THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 168734. April 24, 2009.]

MARCELINO LOPEZ, FELISA LOPEZ, LEONARDO LOPEZ and

ZOILO LOPEZ , petitioners, vs. JOSE ESQUIVEL, JR. and
CARLITO TALENS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 170621. April 24, 2009.]

NOEL RUBBER & DEVELOPMENT CORP. doing business

under the name of "NORDEC PHIL." and DR. POTENCIANO
MALVAR, petitioners, vs. JOSE ESQUIVEL, JR., CARLITO
TALENS, MARCELINO LOPEZ, FELISA LOPEZ, LEONARDO
LOPEZ, ZOILO LOPEZ, ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, ATTY.
GEORGE A. ANG CHENG, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

Before this Court are two consolidated 1 Petitions for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. ECaTAI

The petitioners in G.R. No. 168734, namely, Marcelino, Felisa,

Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez (Lopez siblings), seek to reverse and
set aside the Decision 2 dated 14 February 2005 and Resolution 3 dated 27
June 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200. In its assailed
Decision, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision 4 dated 11 January
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Civil
Case No. 96-4193, which (1) ordered the Lopez siblings to vacate and to
convey to Jose Esquivel, Jr. (Esquivel) and Carlito Talens (Talens) a parcel of
land, measuring 2.6950 hectares, situated in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal
5 (subject property); and (2) directed the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
Metropolitan Manila, 6 to divest the Lopez siblings of their title over the
subject property and to issue title over the same property in the names of
Esquivel and Talens. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court denied for
lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Lopez siblings.
On the other hand, Noel Rubber and Development Corporation (Nordec
Phil.) and Dr. Potenciano Malvar (Dr. Malvar), the petitioners in G.R. No.
170621, pray for the setting aside of the Resolutions dated 6 October 2005
7 and 16 November 2005 8 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428.
The Court of Appeals, in its questioned Resolution dated 6 October 2005,
dismissed for prematurity the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar under Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
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 Procedure, assailing the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case
No. 96-4193, as they were not impleaded in said case, neither as
indispensable nor necessary parties. The appellate court, in its other
questioned Resolution dated 16 November 2005, denied the Motion for
Amendment and/or Reconsideration filed by Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.
The antecedent facts of both Petitions are recounted as follows:
G.R. No. 168734
Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez siblings.
During Hermogenes' lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of Lands for a
homestead patent over a parcel of land, with an area of 19.4888 hectares,
located in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal. Hermogenes' application was
docketed as Homestead Patent No. 138612. After ascertaining that the land
was free from claim of any private person, the Bureau of Lands approved
Hermogenes' application. In 1939, Hermogenes submitted his final proof of
compliance with the residency and cultivation requirements of the Public
Land Act. As a matter of course, the aforesaid parcel of land was surveyed
by a government surveyor and the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by
the Director of Lands on 7 February 1939. The Director of Lands, thereafter,
ordered the issuance of the homestead patent in Hermogenes' name. The
patent was subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for
transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title 9 in
Hermogenes' name. 10
Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent over
the 19.4888-hectare land, Hermogenes sold 11 the same to Ambrocio Aguilar
(Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 12 dated 31 July 1959. aHICDc

Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property, with
an area of 2.6950 hectares, was erroneously included in survey plan H-
138612 of Hermogenes' property. The subject property supposedly formed
part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of
Hermogenes. Resultantly, on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes executed a
Quitclaim 13 over his rights and interests to the subject property 14 in Hizon's
favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land 15 dated 26
August 1968.
Hermogenes died 16 on 20 August 1982. The Lopez siblings, as
Hermogenes' heirs, filed an action with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,
for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959,
executed between Hermogenes and Aguilar, and which involved the entire
19.4888-hectare land. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A. In a
Decision 17 dated 5 February 1985, the RTC declared the aforesaid Deed of
Absolute Sale null and void ab initio as it was made in violation of Section
118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended. The said RTC Decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision 18 dated 18 August 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242.
In a Resolution 19 dated 13 April 1988, this Court denied Aguilar's appeal,
docketed as G.R. No. 81092, for being filed late.
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 On 4 March 1993, on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968 executed by Hizon in their favor,
Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for Registration of the subject
property with the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. It was docketed as LRC
Case No. 93-1211. The Lopez siblings filed an opposition to the application
in LRC Case No. 93-1211, asserting, among other grounds, that: (1) they did
not know the persons and personal circumstances of Esquivel and Talens
who were not the former's adjoining property owners; (2) the subject
property, which Esquivel and Talens sought to have registered, was already
titled under the Torrens system and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) No. 207990 to No. 207997 20 in the names of the Lopez siblings; and
(3) Tax Declaration No. 04-10304 of Esquivel and Talens covering the subject
property was spurious. The Lopez siblings also moved for the dismissal of
LRC Case No. 93-1211 invoking the final and executory Decision 21 dated 5
February 1985 of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 463-
A, which affirmed Hermogenes' title to the 19.4888-hectare land, which
included the subject property.
The RTC rendered its Decision 22 on 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No. 93-
1211, granting the Application for Registration of the subject property filed
by Esquivel and Talens. Accordingly, the Lopez siblings filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said RTC judgment. Acting on the Motion of the Lopez
siblings, the RTC issued an Order 23 dated 23 May 1996 in which it corrected
several errors in its earlier decision, i.e., a typographical error on the area of
the subject property, and a mistake in the conversion of the area of the
subject property from square meters to hectares. The RTC also stated in the
same Order that it could not direct the amendment of the TCTs in the names
of the Lopez siblings, to exclude therefrom the subject property which was
adjudged to Esquivel and Talens, as the RTC was sitting only as a land
registration court. The RTC, thus, advised Esquivel and Talens to file an
action for reconveyance of the subject property and only when Esquivel and
Talens succeed in such action can they subsequently cause the registration
of the subject property in their names. SaTAED

