Chapter 3

Intentional Torts to Persons or Property

§1. Battery
McElhaney v. Thomas
Facts:

Issue:

Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule of Law:
o
 Analysis:
o
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o
 Reasoning
o

Cohen v. Smith
Facts:
 Cohen (plaintiff) was admitted to a hospital to give birth. After a doctor informed Cohen that she would
need a cesarean section, Cohen told the doctor that her religious beliefs prevented a male from seeing her
naked. In turn, the doctor informed Smith (defendant), a male nurse, of Cohen’s beliefs. During Cohen’s
surgery, Smith viewed and touched Cohen’s unclothed body. Cohen brought a battery claim against Smith,
and the trial court dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
 Is an offensive touching committed if a tortfeasor touches a person in a way not offensive to a reasonable
person, but after the person has informed the tortfeasor of an unusual susceptibility to the touching?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule of Law:
o An offensive touching can occur if a tortfeasor has knowledge of a person’s unusual susceptibility and
the tortfeasor then violates that susceptibility, even if a reasonable person would not be offended by the
touching.
 Analysis:
o An offensive touching occurs if the tortfeasor knew of a person’s susceptibility to the touching, even if
the touching would not be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
o A main rationale for the tort of battery is to protect personal integrity, which explains why battery
encompasses offensive touching in addition to harmful touching.
o In some cases, the insult caused by a battery can inflict greater harm than the physical damage.
o A patient has every right to determine the extent of his or her own medical treatment, and an action by
a doctor without the patient’s consent may result in liability.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The decision of the trial court is reversed.
 Reasoning
o Similar to the case at hand is a series of cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refused blood
transfusions because of their religious beliefs. Even though most individuals would accept a life-
 saving blood transfusion, courts have held that a doctor who knows about and violates this religious
conviction could be liable for battery.
o Most people would accept being naked and touched by the opposite sex while undergoing surgery.
o However, Smith knew about Cohen’s religious beliefs and touched her while she was unclothed.
Therefore, Smith may be liable for battery. The decision of the trial court is reversed.

Dual or Single Intent

White v. Muniz
Facts:
 White (defendant) moved her elderly grandmother, Everly, into a nursing home. While at the home, Everly
showed signs of dementia, becoming easily agitated and acting aggressive. Muniz (plaintiff) was changing
Everly’s diaper with little cooperation from Everly, when Everly struck Muniz. Muniz then brought a
battery claim against Everly and White. The trial judge instructed the jury to find Everly liable for battery
only if she intended to strike Muniz and intended that her conduct be offensive. The jury then found that
Everly and White were not liable for battery. The court of appeals reversed, however, finding that the trial
court erred in its jury instruction.
Issue:
 To be liable for battery, must a person intend that contact with another cause a harmful or offensive result?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule of Law:
o In a dual intent jurisdiction, a tortfeasor must both intentionally contact another person and intend that
the contact be harmful or offensive to be liable for battery.
 Analysis:
o A dual intent jurisdiction requires that a tortfeasor both intend to cause the contact and intend for the
contact to be harmful or offensive.
o Some jurisdictions use a single intent approach for battery, requiring that the tortfeasor only intend to
cause the contact with another person.
o Under the single intent approach, a person need only willingly touch another and cause a harmful or
offensive result to be liable for battery.
o Whether the actor intended for any harm or offense to occur would be irrelevant.
o However, in a dual intent jurisdiction like Colorado, an actor must intend for harm or offense to occur.
It may be difficult for a jury to establish the mental state of a potential tortfeasor with certainty, but the
fact finder may use circumstantial evidence to determine the actor’s probable intentions.
o In the case at hand, the jury had to evaluate whether Everly understood the offensiveness of her
actions by considering her mental capabilities and any other relevant personal characteristics.
o The jury presumably considered these factors in finding that Everly lacked the necessary intent for
battery. Because the trial court’s instructions correctly directed the jury to evaluate Everly’s mental
state, the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

