1

Reserved
AFR
In Chamber
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2071 of 2017
Petitioner :- Manish Kumar Mishra
Respondent :- Union Of India And 4 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Vijay Gautam,Vinod Kumar Mishra
Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,A.K.Mehrotra U.O.I.,Purnendu
Kumar Singh,Satish Kumar Rai
Connected with
(1) Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2073 of 2017
Petitioner :- Amarjeet Yadav
Respondent :- Union Of India And 4 Ors.
(2) Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2074 of 2017
Petitioner :- Rabesh Singh
Respondent :- Union Of India And 4 Ors.
(3) Case :- WRIT - A No. - 2075 of 2017
Petitioner :- Santosh Kumar
Respondent :- Union Of India And 4 Ors.
(4) Case :- WRIT - A No. - 5634 of 2011
Petitioner :- Jitendra Kumar Nagar
Respondent :- Union Of India Thru Sec Department Of Home Affairs
And Other
(5) Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 22 of 2019
Appellant :- Chandra Pal Singh
Respondent :- Union Of India And 3 Others
(6) Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 23 of 2019
Appellant :- Sikandar Yadav
Respondent :- Union Of India And 4 Others

Hon'ble Mrs. Sunita Agarwal,J.

Hon'ble Anjani Kumar Mishra,J.
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.

1. Heard Sri Vijay Gautam learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri

Amrish Chaterjee, Sri D.K. Mishra and Ms. Atipriya Gautam, learned
advocates for the petitioners and Sri Satish Kumar Rai, Sri Manoj Kumar
Singh, Sri Nand Lal, Sri Raghuraj Kishore Mishra and Sri Purnendu
Kumar Singh, learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents.

2. This Larger Bench has been constituted under the orders of Hon'ble
the Chief Justice on a reference made by the learned Single Judge vide
judgment and order dated 25th January, 2017. In the writ petitions
 2

challenging the dismissal order and the order passed by the appellate and
the revisional authority under the provisions of 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949
readwith Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, a
preliminary objection was raised with regard to the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court. It was argued that no cause of action or part of cause of
action has accrued to the petitioners within the State of U.P. and merely
because the appellate and the revisional order had been communicated to
them at their respective home districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh, same
would not confer jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain the writ
petitions.

3. The submission was that since the dismissal order has been passed
by the Commandant, 129th Battalion, CRPF at Bhotgaon, Kokarajhar,
Assam and was communicated to the petitioners there itself and further
that the departmental appeal and revision have been rejected by the
competent authorities at Bhopal, the remedy before the petitioners is to
either approach the Gauhati High Court or Jabalpur High Court,
whichever they choose. The writ petitions challenging the dismissal,
appellate and revisional orders cannot be maintained in this Court.

4. The learned Single Judge in the referral order noted the arguments
of Advocates for both sides in the following words:-

“In support of their contention the respondents have relied upon a Full
Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra Vs.
Union of India reported in 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108 as well as a Division
Bench judgement of this Court passed in Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010
The Director General CRPF, New Delhi Vs. Constable Lalji Pandey .
The Division Bench in Lalji Pandey (supra) has relied upon the Full Bench
decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra (supra) and held that
mere communication of the order of dismissal, appellate and revisional orders at
the residential address of the respondents (therein) at district Bhadohi would not
confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court.

Shri Vijay Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand,
has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nawal
Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2014) 9
 3

SCC 329. Paragraph 20 of the said judgment reads as under:

"17. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the appellant
reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off
for further medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently
declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy
(heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the
Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the
registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to
the appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he
was found medically unfit. It further appears that the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the respondent
claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by
the respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya,
Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further evident
that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit, he
returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he
made all claims an filed representation from his home address at Gaya
and those letters and representations were entertained by the respondents
and replied and a decision on those representations were communicated to
him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering
from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and
breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom he
had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability
compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a
part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation."