Following the advice of the RTC, Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, on 2 October 1996, a Complaint 24 for
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of the subject property against
the Lopez siblings. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193.
In their Complaint, Esquivel and Talens alleged that when the Lopez
siblings had the land they inherited from Hermogenes registered, they
included the subject property, which Hermogenes already conveyed to Hizon
in the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965. Hence, the subject property was
erroneously included in TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, in the names of the Lopez
siblings. The subject property is presently occupied and in the physical
possession of the Lopez siblings. 25
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Lopez siblings
denied all the allegations of Esquivel and Talens. As their special defenses,
the Lopez siblings called attention to the non-compliance by Esquivel and
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 Talens with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
on non-forum shopping, considering that there was another case before the
RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, 26 also involving the subject property and
the issues on the genuineness and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968, executed by Hizon in favor of
Esquivel and Talens. The Lopez siblings further averred that the cause of
action of Esquivel and Talens was already barred by the statute of limitations
and laches since they failed to assert their alleged rights to the subject
property for 25 years. 27 The Lopez siblings additionally interposed that the
Quitclaim involving the subject property, invoked by Esquivel and Talens,
was ineffective, because by the time it was executed by Hermogenes in
favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes had already sold his
entire 19.4888-hectare land, of which the subject property was part, to
Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings finally argued that the said
Quitclaim was a nullity as it contravened Section 17 28 of the Public Land
Act, as amended. 29

On 11 January 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case 96-

4193, granting the prayer of Esquivel and Talens for the reconveyance and
recovery of possession of the subject property. The RTC held that the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959 between Hermogenes and Aguilar was
already declared null and void ab initio by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Lopez siblings were estopped from asserting said Deed to
defeat the rights of Esquivel and Talens to the subject property. The RTC also
ruled that Esquivel and Talens were not guilty of laches because as early as
1986, they had declared the subject property in their names for taxation
purposes. Moreover, in 1993, Esquivel and Talens filed before the RTC an
application for registration of the subject property, LRC Case No. 93-1222,
where they obtained a favorable judgment. The RTC lastly found that the
action for reconveyance of Esquivel and Talens was not yet barred by
prescription as it was instituted within the 30-year prescriptive period.
The Lopez siblings filed an appeal of the aforementioned RTC Decision
to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 70200.
In their Appellants' Brief, the Lopez siblings assigned the following
errors: SCETHa

1. The trial court presided by Judge Mauricio M. Rivera erred in

failing to dismiss this case for reconveyance on the grounds of:
(a) prescription of action; and (b) laches;

2. [Hermogenes] was no longer the owner of the property when he

executed the [quitclaim] dated [29 November 1965] because of
the previous sale to third party on [31 July 1959];
3. There was (sic) no prior records in the Bureau of Lands or in the
assessor's office that [Hizon], the predecessor-in-interest of the
[Esquivel and Talens] is a landholder or a previous tax declarant;
4. The court a quo thru the same judge indiscreetly based primarily
the appealed decision on its erroneous findings and conclusions
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 in LRC Case No. 93-1211 contrary to the findings and conclusions
of this Honorable Court among others in CA G.R. CV No. 07745,
entitled Ambrocio Aguilar v. Heirs of Fernando Gorospe, et al.
promulgated on 31 August 1989; in CA G.R. CV No. 06242,
entitled Marcelino Lopez, et al. v. Sps. Ambrocio [Aguilar] and
Pelagia Viray promulgated on 18 August 1987; and the findings
and conclusions of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 90380 entitled
Santos v. Court of Appeals promulgated on 13 September 1990
among others.

5. Having already erred in favor of the [Esquivel and Talens], the

same presiding judge of the trial court erringly proceeded to
conduct hearing and to decide this case despite the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 95-3693 entitled Angelina Hizon, et al. v. Carlito
Talens, et al. , involving the same subject property and the
efficacy and validity of the [quitclaim] solely relied upon by the
[Esquivel and Talens]. 30

