed the
proposals as public safety issues and agreed to push new legislation. The governor,
pleased with these results, appointed a comprehensive emergency manager for the state,
with authority to convene agency heads and other key officials to investigate, share, and
develop other ideas and cooperative efforts to mitigate all kinds of emergencies.

This example of gubernatorial initiative led to COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT in the state, with the potential for long-term benefits to public protection. It
also resulted in recovery cost savings which were directed into long-delayed public development
programs in the state community development plan.

Comprehensive emergency management (CEM) is a new term. It refers to a state’s responsibility

and capability for managing all types of emergencies and disasters by coordinating the actions of
numerous agencies. The “comprehensive” aspect of CEM includes all four phases of disaster or
emergency activity: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It applies to all risks:
attack, man-made, and natural, in a federal-state-local partnership.

CEM should be distinguished from the term comprehensive emergency preparedness, now
generally in use, because the latter has come to place too much emphasis, in practice if not
legislative intent, on the preparedness phase of emergency management. There are several
reasons for this misdirected emphasis: (1) a lack of federal funds to states to mount mitigation
and long-term recovery planning, (2) a lack of state funds, staff, and time to coordinate these
phases, and (3) a lack of understanding of the relationships between the four phases. In addition,
public leaders have tended to emphasize preparedness and response at the expense of
coordinated mitigation and recovery, at both federal and state levels.

A CEM program identifies agencies and individuals who have useful resources to bring to bear
on all aspects of emergencies. It motivates them to apply their resources in the most productive
manner, and it coordinates their disaster activities. The coordination function should not be
confused with the concept of “directing,” as in directing emergency response operations.

11
The following discussion describes types of emergencies, phases of disaster activities, and the
partnership of organizations whose emergency resources a state CEM program must coordinate.
In short, it delineates the components of a state CEM program and shows their interrelationships.

Types of Emergencies

Emergencies take many forms. They can involve any combination of consequences stemming
from:

 Technological and man-made hazards: nuclear waste disposal spills; radiological, toxic
substance, or hazardous materials accidents; utilities failures; pollution; epidemics; crashes;
explosions; urban fires.
 Natural disasters: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunami, sea surges, freezes,
blizzards of snow and ice, extreme cold, forest fires, drought, and range infestation.
 Internal disturbances: civil disorders such as riots, demonstrations run amok, large-scale
prison breaks, strikes leading to violence, and acts of terrorism.
 Energy and material shortages: from strikes, price wars, labor problems, and resource
scarcity.
 Attack: the ultimate emergency—nuclear, conventional, chemical, or biological warfare.

Emergency Management Phases

Emergency-related activities are clustered into four phases that are related by time and function
to all types of disasters. The phases are also related to each other, and each involves different
types of skills.

Mitigation: Mitigation includes any activities that actually eliminate or reduce the probability of
occurrence of a disaster (for example, arms build-up to deter enemy attack or legislation that
takes the unstable double-bottom tanker off the highways). It includes long-term activities
designed to reduce the effects of unavoidable disaster (for example, land-use management,
establishing comprehensive emergency management programs, or legislating building safety
codes).

After a suburban gas line explosion tore up several roads, the governor was called on to
solve the problem of restrictions that prohibited state vehicles from clearing county roads
to utility lines. After notifying the attorney general and the Highway Department, the
governor suspended the problem-causing statute and notified the County Road
Commission. The CEM director and the attorney general were later asked to look into all
laws and regulations that might have emergency-related conflicts and to recommend
solutions. When the recommendations were compiled, the governor addressed both the
state legislature and the annual convention of county commissioners about writing and
revising statutory and regulatory language to allow for responsible, wider application of
authorities in times of emergency.

Experience, if acted upon, can reduce procedural frustration in times of emergency when
responsible, fast decisions and follow-up are needed and thus improve future PREPAREDNESS
and response.

12
Preparedness: Preparedness activities are necessary to the extent that mitigation measures have
not, or cannot, prevent disasters. In the preparedness phase, governments, organizations, and
individuals develop plans to save lives and minimize disaster damage (for example, compiling
state resource inventories, mounting training exercises, or installing warning systems).
Preparedness measures also seek to enhance disaster response operations (for example, by
stockpiling vital food and medical supplies, through training exercises, and by mobilizing
emergency personnel on a standby basis).

Response: Response activities follow an emergency or disaster. Generally, they are designed to
provide emergency assistance for casualties (for example, search and rescue, emergency shelter,
medical care, mass feeding). They also seek to reduce the probability of secondary damage (for
example, shutting off contaminated water supply sources, cordoning off and patrolling looting-
prone areas) and to speed recovery operations (for example, damage assessment).

Recovery: Recovery activities continue until all systems return to normal or better. They include
two sets of activities: Short-term recovery activities return vital life-support systems to minimum
operating standards (for example, cleanup, temporary housing). Long-term recovery activities
may continue for a number of years after a disaster. Their purpose is to return life to normal, or
improved levels (for example, redevelopment loans, legal assistance, and community planning).

Federal-State-Local Partnership

The National Weather Service issued a forecast for a severe and prolonged drought
throughout the central United States. Governors of eight affected states directed their
CEM directors to set up a task force coordinated by NGA, which in turn asked the
Farmers Home Administration, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service,
and other offices in the U.S. Department of Agriculture to participate. The National
Association of Counties, the National League of Cities, and the National Weather Service
were also contacted and brought together. The task force analyzed irrigation possibilities
and the potential economic threat to affected farmers, their markets and to the national
economy. An effective county-by-county public information program was mounted. In
some areas, farmers agreed to plant alternate crops requiring less water; farmers from
southeastern and southwestern states agreed to increase their corn and wheat
production. State legislatures passed temporary farm assistance programs, and state
agriculture and planning offices provided regular reports to the state CEM directors and
governors. When the drought lifted five years later, no presidential disaster declaration
had been issued, and no farmers had lost appreciable income.

This is an example of how COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND

EFFECTIVE FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL PARTNERSHIP can mitigate an emergency. It is
based on real events, although the coordinated outcome is hypothetical.

13
Different levels of public and private organizations have special resources they can apply to
disaster management. For example, the federal government provides authorities—legislation,
executive orders, and regulations—which influence disaster activities. It is also an important
source of fiscal aid that can be applied to emergency management. The Federal Disaster
Assistance Administration, for example, provides preparedness planning grants to states; the
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency provides operations planning and financial assistance,
including personnel and administrative support funds. In other cases, federal agencies are sources
of the specialized services, research, technical information, and manpower needed in disaster
work.

Local governments also have unique resources. First and foremost, they bring motivation to
manage disasters, all of which occur in single or multiple localities. Second, localities provide
manpower and knowledge of the area affected by a disaster. Third, they can provide limited
funds and locally available equipment and supplies. Fourth, they can pass ordinances and
regulations to prevent or forestall some emergencies, reduce the damage caused by others,
improve response efficiency, and enhance recovery.

The private sector can provide specialized material, such as heavy construction equipment, and
volunteer workers with varied expertise. The private sector can also provide specialized
technical information. Chemical companies, for example, can provide data on the rate of
detoxification for certain accidentally released chemicals.

State governments have a very strong public mandate (and federal encouragement) to coordinate
all aspects of emergency management. This mandate is translated into legislated authorities and
extraordinary gubernatorial powers. The state, like the federal government, is a source of
disaster-related laws and regulations, such as land use codes, state fire regulations, and other
protective covenants. State government is also a source of the public administration skills and
equipment necessary to manage emergencies.

State government’s unique resource is its capability to broker relationships between those in
need at the local level and those who can help at the state and federal levels.

Although the variety of hazards and the costs of responding to them are growing, personnel,
equipment, and dollars are becoming more scarce. This disparity has led some states to seek
ways to use available resources more efficiently at all levels of government and in the private
sectors. More should do so.

State government is in a unique position to ascertain local disaster program needs, assess
available state and federal government disaster resources, and facilitate the acquisition,
application, and coordination of those resources.

These fiscal and management factors favor a program of comprehensive emergency

management, that is, the integration of all possible organizations at all levels into all phases of
emergency activity, for all types of disasters. CEM is more appropriate for state governments
than emergency preparedness alone.