Shri Vijay Gautam has further placed reliance upon two Division Bench
judgments of this Court passed in Special Appeal Defective No. 785 of
2014 Bibhuti Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of India and
others and Special Appeal No 158 of 2016 Har Govind Singh Vs.
Union of India and others . In both the judgments, the two Division Benches
have relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra). In the case of Bibhuti Narain Singh (supra) the Court
has held that in view of the judgment of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), the
communication of the penalty order to the appellants at Faizabad would confer
 4

jurisdiction on this Court (Lucknow Bench) to maintain the special appeal. In the
case of Har Govind Singh, the Division Bench has considered the judgment of
Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) and Full Bench judgment in the case of Rajendra
Kumar Mishra (supra) as well as the judgment of the Constitution Bench in AIR
1961 SC 532, Lieutenant Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India
and others and thereafter referring to the judgment of Nawal Kishore Sharma
(supra) with approval, has entertained the special appeal and directed the Union
of India to file its response.

Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that
paragraph 17 of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) cannot be read in isolation but
must be read alongwith the observations made by the Supreme Court in
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment. It is submitted by them that the plea
of jurisdiction was never taken before the High Court (therein). The High Court
had issued notice in response to which parties appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the High Court. The High Court had also passed an interim
order directing the Shipping Corporation of India to pay a sum of Rs.2.75 lacs to
the petitioner. However, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing the High
Court took a view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action
had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. The submission is that it is in this
context that the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of the Nawal Kishore Sharma
(supra) held that the petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction.

The submission further is that in Bibhuti Narain Singh (supra), the

Division Bench of the High Court has noticed that the appellant (employee
therein) was posted at Faizabad where the penalty order of stoppage of annual
increments was served upon him. It is, therefore, contended that this fact of the
appellants posting at Faizabad, U.P., in any case would confer jurisdiction on the
Lucknow Bench of the High Court even without the aid of Naval Kishore Sharma
(supra) and therefore, the order/judgment in Bibhuti Narain Singh has no
application to the facts of the present case. ”

The conflict noticed by the learned Single Judge for reference to the
Larger Bench is in the following words:-
“Having considered the judgments and orders referred to above, I am of
the view that there is a conflict of opinion between the Full Bench judgment of
this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra (supra) and Constable Lalji
Pandey (supra) on one hand and the orders passed by the two Division Benches of
this Court in the case of Bibhuti Narain Singh (supra) and Har Govind Singh
 5

(supra) in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra) and this dispute, therefore, needs to be resolved by a
larger Bench on the question with regard as to whether the observations of the
Supreme Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) in paragraph 17 can
be said to be a binding precedent on this Court to entertain the above writ
petitions or whether the observations of paragraph 17 were in the peculiar facts
and circumstances of the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) in view of
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment.

OR

In the alternative whether the judgment of the Full Bench in Rajendra

Kumar Mishra (supra) and Constable Lalji Pandey (supra) can be said to still lay
down the correct law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra).

Therefore, in my opinion this controversy needs to be resolved by a larger

Bench of this Court. Let the records of these cases be placed before the Hon'ble
Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench to resolve the above conflict in the
several decisions of this Court. ”

5. Firstly we think it proper to re-formulate the questions referred for

convenience:-

(i) Whether the judgments of the Full Bench in Rajendra

Kumar Mishra Vs. Union of India 1 and the Division Bench in The
Director General CRPF, New Delhi Vs. Constable Lalji
Pandey 2 are still good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court
in Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India and others 3?

(ii) Whether the decisions of the Division Bench in Bibhuti

Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of India and others 4 and
Har Govind Singh Vs. Union of India and others 5 are good law
on the subject in the light of judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of

1 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108

2 Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010
3 (2014) 9 SCC 329

4 Special Appeal Defective No. 785 of 2014

5 Special Appeal No 158 of 2016

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Nawal Kishore Sharma 3?

(iii) Whether there is any conflict of opinion in the decisions of

the Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra 1 and Division Bench in
Constable Lalji Pandey 2 on one hand and in Bibhuti Narain
Singh 4 and Har Govind Singh 5 on the other in the matter of exercise
of territorial jurisdiction by the High Court in view of clause (2) of Article
226 of the Constitution of India and the issue needs to be resolved by the
authoritative decision of the Larger Bench?

6. To answer the above questions, firstly we would be required to go

through the above decisions of this Court referred for our consideration
one by one.