On 14 February 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

dismissing the appeal of the Lopez siblings and affirming in toto the RTC
Decision dated 11 January 2001. The appellate court ruled that the Lopez
siblings are barred by the doctrine of estoppel in pais from challenging the
Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes over the subject property in favor of
Hizon on 29 November 1965 on the ground that Hermogenes no longer
owned the subject property at that time. The Lopez siblings themselves, as
Hermogenes' heirs, filed with the RTC Civil Case No. 463-A for the
cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the 19.4888-hectare land
(which included the subject property), executed by Hermogenes in favor of
Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings obtained a favorable judgment in
Civil Case No. 463-A as the RTC therein declared void ab initio the aforesaid
Deed of Absolute Sale. Hence, the Lopez siblings are now estopped from
asserting the validity of the same Deed of Absolute Sale so as to void or
nullify the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes in favor of Aguilar, on which
Esquivel and Talens based their claim to the subject property. Any deviation
by the Lopez siblings from their previous position would definitely cause
injury and prejudice to Esquivel and Talens, who acted relying on the
knowledge that the previous sale between Hermogenes and Aguilar of the
land, which included the subject property, was already adjudged void ab
initio. The Lopez siblings, moreover, were only subrogated to whatever rights
and interests their father Hermogenes still had over the subject property
upon the latter's death in 1982. They were, thus, bound by the Quitclaim
Hermogenes executed in 1965 involving the subject property. 31 AHECcT

The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision filed by the

Lopez siblings was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 27
June 2005.
The Lopez siblings are presently before this Court seeking the
resolution of the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [Court of Appeals] erred in applying the rule of
estoppel in disregard of the law of the case doctrine (a) in the
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 Decision promulgated on [13 September 1990] in G.R. No. 90380
entitled Eduardo Santos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals ; (b) in
the Decision [E]n [B]anc promulgated on [24 September 2002]
in G.R. No. 123780, entitled In Re: Petition Seeking for
Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final
and Executory but conflicting Decisions of [this Court] Col. Pedro
Cabuay, Jr. v. Marcelino Lopez, et al. ; and (c) in the Decision
promulgated on [5 March 2003] in G.R. No. 127827 entitled
"Eleuterio Lopez, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, Spouses
Marcelino Lopez and Cristina Lopez, et al.;"
II. Whether or not the [appellate court] was correct in applying the
rule of estoppel in pais in disregard of the peremptory and
[personal-to-the-applicant's-homestead] provisions of the Public
Land Law or Commonwealth Act 141, as amended;

III. Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their predecessor-in-interest

barred by the statute of limitations?

IV. Are the [Esquivel and Talens] and their predecessor-in-interest

guilty of laches?

V. The quitclaim relied upon by [Esquivel and Talens] is intrinsically

void and has violated the provisions of the Public Land Law. 32

The Lopez siblings aver that a deeper analysis of the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals will reveal the latter's utter disregard for or deviation
from the law of the case set by this Court in its Decisions in Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 33 Group Commander, Intelligence & Security Group, Philippine
Army v. Dr. Malvar , 34 and Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 35 where the issue on
the validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes, father of the
Lopez siblings, was already passed upon. In these three Decisions, the Court
already declared the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes valid.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule on estoppel in
disregard of the doctrine of law of the case. AEITDH

The Lopez siblings further argue that the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals runs counter to the "personal-to-the-homestead-applicant" policy
36 provisions embodied in Sections 12, 13, and 17 of the Public Land Act, as

amended, that this Court upheld in Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez. The Court
precisely disregarded the rule on estoppel in pais or the principle of trust in
said three cases as it had no room for application under the tenor or context
of the mandatory personal-to-the-homestead-applicant policy provisions of
the Public Land Act, as amended. It was, thus, erroneous for the appellate
court to apply estoppel in pais in ruling against the Lopez siblings in its
assailed judgment.
The Lopez siblings additionally avow that in the proceedings conducted
on Hermogenes' homestead application by the Bureau of Lands, it was
verified that the land applied for, which included the subject property, was
disposable public land. If it was true that the subject property was only
erroneously included in the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes, then
such an award could only be challenged by the government in an action for
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 reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act, as amended; or objected
to by a private person under Section 102 of the same statute. Resultantly,
Esquivel and Talens could not have availed themselves of the recourse
prescribed by Section 38 37 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, in their action for reconveyance of the subject property.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may only be availed of by an
aggrieved owner whose property was fraudulently included in a decree of
registration. A decree of registration under the Land Registration Act merely
confirms, but does not confer, ownership over private land so as to bring it
under the operation of the Torrens system. The remedies provided under
Sections 101 and 102 of the Public Land Act, on one hand, and Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, on the other, are exclusive of each other,
considering the basic distinction between the subject matters thereof, i.e.,
the award or grant of public land in the former, and the registration of
private land in the latter.
The Lopez siblings also maintain that Hizon, predecessor-in-interest of
Esquivel and Talens, who claimed ownership over the subject property, was
duty-bound to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family by
opposing or taking exception to Hermogenes' homestead application, which
included said property. Even after the homestead patent over the subject
property was already awarded to Hermogenes, Hizon still had opportunity to
protest the same before the Bureau of Lands, prior to the registration of said
homestead patent with the Register of Deeds. For failing to take appropriate
actions, Hizon, and his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now
barred from doing so by the statute of limitations and laches.
Finally, the Lopez siblings assert that the reliance by the Court of
Appeals on the legal efficacy of the Quitclaim, involving the subject property
executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon, is misplaced. The reason for the
renunciation, waiver, or repudiation by Hermogenes of his rights to the
subject property in Hizon's favor, as stated in the said Quitclaim, is not a
recognized cause or consideration for conveyance of a parcel of land subject
of a homestead patent under the prohibitive and mandatory provisions of the
Public Land Act, as amended. Moreover, whatever efficacy the Quitclaim had
was already barred by the ruling of this Court en banc in Cabuay and Lopez.
DHTCaI

The instant Petition is meritorious.

