1NPLEA2023003

IMF Country Report No.
23/343
NEPAL
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT – FINANCIAL
October 2023 SECTOR STABILITY REVIEW
This paper on Nepal was prepared by a staff team of the International Monetary Fund. It
is based on the information available at the time it was completed on July 2023.
Copies of this report are available to the public from
International Monetary Fund • Publication Services

PO Box 92780 • Washington, D.C. 20090
Telephone: (202) 623-7430 • Fax: (202) 623-7201
E-mail: [email protected] Web: http://www.imf.org
International Monetary Fund

Washington, D.C.
© 2023 International Monetary Fund

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
REPORT
NEPAL
Financial Sector Stability Review
July 2023
Prepared By
Tanai Khiaonarong (Mission Chief, MCM)
Bidisha Das (STA), Chloe Zhang (MCM)
Adam Gersl, Terry Goh, Peter Lohmus, Laura Newbury, Christopher Wilson (External Experts)
Authoring Departments:
Monetary and Capital Markets

Statistics
DISCLAIMER
The contents of this report constitute technical advice provided by the staff of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to the authorities of Nepal (the “TA recipient”) in response to their request for technical
assistance. This report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof may be disclosed by the IMF to IMF
Executive Directors and members of their staff, as well as to other agencies or instrumentalities of the TA
recipient, and upon their request, to World Bank staff, and other technical assistance providers and
donors with legitimate interest, including members of the Steering Committee of the South Asia Regional
Training and Technical Assistance Center (SARTTAC), unless the TA recipient specifically objects to
such disclosure (see Operational Guidelines for the Dissemination of Technical Assistance Information).
Publication or Disclosure of this report (in whole or in part) or summaries thereof to parties outside the
IMF other than agencies or instrumentalities of the TA recipient, World Bank staff, other technical
assistance providers and donors with legitimate interest, including members of the Steering Committee of
SARTTAC, shall require the explicit consent of the TA recipient and the IMF’s Monetary and Capital
Markets Department.
Table of Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 4
Preface ................................................................................................................................................... 7
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 8

A. Scope of Work ..................................................................................................................... 12
B. Overview of the Financial System ....................................................................................... 12
C. Macrofinancial Vulnerabilities .............................................................................................. 13
D. Stocktaking of Past Technical Assistance ........................................................................... 16
1. Diagnostic Review and Main Recommendations ........................................................................ 18

A. Banking Supervision and Regulation ................................................................................... 18
B. Stress Testing ...................................................................................................................... 22
C. Crisis Management .............................................................................................................. 27
D. Payment Systems ................................................................................................................ 32
E. Financial Inclusion ............................................................................................................... 38
2. Technical Assistance Roadmap .................................................................................................... 44
Annex I. Assessment of Financial Sector Statistics ....................................................................... 61

A. Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) ................................................................................ 61
B. Monetary and Financial Statistics ........................................................................................ 62
C. Balance Sheet Approach ..................................................................................................... 62
D. Financial Access Survey ...................................................................................................... 64
Annex II. Assessment of TA Needs in Financial Sector Statistics.................................................66

A. Financial Soundness Indicators ........................................................................................... 66
B. Monetary and Financial Statistics ........................................................................................ 66
Figures
1. Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) ................................................................................. 12
2. Total Assets and Growth on BFIs ..................................................................................................... 13
3. Growth of Remittances...................................................................................................................... 14
4. Total Credit and Deposit ................................................................................................................... 14
5. Weighted Average Lending ............................................................................................................... 14
6. NPL/Total Loans (%) Country ........................................................................................................... 15
7. Loans and Advances of BFIs by Collateral Type .............................................................................. 15
8. Loans and Advances by Type of Financial Institutions ..................................................................... 15
9. Capital Market Historical Trend ......................................................................................................... 16
Tables
1. Nepal: Table of Main Recommendations .......................................................................................... 10
2. Number of Financial Institutions in Nepal ......................................................................................... 13
3. IMF MCM Technical Assistance Since 2014 .................................................................................... 16
4. Nepal FSSR TA Roadmap ................................................................................................................ 46
5. Nepal Financial Soundness Indicators 2021Q2-2022Q2.................................................................. 64
6. Nepal Balance Sheet Approach Matrix with MFS and IIP data ........................................................65
IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 3

Acronyms and Abbreviations
BCM Business Continuity Management

BCP Business Continuity Planning
BFI Bank and Financial Institution
BPM Balance of Payments and International
Investment Position Manual
BSA Balance Sheet Approach
CBDC Central Bank Digital Currency
CC Coordination Committee
CIB Credit Information Bureau
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
CPSS Committee on Payments and Settlement
Systems
CRE Commercial Real Estate
CSP Customer Security Program of SWIFT
DCGF Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund
DF Disclosure Framework
DoC Department of Co-operatives
DOMS Debt Operations Management System
DR Disaster Recovery
DT Deposit-Takers
ECC Electronic Cheque Clearing
ECF Extended Credit Facility
ED Executive Director
ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance
FCP Financial Consumer Protection
FMI Financial Market Infrastructure
FSAP Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSI Financial Soundness Indicator
FSP Financial Service Provider
FSSR Financial Sector Stability Review
GFS Government Financial Balance Sheet
GL General Ledger

HH Households
HR Human Resource
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International Investment Position
ILF Intraday Liquidity Facilities
IOSCO International Organization of Securities
Commissions
ITD Information Technology Department (of the NRB)
KA FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes
LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio
LGD Loss Given Default
LTV Loan-to-Value
MCM Monetary and Capital Markets Department (of the
IMF)
MCR Minimum Capital Ratio
MFI Microfinance Institution
MFS Monetary and Financial Statistics
MoLCP Ministry of Land Management, Co-operative, &
Poverty Alleviation
MOF Ministry of Finance
MSME Micro, small and medium enterprise
NBFI Nonbank Financial Institution
NCHL National Clearing House Limited
NCWO No-Creditor-Worse-Off
NEPSE Nepal Stock Exchange
NFC Nonfinancial Corporation
NFRS Nepal Financial Reporting Standards
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NLA Net Liquid Assets
NPL Non-performing Loan
NRB Nepal Rastra Bank
ODC Other Depository Corporation
OFC Other Financial Corporation
P&A Purchase and Assumption
PCA Prompt Corrective Action
PD Probabilities of Default
PDMO Public Debt Management Office

PFMI CPSS/IOSCO Principles for Financial Market
Infrastructures
PS Act Payment and Settlement Act
PSD Payment Systems Department (of the NRB)
PSO Payment System Operator
PSP Payment Service Provider
RTGS Real-Time Gross Settlement
RTO Recovery Time Objective
RWA Risk-Weighted Assets
SACCO Savings and Credit Cooperative
SARTTAC South Asia Regional Training and Technical
Assistance Center
SEBON Securities Board of Nepal
SIS Supervisory Information System
SREP Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process
SRF Standardized Report Forms (of the IMF)
STA Statistics Department (of the IMF)
TA Technical Assistance
TARM Technical Assistance Road Map

Preface
At the request of the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Financial Sector
Stability Review (FSSR) mission was conducted remotely and in-person between September 20–
November 18, 2022. The mission visited Kathmandu, Nepal during the period November 1–14, 2022. The
mission was led by Mr. Tanai Khiaonarong of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), and
included Ms. Bidisha Das (Statistics Department, STA), Chloe Zhang (MCM), as well as Ms. Laura
Newbury, and Messrs. Adam Gersl, Terry Goh, Peter Lohmus, and Christopher Wilson (all MCM short-
term experts).
Mr. Miguel Savastano, Deputy Director (MCM) joined the mission for the closing meeting. Ms. Teresa
Daban Sanchez, Resident Representative, and Ms. Sudha Dulal, Local Economist, from the IMF
Resident Representative Office in Kathmandu, provided support to the FSSR mission.
The scope of the mission, which was agreed with the NRB during the discussions that were held remotely
in May 2022, comprised banking supervision and regulation, stress testing, crisis management, payment
systems, financial inclusion, and financial sector statistics.
The mission met with Mr. Maha Prasad Adhikari (Governor of the NRB) and Mr. Ramesh Kumar Hamal
(Executive Chairman of the Securities Board of Nepal -SEBON-). It also met with NRB senior
management and staff, and representatives from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Deposit and Credit
Guarantee Fund (DCGF), Credit Information Bureau (CIB), Department of Co-operatives (DoC), Nepal
Federation of Savings & Credit Cooperative Unions Ltd, Nepal Microfinance Banker’s Association, and
Nepal Bankers’ Association; as well as with senior executives from public and private sector financial
institutions and companies; and it liaised with the World Bank.
The mission wishes to thank the staff of the NRB for their excellent collaboration, productive discussions,
and warm hospitality.

Executive Summary
The mission conducted a diagnostic review of the financial sector oversight capacity and
proposed a Technical Assistance Roadmap (TARM) to support the authorities’ efforts to
strengthen the identification, analysis, and mitigation of risks to financial stability in Nepal. Two
modules were undertaken: (i) the financial stability module, focused on areas agreed with the NRB during
the scoping stage: banking supervision and regulation, stress testing, crisis management, payment
systems, and financial inclusion; and (ii) the financial sector statistics module, focused on key data gaps
hampering financial stability analysis, as well as statistical reporting to the IMF’s STA.
The NRB has developed its approach to supervision and continuing to strengthen its capacity will
help improve the resilience of the banking sector. Regulations are largely rules-based and use
limits/caps (e.g., interest ceilings and fee caps). While there are examples of conservatism in the
regulations (e.g., low loan-to-value -LTV- and high risk-weighted assets -RWA-), the use of limits/caps
impact banks’ strategic decision-making and could impair the effectiveness of other regulations. The NRB
has a heightened focus on credit risk and recent guidance was issued on working capital loans to address
the evergreening of loan obligations. The supervisory cycle sees supervisors onsite on an annual basis,
and considerable effort has been put into developing an automated system for offsite data. Nonetheless,
limited progress has been made on several recommendations from the 2014 Financial Sector
Assessment Program (FSAP)–e.g., an absence of a framework for consolidated supervision. These gaps
need to be filled to ensure the effective supervision of banks. Development of offsite analytical tools will
optimize supervisory data and help identify early emerging risks. Risk specialization is needed in banking
supervision to keep pace with the size, scale, and sophistication of the banking sector, and will help with
the implementation of several planned regulatory changes (e.g., liquidity coverage ratio (LCR),
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9, and the new Working Capital Guidelines).
Micro stress tests of solvency and liquidity have been conducted since 2012, but the current
methodology remains overly simplified. The exercise contributed to establishing a stress testing
culture in the individual banks but needs to be improved to provide more plausible results to facilitate
regular risk monitoring and calibration of prudential policies. In addition, top-down macro stress tests
should be developed, based on alternative macroeconomic scenarios, credit risk satellite models, and
explicit projections of banks’ balance sheet and profit and loss items over a longer horizon in line with
best practices. Such macro stress tests, complemented by analyses of interconnectedness and contagion
risk in the financial sector, as well as additional risk monitoring tools, should support the existing financial
stability unit in enhancing the level of the macro-financial surveillance, and improving the quality of the
annual Financial Stability Report.
The NRB, as a de facto resolution authority, has relatively strong powers for early interventions
and recent changes in the legislative framework provided it also with additional resolution tools.
Nevertheless, the new tools need further legal underpinnings, and various laws and regulations need to
be better aligned. The NRB should introduce recovery planning requirements for banks as soon as
feasible and start developing an approach to resolution planning. Deposit guarantee scheme should be
significantly strengthened to ensure rapid payouts, and to operationalize its recently provided powers to
fund resolution. The NRB also needs to further refine its emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) policies
and procedures, including by increasing the supervisory reach and intrusion in banks in receipt of ELA.
Domestic coordination should be significantly improved for effective crisis management.

Payment systems modernization efforts have gained momentum, but further progress is needed
to improve the safety and efficiency of payment systems to support monetary policy and financial
stability. Key reforms include the passing of the Payment and Settlement Act (PS Act) and its bylaws,
and the implementation of the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system in 2019. Developments in retail
payment systems have included instant payments and explorations into central bank digital currency
(CBDC). However, gaps remain, including: (i) the legal certainty of finality and netting for payment
systems is unclear and oversight needs strengthening; (ii) systemically important payment systems have
not been formally identified and designated, and international risk management standards have not been
adopted or applied; (iii) the RTGS system needs enhancement to support the growing banking and capital
market sectors; (iv) cyber risk and business continuity management (BCM) need improvements; and (v)
further protection is required for e-money from the insolvency of payment service providers (PSP) or
settlement bank.
Access to formal financial services has more than doubled over the past 10 years, from 25 percent
of adults in 2011 to 54 percent in 2021. This progress reflects significant efforts by the NRB to reach
the unbanked through a variety of programs. However, nearly half of Nepalese remain excluded, and
women are less likely to have an account than men. Usage of accounts is also low. Microfinance
institutions (MFIs) and savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) are important providers of financial
services to low-income people, especially women. The MFI sector is consolidating, and some are
struggling due to the current interest rate ceiling. Some SACCOs exceed the size of smaller banks and
risks appear to be increasing in the absence of effective supervision, an issue noted by the 2014 FSAP. A
CIB provides data for banks and MFIs on separate platforms, and excludes most SACCOs, creating blind
spots in credit risk and over-indebtedness monitoring. The newly formed financial consumer protection
(FCP) division will be an important enhancement to build trust and confidence in formal financial services.
Financial sector statistics in Nepal have scope for improvement. Currently, the monetary and
financial statistics (MFS) cover the central bank, and other depository corporations (ODCs)
comprising of commercial banks, development banks, and finance companies, which accept
deposits. The other financial corporations (OFCs) sector which represents around 12 percent of total
financial system assets is not currently covered in MFS. Given the importance of OFCs, as key input for a
more complete Balance Sheet Analysis, compiling OFCs data in IMF’s standardized report forms (SRFs)
should be a priority for the NRB. As for the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs), core and additional
FSIs for the deposit-takers (DTs) are compiled and disseminated by the NRB with a quarterly frequency.
But there is scope to include new indicators for DTs and expand the compilation of FSIs to the nonbank
financial institutions (NBFI). The collaboration of the NRB with other financial regulators will be key to
improving Nepal’s financial sector statistics.
The mission’s diagnostic review supports a TA plan. The main recommendations are summarized in
Table 1, and the comprehensive TARM is provided in Section III. The mission recommended that
authorities should ensure the close alignment between the FSSR recommendations and the measures on
improving financial sector regulation and supervision under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF). 1 This
pertains to the prioritization and timelines for the implementation of the recommendations. Going forward,
the mission views that the continuing efforts to improve asset quality and banking supervision, which are
consistent with the proposed structural benchmarks under the ECF program, should warrant the highest
priority from authorities.
1See IMF (2022) Nepal: Request for an Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, Country Report
No. 2022/024, January 27. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/01/27/Nepal-
Request-for-an-Arrangement-Under-the-Extended-Credit-Facility-Press-Release-Staff-512283

Table 1. Nepal: Table of Main Recommendations
Time
Recommendation
Frame1
Banking Supervision and Regulation
Develop risk specialists in banking supervision to keep pace with planned regulatory
changes and developments in the sector (e.g., liquidity, credit, information technology, IFRS, MT
etc.).
Develop analytical tools for offsite surveillance to support forward-looking analysis and
ST
maximize use of data from the Supervisory Information System (SIS).
Assess liquidity regulations and supervisory processes, including contingency funding plans,
MT
and undertake a quantitative impact study to prepare for the introduction of the LCR.
Assess credit risk supervision processes, regulations for problem loans, undertaking a
targeted review of the NRB’s Working Capital Guideline and restructured loans to ensure a ST
consistent application.
Undertake a comprehensive review of the capital management framework, including
MT
definition of capital, buffer regime, application of pillar 2, and the supervisory review process.
Reconsider phasing-out directed lending programs where banks have not built expertise in
ST
risk management for this type of lending (e.g. agriculture sector).
Stress Testing
Revise existing micro stress testing of solvency and liquidity to make the projections more
MT
realistic and useful in guiding supervisory and prudential policies.
Build a top-down macro stress testing framework for solvency based on explicit
macroeconomic scenarios, credit risk satellite model(s), and consistent projection of banks’ MT
balance sheets and P&L items over a 3-year horizon.
Strengthen regular macro-financial and systemic risk surveillance and raise the analytical
MT
quality of the annual Financial Stability Report.
Crisis Management
Introduce recovery planning requirements and start with resolution planning. MT
Operationalize resolution framework and align associated laws, by-laws, and regulations. ST
Strengthen the role of the DCGF as a safety net. ST
Improve inter-agency cooperation on crisis preparedness. MT
Strengthen the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework to turn it into an instrument
ST
for solvent banks in exceptional cases.
Payment Systems
Strengthen the legal framework and oversight function to provide a high degree of legal
MT
certainty of transactions and sound payment oversight.
Identify and designate systemically important payment systems, formally adopt the Principles
ST
for FMIs in regulations and apply them to designated payment systems.
Enhance the RTGS system, increase utilization and fully automate intraday liquidity facility to
LT
achieve Delivery Versus Payment.
Improve the cyber and operational resilience of major payment systems, including the RTGS
MT
system, and their participants, as well as of the NRB.
Consider activity-based risk-focused payment legislation to keep pace with innovation,
LT
protect e-money funds, and make fully informed decision on whether to issue CBDC.

Financial Inclusion
Implement a formal information sharing agreement with cooperative authorities to ensure a
MT
timely flow of data on SACCOs.
Work with the Ministry of Land Management, Co-operative, & Poverty Alleviation (MoLCP) to
develop a coordinated supervision program for SACCOs with cooperative authorities, with MT
the goal of minimizing risks to the wider financial sector.
Replace the required interest rate ceiling for Class D MFIs with a base rate plus premium
ST
used for banks, supported by risk-based supervisory procedures and experienced staff.
Develop and implement a robust FCP function, including dedicated law, subordinate
LT
regulations, and supervisory tools and resources.
1 Time Frame: Short-Term (ST): < 6 months; Medium Term (MT): around 18 months; Long
Term (LT): around 30 months.

Note: This table summarizes recommendations from the Technical Assistance Roadmap which were assigned a high
priority, among others. Within each area, recommendations are further ordered by priority of implementation.