(a) The Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra 1 was

constituted on a reference made by a learned Single Judge, wherein he
had referred two contradictory Division Bench judgments of this Court in
Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.), LT. Colonel v. Union of India 6 and in
Kailash Nath Tiwari v. Union of India 7, decided on 9.1.2002. The
short question before the Full Bench was whether this Court had
jurisdiction to decide the writ petition challenging the Court martial
proceedings and the sentence awarded to the petitioner who was serving
in Indian Army.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner therein had urged that in view of
the decision of the Apex Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief
of Army Staff 8, a writ petition challenging the impugned sentence can
be filed in any High Court in India as the Chief of Army Staff has been

3 (2014) 9 SCC 329

1 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108
2 Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010
4 Special Appeal Defective No. 785 of 2014

5 Special Appeal No 158 of 2016

6 2003 (3) ESC 1419

7 Special Appeal No. 997 of 1995

8 (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275

 7

made respondent in that case. It was further urged that since the petitioner
(therein) was resident of District Ballia within the State of Uttar Pradesh,
the writ petition can be filed in the High Court at Allahabad.

Considering the law propounded by the Apex Court, referring to the

various decisions, it was held by the Full Bench in paragraphs '39', '40'
'41' and '42' as under:-
“39. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a
decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the
decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can
be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be
regarded as a full exposition of law.

40. For the reasons given above we arc of the opinion that the Chief of Army
Staff can only be sued either at Delhi where he is located or at a place where the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

41. We may mention that a "cause of action" is the bundle of facts which,
taken with the law applicable., gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. However, it must include some act done by the defendant, since in the
.absence of an act, ho cause of action can possibly occur. [Vide Radhakrishnamurithy
v. Chandrasekhara Rao, AIR 1966 A.P. 334; Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969
All. 526 (FB), and Salik Ram Adya Prasad v. Ram hakhem and others, AIR 1973 All.
1071.

42. In the present case no part of the cause of action has arisen in U.P. Hence
in our opinion the writ petition is not maintainable in this Court. It is accordingly
dismissed. The decision of the Division Bench in Kailash Nath Tiwari v. Union of
India (supra) in our opinion does not lay down the correct law and is overruled.”

It can, thus, be seen that the question whether the writ petition
challenging the Court martial proceedings and the order of the Chief of
Army Staff was maintainable in this Court, was decided in the facts of
that case, it was held that since no part of cause of action had arisen in the
State of U.P., hence the writ petition was not maintainable in this Court.
We may record that after referring decisions of the Apex Court, the
Full Bench has held that the Chief of Army Staff can only be sued either
at Delhi or at a place where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

Limited issue as to whether the writ petition challenging the order

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of the Chief of Army Staff can be maintained in this Court was answered
by the Full Bench repelling the plea of the petitioner that in view of
decision of the Apex Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori 8, the Chief of
Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the Country. It was held that the
said observation cannot be construed to mean that the Supreme Court had
laid down any absolute proposition that it is open to the petitioner to file a
writ petition in any High Court in India. It was held that the said
observation is only a laconic observation and cannot override the Larger
Bench decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein it had laid down the
principle that the place where whole or part of cause of action has arisen
gives jurisdiction to the Court within whose territory such place is situate.
Whether the cause of action has arisen within the territory of the
particular Court will have to be determined in each case on its own facts
in the context of the subject matter of the litigation, and relief claimed.

The Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra 1, in principle has

approved the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Saroj
Mahanta (Mrs.), LT. Colonel 6, wherein it was stated that in order to
determine as to whether the Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a petition,
the pleadings in the petition have to be examined to form an opinion as to
whether a cause of action partly or fully has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court. The Division Benches in Saroj Mahanta
(Mrs.), LT. Colonel 6, in the facts situation of that cases had concluded
that this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction.