Since the issues in this case are interrelated, the Court shall discuss
them concurrently.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of
the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law
of the case, whether or not correct on general principles, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
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 case before the court. 38 Thus, the court reviewing the succeeding appeal
will not re-litigate the case but instead apply the ruling in the previous
appeal. This enables the appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily
and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case and upon any and
subsequent appeal. 39
Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the Decisions of this Court in
Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, cited by the Lopez siblings in their instant
Petition, cannot be regarded as the law of the case herein. The law of the
case applies only when (1) a question is passed upon by an appellate court,
and (2) the appellate court remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate courts on subsequent
appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been
previously settled. It must be emphasized, therefore, that the law of the case
finds application only in the same case between the same parties .
The Petition at bar is without question separate and distinct from
Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, although they may all involve, in varying
degrees, the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the 19.8222-
hectare land, which included the subject property. First, Santos, Cabuay, and
Lopez, directly tackled the validity of the homestead patent granted to
Hermogenes over the 19.8222-hectare land; in the instant case, the validity
of the homestead patent thus granted to Hermogenes is no longer in issue,
but it is alleged herein that said patent erroneously included the subject
property. Second, to recall, the instant Petition originated from Civil Case No.
96-4193, the Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of the subject
property filed by Esquivel and Talens against the Lopez siblings before the
RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. In no instance was a question or issue in
Civil Case No. 96-4193 ever been previously raised to an appellate court.
Santos, Cabuay, and Lopez, did not pass upon any question or issue raised
before this Court from Civil Case No. 96-4193. And thirdly, despite the fact
that all these cases may have common antecedent facts and sometimes
involved the same personalities, the Lopez siblings (herein petitioners) and
Esquivel and Talens (herein respondents) were not parties in Santos,
Cabuay, and Lopez. ASaTCE

The Court now proceeds to resolve the issue of whether Esquivel and
Talens have a right to the reconveyance of the subject property based on
the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes in Hizon's favor on 29 November
1965. Such determination shall be dependent on whether the Quitclaim was
executed beyond the period within which encumbrance or alienation of the
land acquired by homestead patent is prohibited; and whether the Quitclaim
effected a valid conveyance of the subject property from Hermogenes to
Hizon.
Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits any
encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under homestead provisions
from the date of the approval of application and for a term of five years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant. The same provision
provides that no alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after
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 five years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid without
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which
approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
In this case, the subject property was included, whether correctly or
erroneously, in the 19.4888-hectare land awarded to Hermogenes, by virtue
of a homestead patent, issued on 7 February 1939. The Quitclaim over the
subject property, a 2.6950-hectare portion of the said 19.4888-hectare land,
was executed by Hermogenes in Hizon's favor on 29 November 1965.
Between the date of issuance of the homestead patent to Hermogenes and
that of the execution of the Quitclaim, more than 26 years had passed.
Therefore, the execution of the Quitclaim was no longer within the five-year
period within which the land covered by the homestead patent issued to
Hermogenes must not be encumbered or alienated; and was also beyond the
period between five and 25 years following the issuance of patent within
which approval of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources is still
necessary to make the alienation or encumbrance valid. 40
Although it has been established that the Quitclaim was executed
beyond any of the prohibitive and/or restrictive periods under the Public
Land Act, as amended, the Court must next look into whether the Quitclaim
had the effect of validly conveying the subject property to Hizon.
The pertinent portions of the Quitclaim in question read as follows:
2. That it has come to my personal knowledge that a
boundary owner of my above-cited parcel of land by the name of
[Hizon] has duly caused the survey of his land bordering mine . . .; that
after the actual execution of the survey of the land of said [Hizon], it
was found out that the land which has been in his possession for many
many years or since time immemorial is within my plan denominated
as H-138612;

xxx xxx xxx

5. That in fairness and in justice to [Hizon], I herewith
renounce, repudiate and unconditionally and irrevocably waive and
quitclaim all my rights, shares, interests or participations on the above-
described parcel of land in favor of [Hizon], of legal age, Filipino,
married to Angelina Villarosa and a resident of Antipolo, Rizal, and for
this purpose I am agreeable that my plan H-138612 be duly amended
so as to segregate the above-described portion which is owned by the
aforesaid [Hizon]. 41ACIDSc