14
In summary, comprehensive emergency management marshals all the resources available to meet
all potential emergencies under coordinated management. CEM enables a state to meet its
responsibility in emergencies and disasters by coordinating public and private programs, not only
toward preparedness and response to disasters, but for mitigation of their consequences and
augmenting recovery from them. CEM fosters a federal-state-local operating partnership.

A series of tornadoes across the state inflicted severe damage on two medium-sized cities.
In visiting both, the governor noticed that cleanup seemed to be further along in the more
severely hit city. He found that the local emergency services coordinator (EMC) was well
respected in town and had worked out and tested an emergency response plan for early
warnings from the National Weather Service. He had initiated installation of new
warning sirens at the fire department and had coordinated health services, evacuation
procedures, search and rescue operations, debris clearance, temporary shelter
construction, feeding programs, and other response services. He had made particularly
good use of trained volunteers. The other city had a part-time EMC, who was not on duty
when the tornado hit. Warnings to the city, as well as notification to city and state
officials, were delayed. The second city, although less severely struck, took longer to
respond to and recover from the emergency.

Both these situations occur frequently throughout the United States. CEM, EXTENDED TO
THE LOCAL LEVEL, should involve meetings between governors and state-level CEM
coordinators and the local officials who appoint emergency management coordinators to develop
a mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities. An agreement under which local officials
nominate several EMC candidates to the governor for final choice and joint local-state funding of
salaries of full-time EMCs might be useful.

Organizational Involvement in Varied Types of Emergencies

To further illustrate the various aspects of CEM, let us take a specific look at organizational
resources in each phase of five varied types of emergencies.

The following diagrams illustrate that emergencies are handled by combinations of organizations
that vary according to type of emergency and phases of emergency management. Comprehensive
emergency management coordinates the interactions of all organizations for all phases of all
risks. The diagrams on the following pages depict five generalizations:

 Federal and state governments are the major sources of long-term recovery resources for all
types of major emergencies. The private sector and local government can make special
contributions which, together with outside assistance, require coordination at the state level.
 Generally, federal organizations provide resources for all phases of activity only in
conditions of attack or internal disturbance.
 Federal resources are usually tapped for national, strategic, long-term recovery, and
preparedness aspects of emergency management.
 Generally, local and private resources are most appropriate for emergency preparedness
operations, response mobilization, and short-term recovery.

15
 In all types of disasters, state organizations not only provide disaster resources, but also
coordinate the resources and assistance provided by other levels.

Hence, state government exercises a pivotal role in managing all kinds of disasters.

Figures 4 through 8 illustrate the organizational levels that usually have the most resources to
bring to bear on five types of emergencies: attack, internal disturbance, natural disaster,
technological hazard, and energy or materials shortage. In each figure, the center circle labels the
type of emergency; the second circle shows quadrants for the four phases of emergency activity;
and the screening, or shading, in the outer circles shows emphases of organizational activity by
emergency phase.

The figures highlight primary resources in order to point up differing organizational role
emphases between types of emergencies as they appear to be practiced currently. There are, of
course, numerous specific exceptions.

The governor of a coastal state learned from the press that federal agents had captured a
group of Asians who had recently arrived by ship to blow up strategic facilities in Port
City with a nuclear bomb. The terrorists were protesting the deportation of fellow
countrymen for subversive activities. The mayor of Port City had notified the FBI, which
worked with local port officials to screen all incoming vessels. The FBI had called in the
Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) which had analyzed
threatening telephone voices for national origin and psychological implications. Shipping
arrival schedules were then consulted and suspect vessels searched. NEST experts found
and defused the bomb while the FBI and local police arrested the terrorists. Because the
governor had not been informed of this potential threat to the city and area citizens, he
filed complaints at the White House and FBI, and requested all mayors to notify him of
any terrorist or attack events in the future.

While it is true that terroristic emergencies instigated by foreign or domestic groups are
classified as federal offenses and the FBI and/or the State Department have official jurisdiction,
the governor should have been advised. In an effort to avert panic, the State Department did not
want more offices than necessary to know of the threat. It did not occur to the FBI to alert the
governor, although agents were working with local police authorities. Neither would have
refused to do so.

There have been over seventy nuclear threat incidents across the United States during the last
eight years. In only a few instances have the governors concerned been informed. Federal-state
agreements for COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF ALL TYPES OF
ATTACK EVENTS should be updated to include notification of governor’s offices.

16
 Figure 4
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ATTACK

The impact of attack (nuclear, conventional, biological, or chemical) would be widespread, if not
nationwide. Life, property, and the economy are at risk. Federal organizations have skills,
resources, and personnel for all four phases of attack activity. State government has
preparedness, response, and recovery capability. Local governments and the private sector have
limited preparedness and recovery options. They must deal with initial response alone until
outside help is mobilized, and must plan for that initial response. By law, attack preparedness is a
joint federal, state, and local responsibility; however, each level’s resources are different in type
and amount.

17
 The governor was aware of growing citizen concern about potential radiation problems
in ten urban and rural areas where new nuclear power plants were to be located. Local
officials reported demonstrations appeared likely. The governor decided to establish a
strong emergency management policy, addressing all potential risks in the state, both
technological and natural. Civil demonstrations were averted when she initiated a public
information program that explained the need for nuclear energy and stressed the
potential economic benefits to be derived from new jobs. She personally inaugurated
public protection exercises and information programs. A small leakage incident at an
existing plant was quickly handled and well publicized, forestalling public skepticism.

The governor built a reputation for strong, forward-looking leadership by coordinating state
development planning with emergency response planning. She also encouraged good interagency
relationships through cooperative exercises.

The development of new industries and other economic, social, and geological changes pose
potential civilian hazards. The state should have a comprehensive emergency manager to
coordinate analyses of current and changing vulnerabilities that result from social and economic
development. The CEM should also analyze the relation of potential risks to the state community
development plan and the legislative and regulatory implications and coordinate emergency-
related programming with all the concerned state agencies and offices, not only for INTERNAL
DISTURBANCES but for all kinds of emergencies.

18
 Figure 5
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL DISTURBANCE

Internal disturbances, such as riots, prison breaks, disruptive terrorism, and strikes, are usually
matters for police management, with state and federal support and assistance being provided only
if needed. The impact of internal disturbances is more localized, threatening mainly life and
property. Local and private-sector managers usually have the tools to mitigate and prepare for
them. Local and state police usually have the necessary response resources, unless the
disturbances pose a widespread or sensational threat.

Internal disturbances require government regulation, planning, emergency enforcement

personnel, and recovery funds. The private sector is most limited in the response phase.

19
 Following hurricane Zelda, the governor visited heavily devastated areas in Mason
County, to find the sheriff was running roughshod over the county civil defense director.
He was giving out conflicting news information to area CB operators, arguing with
neighboring mayors over equipment and deployment for debris removal, and had used
the governor’s name to call out the National Guard without permission. The governor
convinced the sheriff that the sheriff’s most important task was to enforce public safety,
allowing others to manage relief operations. The governor left an inexperienced aide at
the scene to monitor activities in his behalf, but the sheriff soon overstepped his role
again and confusion returned. The governor’s request for a presidential disaster
declaration was delayed when he was forced to return to the scene.

The case shows a lack of several important CEM factors: TRAINING, PLANNING, and
DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES at both state and local levels. These factors are
important not only to natural disasters but to all types of emergencies.

The National Guard should have been called out only by the governor or his authorized
representative (often the SEO director), not the sheriff. Had the county commissioners been
briefed on the importance of coordinating all emergency response activities apart from the
sheriff’s public safety functions, they might have appointed a strong county emergency
management coordinator to develop practical plans and cooperative training exercises.

The governor also needed a state CEM manager to serve as state coordinating officer (SCO),
with adequate clout to solve and monitor the on-site problems. This person could have worked in
close cooperation with the emergency services office and all the state and national agencies
involved in response operations.

