Table of Contents

Cover
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Map
Chronology
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction
1: The Genesis of Chinese Education: From Confucius to the Twenty-First Century
The imperial Confucian period
The late imperial period to the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949
The socialist era from 1949 to 1978
The reform era from 1978 to the twenty-first century
Conclusions
2: Formal and Informal Education: Policies, Structures, Governance and Contexts
National goals
Structure and funding of public education
‘Elite’ education and hyper-competitiveness
Early childhood education
Basic education
Examination system
Senior high schools
Vocational and technical education
Higher education
Online and distance learning
Adult, continuing and lifelong education
Non-formal education and extra-curricular learning
The role of teachers
Conclusions
3: Reform and Resistance
School education reform
Challenges to implementation
Teacher education and professional development
Vocational and higher education reform
Conclusions
4: Inequalities and Disparities
Urban and rural education
‘Left-behind’ children
Migrant children
Minority education
Students with disabilities
Private education
International schools and programmes
Conclusions
5: Ideologies in Competition
Neoliberalism versus traditionalism
Resurrecting Confucius
Moral education
Citizenship and patriotic education
Ethnic solidarity education
Political and ideological education
The CCP embedded in education
 Conclusions
6: Changing Relationships with the World and Future Challenges
China's rise and impact on international relationships
Changing flows of people, ideas and knowledge
From importing to exporting education and culture
Opportunities for mutual learning and understanding
Continuing challenges and tensions
Conclusions
References
Index
End User License Agreement
China Today series
Richard P. Appelbaum, Cong Cao, Xueying Han, Rachel Parker and Denis Simon, Innovation in China
Greg Austin, Cyber Policy in China
Yanjie Bian, Guanxi: How China Works
Jeroen de Kloet and Anthony Y. H. Fung, Youth Cultures in China
Steven M. Goldstein, China and Taiwan
David S. G. Goodman, Class in Contemporary China
Stuart Harris, China's Foreign Policy
William R. Jankowiak and Robert L. Moore, Family Life in China
Elaine Jeffreys with Haiqing Yu, Sex in China
Michael Keane, Creative Industries in China
Joe C. B. Leung and Yuebin Xu, China's Social Welfare
Hongmei Li, Advertising and Consumer Culture in China
Orna Naftali, Children in China
Eva Pils, Human Rights in China
Pitman B. Potter, China's Legal System
Pun Ngai, Migrant Labor in China
Xuefei Ren, Urban China
Nancy E. Riley, Population in China
Janette Ryan, Education in China
Judith Shapiro, China's Environmental Challenges 2nd edition
Alvin Y. So and Yin-wah Chu, The Global Rise of China
Teresa Wright, Party and State in Post-Mao China
Teresa Wright, Popular Protest in China
Jie Yang, Mental Health in China
You Ji, China's Military Transformation
LiAnne Yu, Consumption in China
Xiaowei Zang, Ethnicity in China
Education in China
Philosophy, Politics and Culture
Janette Ryan

polity
Copyright © Janette Ryan 2019
The right of Janette Ryan to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2019 by Polity Press
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Names: Ryan, Janette, 1956- author.
Title: Education in China : philosophy, politics and culture / Janette Ryan.
Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity, 2019. | Series: China today | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018045218 (print) | LCCN 2018045667 (ebook) | ISBN 9781509535972 (Epub) | ISBN 9780745664088 (hardback) | ISBN
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Subjects: LCSH: Education–China–Philosophy. | Education and state–China. | Education–Aims and objectives–China. | Educational change–China. |
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Map
Chronology
551–479 BCE Life of Confucius
581–618 CE Imperial examination system formalized (Sui Dynasty)
1860s Christian missionary schools established; self-strengthening movement
1894–1895 First Sino-Japanese War
1905 Abolition of imperial examinations
1911 Fall of the Qing Dynasty
1912 Republic of China established under Sun Yat-sen
1917 New Culture Movement
1919 May 4th Movement
1927 Split between Nationalists (KMT) and Communists (CCP); civil war begins
1934–1935 CCP under Mao Zedong evades KMT in Long March
December 1937 Nanjing Massacre
1937–1945 Second Sino-Japanese War
1945–1949 Civil war between KMT and CCP resumes
October 1949 KMT retreats to Taiwan; Mao founds People's Republic of China (PRC)
1950–1953 Korean War
1952 Higher education re-organized on Soviet model
1953–1957 First Five-Year Plan; PRC adopts Soviet-style economic planning
1954 First Constitution of the PRC and first meeting of the National People's Congress
1956–1957 Hundred Flowers Movement, a brief period of open political debate
1957 Anti-Rightist Movement
1958–1960 Great Leap Forward, an effort to transform China through rapid industrialization and collectivization
March 1959 Tibetan Uprising in Lhasa; Dalai Lama flees to India
1959–1961 Three Hard Years, widespread famine with tens of millions of deaths
1960 Sino-Soviet split
1962 Sino-Indian War
October 1964 First PRC atomic bomb detonation
1966–1976 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution; Mao reasserts power
February 1972 President Richard Nixon visits China; ‘Shanghai Communiqué’ pledges to normalize US–China relations
September 1976 Death of Mao Zedong
October 1976 Ultra-Leftist Gang of Four arrested and sentenced
1977 Gaokao university entrance examination re-introduced
December 1978 Deng Xiaoping assumes power; launches Four Modernizations and economic reforms
1978 One-child family planning policy introduced
1979 US and China establish formal diplomatic ties; Deng Xiaoping visits Washington
1979 PRC invades Vietnam
1982 Census reports PRC population at more than one billion
December 1984 Margaret Thatcher co-signs Sino-British Joint Declaration agreeing to return Hong Kong to China in 1997
1986 Compulsory Education Law
1989 Tiananmen Square protests culminate in 4 June military crack-down
1992 Deng Xiaoping's Southern Inspection Tour re-energizes economic reforms
1993–2002 Jiang Zemin is president of PRC, continues economic growth agenda
2001 Guidelines on Basic Education Curriculum Reform introduced
November 2001 WTO accepts China as member
2002–2012 Hu Jintao, General-Secretary CCP (and President of PRC from 2003–2013)
2002–2003 SARS outbreak concentrated in PRC and Hong Kong
2006 PRC supplants US as largest CO2 emitter
August 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing
2010 Shanghai World Exposition
2011 New curriculum standards introduced
2012 Xi Jinping appointed General-Secretary of the CCP (and President of PRC from 2013)
2015 China abolishes one-child policy
2016 13th Five-Year Plan prioritizes education
2017 Xi Jinping reappointed General-Secretary of the CCP's Central Committee (and President of PRC from 2018);
‘Thoughts of Xi Jinping’ written into the Constitution and education curriculum
2018 National People's Congress removes two-term limit on China's Presidency
Preface and Acknowledgements
This book draws on my first-hand experience of education in China over four decades, first as an international student there in the
early 1980s; then in government in Australia, working on a sister state–province relationship with Jiangsu Province just as China was
beginning to engage more with the world; and later as an academic, teaching and researching in China and in several universities
worldwide. These experiences have given me a perspective over time and in different contexts. The personal examples given in this
book are the product of my experience researching and working in education in China and the wide network of acquaintances that this
has enabled me to build up. These examples are anecdotal but are intended to illustrate the arguments being offered as well as to give
‘voice’ to those engaged in Chinese education themselves.
Many people have given me generous assistance, especially when I have visited schools and universities, and have shared their
personal stories and ideas, and I am grateful to them all. I would especially like to acknowledge the assistance of several colleagues who
read sections of the manuscript, including Jiaxin Chen, Lin Li, Xi Liang, Lu Wang, Fuyi Yang and Yue Ying.
Introduction
China had stunning success in the 2009 and 2012 rounds of the triennial Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA),
testing worldwide competency in mathematics, science and reading. These were the first years in which China participated in these
global assessments of student learning, and students from Shanghai (the only students in China to participate in these two rounds)
topped the rankings. This led in many countries to the valorization of Chinese education and intense interest in the nation's education
system, including calls to copy it to emulate China's success.