Wagner v. State
Facts:
 Wagner (plaintiff) was standing in line at K-Mart when she was pulled to the ground from behind by Giese,
resulting in injury to Wagner. Giese was mentally disabled and was under the supervision and control of
the State of Utah (state) (defendant) at the time of the incident. Wagner brought suit against the state.
Wagner did not claim that Giese’s action was the result of an involuntary spasm. The state argued that the
attack constituted the intentional tort of battery. The state was statutorily immune from being sued for
 battery. Wagner argued that the attack was not battery, because Giese could not form the intent to harm
through the contact, an element of a battery claim. The trial court agreed with the state and held that the
attack constituted battery. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on account of the
state’s immunity. The appellate court affirmed. Wagner appealed.
Issue:
 Is more than intent to make contact necessary to meet the intent element in a battery claim?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule of Law:
o Intent to make contact is all that is necessary to meet the intent element in a battery claim.
 Analysis:
o For contact to amount to battery, it must be intentional and must be harmful or offensive.
o To meet the intent element, the tortfeasor need not have intended that the contact be harmful or
offensive.
o Rather, intent to make contact is all that is necessary to meet the intent element.
o An “act” is defined as “an external manifestation of the actor’s will and does not include any of its
result, even the most direct, immediate, and intended.” In other words, an actor need not appreciate the
results of his intent to make contact for the act to constitute battery.
o It is enough that the result of harm or offense occurs. In this case, then, it is immaterial for the first
element of battery whether Giese could form the intent to harm Wagner.
o It is enough that Giese formed the intent to make contact with Wagner. When this intent is combined
with the resulting harm to Wagner, the elements for battery are met. Because the state is immune from
battery claims
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The lower courts’ dismissal of Wagner’s claim is affirmed.

The Meaning of Intent

Garratt v. Dailey
Facts:
 On July 16, 1951, Brian Dailey (defendant), a five-year-old boy, was visiting at the home of Ruth Garratt
(plaintiff). Garratt started to sit down in a lawn chair when Dailey moved it. Garratt fell, sustaining serious
injuries, including a broken hip. Garratt sued Dailey for battery. At trial, Garratt’s sister testified that
Dailey deliberated pulled the chair out from under Garratt. The trial court did not accept this version of
events, however, and instead accepted the testimony of Dailey. Dailey claimed that he moved the chair to
sit down in it, and despite his efforts, he was unable to replace the chair in time to stop Garratt’s fall. The
trial court thus concluded that Dailey did not possess any “any willful [sic] or unlawful purpose” or intent
to harm Garratt when he moved the chair. The judge dismissed the action against Dailey. The court then
determined that Garratt had suffered some $11,000 in damages, in case the decision was to be overruled on
appeal. Garratt appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, requesting entry of judgment in her favor or
a new trial.
Issue:
 May a five-year-old child be held liable for battery?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule of Law:
o A minor may be held liable for the tort of battery if she acted intentionally, with knowledge to a
substantial certainty that her actions would cause a harmful or offensive contact to another person.
 Analysis:
o A five-year-old child may be held liable for battery if she possessed the necessary intent.
 o The tort of battery may be generally defined as the “intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact
upon another.”
o The elements of battery are: (1) an intentional act done to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an
apprehension of such contact to another person, (2) without valid consent, and (3) without privilege.
o To be intentional, the act must have been done “for the purpose of causing the contact or apprehension
or with knowledge . . . that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain.”
o Substantial certainty is necessary for liability for an intentional tort to attach, though the conduct may
be negligent without it.
o Generally, a minor may be held liable for committing a “tort with force” just as an adult would.
o That said, a child’s “experience, capacity, and understanding” may be considered in determining what
she knew.
o In this case, there is no question that Garratt did not consent to Dailey moving the chair, and Dailey’s
actions were not privileged.
o The only issue is whether Dailey possessed the requisite intent for liability to attach. Dailey committed
a volitional act when he moved the chair.
o If Dailey intended to cause Garratt to fall, liability is proper. This may be shown by demonstrating that
Dailey knew with substantial certainty that Garratt was going to try to sit down where the chair had
been previously.
o It cannot be determined from the evidence presented at trial whether Dailey knew this with substantial
certainty. Dailey’s age is not significant to his liability in this case, except as it relates what he knew at
the time he moved the chair.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The case is remanded for ruling on the issue of whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty when
he moved the chair that Garratt was going to try to sit down in it.