(b) In Constable Lalji Pandey 2, the challenge before the

Division Bench was to the punishment order dated 17.3.1994 of dismissal
from service on the charge of unauthorized absence from duty. The writ
petition was filed by the delinquent after exhausting departmental remedy
of appeal as well as revision before the competent authorities which were
8 (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1275

1 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108

6 2003 (3) ESC 1419

2 Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010

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also rejected. On a preliminary objection raised by the respondent with

regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, the Division Bench has
relied upon the view taken by the Full Bench in the case of Rajendra
Kumar Mishra 1 to hold that mere communication of dismissal,
appellate and revisional orders at the residential address of the delinquent
employee at District Bhadohi would not confer territorial jurisdiction to
this Court. Mere residence of the petitioner within the territory of this
Court would not confer jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

We may note here again that the Division Bench in Constable

Lalji Pandey 2 had decided the question of jurisdiction in the facts and
circumstances of that case. It was noted that the delinquent employee who
was a member of Central Reserve Police Force (C.R.P.F.) deliberately
absented himself from duty for considerable long period without
permission and due intimation to the department and without sending any
medical certificate and proper application within time. He had not
admitted himself in any of the C.R.P.F. Hospital and, therefore, his plea
that he had fallen ill and could not join his duty, raised doubts about his
conduct. The departmental authorities having considered various pleas
raised by the petitioner in appeal and revision affirmed the punishment
order. It can, thus, be clearly seen that the Division Bench had refused to
entertain the writ petition rejecting on the plea that service of the
dismissal, appellate and revisional orders upon the employee at his place
of residence at Bhadohi would give rise to cause of action within the State
of U.P. It was concluded that mere communication of the decisions at the
residential address of a member of a disciplined force would not confer
jurisdiction on this Court as the same cannot be said to be an integral fact
to the bundle of facts which constitute cause of action in that case.
(c) Har Govind Singh 5 is the decision where the Division
Bench has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Nawal Kishore

1 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108

2 Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010
5 Special Appeal No 158 of 2016
 10

Sharma 3 to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge in dismissing
the writ petition. The matter was remitted to the writ Court to decide
afresh keeping in view of the observation of the Apex Court in Nawal
Kishore Sharma 3.
With due respect to their lordships, in the order dated 26.11.2019 of
the Division Bench, we do not find any reasoning given by it to reach at
the conclusion as to how the order of learned Single Judge was wrong and
why in their opinion, the issue required reconsideration by the Single
Bench.
We, however, may note that the same issue in Har Govind
Singh 5 had been remitted twice. In an earlier decision dated 27.4.2016, it
was observed by the earlier Division Bench that the writ petition filed in
the year 2004 had wrongly been dismissed after 12 years of its institution
on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
Be that as it may, in our considered opinion, the conclusion drawn
by the Division Bench in Har Govind Singh 5 is not the law laid down
as a binding precedent which merited this reference. The reference to the
decision of the Division Bench in Har Govind Singh 5 in the referral
order is, thus, wholly irrelevant.
(d) In Bibhuti Narain Singh 4, the Division Bench of this
Court placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Nawal
Kishore Sharma 3 has held that the part of cause of action had arisen
within the jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as, the petitioner (therein)
was posted in Faizabad, a District in the State of U.P. when the order of
penalty of stoppage of annual increment was served upon him. It was held
that though whole departmental proceedings concluded at the place
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Court but since the order of
punishment was served at the place of posting of the petitioner, within the
State of U.P., part of cause of action would lie within the territorial

3 (2014) 9 SCC 329

5 Special Appeal No 158 of 2016

4 Special Appeal Defective No. 785 of 2014

 11

jurisdiction of this Court.

We may note here that the issue as to whether the whole or part of
cause of action would lie within the jurisdiction of a Court or not is a
question to be decided in each case on its own facts in the context of the
subject matter of litigation and relief claimed as the expression “cause of
action” constitutes bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed, to entitle to him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. In
determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the court must
take into consideration the facts pleaded in support of cause of action
albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. Thus, the question of territorial jurisdiction
must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition and, thus, would
depend on the facts of the case.
(e) In Nawal Kishore Sharma 3 , the issue before the Supreme
Court was regarding validity of the order passed by the Patna High Court
dismissing the appellant's writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has discussed the law on exercise of jurisdiction
(territorial) by the writ Court prior to and subsequent to the Constitution
(42nd) Amendment Act, 1976, whereby clause (2) was inserted in Article
226 of the Constitution of India which reads as under:-
Clause (2):- The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions,
orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by
any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories. (3) xxxxx (4) xxxxx”

While tracing the law holding the field, the judgment of the Apex
Court in State of Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s Swaika
Properties and Another 9, was noted, wherein the expression “cause of
action” was considered to hold as under:-

“8. The expression “cause of action” is tersely defined in Mulla’s Code of

3 (2014) 9 SCC 329

9 (1985) 3 SCC 217
 12

Civil Procedure:

“The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be

necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the
court.”

