Training & Convention Division

University of the Philippines Law Center

SUGGESTED ANSWERS
to the
2018 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN
REMEDIAL LAW

Danielle, a Filipino citizen and permanent resident of Milan, Italy, filed

with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, where she owns a rest
house, a complaint for ejectment against Dan, a resident of Barangay Daliao,
Davao City. Danielle’s property, which is located in Digos City, Davao del Sur,
has an assessed value of PhP 25,000. Appended to the complaint was Danielle’s
certification on non-forum shopping executed in Davao City duly notarized by
Atty. Dane Danoza, a notary public.

(a) Was there a need to refer the case to the Lupong

Tagapamayapa for prior barangay conciliation before the
court can take cognizance of the case? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) No. Since Danielle is not an actual resident of Barangay Daliao,

or a barangay adjacent thereto, this case is not subject to the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; hence, prior referral to the
Lupong Tagamayapa is not a pre-condition to the filing of this
case in court (Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830, 17 November
2005).

(b) Was the action properly instituted before the RTC of Davao
City? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) No. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 vests the Municipal Trial Court
with the exclusive jurisdiction over unlawful detainer cases,
regardless of the assessed value of the property; hence, the
action was wrongfully instituted with the RTC.
 (c) Should the complaint be verified or is the certification
sufficient? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(c) Yes. Considering that the action is for unlawful detainer, the
Rules on Summary Procedure will apply. Rule II, Section 3(B)
of the Rules on Summary Procedure requires that all pleadings
submitted to the court be verified; hence, a mere certification on
non-forum shopping, the complaint being an initiatory pleading
is insufficient.

II

Dendenees Inc. and David, both stockholders owning collectively 25% of

Darwinkle Inc., filed an action before the RTC of Makati to compel its Board of
Directors (BOD) to hold the annual stockholders’ meeting (ASM) on June 21,
2017, as required by Darwinkle Inc.’s By-Laws, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction to use, as record date, April 30, 2017. The complaint
alleged, among others, that the refusal to call the ASM on June 21, 2017 was
rooted in the plan of the BOD to allow Databank, Inc. (which would have owned
50% of Darwinkle Inc. after July 15, 2017) to participate in the ASM to
effectively dilute the complainants’ shareholdings and ease them out of the
BOD. Dendenees Inc. and David paid the amount of PhP 7,565 as filing fees
based on the assessment of the Clerk of Court. The Board of Directors filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They averred that the
filing fees should have been based on the actual value of the shares of
Dendenees Inc. and David, which were collectively worth PhP 450 million.

If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case. The court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Here, Dendenees Inc. and David
merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court. If incorrect, the
clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing how much they must pay
within the prescriptive period (Proton Pilipinas v. Banque Nationale de
Paris, (G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005).

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ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No. Since the case is an intra-corporate suit, BOD’s motion to dismiss

on the ground of deficient filing fees must be denied for being a prohibited
pleading. Under Rule 1, Section 8 of the Interim Rules on Intra-Corporate
Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC), a motion to dismiss is a prohibited
pleading.
III
On February 3, 2018, Danny Delucio, Sheriff of the RTC of Makati,
served the Order granting the ex-parte application for preliminary attachment of
Dinggoy against Dodong. The Order, together with the writ, was duly received
by Dodong. On March 1, 2018, the Sheriff served upon Dodong the complaint
and summons in connection with the same case. The counsel of Dodong filed a
motion to dissolve the writ.

(a) Can the preliminary attachment issued by the Court in favor

of Dinggoy be dissolved? What ground/s can Dodong’s
counsel invoke? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) Yes, the preliminary attachment issued by the court in favor of

Dinggoy can be dissolved, because the enforcement thereof was
improper.
In Torres, et al. v. Satsatin, (G.R. No. 166759, 25 November
2009), the Supreme Court ruled that once the implementation
of a writ of preliminary attachment commences, the court must
have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such
jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any
manner against the defendant, consequently, any order issuing
from the Court will not bind the defendant. It is, thus,
indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant; but also upon
consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the
complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment and the grounds therefore that prior or
contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment,
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the

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 application for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond,
and the order must be served upon him.
In this case, since copies of the complaint and summons
were served after the writ of preliminary attachment was served
upon Dodong, the writ therefore, was improvidently issued; the
writ of preliminary attachment may be dissolved.

ALTERNATIVE ASNWER:

(a) Yes, the party whose property has been ordered attached may
file a motion to quash the order by filing a motion in court in
which the action is pending before or after the levy (Rule 57,
Sec. 13).