Introduction
A. SCOPE OF WORK
1. This report was prepared as part of the FSSR mission which was conducted remotely and
in-person between September 20–November 18, 2022. The mission held scoping discussions
with the NRB remotely in May 2022. Based on this agreed scope of work, the FSSR mission
conducted a broad diagnostic of some key segments of the financial system, and proposed a
TARM to support the efforts of the authorities to address key gaps and vulnerabilities in the
Nepalese financial system. The topics covered in the diagnostic review are banking supervision
and regulation, stress testing, crisis management, payment systems, financial inclusion, and
financial sector statistics.
2. The diagnostic review is based on existing standards and methodologies and was
targeted to specific circumstances in Nepal. The evaluation of bank supervision was guided
by the Basel Core Principles for banks. The authorities’ stress testing capacity was evaluated
against the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision 2018 Stress Testing Principles and best
international practices. The Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes (KA) and the Revised
Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance formed the basis for the evaluation of the financial
crisis management frameworks. The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) guided
the review of the payment systems. The review of financial inclusion was guided inter alia by the
Basel Committee Guidance on the application of the Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision to the regulation and supervision of institutions relevant to financial inclusion, World
Bank/Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures Payments Aspects of Financial
Inclusion, and the World Bank Good Practices for FCP.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
3. Nepal’s financial sector is large

relative to other peer countries. As of
Figure 1. Domestic Credit to Private
2020, the domestic private sector credit 160 Sector (% of GDP)
stood at 88 percent of GDP (Figure 1). 140
120
Since 2021–2022, the Nepalese 100
88% of GDP
economy and financial sector were in a 80
recovery phase from the COVID-19 60
pandemic. 40
20
0
4. Banks and Financial Institutions
(BFIs) represent approximately 80
percent of the total financial system
assets in Nepal. Commercial banks are
by far the largest asset holders, followed
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicator,
by development banks. After the data as of 2020
introduction of the Merger and
Acquisition Bylaw 2073 (B.S.), the NRB proactively consolidated BFIs through mergers and
acquisitions to promote financial stability and strengthen the financial system. The share of
overall system assets by development banks and finance companies contracted, whereas the
share of MFIs increased.

5. Although the number of BFIs decreased through mergers and acquisitions over the past
years (Table 2), the value of bank assets continuously increased, despite some
fluctuations (Figure 2). The differentiation among the four classes of financial institutions has
been blurred other than their capital requirements. As of July 2022, there were 26 commercial
banks (Class A), 17 development banks (Class B), 17 finance companies (Class C), 64 MFIs
(Class D), and one Infrastructure
Development Bank. Other financial Figure 2. Total Assets and Growth on
institutions include 19 life insurance BFIs
companies, 19 non-life insurance
companies, 2 reinsurance 8,000 25%
companies, and several other 7,000
financial institutions, such as the 6,000
20%
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), 5,000
Rs. in billions
15%
the Citizen Investment Trust (CIT), 4,000
Social Security Fund (SSC), 3,000 10%
Hydroelectricity Investment and 2,000

5%
Development Company Ltd. 1,000
(HIDCL), 10 hire purchase - 0%
companies, and a postal saving 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22
bank. In addition, there is an Total Asset of BFIs (Rs. In billions) Growth of the Total Asset (%)
estimated number of 30,879

cooperatives, which includes 14,484
Saving and Credit Co-operatives Source: Nepali Authorities
(SACCO). They are regulated at the
local, provincial, and federal levels, depending on the respective territory.
Table 2. Number of Financial Institutions in Nepal

2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Commercial Banks (class A) 28 28 27 27 26
Development Banks (class B) 33 29 20 18 17
Finance Companies (class C) 25 23 22 17 17
Microfinance Financial Institutions (class D) 65 90 85 70 65
Infrastructure Development Bank 1 1
Hydroelectricity Investment and Development Company
Ltd. 1 1 1 1 1
Sub-total 152 171 155 134 127
Life Insurance Companies 18 19 19 19 19
Non-Life Insurance Companies 20 20 20 20 19
Reinsurance Company 1 1 1 2 2
Sub-total 39 40 40 41 40
Employees Provident Fund 1 1 1 1 1
Citizen Investment Trust 1 1 1 1 1
Postal Saving Bank 1 1 1 1 1
Deposit and Credit Guarantee Fund 1 1 1 1 1
Credit Information Center Limited 1 1 1 1 1
Social Security Fund 1 1 1
Sub-total 5 5 6 6 6
Source: Nepali Authorities
C. MACROFINANCIAL VULNERABILITIES

6. The financial sector demonstrated
its resilience during COVID due in Figure 3. Growth of Remittances
part to central bank support, but 1,200 25%
the external sector came under 1,000 20%
pressure. As of 2022, imports 800 15%
Rs. in billions
increased to 40 percent of GDP, 600 10%
compared to 36 percent a year ago.
400 5%
Additionally, due to the disruption of
200 0%
the tourism sector and sluggish
remittance growth (Figure 3), the -
2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22
-5%
increasing risks in the external sector Workers' Remittances (Rs. in billions)

may have implications for the overall Workers' Remittances to GDP (%)
Growth of Workers' Remittances (%)
financial sector stability in the
medium term, leading to tight liquidity
conditions, and upward pressure on
interest rates. The current account deficit widened significantly from 7.8 percent of GDP to 12.8
percent of GDP from 2021–2022, resulting in increased pressure on the overall balance of
payments, and declines in foreign exchange reserves.
7. As part of contractionary monetary policy, the NRB increased the bank rate, the statutory
liquidity ratio, and the cash reserve ratio, which put pressure on interest rates and bank
funding. At the same time, deposit growth slowed (Figure 4). The total credit to deposit ratio
reached over 90 percent as of 2022, which exerted pressure on banks’ balance sheets, as banks
are required to limit their lending to 90 percent of deposits and other stable sources of funding.
Even though commercial banks are also obligatorily issuing debentures (long-term bonds) as an
alternative source of funds, their amount is limited by regulation, so the banking sector remains
dependent on traditional deposit mobilization. Combined with a lack of liquidity in bond markets
and existing limits for interbank lending, it adds to the funding challenge amongst banks. Two
months into the fiscal year 2022/23, the total BFI deposits decreased by 0.9 percent. With soaring
inflation and depleting foreign reserves, the lending rates increased, from 8.5 percent in August
2020 to 12.1 percent in September 2022, mirroring a strong increase in deposit rates offered to
customers to attract funding (Figure 5).
Figure 4. Total Credit and Deposit Figure 5. Weighted Average Lending

Rate (Commercial Banks)
25% 100%
95% 13%
20%
90%
15% 11%
85%
10% 9%
80%
5% 7%
75%
0% 70%
2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22
5%
2019 2019 2020 2020 2021 2022 2022 2022
Growth of Total Deposits Total Credit/ Total Deposit Jul Nov Mar Jul Sep Jan May Sep
8. Multiple challenges remain in addressing financial sector risks and vulnerabilities,

especially in the credit risk area. These were identified through the 2014 FSAP, TA, Article IV
Consultations, and the FSSR Scoping Mission. Although non-performing loans (NPLs) were low,
stress was building on asset quality and regulatory capital. As of July 2022, Nepal had an NPL of

only 1.31 percent for class A, B and C banks—the lowest among its peer countries (Figure 6).
The COVID-19-related restructuring, forbearance, and rescheduling facility helped contain the
reported BFI NPL ratio, compared to 1.48 percent in mid-July 2021. The disciplining effect of a
strict collateral regime, mostly in real estate (Figure 7), widespread use of additional guarantees
by family members, and the blacklisting practices especially in retail lending, contribute to the low
NPL ratio. However, it is still likely underreported due to a certain degree of evergreening mostly
in the corporate sector given the long-term practice of using revolving working capital loans. In
addition, banks’ NPLs are slowly rising due to higher interest rates in recent months. Due to
conservative provisioning rules, which don’t take into account collateral, banks’ capital position
might be vulnerable to large credit shocks.
Figure 6. NPL/Total Loans (%) Country Figure 7. Loans and Advances of

Comparison BFIs by Collateral Type
Bangladesh Fixed Deposit Against

Against Receipts security of
Guarantee 1.4% Bill
Bhutan 4.1% 0.4%
India Others
6.7%
Papua New Guinea
Current
Sri Lanka Assets
12.3%
Cambodia Fixed Assets
75.1%
Nepal
- 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Sources: NRB (Bank and Financial Institutions
Note: For countries where data in 2022 is not Monthly Statistics)
available, the most recent data is used. Note: Fixed assets include assets that can not
be converted into cash easily such as property,
plant, and equipment. Others include gold &
silver, securities, and credit cards.
9. Oversight of MFIs and SACCOs,

which collectively represent 15 Figure 8. Loans and Advances by Type
percent of financial sector lending, of Financial Institutions
needs to be strengthened. Finance Companies
Cooperatives
Supervision of MFIs is compliance- 7%
2%
based rather than risk-based.

Development Banks
SACCOs are relatively large providers 8%
of financial services (Figure 8) in
terms of customers and number of MFIs Commercial
institutions but are mostly supervised 8% Banks
75%
at the local level by inexperienced
authorities. The largest SACCOs
exceed the size of some of the Class
B and C banks. A lack of good data on
these institutions makes it difficult to Sources: NRB (Bank and Financial Institutions
assess the level and severity of risk Monthly Statistics), and Department of Cooperatives,
data as of July 2022.
they pose to overall financial stability
due to their linkages to banks and financial institutions. There is evidence of serious governance
and liquidity issues, as well.

10. The capital market has grown larger and more complex. As of 2022, Nepal has one stock
exchange, the Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE). Due to the increasing interest from the public
and the growing size of the capital market, the SEBON has called for applications to establish a
second stock exchange focusing more on SMEs and MFIs. The NEPSE trading system, Online
Trading System, became fully automated in 2021, and experienced growth in trading during the
pandemic. However, the capital market became very volatile (Figure 9). The large fluctuation may
have implications for both financial stability and overall macroeconomic activity. The brokerage
system is not well-regulated and not fully transparent. Corporate paper and bond markets are
largely absent. Mutual fund issuance is
Figure 9. Capital Market Historical Trend
making progress, but government
94
100 3500 securities are still not actively traded.
90
80
3000 Daily market turnover amounts to nearly
70 60 59 2500 3.8 percent of market capitalization, and
60 46
50 42 41
2883 2000 trading is highly concentrated on a
40 2009
1500 handful of banks and financial institutions,
30
1583 1259 1362 1000 representing 83.5 percent of market
20
1212
10
500 traded value. As of 2021/22, 30 percent
0 0 of total market capitalization consists of
2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 2021/22
the largest ten companies. SEBON’s
Market Capitalization/GDP (%) NEPSE Index (Closing)
supervisory capacity remained limited to
keep up with rapid changes in the market.
D. STOCKTAKING OF PAST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
11. The Nepalese authorities have received considerable technical assistance (TA) from the
IMF (notably MCM). Since the 2014 FSAP, the focus of TA missions was on strengthening
financial supervision and regulation, liquidity management, and monetary policy operations (Table
3 summarizes the TA missions during 2014–2022). The World Bank Group (WBG) has also been
working with the Nepalese authorities through a series of operations to address structural
obstacles that currently hinder the financial sector in fulfilling its potential. These include financial
stability challenges, underdeveloped non-bank financial institutions, gaps in payment systems,
credit infrastructure, and financial inclusion.
12. The FSSR takes account of the authorities’ experience with implementing past TA, while
also reflecting the broad assessment of future needs undertaken by the mission.
Recommendations cover outstanding issues from previous IMF TA on financial sector stability
issues, and the recommendations reflect a stock-take of progress on a wide range of issues in
recent years and identify priority areas for further development.
Table 3. IMF MCM Technical Assistance Since 2014

Lead Division Start Date End Date Title
MCMCO 03/14/2022 04/15/2022 Interest Rate Corridor Under an Exchange Rate Peg
MCMCO 01/31/2022 02/04/2022 Central Bank Risk Management
MCMFR 12/20/2021 12/23/2021 Credit Risk Supervision
MCMFR 09/12/2021 09/16/2021 Off-Site Supervisory Capacity
SARTTAC 04/07/2021 04/07/2021 Bank Supervision for SARTTAC Countries
SARTTAC 03/15/2021 03/26/2021 Monetary Policy Operations
SARTTAC 11/04/2020 11/04/2020 Bank Supervision
MCMDM 09/21/2020 10/01/2020 Public Debt Management

SARTTAC 11/24/2019 12/06/2019 Supervisory Capacity at the NRB
SARTTAC 07/28/2019 08/06/2019 Liquidity Monitoring Tools
MCMCO 02/20/2019 03/05/2019 Internal Audit Function
SARTTAC 12/03/2018 12/06/2018 Monetary Policy Framework
SARTTAC 09/30/2018 10/19/2018 Supervisory Capacity at the NRB
MCMFR 02/05/2018 02/16/2018 Cyber Security
SARTTAC 01/30/2018 02/13/2018 Banking Supervision and Regulation
SARTTAC 10/08/2017 10/18/2017 Technical Assistance Mission
SARTTAC 08/27/2017 09/07/2017 Liquidity Forecasting and Management
MCMCO 06/25/2017 07/07/2017 Payment System Oversight
SARTTAC 06/11/2017 06/16/2017 Liquidity Management
MCMFR 02/12/2017 02/17/2017 Off-Site Supervision to Risk-Based Supervision
MCMFR 07/31/2016 08/04/2016 Licensing Procedures
MCMCO 03/30/2016 04/11/2016 Liquidity Management
MCMFR 01/11/2014 05/10/2014 Banking Supervision
Source: IMF

1. Diagnostic Review and Main Recommendations
A. BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
Baselines Diagnostics
13. The NRB has enhanced its approach to supervision and planned future regulatory
changes will strengthen the resilience of the banking sector. The NRB has made progress
toward implementing risk-based supervision complemented with stronger regulations, including
implementing calculation of regulatory capital using approaches under Basel II. Recently the NRB
also implemented new guidelines on working capital loans to address potential evergreening of
borrower facilities. The NRB also acted swiftly during the pandemic to implement special
measures designed to support the banking system and financial stability. The NRB has a strong
focus on credit risk management with an annual onsite examination cycle for all Class A banks.
14. There remain vulnerabilities and challenges for the NRB in implementing its framework.
Regulations are largely rules-based with significant conservatism (e.g., low LTVs and high RWAs)
and limits/caps (e.g., interest ceilings and fee caps). Nonetheless, limited progress has been
made on several recommendations from the last FSAP (e.g., an absent of a framework for
consolidated supervision). These gaps need to be filled to ensure the NRB is able to effectively
supervise the banks. Transition to principles-based regulations over time would help support
development in bank risk management. There is also a need to evaluate the use of limits on bank
activities that may unnecessarily encumber the ability for banks to implement longer-term plans.
The existence of directed lending is causing distortions in the sector leading to unintended
consequences and should be reviewed.
15. Development of offsite analytical tools and training will help strengthen offsite analysis
and help supervisors identify early emerging risks. The NRB has invested in a new software
platform—the SIS—which is designed to automate the capture of regulatory returns. Together
with a revised offsite supervision manual, the SIS should lead to greater efficiencies and more
robust analysis. Further TA is needed to support the development of offsite reports that allow
supervisors to perform benchmark analysis of key performance indicators for all major risks.
Training is also needed to fully implement the revised supervisory manual to assist supervisors to
improve their analytical skills using new statistical reports, financial ratios, and peer group
analysis. This type of training will help support supervisors to identify early emerging risks and
underpin the Pillar II process where weaknesses are identified.
16. Risk specialists are needed to keep pace with the size, scale and complexity of banks and
banking groups. The NRB’s Human Resource (HR) policy typically rotates staff periodically with
the goal of promoting knowledge across central bank functions. While new skills are brought into
the supervision department, supervision expertise and risk management are lost, and institutional
knowledge is taken away from the department. As banks become larger and more complex,
experience and expertise in supervision is needed. Development of risk specialists will help
strengthen onsite and offsite supervision. Moreover, supervisors with specialist knowledge will
also help support planned changes in regulations such as implementation of the LCR and
introduction of IFRS9.