20
 Figure 6
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN NATURAL DISASTER

Natural hazards provide the greatest opportunity for coordinated interaction of all levels. Impact
may be limited to small areas, as in the case of a tornado that hits one town. Or, impact may be
dispersed, as in the case of multistate winter storms. To date, natural disasters have provided all
organizational levels with the most experience in hazard management. Federal agencies provide
recovery assistance for major disasters. State emergency offices prepare for and coordinate
response to large disasters. Local governments maintain warning systems and respond to all
disasters in their areas.

Major natural disasters require recovery resources from the federal government. The state is in a
good position to coordinate all phases of activity.

21
 A seventeen-car freight train carrying both chlorine and propane gas was derailed. On
visiting the scene, the governor, his emergency services director, and an aide found that
residents for a five-mile radius had been quickly evacuated. Trained railroad technicians,
wearing protective clothing, had already sealed the cars that had been leaking deadly
chlorine gas and were about to begin the delicate operation of righting two propane gas
tank cars. The governor was told the tanks were secure and the operation would be
completed that afternoon. On his departure, the governor held a press conference at the
road barricade five miles away, after which his aide told reporters that local residents
would be able to return to their homes that night. Later, returning homeowners found
that they were not allowed to cross the barricade. Five people who disregarded the order
and walked home through the woods were found dead the next day of chlorine gas
inhalation. Chlorine had hovered in the forest declivity where the five victims lived.

The aide should not have inferred that the area was safe because the propane tanks would be
righted that day and the chlorine tanks had been sealed.

In dealing with MAN-MADE TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS, public officials and their

representatives must leave technically related decisions, predictions, and announcements to the
experts.

22
 Figure 7
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARD

Most technological hazards such as train derailments or toxic gas escapes have very limited
impact areas. For the most part, they threaten life and property, and they frequently require a
great deal of private-sector technological input to overcome them. Local jurisdictions can
mitigate technological hazards by assessing public vulnerabilities and passing appropriate
regulatory ordinances. Local governments and private industries can cooperate in mitigation,
preparedness, and response activities. State and federal governments regulate technology to
mitigate emergencies. The federal government is least able to issue warnings or respond to or
activate short-term recovery from emergencies, although it can provide clearinghouse, research,
and information services.

23
 The worst blizzard in the state’s history knocked out power and utilities and blocked
incoming highways and railroads. Fuel, water, food, and medical supplies became scarce
in three major communities. The governor was informed that public panic was likely and
that famine and epidemic conditions were developing. Adequate help from outside the
state could not be brought in for several days until roads and airstrips could be cleared.
Having recently participated in crisis relocation planning exercises with two adjacent
states, the governor called for all available helicopters to evacuate stranded people
according to the relocation plan. The media broadcast life protection information for
areas which couldn’t be reached immediately, and the SEO mobilized volunteer
snowmobile deliveries of basic necessities to distribution points until help could be
brought in. The disaster response operation worked well and also provided an
opportunity to test crisis relocation plans in a real-life situation.

This application of attack preparedness measures and the allocation of existing resources to
ENERGY AND MATERIALS SHORTAGES caused by a natural disaster illustrate the
importance of integrating attack and natural disaster authorities in CEM.

24
 Figure 8
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ENERGY AND MATERIALS SHORTAGES

Energy and materials shortages require a greater input from quasi-public and private industrial
organizations. They generally threaten the economy more than property or life. Federal
government activities are usually limited to regulatory mitigation, conciliatory response, and
long-term recovery. States can influence mitigation and preparedness through quasi-public
commissions and multistate resource-sharing agreements. Because the scope of these disasters is
usually great, local jurisdictions are much more dependent on state-level management.

Energy and materials shortages are best mitigated by all organizational levels. Both federal and
state government can regulate production and distribution of vital commodities. After a shortage
occurs, federal response is largely ineffectual, but state governments may have response options,
such as sharing their diminishing stockpiles or imposing rationing. Long-term recovery usually
requires major fiscal support—a task for the federal government.

25
3. ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN
COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The governor was faced with a drought affecting human water supplies, agricultural
irrigation, inland fisheries, recreational use of reservoirs, industrial waste disposal, and
hydroelectric power. The situation threatened severe social and economic consequences.
The governor appointed a comprehensive emergency manager with cabinet rank,
instructing her to contact the state planning office to obtain economic forecasts and to
ask line agencies for analyses of all potential federal and state assistance programs
applicable to drought situations. He also asked her to contact other affected states
regarding their planning and to develop contingency plans and action options. The CEM
manager developed a successful three-state effort to secure federal assistance from
USDA’s Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) for emergency
conservation and irrigation measures programs. The Rural Electrification
Administration provided loans, and the Soil Conservation Service assisted in resource
conservation and emergency watershed protection. County public information programs
were developed with the help of the ASCS, the state emergency office, media, and local
municipalities. The CEM manager also coordinated planning between the federal Bureau
of Land Management and the state Emergency Services Office to mitigate the effects of
torrential rain on abnormally dehydrated land the following year.

This coordinated planning and action program at every organizational level averted the
destruction of many industries in the state and provided economic assistance until plentiful rains
came the next year. This is an example of RESOURCE MANAGEMENT in
COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.

Because the governor is responsible for the general welfare of the citizens of the state, he or she
has specially legislated powers and resources that can be applied to emergency situations. At
minimum, all governors have the responsibility to exercise the following emergency-related
options:

 issue state or area emergency declarations and invoke appropriate state response actions
(see Chapter 5);
 activate emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state agency budgets for
emergency work; and
 apply for and monitor any federal assistance in the wake of disasters.

27
For optimum protection of public lives and property, however, governors should support a
comprehensive emergency management program. This may be done by taking the following
steps:

 publicly declaring a policy for state performance and standards of emergency

management;
 taking a personal interest in life and property protection programs;
 reviewing the current state emergency program;
 establishing a comprehensive emergency management program for mitigation and
recovery activities as well as preparedness and response based on vulnerability
analyses for all types of emergencies;
 appointing a CEM manager to coordinate all pertinent emergency-related activities of
the courts, legislature, and all state offices, as well as substate and federal agencies.
The CEM manager should ensure comprehensive four-phase emergency management
for all types of emergencies, institute awareness and training as needed for
appropriate state personnel and the general public, and coordinate all available
resources of year-round support; and
 establishing a continuous CEM monitoring system.

The first four of the above steps are the cornerstones of developing CEM; the fifth and sixth
provide the foundation for maintaining and improving it. We will briefly explore the first five
points on the following pages and the sixth in the next chapter.

The Governor’s Policy

A state’s CEM program is based on the governor’s clearly stated policy, from which program
tasks can be developed, assigned, and monitored.

Systematic assessment of the state’s recent history of emergencies and future vulnerability can
help formulate the governor’s stated policy. Five questions that can help the governor derive a
policy stance are outlined below. They also suggest a CEM program of work.

28
 Eager to support his newly appointed state health director, the new governor agreed to
participate in a series of multi-county emergency medical service (EMS) simulation
exercises. The Health Department was working out the exercises in great detail through
all levels of the department. The governor appeared on TV to urge complete state and
local support. He expected some confusion in the first exercises, but could not understand
why the entire series lacked coordination and focus. Local public health officials seemed
confused at every control point he visited. Ambulances were delayed or lost; EMS
coordinators had few backup volunteers; and in one town no one could find the keys to
the school gym where patients were to be taken. The new health director was unaware of
the state emergency plan and never thought of involving either state or county emergency
coordinating services (civil defense) offices or the fire service, which traditionally
supports many aspects of emergency medical services. The SEO did not see the
governor’s telecast, and fire officials and local emergency management coordinators
who saw it thought they were excluded in the new administration, since they were not
contacted by the SEO or EMS. Trained community volunteers and support services were
ready to participate, but were not called.

No state agency can “go it alone” when it comes to large-scale public involvement. Successful
training, just like actual response, works well only when fully planned with and supported by the
full spectrum of appropriate public and private support resources.

GOVERNORS SHOULD HAVE AN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POLICY WITH

COORDINATED PLANS, and they should ensure that all new agency officials are oriented to
these plans early in their terms.