Within China education has been designated a national priority to underpin continued economic development and meet the need for a
highly skilled workforce and also to fulfil the social and cultural aspirations of its citizens. As Postiglione (2016) states: ‘If there is a
unifying consensus across society, it is for education to transform China from a middle- to high-income market economy’ (p. x). There
has been intense focus on the development of and investment in the education system and reform of all its levels, from preschool
through to higher education and beyond. The past decade has seen radical change and fundamental reform of administration, finances,
governance, policy, and curriculum and pedagogy across all parts of education in China and across all its regions.
The dazzling recent achievements of China, economically and in its increasing importance on the world stage, and in such measures as
the PISA results, have led to growing fascination about what it is apparently ‘doing right’. But before any decision is taken that China's
education system should be emulated, what is needed is an examination of the genesis of its educational philosophies, ideologies and
practices, and the role that education plays in the national psyche and in the public and political arenas. The success of educational
approaches anywhere is based to a large degree on context, and systems cannot easily be transplanted from one place to another. In
many Western countries, for example, education is seen by some, particularly politicians, often to be ‘struggling’ by comparison with the
recent advances in Asia. But Chinese education has its own problems and tensions – they just come from different sources. This book
examines many of these.
Education, culture and politics in China are inextricably linked and education has played a key role in the nation's intellectual, political
and civic development. It has both influenced, and been influenced by, all these interweaving forces. Education has been at the very
heart of Chinese society throughout its long history, from the time of Confucius and even before. It has been, and is, the primary vehicle
for social mobility and status for individuals and is a marker of one's ‘culture’. Indeed, the word ‘culture’ in Chinese (wenhua 文化) also
means to be educated or learned and through which to be ‘civilized’. Whereas in most countries in past centuries military prowess was
usually the means to gain great fortune, land or political favour, in China one's ‘culture’ or ‘educatedness’ was considered the most
important factor in determining prestige, respect, and social and political standing and hence wealth. Education in China has a primacy
not found in other cultures and has influenced its history, philosophy, politics, culture and society, and indeed its ‘mindset’, and its
influence on the social and economic life of its citizens continues unabated to the present day. It also plays a key role for the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) party-state in enlisting citizens to its national cause and in instilling in them its ideology of ‘socialism with
Chinese characteristics’.
As well as being used by the central government for the nation's continued economic success, national development and modernization,
education has also become an instrument of soft power for the party-state's ambitions for China to become a dominant super power and
regain a leading status in the world. This has been particularly highlighted by President Xi Jinping in recent speeches. These aims are
evident in the ‘New Silk Road’ or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (yidai yilu 一带一路) which includes supranational educational
initiatives across central Asia and beyond (described in Chapter 6). There has been a move away from simply reaping the benefits of
sending people overseas to learn from the West and other advanced economies such as Japan. There is a desperation within China to
regain the geopolitical pre-eminence it had in earlier imperial times, and education has become an instrument of foreign policy as well as
a source of national pride as Chinese education is now exported to countries such as the United Kingdom, its former imperialist
aggressor.
Although China was never colonized in the same way as other Asian nations, and instead carved up into foreign ‘concessions’ during the
nineteenth century and then occupied by Japan during the Second World War, the psychological impact of its newfound global influence
has been incredibly powerful. This ties in with the recent resurgence of pride often found among people in China in its long intellectual
history, as part of its national triumphalism in regaining the nation's ‘rightful’ place in the world. The Chinese government and many of
its citizens have a strong sense of national identity and historical purpose, and a continuing nostalgia for past glory, and education plays
a constitutive role in both these realms.
Education has also for some time been a major vehicle for China's new engagement with the world precisely through its unprecedented
flows of international students and scholars from China engaging with countries in the Western world, and beyond, especially in
Anglophone countries such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. The movement of people and ideas,
however, has been until very recently mostly one-way, and those with whom China engages are often remarkably unaware of both the
past and contemporary nature of education in China and the role it has played in the nation's historical development and will continue to
play in its future trajectory.