In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to
them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of
notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at
18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West
Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service
of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within
the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High
Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an
integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause
of action. ...….xxxxxxxxxxx”

The expression “cause of action” considered in the case of Oil and

Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others 10,
was noted :-

“6. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction

the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of
the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the
facts pleaded in the petition.”
It was considered that in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs.
Union of India and Another 11, the Apex Court elaborately discussed
Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the meaning of
the word 'cause of action’ with reference to Section 20(c) and Section 141
of the Code of Civil Procedure to hold that the entire bundle of facts
pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be

10 (1994) 4 SCC 711

11 (2004) 6 SCC 254

 13

proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The
expression material facts is also known as integral facts.

It was further observed that :-

“10. Keeping in view the expressions used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues
within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter.”
It was noted that in Union of India and others vs. Adani
Exports Ltd. and another 12, the Apex Court has held that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition, it must
disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide the dispute and the
entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact
pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to
the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the
Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. the dispute involved in the case. Facts
which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do
not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on
the court concerned.

In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and

another 13, it was observed that writ petitioners have to establish that a
legal right claimed by them has prima facie either been infringed or is
threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of
the Court’s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing
him actual injury or threat thereof.

In Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K. Mishra, Additional

Commissioner of Income Tax and Others 14, the Apex Court while
considering the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the
cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held that clause (2) of

12 (2002) 1 SCC 567

13 (2006) 6 SCC 207
14 (2010) 1 SCC 457
 14

Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or
in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small
fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a
petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territory of a State, the High
Court of that State will have jurisdiction. .

Having considered the above decisions of the Apex Court, it was

concluded in paragraph '16' in Nawal Kishore Sharma 3 as under:-
“16. …....there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action
wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High
Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to
establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the
territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.”

7. It was thus held that in order to maintain the writ petition, the
petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been
infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's
jurisdiction.
8. Considering the above legal position, in the facts of that case in
Nawal Kishore Sharma 3 , it was held by the Apex Court that the writ
petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial
jurisdiction. The facts of the case noticed by the Apex Court were that the
appellant while on duty reported sickness including difficulty in breathing
and was referred to the hospital. Later, he was signed off for further
medical treatment. Finally, the respondent permanently declared the
appellant unfit for Sea services due to dilated Cardiomyopathy (heart
muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government
of India issued an order cancelling the registration of the appellant as a
Seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to the appellant at his native place
in Bihar, where he was staying after he was found medically unfit. Faced
with this, the appellant sent a representation from his home in the State of

3 (2014) 9 SCC 329

 15

Bihar to the respondent claiming disability compensation. The said

representation was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to him
at his home address in Gaya, Bihar, rejecting his claim for disability
compensation.
9. Noticing the above facts, it was observed therein that admittedly,
the appellant was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated
Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to stay in his
native place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with
regard to his disability compensation. It was considered that all claims
and representations filed by the appellant (therein) were entertained by the
respondent and replied and decision on those representations were
communicated to him at his home address in Bihar. Considering these
facts together, it was held in Nawal Kishore Sharma 3 that prima facie
a part or a fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received the letter of refusal disentitling him
from disability compensation. It was clearly observed by the Apex Court
that the order of dismissal of writ petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case.
10. From an exhaustive reading of the decision in Nawal Kishore
Sharma 3 , it is evident that the question of maintainability of the writ
petition in Patna High Court was decided in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case considering the nature and character of the
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was found that legal
right claimed by the appellant (therein) to disability compensation had
been infringed by the respondent with rejection of his representations
communication from the home address of the employee and orders were
communicated to him at the same address. On account of suffering from
disease, the appellant having been permanently declared unfit was forced
to stay in his native place.
11. From the above, it is evident that there can never be an
3 (2014) 9 SCC 329
 16

encyclopedic exposition as to what would constitute cause of action in a

case. The decisions of the Full Bench and the Division Benches of this
Court and the Apex Court should not be read to exhaustively enunciate as
to when and how the Court should determine in a case that the cause of
action, wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits. Peculiar
facts in the context of the subject matter of the litigation, and relief
claimed are the only guiding factors for the learned Judge(s) to decide. It
is to be entirely left at the discretion of the Judge(s) considering the
petition to ascertain whether the cause of action did exist entitling the
petitioner to approach the High Court concerned.