It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted paragraphs of the Quitclaim

that the intention of Hermogenes in executing the same was to restore to
Hizon the subject property, which Hermogenes believed to have been
mistakenly included in his homestead patent.
It is worthy to note, however, that the subject property was part of the
19.4888-hectare land covered by the homestead patent awarded by the
Bureau of Lands to Hermogenes. The 19.4888-hectare land was identified
and measured in a survey conducted by a government surveyor and the
resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the Director of Lands. The
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 approval of survey plan H-138612 and the grant of the homestead patent
over the 19.4888-hectare land in favor of Hermogenes, performed as part of
the official functions of the Director of Lands and the Bureau of Lands, enjoy
the presumption of regularity. 42 Reasonable doubt is thus cast on the
supposed mistake which resulted in the inclusion of the subject property in
the 19.4888-hectare land awarded to Hermogenes by virtue of the
homestead patent.
Even assuming that the homestead patent awarding the 19.4888-
hectare land to Hermogenes did erroneously include the subject property,
Hermogenes could not simply convey said property to Hizon, nor could Hizon
easily recover the same, by virtue of a mere Quitclaim. Lands acquired
under homestead patents come from the public domain. If the subject
property was erroneously included in the homestead patent awarded to
Hermogenes, then the subject property must be returned to the State and
not to Hizon. Furthermore, the survey plan conducted and homestead patent
issued in Hermogenes' name covered a 19.4888-hectare land; to exclude
therefrom the 2.6950-hectare subject property (since it purportedly
belonged to Hizon) would mean that Hermogenes actually acquired land with
an area less that what he was awarded under the homestead patent. This
complication reveals that any alleged mistake as regards the subject
property is not a simple and private matter between Hermogenes and Hizon;
but is primarily a problem between Hermogenes and the State, the latter
having awarded the 19.4888-hectare land to the former by virtue of the
homestead patent.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, as amended, a
homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age
of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than
24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must show
that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality
where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the
land applied for. 43
In this case, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes' application for
homestead patent over the 19.4888-hectare land after finding him qualified
for the same. In contrast, the only evidence supporting Hizon's claim to the
subject property was the Quitclaim. There is no other proof that Hizon
possessed, cultivated, and introduced improvements on the subject
property. Neither is there any showing that after the execution of the
Quitclaim, Hizon himself applied for a homestead patent over the subject
property. In fact, it is undisputed that the subject property has always been
in the possession of Hermogenes, then the Lopez Siblings. Hizon and
Esquivel and Talens never came into the possession of the subject property
even after the execution of the supposed deeds of conveyance in their favor.
ScHAIT

The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held
in trust by Hermogenes for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the rule that a
homestead applicant must personally comply with the legal requirements for
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 a homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself must possess the
necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a
circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply "in behalf
of another", as the latter may be disqualified by or might not comply with the
residency and cultivation requirements. 44
In the end, the Quitclaim dated 29 November 1965 could not have
validly conveyed or transferred ownership of the subject property from
Hermogenes to Hizon. It is null and void for being contrary to the provisions
of the Public Land Act, as amended. As a result, Hizon acquired no right over
the subject property which he could have sold to Esquivel and Talens; and
the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land dated 26 August 1968,
executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens, is similarly void for lack of
an object.
Even granting arguendo, that the Quitclaim is valid and transferred
ownership of the subject property from Hermogenes to Hizon, the latter and
his successors-in-interest, Esquivel and Talens, are now barred by the statute
of limitations and laches from asserting their rights to the subject property,
after failing to exercise the same for an unreasonable length of time.
Laches has been defined as the failure of or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of
laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to
do what should have been done, but failed to do so. 45
In the instant case, when Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC their
application for registration of the subject property on 5 March 1993, 28
years had passed since the execution by Hermogenes of the Quitclaim
covering the subject property in favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965; and
25 years had elapsed from the execution by Hizon of the Deed of Absolute
Sale of the subject property in favor of Esquivel and Talens on 26 August
1968. During these periods, without providing any reasons therefor, neither
Hizon nor Esquivel and Talens took possession of the subject property or
exercised in any other way their rights over the same. DaIAcC

Finally, concerning this Petition, is the issue of whether the Lopez

siblings are estopped from questioning the validity of the Quitclaim, as ruled
by the Court of Appeals? It bears to point out that the question of estoppel is
relevant only if the Lopez siblings are challenging the validity of the
Quitclaim on the ground that when Hermogenes executed the same, he had
already previously sold his 19.4888-hectare land, which included the subject
property, to Aguilar. In recollection, the Lopez siblings successfully had the
said sale of the land by Hermogenes to Aguilar nullified. Since the Court
herein refuses to give effect to the Quitclaim in question on other grounds
already discussed above, the issue of estoppel actually loses relevance and
need not be resolved anymore.
Considering the pronouncements of this Court that the Quitclaim
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 covering the subject property executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon is
null and void for being contrary to the provisions of the Public Land Act, as
amended, on homestead grants; and that the Deed of Absolute Sale of the
subject property executed by Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens is null
and void for lack of a proper object, then Esquivel and Talens have no basis
to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. Hizon never owned the
subject property and could never have sold the same to Esquivel and Talens.
G.R. No. 170621
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed with the Court of
Appeals by Nordec Phil., a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines; and Dr. Malvar, President and General Manager of
petitioner Nordec Phil., docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 91428.
The Lopez siblings, Esquivel and Talens, were named respondents in
CA-G.R. CV No. 91428 (and also herein), being the parties to Civil Case No.
96-4193, wherein the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, rendered the
Decision dated 11 January 2001, which Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar were
seeking to have annulled by the Court of Appeals. Atty. Sergio Angeles (Atty.
Angeles) and Atty. George A. Ang Cheng (Atty. Ang Cheng) were similarly
impleaded as respondents in said petition before the appellate court on
account of their involvement as counsels for the parties in Civil Case No. 96-
4193.
In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the
RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel
and Talens. The subject property, however, was already supposedly sold by
Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar.cICHTD

Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of
Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of Hermogenes,
were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land situated at Overlooking,
Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz, (formerly Barrio dela Paz), Antipolo
City, Rizal, covered by plan (LRC) Psd-3289610, with a total area of 19.4888
hectares. 46 Among these parcels of land were Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8,
covered by TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997 47 of the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina City, with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares, and which
constituted the subject property. 48
Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the
aforementioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely, Atty.
Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao), 49 as evidenced by several Deeds of
Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making such
purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large, scale *
improvements on the subject property, among which were several business
establishments, 50 at a cost of no less than P50,000,000.
In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-
4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, entitled Heirs of
Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez , it was Atty. Angeles who
represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in
said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss. 51 In Cabuay, Jr. , wherein Dr. Malvar
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 and the Lopez siblings were named the respondents in the Petition Seeking
for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and
Executory but Conflicting Decisions of this Court involving the subject
property, it was also Atty. Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar.
Sometime after 2 August 2004, Atty. Angeles again informed Nordec
Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed against the Lopez
siblings involving the subject property. The said case was the action for
reconveyance filed by Esquivel and Talens, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
4193 before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, but which was already, by
then, the subject of an appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 70200 (and which would eventually reach this Court in G.R.
No. 168734). Atty. Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case
involving the subject property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar the Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which Atty.
Angeles filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez
siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own inquiry and
were surprised to discover that the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11
January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was actually adverse to their rights
and interest; and despite this, they were neither impleaded nor represented
therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar, did not lift a finger to protect their rights in said case.
IcHSCT

Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar

that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was
rendered under circumstances amounting to extrinsic fraud and lack or
denial of due process, insofar as said Decision adversely affected their rights
to and interests in the subject property. Among the circumstances which
allegedly amounted to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process were
described by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar. Among these: (1) when Esquivel
and Talens instituted Civil Case No. 96-4193, they personally and through
their caretakers already knew that Nordec Phils. and Malvar already bought
and took possession of the subject property, but Esquivel and Talens,
through their counsel Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to implead Nordec
Phils. and Dr. Malvar; and (2) Atty. Angeles, who was supposed to protect the
rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, as their counsel, had an
adverse personal interest in the subject property as he had unconscionably
taken, by way of champertous attorney's fees, almost the whole of the
19.4888-hectare land inherited by the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes.
Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200, Nordec Phil.
and Dr. Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition to annul the
Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193,
granting the reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel and Talens.
Their Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 91428. Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar prayed in their Petition that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. 96-4193 be annulled for the reason that they were not
impleaded therein even if they were necessary, if not indispensable, parties.
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 Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar additionally prayed that any writ of execution
and other orders, which may have been or may thereafter be issued to
enforce the said RTC decision, be declared ineffective, insofar as they and
their assigns are concerned.

On 6 October 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Resolution

in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 dismissing the Petition of Nordec Phil. and Dr.
Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the RTC Decision dated 11 January
2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 could not be the proper subject of the said
Petition for Annulment of Judgment given that the very same decision was
still pending appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 168734 and, thus, was not
yet final and executory. In addition, should the Court of Appeals take
cognizance of such a Petition, it could result in contrary and inconsistent
rulings by the appellate court and this Court.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar filed a Motion for Amendment and/or
Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428,
but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 16 November
2005.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar then filed the instant Petition assailing the
Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428.
In their Memorandum before this Court, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
raised the following issues: EcSCHD

I. Do [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] have good standing and

substantial defenses?
II. In view of all the documented and unrebutted circumstances
detailed in the petition — not to mention the obviously pre-
conceived and even incompatible claims of private respondents
[Lopez siblings] and [Atty. Angeles] in their Comment that the
sale to [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] is void and defective from
the very start being signed by only one of the co-owners,
simulated and only partially paid and that petitioners' rights have
prescribed — was there extrinsic fraud and lack of due process
insofar as [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] are concerned?

III. Considering all the foregoing and, more significantly, the

admission of [Esquivel and Talens] in their separate Comment
that they (as plaintiffs) purposely did not implead [Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar] because it was from the [Lopez siblings] alone
that they are trying to recover the [subject property], is
annulment of the judgment proper, at least insofar as the rights
and interests of [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] are concerned?
IV. Inasmuch as [Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar] were not impleaded
as defendants and were not parties to the appeal of the judgment
affecting [the subject property], hence, the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available to them — and so even their motion for
intervention was not allowed — is it improper or premature for
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 them to file an action for annulment of the judgment while
further appeal by the impleaded [Esquivel and Talens] is pending
with this [Court]?

V. In view of the undisputed circumstances showing extrinsic fraud

— and in view of the consolidation of G.R. No. 170621 with G.R.
No. 168734, it is now proper or imperative for [this Court] to
resolve the issues presented by annulling the impugned
judgment of the [RTC of Antipolo City, Branch 73] without having
to remand the case to the Court of Appeals.