17. Intense competition in the deposit market is driving up interest rates and creating funding
and liquidity stress for banks. Banks are predominantly deposit funded and slower deposit
growth is creating intense competition driving up rates which have experienced rapid growth in a
short period of time. Access to term funding is problematic as Nepal’s capital markets are at an
early stage of development. Corporate paper and bond markets are largely absent, and
government securities are not traded. The stock market is dominated by listings of financial
institutions, with thin liquidity and low turnover. The capacity for banks to lengthen the maturity
profile and diversify the source of funding remains a challenge adding to the inherent risk profile
of banks.
18. The NRB plans to implement the Basel III LCR Framework, which will help to strengthen
risk management, but further work is needed to address liquidity pressure. Plans to
implement LCR should help improve risk management and monitoring with a forward-looking
view of stressed liquidity. Nonetheless, action is needed to address liquidity concerns of banks,
and better manage maturity mismatch. Analysis highlights high dependence on institutional
deposits, with a majority of banks being severely affected in the event of deposits withdrawal by
several of the largest institutional depositors. Contingency funding plans should be developed to
assess the readiness of alternative sources of funding. Development of the secondary market for
securities and liquid assets will offer a longer-term solution. A quantitative assessment study will
need to be undertaken to assess the readiness of the sector to implement the LCR and help
identify areas for additional guidance and calibration. While progress has been made to develop
the NRB’s monetary operations, further work is needed, so that the NRB is able to assist banks to
manage their liquidity positions effectively.
19. Banks calculate regulatory capital using the Basel II framework, which contains significant
conservatism in the risk-weighting for certain asset classes. All Class A banks meet the
minimum capital ratio (MCR) of 8.5 percent. A capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent is applied
in addition to the MCR (effectively raising the MCR to 11.0 percent), and the NRB plans to
implement a countercyclical buffer in 2023. Banks are required to meet a minimum leverage ratio
of 4 percent. Credit risk is approximately 93 percent of system RWAs, followed by operational risk
ranging between 3–6 percent followed by market risk which is typically 1 percent or below
(reflecting limits on bank speculation in traded market products).
20. The supervisory review is undertaken annually to assess the adequacy of capital (the
‘Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process’ -SREP-) and adjustments to RWAs are
applied if deficiencies are identified. Banks issue debentures, which are treated as tier 2,
however, the instruments appear to be more bond like rather than consisting of a permanent
commitment of capital. Banks disclose their MCR on a monthly basis and published by the NRB
on their website. Bank Pillar 3 disclosures are disclosed on their respective websites.
21. While banks have historically generated high returns adding to Common Equity Tier 1,
banks report relatively thin margins above the MCR. With the planned implementation of the
countercyclical buffer, further analysis of pillar 2 processes is needed in addition to an
assessment of banks’ quality of capital to ensure longer-term stability.
22. Banks have typically reported low NPL ratios by cross country comparisons. The industry
NPL ratio decreased to 1.20 percent in mid-July 2022 as compared to 1.41 percent in mid-July
2021. Asset quality across the sector deteriorated only marginally during the COVID-19 period,
principally due to a suite of special measures implemented by the NRB helped support the sector
which alleviated pressure on NPL ratios. Discussions with banks suggest asset quality is
deteriorating owing to a confluence of factors including higher interest rates negatively impacting
loan serviceability. New guidelines have been implemented by the NRB on working capital loans

in an effort to reduce potential for evergreening of bank exposures. The new guidelines will likely
require a change in borrower behavior whereby facilities covered by the guidelines will need to
align with new limits and amortized to zero over a specific timeline. Consistent application of the
guidelines into bank policies and risk management systems will need to be closely monitored for
effective implementation.
23. Revision to regulations for problem loans and provisioning is underway and the transition
to IFRS9 is planned for 2023/24. Banks calculate provisions using the Nepal Financial
Reporting Standards (NFRS) as well as regulatory provisions based on a prescribed set of rates
as per loan classifications (Pass, watchlist, substandard, doubtful, and loss). The NRB has
adjusted the provisioning methodology including the ‘watchlist’ classification, and increasing
provisioning for ‘Pass’ loans from 1 percent to 1.3 percent. Onsite examinations have a strong
focus on loan classification and provisioning where files are sampled and evaluated. The NRB
requires adjustments to loan classifications as part of the process, and incorporates the outcome
of asset quality into the SREP. The transition to IFRS9 will involve expertise in estimating
probabilities of default (PD) and expected loss given default (LGD) for asset classes that may
require additional focus on systems, data, and expert knowledge of statistical modelling. A
comprehensive review of loan classifications, treatment of restructured loans and the loan loss
methodology, alongside the planned transition to IFRS9 is warranted to ensure provisioning is
accurate and conservative.
24. Credit risk is the largest risk in the system, yet some dimensions of the risk profile remain
opaque. Credit risk is overwhelmingly the largest share of RWAs followed by operational risk and
market risk. Credit risk from the real estate sector including owner-occupied mortgages,
investment-led mortgages, and commercial real estate (CRE) is evaluated by the NRB as
moderate. Most of the real estate sector loan is on an amortizing basis. Key risks related with
housing finance are fluctuation in price and changes in government policies (approval of plot
separation, classification of land, etc.).
25. Credit risk data submitted to the NRB does not capture credit risk by all dimensions. Credit
exposures are not reported by type (e.g., margin loan), by vintage (e.g., 2021), by LTV, by debt-to
income ratio, or by purpose (e.g., investment). Reporting is often based on stock rather than flow.
For example, there was high growth in margin lending during the first half of 2021, however,
credit data reported to the NRB was not able to breakdown aggregate data to a granular view of
underlying risk profile of that lending (e.g., volume of margin loans extended by a single bank
during a quarter at LTV, debt-to-service ratio and with collateral). The new SIS should help
develop reporting. However, at the time of the mission, more effort was needed to capture risk
information.
26. While banks have relatively simple structures, the absence of a consolidated supervision
framework constrains the full exercise of the NRB’s powers. Banks typically have limited
group-wide activities, and legal and ownership structures are not overly complex. The gaps in the
current regulatory framework, however, need to be filled by having explicit mention of
consolidated supervision in the regulations. A revision of the regulations should be accompanied
with an update of supervisory reporting requirements and supervisory manuals as well as staff
training.
27. The main operational risks faced by banks are related to misuse of technology and
fraudulent activities. Banks are increasingly adopting new technologies to deliver financial
services. In some instances, close to half of all transactions are delivered outside of the branch
channel (although significant geographical difference exists). Robust approaches to operational
risk management are needed, including contingency and disaster planning. Currently there are

only general requirements for operational risk including for business continuity planning and
disaster recovery (DR). Greater prescriptiveness in the requirements will help build overall risk
management and ensure larger more systemic banks are resilient to operational disruptions.
28. Nepal is highly vulnerable to climate-related financial risks. The country is subject to
significant and growing climate related shocks including landslides, floods, and storms. 2
Main Recommendations
29. The NRB is encouraged to enhance training programs to strengthen supervisory skills,
with a focus on adding risk specialists to banking supervision. Development of risk
specialists is needed to keep pace with the size, scale and complexity of banks and the banking
system. Specialist knowledge in the following areas are priorities: credit risk, liquidity risk, IT, and
provisioning. Examples of methods to strengthen supervisory skills include: (i) short-term
secondments to industry; (ii) short-term secondments with regional supervisors; (iii) supervisory
training manuals; (iv) succession planning; and (v) review rotation policy for banking supervision.
30. The NRB is recommended to develop analytical tools to enhance offsite surveillance and
forward-looking assessments of risk. Analytical tools will help optimize the data contained in
the SIS and support a focus on forward-looking assessments of risk and risk profile.
31. An assessment of liquidity regulations and supervisory processes is needed. The mission
recognizes that the NRB has made significant progress to strengthen the implementation of
monetary operations in a modernized framework. Nonetheless, if the arrangements for monetary
operation are not functioning appropriately, this may exacerbate liquidity risks for banks. Further
work to refine monetary operations is needed to alleviate liquidity risks. A focus on the liquidity
regulations and supervision processes include: (i) develop bank contingency funding plans; (ii)
undertake a quantitative assessment of the introduction of the LCR; and (iii) longer-term plans to
diversify bank sources of funding.
32. An assessment of the credit risk supervisory processes should target the following: (i) a
targeted review of bank credit policies and processes to support the consistent implementation of
the Working Capital Guideline; (ii) assess bank policies and processes and reporting of
connected lending exposures and lending to shareholders; and (iii) large exposures and risk
concentrations.
33. An assessment of regulations for problem assets and loan loss provisioning should
include: (i) loan classifications; (ii) treatment of restructured loans; (iii) engagement with
industry to identify challenges in implementing IFRS9; and (iv) undertake sensitivity analysis on
potential credit deterioration of revolving working capital loans to capture risks stemming from
evergreening practices and to ensure sufficient level of provisioning.
34. The NRB is recommended to implement a comprehensive framework for consolidated

supervision. Powers for the NRB to supervise on a consolidated basis will need to be integrated
into the primary legislation. The NRB is recommended to adopt a holistic approach to
implementing consolidated supervision that sequences the implementation of the new framework
which includes the following: (i) amend regulations with industry consultation and agreed
implementation timeline; (ii) training of Banking Supervision Department staff; (iii) update and
2See IMF (2023) Nepal: Staff Report for the 2023 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No.
23/158, May 4. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/05/04/Nepal-Staff-
Report-for-the-2023-Article-IV-Consultation-First-and-Second-Reviews-Under-the-533075

revision of supervisory manuals; (iv) review of reporting requirements to align with new
regulations; and (v) assessment of group structures to fully identify ultimate beneficial owners and
group-wide affiliates.
35. An assessment of the regulatory framework and supervisory processes for continuity
planning should revise the existing requirements for BCP and DR planning with a greater
level of prescription, especially for larger more systemic banks.
36. The NRB is encouraged to reconsider phasing out directed lending programs. It is
acknowledged the broader economic benefits of lending programs. Nonetheless, the primary role
of banking supervision should be the safety and soundness of banks and banking systems. The
setting of lending targets could cause unintended consequences. The NRB is encouraged to work
with stakeholders to consider alternative schemes to achieve the intended outcomes of the
programs.
37. The NRB should consider integrating climate-related financial risks into banking
supervision processes and bank stress testing.
B. STRESS TESTING
Baseline Diagnostics
38. Stress testing is a key analytical tool used in financial supervision and macro-financial
surveillance. Financial supervisors and central banks conduct stress tests to assess resilience of
financial institutions against severe but plausible shocks. The tests are typically run using both
the bottom-up approach, with banks calculating the impact of pre-defined shocks (micro stress
tests), and the top-down approach (macro stress test), where exposure data available at the
authority would be used and the authority would perform all the calculations.
39. The NRB conducts simple micro solvency and liquidity stress tests of banks at a quarterly
frequency since 2012, and MFIs are currently not stress tested. All three types of banks
(commercial banks, development banks, and finance companies) are included in this exercise,
which is run as single factor sensitivity analyses with a high number of simple prescribed
scenarios (in total about 30, most of them single factor scenarios), capturing credit risk (various
degrees of deterioration of loan quality leading to additional loan loss provisions), interest rate risk
(decrease in loan rates or increase in deposit rates impacting the net interest income), FX risk
(appreciation and depreciation of domestic currency against USD), equity price risk (revaluation
of stocks held by banks), and liquidity risk based on deposit withdrawals. The NRB has been
revising the stress tests over the past years, imposing additional shocks and scenarios, and plans
to bring on board additional small improvements in the near future (such as adding a reverse
stress test).
40. Results of the quarterly micro stress tests are used by the NRB, as well as by the
participating banks. In the NRB, the results are reflected in monitoring the risk profiles of the
individual banks, complementing the risk analysis by the traditional capital adequacy, assets,
management capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity indicators. Once a year, the results are
included in the annual Financial Stability Report and discussed at the Financial Stability Oversight
Committee. The participating banks need to discuss their results at a quarterly frequency at their
own risk committees and the bank board. They also include the NRB stress tests in their annual
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process exercise, sometimes complementing them with

additional stress test scenarios. As such, the exercise has contributed to establishing a stress
testing culture in the banking sector.
41. Credit risk calculation in the stress tests is based on valid prudential provisioning rules
for individual loan classes specified by the NRB. But not all possible migrations among the
loan classes are included in the exercise, and restructured loans are not explicitly captured. Also,
per NRB rules, the value of collateral behind the defaulted loans is not taken into account when
creating provisions. However, given the dominance of fully collateralized lending by commercial
banks, development banks, and finance companies, mostly against real estate, the institutions
are typically able to recover almost all defaulted exposures from seizing and foreclosing the
collateral ex post. Banks also calculate accounting provisions per NFRS, currently following the
IAS 39 incurred loss approach, but the current micro stress tests do not require banks to report
the results based on accounting provisions, as the NRB regulation specifies that the higher of the
prudential provisions and accounting provisions needs to be taken for the P&L and the regulatory
capital calculation (prudential provisions are higher). The credit risk scenarios also include the
concentration risk by assuming the top 2 borrowers to default and be moved directly to the worst
(loss) loan category. This is in line with best practices and presents a conservative approach.
42. Only the net interest income effect of changes in interest rates is captured in the current
micro stress tests. Government bonds and bills are held by banks till maturity in the amortized
cost category, without the need to reprice them. Secondary market for government bonds is
virtually non-existent, so it would be anyway very difficult for banks to mark to market as there is
no yield curve. Trading portfolios including additional (non-government) bonds and bills, and
potentially other instruments such as shares, mutual fund units, or derivatives are very small (the
size is limited by NRB rules).
43. Direct FX risk (FX revaluations) and equity price risk complement the market risk part of
the micro stress tests. Impact of both risks is typically small given the NRB regulations on net
FX open position (30 percent of capital), FX lending (which is allowed only to hedged borrowers),
and accepting FX retail and wholesale deposits. There is very little risk of the materialization of
the so-called “indirect FX risk”, i.e., FX-induced credit risk, in which borrowers with FX loans
would face a significant increase in debt service costs if the local currency depreciates against
US dollar. However, depreciation of local currency would have an indirect effect on the domestic-
currency value of the FX-denominated assets (such as nostro accounts abroad) included in the
calculation of RWAs, which is currently not included in the micro stress tests. Equity holdings are
relatively small, mostly composed of shares of microfinance companies (which are majority or
minority owned by some A-class banks to facilitate the NRB requirement to direct at least 5
percent of loan portfolios to lending to deprived sectors), insurance companies, and hydropower
firms. The stocks are typically part of the banking book (rather than trading book), but are marked
to market given the active trading at the country’s stock exchange.
44. Liquidity stress tests are based on various scenarios of deposit withdrawals. In most
cases, banks are impacted in terms of seeing their Net Liquid Assets (NLA) ratio declining below
the regulatory limit of 20 percent, but not becoming totally illiquid (i.e., with zero or negative NLA).
There is also one scenario that combines solvency and liquidity shock, assuming that top 2
interbank lending of each bank goes from performing to non-performing (loss) status, impacting
both solvency (credit losses) and liquidity (drop in NLA, as interbank loans are part of them).
45. While the current sensitivity-based micro stress tests are a good starting point, they
should be revised and enhanced to be more realistic and in line with best practices. First,
there are too many credit risk scenarios with shocks calibrated somewhat randomly, without a
clear ordering by the level of stress. It is very difficult to judge ex ante the stress level of the credit

risk scenarios, as currently there is no data that would enable comparing the assumed migration
rates with the observed migration rates. Second, the solvency stress tests are lacking an explicit
horizon over which the shocks materialize, and pre-provision income is not taken into account as
a first line of defense against shocks, muting their impact on regulatory capital. Third, for interest
rate shocks, the way the impact is calculated is not realistic in terms of the effects on banks’ net
interest income as most loans are provided at variable interest rates linked to the bank’s base
rates and thus banks can pass the increase in deposit rates almost fully onto the borrowers. On
the other hand, an increase in interest rate would typically bring some borrowers into default,
decreasing the interest-bearing assets and thus, indirectly (with the same net interest margin)
reducing the net interest income, which is not captured. Fourth, there is no haircut assumed for
the bonds and bills in the liquid assets, which is not realistic as the only way to get liquidity
against the bonds and bills is to repo them with the NRB or pledge them within the NRB marginal
lending facility, which applies a 10 percent haircut. Also, the funding shocks could be richer, with
various withdrawals by type of funding (different type of deposits such as retail versus wholesale,
current versus fixed deposits, and other funding such as debentures or interbank loans).
46. There are no macro (top-down) solvency, or liquidity stress tests conducted at the NRB.
So far, the NRB relies only on the quarterly micro stress tests to assess resilience of the financial
institutions and the banking system as a whole. While options were discussed during the last two
years to create a top-down solvency stress tests based on macroeconomic scenarios and a
satellite model for NPLs, no concrete steps have been taken yet.
47. No detailed intra-financial sector interconnectedness analyses and domino-type contagion

simulations are conducted at the NRB. Often, simulations of interbank contagion are an
integral component of macro stress tests, allowing the central bank to investigate second-round
effects of potential failures in the banking sector due to interbank exposures. Even if the NRB
restricts the interbank lending (the maturity can only be up to seven days, no long-term deposits
between banks are allowed), these short-term uncollateralized interbank loans do exist and the
NRB has the data about them at its disposal. Also, there are additional interlinkages with non-
bank financial institutions such as MFIs, insurance companies, purchase and hire companies, or
SACCOs that should be analyzed and the risk of contagion across the various segments of the
financial system assessed.
48. Top-down macro stress tests and interconnectedness analyses form part of macro-
financial surveillance that would be typically conducted at a regular frequency by a
dedicated financial stability unit. The central banks in most peer countries in the region have
already formed such units (India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Cambodia) charged with the responsibility
to (i) regularly monitor the development of systemic risk, financial sector trends, emerging risks
and vulnerabilities, and macro-financial imbalances, (ii) report to the higher management, and (iii)
provide policy recommendations, especially in the area of (macro-) prudential policy. They would
also publish an external Financial Stability Report, informing the public about the macro-financial
risk outlook and policy responses.
49. The NRB has a small financial stability unit within its Regulation Department that is
charged with preparing the annual Financial Stability Report, but a systematic and regular
system-wide monitoring of risks and vulnerabilities is missing. Also, the Financial Stability
Report currently serves more as a backward-looking summary of recent developments, with data
and inputs collected from various departments and agencies. It lacks a clearer up-to-date risk
outlook and forward-looking projections to help the policymakers and the public understand the
emerging risks that are building up in the financial system.