Other grounds:

1. Writ was improvidently issued

2. A counter-bond has been posted by the defendant
3. The attachment bond is insufficent

(b) If Dodong posts a counter bond, is he deemed to have

waived any of his claims for damages arising from the
issuance of the Order and writ of attachment? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) No, the posting of a counter-bond does not amount to a waiver

of his claim for damages arising from the issuance of the Order
and the writ of attachment. The counter-bond and a claim for
damages pertain to two (2) different aspects in the issuance and
implementation of a writ of preliminary attachment.
A counter-bond posted by the person against whom the
writ of preliminary attachment was issued, does not answer for
damages on account of the lifting of the attachment, but for the
payment of the amount due under the judgment that may be
recovered by an attaching creditor. The counter-bond stands
“in place of the properties so released” (Dizon v. Valdes, G.R.
No. L-23920, 25 April 1968).

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 On the other hand, a claim for damages by the person
against whom the writ of preliminary attachment was issued is
governed by Rule 57, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, which
states that “an application for damages on account of improper,
irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial
or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes
executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety
or sureties setting forth the facts showing his right to damages
and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded only
after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on
the main case x x x”.
Considering that the Rules of Court provided different
purposes for the filing of a counter-bond and the filing of claim
for damages, Dodong’s posting of a counter-bond cannot be
deemed a waiver of his claim for damages.

IV

Dick Dixson had sons with different women — (i) Dexter with longtime
partner Delia and (ii) Dongdong and Dingdong with his housemaid Divina.
When Dick fell ill in 2014, he entrusted all his property titles and shares of stock
in various companies to Delia who, in turn, handed them to Dexter for
safekeeping. After the death of Dick, Dexter induced Dongdong and Dingdong
to sign an agreement and waiver of their right to Dick’s estate in consideration of
PhP 45 million. As Dexter reneged on his promise to pay, Dongdong and
Dingdong filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for annulment of the
agreement and waiver. The summons and complaint were received by Dalia, the
housemaid of Dexter, on the day it was first served. Hence, Dexter filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person. RTC
Manila granted the motion to dismiss.

Dongdong and Dingdong thereafter filed a new complaint against Dexter

for annulment of the agreement and waiver. Before Dexter could file his answer,
Dongdong and Dingdong filed a motion to withdraw their complaint praying that
it be dismissed without prejudice. An Order was issued granting the motion to
withdraw without prejudice on the basis that the summons had not yet been
served on Dexter. Dexter filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal. He argued that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under
the “two-dismissal rule” of Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, in view of
the previous dismissal of the first case.

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 Will the two-dismissal rule apply making the second dismissal with
prejudice? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the two-dismissal rule will not apply, because the first dismissal
was at the instance of the defendant.
The requirements for the application of the two-dismissal rule under
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Court are: (a) [t]here was a previous case
that was dismissed by a competent court; (b) [b]oth cases were based on or
include the same claim; (c) [b]oth notices for dismissal were filed by the
plaintiff; and (d) [w]hen the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was
consented to by the defendant on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former (Ching, et al. v. Cheng, et al., G.R. No.
175507, 8 October 2014).
In this case, the third requisite is absent because the first dismissal
was upon the motion to dismiss filed by Dexter; hence, the two-dismissal
rule will not apply.

Dorton Inc. (Dorton) sued Debra Commodities Inc. (Debra), Daniel, and
Debbie in the RTC of Manila for recovery of sum of money. The complaint
alleged that, on October 14, 2017, Debra obtained a loan from Dorton in the
amount of PhP 10 million with interest of 9% per annum. The loan was
evidenced by a promissory note (PN) payable on demand signed by Daniel and
Debbie, the principal stockholders of Debra, who also executed a Surety
Agreement binding themselves as sureties. Copies of both the PN and the Surety
Agreement were attached to the complaint. Dorton further alleged that it made a
final demand on March 1, 2018 for Debra and the sureties to pay, but the demand
was not heeded.

Debra, Daniel, and Debbie filed their answer, and raised the affirmative
defense that, while the PN and the Surety Agreement appeared to exist, Daniel
and Debbie were uncertain whether the signatures on the documents were theirs.
The PN and the Surety Agreement were pre-marked during pre-trial, identified
but not authenticated during trial, and formally offered.

Can the RTC of Manila consider the PN and the Surety Agreement in
rendering its decision? (5%)

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the RTC of Manila may consider the PN and the surety
agreement in rendering its decision.
The PN and the surety agreement are actionable documents, defined
under Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court as a written instrument upon
which an action is founded upon Rule 8, Section 8, moreover, provides that
when an action is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached
to the corresponding pleading, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
In this case, Debra, Daniel, and Debbie are parties to the PN and the
surety agreement. Since the PN and surety agreement are attached to the
complaint, Debra, Daniel, and Debbie are deemed to have admitted the
genuineness and due execution thereof for their failure to: (a) deny the
genuineness and due execution of these documents under oath; and (b) to set
for what they claim to be facts.
The court, therefore, may consider the PN and the surety agreement
in rendering its decision.