12. Each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition cannot by itself
constitute a cause of action. Facts which have no bearing on the lis or the
dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to
confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. In view of the
expression used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, even if a
small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. Integral facts pleaded
must have nexus or relevance with the lis so as to constitute a cause of
action.

13. We find that law on the subject is fairly well settled with the
decision of Larger Benches of this Court and the Supreme Court. The
judgments of Division Benches and Larger Bench placed by the counsels
for both sides before the learned Single Judge do not show any conflicting
view in the matter and need no further explanation or elaboration.
14. The learned Single Judge, with due respect, totally misdirected
himself in not considering the ratio of the decisions placed before him and
referring the matter to the Larger Bench when no conflicting view on the
matter was facing him. In our considered opinion, the learned Single
Judge ought to have applied the law laid down by the Apex Court and the
Larger Bench to appreciate the facts of the case to form its opinion as to
whether the instant writ petitions were maintainable before this Court i.e.
 17

to decide whether the facts pleaded in the writ petitions constitute cause
of action, wholly or in part to confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court.
15. We may note that reference to a Larger Bench under Chapter V
Rule 6 of the Allahabad High Court Rules' 1952 can only be made when
there are conflicting views of the Coordinate Bench or the Larger Bench
facing his Lordship on a subject/controversy before him making it
difficult for him to take one or other view. Reference cannot be made
merely to create a precedent or to get an authoritative pronouncement by
the Larger Bench on any assumed conflict. Whenever a matter is placed
before the Court (whether single or division bench) for adjudication, if a
question of law of whatever importance arises before that bench,
ordinarily the Court should decide it itself by applying the legal principles
and judicial pronouncements on the subject. Only if the learned judge
reaches at a conclusion that there is conflict of precedent, i.e. conflicting
views of the Coordinate Bench or the Larger Bench on the subject making
it impossible for the Court to decide this way or the other, reference could
have been made.
16. A Full Bench of this Court in Suresh Jaiswal vs. State of U.P.
and another 15 considering the scope of Chapter V Rule 6 of the
Allahabad High Court Rules' 1952 has held that:-
“53. Thus, from the above discussion, it is found that when it appears to a
Single Bench or a Division Bench that there are conflicting decisions of the Co-
ordinate strength of the same Court or that a question of law of importance having
conflicting views arises in the trial of a case, the Judge or the Bench passes an order
that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice of the High Court with the request
to form the Special or Full Bench to hear and decide the case on the questions raised
in the case.
54. Normally, the judge concerned should make a reference briefly indicating
reasons for his views which necessitated to refer the matter to a Larger Bench but the
same is not indispensable.
55. At the same time, we may clarify that if reasons are not stated in respect
of the order of reference, the Full Bench cannot decline to answer the questions
referred to it. The brief reasons for making a reference, however, has to be indicated
so as to enable the Larger Bench to know the minds of Hon'ble Judge(s) making the
15 Writ-C No. 53941 of 2015
 18