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar asseverate that they were not impleaded
as defendants in Civil Case No. 96-4193 where the RTC rendered its Decision
dated 11 January 2001, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar's rights to and interest
in the subject property. The remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
and other appropriate remedies are also no longer available to Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar because of the extrinsic fraud committed upon them by the
Lopez siblings, Esquivel, Talens, Atty. Angeles, and Atty. Ang Cheng; and of
the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC to take cognizance of Civil Case
No. 96-4193 and to render the 11 January 2001 Decision therein. Even the
Motion for Intervention of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in CA-G.R. No. 70200,
the appeal of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC, was not allowed by
the Court of Appeals. Therefore, it is neither improper nor premature for
Nordec Phil. and Malvar to file a Petition for the annulment of the said 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, even though the
said Decision, after being affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is now
pending appeal before this Court. HcISTE

Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar additionally argue that the Court of
Appeals resolved the question of procedure in a manner that was patently
not in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly, when
it held that (1) Rule 47 does not cover the judgment of the RTC in this
particular case; and (2) Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar still had an adequate
remedy in seeking intervention in G.R. No. 167834, the appeal to this Court
of the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38 and 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new trial, petition for relief, and
appeal, respectively, simply mention "judgments or final orders", without
making any distinction as to whether or not the same is final and executory;
it should follow that where only the words "judgments or final orders" are
similarly used in Rule 47 on annulment of judgments, then such words
should be understood to also refer to all judgments or final orders,
regardless of whether they are final and executory.
The issues and arguments raised by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar all
boil down to the question of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the
judgment sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review
before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final and
executory.
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 The Court answers in the negative.
The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and
a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in
the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has
been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even
summoned to appear therein, cannot make use of a petition for relief from
judgment. 52 Indubitably, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail
themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for new trial,
petition for relief from judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated
11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr.
Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of
the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The
purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside
so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his
allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion
and he would be adversely affected thereby. 53 EHaASD

An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if

the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 54
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there
will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, as in
this case, is still on appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be
regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the
litigation is actually still open and ongoing. In this light, the arguments of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be
final and executory for it to be annulled must fail.
This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and
Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that the 11 January 2001
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still pending appeal before
this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for
annulment of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk
promulgating a ruling that could be contrary to and inconsistent with the
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 ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered:
(a) The Petition in G.R. No. 168734 is GRANTED. The Decision dated
14 February 2005 and Resolution dated 27 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200, affirming in toto the 11 January 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, in Civil Case No. 96-
4193, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession of Jose Esquivel, Jr. and Carlito Talens in Civil Case
No. 96-4193 is DISMISSED; and
(b) The Petition in G.R. No. 170621 is hereby DENIED. The
Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Per Resolution dated 20 March 2006, rollo (G.R. No. 168734), pp. 180-182.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas with Associate Justices Portia

Aliño-Hormachuelos and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., concurring; rollo (G.R. No.
168734), pp. 27-35. ESDHCa

3. Id. at 38-39.
4. Penned by Executive Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, id. at 117-123.

5. Now Antipolo City.

6. Now Marikina City.

7. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices

Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring, rollo (G.R. No.
170621), pp. 684-685.

8. Id. at 699-700.
9. Originally registered on 31 August 1944 as Original Certificate of Title No. P-
736 pursuant to a homestead patent in the name of Hermogenes Lopez,
Records, Volume II, p. 20. TECIaH

10. Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 722 (2003).

11. Prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959,
Hermogenes applied with the Land Registration Commission for the
registration of the said 19.4888-hectare land in his name on 16 July 1959.
This was docketed as LRC Case No. 2531. To his surprise, he found that the
land was already registered in the names of Fernando Gorospe, Salvador de
Tagle, Rosario de Tagle, Beatriz de Suzuarrequi, and Eduardo Santos
(Gorospe, et al.), who collectively opposed his application.
Consequently, in December 1959, Hermogenes filed before the Court of First
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 Instance (CFI) of Rizal a complaint for the annulment of the free patent and
title of Gorospe, et al., which was docketed as Civil Case No. 5957. Gorospe,
et al. moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5957 alleging that
Hermogenes was not a real party in interest since he previously sold his right
to the land to Ambrocio on 31 July 1959. Thus, Civil Case No. 5957 was
dismissed.
Ambrocio instituted on 18 November 1976 a new civil action before the CFI
of Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 24873. It was similar to Civil Case No.
5957 except for the change in plaintiff and the addition of the Bureau of
Lands as co-defendant. On 15 April 1982, the CFI recognized Ambrocio the
absolute owner of the 19.4888-hectare lot and declared OCT No. 537 and all
subsequent certificates of title emanating therefrom (including those of
Gorospe, et al.) void ab initio . This judgment of the CFI was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 18 August 1987; which was, in
turn, affirmed by this Court in its Decision dated 13 September 1990 in G.R.
No. 90380 (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, id.).