VI

Daribell Inc. (Daribell) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
against spouses Dake and Donna Demapilis for unpaid purchases of construction
materials in the sum of PhP 250,000. In their answer, spouses Demapilis
admitted the purchases from Daribell, but alleged that they could not remember
the exact amount since no copies of the documents were attached to the
complaint. They nevertheless claimed that they made previous payments in the
amounts of PhP 110,000 and PhP 20,000 and that they were willing to pay the
balance of their indebtedness after account verification. In a written

manifestation, spouses Demapilis stated that, in order to buy peace, they were
willing to pay the sum of PhP 250,000, but without interests and costs.
Subsequently, Daribell filed a Motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter,
Daribell filed an amended complaint, alleging that the total purchases of
construction materials were PhP 280,000 and only PhP 20,000 had been paid.
Daribell also served upon the spouses Demapilis a request for admission asking
them to admit the genuineness of the statement of accounts, delivery receipts and
invoices, as well as the value of the principal obligation and the amount paid as
stated in the amended complaint.

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 Daribell thereafter amended the complaint anew. The amendment
modified the period covered and confirmed the partial payment of PhP110,000
but alleged that this payment was applied to the spouses’ other existing
obligations. Daribell however reiterated that the principal amount remains
unchanged.

(a) Is the request for admission deemed abandoned or withdrawn by

the filing of the second amended complaint? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) No. The second amended complaint merely supersedes the first
amended complaint and nothing more, pursuant to Rule 10,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court; thus, the Request for Admission
is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint (Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware
and Construction Supply, Inc., G.R. No. 176570, 18 July 2012).

(b) Can the amendment of the complaint be allowed if it

substantially alters the cause of action? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) Such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to

serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay,
and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions
and proceedings (Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
131175, August 28, 2001). The amended complaint may be
allowed if it will not prejudice the rights of the parties.

(c) Can the facts subject of an unanswered request for admission

be the basis of a summary judgment? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(c) Yes. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in

order to avoid long drawn-out litigations, and useless delays.
Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven
summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions
of the parties (Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware and
Construction Supply, Inc. G.R. No. 176570, 18 July 2012).

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 In this case, the facts subject of an unanswered request
for admission are deemed admissions by the adverse party
(Rule 26, Section 2, Rules of Court). Applying the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Spouses Villuga v. Kelly Hardware and
Construction Supply, Inc., (G.R. No. 176570, 18 July 2012), these
facts may be the basis of a summary judgment.

VII

Dory Enterprises Inc. (Dory) leased to Digna Corporation (Digna) a

parcel of land located in Diliman, Quezon City. During the term of the lease,
Digna was informed by DBS Banking Corporation (DBS) that it had acquired
the leased property from the former owner Dory and required Digna to pay the
rentals directly to it. Digna promptly informed Dory of DBS’ claim of
ownership. In response, Dory insisted on its right to collect rent on the leased
property.

Due to conflicting claims of Dory and DBS over the rental payments,
Digna filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Manila. Digna also prayed
that it be allowed to consign in court the succeeding monthly rentals, and that
Dory and DBS be required to litigate their conflicting claims. It later appeared
that an action for nullification of a dacion en pago was filed by Dory against
DBS in the RTC of Quezon City. In said case, Dory raised the issue on which of
the two corporations had better right to the rental payments. Dory argued that, to
avoid conflicting decisions, the interpleader case must be dismissed.

Does the action for nullification of the dacion en pago bar the filing of the
interpleader case? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The interpleader case should be dismissed in view of the action
for nullification of the dacion en pago.
Under Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, if two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for dismissal
of the others. In the situation above, the interpleader case filed by Digna
seeks to resolve who between Dory and DBS has the right to receive the
rental payments. Similarly, Dory’s action for nullification of the dacion en
pago will determine who between Dory and DBS has the right to collect
rental payments from Digna. Considering that the two cases involve the
same cause of action, the interpleader case should be dismissed.
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ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the interpleader case must be dismissed. Interpleader, in this
case, should have been raised as a compulsory counterclaim. Failure to raise
the same amounts to a waiver of the counterclaim (Wack Wack Golf &
Country Club, Inc. v. Won and Tan, G.R. L-23851, March 26, 1976).