50. The NRB micro stress testing methodology and templates should be revised and made
more realistic in line with best practices. In the solvency part, the stress tests should turn into
a more realistic “projection exercise”, with a horizon of one year, where the banks consistently
project selected balance sheet, P&L, and capital adequacy items under stress. The exercise
should only use a limited number of scenarios (say 3 to 5) that would all combine credit risk
(deterioration of loan quality via migrations) and market risk (an increase in interest rate,
exchange rate depreciation, and drop in stock prices), and could be easily ordered by the level of
stress (e.g., mild/moderate/severe). This combination of shocks typically represents a consistent
adverse scenario for emerging markets.
51. Credit risk shock in all scenarios should be defined as a simultaneous deterioration of
loan quality across all loan classes. This is a more realistic representation of the development
of the loan portfolios during distress, rather than testing the isolated impact of individual
transitions. Working with the whole migration matrix would have a positive side-effect in moving
banks to use such an approach in their own analyses and stress tests, helping them understand
the dynamics of credit risk materialization in the loan portfolios, and prepare for the transition to
the IFRS 9 expected credit loss modelling. At the same time, micro stress tests would continue
using the prudential provisioning rules, even after the introduction of IFRS 9 in 2024/25 as the
NRB plans to keep them. The calibration of stressed credit migration matrices would need to be
based on the analysis of observed migration rates, which requires historical data on loan
migrations. These could be received from the CIB or collected ad-hoc from banks. Also, banks
would start reporting in each stress test round their last own migration rates on pre-specified
portfolios over the past year or two, providing the individual banks with comparison of the
stressed values and their own observed values and the NRB with additional information not
available in regular reporting.
52. The calculation of the impact on net interest income would need to be more realistic. The
estimates of the effect would need to consider the base rate mechanism, and the usual risk
premia charged for the borrowers, but it should also reflect the existing time lag between the
increase in funding costs and the base rate/loan rate changes. Also, for consistency, the new
NPLs would lower the interest-bearing assets, decreasing the net interest income even when the
net interest margin (spread between funding costs and loan rates) remains the same.
53. The impact of credit risk, interest rate, FX and equity price shocks would impact regulatory
capital though projections of net income. Loan loss provisions, net interest income, FX
revaluation, and losses from equity holdings would need to be complemented by projections of
other key P&L items such as non-interest income (fees & commissions, etc.) and other operating
expenses (administrative costs, etc.) to arrive at the final gross and net (after tax) income. These
additional projections would be guided by pre-set parameters (e.g., the administrative costs could
be equal to the last year, non-interest income could be slightly decreased in the stress scenarios).
As net income is a part of core regulatory capital, the net income projections would automatically
impact the capital. This approach is more realistic than the current approach of a simple
deduction of the impact of the shock from capital.
54. The end-horizon risk weighted assets would be calculated consistently with the existing
NRB rules. The credit portfolios would be split into the performing and non-performing parts,
whereby the non-performing exposures net of provisions would be assigned the elevated risk
weights (150 percent for real-estate loans and other loans). In many cases, this would lead to an
increase in RWAs or a smaller decrease in RWAs compared to the current approach, especially if
the portfolios are also split by the starting risk weight capturing whether they are real estate loans

or not. In addition, the depreciation of local currency would increase the part of RWAs
denominated in FX, putting additional pressure on the final capital adequacy ratio.
55. The revised and more realistic projection-oriented supervisory stress tests would enhance
the quality of the supervisory review process and have a positive knock-on effect on
banks’ own stress tests. The projection-oriented stress tests results could be discussed jointly
with the banks’ business plans, comparing the outcomes under most probable developments
(business plan) and stressed conditions (the various stress scenarios). Banks should be explicitly
encouraged to not only use the revised NRB micro stress test scenarios, but also build their own
additional scenarios, implementing them in the NRB methodology and templates, or even going
beyond the NRB approach in terms of complexity.
56. The NRB could use the micro stress test results to calibrate additional capital charges for
banks within the Pillar 2. Many countries opt for using the estimated losses as information to
guide the calibration for additional capital on top of the minimum capital adequacy. The NRB
could, for example, require that banks are able to survive the mild or even the moderate stress
scenarios and set Pillar 2 buffers accordingly.
57. The micro stress tests of liquidity would benefit from a few small adjustments. First, adding
a haircut on government bills and bonds would be desirable to reflect the current rules for liquidity
provision by the NRB within its facilities. Second, adding an explicit time horizon for the deposit
withdrawal scenarios would provide for additional information about banks’ liquidity risk. In
particular, these scenarios could be specified as deposit withdrawal rate per day, which would
allow the construction of additional metrics of a survival horizon. Third, differentiating between
different types of deposits (current versus fixed, retail versus wholesale), stressing other sources
of funding (maturing debentures, interbank loans), and adding the shock from off-balance sheet
(commitments turning into loans), can be also included. Additional adjustment might be desirable
in the medium term after the implementation of the LCR, which will bring a much richer data
environment for assessing the liquidity risk and resilience of banks against liquidity and funding
shocks.
58. MFIs should be also included in the micro stress tests of solvency and liquidity on a
proportionate basis. The sector of MFIs is as large as the sector of development banks (both
account for about 8 percent of total loans of all financial institutions involved in lending; see
Introduction). Solvency stress tests for MFIs should be based on the consistent projections
approach (projecting provisions, net income, RWAs and capital over a 1-year horizon) and use
the same scenarios as banks, but the methodology and templates could be simplified to reflect
specifics and the regulatory framework of this segment. A sequential approach would be the best
strategy of implementation, starting with the largest MFIs first and extending it to more (or even
all) MFIs at a later stage as a part of the planned move to the risk-based supervision in this
financial sector segment.
59. In addition to revising the micro stress tests, the NRB should develop its own top-down
macro solvency stress test. A state-of-the-art solvency framework based on alternative
macroeconomic scenarios, credit risk satellite models, explicit assumptions about the pre-
provision income, and consistent projection of banks’ balance sheet and profit & loss items ideally
over a 3-year horizon should be built. The exercise would offer value added over the micro stress
tests in linking the macroeconomic developments with the credit risk parameters and in providing
projections for a longer horizon, allowing for lagged and cumulative effects of adverse macro-
financial developments on banks’ profitability and solvency. As such, it would help to calibrate
prudential policies and enhance macro-financial surveillance. All supervised banks and financial
institutions including MFIs should be included in the macro stress tests.

60. The NRB Research Department should be involved in the calibration of the
macroeconomic scenarios. The modelling team is upgrading its macroeconomic projection
models and will be over time able to provide projections of key macro-financial variables and help
with estimating the satellite credit risk models. In contrast to the micro stress tests, the top-down
macro stress tests would also use a “baseline” macroeconomic scenario capturing probable
macro-financial developments alongside several calibrated stress (adverse) scenarios, providing
for a risk outlook and facilitating a discussion about expected developments.
61. A longer projection horizon of macro stress tests allows for additional analyses not
available in the micro stress tests. In particular, the realization of collateral behind the
defaulted loans could be explicitly captured, as banks are typically able to recover their credit
losses by selling collateral within the next 1–2 years. The macro scenarios could include
assumptions about the real estate market, capturing a potential property market correction that
would decrease the value of land and buildings and thus the recovery rates.
62. The implementation of IFRS 9/NFRS 9 in Nepal in the fiscal year 2024/25 offers an
opportunity for the NRB to collect relevant credit risk parameters to be used in the top-
down stress tests. Once the NFRS 9 is introduced, the NRB should start compiling historically
consistent time series of PD and LGD from all banks, by loan categories, to facilitate future
advancement to a fully-fledged macro-scenario-based top-down stress test where the PDs and
LGDs—rather than NPL ratios—are modeled as a function of macro-financial variables.
63. The macro stress test should include a block to analyze interconnectedness among
financial institutions and allow for domino-type contagion effects. This will allow the
investigation of the second-round impact of potential failures in the financial or banking sector due
to inter-institutions exposures. While the contagion block would in the first version focus on
interbank exposures only, over time, additional interlinkages with non-bank financial institutions
such as micro-finance institutions, insurance companies, purchase and hire companies, or credit
cooperatives should be added.
64. Macro stress test of liquidity can be developed after the implementation of the LCR.
Currently, given the data available at the NRB, running a top-down liquidity stress test in parallel
to the micro stress tests would not bring any additional value added. Once the LCR is
implemented though, a new top-down liquidity stress test could be developed with a cash-flow
based approach using the very granular LCR-reported exposure and cash flow data. However,
the value added of such exercise needs to be discussed, especially if the micro stress tests of
liquidity will also be further revised to be based on LCR data.
65. To enhance the macro-financial surveillance of risks and vulnerabilities in the Nepali
financial sector, of which the macro stress testing and interconnectedness analyses are
an important component, the role, staffing and capacity of the existing financial stability
unit should be strengthened. The unit should be newly charged with regular monitoring of the
development of systemic risk, financial sector trends, and macro-financial vulnerabilities,
reporting internally in quarterly frequency and being involved in proposing and discussing
prudential policies. It would continue to be responsible for writing the annual Financial Stability
Report but would aim at improving the level of the analysis from the current backward-looking
summary of recent developments towards a risk-oriented forward-looking projections to help the
policymakers and the general public understand the evolving risks and policy responses.
C. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

66. The review focused on effective banking resolution and crisis management, and early
intervention procedures. It reviewed the plans for establishing recovery planning requirements
and enhancing resolution options against the existing frameworks, and applicable provisions of
the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) KA for Financial Institutions as appropriate for developing
countries. The review also included an assessment of financial safety nets, particularly ELA by
the NRB, and arrangements for depositor protection. The mission’s review also looked at the
arrangements in place for resolving a failing bank, together with domestic coordination
arrangements. Although the mission did not formally assess compliance using the approved
assessment methodology, the framework still has significant gaps vis-à-vis the FSB’s KAs and
the International Association of Deposit Insurers Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance
Systems.
67. The recent legislative amendments to the Nepal Rastra Bank Act (NRB Act) have
contributed to the broadening of the resolution toolkit, but significant gaps remain. There
is, in general, a lack of sufficiently detailed operational plans for implementation of resolution and
some of the laws, by-laws, and regulations need stronger alignment. For example, the liquidation
triggers and processes (including the appointment of liquidators) in the recently amended NRB
Act need better alignment with the Banking and Financial Institutions Act. The Problem Bank
Resolution Framework, made available by the World Bank TA, is also not synchronized with
existing legislation. No resolution simulation exercise has been undertaken to test authorities'
preparedness and inter-agency cooperation.
68. The laws do not assign a clear mandate to the NRB as resolution authority, although it is
clear in substance that this is one of the NRB's responsibilities. The resolution powers in
Nepal are provided to the NRB under the same legislation as for their respective broader
functions and the supervisory responsibilities for problem banks are operationally not separated
from day-to-day supervision. The NRB Act provides reasonably comprehensive powers for
resolution, but there are numerous gaps, including a lack of clear resolution objectives, no group
resolution powers, and no explicit powers for bail-in. The lack of “no-creditor-worse-off” (NCWO)
safeguards and uncertain creditor hierarchy may complicate resolution further. Legal protection
for the NRB, its directors and staff, and any agents engaged by it for resolution purposes are
missing.
69. Legislation grants the NRB relatively strong powers to direct banks to take corrective
actions. Such powers could be used to facilitate the resolution of a bank while it is under private
control. The NRB Act allows, inter alia, to order a recapitalization or to remove or replace
directors and officers. The NRB may appoint an “officer” to any problematic bank or take over the
management by itself. However, as already pointed out in the 2014 FSAP 3, the effectiveness of
the existing framework for restructuring a bank under official controls is not ensured. In particular,
the NRB Act has complicated procedural requirements for each step of the official controls,
including the requirements to hold hearings before placing an official or 30-day notice for reducing
capital.
70. The current resolution framework in Nepal is based on resolving a going concern bank
under a special administration regime providing the NRB with relatively broad powers. It
3 Technical Note on Bank Resolution and Crisis Management, unpublished.

provides for a broad range of resolution tools, including the newly established bridge bank tool.
Bank liquidation tool (court-based) is described in the Bank and Financial Institution Act.
71. The financial sector safety net is still largely undeveloped. The DCGF in Nepal provides both
deposit insurance coverage and credit guarantee services to member banks, although the two
funds are kept separately. While the very recent Deposit and Credit Guarantee Regulation Act
provides additional functions to the DCGF, the new framework remains largely underdeveloped
and inoperative. The NRB also needs to further refine its ELA policies and procedures.
72. Nepal has a high-level Coordination Committee (CC) to discuss matters related to
economic developments. The CC is led by the Minister of Finance and has the NRB Deputy
Governor, the Heads of the Securities Exchange and the Insurance Board as members.
However, it meets on an ad hoc basis and has no supporting legislation or other formalized rules.
The CC has not discussed crisis management related issues. Also, the MOF has so far been
absent from formulating crisis preparedness matters, and there is no guidance prepared for the
government’s potential role in bank resolution and providing backstop for the DCGF or
indemnities for ELA.
73. Nepal has seen two failures of licensed financial institutions in the last ten years, which
were contained to category ‘C’ banks. 12 licensed financial institutions have been declared
problematic (including 10 category ‘C’ banks and 2 category ‘B’ banks), but most of them have
recovered. Only 1 bank failure has led to deposit payouts by the DCGF. In addition, the NRB has
encouraged consolidation and mergers through a moratorium on category A, B, and C licenses
and moral suasion. The same approach has been taken vis-a-vis the problematic financial
institutions, most of which have been kept operating as “problem banks” while the NRB was
looking for new investors.
74. The Key Attributes stress the importance of a clearly defined mandate for a resolution
authority and legal protection. In line with international best practice, the FSSR recommends
the inclusion of more tangible and granular objectives and principles into the NRB Act. These
should include, but not be limited to: (i) maintaining continuity of critical functions in the case of
resolving systemically important banks; (ii) the use of public (government) support as a last
resort; and (iii) the principle of private loss absorption and the lesser cost than liquidation test.
Explicit mention of resolution objectives will help the NRB to guide and justify actions taken in the
individual case, including with a view to limit potential litigation risk and provide justification for the
review by the court.
75. The NRB would gain from an enhancement of the current risk assessment framework. The
risk assessment should be more forward-looking than is currently the case, with a more
structured link between the assessed risk of a bank and the scale of supervisory attention it
receives. There is a need to ensure the availability of adequate and timely supervisory data,
updating the regulatory framework to better capture various risks. The off-site monitoring of banks
should rely on a more comprehensive set of data and early warning indicators for risk
assessment purposes. Stress testing, although improved and institutionalized, is still at an early
stage of development, relies on single factor sensitivity analyses, and has not progressed to the
point where it is a useful mechanism for informing supervisors of emerging risks, potential
vulnerabilities, or for calibration of prudential requirements.
76. In addition to the earlier detection of bank stress, the NRB internal processes should also
allow timely intervention measures. The Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework should

provide for more specific and structured guidance via clear escalation processes under and
between various states of distress and early interventions (in addition to those provided for capital
shortfall). In order for PCAs to be effective, they should be carried out in a fast and efficient
manner, but several provisions in the NRB Act may lead to significant delays in addressing
deficiencies which may aggravate the underlying problems, cause additional costs to the creditors
and, in the worst case, endanger the stability of the entire system. It is also advised to use the
temporary administrator tools sparingly and keep the mandate short, preferably expiring within six
months (or one year with an extension). It is also important to clearly distinguish between the
banks which have failed or are likely to fail, from institutions still at various stages of distress
which could be addressed and mitigated.
77. The NRB should start working on establishing recovery planning requirements. Although
the recovery plans are to be prepared by the banks, the requirements should be based on
guidance developed by the NRB. The recovery planning requirement should be initially
introduced for systemically relevant banks. Over time, the recovery plans should be made
mandatory for all banks and other institutions supervised by the NRB. The regulations for
recovery planning should specify the minimum trigger points for invoking the plan and for specific
actions in the plan while recognizing that recovery triggers and options are to be tailored to the
banks’ specificities and determined by the banks. The guidance should require banks to prepare
recovery plans for two categories of scenarios: idiosyncratic shocks (in which just the bank in
question has sustained impacts to its capital and liquidity, and the banking system is sound); and
systemic shocks.
78. It is necessary for the NRB to develop comprehensive policies and processes (resolution
plans) for how it would seek to resolve a bank, starting with larger institutions. A resolution
plan is a comprehensive document that details the characteristics of an institution and describes
the preferred resolution strategy for that institution, including which resolution tools to apply. It
runs parallel with a resolvability assessment of the institution. The purpose of the resolvability
assessment is to identify and address any impediments to the resolution of the institution, and to
ensure that it has a sufficient level of loss-absorbing capacity in place. The recovery and
resolution framework should eventually provide the NRB with powers to pre-position the
supervised institutions, in order to improve their resolvability and to speed up the resolution
process. The recovery and resolution planning should form part of an iterative process by which
resolvability assessments can inform resolution plans and test their feasibility.
79. While the revised NRB Act provides broader options for bank resolution, the provided
tools and procedures should be substantially streamlined and clarified. Most importantly,
the new powers to create a bridge bank or conducting a purchase and assumption (P&A)
transaction lack in-depth coverage in the current legal framework. The banks under resolution are
prohibited to accept deposits and extend credit, which may undercut the bank’s ability to generate
further revenues, undermining its financial standing as a going concern institution. The purpose of
discussing creditor’s hierarchy and compensation (e.g., sequencing priority payments) under
resolution (before liquidation) is also unclear. The current resolution toolkit could also benefit from
strengthening the good-bad asset separation power as transfer of non-core assets to a special
asset management company may be an adequate tool in extraordinary circumstances. The NRB
should use its broad resolution powers to trigger the special administration at a sufficiently early
stage to restructure a bank in going concern under public controls.
80. The NRB should invest more resources in preparing resolution manuals for all available
resolution tools. As the new resolution tools are now instituted, they need to be operationalized
given the legal complexities involved. The resolution authority should also carefully consider
applying multiple resolution options. Bridge banks should be considered during the time of

systemic crisis, but it could be also relevant for small bank resolution, especially in case of the
failure of several smaller banks. The modalities for funding resolutions by the deposit guarantee
fund and the government (in the case of a bridge bank) should be also prepared. Over longer
time, it will be important to build into the system features that will ensure that banks bear the
costs of their own failures through an increase in the loss absorbing capacity (in the form of
contractual bail-in instruments).
81. The current resolution framework would benefit from a single, more elaborated creditors’
hierarchy for different types of bank creditors to provide for clear and efficient resolution
rules. This would, inter alia, also facilitate applying certain resolution options, e.g., bridge bank or
P&A transactions. In particular, there is a need to introduce the NCWO principle. An explicit pari
passu provision in treating creditors is also strongly recommended to strengthen property rights.
As creditors (after shareholders), should be first to face a loss in bank resolution in accordance
with the liquidation hierarchy and before any formal support, the NCWO principle should be
introduced as a legal safeguard in any future legislative amendments. The NCWO principle
ensures that no shareholder or creditor faces higher losses than under the hypothetical liquidation
counterfactual; or if they do, they will have the right to compensation.
82. Although the adoption of NRB regulations on Lender of Last Resort was a significant
improvement, further progress is needed. Most importantly, central banks should provide ELA
only to solvent institutions which are expected to remain adequately capitalized in the foreseeable
future. Therefore, ELA procedures in Nepal should better incorporate reliable solvency, viability
and capital assessments processes and the language in the NRB Act and in the regulation should
be made clearer in this regard. It is therefore critical for the NRB to have up-to-date bank financial
granular data in the shortest time-frame possible to assess the basis for granting ELA. It is also
recommended that the ELA policies and processes create a separation within the NRB between
those responsible for making an assessment of bank capital, liquidity and viability, on the one
hand, and those responsible for advising the NRB board on whether to provide ELA and, if so, the
terms on which it should be provided, on the other. As to the latter, the law should be clearer that
ELA is provided at a penalty rate, preferably reflected as a margin above the main lending rate.
There is also room to expand the collateral list for ELA.
83. The authorities should consider an option where banks in resolution may also be
considered eligible for ELA, when experiencing temporary liquidity problems. A bank
that is going to be resolved and recapitalized (via bail-in instituted by the authorities,
and/or, as a very last resort, public support) will most probably satisfy the criterion of
forward-looking solvency. This consideration should be based on time-criticality of a resolution
process, but it is also important to maintain the legal requirement to grant liquidity only to solvent
banks. In this context, the NRB may consider bank solvency at the moment a decision is made to
recapitalize and restore the bank’s solvency. However, ELA should not be given to the (insolvent)
entity in liquidation as currently foreseen in regulations.
84. The DCGF is still at a very nascent stage. Although the recently introduced new law provides
the option to use DCGF resources for funding P&A, the modalities in the law are very vague and
insufficient for these purposes. There is also no clear view in terms of deposit coverage; for
instance, regarding the share of deposits fully covered by the current coverage limit (NPR
500,000 or about USD 8,000). The eligibility of a depositor and of each deposit product for
deposit insurance protection is still assessed manually, impeding the efforts for a timely and
efficient payout. The authorities should also consider separating institutionally the deposit
guarantee functions from those of credit guarantee given the minimal overlap of the respective
mandates, and to strengthen the focus on systemically important functions.