reference.
56. In the instant matter, as expressed above, we could not find any conflict
between two decisions which warranted a reference before the Larger Bench.
57. The questions, in the reference order, framed by the Division Bench,
assuming conflict of opinion in the election matters, with due respect, are sweeping.
On a plain reading of the order of reference, it appears that their Lordships have
referred the questions to the Larger Bench with a view to create a precedent assuming
that those questions of law of importance may arise in election matters and an
authoritative pronouncement of a Larger Bench is needed on the subject.
58. The pronouncement by a Full Bench, with due regards to the learned
Judges referring the matter, on hypothetical conflict, would not be a proper judicial
exercise.
60. In our considered view, an issue being of importance by itself, cannot be
a ground for referring the matter to the Larger Bench.”
17. Having said that, to restate the law, we may revisit the issue to
clarify the legal position as we deem it apposite to express our view in
order to lend a quietus to the doubts which appear to exist.
18. As noted above in detail, it is reiterated at the cost of repetition that
the Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma 3 having traced the legal
position pre and post insertion of clause (2) in Article 226 of the
Constitution had come to the conclusion that the question of jurisdiction
(territorial) must be decided in the facts of the case having due regard to
the pleading in the writ petition. Appreciating a long line of decisions
ranging from the year 1985 till the year 2000 and the scope of Article 226
(2) of the Constitution, particularly the cause of action in maintaining a
writ petition, it has been concluded in paragraph '16' of the report that to
establish that the cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of any High Court, the petitioner has to show that a
legal right claimed by him has been infringed or is threatened to be
infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's
jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual
injury or threat thereof.
19. What would constitute a cause of action obviously would depend
upon the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the
3 (2014) 9 SCC 329
 19

Constitution. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can
exercise powers to issue direction, order or writs for enforcement of any
of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for
any other purpose. If the cause of action wholly or in part had arisen
within the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, it can
entertain the writ petition to pass orders or directions notwithstanding that
the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person
against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within its
territories.

20. 'Cause of action' implies a right to sue. The material facts which are
imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of
action. It has been interpreted to mean that every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his
right to the judgment of the Court. The question as to whether the Court
has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, has to be decided on
the basis of averments in the petition, truth or otherwise thereof, however,
would be immaterial.

21. As cause of action is the bundle of facts to examine the issue of

jurisdiction it is necessary that one of the interlinked fact must have
occurred in a place where the case has been instituted. All necessary facts
must form an integral part of the cause of action. The fact must have
direct relevance in the lis involved. It is not that every fact pleaded can
give rise to a cause of action so as to confer jurisdiction on the Court in
whose territorial jurisdiction it has occurred.
22. Mere service of notice would not give rise to a cause of action
unless service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action. The
answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the
cause of action within the meaning of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution
must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to the
cause of action. In order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to
entertain a writ petition, it must be disclosed that the integral fact pleaded
 20

in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower

the Court to decide the matter and the entire or a part of it arose within its
jurisdiction. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have the nexus on
the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing
to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of
action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.
23. In Ex. No. 1387-5234-M Sepoy/D.B./M.T., Chabi Nath
Rai vs. Union of India & others 16, a Division Bench of this Court,
while considering the question whether the cause of action had arisen at
Allahabad on communication of the decision on the representation of the
appellant therein, had observed that the 'right to action' and 'cause of
action' are two different things. This distinction was earlier considered by
a Division Bench of this Court in Daya Shankar Bharadwaj v. Chief
of Air Staff, New Delhi and others 17 , wherein it was observed:-

"A right of action arises as soon as there is an invasion of right. But 'cause of
action' and 'right of action'...... are not synonymous or interchangeable. A right of
action is the right to enforce a cause of action (Americal Jurispurdence 2 nd Edition
Vol.1.) A person residing any where in the country being aggrieved by an order of
Government Central or State or authority or person may have a right to action at law
but it can be forced or the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked of that High
Court only within whose territorial limits the cause of action wholly or in part arises.
The cause of action arises by action of the Government or authority and not by
residence of the person aggrieved."

24. It was further discussed in Chabi Nath Rai 16 that an order

imposing penalty does not take effect unless it is communicated and the
cause of action may arise at a place where it is communicated but if an
order is passed in appeal or on a representation filed by delinquent and the
order is confirmed, it does not give rise to any fresh cause of action at a
place where the order of appellate authority is communicated. It is only an
intimation to an order passed on the appeal or the representation made by
the delinquent at a place where he is residing or where he indicates his
address for communication of the order which may be passed on appeal
16 1997 (1) UPLBEC 236
17 AIR 1988 Allahabad 36
 21

by the authority concerned. Every order which is communicated to a

person at a particular place does not give rise to the cause of action to
institute an action where it is communicated.