VIII
Spouses Dondon and Donna Dumdum owned a residential lot in Dapitan
City. Doy Dogan bought said lot and took possession thereof with the promise
to pay the purchase price of PhP 2 million within a period of six (6) months.
After receiving only PhP 500,000, spouses Dumdum executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale and transferred the title to Doy Dogan. The balance was not paid
at all. Spouses Dumdum, through counsel, sent a demand letter to Doy Dogan
for him to pay the balance of PhP 1.5 million plus interest of PhP150,000. Doy
Dogan responded in a letter by saying that “while the remaining balance is
admitted, the interest charged is excessive.” There being no payment, Spouses
Dumdum filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against Doy Dogan
in the RTC of Dapitan City.

In his Answer, Doy Dogan raised, by way of affirmative defense, that the
purchase price had been fully paid and for this reason the complaint should have
been dismissed.

Spouses Dumdum then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings

which was granted by the RTC of Dapitan City. The Court awarded PhP1.5
million actual damages representing the balance of the purchase price,
PhP200,000 as moral damages, PhP 200,000 as exemplary damages,
PhP 90,000 as interest, PhP 50,000 as attorney’s fees, and PhP 5,000 as cost of
suit.
Was it proper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion for
judgment on the pleadings? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. It was improper for the RTC of Dapitan City to grant the motion
for judgment of the pleadings.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court states that a judgment on the pleadings
is proper where an answer failed to tender an issue or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. In this case, Doy
Dogan alleged that he paid the purchase price in full, contrary to Spouses
Dumdum’s allegation that Doy Dogan did not pay the balance of Php1.5
Million. He tendered an issue in his answer as to whether or not he has an
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outstanding unpaid balance with Spouses Dumdum. The answer claims that
the purchase price has been fully paid; hence, a judgment on the pleadings
was improper.

IX
In 2015, Dempsey purchased from Daria a parcel of land located in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. The latter executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and
handed to Dempsey the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 covering the
property. Since he was working in Manila and still had to raise funds to cover
taxes, registration and transfer costs, Dempsey kept the TCT in his possession
without having transferred it to his name. A few years thereafter, when he
already had the funds to pay for the transfer costs, Dempsey went to the Register
of Deeds of Dumaguete and discovered that, after the sale, Daria had filed a
petition for reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777 which
the RTC granted. Thus, unknown to Dempsey, Daria was able to secure a new
TCT in her name.

What is Dempsey’s remedy to have the reconstituted title in the name of

Daria nullified? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dempsey may file a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court.

The Supreme Court had consistently held that when the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession
of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the
court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. As a rule,
reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original
certificate. In this regard, the remedy to nullify an order granting
reconstitution is a petition for annulment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court (Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, G.R.
No. 163994, 16 December 2005).

In this case, RTC Dumaguete had no jurisdiction to order the

reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 777, considering
that the owner’s duplicate copy thereof had not been lost, but is merely in
Dempsey’s possession. The order granting Daria’s petition for
reconstitution is therefore void; accordingly, Dempsey may file a Petition

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for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 to nullify the reconstituted title
in Daria’s name.

X
In a buy-bust operation, 30 kilos of shabu were seized from Dave and
Daryll. They were arrested and placed on inquest before Prosecutor Danilo
Doon who ordered their continued detention. Thereafter, the information for
the sale and distribution of shabu was filed in court. When arraigned, Dave and
Daryll pleaded not guilty to the charge. During pre-trial, counsel for both of the
accused raised, for the first time, the illegality of the arrest. The case proceeded
to trial. After trial, the court scheduled the promulgation of judgment with
notice to both the accused and their counsel, Atty. Dimayuga. During the
promulgation, only Dave and Atty. Dimayuga were present. Both the accused
were convicted of the crime charged.

(a) Was the challenge to the validity of the arrest timely raised?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) No, the challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely
raised. As a rule, an accused may question the validity of his
arrest through a motion to quash before he enters his or her
plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived, and an accused
is estopped from questioning the legality of his or her arrest
(Veridiano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, 7 June
2017).

(b) What is the remedy available to Daryll, if any, to be able to

file an appeal? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(b) In this case, Dave and Daryll questioned the legality of their
arrest only during pre-trial, after they were arraigned; hence,
the challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised.
To be able to file an appeal, Daryll should: (a) surrender,
and (b) file a motion for leave of court to file an appeal, stating
therein the reasons for his absence during the promulgation,
within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment.

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 As a rule, the accused who fails to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available under the Rules of Court against the
judgment, such as the filing of: (a) a motion for new trial or
reconsideration; or (b) an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. The Rules of Court, however, allow the accused to
regain his standing in court to avail of these remedies by: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies, stating therein the reasons for his
absence within 15 days from the date of promulgation of
judgment (Villena v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184091,
31 January 2011).