85. More needs to be done to ensure that the authorities, including the MOF and DCGF, are
well positioned to resolve a systemically important bank or to address a systemic banking
crisis. The current resolution framework and interagency cooperation modalities are not suitable
for addressing a failure of a large bank with systemic implications.
86. The high-level CC should be formalized. The mission recommends that a subcommittee be
established under the CC to focus solely on systemic financial crises related matters. The
subcommittee could be led by a high-level NRB official and would provide support for CC work on
crisis management, including by preparing nation-wide contingency planning based on agency-
wide contingency plans. The CC sub-committee should also include the representatives of the
DCGF. Based on the subcommittee recommendations, the CC could decide, for instance,
whether a particular event represents a systemic crisis, and only then should the exceptional
provisions, related only to systemic events, be applied by the respective institutions under the
terms and conditions prescribed by the legislation.
87. It is essential that there be close coordination between the NRB and MOF in responding to
a bank distress or failure situation. MOF involvement is critical at all stages of systemic
financial crisis. The absence of dialogue on financial stability and crisis management, including
through structured cooperation processes, constrains the ability of the two agencies to effectively
coordinate either the promotion of financial stability in normal times or manage a financial crisis in
periods of instability. It is suggested that the NRB and MOF establish a Memorandum of
Understanding that sets out their respective responsibilities in responding to a banking distress or
failure situation. Although the MOF will take the lead, NRB regulations and internal procedures
are needed to specify how the powers will be used. In particular, strong safeguards are needed
before public funds are used, including ensuring that existing shareholders bear the first loss.
88. The NRB should consider reinstituting a Problem Bank Resolution Unit. A small, cross-
departmental unit consisting of some (two or three) legal and financial sector experts could
benefit the NRB in operationalizing the relevant laws and guidelines. A small, specialized unit
could also serve as an operational nucleus which could be expanded as needed in case of an
emerging systemic threat.
89. Also, legal protection for resolution purposes should be enshrined in the NRB Act. Legal
protection should extend to the NRB, members of the NRB Board, NRB staff, and persons or
entities engaged by the NRB for matters relating to resolution, such that they are immunized from
liability and indemnified for legal costs, provided that any actions taken were in accordance with
the powers conferred upon them by the NRB Act, and they acted in good faith.
D. PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Strengthen legal framework and oversight function
90. Nepal has made significant progress in modernizing its payment systems since
formulating its Payment System Development Strategy in 2014. Today, the NRB performs
the role of an overseer, operator, and catalyst of payment systems. The legal basis for the
oversight and development of national payment systems in the country is provided by the
Payment and Settlement (PS) Act 2019, Payment and Settlement Bylaw 2020, Payment Systems
Inspection and Supervision Bylaw 2021, and Licensing Policy for Payment Related Institutions
2016. The NRB has also implemented a RTGS system in 2019, instead of relying on semi-

automated entries to the General Ledger (GL) system for settling inter-bank payments. The retail
payment landscape has undergone significant transformation in the last few years, including the
introduction of instant payment systems (connectIPS, IPS), Mobile Banking, Internet Banking,
Wallets, and QR Code among others. The National Clearing House Limited (NCHL) operates key
retail payment systems including check clearing and IPS. A national blueprint Digital Nepal
Framework (2019) also serves as a reference for the NRB's policies, regulations, and strategies
for payment systems.
91. Notwithstanding the reforms, there are critical gaps in the legal framework and oversight
function. Provisions for finality and netting enforceability of transactions in the Payment Systems
and Settlement Act, appear not to be given precedence over insolvency laws, or address zero-
hour rules. This creates legal uncertainty of settlement and risks systemic disruption to the
payment system if a participant becomes insolvent.
92. The Payment Systems Department (PSD) is understaffed, and the organizational
arrangement creates opportunities for conflicts of interest in the oversight and operations,
as well as the NRB’s role in NCHL. PSD’s oversight unit is responsible for the supervision of 37
payment system operators (PSO) and PSPs, but there are inadequate skilled resources, with the
most experienced staff having less than 3 years in payment systems oversight. The NRB has a
rotation policy where staff gets rotated out every 2–3 years, except for the IT Department. As a
result, at the department level, PSD is understaffed, with 5 unfilled positions. While the oversight
and RTGS operator functions are performed by different units in PSD, the separation would not
sufficiently address conflicts of interest. The working arrangements among the PSD and other
operational departments for the RTGS system have also not been formalized and documented.
This could lead to ambiguity in roles and responsibilities, and gaps in complying with international
standards and the NRB’s oversight obligations. The NRB noted that a RTGS User Manual and a
document describing work division and responsibilities have been in place. Further, the NRB is a
10 percent shareholder, and its Executive Director (ED, Banking Department) is the chairman of
NCHL which operates retail payment systems that competes with commercial payment systems
operators. 4 While the objective of its involvement in NCHL is to ensure safe and efficient payment
systems at low costs, it puts the NRB in a potential conflict-of-interest position as overseer of
payment systems.
93. The NRB should strengthen its legal framework and oversight function. It is
recommended to:
 Review the legal framework to identify and address gaps in the provisions, including
those related to the finality and irrevocability of transactions settled through payment
systems. The assessment should try to determine whether the Act gives a high degree of legal
certainty of finality and irrevocability of transactions settled through payment systems (e.g.,
investigate whether when a court orders for the bankruptcy or winding up of a participant, its
payment or netting obligations would be disregarded). It should also address zero-hour rules
and netting should be enforceable, among others. The assessment should fully consider the
relevant principles of the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems- International
4 According to NRB Act 2022, Section 7 (2)(a), NRB can provide loan to and invest in the shares of the
institutions which carry out the functions helpful in carrying out the function of the NRB or in attaining its
objectives, not exceeding ten percent of the total capital of such institutions.

Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure
(PFMI).
 Fill the five vacancies in PSD immediately, either by rotation or external hiring or their
combination. Existing and new staff should be sent for training on the PFMI. In the longer
term, PSD should work with HR Department to limit the number and frequency of rotation of
specialist staff in payment systems, and plan for succession before rotating staff out, to ensure
continuity.
 Publish English versions of all key laws, regulations, and directives even though some
are already in English. This will promote accurate understanding of the rules, procedures, and
risks of participating in the payment systems, among BFIs and potential investors.
 Separate the oversight and operator function at the ED level or higher and formalize
internal arrangements for RTGS. The separation will deconflict PSD in its oversight and
operator roles. Internal working arrangement for RTGS should be formalized and should
include reporting requirements for Operations Unit, supervision by Oversight Unit and roles of
internal audit, risk management and any other relevant departments in the RTGS system
should be defined.
 Consider divesting the shareholding and relinquishing chairmanship in NCHL. The NRB
could instead use moral suasion, or its oversight powers vested by the PS Act to achieve the
desired policy outcome.
Designate systemically important payment systems and adopt PFMI
94. The NRB has been supervising payment systems and guided them to observe the PFMI
but have not formally identified and designated systemically important payment systems
in Nepal. As a result, these payment systems are not subject to the higher international risk-
management standards, PFMI. Self-assessments for payment systems have not been conducted
nor disclosure frameworks (DF) been published for any payment systems. The NRB intends to
develop a framework for the designation of systemically important payment systems by the fiscal
year ending July 2023. While the NRB intends to designate the RTGS system, Electronic Cheque
Clearing (ECC), and connectIPS, it is unsure about FonePay (an instant payment system) or
credit and debit card systems. The NRB has also not established whether its RTGS foreign
currency settlement should be subject to cooperative oversight.
95. The NRB should formally adopt and apply the PFMI to systemically important payment
systems. 5 It is recommended to:
 Develop Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) designation framework. The criteria used for
identifying systemically important payment systems should be consistent with the definition in
PFMI. Designation of the systems should follow immediately.
 Formally adopt PFMI. This should be done through regulations or directives that apply all the
principles to designated systems.
 Conduct self-assessments against PFMI and publish DF. These should be done for the
NRB’s RTGS Operations Unit, and all designated payment systems, such as ECC and
5 The NRB PSD has included these items in the action plan of FY 2022/23.

connectIPS operated by NCHL. The oversight unit should review these self-assessments, and
ensure the DF is published at least once every two years. In addition, it should assess itself
against the authorities’ responsibilities in the PFMI.
 Establish whether there is a need for cooperative oversight with other payment system
regulator for the foreign currencies settled through RTGS system. The NRB should start
by informing the relevant authorities in line with Responsibility E Key Consideration 2 for its
multi-currency RTGS.
Enhance RTGS system and increase utilization
96. The RTGS system currently does not support fully automated Intraday Liquidity Facilities
(ILF), and is not fully utilized to support the growth of the banking and capital market
sectors. While the RTGS system has operated since 2019, the NRB continues to settle
payments between banks for high-value checks (above NPR 300 million) via the GL system,
suggesting that settlement risks remain. The main reason for this is that many government
agencies prefer to use checks, and do not have processes and mechanisms to use RTGS
services, nor do they have direct RTGS access. Also, some BFIs who are not direct participants
prefer to continue the practice of using checks for settlement via GL transfers at the central bank,
instead of investing in new processes or mechanism to utilize RTGS services. At the time of the
mission, the figures of GL transfers appeared relatively large, but could not be confirmed by the
NRB. While the RTGS supports automated ILF, it has not been utilized yet because of the
absence of an automated and dematerialized collateral management system. Full automation of
the ILF can be implemented only when government securities needed as collateral for liquidity
provision has been dematerialized. The Public Debt Management Office (PDMO) of the MOF,
responsible for management of government securities is embarking on a Debt Operations
Management System (DOMS) that will make securities electronic. This could take up to two
years.
97. The NRB has published the RTGS System Rules describing the design and procedures of
the system, but gaps remain. The RTGS system settles Nepalese rupee, US dollar, euro,
British pound, and yen payments transactions. 6 While some of the settlement rules for the foreign
currencies can be implied from the rules for Nepalese rupee, they may not have clearly and
adequately addressed foreign currencies settlement. For example, it can be inferred that ILF does
not apply to foreign currencies, whose accounts need pre-funding. But there is no description of
how participants should manage intraday liquidity if they face a shortage of foreign currencies for
settlement. As a result, participants may not be comprehensively informed of the design,
operation, and risk of foreign currency settlement in the RTGS system.
98. The NRB should enhance RTGS system and increase its utilization by banks. It is
recommended to:
 Increase utilization of the RTGS for interbank payments. The NRB should consider
measures that discourage the use of the GL system for transfers between banks as it increases
operational, liquidity and settlement risks. Measures could include mandating that high-value
6 The NRB noted that there is no cross-border settlement of foreign currency in the RTGS system. RTGS
settlement for foreign currency only takes place among domestic BFIs.

payments must be settled through RTGS instead of via checks and GL transfer, with the goal of
eliminating them.
 Expedite the dematerialization of government securities to facilitate the full automation
of the intraday liquidity facility available to participants. The NRB should work with PDMO
to accelerate the de-materialization of government securities and complete the DOMS project
as soon as possible. It should also start to plan and design to integrate or interface with DOMS
to achieve delivery-vs-payment to reduce lead time.
 The NRB should review the RTGS Rules document and enhance the description of the
design and operations of the RTGS for foreign currencies. The scope should include
specific details on the settlement process, queuing, gridlock resolution, liquidity facilities,
operational timings, among others, that may apply to foreign currencies or otherwise. The NRB
should continue to monitor growth in foreign currency and have plans for intraday liquidity risk
management.
Improve operational and cyber resilience
99. The NRB issues the IT Security directive to PSP and PSOs and updates them on a regular
basis. The latest directive was issued in 2022 and contain cyber security and resilience.
However, it does not sufficiently cover specific cyber resilience requirements, such as the need
for cyber resilience framework, governance, cyber response, and recovery plans to meet the 2-
hour recovery time objective (RTO), specific cyber testing with key service providers, among
others. The NRB plans to issue a specific cyber resilience directive that is aligned with the
Guidance on Cyber Resilience for FMI by the fiscal year ending July 2023.
100. The NRB has cyber security policies in place and has issued strategies related to
cyber-security for the Central Bank. It will implement Cybersecurity Info Sharing platform in the
fiscal year 2022/23, Financial section CERT in 2022/23 and securities operations sector in
2024/25. A Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) has been appointed in July 2022 to oversee
the NRB’s information, cyber and technology security, but he does not have a dedicated team.
Instead, he taps on Info-security Unit of the Information Technology Department (ITD), who do
not have direct reporting to him. Furthermore, the CISO is also heading the new Financial
Inclusion unit of the NRB formed also around July 2022.
101. The NRB is temporarily occupying annex buildings as the main central bank
building is undergoing repair following the 2015 earthquake. The mission team conducted its
meetings with the NRB in these buildings, which have security officers in the premises. However,
an IT asset was seen to be installed and operating in open areas of one of these buildings. This
exposes the network and systems of the NRB to the risk of sabotage and unauthorized access.
102. In its supervision, PSD relies on ITD staff to assess the PSP/PSOs’ cybersecurity
and IT risk management against the NRB’s security-related directives. The ITD staff
assigned for inspections usually have limited or no IT audit experience, and may have conflicting
ITD duties at the same time, raising concerns that assessments are not competently conducted.
With no professional qualification or experience relating to IT risk management, the ITD staff may
be challenged by the PSOs/PSPs, and the NRB may suffer supervisory reputation damage for
not being able to assert authority in this specialized area.
103. Cybersecurity incidents are increasing in Nepal, and there had been recent
successful attacks on a bank’s SWIFT system and a payment switch. Banks are now
required to comply with the SWIFT Customer Security Program (CSP), an attestation of

compliance to a security controls framework. The NRB’s RTGS system does not rely on SWIFT
network, instead the RTGS communication is based on VPN using a CA/PKI security
infrastructure. However, there is no requirement for participants of the RTGS system to comply
with an equivalent CSP. The NRB has also not conducted any assessment on the risk of
wholesale payments fraud related to endpoint security for its RTGS system.
104. While DR arrangements are in place for RTGS system, there are no BCM and plans.
Bank participants are subject to business continuity requirements and have conducted drills for
their RTGS front-end systems. However, the RTGS system itself has not conducted any drills. At
the enterprise-level, the NRB’s BCM Committee is overseeing the development of a BCM
framework and expects its completion in fiscal year ending July 2023.
105. The NRB should improve the cybersecurity and operational resilience of key
payment systems, including RTGS system, the NRB and participants. It is recommended to:
 Ensure cyber resilience guidelines being drafted are aligned with the CPMI-IOSCO
Guidance on Cyber Resilience for FMI before issuing them. The guidelines should also be
issued by other supervisory departments to their regulated entities.
 Have a dedicated team of information and cyber security officers with direct reporting to
CISO. This will assist the CISO in executing the NRB’s cyber strategy and completing the major
cyber initiatives in a timely manner.
 Review the physical security of its systems and network infrastructure to identify any
weak links. The NRB should have comprehensive physical security policies that address all
potential vulnerabilities and threats to ensure strong security.
 Build IT risk supervision capacity. The NRB could hire or identify and train a pool of IT staff
who are experienced in IT risk management and are certified in IT Audit, for supervision. This
could be done at the organizational level e.g., to also support other supervision departments.
 Review and adopt the CPMI Wholesale Payment Fraud End-point Security elements. This
should be done to the greatest extent possible for the RTGS system. The NRB should also
develop a security controls framework for RTGS participants that includes a security
attestation. This could be modelled against the SWIFT CSP.
 PSD should immediately develop BCP for RTGS and test it regularly. The plan should
have a 2-hour RTO, including for extreme, but plausible scenario such as wide-area
disruptions. BCP should be tested at least annually. The NRB should consider implementing an
alternate to the RTGS system that is non-similar and can settle time-critical transactions for
scenarios where it is not able to recover in 2 hours.
Strengthen prudential supervision, oversight and user protection of e-money and emerging
payments
106. The NRB has issued 27 licenses to PSPs, of which 25 perform only e-money or
domestic money transfer functions and the other 2 PSPs perform card payment
functions. 7 As the current licensing regime for PSPs is mostly limited to e-money and domestic
7 The NRB noted that it has opened licenses for PSPs/PSOs offering innovative products and is also
working on developing a regulatory sandbox for digital innovation.