1. What emergencies have occurred over the past ten years?

 Types of incidents
 Frequency of occurrence
 Duration of emergency periods
 Warning time

2. What were the impacts?

 Lives lost and persons injured
 Geographic locale and dispersion
 Extent of private and public property damage
 Response and recovery costs
 Economic losses

3. How were they managed?

 Which organizations (federal, state, and local governments and the private sector)
 Did what (lifeline and property preservation actions)
 To forestall them, prepare for them, respond to them and/or recover from them

29
4. Are there climatic, social, or economic changes under way in the state that could affect its
vulnerability to attack, civil disturbance, natural, man-made, or technological disasters, or
energy or materials shortages? For example:
 industrial and business expansion or shifts;
 technological build-up;
 radiological, biological, and/or chemical plant expansions, product use, or
transportation through populated areas;
 climatic patterns; and
 economic trends that affect population mobility.

5. What resources will be needed by the state to manage emergencies of all types, beyond
those resources covered in the state emergency plan? For example:
 special mitigation needs;
 high priority preparedness needs;
 response coordination needs;
 long-term recovery needs;
 mitigation and recovery roles of line agencies;
 state (community development) planning applications;
 state budget; and
 legislation.

Answers to these questions may be obtained by contacting a wide range of state officials. For
example, economic advisors and state planners track and anticipate social, industrial, and
economic changes that may influence a state’s vulnerability to certain hazards. Legislators,
planners, and line agency heads are familiar with state community development needs and
resources. The state emergency office can deal with emergency preparedness and response
resources.

When answers are obtained, governors and their aides should not be overwhelmed by the
potential vulnerabilities discovered, but take steps to make political and public information
decisions concerning the release and use of the information obtained. (These questions also
provide a basis for the review all governors agreed to undertake when they passed NGA policy
position A-19 in August 1978. See Appendix A.)

The governor may wish to appoint a special CEM review leader to obtain answers to the above
questions. The review leader might be a special appointee, a special aide, the State Emergency
Services Office director, or a person knowledgeable in all four phases of emergency
management.

The CEM review leader should interview the state agency personnel who can provide answers.
Others who can help are senior personnel on the governor’s staff or planning office, since policy
will flow from this activity.

The governor’s stated policy should direct the formation and/or maintenance of a state
comprehensive emergency management program. Further, it should specify the goal of such a
program. For example, “The State Comprehensive Emergency Management program will use all

30
resources at its disposal (federal, state, local, private) to reduce disaster occurrence or damage,
prepare and warn citizens of imminent danger from disasters, aid in emergency response, and
facilitate disaster recovery.”

Following a landslide election victory, the governor, a former state emergency office
director, announced that the lapsed federal building program for emergency operations
centers (EOCs) would be reactivated with surplus state funds. He met obstacles at every
turn. The legislature balked at appropriating funds for what it considered a federal
program. The budget office advised state funds were inadequate because building
estimates would be doubled due to inflation. The state architect said that the EOC plans
were outmoded. The planning commission said that the EOCs were not strategically
located. The emergency services office said there were not adequate personnel to staff
area EOCs. The governor had to retract the announcement.

This illustrates how programs lacking complete coordination can backfire. While his wish to
protect the people of his state through additional emergency operating centers was
commendable, the governor needed an able CEM manager to carefully REVIEW ALL NEEDS,
pitfalls, options, and priorities in light of the state budget and community development plan. If
this new type of state expenditure proved feasible, the CEM could have developed an
implementation plan and gained the concurrence of the state budget and planning offices, the
state architect, the legislature, and others concerned. All of this should have been done before the
governor made his announcement.

Establishing a CEM Program

The governor’s policy statement provides numerous possibilities for CEM program
development. Following are five questions that may help the CEM review director determine
how best to proceed.

1. What emergency-related state legislation and local ordinances are already in effect?
Consider all risks. (Federal Emergency Authorities: Abstracts, prepared by the National
Governors’ Association Emergency Preparedness Project, may be used as a guide to review
state legislation.) Do not overlook:
 statute analyses;
 executive orders;
 regulations;
 ordinances; and
 their gaps, inconsistencies, and overlaps.

2. What program, planning, dollar, materiel, and manpower resources are available for all
four phases of CEM? Consider:
 high probability incidents;
 high vulnerability geographic areas;
 less probable risks in all areas;

31
  preparedness and response at all levels;
 prevention and mitigation activities;
 long-term effects and recovery needs; and
 all sources of potential assistance, including private organizations and individuals, local
governments, substate groups, state agencies, multistate organizations, and federal
agencies.

3. What specific benefits might be obtained by coordinating state CEM efforts and applying
them to existing programs to reduce:
 the probability of disaster occurrence;
 the quantity of damage;
 the response and recovery costs; and
 duplicated efforts by varied state programs.

4. What can the state encourage others to do?

5. What are the cost and level-of-effort options for the above?

Answers to these questions will begin to uncover program objectives that can be assigned
priorities. State planners, economic advisors, and emergency personnel (SEO, enforcement, fire,
health, et cetera) are sources for pertinent interviews and documents. Resource surveys can be
conducted by interviews, mail, and telephone. Some of these questions are best answered by
reviewing and recombining the data already on hand and by some limited new data collection.
Several cost/benefit analyses may be useful.

Development of CEM program objectives enables a structured approach to coordinating

emergency-related functions, resources, and relationships with state line agencies and legislators,
with substate, multistate and federal groups, and with the private sector. CEM program tasks can
also be developed, specified in operational terms, and combined to meet the stated program
objectives.

32
 The governor was concerned about warnings from the Department of Agriculture of
impending drought in the small, but important northwest citrus belt in his state. Since his
background was urban, he appointed a blue-ribbon advisory group of agriculture
experts. He did not realize that this action would insult his independently elected
agriculture commissioner. To complicate the matter, the downstate business lobbies were
promoting siphoning off northwest river water for hydroelectric expansion, and the
farmers did not really believe the drought might become serious. Thus, the agriculture
commissioner would not listen to the advisory group’s recommendation to build a
reservoir in the northwest. Organized business lobbied against the advisory committee,
and northwest farmers “kept their heads in the sand,” The governor was caught in a
three-way stalemate and was publicly blamed for disinterest when drought in the
northwest set in.

This problem might have been avoided if the governor had involved the agriculture
commissioner in appointing the advisory group, which might have offset the business lobbies’
arguments and raised public awareness in the northwest.

Asking the state planning office for development and economic forecasts, and the state budget
office for welfare and recovery cost estimates, might have minimized the problem.

The governor could have used the help of a COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGER
WITH POLITICAL SENSITIVITY AND STRONG NEGOTIATING ABILITIES to evaluate
and deal with matters before they became acute.

Appointing a Comprehensive Emergency Manager

State agencies such as health, human services, energy, the National Guard, transportation, natural
resources, and the emergency services office all have roles in preparing for and responding to
emergencies. There are also legislative, political, preventive, mitigational, and community-
development-oriented recovery activities involved in all types of emergencies. The governor
needs, therefore, a senior appointee who coordinates all state emergency-related activities. The
responsibilities for these activities go far beyond the traditional approach of preparedness to
respond to expected disasters. Although some state emergency offices bear greater
responsibilities than others in mitigation and long-term recovery activities, most governors
currently mandate that SEOs coordinate only preparedness and response activities, mainly for
natural hazards. This leaves the mitigation and long-term recovery phases, as well as
technological and other man-made disasters, major civil disorders, and energy and materials
shortage emergencies, subject to ad hoc management. Both governors and SEOs report that
SEOs are used only 20 percent of the time in these latter instances, and not at all for mitigation or
long-term recovery coordination.

33
A CEM manager should have the confidence of the governor, the executive staff, lawmakers,
and line agencies to work effectively with all of them. The comprehensive emergency manager
must know state government, its powers, processes, politics, and functional units. He or she must
be familiar with the state development plan, economic forecasting, and public administration,
and should be able to exert authority, negotiate functional relationships between competing units
of state government, and communicate effectively with the public media. The CEM must
appreciate the importance of balancing mitigation and long-term recovery concerns with
emergency preparedness and response, and should also have working experience with federal
and local officials.