XI
In 2007, Court of Appeals Justice (CA Justice) Dread Dong (J. Dong) was
appointed to the Supreme Court (Court) as Associate Justice. Immediately after
the appointment was announced, several groups questioned his qualification to
the position on the ground that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen. In the
same year, the Court issued an Order enjoining him from accepting the
appointment or assuming the position and discharging the functions of his office
until he is able to successfully complete all the necessary steps to show that he is
a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He however, continued to exercise his
functions as CA Justice.

Since the qualification of a natural born citizen applies as well to CA

Justices, Atty. Dacio, a practicing lawyer, asked the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), through a verified request, to initiate a quo warranto proceeding
against J. Dong in the latter’s capacity as incumbent CA Justice. The OSG
refused to initiate the action on the ground that the issue of J. Dong’s citizenship
was still being litigated in another case.

When the OSG refused to initiate a quo warranto proceeding, Atty. Dacio
filed a petition for certiorari against the OSG, and certiorari and prohibition
against J. Dong. The petition for certiorari against the OSG alleged that the OSG
committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the filing of a quo
warranto proceeding against J. Dong, while the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against J. Dong asked the Court to order him to cease and desist from
further exercising his powers, duties and responsibilities as CA Justice. In both
instances, Atty. Dacio relied on the fact that at the time of J. Dong’s appointment
as CA Justice, J. Dong’s birth certificate indicated that he was a Chinese citizen
and his bar records showed that he was a naturalized Filipino citizen.

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 (a) May the OSG be compelled, in an action for certiorari, to initiate a
quo warranto proceeding against J. Dong? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) No. the OSG has the discretion in determining the presence of
the requisites for a Quo Warranto proceeding. Besides, there is
already a pending case for the purpose of determining
citizenship.
For a Quo Warranto proceeding to be successful the
private person suing must show a clear right to the contested
office (Ferdinand Topacio v. Associate Justice Gregory Ong and
the Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 179895, 18 December
2008).

(b) Does Atty. Dacio have the legal personality to initiate the action for
certiorari and prohibition against J. Dong? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) No. He is not clothed with legal interest. Rule 65, Sections 1 and
2 of the Rules of Court state that only an aggrieved party may
file petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the appropriate
court.

An “aggrieved party” is one who was a party to the

original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 (Siguion Reyna Montecillo and
Ongsiako Law Offices v. Chionlo-Sia, G.R. No. 181186, 3
February 2016).
In this case, since there is no “original proceeding” before
J. Dong where Atty. Dacio is a party. Atty. Dacio cannot be
considered an “aggrieved party” for purposes of Rule 65,
Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Dacio therefore,
has no legal personality to file the same.

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 XII
Dodo was knocked unconscious in a fist fight with Dindo. He was rushed
to the emergency room of the Medical City where he was examined and treated
by Dr. Datu. As he was being examined, a plastic sachet appearing to contain
shabu fell from Dodo’s jacket which was on a chair beside him. Dodo was thus
arrested by the same policemen who assisted him to the hospital. At Dodo’s
trial, the public prosecutor called Dr. Datu to the witness stand. When the public
prosecutor asked Dr. Datu as to what he saw in the emergency room, Dodo’s
counsel objected, claiming doctor-patient privilege rule.

How would you rule on the objection? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The objection should be overruled. The doctor-patient privilege under
Rule 130, Section 24 of the Rules of Court is limited to “any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient” (See also: Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91114,
25 September 1992).
In this case, Dr. Datu is being called to testify on what he saw in the
emergency room, which does not pertain any information which he
acquired in attending to Dodo in a professional capacity. Simply, Dr. Datu
was being asked to testify as an ordinary witness, and not as Dodo’s
physician; hence, doctor-patient privilege under Rule 130, Section 24 of the
Rules of Court does not apply.

XIII

Denny is on trial for homicide. The prosecution calls Danilo, a police

officer, who interviewed the victim, Drew, shortly after the shooting. Danilo’s
testimony is being offered by the prosecution for purposes of proving that (i)
Drew is now dead; (ii) while in the emergency room, Drew was posting his
medical condition on Facebook and was “liking” the posts of his Facebook
friends; (iii) Drew asked the nurse for water but was refused because he was
bleeding, which subsequently angered Drew; and (iv) that before dying, Drew
signed a statement in which he identified Denny as the shooter.