Contact
Eichenwald v. Rivello
Facts:
 Kurt Eichenwald (plaintiff) who suffers from epilepsy would express his critical views of Trump on
twitter.
 John Rivello (defendant) replied to one of Kurt’s tweets with a GIF that contained an animated strobe
image flashing at a rapid speed with a message saying, “You deserve a seizure for your posts.”
 When the plaintiff clicked on the tweet displaying the GIF, he suffered a severe seizure at his home in
Texas.
 The Defendant was aware that the plaintiff was epileptic and told others his desire to cause him a
seizure.
 The plaintiff brought a claim for battery and other torts towards the defendant.
 The defendant moved to dismiss.
 The motion to dismiss was denied.
Issue:
 If battery requires an intent of physical contact either harmful or offensive, does a GIF through a
computer constitute as a weapon to inflict physical injury?
Rules & Application:
 Intentional tort requires a volitional act with intent to cause tortious harm and tortious harm result.
o Intent to contact be harmful or offensive
o Bodily dignity/ integrity
 A battery requires some physical contact.
 Physical contact need not be with the physical body of the plaintiff, and it does not need to be direct
physical contact.
  Plaintiff alleged that the light waves from the GIF touched his retina creating an electric signal that
caused the seizure.
 Taking his allegations are true, including the science and the plaintiff’s physical condition- there was
physical contact.
 The defendants’ tweets activated harmful capabilities that converted the computer into a weapon used to
inflict physical injury.
 The strobe GIF was a physical tool.
 This case qualifies as battery.
Procedural Posture:
 Texas court has not found prior cases that found battery under these circumstances.
 Texas court has also not found any prior cases establishing the use of laser-beam or a sonic weapon to
constitute battery.
 Under the Rule of “lex loci delicti”- the law of the place where the tort was committed governs- here the
plaintiff was harmed (suffered a seizure) in Texas.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court will not dismiss the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
 The Maryland court applied Texas law- plaintiffs home state.
 The defendant intended to cause physical injury to the plaintiff.

Transferred Intent
Baska v. Scherzer – Supreme Court of Kansas
Facts:
 Baska (plaintiff) allowed her daughter to host a party at their house- that night a fight broke out between
Calvin Madrigal and Harry Scherzer.
 Baska was punched in the face when she placed herself in between the boys to try and break up the
fight.
 The punch to the face caused her to lose several teeth and injury to her neck.
 Baska filed suit against the two boys for personal injuries.
 The defendants testified that they did not intend to strike or injure Baska, both of them only intended to
strike and injury each other.
 The boys filed motions for summary judgment based on the one-year statute of limitations for assault
and battery.
 The court held and granted the motion.
Issue:
 When a one party, in attempting to injure a second party, inadvertently injures a third party instead, act
with transferred intent against the third party?
Rules & Application:
 The Doctrine of transferred intent states that the tort of battery or of assault may be committed, although
the person struck or hit by defendant was not the one whom he intended to strike or hit.
 The Restatement (2) of torts says:
o Intention which is necessary to make the actor liable for battery, does not have to necessarily be
an intention to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension of such contact to the
plaintiff himself or cause him bodily harm.
o It is enough that the actor intends to produce this effect on someone else and that the act intended
is the legal cause of a harmful contact to another.
o It was not necessary that the one of the defendants know or have reason to suspect that the
plaintiff was in the vicinity of the other defendant who the action was intended for and therefore,
involves a risk of causing bodily harm to the plaintiff.
o The act would be considered negligent.
  The facts show that the defendants intended to strike and cause harm to one another and when Baska
intervened, she was unintentionally struck by punches intended for the defendants.
 Under the doctrine of transferred intent (recognized in Kansas) the fact that the defendants struck the
plaintiff does not change the fact that their actions were intentional.
Holding & Reasoning:
 Supreme Court of Kansas granted the motion for summary judgment.
 The plaintiff failed to file suit within the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery.
 If the plaintiff would have filed a negligence suit (which the statute of limitations is longer) it would not
have barred her claim.