Depending on the governor’s style and the traditions and needs of the state, the CEM manager
could be a top appointee, a line agency director, an emergency services or other special office
director, a special assistant, or an appointed or elected commission. The main thing is that this
office must have clout and be backed by the governor’s strong policy. The governor’s
comprehensive emergency manager should be familiar with 1978 Emergency Preparedness
Project: Final Report, Federal Emergency Authorities: Abstracts, Managing Domestic
Terrorism, and National Emergency Assistance Programs: A Governor’s Guide, all prepared by
the NGA Emergency Preparedness Project.

The following is taken from Governor O’Callaghan’s report on CEM to the nation’s governors
on August 28, 1978:

I wish to emphasize that the subcommittee is not suggesting that states should necessarily
create a new position to oversee comprehensive emergency management.

The subcommittee is stressing only that there must be one individual who is currently
responsible for emergency management—including not only preparedness and response
for natural disasters, man-made emergencies, and attack, but the functional ability to
coordinate mitigation and recovery activities as well.

If some states choose to create a new department, then surely that is their prerogative. If
others choose to merely designate an individual, whether in the governor’s office or some
other agency, then that, too, is their prerogative. We are talking about accountability and
the need to streamline a process that currently is fragmented. How that is done is up to
the individual governors.

The NGA Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance and all governors at the NGA annual meeting in
Boston in August 1978 endorsed the concept of CEM (see Appendix A).

34
4. MONITORING COMPREHENSIVE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

After a major earthslide knocked out several miles of an interstate highway, the
governor arranged for reconstruction with help from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
After three weeks of intensive work, the road was repaired. The governor, in an election
year, delayed reopening the road for two days until he could personally cut the ribbon
and ride in the first vehicle down the needed thoroughfare. Poor voter support from the
area later contributed to the governor’s renomination loss.

Public gratitude for the reconstruction arranged by the governor was overbalanced by his delay
in reopening the road. Had the governor been fully informed of the number of people who used
the closed road and the lack of a viable detour, he might have changed his schedule to reopen the
highway as soon as it was repaired, or sent a representative to do so in his place.

Fuller CASE REPORTING, including damage estimates and local implications, would have
served the governor well. This situation might have been prevented if the governor had a CEM
MANAGER TO ADVISE ON THE PLANNING AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS of
recovery management.

The state CEM program should address several objectives:

 Reduce (if not eliminate) the incidence of disasters wherever possible (for example,
man-made);
 Reduce the damage (health, property, economic) caused by disasters that could not be
prevented; and
 Reduce the costs of emergency response and disaster recovery while increasing their
effectiveness.

These are the governor’s criteria for monitoring the state CEM program,

The governor should review CEM monitoring data annually and receive news of each disaster.
The governor’s CEM manager, on the other hand, should collect evaluation data continually and
summarize results semiannually and annually.

35
The Governor’s Report

Each time a disaster occurs, the governor should require an immediate report with reliable
assessments of threat to life and property damage.

The specific data contained in the governor’s report helps the governor manage state resources
and make informed decisions about providing state assistance, declaring emergencies, and
requesting outside assistance. The report should contain as much specific information as possible
and should be updated regularly until the information is complete. The governor needs the
following information:

 Disaster: type and/or cause; date and time of impact; onset and duration; location and
counties; population affected; congressional districts and state legislative districts
affected;
 Damage: lives lost; injuries; number evacuated, sheltered, and fed; health problems;
homes lost; businesses closed; preliminary economic loss estimates; families needing
temporary housing; estimated unemployed; public facilities affected—roads, utilities,
water and sewer, buildings;
 Preparedness and response: warning time; response mobilization time; key
organizations and resources used; sufficiency of local and state resources; needed
resources;
 Recovery: estimated short-term duration; estimated long- term duration; estimated
costs—local, state, and federal;
 Mitigation: what operations were in force; what should have been; and
 Special problems: potential secondary effects; declaration and other assistance trade-
offs; media concerns; special interests; and political considerations.

For a sample one-page report form, see Appendix B.

The report permits the governor and the CEM manager to monitor emergency management
without impeding operations and readily indicates when the governor’s direct involvement is
warranted. The report should be submitted in as complete form as possible within twenty-four
hours of emergency impact and updated frequently until complete.

These data are particularly useful as the number of reports increases. The governor can observe
management tasks over time and a range of emergencies. The same data can also be combined
periodically to indicate costs of repair and restoration, unrestorable losses, and will provide the
governor an opportunity to observe trends in disaster characteristics and state CEM performance.

The governor’s report is actually excerpted from the CEM manager’s emergency case report.
This is the full record on which specific disaster case data are recorded. (A sample of the case
report is provided in 1978 Emergency Preparedness Project: Final Report, Chapter 9.)

The emergency case report should be completed by a combination of the following methods: (1)
personal interview; (2) telephone interview; and/or (3) direct mail. Health and property damage
estimates should be verified by the SEO through state agencies to expedite immediate emergency

36
damage information to the governor. The CEM manager should work with the state planning and
budget offices, line agencies, and other sources such as insurance companies, local government
officials, tax personnel, associations, and business groups, universities, and research
organizations to obtain economic and other data needed.

Annual CEM Evaluation

The individual case reports and special reports to the governor go a long way toward providing
the data base for an annual evaluation of the state’s CEM program. But they are not entirely
sufficient for this purpose. Additional data are needed and can be obtained from answers to the
following questions:

Mitigation

1. Have prevention and/or reductions of disasters occurred?

2. Do fewer deaths and injuries occur between disasters of similar types and intensity?

3. Is there a good mix of organizational cooperation for mitigation of each type of emergency
in the state?

4. Has disaster damage been reduced in similar kinds of events?

5. Are all organizations identified in establishing the CEM program and its objectives
involved in mitigation activity?

Preparedness

1. What are the increases in the length of disaster warning, by type of emergency?

2. How accurate are the predictions of disaster duration?

3. Are planning, training, and exercises appropriate to the types of disasters experienced?

4. Are state emergency preparedness plans current? Do they cover all risks, all three
government levels, substate and multi-state groups, and the private sector?

5. In recent emergencies were preparedness plans followed? What caused any divergences?

37
Response

1. Have there been avoidable delays in obtaining damage assessments?

2. Are damage and needs assessments after disasters correct?

 Damage done to people, their property and public facilities
 Assistance, equipment, and supplies needed (type and quantity at site and from
elsewhere)

3. What is the length of the emergency response period, by type of disaster? Can response
periods of similar intensity disasters be compared? Are they becoming shorter?

4. Are all organizations involved able to communicate effectively?

5. Is there a search and rescue operation for air, land, and water?

Recovery

1. Are assessments made of recovery needs?

 Systems to be returned to pre-disaster norms
 Systems to be modified to new norms more consistent with community development
plans

2. What is the speed and effectiveness of short-term recovery?

3. What is the quality and sufficiency of long-term recovery?

 Legal assistance
 Technical assistance
 Financial assistance—state, local, federal
 Public information

4. Is recovery management effective?

 Appropriate involvement of all organizational levels
 Acquisition, disbursal and control of financial aid
 Accuracy, efficiency, and use of records
 Availability, efficiency, and use of information
 Adequacy of staff
 Quality of overall coordination

38
Administration

1. Has the state applied for federal emergency assistance since 1974?

No. of No.
Applications No. Granted Disallowed
Presidential
Disaster
Presidential
Emergency
Small
Business
Admin.
FmHA

2. Are federal regional offices supportive of all types of emergencies?

Yes ______ No ______ (Explain):

3. Do DCPA funds for personnel and administration and FDAA planning grants provide the
minimum necessary to augment state response operations?

4. Does the state take advantage of other federal assistance programs for all four phases of
CEM? (National Emergency Assistance Programs: A Governor’s Guide will be a useful
reference here.)

5. Does the SEO record and monitor emergencies of all kinds?

 Attack
 Internal disturbance
 Natural
 Technological
 Energy and material shortages

6. How many emergency operations centers (EOCs) are there in the state? Enough?
Construction delayed?

7. Is media coverage supportive?

8. Does the state have a CEM manager who:

 Is known to have the governor’s confidence?
 Can speak readily for the governor?
 Understands and participates in the formulation of the state development plans?
 Has positive, active relations with state lawmakers?
 Has credibility with state agencies?