Is the proposed testimony of Danilo admissible? (2.5%)

15
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The subject matter of Danilo’s statements could be admitted as
independently relevant statement. They are intended to merely establish
either the truth or falsity of Drew’s statements.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(i) Danilo’s testimony as to the fact of Drew’s death is admissible,

because he has personal knowledge of Drew’s death. Rule 130,
Section 36 of the Rules of Court states:
“Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules”.
In this case, Danilo has personal knowledge of Drew’s
death, because he was present when the latter died in the
emergency room; thus, Danilo’s testimony which pertains to
Drew’s death is admissible.
(ii) Danilo’s testimony as to the fact that Drew was using his
Facebook at the time he was in the emergency is inadmissible
because it is irrelevant. Rule 128, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court states:
“Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. —
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules”.
In this case, the fact that Danilo saw Drew using his
Facebook is irrelevant in proving the issue of Denny’s
purported commission of the crime of homicide.
(iii) Danilo’s testimony as to the fact that Drew was mad after the
nurse refused to give him water in the emergency room is
inadmissible, because it is irrelevant and immaterial under Rule
128, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. In this case, Drew’s

16
 reaction upon being refused water by the nurse is irrelevant to
prove Denny’s purported commission of the crime of homicide.
(iv) Danilo’s testimony is admissible to prove the fact that Drew
signed a document which identified Denny as the shooter
because he has personal knowledge of the same. Rule 130,
Section 36 states:
“Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to
personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules”.
Danilo personally saw Drew sign the document which
purportedly identified Denny as the shooter; thus, his testimony
regarding the fact that Drew signed said document is
admissible.

XIV

Dave is on trial for sexual assault of Delly, a law student who sidelines as
a call center agent. Dave offers the testimony of Danny, who says that Dave is
known in the community as a decent and discerning person. The prosecution
presents a rebuttal witness, Dovie, who testifies that, if Dave was reputed to be a
good person, that reputation was a misperception because Dave had been
previously convicted of homicide. Is Dovie’s testimony admissible as to the
character of Dave? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Dovie’s testimony on Dave’s previous conviction for homicide as

evidence of his bad character does not refer to a moral trait involved in the
offense charged which is sexual assault (Section 51 (a)(2), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court) .

XV

Atty. Dalmacio, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,

applied for a search warrant before the Executive Judge of RTC Manila. He

17
alleged in his application that a certain alias Django was keeping about 10 kilos
of shabu in a wooden cabinet located at Dillian’s Store in Paseo de Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. The Executive Judge of Manila personally examined Atty. Dalmacio
and his witnesses and thereafter issued the search warrant particularly describing
the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

(a) Can the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge of

Manila be enforced in Laguna? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) Yes, the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge of

Manila may be enforced in Laguna.
Administrative No. 99-20-09 of the Supreme Court states
all applications for search warrant personally endorsed by the
head of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), The Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime
Task Force (REACT-TF) with The Executive Judge and Vice
Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon
City, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction
of said courts.
In the case at bar, the application for the issuance of
search warrant was filed by the Director of the National Bureau
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) before the
Executive Judge of Manila; hence, the search warrant may be
enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of Manil

(b) Can the legal concept of “venue is jurisdictional” be validly

raised in applications for search warrants? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) No, the legal concept of venue being jurisdictional is not

applicable.
The Supreme Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,
(G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994), states that an application for a
search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a

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 criminal action; hence, the legal concept of venue being
jurisdictional is not applicable in the case at bar.

XVI

Danjo, a stay-in gardener at the Dy home in Quezon City, applied for

overseas employment in Riyadh as a flower arranger. After he left for abroad,
Dino Dy, head of the family, discovered that all his wristwatches were missing.
Dino followed Danjo’s Instagram account and in one instance saw Danjo
wearing his Rolex watch. He filed a complaint for qualified theft against Danjo
with the Office of the Prosecutor (OP), Quezon City. The subpoena with the
affidavit-complaint was served on Denden, Danjo’s wife, at their house. No
counter-affidavit was filed by Danjo who continued to work in Riyadh. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, the OP found probable cause against
Danjo and subsequently filed the information for qualified theft before the RTC
of Quezon City. The court likewise found probable cause and issued in 2016 a
warrant for Danjo’s arrest.

Danjo was repatriated to the Philippines in 2018. While Danjo was lurking
outside the Dys’ house, which was only about 100 meters away from the police
station, SPO1 Dody recognized Danjo. Realizing that the police station had a
copy of Danjo’s warrant of arrest, SPO1 Dody immediately pursued and arrested
Danjo.