money-transfer, it may not be conducive to innovative payments services. Payment activities,
such as merchant acquisition and payment aggregators, are not provided for in the licensing
policy, and while left unregulated may cause uncertainty. Furthermore, there are funds-in-transit
and operational risks that may negatively impact consumer confidence if they materialize.
107. There are safeguarding requirements for e-money PSPs, but they do not
sufficiently protect customer funds. E-money PSPs are required to segregate customer funds,
hold them with a settlement bank and perform daily reconciliation of funds. The selection of
settlement bank is subject to the NRB’s approval and limited to Class A banks. There are also
onboarding requirements for agents of e-money PSPs. However, these safeguards do not protect
the funds from an insolvency of the e-money PSP or settlement bank. NRB also limits e-money
PSPs to holding funds with only one bank, creating concentration risk.
108. NRB is exploring CBDC and has issued a concept paper for public consultation in
August 2022. NRB’s key policy goals for considering CBDC are better access to payments,
providing resilience to payment systems and reducing costs of cash handling. CBDC, if issued,
has potential financial stability implications.
109. NRB could review whether its legislation and regulations need modernization to
keep pace with its efforts to foster payment innovation. Some countries have modernized
their legal and regulatory frameworks to foster innovation and competition, while at the same time
addressing the associated risks and consumer protection. A study into such activity-based, risk-
focused regulatory regimes for payment systems could be conducted for the Nepal context.
110. NRB should review the safeguards to protect float against insolvency of an
e-money issuer or its settlement bank and ensure other e-money measures are
comprehensive. Safeguards could include insurance, bank guarantees, trust account,
undertaking by banks, among others, making reference to good practices published by IMF and
CPMI/World Bank. NRB should also diversify risks by allowing PSP to hold float in high quality
liquid asset with multiple settlement banks.
111. NRB should make a fully informed decision on whether to issue CBDC. If so, it
should incorporate design features that support public policy objectives and ensure an efficient,
resilient, and competitive payment system.
E. FINANCIAL INCLUSION
Financial Inclusion Framework
112. Access to formal financial services has more than doubled in Nepal over the past
10 years. According to the World Bank, access increased from 25 percent of adults in 2011 to 54
percent in 2021. This progress reflects concerted efforts by NRB and other stakeholders to reach
the unbanked through a wide variety of programs. For example, NRB requires financial service
providers (FSPs) to establish a certain number of “brick and mortar” access points (e.g.,
branches, ATMs), and dedicate a prescribed percentage of lending to deprived sectors. There is
also a growing number of digital financial services available, such as e-money, QR code
payments, and digital credit. Financial inclusion efforts are supported by a formal Financial Sector

Development Strategy and Financial Literacy Framework. NRB has a financial inclusion
dashboard that collects various metrics from Class A, B, and C banks. There are some gaps in
data, such for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) (demand side), and gender
disaggregated data for loans and payments.
113. Despite noteworthy efforts to expand access, nearly half of adults in Nepal are still
excluded, and women are less likely to have an account than men. Access in rural areas is
also challenging. Usage of accounts is low, and a significant proportion of bank and e-wallet
accounts are dormant. NRB’s hands-on approach to credit allocation, branch locations, and other
common business decisions provided momentum when financial inclusion was extremely low.
However, now that the sector is more developed it may inhibit market-driven approaches, that
could be more effective at reaching those who remain excluded.
114. NRB should evaluate where it could revise its requirements for branching and
lending to permit more demand driven, market friendly approaches by FSPs. This would
give FSPs freedom to develop more diverse offerings that would in turn expand customer choice.
This can be done gradually, based on evidence of each program’s respective impact. NRB is
planning to have an external evaluation of various directed lending programs to determine their
effectiveness, which should provide useful inputs.
115. NRB should enhance its data collection efforts for MSME credit (demand side) and
gender disaggregated data, and include MFI information in the Financial Inclusion
Dashboard. While NRB has information on credit availability for MSMEs, data on barriers to
accessing credit could help refine policies in this area. Similarly, additional data on women’s
access to financial services would be useful to inform financial inclusion and financial literacy
programs. NRB should also work with MFIs to incorporate their information into the Financial
Inclusion Dashboard to provide a more complete picture of the indicators. NRB noted that it has
conducted a baseline survey to identify gender and geography disaggregated demand side data.
The survey report is in the final stage of public dissemination. The NRB will also include MFIs in
the Financial Inclusion Dashboard.
Regulation and Supervision of Institutions Relevant to Financial Inclusion
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs)
116. SACCOs are important providers of financial services in Nepal, including women.
There are an estimated 14,484 SACCOs serving urban and rural customers. In addition to
traditional loans and savings, some SACCOs offer digital services in partnership with licensed
providers. While filling a critical access gap, SACCOs are largely unsupervised and show signs of
widespread governance issues, insider abuse, over-lending, and liquidity constraints that have
prevented customer access to their deposits. Many SACCOs are small, local institutions but
others are quite large, with total deposits exceeding that of some of the Class B and C banks.
117. Risk in the SACCO sector appears to be increasing. Lack of reliable data, a
decentralized approach to supervision by inexperienced local authorities, and regulatory inertia
increase risk to the financial sector due to linkages between SACCOs and BFIs. The level and
severity of risk is challenging to estimate in the absence of good data and supervision. In addition
to uneven financial reporting to the cooperatives regulator, only a few SACCOs participate in the

CIB, although customers may borrow at both BFIs and SACCOS, sometimes using a loan from
one license type to repay another.
118. The 2014 FSAP recommended improved oversight, including a shared supervisory
framework between NRB and the DoC. Although there was initial consideration by NRB to
supervise the 15 largest cooperatives, this is no longer being pursued. There is also legal
ambiguity as to whether NRB has authority to regulate SACCOs. NRB does supervise National
Cooperative Bank, an NBFI that provides services to SACCO customers under a supervisory
regime that is still being developed.
119. Interviews with SACCOs revealed strong interest in being supervised by NRB or
other competent authority. SACCOs believe better oversight would enhance professionalism,
trust, and viability of the sector. Some have undertaken their own self-regulatory efforts to
strengthen risk management, governance, and controls. There is also a new regulatory reporting
system that is gaining traction, with around 50 percent of SACCOs currently onboarded.
120. NRB should work with the MoLCP to develop a coordinated supervision program
for SACCOs with cooperative authorities, with the goal of minimizing risks to the financial
sector. NRB’s role should be targeted to the largest and/or systemically important SACCOs. TA
is recommended for development of the new regime, following global good practices. NRB stated
it is exploring support for a second-tier cooperative to be created that would assist with
supervising systemically important SACCOs.
121. Data sharing arrangements for SACCOs should be formalized with cooperative
authorities under a written agreement to ensure a timely flow of information. Monitoring
activities should be complemented by regular engagement between authorities to discuss
sectoral risks and trends. NRB noted that it plans to work on formalizing data sharing with
relevant cooperative authorities.
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)
122. MFIs are another important source of financial services for low-income and rural
customers in Nepal, especially women. MFIs offer small loans and savings under a tiered
(Class D) bank license with more limited permissible activities. Four MFIs offer wholesale
services to other MFIs, and two take public deposits (i.e., other than from members) on a
restricted basis. MFIs mostly offer unsecured group loans for female borrowers who lack
collateral. Although MFIs have their roots in the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) group
lending model, many are digitalizing their product lines and offer complementary services such as
money transfers and insurance through partnerships with other FSPs.
123. With 64 providers, the microfinance sector is considered larger than it should be
by both NRB and the MFIs. This has led to unhealthy competition and impacts viability. For this
reason, NRB is encouraging orderly consolidation within the sector and not issuing new licenses.
124. MFIs are supervised similarly to Class A, B, and C banks, including onsite and
offsite monitoring and prudential norms. MFIs report NPLs under 5 percent in most cases,
with two problematic institutions subject to PCA. Staff conducting MFI inspections lack expertise
in the microfinance business model, due in part to the frequent rotations that occur with NRB

staff. In addition, uniform, compliance-based procedures are applied to all institutions regardless
of complexity and size.
125. Lending rates are capped at 15 percent, and service charges at 1.5 percent.
Funding comes mainly from investments and borrowings from other BFIs (including directed
lending required by NRB) and voluntary savings from members. The interest rate ceiling for loans
paired with variable rate funding costs has negatively affected interest margins for some; for
example, some MFIs are lending at 15 percent while borrowing at 17 or 18 percent. This is
obviously not sustainable.
126. NRB is supportive of the MFIs’ role in financial inclusion, but the current regulatory
approach could do more to foster sustainability and stability. Interest rate ceilings are
usually counterproductive in financial services, including MFIs. If providers are not able to cover
loan and administrative costs, they will be forced to restrict lending or go out of business, which
often hits those at the base of the pyramid hardest. Policy goals for affordable credit are better
served by robust transparency of terms and conditions, healthy competition, and access to good
credit information. NRB staff indicated they are considering allowing MFIs to set their own rates
using a base rate plus premium framework similar to BFIs, which would be positive for the sector.
127. The MFI sector would benefit from a clearer vision and strategy. MFIs that were
interviewed noted they face competing expectations to operate a sustainable (i.e., profitable)
bank while being viewed as a charitable endeavor like their NGO predecessors. Increased clarity
and a shared vision for the future will help ensure MFIs’ continued relevance and contribution to
financial inclusion efforts.
128. NRB should replace the MFI interest rate ceiling with a base rate plus premium. To
ensure MFIs retain their unique focus and accessibility to the poor, the new regime should be
complemented by basic disclosure of key terms and conditions, clear definitions for microcredit
(e.g., loan size, purpose), and market surveillance to ensure rates stay transparent and
affordable. NRB is working on publishing a base rate and will review the need for the interest rate
ceiling.
129. MFI inspections should follow proportionate, risk-based procedures to better

allocate staff resources and capture risks. Inspections should ensure participation by at least
one microfinance subject matter expert, with training extended to others, as resources permit.
130. NRB should consider articulating its vision and goals for the microfinance sector
in a formal policy. This would signal and help build support for policies that allow microfinance to
remain true to the spirit of its business model while allowing the sector to grow and thrive. NRB
should include MFIs and other relevant stakeholders in this effort.
Credit information and preventing over-indebtedness
131. The CIB provides a basic platform to exchange credit information for 137 banks
and financial institutions. The CIB is owned by BFIs (90 percent) and NRB (10 percent) and is
chaired by a member of NRB’s management team. Information reported is mostly negative, but
efforts are underway to incorporate alternative information (e.g., utility bills) and create a
psychometric credit score to help expand access to borrowers who may be excluded due to lack

of credit history or collateral. All BFIs that extend credit must participate in the CIB. MFIs provide
and access credit information on a separate platform from other banks, and only a few wholesale
SACCOs participate. This greatly undermines the effectiveness of the system by precluding a
comprehensive view of a customer’s credit history. CIB shared during the review that they plan to
merge the databases of MFIs and banks in the future so users can pull a single credit report for
individual borrowers.
132. A public blacklist is available on the CIB website with names of individuals who
have defaulted on a loan or bounced a check. While the NRB Act requires a blacklist to exist,
it should not be publicly available. Public disclosure of this information is an unwarranted intrusion
on customer privacy and could lead to harm if the information is misused. The list contains
thousands of names dating back decades and is available to anyone to use for any purpose,
including fraudulent or other illegal activities. Credit information systems normally limit sharing of
customer information to identified purposes (e.g., loan, job) through a credit report to an
authorized user. This ensures the accuracy and proper use of the data. While NRB needs to keep
bad actors out of the system, the public blacklist may also deter the unbanked from seeking
formal services for fear of public humiliation for making a mistake or struggling to repay a loan
due to personal hardship like a job loss or health crisis.
133. MFI and bank credit information should be combined on the CIB platform and
incorporate SACCO data. This can be done gradually as systems and data quality allow.
134. The CIB should remove public access to the blacklist on its website. NRB should
also review its privacy rules to ensure they adequately protect customer privacy in financial
services.
Digital payments and remittances
135. Digital payments are an increasingly important access point for financial inclusion.
There are 27 non-bank PSP, although only a handful are active. Four companies are the main
providers of e-wallets, with the largest reporting market share of 56 percent. There are around
13,000 agents to provide cash in/cash out and other transactions. QR code payments were
introduced in 2021. The use of debit cards and mobile banking is common, but credit card use is
rare. Ecommerce is in early stages of development.
136. Some products have greater traction than others. For example, while QR payments
have been incredibly popular, there is still much room for e-money usage to grow, with a large
proportion of accounts inactive. The main reasons seem to be that many customers open
accounts simply to receive a bonus or premium, along with a persistent preference for cash. The
larger wallet providers are trying to increase activity and customer loyalty by incorporating other
useful services to their apps.
137. Remittances from migrant workers are critical source of income for Nepal citizens.
Inward remittances reached $7.6 billion in the year ending July 2022, mainly from the United
States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, India, and the United Arab Emirates. Migrant workers can use one of
many sources to send and receive funds, including traditional money transmitters, banks, PSPs,
and informal hundis. Remittances are frequently converted to cash but some FSPs offer
incentives to link funds to an e-wallet or bank account. Because of the importance of remittances

to households (HH) in Nepal, this is one the best opportunities to engage consumers in formal
financial services. NRB has implemented a number of incentives to help encourage formalization
of remittances.
Financial Consumer Protection (FCP)
138. FCP is a critical component of inclusive financial services. A sound framework for
transparency, fair treatment, data protection and privacy, and dispute resolution promotes
confidence and trust in financial services. Financial regulators increasingly recognize that FCP is
not simply a “nice to have” but an important contributor to financial sector health, as well. As
financial services increase in complexity through digital access points, FCP becomes even more
important.
139. NRB has a newly formed Financial Inclusion and Consumer Protection Division
staffed with six people, three of which are assigned to FCP. To date, FCP functions have
been limited to responding to grievances and financial literacy activities. The dedicated division
will be better able to identify and mitigate consumer risks in the marketplace, but will need the full
array of legal, regulatory, and supervisory resources along with training and capacity building to
do so. While this is a large undertaking, NRB can use a building block approach and prioritize its
activities over time beginning with areas of greatest risk and potential impact.
140. NRB should develop a comprehensive FCP function, including:
 Draft a dedicated FCP law and subordinate regulations.

 Develop tools and resources to supervise FCP, including manuals, policies, training,
onsite inspection procedures, offsite monitoring tools, enforcement standards.
TA would be desirable in implementing this recommendation to assist NRB in applying global
good practices in line with Nepal’s unique country context.

2. Technical Assistance Roadmap
141. A TA Roadmap (TARM) was developed in cooperation with the authorities and in
consultation with IMF departments. Based on discussions with the authorities during the main
FSSR mission and resulting conclusions, the mission team developed a comprehensive list of TA
recommendations in the six topical areas. Reforms should be conducted with close involvement
and coordination among the relevant competent authorities. Key recommendations were also
shared with the principal collaborators in MCM and the area department team.
142. The mission noted authorities’ comments on the TARM, which have been largely
addressed and would be further considered in follow-up TA. Additional information on some
of the topical areas were added, completion timeframes were adjusted, and TA needs modified,
as appropriate. The mission views that the sequencing of a single (or multiple) TA under each
workstream should be addressed in follow-up TA, which would be subject to approval by the
Financial Sector Stability Fund and further discussions between authorities and IMF staff. Given
the need to address the key risks and vulnerabilities identified, the mission maintains its
recommendations for TA needs for banking supervision and regulation, stress testing, crisis
management, and financial inclusion. This would assist authorities in enhancing capacity in
financial sector oversight.
143. The mission recommended that authorities should ensure the close alignment
between the FSSR recommendations and the measures on improving financial sector
regulation and supervision under the ECF. This pertains to the prioritization and timelines for
the implementation of the recommendations. Going forward, the mission views that the continuing
efforts to improve asset quality and banking supervision, which are consistent with the proposed
structural benchmarks under the ECF program, should warrant the highest priority from
authorities.
144. The TARM proposes TA to build capacity in the authorities to address risks and
vulnerabilities in the financial system. Based on the analysis of the risks and vulnerabilities
and existing gaps, the TARM develops a prioritized set of actions that need to be taken by the
authorities to address these vulnerabilities and to strengthen the financial system in the next three
years. It presents, in one integrated table, the main strategic recommendations and the
supporting TA to address the main risks and vulnerabilities identified in by the baseline diagnostic
review. The comprehensive TARM presents the following:
 Key Vulnerability: Identified by the FSSR diagnostic review with high probability to affect the
well-functioning of the financial system if left unaddressed, and which will benefit from targeted
TA in most cases.
 Recommendation: Action by the authorities to address the vulnerability, in most cases to be
supported by TA.
 TA Activity: Indication of whether for the implementation of an FSSR recommendation TA
delivery is “needed” or “not needed”, as well as instances where TA on a certain matter is
already “in progress” or “planned”.
 Responsible Agency: Those institutions that are primarily responsible to implement a given
recommendation for TA.
 Priority: an indication of the level of priority associated with the TA activity (high, medium, low).

 Timeframe: an indication of the timeline when the TA activity should take place (short-term
(ST), medium-term (MT), long-term (LT)).
The TA Activities in the TARM are grouped by topical areas, with several individual activities in
each group.