39
  Has credibility with local government?
 Has good working relationships with the regional offices of pertinent federal agencies?
 Oversees and coordinates all state emergency services for all types of emergencies?

Answers to the first seven questions are obtained by the CEM manager. The answer to the eighth
question is obtained by the governor personally or by an executive assistant.

Whenever frequency and severity of similar types of disasters can be reliably compared, answers
to the above questions can be used to describe change. The results of monitoring CEM
effectiveness are comparative. Therefore, the governor should direct that general raw data be
aggregated to permit visual, as well as statistical, comparisons. Comparisons between specific
disasters should, however, be approached carefully. Any number of methods and formats for
comparisons can be designed. They should be developed and implemented by the state officials
responsible for maintaining the consistency and integrity of all state fiscal, economic, and
planning data. The governor should review them annually, monitoring trends and special
problems.

Obtaining the answers to these questions may require a full range of approaches. Also, a decision
will be needed about minimum quality and quantity requirements to ensure lowest costs. Care
and scientific rigor must be used in making these annual evaluative observations. Such rigor is
more readily achieved if minimum data, like those recommended for the monitoring system, are
recorded as soon after the emergency as possible. The monitoring system is the key to effective
CEM program management, including evaluation.

While attending an out-of-state land use management conference, the governor was
contacted by a wire service for comment on the legionnaires’ disease epidemic which,
according to the reporter, had broken out in three communities in his state. The governor
was embarrassed not to know of the situation and tried to locate his health director or
deputy, but both were away for the weekend. The state SEO, who usually alerted the
governor to natural disaster events, had no directive to track health matters. The health
director was aware of the situation, but never thought to alert the governor. The health
director could have been reached through the agency duty officer, but the governor did not
have the duty roster or telephone number.

A state CEM director would have had standing orders from the governor to receive word about
emergencies of all kinds from all sources and alert him wherever he was at any time.

With the growing incidence of complex emergencies, governors need COMPREHENSIVE

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT COORDINATION.

Answers to these questions should enable governors to improve CEM management and
organization continually. These questions can help answer additional questions, such as: What is
the smallest number of personnel needed to staff the CEM program office? How will the
program ensure coordination between state planning, the legislature, budget and line agencies,

40
and the state emergency response office? How will the program incorporate the governor’s level
of interest and commitment to CEM? How can program quality control be managed?

Maintaining a CEM monitoring system enables the governor to direct a productive state
program. It also helps indicate when outside assistance is needed and provides rationales with
which to obtain it quickly. The governor who has a good CEM program and monitoring system
will acquire a creditable reputation that directly affects federal willingness to assist.

41
5. OBTAINING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE
IN EMERGENCIES

The governor was notified that three grain elevators had exploded and started a fire in a
large downstate port city. Over 200 persons were killed and a densely populated twenty
block area leveled. The city power plants were knocked out and shipping was crippled.
After verifying the situation by telephone, the governor called the president and asked for
a major disaster declaration. When it was not immediately forthcoming, he thought the
president had turned him down, so he contacted his congressional delegation to pressure
the White House. Two days later, the regional Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration (FDAA) director called to ask where his application was for the
declaration.

The governor thought his call to the White House should be sufficient and did not look at his
SEO director’s draft for an application for federal assistance. He did not personally know his
SEO, which was a small unit in the office of the adjutant-general. He was not aware that, while
governors may telephone the White House to alert the president to emergency events, FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE CANNOT BE INVOKED UNTIL AN APPLICATION IS SUBMITTED
THROUGH THE REGIONAL FDAA office to federal FDAA headquarters, which administers
disaster assistance on behalf of the president. A trusted CEM advisor could have averted this
situation.

One of the most important steps in disaster response is the governor’s declaration of a disaster or
state of emergency. The declaration authorizes a range of emergency actions including funding,
manpower, and materiel commitments in extraordinary amounts for unusual circumstances. This
use of emergency powers dictates appropriate caution, but also appropriate responsiveness by the
governor and state administration. The subtleties of making each declaration change, but the
main characteristics rarely vary.

Accuracy

Accuracy is critical to disaster management. Fast, accurate reporting of damage enables the
governor to ensure appropriate types and levels of assistance will be provided. Governors report
that this is their most important need. Disaster damage assessment is a very difficult task and
accuracy is always questioned. Reasonably accurate damage assessments can be developed,
however, by applying a phased verification process in which local, state, and federal expertise is
used. Of singular importance to governors is that verification be done quickly before
recommendations for response actions are entertained.

43
Timing

Timing of a governor’s declaration, the decision not to declare, or even a deliberate delay of a
declaration is a subtle but important matter. Perhaps the most critical consideration is the
emotional impact to the victims and disaster workers. The initial aftermath of any disaster is a
period of shock, disappointment, and extreme fatigue. These are compounded by deprivation of
basic living commodities and, in many cases, threats to health and welfare. It follows that a
response to a request for assistance can have important psychological effects on all of those
involved in a disaster. The governor should be aware that, with an emergency declaration, there
is an immediate rise in the level of community expectation. Knowing that presidentially declared
disasters provide more benefits, local officials naturally tend to petition the governor to request
presidential assistance. Often, a local governing body will petition as a shock reaction, rather
than base a request on actual damage or the amount of unmet need. Too often, in marginal cases,
the disaster turns out to be not as serious as it first appeared. Where local and/or state resources
are sufficient to respond to the situation, federal assistance would be denied. Carefully controlled
public information programs and press releases stating the concerns and intentions of the
governor can bolster public attitudes. It is wise to underestimate anticipated levels of assistance
when making public statements, however, so the public will not feel misled.

Unnecessary delay in making a declaration can have serious negative effects. A timely
declaration acknowledges the severity of the situation and assures that assistance will be
promptly offered. Undue hesitation may mean that assistance is received too late to provide full
benefit. In requesting a presidential declaration, unnecessary delay may imply that the situation
is less urgent and that federal assistance is not immediately needed.

44
 Oakville and Elmton were severely affected when their joint water supply was
contaminated by waste from a nearby chemical plant. Hospitals in four counties were
filled to capacity. The chemical plant was closed and economic hardship loomed for the
two cities. The governor requested, and was granted, a presidential emergency
declaration. A federal coordinating officer (FCO) and support staff from the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) and a health team from the Atlanta Disease
Control Center and the HEW regional office flew to the scene. In Oakville, the emergency
management coordinator (EMC) was full-time, and the mayor respected and backed him.
In Elmton, the EMC was part-time, had no facilities, was often difficult to find, and local
officials hardly knew him.

Conflict arose in Oakville between the EMC and FCO, who wanted to establish a one-
stop assistance center between the two towns. Elmton welcomed the FDAA and endorsed
its proposals. The two city mayors disagreed about where the center should be located
and a stalemate ensued. The governor sent the lieutenant governor as state coordinating
officer to the site several times to settle differences among federal and state officials and
between the mayors. The unclear jurisdictional prerogatives in this case led to
differences between strong people, until someone with adequate clout intervened to
resolve them.

This case illustrates the necessity of a strong FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL PARTNERSHIP IN

RECOVERY MANAGEMENT.

Gauging

Gauging the magnitude of an event to determine if it is a disaster of state or federally declarable

proportions is a difficult task. A good deal of effort at state and federal levels has been spent
trying to establish fixed thresholds beyond which a disaster is declared, but this effort has proven
impractical. There are, however, indicators which will help the governor judge the
recommendations made to him. Perhaps most important of these is the individual policy of the
governor on what constitutes a disaster and how it has been communicated to his advisors. The
state disaster legislation and history are also very important.

It is best to rely on a systematic approach wherein the governor relies on an organized

emergency management division to conduct emergency operations, assess damage, coordinate
recovery, and apply lessons learned to future mitigation. Such an organization should serve as
the operational linkage with local government and should recommend gubernatorial actions.

A CEM director’s comfortable relationship with the governor and his staff is necessary in order
to deal effectively with the critical disaster policy and operational matters.