(a) Was the warrant of arrest issued against Danjo who was not
in the Philippines valid? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) Yes, the warrant of arrest issued against Danjo is valid.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure states:

“Section 6: When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By

the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds
probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information

19
 was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days
from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information”.
Likewise, in Ocampo v. Abando, (G.R. No. 176830, 11
February 2014), the Supreme Court held that,
“[I]t is enough that the judge personally
evaluates the Prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause
for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or on the basis of his evaluation
he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
Prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission
of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence”.
It is provided that the Judge, may at his discretion, issue a
warrant of arrest to order the arrest of Danjo if the prosecution
sufficiently established the existence of a probable cause as
required by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is clear, therefore, that the warrant of arrest issued
against Danjo is valid

(b) Can the warrant of arrest be served Danjo upon his return?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) Yes, the warrant of arrest may be served on Danjo upon his
return to the Philippines.
The Supreme Court in Manangan v. Court of First
Instance of Nueva Vizcaya (G.R. No. 82760, 30 August 1990)
ruled that unlike a search warrant, which is valid for only ten
(10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest
remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted.

20
 In the case at bar, absent any indication that the
warrant of arrest is lifted by the Court , the warrant of arrest
issued for the arrest of Danjo is still valid.

XVII

Don Deles, a contractor, was sued together with Mayor Dante Dungo and
Congressman Dal Dilim for malversation of public funds before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Danny Din, a material witness of the complainant Diego
Domingo, was hired as an engineer by a construction company in Qatar and had
to depart in two (2) months. To perpetuate Danny Din’s testimony, Diego
Domingo applied for his conditional examination before the Sandiganbayan.

Should the application for conditional examination of Danny Din be

granted? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The application for conditional examination of Danny Din should not

be granted.
The case is still under investigation before the Office of the
Ombudsman. There is no trial of the case before the Sandigan, yet. Rule
119, Section 15 of the Rules of Court on the conditional examination of the
witness of the Prosecution is made before the court where the case is
pending.
Rule 119, Section 12 of the Rules of Court state that a conditional
examination of witnesses for the prosecution may be applied for when a
person has been held to answer for an offense. In addition to this
requirement, the applicant must show that: (a) the witness is sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the order of the court; (b) or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning thereto, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the judge or the court where the
case in pending.

XVIII

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a complaint with the

Sandiganbayan in connection with the sequestered assets and properties of Demo
Companies Inc. (Demo) and impleaded its officers and directors. Since the
complaint did not include Demo as defendant, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution where it ordered Demo to be impleaded. Thereafter, the Republic
21
filed an amended complaint naming Demo as additional defendant, which
amendment was later admitted.

Demo filed a motion for bill of particulars for the Republic to clarify
certain matters in its amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan immediately
granted the motion. Upon submission of the bill of particulars by the Republic,
Demo filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the answers in the bill of particulars
were indefinite and deficient responses to the question of what the alleged
illegally acquired funds or properties of Demo were. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case.

(a) Was the Sandiganbayan correct in dismissing the case? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) No, the Sandiganbayan is incorrect in dismissing the case. An

action cannot be dismissed on the ground of vagueness or
indefiniteness (Galeon v. Galeon, G.R. L-30380, 28 February
1973).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(a) Yes, the Sandiganbayan was correct in dismissing the case.

Under Rule 12, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the
consequence of insufficient compliance with the court’s order
for a bill of particulars or a more definite pleading is that the
court may order the striking out of said pleading or the portions
thereof.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case upon
non-compliance with its order for a definite pleading. The
dismissal of the case was made by the striking out of the
pleading, which in this case was the complaint by the Republic.
In striking out said pleading, no complaint existed; thus, the
Sandiganbayan effectively dismissed the case.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, correctly dismissed the
case, as the bill of particulars was deemed insufficient leading to
the striking out of the complaint.

22
 (b) What can the defendant, in a civil case, do in the event that his
motion for bill of particulars is denied? (2.5%) (BRUSELAS)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Under Rule 12, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, after notice of
denial of his motion, the moving party may file his responsive
pleading within the period to which he was entitled at the time
of filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in
any event. If tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the moving
party may question the denial thru a Rule 65 certiorari.

XIX
Drylvik, a German national, married Dara, a Filipina, in Dusseldorf,
Germany. When the marriage collapsed, Dara filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC of Manila. Drylvik, on the other hand, was
able to obtain a divorce decree from the German Family Court. The decree, in
essence, states:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on xxx before the Civil Registrar of
Dusseldorf is hereby dissolved. The parental custody of the children Diktor and
Daus is granted to the father.

Drylvik filed a motion to dismiss in the RTC of Manila on the ground that
the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter as a decree of divorce had
already been promulgated dissolving his marriage to Dara. Dara objected, saying
that while she was not challenging the divorce decree, the case in the RTC still
had to proceed for the purpose of determining the issue of the children’s custody.
Drylvik counters that the issue had been disposed of in the divorce decree, thus
constituting res judicata.