To support its view, the Division Bench in Chabi Nath Rai 16

(supra) had taken aid from the decision of the Apex Court in State of
Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s Swaika Properties 9 wherein
though the notification issued by the authority under Section 52(2) of
Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served at Calcutta on the
petitioner but it was held that since the proceedings for acquisition had
taken place at Jaipur and were complete, mere service of notice under
Section 52 of the Act would not give rise to the cause of action at
Calcutta.
It was concluded in Chabi Nath Rai 16 that since the confirmation
of the order of sentence was made at Jammu by the confirming authority,
the mere fact that the appellant sent representation from Allahabad and the
decision on his representation was communicated at Allahabad did not
give rise to any cause of action at Allahabad.
On the plea that the doctrine of merger is applicable in the case
when an order is passed in appeal and the place where appellate order is
communicated should be treated as a place where cause of action arises, it
was held in Chabi Nath Rai 16 that even if the doctrine of merger is
applied in relation to the statutory appeal, it is only the place where the
appeal is decided, the Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the petition
of the appellant. The decision of the Apex Court in Collector of
Customs, Calcutta vs. East India Commercial Company
Calcutta and others 18, was considered, wherein it was held that once
an order of original authority is taken in appeal to the appellate authority,
it is the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellate order has been
passed, will only have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under

16 1997 (1) UPLBEC 236

9 (1985) 3 SCC 217

18 AIR 1963 SC 1124

 22

Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

25. The view taken by the Division Bench in Chabi Nath Rai 16 has
been cited with approval by another Division Bench in Ex-Naik Ram
Sharan vs. Union of India and others 19 to hold that mere
communication of the appellate order at the place where the petitioner
resides itself does not give any cause of action.
26. In Vishnu Kumar Bhargawa and others vs. Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bombay and others 20, it was considered that the service
of notice of the case filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate,
Bombay was not an integral part of cause of action, inasmuch as, for
succeeding in the case, service of notice at Allahabad was not material
and would not confer jurisdiction on the High Court at Allahabad to
entertain the writ petition.
27. We subscribe to the view taken by the above noted Division
Benches to hold that mere communication of the appellate or revisional
order at the place of residence of the petitioner itself does not give rise to
a cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court
within limit of which jurisdiction he resides as the communication of such
a decision would confer only the “right to action”. The confirmation of
order of dismissal with the rejection of appeal and representation does not
give rise to any fresh cause of action at a place where the order of
appellate authority is communicated.
28. Further, we may note that doctrine “forum conveniens” has a
limited application and the same by itself may not be considered to be a
determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on
merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.
[Reference Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. 11]
29. Coming back to the reference, with greatest respect, we may note

16 1997 (1) UPLBEC 236

19 Special Appeal (Defective) No. 622 of 2008
20 1986 ALJ 1093
11 (2004) 6 SCC 254
 23

that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Larger Benches of this Court to decide
whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions instead of
referring the matter to Hon'ble The Chief Justice for constituting a Larger
Bench. The judgments of Division Benches considered by the learned
Single Judge were decided in the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. What was binding on the learned Single Judge is the ratio decidendi
of the judgment.
30. We are not called upon to determine as to how can the ratio
decidendi be ascertained from a decision. We may, however, note that the
doctrine of precedent i.e. being bound by previous decision is limited to
the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. The
enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a
Court has been decided is alone a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the
underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds
upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific
peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The
ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case
and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a
pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge-made and a minor
premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate
consideration. It is not the duty of the Court to spell it out with difficulty
in order to be bound by it. [See Krishna Kumar Vs. Union of
India 21].
31. In light of the aforesaid, we conclude that the reference itself is not
merited as there is no conflict of opinion in the decisions referred by the
learned Single Judge. We, however, clarified the law (with the help of the
long line of decisions of the Supreme Court) in order to lend a quietus to
the doubts which appear to exist so that to avoid any further delay in the
proceedings.
32. Reformulated question no. (iii) of the Reference is, thus, answered
21 AIR 1990 SC 1782
 24

in negative.
33. Reference stands answered, accordingly. The individual writ
petitions and Special Appeals may now be placed before the appropriate
Bench for disposal in light of the above.
Order Date :- 1.5.2020
Brijesh (Sunita Agarwal,J.)

(Anjani Kumar Mishra,J.)

(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)