A great deal of attention has been given by the federal and state governments and the National
Governors’ Association to the development of a workable criteria system. It has not been

45
possible, however, to refine such a system, short of investigating each state’s experience and
analyzing them separately and in the aggregate against demographic data, and drawing
conclusions therefrom.

The governor should be aware that federal reaction to a request is partly influenced by
experience. If a state has a reputation for inflating disaster damage, delays can be expected while
federal reverification takes place. It is also advisable for the governor to stay current on each
administration’s attitude toward federal assistance, and what levels of state commitment are
expected. A telephone conversation between the governor and the regional administrator of the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration to establish the governor’s interest and general
perspectives in this somewhat confusing process can set the tone for the SEO’s follow-through in
times of emergency.

The Federal Disaster Act specifies that a situation “must be clearly beyond the ability of state
and local government before federal assistance can be approved.” It goes on to conclude that
federal assistance is supplemental to, and does not substitute for, state and local assistance.

At the state level, it is very difficult to determine what is beyond the state’s capabilities. The
level of the state’s assistance program affects the determination, but it is not necessarily an exact
measurement. Rather, the clue seems to be a reasonable person’s judgment of the size of the
disaster compared to the reasonable ability of the state and local governments to cope with it.
The complexity of this process of determination is in inverse proportion to the severity and
magnitude of the disaster. In severe disasters, the decision that additional resources are required
is clear cut; it is in marginal events that the decision is difficult. The magnitude of unmet needs
after state and local governments have exhausted their programs is a good benchmark to use.

Also, current policy seems to favor federal assistance for human needs rather than for restoration
of government property. It is also clear that because federal disaster assistance cannot be
considered a financial recovery program, reports of loss in dollar terms are not well received by
the federal government.

Communications

Communications are also a vital factor in achieving accuracy, good timing, and correct gauging
of an event’s magnitude. There are several important aspects of communications. One is the
technical ability to communicate quickly and efficiently, which means having designated
telephone, radio, telex, and other electronic mechanisms available, on compatible frequencies,
and with backup systems in case of failure of the primary system. Ability to communicate over a
wide area, even nationally, is also important. Another important aspect of communications is
prompt, friendly relations with the media, all of which can be of tremendous service in times of
emergency. During disasters, officials never have to worry about getting a story covered. But the
release of incorrect information can cause great hardship and anguish, and even threaten citizens.
Bad information returns to haunt officials later. It is very important to issue correct information
even if that means delay.

46
Table 2 shows the general sequence of events for various disaster declarations. It should be noted
that there are, of course, many exceptions to the general patterns described here.

Within hours after major river flooding around Metropolis, the governor, his emergency
services director, one of the state’s U.S. senators, and a station WRXZ pool reporter were
surveying damage from a helicopter. Highland rivers were still rising due to spring thaw
and heavy rains. Hovering upstream, the governor noticed that the Dixon Dam to the
north had a fissure. The helicopter’s occupants watched it widen, and the dam began to
disintegrate. They discovered that although they had a clear patch into the local radio
station, they could not talk to the Metropolis mayor or to the highway patrol below to
warn them. The governor preempted WRXZ regular programming to warn Metropolis
citizens. The station alerted the mayor, the local emergency services director, and others,
and many lives were saved.

While the governor’s fast action in going on the air direct to area citizens was commendable, the
radio station patch was a lucky happenstance.

State and local officials must be able to communicate at all times, wherever they may be.
COMPATIBLE FREQUENCIES AND READY COMMUNICATIONS are a first order of
business for every governor’s CEM director to assure.

47
 Table 2
DECLARATION PROCESS FOR VARIED TYPES OF DAMAGES
Damage Primarily to
Government or
Damage Primarily to Damage Primarily to Municipally Owned Combination of All
Agricultural Property Homes and Businesses Property Categories of Damage

Coordinate emergency Coordinate emergency Coordinate emergency Coordinate emergency

operations to perform operations to perform operations to perform operations to perform
essential life saving & essential life saving & essential life saving & essential life saving &
property protection property protection property protection property protection
measures & response to measures & response to measures & response to measures & response to
immediate human needs. immediate human needs. immediate human needs. immediate human needs.

Local officials activate local City & county officials City & county officials City & county officials
USDA Emergency Board survey, declare local survey & request survery & request
survey & emergency, forward assistance. State agency assistance.
recommendations. request for assistance. survey & damage report.

State USDA Emergency State emergency State emergency Governor would likely
Board recommendations. organization verification & organization verification & declare local or statewide
recommendations recommendations. emergency, if requested.
including coordination with
other organizations.

State emergency Governor may or may not Governor may or may not Governor may issue
organization verification & declare local emergency. declare a state of appropriate emergency
recommendations. emergency. orders for emergency
measures and/or
restoration of public &
private property including
individual and family
assistance.

Governor may or may not Letter of request to U.S. Governor may issue Governor may request
declare local emergency. Small Business Admin. appropriate emergency consultation with FDAA for
and/or U.S. Farmers Home orders to assist state possible major disaster
Administration for and/or locals for declaration and/or
emergency loan restoration of essential particular form of
assistance. services and/or restoration emergency assistance.
of property.

Governor may authorize Governor may also Governor can appeal to

letter to U.S. Sec. of activate state housing federal regional council for
Agriculture requesting assistance programs and priority assistance through
appropriate assistance. state individual & state regular programs.
family grant programs with
appropriate emergency
orders.

Governor may also choose

to activte state agricultural
assistance programs with
appropriate emergency
orders.

48
6. SUMMARY

Soon after her election the governor appointed a CEM manager who was a former state
senator and, more recently, chief land use analyst in the state planning office. The
governor directed the CEM manager to use all pertinent state resources to analyze
current and future vulnerabilities for all risks, in conjunction with economic forecasts,
climatic changes, and shifting business and population trends. She also directed the CEM
manager to make recommendations based on present and future vulnerability data, as
well as on long-term recovery and disaster mitigation needs, especially for man-made
hazards. The governor also directed that the recommendations take the state community
development plan, the state emergency preparedness plan, and current state emergency-
related legislation into account.

When the CEM manager brought in his initial findings four months later, the governor
convened her cabinet, pertinent office heads, the speaker of the house and president of
the senate, federal regional emergency officials, as well as business, labor, and volunteer
agency heads and the mayors of all cities over 30,000 in population. The group was
astounded to learn of the aggregated probable and potential risks in the state. A priority
task force was established to examine all possible federal, state and local public and
private resources which could be applied to all four phases and all types of risk. The task
force was surprised to find numerous public and private programs at all levels already
under way or available. Through their coordination, more mitigation services were
provided without additional cost in the state.

Thus, the state was able to develop a COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

PROGRAM.

Recent increases in technological hazards and rising equipment and personnel costs demand the
application of all federal, state, and local resources to mitigate emergencies of all kinds.
Coordination is needed for preparation, response, and long-term recovery as well. These same
increases require the broadest possible coordination of available resources to meet needs without
increasing costs.

Although the variety of hazards and the costs of responding to them are great and growing,
personnel, equipment, and dollars are becoming scarcer. This disparity has led some states to
review how to use available resources more efficiently at all levels of government and in the
private sector. This review process is encouraged so that these same resources can be applied to
all phases of emergency management.

State government can ascertain local disaster program needs, evaluate the available state and
federal government disaster resources, and facilitate the acquisition, application, and
coordination of those resources.

49
For these reasons, the comprehensive emergency management concept was developed. CEM
refers to the responsibility and capability of a state to manage all types of disasters by
coordinating the actions of numerous agencies. The “comprehensive” aspect of CEM includes all
four phases of disaster activity—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It applies to
all risks—attack, man-made, and natural—in a federal-state-local operating partnership.

CEM should be distinguished from comprehensive emergency preparedness, a term now

generally in use, which emphasizes, in practice if not legislative intent, the preparedness and
response phases of emergency management almost exclusively.