Table 4. Nepal FSSR TA Roadmap
TA Responsible Completion
Key Vulnerability Recommendation Priority
Activity Agency Timeframe1
BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (Section II.A)
Develop offsite surveillance capabilities

A lack of forward- Develop analytical tools to produce reports for offsite surveillance. Analytical
looking analysis to tools are needed to extract the data from SIS and create reliable, consistent
Needed NRB High ST
identify early and easily-comparable reports for offsite supervision
emerging risks
Structured
succession
Enhance training programs to strengthen supervisory skills and build risk Not
planning and risk NRB High ST
specialists in banking supervision needed
specialism for
supervision
Assess regulations and supervisory processes
Undertake a comprehensive review of credit risk supervision practices and
A build-up of credit
processes targeting (i) connected lending, (ii) group exposures and (iii) risk Needed NRB High MT
risks
concentrations.
Liquidity and Undertake an assessment of liquidity regulations and supervisory processes
funding stress targeting: (I) development of funding plans; (ii) a quantitative impact study for Needed NRB High MT
cause a disruption the LCR; and (iii) longer-term plans to diversify bank sources of funding.
Robustness of Undertake a comprehensive review of the capital management framework
capital buffers to including: (i) definition of capital; (ii) calculation of RWAs; (iii) SREP processes;
absorb losses and (iv) Pillar 2; and (v) the buffer framework. Needed NRB High MT
resilience during
stress
Problem assets Undertake a comprehensive review of the regulations and supervisory
and loan loss processes for problem loans and loan loss provisioning with a focus on loan
Needed NRB High MT
provisioning classifications and the transition to IFRS; exit of special measures related to
COVID-19; and collateral valuation guidance.
Absence of a
consolidated
supervision Develop a comprehensive consolidated supervision framework that enables
Needed NRB Medium LT
framework effective group supervision.
constrains the
exercise of powers

Inadequate
business continuity
Not
and DR planning Assess the regulations for BCP and DR NRB Medium MT
needed
for larger systemic
banks
Vulnerability to
Climate-related financial risks should be integrated into supervision processes
climate- related Needed NRB Medium LT
and risk management activities such as bank stress testing
financial risks
Phase out directed lending
Directed lending Consider alternative programs and instruments to achieve goals associated Not NRB High ST
causes distortions with existing directed lending programs needed
STRESS TESTING (Section II.B)
Revise existing micro stress testing of solvency and liquidity

Overly simplified
micro solvency Revamp the micro stress tests of solvency by using a smaller set of
stress tests based comprehensive scenarios and relying on more realistic calculations and Needed NRB High MT
on single factor projections over an explicit 1-year horizon
sensitivity analyses
A limited
granularity of
funding shocks and Improve micro stress tests of liquidity by introducing a richer funding shock
Not
a lack of stress in structure, imposing haircuts on government securities, and making the horizon NRB Medium MT
needed
the value of liquid of liquidity distress more explicit
assets in the micro
liquidity stress tests
Micro-finance
institutions not After revisions, extend the solvency and liquidity stress testing to include Not
NRB Medium MT
included in the micro-finance institutions on a proportionate basis, with selected simplifications needed
micro stress testing
Lack of use of
Use the micro stress test results, especially of solvency, to calibrate additional
micro stress test Not
Pillar 2 capital buffers to strengthen the resilience of banks against adverse NRB Medium MT
results in risk- needed
shocks
based supervision

Limited
Encourage banks to develop their own stress test scenarios on top of the NRB
development of Not
to reflect their risks and exposures, leveraging upon the expected introduction NRB Medium LT
banks’ own stress needed
of IFRS/NFRS 9
testing
Build a top-down macro stress testing framework
Develop macro stress tests of solvency of all supervised institutions (ABC and
Non-existent top-
D class) based on explicit macroeconomic scenarios, credit risk satellite
down macro stress Needed NRB High MT
model(s), and consistent projection of banks’ balance sheets and P&L items
tests of solvency
over a 3-year horizon
No contagion and
interconnectednes Complement the macro stress tests with developing a contagion block to test
s analyses in the scenarios of domino-like sequences of institutions’ failures due to their Needed NRB Medium MT
financial sector interconnectedness
performed
No macro stress
Develop top-down liquidity stress tests after the introduction of the LCR Needed NRB Low LT
tests of liquidity
Strengthen macro-financial and systemic risk surveillance
Lack of regular Strengthen the role, staffing and capacity of the existing financial stability unit
Not
macro-financial to support developing a full-fledged regular systemic risk monitoring NRB High MT
needed
surveillance
Mostly only Enhance the level of analyses in the published Financial Stability Report,
descriptive adopting a risk-oriented forward-looking approach, based also on the newly
Needed NRB Medium LT
Financial Stability developed macro stress tests and additional risk monitoring tools
Report
CRISIS MANAGEMENT (Section II.C)
Strengthen the applicable legal and regulatory framework pertaining to crisis management
The current legal Review the DCGF institutional setup and legal framework, including but not
and operational limited to (i) the DCGF access to depositors' records at all times and to
framework is not prescribe specific formats in which information should be provided (Single
conducive for a Costumer View files); (ii) the DGF powers to assess the quality of the Needed DCGF High ST
fast and efficient information provided and request banks to correct it and to improve their
reimbursement of management information systems if needed; (iii) use of DCGF resources for
deposits. P&A

Current legal Adopt a targeted review of the NRB Act to ensure the consistency of resolution Needed NRB Medium MT
framework tools (resolution of going concern bank under special administration and
pertaining to bank liquidation) as well as the consistency between the different relevant laws and
resolution has regulations guiding bank resolutions.
significant gaps
and
inconsistencies in
providing for
adequate
resolution tools.
The current legal Review the NRB LOLR regulations and the applicable sections in the NRB Act. Not NRB High ST
and regulatory Needed
framework for ELA
has gaps which
may, inter alia,
expose the NRB to
undue risks.
Enhance the crisis and resolution preparedness competences of authorities and continuing implementation of the current legal framework
The current risk
assessment
framework is not
sufficiently broad
NRB to strengthen its frameworks and capacity for the early detection of bank
and forward
stress and early intervention actions. The risk assessment should be more
looking, which may Needed NRB Medium MT
forward-looking than is currently the case, with a more structured link between
lead to delays in
the assessed risk of a bank and the scale of supervisory attention it receives
identifying
vulnerabilities
which may lead to
costlier resolutions.
Lack of adequate
operational
plans/procedure Strengthen the resolution preparedness of the NBM for the implementation of
manuals for the the various resolution tools (including P&A and bridge bank), including the Needed NRB High MT
implementation of preparation or improvement of operational plans
the more relevant
resolution tools

Absence of crisis
simulation
exercises to test
Carry out resolution simulation exercises to test authorities’ internal resolution
the resolution NRB, MOF,
preparedness and robustness of operational plans as well as inter-agency Needed Medium LT
preparedness of DCGF
cooperation and communication
authorities and
inter-agency
cooperation
The missing
systemic crisis
management
framework and
coupled with the Provide a framework for improved interagency cooperation via strengthening
lack of contingency the systemic crisis management framework, and provide input for country- and NRB, MOF,
Needed Medium LT
planning poses agency-wide contingency planning, specifying the role of each relevant DCGF
curtails the agency.
country’s capacity
to withstand
serious financial
shocks.
PAYMENT SYSTEMS (Section II.D)
Strengthen legal framework and oversight function to provide high degree of legal certainty and sound payment systems oversight
Legal certainty in
the finality and
netting of payment
and securities
transactions is
Review the legal framework to identify and address gaps in the provisions
unclear. This could
including those related to the finality and irrevocability of transactions settled Not
cause unwinding of NRB High MT
through payment systems. It should take into consideration the relevant needed
transactions,
principles in PFMI.
disrupt payment
systems and
create systemic
risk

Inadequate skilled
resources, with
the most
experienced PSD
staff having less
than 3 years of
payment systems
Fill vacancies immediately. Train staff, limit the number and frequency of Not
oversight NRB High MT
rotation of specialist staff in payment system and plan for succession. needed
experience. This
impacts continuity
of projects and
could lead to a
decline in standard
of oversight and of
FMI compliance.
Key laws,
regulations and
directives are not
published in a
language
commonly used
in financial Provide English version of key documents including PS Act, Bye-laws, design Not
NRB Medium MT
markets. This may of RTGS system, security requirements etc. needed
impede accurate
understanding of
the rules and risks
of participating in
the FMI.
Inadequate
separation of the
oversight and Re-organize PSD to sufficiently deconflict the oversight and operator roles
operator which now fall under the same Director. At a minimum, the functions should be Not
NRB High MT
functions. This split at the Director level but it is highly recommended that the split be needed
could lead to weak implemented at the ED or higher level.
oversight and
compromises in

standards and
controls.
Lack of
formalized and
documented
working
arrangements for
RTGS system
among NRB
Formalize and document internal arrangement for RTGS system operations,
departments and
including reporting requirements by Operator Unit and supervision by
units. This could Not
Oversight Unit. Arrangements should also include the role of internal audit, NRB High MT
lead to ambiguity in needed
risk-management functions and any other relevant departments for the RTGS
roles and
system operations.
responsibilities,
and gaps in
complying with
international
standards and
NRB’s oversight
obligations.
NRB is a 10%
shareholder and
chairman of Nepal
Clearing House
Limited which
operates retail
Consider divesting shareholding and relinquishing chairmanship in NCHL and Not
payment systems NRB Medium MT
instead use oversight powers to influence the desired policy outcome. needed
that competes
with other
payment
operators. This
puts NRB in a
potential conflict of

interest position as
overseer of
payment systems.
Identify systemically important payment systems, formally adopt PFMI in regulations, and apply it to the designated payment systems
Systemically Develop FMI designation framework that identifies systemically important
important payment systems and other relevant FMIs
payment systems
have not been
formally identified
and designated
for oversight and
compliance to
Formally adopt PFMI through regulations or policy statements and apply PFMI
PFMI. This
to the identified FMIs.
hampers
prioritization of
supervision and
creates potential
risks to the
financial system.
No assessments RTGS Operations Unit should conduct a self-assessment of the RTGS system
have been and other designated systems’ observance against PFMI. Needed NRB High ST
conducted on the The Oversight Unit should conduct a self-assessment of NRB’s responsibilities
RTGS system against PFMI.
against The Oversight Unit should review the Operations Unit’s self-assessment and
international require disclosure compliance according to the PFMI DF, at least once every
standards (PFMI) two years. It should include authorities’ responsibilities in the DF.
and relevant ACH should conduct a self-assessment of the ECC and other payment
payment systems. systems that will be designated, against PFMI. If these are not designated,
Consequently, selected principles should be applied to the payment systems.
there is no public
disclosure of
compliance. This
leads to risks that NRB should require ACH to complete and publicly disclose the compliance to
gaps and remedial PFMI.
actions have not
been identified,
and hampers

participants’
understanding of
risks in the FMI.
Lack of
consideration for
oversight
cooperation with
foreign regulators
for multicurrency
Establish whether there is a need for cooperative oversight with other payment
RTGS system.
system regulator for the foreign currencies settled through RTGS system. NRB
This could Not
should start by informing the relevant authorities in line with Resp E KC2 for its NRB Low LT
potentially affect needed
multi-currency RTGS. Continue to monitor and update on changes where
efficient and
relevant.
effective oversight
of interest to
foreign authorities
for the currencies
concerned.
Enhance RTGS system and increase utilization to support financial stability for Nepal’s growing banking and capital market
Considerable
interbank
payments are still
settling via GL
entries instead of
Consider additional measures to increase participation in RTGS and
RTGS. This
discourage inter-bank payments via GL entries, including to mandate that all Not
means settlement NRB High LT
high-value payments via checks must be settled through RTGS with the goal of needed
risk has not been
eliminating them.
adequately
mitigated despite
RTGS
implementation.
Intraday liquidity Expedite the dematerialization of government securities to facilitate the full Not
NRB/PDMO High LT
facilityof RTGS automation of intraday liquidity facility available to participants. needed

system are Work with PDMO to accelerate the dematerialization of government securities
cumbersome to and complete DOMS project as soon as possible.
use and not been
utilized so far.
This exposes the Integrate or interface with DOMS to achieve delivery-vs-payment
system to liquidity
risk.
Gaps exist in the Enhance RTGS Rules document and make publicly available specific
RTGS system description of design and operations of the RTGS foreign currency, including NRB High ST
rules for the the settlement process and any liquidity facilities that apply.
settlement process
of foreign
currencies. As a
Not
result, participants
needed
may not be well- Monitor growth in foreign currency and have plans for intraday liquidity risk
NRB Low LT
informed of design, management
operations and risk
of foreign currency
settlement in the
RTGS system.
Improve cybersecurity and operational resilience of key payment systems, including RTGS system, NRB and participants
Cyber - The
current IT
Security directive
to PSP/PSO does
not sufficiently
cover cyber
resilience
requirements. Expedite the completion of cyber resilience guidelines and ensure they are
Needed NRB High ST
These include aligned with the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance on Cyber Resilience for FMI.
requirements for
cyber resilience
framework,
governance, cyber
response and
recovery plans to
meet the 2-hour

RTO, specific
cyber testing with
key service
providers, among
others.
Cyber - Key cyber
strategies such
as the cyber info-
sharing platform,
CERT and CISO should have a dedicated team of information and cyber security officers
Securities Ops with direct reporting to the CISO. Strategies to be completed as soon as
Centre are work- possible.
in-progress. The
appointed CISO
does not have a
dedicated team.
Physical Security
- IT asset was
installed in an
open area of
buildings of
temporary
Review physical security of all systems infrastructure and network to identify
occupation. This
any weak links and remediate to ensure a high degree of security.
exposes the
network and
systems of NRB to
risk of sabotage
and unauthorized
access.
Lack of cyber and
IT risk
supervision Hire or identify a pool of IT staff who are experienced in IT risk management
capacity in NRB. and are certified in IT Audit, for supervision, and provide the necessary Not
NRB High ST
As a result, NRB training. This could be done at the organizational level e.g. to also support needed
cannot effectively other supervision departments.
assess cyber risks
and enforce IT risk

management
regulations in
payment systems.
Fraud -Lack of Review and adopt the CPMI Wholesale Payment Fraud End-point Security
requirements to elements to extent possible for both its RTGS and SWIFT systems.
reduce risk of
Not
wholesale NRB High MT
Develop a security controls framework for RTGS participants that includes a needed
payment fraud
security attestation. This could be modelled against the SWIFT CSP.
related to end-point
security.
BCP - NRB does The BCM and plan for RTGS should have a 2-hour RTO for critical systems,
Not
not have a BCM including for extreme but plausible scenario such as wide-area disruptions. BC NRB High MT
needed
framework in plans should be tested at least annually.
place yet. This
exposes NRB and
its RTGS system to
risk that it would be
Implement an alternate non-similar system that can settle time-critical
unprepared for
transactions where it is not able to recover in 2 hours in extreme but plausible Needed NRB High LT
some scenarios,
scenarios
including wide-
scale disruption
events.
Strengthen prudential supervision, oversight and user protection of e-money and emerging payments
Current licensing
regime for
payments is
mostly limited to
Consider modernizing legislation/regulations to be more activity-based and
e-money and
risk-focused to allow for innovation by conducting a study of cross-country
domestic money
comparison of such legislation
transfer, hence Needed NRB Medium LT
may not be
conducive to
innovation.
Inadequate e- Review safeguards to protect float against insolvency of e-money issuer and
money float ensure other e-money measures are comprehensive. These could include
protection. This insurance, bank guarantees, trust account, undertaking by banks. Diversify

gives rise to the risks by allowing PSP to hold float in high quality liquid asset with multiple
risk of financial settlement banks.
losses for
consumers in the
event of e-money
issuer or
settlement bank
failure.
CBDC, if issued, Make a fully informed decision on whether to issue CBDCs, and if so, Needed NRB Medium MT
has potential incorporate design features that support public policy objectives and ensure an
financial stability efficient, resilient, and competitive payment system.
implications
FINANCIAL INCLUSION (Section II.E)
Shift to a more market-driven approach to inclusive financial services and improve data collection efforts
NRB’s hands-on
approach to FSP
product and
NRB should evaluate where it could revise its requirements for branching and Not
strategic decisions NRB Medium MT
lending to permit more demand driven, market friendly approaches by FSPs. needed
constrains
innovation and
diversification.
Data gaps hinder NRB should enhance its data collection efforts for MSME credit (demand side)
Not
informed policy and gender disaggregated data and work with MFIs to include their information NRB Medium MT
needed
decisions. in the Financial Inclusion Dashboard.
Create a more proportionate and robust oversight framework for large SACCOs and MFIs
Failure to monitor
and supervise NRB should work with the MoLCP to develop a coordinated supervision
large SACCOs program for SACCOs with cooperative authorities, with the goal of minimizing NRB, MOF,
Needed High MT
exposes the risks to the wider financial sector. MoLCP
financial sector to
risks.
Ineffective Data sharing arrangements for SACCOs should be formalized with cooperative
Not NRB, MOF,
information sharing authorities under a written agreement to ensure a timely flow of information. High MT
needed MoLCP
precludes

monitoring of
SACCO risks.
MFI interest rate
NRB should replace the MFI interest rate ceiling with a base rate plus Not
ceiling undermines NRB High ST
premium. needed
sustainability.
Uniform
compliance
approach and lack
MFI inspections should follow proportionate, risk-based procedures to better Not
of staff with NRB Medium MT
allocate resources and capture risks. needed
microfinance
expertise weakens
MFI supervision.
Lack of clearly
articulated vision NRB should consider articulating its vision and goals for the microfinance
Not
for the MFI sector sector in a formal policy. NRB Low LT
needed
could impact its
sustainability.
Improve availability of comprehensive credit information and responsible use of customer information
Lack of integrated
credit information
across providers MFI and bank credit information should be combined on the CIB platform and
Not
limits CIB users’ incorporate SACCO data. NRB, CIB Medium MT
needed
ability to assess
credit risk and
over-indebtedness.
Public access to The CIB should remove public access to the blacklist on its website. Not NRB, CIB Medium ST
blacklist on CIB needed
website creates
consumer risks and
invades privacy.
Implement a comprehensive FCP regime
NRB should develop a robust FCP function, including:
Lack of FCP - Dedicated FCP law and subordinate regulations
regime exposes Needed NRB Medium LT
- Tools and resources to supervise FCP.
consumers to risk.

1 Timeframe: ST, short-term, less than six months; MT, medium-term, with results around 18 months; LT, long-term, with results around 30 months.