Assault
Cullison v. Medley- Indiana Supreme Court
Facts:
 Cullison (Plaintiff) met Sandy Medley, a teenager, in a grocery store parking lot and invited her over to
his home.
 That same day, Sandy and the Medley family (defendants) went over to the plaintiff’s mobile home and
confronted him about the interaction with Sandy.
 Sandy’s father Ernest, had a revolver in a holster strapped to his thigh, repeatedly reached for it and
shook the gun at the plaintiff during the encounter.
 Ernest threatened to jump on Cullison, meanwhile Sandy’s mother, Doris, kept her hand in her pocket,
to try and convince Cullison that she was also carrying a weapon.
 Cullison feared that one of the Medley would shoot him and felt intimidated by the 5 people standing
inside his trailer.
 After the Medleys left, Cullison suffered chest pains and feared he was having a heart attack.
 He later learned that Ernest had previously shot a man.
 2 months after the encounter, Cullison ran into Ernest at a restaurant and Ernest armed with a pistol,
glared at him causing him great apprehension.
 After the encounters with the Medleys, Cullison experienced severe emotional and psychological harm.
o He sought counseling and therapy and continued to see a therapist for 18 months.
o He also sought psychiatric help and received prescription medication which prevented him from
operating power tools or driving a car, preventing him from doing his job which was in the
construction business.
o He also suffered from nervousness, depression sleeplessness, inability to concentrate and
impotency.
 Cullison brought a claim of assault, among other torts, against the Medleys.
 The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
Issue:
 Can a plaintiff bring a claim of assault if there was no physical harm only psychological/ emotional
distress?
 Did the defendant assault the plaintiff?
Rules & Application:
 Assault requires that a person acts while intending a harmful or offensive contact with another or acts
while intending to produce a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery, causing mental or
emotional damages.
 It is the intent to harm one emotionally that constitutes the basis for the tort of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
o An assault constitutes the touching of the mind, if not of the body.
o Assault only requires mental or emotional damages, caused when a person acts while intending a
harmful or offensive contact or acts while intending to produce a reasonable apprehension of an
imminent battery.
o This apprehension must be one usually produced in a reasonable person’s mind.
 o The tort of assault aims to protect a person’s right to be free from apprehension of a battery.
o Various actions may constitute assault, such as a threatening gesture, aiming a weapon, or
forcefully surrounding a person.
o If true, Cullison’s allegations describe an assault by the Medleys.
Procedural Posture:
 The trial Court entered summary judgment on all claims.
 The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts holding, reasoning that bc Ernest never removed the gun
from his holster, his threat constituted conditional language that did not indicate any present intent to
hurt Cullison, and even if an assault occurred, Cullison could not recover bc he only alleged emotional
harm and did not show that the Medleys actions were malicious, callous or willful.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded.
o The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the count two allegation of assault.
 The facts alleged by the plaintiff-appellant, if believed, could entitle him to recover for an assault against
the Medleys.