(a) Should Drylvik’s motion to dismiss be granted? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) No, the motion to dismiss cannot be granted.

In Roehr v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003),
the Supreme Court ruled that divorce decrees obtained by
foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care
and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a
foreign judgment, such as the award of custody of the children,
23
 it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 39, Section 50 states that “[i]n case of a judgment
against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence
of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus, in actions in
personam, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German
Family Court merely constitutes prima facie evidence and it
must be proven that Dara was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to
the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two
children.

(b) Is a foreign divorce decree between a foreign spouse and a

Filipino spouse, uncontested by both parties, sufficient by
itself to cancel the entry in the civil registry pertaining to the
spouses’ marriage? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) No, a foreign divorce decree between a foreign spouse and a
Filipino spouse, uncontested by both parties is insufficient by
itself to cancel the entry in the civil registry. Before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it (Republic v. Manalo,
G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018).

24
 XX

Dominic was appointed special administrator of the Estate of Dakota

Dragon. Delton, husband of Dakota, together with their five (5) children,
opposed the appointment of Dominic claiming that he (Dominic) was just a
stepbrother of Dakota. After giving Dominic the chance to comment, the court
issued an Order affirming the appointment of Dominic.

(a) What is the remedy available to the oppositors? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(a) The remedy available to the oppositors of the appointment of
Dominic as special administrator is to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The appointment of special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, 5 July
2010).

(b) If there are no qualified heirs, can the government initiate escheat
proceedings over the assets of the deceased? To whom, in
particular, shall the estate of the deceased go and for whose benefit?
(2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) If there are no qualified heirs, Rule 91, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Solicitor General or his representatives
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition
with the Regional Trial Court where the deceased last resided
or in which he had estate, if he resided outside the Philippines,
setting forth the facts and praying that the estate of the
deceased be declared escheated.
Rule 91, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
once a judgment has been rendered in escheat proceedings, the
properties of the deceased shall be assigned as follows: (a)
personal estate to the municipality or city where he last resided
in the Philippines; (b) real estate to the municipalities or cities
in which the same is located; and (c) if the deceased never

25
 resided in the Philippines, the whole estate may be assigned to
the respective municipalities or cities where the same is located.
Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public
charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or
cities.
XXI

The municipality of Danao, Cebu was a quiet and peaceful town until a
group of miners from Denmark visited the area and discovered that it was rich in
nickel. In partnership with the municipal mayor, the Danish miners had to
flatten 10 hectares of forest land by cutting all the trees before starting their
mining operations. The local DENR, together with the Samahan Laban sa
Sumisira sa Kalikasan, filed a petition for writ of Kalikasan against the
municipal mayor and the Danish miners in the RTC of Cebu.

(a) Is the petition within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(a) No, the petition for a writ of kalikasan is not within the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu. Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides that a petition
for a writ of kalikasan is filed with the Supreme Court or any of
the stations with the Court of Appeals.
(b) What is the Precautionary Principle? (2.5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(b) The Precautionary Principle states that when human activities

may lead to threats of serious and irreversible damage to the
environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain,
actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that threat (Rule 1,
Section 4(f) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases).

XXII
Danica obtained a personal loan of PhP 180,000 from Dinggoy, payable in
18 equal monthly installments of PhP 10,000 until fully paid. In order to
complete her payment at an earlier date, Danica instead paid PhP 20,000
monthly, and continued doing so until the 18th month, which payments Dinggoy
all accepted. Later on, she realized that she had overpaid Dinggoy by 100% as
she should have already completed payment in nine (9) months. She demanded
the return of the excess payment, but Dinggoy completely ignored her. Thus,

26
Danica availed of the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases by filing before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) a Statement of Claim, together with the
required documents.

Should the MTC proceed with the case under the: (i) Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure; (ii) the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims; or (iii) the
regular procedure for civil cases? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) should try the case under the
Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims (the “Revised Rules”). As per
the latest amendment of said rules (En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2018
in A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC), the MTC shall apply the Revised Rules in all actions
which are purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for is solely
for payment or reimbursement of sum of money not exceeding
Php300,000.00,[1] exclusive of interest and costs.
Having overpaid by one hundred percent (100%) of the amount of the
loan, Danica’s claim for reimbursement amounts to One Hundred Eight
Thousand Pesos (Php180,000.00), which is within the threshold of the
Revised Rules. Thus, the MTC should proceed to hear the case under the
Revised Rules.

[1]
The 2016 amendment increased the amount covered from Php100,000.00 to Php200,000.00.

-NOTHING FOLLOWS-

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