12. Records, Volume I, pp. 60-62.

13. Hermogenes waived and quitclaimed his rights, shares, interests, or
participations over the subject property in favor of Lauro through the
execution of the aforesaid Quitclaim because when the latter allegedly
caused the survey of his land bordering that of Hermogenes, it was found out
that the subject property, which was supposedly part of the land of Lauro,
was included in Hermogenes property denominated as plan H-138612. HIDCTA

14. On the basis of the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes Lopez in favor of

Lauro Hizon and the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land executed by
Hizon in favor of Esquivel and Talens, the subject property has an area of
37,978 square meters. However, as per technical descriptions of Lot 9181 of
plan As-04-002615 Cad-29 Ext. Antipolo Cadastre, the accurate
measurement of the subject property is only 26,950 square meters (See
Records, Volume I, p. 7).
15. Records, Volume I, p. 6.

16. Evidenced by a Death Certificate, Records, Volume II, p. 33.

17. Penned by Executive Judge Antonio V. Benedicto, rollo (G.R. No. 168734),
pp. 54-65.

18. Penned by Associate Justice Celso L. Magsino with Associate Justices Jose
A.R. Melo (now a retired member of this Court) and Esteban M. Lising,
concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), pp. 66-70.
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), p. 71.
20. Records, Volume I, pp. 8-22.
21. Penned by Executive Judge Antonio V. Benedicto, rollo (G.R. No. 168734),
pp. 54-65.

22. Penned by Judge Mauricio M. Rivera, Records, Volume I, pp. 23-38.

23. Id. at 39-41.
24. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), pp. 107-109.
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 25. Id. at 108.
26. The case was for Quieting of Title and Damages entitled, Angelina Villarosa
Hizon, Heirs of Lauro Hizon and Sergio F. Angeles v. Carlito Talens and Jose
Esquivel, Jr., which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-3693, Records, Volume
I, pp. 53-59.

27. Twenty-five years had lapsed since Esquivel and Talens purportedly
purchased the subject property from Hizon in 1968, until they filed with the
RTC their application for registration of the said property (LRC Case No. 93-
1211) in 1993. HIDCTA

28. SEC. 17. Before final proof shall be submitted by any person claiming to
have complied with the provisions of this Chapter, due notice, as prescribed
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall be given to the
public of his intention to make such proof, stating therein the name and
address of the homesteader, the description of the land, within its boundaries
and area, the names of the witness by whom it is expected that the
necessary facts will be established, and the time and place at which, and the
name of the officer before whom, such proof will be made.

29. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), pp. 110-113.

30. CA rollo (CA-G.R. CV No. 70200), pp. 163-164.

31. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), pp. 33-34.

32. Id. at 201-202.
33. G.R. No. 90380, 13 September 1990, 189 SCRA 550.

34. 438 Phil. 252 (2002).

35. Supra note 10.
36. This means that a homestead applicant must personally comply with the
legal requirements for a homestead grant. He must possess the necessary
qualifications. He must cultivate the land and reside on it himself. The
applicant cannot apply for and on behalf of another as the latter may be
disqualified or might not comply with the residency and cultivation
requirements.

37. SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every
decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only
to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, . . . subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of
land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall
be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration
shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject
only to the right of appeal herein before provided; . . . But any person
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 aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the
decree. . . . (As amended by Section 3, Act 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630).

38. Cucueco v. Court of Appeals , 484 Phil. 254, 267 (2004). SIHCDA

39. Ariola v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 147756, 9 August 2005, 466
SCRA 152, 176-177.

40. See Tinio v. Frances , 98 Phil. 32, 37 (1955).

41. Rollo (G.R. No. 168734), p. 131.
42. Heirs of Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47, 58 (1999).
43. Ramos-Balalio v. Ramos , G.R. No. 168464, 23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 533,
540.

44. Lopez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.

45. Placewell International Services Corp. v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, 26 June
2006, 492 SCRA 761, 769.
46. Awarded to Hermogenes by virtue of Homestead Patent No. H-138612.

47. Rollo (G.R. No. 170621), pp. 166-118.

48. There is a small difference in the land area of the subject property claimed
by Esquivel and Talens in G.R. No. 168734 (i.e., 2.6950 hectares) vis-à-vis
the one being claimed by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in G.R. No. 170621
(i.e., 2.875 hectares). The variance may be due to the fact that Hizon, the
predecessor-in-interest of Esquivel and Talens, laid claim only to the 2.6950
hectares which allegedly formed part of his property, without regard to how
the entirety of Hermogenes' 19.8222-hectare land was subdivided into lots.
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, however, purportedly bought particular lots
from the Lopez siblings with an aggregate area of 2.875 hectares.

49. Only with respect to the portions wherein they hold equitable title.
50. This includes the following: (1) Kelly heights-Overlook Bar and Grill; (2)
Cloud 9 Restaurant; (3) Celestial Inn; (4) The Cliff Restaurant; (5) Seventh
Heaven; (6) Mountain Grill Restaurant; and (7) Convention Center (See CA
rollo [CA G.R. CV No. 91428], pp. 122-159). TaEIAS

51. Annex P.
52. Alaban v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156021, 23 September 2005, 470
SCRA 697, 707-708.

53. Id.
54. Id.

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