The governor’s role in comprehensive emergency management is to:

 issue state or area emergency declarations and invoke appropriate state response
actions;
 activate emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state agency budgets for
emergency work;
 apply for and monitor any federal assistance in the wake of disasters;
 take personal interest in life and property protection programs and publicly declare a
policy for state emergency performance and standards;
 review the current state emergency program;
 establish a comprehensive emergency management program for mitigation and
recovery activities as well as preparedness and response. This program should be based
on vulnerability analyses for all types of emergencies, examining social, industrial,
business, and economic trends in the state, in addition to climatic and geological
factors;
 establish a continuous CEM monitoring system; and
 appoint a CEM manager to coordinate all pertinent emergency-related activities of the
courts, legislature, all state and substate offices, and federal agencies. The CEM
manager must ensure comprehensive four-phase emergency management for all types
of emergencies. The CEM manager should also be responsible for awareness and
training for appropriate state personnel and the general public. (See National
Emergency Assistance Programs: A Governor’s Guide.)

50
 Appendix A
NGA COMPREHENSIVE STATE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
POLICY
The National Governors’ Association unanimously passed the following policy position at its
annual meeting in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 29, 1978. This statement was the first
passed by the National Governors’ Association dealing with comprehensive statewide
management policy. Most other NGA resolutions have recommended federal policy.

A premise for this new NGA policy is that an equal local-state-federal partnership is the most
effective approach to a comprehensive national system of emergency management. NGA
recommends that since the president has followed the NGA recommendation and moved to
establish an independent emergency management office, governors should undertake similar
action at the state level. This will enhance the prognosis for a viable national emergency
management system. It is also to be hoped that mayors will undertake a similar policy
enunciation at the local level to complete the system.

A.19
COMPREHENSIVE STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Emergencies can have major or monumental human, economic, and political consequences for
all levels of government. The National Governors’ Association recognizes the importance of
coordinating federal, state, and local activities in the comprehensive management of emergencies
arising from attack or man-made or natural sources. This comprehensive approach should
include not only preparedness and response but long-term recovery and mitigation.

We commend the President for proposing reorganization plan number 3 to Congress. This plan
calls for the establishment of a federal emergency management agency, whose director shall
report directly to the President. Congressional approval of the plan will lay the groundwork for
the development of a strengthened federal-state-local partnership in emergency management. We
urge Congress to approve the plan.

The Governors also recognize the need to review the effectiveness of state emergency
operations. The findings of an in-depth NGA emergency preparedness study, initiated last year,
indicate the need to establish comprehensive state management strategies that are compatible
with the proposed federal reorganization.

The National Governors’ Association hereby adopts the following guidelines for comprehensive
state emergency management:

51
Government Roles and Responsibilities

States recognize that local government has the first line of official public responsibility in the
preparation for and response to most emergencies. States encourage local governments to use
local resources and to exchange and share resources for emergency programs with other local
jurisdictions. Local governments also should share comprehensive emergency mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery management activities with the state. Local governments
should recognize and upgrade, where needed, the responsibilities of local civil defense
coordinators to emergency management coordinators for all hazards.

The state’s role is to develop and maintain a comprehensive program of emergency management
activities that supplements, facilitates, and provides leadership, when needed, to local efforts
before, during, and after emergencies. The state must be prepared to maintain or accelerate
current services and provide new services to local governments that may be unable to manage all
aspects of an emergency. The state also cooperates at multistate levels when appropriate. Further,
the state is responsible for facilitating the acquisition of federal resources to deal with
emergencies.

When states have insufficient resources to manage all prevention, mitigation, preparedness,
response, or long-term recovery services themselves, the federal government should provide
services that are responsible to all types of emergencies and disasters. Such services include
fiscal resources, research and dissemination of research results, economic and other impact
analyses, information and educational materials, technical facilities, and assistance, equipment,
and materials.

State Emergency Management

Comprehensive state emergency management consists of the judicious planning, assignment, and
coordination of all available resources in an integrated program of prevention, mitigation,
preparedness, response, and recovery for emergencies of any kind, whether from attack or man-
made or natural sources.

While all emergency-related program activities are not the responsibility of one single office,
they should be integrated and coordinated. Effective emergency management involves
coordination between the Office of the Governor, the state emergency management office (if it is
not located in the Office of the Governor), the state planning office, the state budget office, the
state legislature, the emergency officers of a state’s line agencies, the regional director of the
proposed federal emergency management agency, and representatives of local government.

State emergency management includes intergovernmental linkages that should: (1) ensure that
any emergency is handled at the lowest appropriate level of government, (2) provide direct
support to local emergency programs as requested and appropriate, (3) facilitate acquisition of
needed federal resources to support local emergency programs, (4) encourage multistate resource
sharing, and (5) stimulate mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions.

52
Sound emergency management requires regular reviews of the performance effectiveness and
coordination of a state’s emergency-related program in light of public need and resources
utilization.

Role of the Governor

The Governor has the mandated responsibility to promote the general welfare and provide for the
common good of the citizens of the state. Because of this, the Governor has special powers and
resources that can be used in emergency situations.

The Governor establishes policy and performance standards for the state’s emergency
organization. The Governor appoints leadership personnel. Just as national emergency
management must have the interest, support, and confidence of the President, the entire state
emergency management program should have the direct interest, support, and confidence of the
Governor. The state emergency manager should have direct access to the Governor.

The Governor, with the assistance of the emergency manager, should: declare the policy on
emergency management, establish or maintain a comprehensive state emergency program, issue
state or area emergency declarations and invoke appropriate state response actions, activate
emergency contingency funds and/or reallocations of state agency budgets for emergency work,
and apply for and monitor the use of federal assistance.

Emergency Management Actions

States should review all their current emergency management programs to ensure that all
appropriate ones are included in a coordinated program of emergency mitigation and recovery, in
addition to preparedness and response, for all types of emergencies.

In keeping with the concept of a full federal-state-local partnership in the consolidation of all-
risk emergency management, state and local governments should adopt consistent nomenclature,
using the words emergency management.

The National Governors’ Association Subcommittee on Disaster Assistance will review the
specific findings of the emergency preparedness project and take action on specific
recommendations that are in keeping with these guidelines.

Adopted August 1978.

53
 Appendix B
THE GOVERNOR’S
EMERGENCY REPORT
Measurements should be taken at the time of each disaster and reported to the governor. The
same data for all emergencies, aggregated into annual status reports, will provide the governor
with the opportunity to observe trends in both disaster characteristics and state CEM
performance.

Measurement of some of the more subjective dimensions, such as warning time and duration,
should be made by both state and local government officials. All estimates should then be
combined to derive an average estimate. The CEM monitoring system should provide the
governor with the following single page of data after each emergency.

(Note that the report is numbered. The first four digits report the fiscal year; the last two digits
represent the series number. For example, the number of the first report for fiscal year 1979
would read “No. FY 1979-01.” Numbers correspond to fiscal years to permit eventual
coordination with state planning and budgeting cycles and CEM cost/benefit evaluations.)

55
 GOVERNOR’S EMERGENCY REPORT
(No. FY 19___-___)

Name of State ________________________ Cong’l Dists: ________________

Federal Region _______________________ State Sen.
Dists: _____________________
State Rep.
Dists: _____________________

Date of Report: ______________________Time: _________ Reporter: ___________

Type of Incident: ______________________________________________________
Date of Impact: ______________________________ Onset duration: ____________
Location: __________________________ # of Counties: _____ Population: _______
Impact on Individuals: Deaths: ________________ Injuries: ___________________
# Evacuated: _____________ # Sheltered: _______________ # Mass Fed: ________
# Receiving Health Care: ________________ # Hospitalized: ____________________
# Evacuated homes: ____________________ # Businesses Closed: ______________

Category of Home/Apts. Businesses Farm

Damage Mobile Homes & Industries Bldgs. Equipment Crops
Destroyed
Major Damage
Minor Damage
% Insured
$ Damage

Est. families needing temp. housing: Estimated unemployed:

Impact on Public Facilities: Debris:
Roads: Water & Sewer:
Utilities: Buildings:
Other:
Preparedness & Response: Date/Time of 1st public warning:
Response mobilization time:
Local resources mobilized:
State resources mobilized:
Est. response costs: Local: $ State: $ Fed.: $
Recovery: Est. duration: Short-term: Long-term:
Est. costs: Local: $ State: $ Fed.: $
Mitigation: What operations were in force?

What operations should have been in force?

Special Problems:

56