Annex I. Assessment of Financial Sector Statistics
This annex presents the status of Nepal’s monetary and financial statistics (MFS) and financial
soundness indicators (FSIs), as well the underlying datasets for the construction of the Balance Sheet
Approach (BSA) matrix.,8
A. FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS (FSIS)
1. Nepal regularly reports data on FSIs to the IMF’s STA, which help monitor the
soundness of the financial sector from a macroprudential vantage point. The NRB
reports and disseminates 13 core and 7 additional FSIs for DTs. Two additional FSIs for
OFCs, a FSI pertaining to HHs and two FSIs related to real estate markets are also compiled
by the NRB in collaboration with other financial regulators in the country. The FSIs are
compiled with a quarterly frequency and reported to STA for dissemination on the IMF’s FSI
website. See Table A.1 for the list of currently reported FSIs.
2. FSI definitions appear in line with IMF guidelines. The regulatory and accounting
practices of the DTs are also broadly in line with the 2019 FSIs Compilation Guide (2019
FSIs Guide). The 2019 FSIs Guide in turn defers to Basel principles and IFRS issued by the
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). The NRB has adopted the core principles
prescribed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision including formalizing a new
Capital Adequacy Framework in 2015, adopting the provisions of Basel III for commercial
banks. Under the Nepal Chartered Accountants Act (1997) as amended, national standards
(NFRS) are developed by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), based on the relevant
IFRS which DTs must comply with. 9
3. The NRB compiles FSIs based on Domestic Location (DL) Basis. Although the 2019 FSIs
Guide recommends using cross border, cross sector, domestically incorporated (CBCSDI)
method of consolidation, it also provides DL as an alternative method when resident DTs
have no nonresident branches or subsidiaries or have ones that are so small that they do not
materially affect the results. DL covers resident DTs along with their resident branches and
subsidiaries in the same sector. No bank in Nepal has a foreign subsidiary or branch but
some banks have resident subsidiaries in DTs and OFCs subsectors. Furthermore, the NRB
does not collect group-consolidated data for the DTs that have subsidiaries. DL basis is
largely adequate for compiling FSIs for DTs.
4. The NRB is expected to start implementing the 2019 FSIs Guide by December 2022.
The implementation of the 2019 FSIs Guide includes adopting new reporting forms and
metadata templates to submit data to STA. In addition, Nepal is expected to expand the FSIs
8 MFS and FSIs are the two key sets of statistics collected and disseminated by the IMF through its
Statistics Department, which are useful for financial sector stability analysis. In addition, the IMF
developed BSA matrices, compiling key sectoral balance sheets in member countries’ economies, as
a starting point to diagnose risks and potential transmission channels of shocks, setting the stage for
deeper analysis (see IMF Policy Paper, June 2015, “Balance Sheet Analysis in Fund Surveillance”).
9 In Nepal, IFRS standards are adopted as NFRS.
IMF | NEPAL Financial Sector Stability Review | 61

for OFCs. A 2021 FSI TA mission to Nepal assisted the authorities to prepare for the
submission of an expanded set of FSIs for OFCs recommended in the 2019 FSIs Guide.
B. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS
5. The NRB reports monthly monetary statistics using SRFs for the central bank and
ODCs. The SRFs 1SR for the central bank and the 2SR for ODCs (comprising commercial
banks, development banks, and finance companies, which accept deposits) are compiled
broadly in line with the methodology of the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and
Compilation Guide (MFSMCG) in terms of classification of financial instruments, asset
valuation, and sectoring of institutional units. The central bank survey, the ODCs survey, and
the depository corporations survey, compiled based on the SRFs, are published monthly in
the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
6. Coverage of Nepal’s ODCs can be expanded to include the SACCOs and the MFIs
which accept deposits. The SACCOs and MFIs together account for close to 10 percent of
the financial sector assets. The NRB publishes supplemental balance sheet data for MFIs but
does not include these data in the SRF-2SR reported to STA. SACCOs provide annual
balance sheet data to the Department of Cooperatives under MoLCP Alleviation, but lack of
prescribed accounting standard and capacity issues hamper regular reporting. A 2019 MFS
TA mission discussed the availability of SACCOs balance sheet data with the Department of
Cooperatives and the National Co-operative Bank Limited (NCBL) which agreed to assist the
NRB in obtaining data from the SACCOs. One of the recommendations of the mission was
that the NRB formalize an agreement with the Department of Cooperatives and the NCBL
covering data sharing, specifically the aggregated balance sheet of SACCOs, between the
institutions. The mission also suggested that once MFIs start reporting data in the new
reporting system of the NRB, they be included in the coverage of ODCs data reporting to the
IMF.
7. The NRB does not report data on OFCs to STA yet. The size of the OFCs sector makes
the compilation and dissemination of a quarterly OFC survey a priority for the NRB. The
OFCs sector comprising mainly of insurance companies, employees’ provident funds, mutual
funds, and merchant banks represent around 12 percent of total financial system assets.
More importantly, the OFCs are becoming increasingly important vehicles for long-term
savings mobilization and credit provision as the country’s financial system continues to
develop. A 2019 MFS TA mission found that the NRB does not have the necessary balance
sheet items to begin compiling data for the OFC sector in SRF 4SR. Following the mission,
the authorities issued simplified call report forms to collect data from OFCs.
8. A TA mission is scheduled in FY2023 to assist the NRB to compile the SRF 4SR and an
OFC survey based on SRF 4SR. The NRB has collected test data in the call report forms
developed by the last STA mission. The upcoming TA mission will assist the NRB to map the
data to the SRFs in line with the methodology of the MFSMCG and start regular reporting to
the IMF for the dissemination of an OFC survey in the IFS. Reporting of SRF 4SR will also
allow the compilation and dissemination of a financial corporation survey consolidating the
data for the central bank, ODCs and OFCs.
C. BALANCE SHEET APPROACH

9. The main data source for the BSA matrix are SRFs with additional information from the
external sector and government sector statistics. Monetary statistics data is the most
important input for a BSA as it captures data on financial intermediation by financial
corporations in the economy including information on counterpart sectors. The SRFs enable
developing from-whom-to-whom tables for stocks for inclusion in the BSA. Other data
sources include the international investment position (IIP), which provides information on
stocks of resident sectors with the rest of the world by instrument, and the government
financial balance sheet (GFS) information presenting assets and liabilities of the general
government or its subsectors by instrument and counterpart.
10. A BSA matrix for Nepal for end-2021 is provided in Table A.2, combining MFS and IIP
data. This version of from-whom-to-whom framework presents total assets and liabilities for
all the sectors by counterpart sector and by currency, enabling to trace who finances whom,
by how much and in what currency. Note that by disaggregating total assets and liabilities,
other BSA matrices can be produced for each financial instrument and for different maturity
where data are available. Nepal’s GFS data are not available for 2021.
11. Further improvements to underlying data would increase the completeness of the
matrix as well as its usefulness as an analytical tool. Specifically, the following
extensions would be useful:
 As MFS is the key source data, once the NRB starts reporting the OFC data based on
SRF 4SR and improves the quality of data on ODCs the completeness of the matrix
as well as its usefulness will improve substantially.
 The NRB compiles and reports annual IIP data based on the sixth edition of the
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6). Due to
lack of some breakdowns in IIP presentation as required under the BSA framework, the
BSA matrix above makes some assumptions for the external sector part, which could be
changed by users. As IIP does not provide separate data on external assets/liabilities of
nonfinancial corporations (NFCs) or HHs, both of which are clubbed together with NPISHs
and presented as one combined sector according to the BPM6, in the BSA matrix NFCs
are assumed to hold all the external assets and liabilities of this combined sector. In
addition, as the currency breakdown (in domestic and foreign currency) is not available in
the IIP, external assets and liabilities of the domestic sectors vis-à-vis the external sector
are assumed to be all in foreign currency. The NRB in coordination with other relevant
agencies should take steps to ensure consistency of IIP with other macroeconomic
datasets (1SR, 2SR, GFS, and external debt statistics (EDS)) to develop consistent
external sector assets/liabilities of the BSA matrix. Developing data on the currency
breakdown would further improve the quality of the BSA matrix. More generally, the NRB
should aim to improve the coverage of IIP data on other investment and portfolio
investment by improving data collection systems and preparing a coordinated portfolio
survey.
 Although the NRB regularly submits annual GFS data, including financial balance
sheet and stock positions by counterpart information for the general government,
the data is still presented at face value and, therefore, it is difficult to be
reconciliated with similar conceptual data in other macroeconomic datasets. Efforts
should be made to cover some institutional gaps in the general government information,
and to align data for stock positions on financial assets and liabilities with the
methodological framework of the GFSM 2014, particularly, the valuation method applied to

stock positions, and data reconciliation, both internally through the GFS compilation
process and, also, with other macroeconomic datasets.
12. Most of the remaining data gaps in the BSA matrixafter using MFS, IIP and GFS
datacan be filled with data on NFCs and HHs. However, collecting data on positions
between NFCs and HHs can be challenging, as they can only be obtained from national
accounts-related data sources. Data quality, coverage, periodicity, and timeliness are usually
key issues, even if source data are available.
D. FINANCIAL ACCESS SURVEY
13. The NRB has also been reporting data to the IMF’s Financial Access Survey (FAS)
since its launch in 2009. Nepal has been a regular reporter of key indicators on access to
and use of financial services in Nepal for the period 2004-2021 including number of
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults & number of ATMs per 100,000 adults
adopted by the UN to monitor Target 8.10 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Since 2019, Nepal has also been reporting indicators on mobile and internet banking and
mobile money. The country doesn’t yet report gender dis-aggregated data on use of financial
services. The FSSR mission discovered that some gender data on financial access is
available with the authorities and recommends that the NRB coordinates with IMF to start
reporting this data.
Table 5. Nepal Financial Soundness Indicators 2021Q2-2022Q2

2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4 2022Q1 2022Q2
Core FSIs for Deposit Takers
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted 14.2 13.4 13.3 13.5 13.5
assets
Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 10.9 10.4 10.4 10.6 10.7
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.3
capital
Tier 1 capital to assets 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.2
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
Provisions to nonperforming loans 68.0 70.6 71.4 66.8 68.3
Return on assets 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8
Return on equity 12.5 11.0 11.3 11.1 12.7
Interest margin to gross income 71.0 67.9 70.5 72.6 75.9
Noninterest expenses to gross income 44.1 46.4 46.5 46.6 46.4
Liquid assets to total assets 22.2 19.6 18.7 19.2 22.1
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 32.5 29.7 25.5 26.7 43.6
Net open position in foreign exchange to 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.5
capital
Additional FSIs for Deposit Takers
Personnel expenses to noninterest 61.2 64.3 62.1 60.5 59.9
expenses
Spread between highest and lowest 115.0 7.0 24.0 50.0 5.0
interbank rates (base points)
Customer deposits to total (non- 93.3 87.9 87.3 87.1 91.3
interbank) loans
Foreign-currency-denominated loans to 3.8 3.7 2.5 1.1 1.0
total loans

Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities 3.4 3.7 2.8 3.1 3.4
to total liabilities
Additional FSIs for Other Financial ... ... ... ...
Corporations
OFCs' assets to total financial system 17.9 17.8 17.6 17.6 18.2
assets: total OFCs
OFCs' assets to gross domestic product: 28.4 29.0 29.3 27.3 28.1
OFCs
Real Estate Markets
Residential real estate loans to total 7.6 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.8
gross loans
Commercial real estate loans to total 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4
gross loans
Households
Household debt to gross domestic 26.2 27.5 28.8 27.0 26.35
product
Table 6. Nepal Balance Sheet Approach Matrix with MFS and IIP data
Balance Sheet Approach Matrix
Nepal
2021 - Percent of GDP (120 Billions)
Government Central Bank Other Depository Other Financial Nonfinancial Households External Total
Corporations Corporations Corporations
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Government Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: OFCs (GFS/MFS estimation)(GFS/MFS estimation) Source: IIP
Total 2.06 15.56 18.68 1.20 … … … … - - 22.47 - 43.21 16.76
In domestic currency 2.06 15.56 18.68 1.20 … … … … - - - - 20.74 16.76
In foreign currency - - - - … … - - - - 22.47 - 22.47 -
Central Bank Source: CB Source: CB Source: CB Source: CB Source: CB Source: CB
Total 15.56 2.06 7.64 7.57 - 0.02 0.30 0.00 13.37 0.13 1.17 28.15 38.04 37.93
In domestic currency 15.56 2.06 7.64 7.57 - 0.02 0.30 0.00 13.37 0.13 - - 36.87 9.78
In foreign currency - - - - - - - - - - 1.17 28.15 1.17 28.15
Oth. Dep. Source: ODCs Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: ODCs Source: ODCs Source: ODCs Source: ODCs
Total 1.20 18.68 7.57 7.64 7.22 11.23 21.54 5.54 20.54 69.47 87.57 38.85 2.26 3.25 147.88 154.65
In domestic currency 1.20 18.68 7.57 7.64 6.36 10.17 21.54 5.54 20.41 65.88 85.92 38.80 1.10 - 144.09 146.71
In foreign currency - - - - 0.86 1.06 - (0.00) 0.12 3.59 1.65 0.04 1.16 3.25 3.79 7.94
Oth. Fin Corporations Source: OFCs Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: OFCs Source: OFCs Source: OFCs Source: OFCs
Total … … 0.02 - 5.54 21.54 … … … … … … … … 5.56 21.54
In domestic currency … … 0.02 - 5.54 21.54 … … … … … … … … 5.56 21.54
In foreign currency … … - - (0.00) - … … … … … … … … (0.00) -
Nonfinancial Corporatio(GFS/MFS estimation) Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: OFCs (No sectoral data) Source: IIP
Total … … 0.00 0.30 69.47 20.54 … … 7.89 0.91 77.36 21.74
In domestic currency … … 0.00 0.30 65.88 20.41 … … - - 65.88 20.71
In foreign currency - - - - 3.59 0.12 … … 7.89 0.91 11.48 1.03
Households (GFS/MFS estimation) Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: OFCs (No sectoral data) Source: IIP
Total - - 0.13 13.37 38.85 87.57 … … … … 38.98 100.94
In domestic currency - - 0.13 13.37 38.80 85.92 … … … … 38.93 99.29
In foreign currency - - - - 0.04 1.65 … … … … 0.04 1.65
External Source: IIP Source: CB Source: ODCs Source: OFCs Source: IIP Source: IIP
Total - 22.47 28.15 1.17 3.25 2.26 … … 0.91 7.89 … … 32.31 33.79
In domestic currency - - - - - 1.10 … … - - … … - 1.10
In foreign currency - 22.47 28.15 1.17 3.25 1.16 … … 0.91 7.89 … … 32.31 32.69
Total 16.76 43.21 37.93 38.04 150.63 151.89 21.54 5.56 21.74 77.36 100.94 38.98 33.79 32.31 CHECK CHECK
In domestic currency 16.76 20.74 9.78 36.87 142.90 147.90 21.54 5.56 20.71 65.88 99.29 38.93 1.10 - 291.35 295.16
In foreign currency - 22.47 28.15 1.17 7.74 3.99 - (0.00) 1.03 11.48 1.65 0.04 32.69 32.31 70.23 70.43

Annex II. Assessment of TA Needs in Financial Sector
Statistics
14. The authorities in Nepal will benefit from TA in financial sector statistics. The NRB
understands that statistical coverage of the financial sector is essential for surveillance and is
focused on closing important data gaps especially in the MFS workstream.
15. More broadly, NRB staff are encouraged to seek to attend regional and IMF
Headquarters (HQ) training courses on financial sector statistics. STA regularly delivers
courses on both MFS and the FSIs. HQ courses are offered once every two years, although
the schedule has been disrupted by Covid-19. Curriculum details and the schedule, once in-
person training recommences, are available on the webpage of the IMF Institute for Capacity
Development.
A. FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS INDICATORS
16. The NRB received TA on FSIs in 2021. The mission assisted the NRB staff in compiling
select FSIs for OFCs for reporting to the IMF. Specifically, the mission assisted the NRB staff
in (i) reviewing source data for OFCs to assess their adequacy for compiling FSIs; (ii)
mapping source data to the FSI templates to produce the OFCs sectoral financial statements
and indicators; and (iii) developing a workplan to compile and report selected FSIs for OFCs.
Though the mission recommended reporting of FSIs for OFC starting December 2021, the
authorities haven’t been able to report the data for OFCs.
17. NRB staff might need TA in the medium to long term to implement all the
recommendations of 2019 FSIs Guide. The implementation of the 2019 FSIs Guide
includes the expansion of the set of FSIs for the DTs, including new indicators for OFCs,
NFCs, and HHs, and compiling concentration and distribution measures (CDMs) to capture
tail risks, concentrations, variations in distributions, and the volatility of indicators over time
that simple averages can miss. While a 2021 TA mission assisted the NRB to compile
additional FSIs for OFCs, the NRB wishes to pursue compilation of the FSIs for the NFCs
and HHs sectors. This will require collaboration with the Central Bureau of Statistics and
Registrar of Companies to assess the adequacy of currently available data and to develop a
road map to fill the identified gaps and then compile and report the additional FSIs. So, while
TA is not needed in the immediate future, TA on FSIs in the medium-long term can be
considered.
B. MONETARY AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS
18. A TA mission for expanding the coverage of MFS to OFCs is already planned for
FY2023. As per recommendations of a 2020 MFS TA mission, the NRB is currently focusing
on collecting data from non-bank sector including the MFIs, Citizen Investment Trust,
Employee Provident Fund, and Hydroelectricity Investment and Development Company using
simplified report forms. Not much progress has been made, to receive data from insurance
companies on the designed templates. So, a TA mission has been planned to map the data
already collected for the OFCs sub-sectors to the SRF 4SR following the methodology of the

MFSMCG. Further the mission will review the progress made in the remaining OFC sub-
sectors.
19. The TA mission on MFS will also discuss the progress made by the NRB on
cooperating with the Department of Cooperatives on collecting balance sheet data for
SACCOs. Based on the feedback received, the TA mission will provide a roadmap on how to
include the SACCOs in the MFS. The TA mission will also identify the MFIs which accept
deposits and map them to the SRF-2SR accordingly. Future TA may be needed to include
the SACCOs in the SRF-2SR.

1NPLEA2023003

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1NPLEA2023003

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

1NPLEA2023003

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IMF Country Report No.

Copies of this report are available to the public from

International Monetary Fund • Publication Services

International Monetary Fund

© 2023 International Monetary Fund

Monetary and Capital Markets

Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 4

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 8

1. Diagnostic Review and Main Recommendations ........................................................................ 18

2. Technical Assistance Roadmap .................................................................................................... 44

Annex I. Assessment of Financial Sector Statistics ....................................................................... 61

Annex II. Assessment of TA Needs in Financial Sector Statistics.................................................66

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 3

BCM Business Continuity Management

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 4

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 5

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 6

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 7

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 8

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 9

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 10

Term (LT): around 30 months.

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 11

B. OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

3. Nepal’s financial sector is large

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 12

Employees Provident Fund (EPF), 5,000

Hydroelectricity Investment and 2,000

estimated number of 30,879

Table 2. Number of Financial Institutions in Nepal

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 13

the external sector came under 1,000 20%

pressure. As of 2022, imports 800 15%

increasing risks in the external sector Workers' Remittances (Rs. in billions)

Figure 4. Total Credit and Deposit Figure 5. Weighted Average Lending

Source: Nepali Authorities

8. Multiple challenges remain in addressing financial sector risks and vulnerabilities,

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 14

Figure 6. NPL/Total Loans (%) Country Figure 7. Loans and Advances of

Bangladesh Fixed Deposit Against

- 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0

9. Oversight of MFIs and SACCOs,

based rather than risk-based.

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 15

D. STOCKTAKING OF PAST TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Table 3. IMF MCM Technical Assistance Since 2014

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 16

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 17

A. BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 18

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 19

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 20

34. The NRB is recommended to implement a comprehensive framework for consolidated

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 21

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 22

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 23

47. No detailed intra-financial sector interconnectedness analyses and domino-type contagion

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 24

IMF | Technical Report – Nepal Financial Sector Stability Review | 25