 A jury could reasonably conclude that the Medleys actions intended to frighten the plaintiff when they
surrounded him in his trailer and threatened him with bodily harm while one of the defendants was
armed with a revolver (even if it was not removed from the holster).
 It is for a jury to decide whether the plaintiffs fear of being shot or injured was one that would normally
be induced in the mind of a reasonable person.
 §3. False Imprisonment
McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Facts:
 Plaintiff: Debra McCann
 Defendant: Wal-Mart
 Debra and her two sons were shopping at a Walmart store, after they paid and were exiting the store, two
Walmart employees blocked them from leaving.
 The employees asserted that Debra’s sons had previously been caught stealing and were not allowed in the
store.
 The employees escorted the McCanns (she did not resist) to an area near the exit to wait while they called
the police (they were really calling a security guard). One of the employees stood near the McCanns the
entire time and did not allow her son to go to the bathroom when he asked.
 When the security guard arrived (not the cops) arrived, he asserted that they were not the boys who were
caught stealing and they let the McCanns leave.
 Debra brought a claim of false imprisonment against Walmart.
 The jury ruled in favor of McCann and awarded her $20,000 in compensatory damages.
 Walmart appealed asserting that under Maine Law, the jury had to find “actual physical restraint.”
Issue:
 In Maine, does false imprisonment require “actual, physical restraint”?
Rules & Application:
 False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally without lawful privilege and
against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.
 Common law tort is conduct by the actor, which is intended to, and does in fact, “confine” another “within
boundaries fixed by the actor” where in addition the victim is either “conscious of the confinement or is
harmed by it.”
o Bad motive is not one of the elements, only intent.
 Confinement may be imposed by physical barriers or physical force; it implies limited range of movement
and is not enough to exclude the plaintiff form some place.
o The mere threats of physical force can suffice, the threats may be implicit as well as explicit, and that
confinement can also be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine.
o Wal-Mart employees escorted the McCanns to an isolated area, threatened to call the police, made the
McCanns wait for the police to arrive, and told Jonathan McCann that he could not go to the bathroom.
o Reasonable people in this situation might believe that they would be physically restrained if they
attempted to leave, or that the Wal-Mart employees were claiming legal power to confine them.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court stated that no it does not require actual physical restraint.
o The cases cited by Walmart are a good example of taking language out of context.
 The case of Knowlton v. Ross, 114 Maine 18 (1915), claiming that Knowlton states that false
imprisonment requires “actual, physical restraint.” This phrase is taken out of context, however,
and merely reinforces the requirement that the plaintiff be confined, and unable to leave the area of
confinement.
 The Restatement and the common law agree that confinement can be satisfied by a mere claim of legal
power to confine or an implicit threat of physical force.
 Because false imprisonment does not require “actual, physical restraint,” the jury verdict is affirmed.
 In a diversity case we are bound by Maine Law, but they are not allowed to treat a descriptive phrase as a
rule or attribute to elderly Maine cases an entirely improbably breadth.
 Case was affirmed.