Education within China is the most important determinant of one's social status, economic wellbeing, career potential and even marriage
prospects, and has been for most of China's history. China's imperial examination system (keju kaoshi 科举考试), which began in the Sui
Dynasty (581–618) and lasted nearly 1,400 years, selected government officials (and therefore the main privileged class) by merit in
the imperial examinations and was claimed to be open to rich and poor alike (though in reality was based on merit among the gentry).
This helps to explain Chinese people's long valuing of education as bringing power, status, wealth and honour.
China has a highly aspirational culture and is fiercely competitive. Most Chinese parents spend enormous sums on their child's
education in their quest for their child, and the family, to get ahead; the child embodies their dreams and aspirations for higher status
and a better life. The nature of this educational culture also means that even the scions of China's new mega-wealthy class are sent to
the best and most prestigious educational institutions in China and abroad. They receive the best education money can buy, including at
the most ‘elite’ kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, as well as at the most ‘famous’ universities overseas, even if the child's
parents have high-level connections which mean they won't have to compete in the open job market as they will simply enter or profit
from the family business. These children have the benefits not just of their parents’ wealth but also their power and connections. To
give a sense of scale and competition, in 2016, there were 1.6 million of these ‘high net wealth individuals’ in China with assets of at least
CNY10 million (USD1.5 million) (Reuters 2017).
But the rise of a middle class in China, and growing social stratification of its society, has fuelled an even more insatiable desire for
education as a means to social standing and prestige. Foreign study has increasingly been an aim for the children of the middle and
lower urban classes, not just for children of the elite. But not all citizens have the same access to educational opportunities, and now that
China has moved from a socialist to a hyper-capitalist society, education is increasingly acting as a filter by which its citizens are
afforded access or not to China's new wealth and prosperity.
As will be seen, behaviours and practices of education in China today have arisen from a deeply embedded set of historical, political,
ideological, social and cultural conditions that have had an enduring impact and cannot, and should not, be easily mimicked or
transposed onto other social and cultural systems. Although education in China undoubtedly has its merits, it also has serious flaws, and
what appears on the surface is not always a good indication of what is happening underneath. The early PISA results which sparked
cries in several countries to learn from China's success by copying its teaching methods resulted in countries like the United Kingdom
and Australia bringing teachers from China to model their teaching. However, this view was shattered when the 2015 PISA results,
which included a broader range of students than just those in Shanghai, saw China falling to twelfth place. The original test results were
confined to Shanghai, and Shanghai is not representative of the broader picture of education in China. In such a vast and diverse
country, the educational picture is much more complex than it appears from the outside and requires deeper examination.
There is no doubt, however, that there is a voracious appetite for education among people in China, not found to the same extent
anywhere else, and the Chinese government is using its education in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ ways as an instrument of foreign and
international policy (as well as for domestic political and ideological purposes). These national desires mix with individual aspirations,
and social and cultural imperatives to achieve educational success, and result in an intensely competitive education system which
dominates family life and children's childhood experiences.
The Chinese government has made some moves to address the serious shortcomings in its educational system and has introduced a
series of policies and measures to reform (and internationalize) education. Although there are differing views of how education reform
can (or should) be achieved, there is a general desire, both for political and pedagogical reasons, to confront contemporary challenges
not through slavish adoption of outside, especially ‘Western’, intellectual values or mimicking of Western academic ways, but instead to
examine the past, resurrecting (or even ‘reinventing’) China's intellectual traditions and attempting to combine these with lessons
learnt from outside.
There is much to admire and to be learnt from China. Distinctive features include a deep respect for education and significant
investment in schools and children's learning. However, although many individual school leaders are working hard to change educational
practices, it is clear that the school system is still largely characterized by overly long hours, excessive homework, drill-based learning
and enormous pressure from teachers and parents, and complicated by political and ideological pressures arising from CCP control over
virtually all aspects of education.