§4. Torts to Property

Trespass to Land
Briggs v. Southwest Energy Production Co.
Facts:
 Plaintiff: Briggs
 Defendant: Southwest Energy Production Co.
 The plaintiff’s own property adjacent to land leased by the defendants for natural gas extraction through
hydraulic fracturing.
 The plaintiff’s claimed that the defendants obtained oil and gas from beneath the surface of their land and
sued for trespass.
 The trial court held, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted.
Issue:
 When southwestern obtained oil and gas from beneath the surface of plaintiff’s land, did they trespass?
Rules & Application:
 The Rule of Capture:
o A fundamental principle of oil and gas law holding that there is no liability for drainage of oil and gas
from under the land of another, so long as there has been no trespass.
o The reference to "lands of another" does not suggest a developer may invade the subsurface area of a
neighboring property by drilling at an angle rather than vertically (referred to as slant drilling or slant
wells), or by drilling horizontally beneath the surface.
o This is because the title holder of a parcel of land generally owns everything directly beneath the
surface. Rather, and as suggested by the "no trespass" predicate, it refers to the potential for oil and gas
to migrate from the plaintiff's property to the developer's land when extracted from a common pool or
reservoir spanning both parcels.
 In Pennsylvania, a trespass occurs when a person who is not privileged to do so intrudes upon the land in
possession of another, whether willfully or by mistake.
 Plaintiffs assume it is physically impossible to cause drainage of oil or gas from a neighbor’s property via
hydraulic fracturing without effectuating a physical intrusion onto that property.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court held that the rule of capture remains extant in Pennsylvania, and developers who use hydraulic
fracturing may rely on pressure differentials to drain oil and gas from under another's property, at least in
the absence of a physical invasion.
 Trial court order granting summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to afford Briggs the
opportunity to fully develop the trespass and conversion claims.
 Conversion of Chattels- Trover
Reif v. Nagy
Facts:
 Plaintiff: Reif- the heirs of Mr. Grunbaum
 Defendant: Nagy and Nagy Ltd.
 Mr. Grunbaum was a prolific art collector who was forced to execute a power of attorney to his wife when
he was sent to a concentration camp.
 The defendants purchased two of Mr. Grunbaum’s drawings- which they claimed was sold by Mr.
Grunbaum’s sister-in-law to a gallery in Switzerland.
 The plaintiff’s- the heirs of Mr. Graunbaum emailed the defendants demanding that the artworks be returned
to them.
 The request was denied by defendants
 Plaintiffs brought claims of conversion and replevin against the defendants.
 The defendants claimed they had good title to the artworks since they were sold by his sister-in-law.
Issue:
 Do the plaintiff have a cause of action of conversion and replevin against the defendant for the artworks?
Rules & Application:
 Rule:
o “An action for replevin requires the plaintiff show legal title or a superior right of possession”
o “An action for conversion requires the plaintiff prove that the property is in the unauthorized
possession of another who acted to exclude the plaintiff’s rights.”
 Application:
o As the heirs, the plaintiffs have showed that they have an arguable claim of a superior right of
possession to the artworks and that the artworks are in the unauthorized possession of another who is
acting to exclude the plaintiff’s rights.
o NY protects the rightful owner’s property where that property has been stolen, even if the property is in
possession of a good faith purchaser.
 A thief cannot convey good title.
 The title remains with the heirs absent a valid conveyance of the works.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court held, for the plaintiffs.
 Plaintiffs have established that they have a prima facie (cause of action) case of both replevin and
conversion.
 Trespass to Chattels
School of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz
Facts:
 Plaintiff: School of Visual Arts
 Defendant: Kuprewicz
 The defendant (K) a former employee of the plaintiff (school) allegedly caused large volume of
pornographic emails and unsolicited job applications to be sent to the plaintiff.
 This resulted in the depleted hard disk space, drained the processing power and other adverse effects to the
computer system.
 The school brough suit against the defendant for trespass to chattels.
 The trial court held- the defendant’s motion to dismiss the trespass to chattels claim was denied.
Issue:
 Is the defendant liable for trespass to chattels?
 Does the complaint state a valid cause of action for trespass to chattels?
Rules & Application:
 Rule:
o To establish a trespass to chattels, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally and without
justification or consent, physically interfered with the use and enjoyment of personal property in
plaintiff’s possession and the plaintiff was ultimately harmed.
o It is committed by “intentionally”
 Dispossessing another of the chattel or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of
another.
 Liability is based on actual damage either in the form of actual harm to the chattel or an
interference with the plaintiff’s access or use.
 Application:
o To sustain this cause of action, the defendant must act with the intention of interfering with the property
of with knowledge that such interreference is substantially certain to result.
o SVA alleges that the voluminous quantities of unsolicited email overwhelmed its computer system by
depleting disk space, draining processing power, and compromising system resources. Those facts, if
true, establish sufficient physical harm for trespass to chattels.
Holding & Reasoning:
 Richter, J
o The court does not hold that sending of unsolicited email communication will automatically subject the
sender to tort liability but in this case, accepting the plaintiffs’ factual allegations of damages to its
computer systems, the complaint states a valid cause of action for trespass to chattels.
 Qualified Immunity
Safford Unified School District No.1 v. Redding
Facts:
 Plaintiff: Redding
 Defendant: Safford Unified School District No.1
 Assistant principal Wilson escorted 13-year-old Savanna Redding from her class and showed her a day
planner containing knives, lighters, and a cigarette.
 Redding denied that the contraband was hers.
 Wilson then told Redding that he received a report that she was giving out common painkiller to students in
violation of school rules.
 She again denied any knowledge of the pills and agreed to let him search her backpack.
 After finding nothing in her bag, Wilson took Redding to the nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills.
 The female nurse and the administrative assistant had her remove most of her clothes- exposing her breasts
and pelvic area to some degree and no pills were found.
 Redding’s mother filed suit against the school and the three school officials under §1983 for conducting a
strip search in violation of Redding’s 4th amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches.
 The defendants asserted qualified immunity arguing that the search did not violate Redding’s constitutional
right and that such a right was not clearly established at the time of the search.
Issue:
 Are the defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity warranted?
 Are the school officials involved in the search individually liable for their actions in this case?
 Did the strip search of a student suspected of possessing drugs against school policy violate the Fourth
Amendment?
Rules & Application:
 Rule:
o A school search is permissible when the measures used are reasonably related to the reason for the
search, and not excessively intrusive under the circumstances.
o Because the law was not clear as to whether a school strip search violated the Fourth Amendment, the
school officials have qualified immunity from suit.
 Application:
o The Fourth Amendment in the school setting is based on reasonableness, and probable cause is not
necessary. Yet, the manner of the search must be appropriate to the circumstances.
o Given the information available to the Assistant Principal, he had enough suspicion to search Redding’s
backpack and outer clothing, but there was no information that would justify a strip search in this case.
There was no information indicating that Redding had pills on her person that day or would carry them
in her underwear, or that the pills posed a danger to the school. Thus, the intrusiveness of the search
went far beyond what was justified here, and therefore the school violated Redding’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
 o Even though the strip search violated Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights, the school officials,
including the Assistant Principal who directed the search, cannot be held personally liable. Because the
law regarding school strip searches is unclear, the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court ruled that the strip search was unreasonable and violated the 4th amendment but that the school
officials cannot be held liable.
 The court concluded that qualified immunity is warranted.
Procedural History:
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school and school officials.
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment,
and that the Assistant Principal was not protected from suit by qualified immunity, though the other school
officials were.
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna
Facts:
 Plaintiff: Cortesluna
 Defendant: Rivas-Villegas
 A 12-year-old called 911 reporting that she, her sister, and mother were hiding in their home from mother’s
boyfriend Cortesluna who was trying to hurt them and had a chainsaw.
 Officer Rivas responded along with four officers.
 Rivas knocked on the front door, announced his presence, and ordered Cortesluna to come to the front door.
o Cortesluna approached the front door and dropped the chainsaw after officers ordered him to do so.
 On the police’s orders, Cortesluna walked out of the house and toward the officers.
 Police ordered him to stop 10 to 11 feet from them.
 At that point an officer saw a knife sticking out of the front left pocket of Cortesluna’s pants.
 When he disobeyed police’s orders to keep his hands up, police shot him with a beanbag round. Cortesluna
then raised his hands over his head and got down on the ground.
 Rivas-Villegas then straddled Cortesluna, placing his left knee on the left side of Cortesluna’s back, near the
knife. He raised both of Cortesluna’s arms up behind his back.
 Rivas-Villegas was in this position for no more than eight seconds.
 At that point, another officer removed the knife, tossed it away, and handcuffed Cortesluna
 Cortesluna filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming (among other things) that Rivas-Villegas used
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
 The district court granted summary judgment to Rivas-Villegas, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Issue:
 Whether police officer Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity bc he did not violate clearly
established law.
Rules & Application:
 Rule:
o Qualified immunity attaches when a official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
o A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.
 Application
o Specificity is especially important in the 4th amendment context, where it is sometimes difficult for an
officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine (excessive force) will apply to the factual situation.
o Whether the officer has used excessive force depends on the facts and circumstances, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect possess an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers, whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
o To show a violation of clearly established law, Cortesluna must identify a case that put Rivas on notice
that his specific conduct was unlawful.
  Cortesluna has not done so, neither has the court of appeals identified any supreme court case
addressing facts like the ones at issue here.
Holding & Reasoning:
 The court ruled that neither LaLonda nor any decision of this court is sufficiently similar.
o For that reason, we grant Rivas-Villegas’ petition for certiorari and reverse the ninth circuit’s
determination that Rivas is no entitled to qualified immunity.
 Through a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed, holding that Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified
immunity.