The heavy toll of the existing education system was recognized in the Outline of National Medium and Long-Term Education Reform
and Development Plan (2010–2020) when the State Council called for a reduction in the ‘burden’ of schooling for children, though
concerns had been raised much earlier. The gruelling gaokao (高考) university entrance examination, the culmination of years of
constant exams, produces exhausted students who have missed out on a childhood.
However, attempts at education reform are a story of contradictions, arising not only from cultural resistance and traditional views of
education but also from national and state imperatives. Evidence of this can be seen in President Xi Jinping's attempts to make Chinese
education ‘world-class’ (though generally reflecting a narrow definition relating to topping specific world league tables) but within a
context where there exist restrictions on access to the international academic literature and increased government control over
curriculum.
The Chinese government's more muscular foreign policy and rising nationalism mean that it is seeking to broaden its influence
internationally and education is performing a symbolic and ideological role in this pursuit. Over the past decades, China has sought to
learn from Western and other countries by sending students and scholars to learn from other educational systems (and in earlier
periods to Japan and Russia). The aims have been the reform and internationalization of its educational system as well as national
educational capacity building. Now – reversing a trend of nearly one hundred and fifty years – it is attracting large numbers of
international students to study in the country, as well as through a number of overseas ventures (see Chapter 6). The Chinese
government is using education to increase its global influence by supporting the establishment of Chinese schools and universities in
countries including the United Kingdom, the United States and Malaysia but also to meet demand overseas for Chinese bilingual and
bicultural education. This demand from outside springs from recognition of the role that China will play in world affairs in the future.
Parents in other countries want their children to be equipped with the Chinese language and intercultural skills that they believe will be
needed to achieve success in this new world order.
Yet, despite efforts in China to reform education, it is beset with a number of problems. These include: the examination-orientation of
its education system; contradictory and competing ideologies and political agendas; growing inequality; a hierarchical system obsessed
with elitism; ambitious aims for education but lack of capacity and expertise; increasingly blurred lines between public and private
education; continuity of cultural beliefs that hamper reform; corruption and fraud; and high aspirations and fierce competition which
are skewing the social fabric.
The crucial question for the Chinese government and Chinese society more broadly is whether education acts as a cohesive force
propelling the party-state's goals of economic prosperity and national unity or continues on its course to be the major vehicle for the
increasing stratification of Chinese society, which can have serious and deleterious effects for individuals and families.
This book offers an overview of contemporary education policy and teaching and learning contexts in China and the place of education in
the political, economic, social and cultural affairs of the nation. It describes the historical, philosophical and political antecedents of
education in China today as important elements for understanding contemporary trends in education in China as well as the role of
government and government policy in education. It examines the aims of the education reform programme and discusses the vast
changes taking place across all levels of the education system. It shows repeatedly a nation grappling with issues such as how to
modernize and internationalize its education system and engage with education systems worldwide while also retaining China's
intellectual traditions and values.
But this book also engages with the question of what other countries can learn from China in the current era of globalization and in the
context of increased and unprecedented flows of people and their ideas between China and other nations. It argues that mutual respect
for traditions and values is vital for the development of transcultural learning and the two-way internationalization of education and for
less hegemonic relationships between China and its international educational partners.
The book uses as its analytical framework a multi-perspective approach, examining historical, philosophical, political, cultural and social
dimensions of education in China and the relationships between these to explain the current contexts and future trajectory of education
in China today. A major theme is the continuity of educational ideas and traditions in the midst of the radical transformation of China's
economic, social and political conditions.
Key questions are raised in each section and are as follows:
How is the education system in China both a ‘mirror’ and ‘motor’ of political, economic and social conditions and agendas?
How does education in China act as a vehicle for cultural continuity as well as change?
How does education in China act to promote individuals’ economic and social mobility and status?
 What are the implications of the increasing disparity in educational access and outcomes in China between rich and poor, developed
and less developed areas, and urban and rural and remote regions?
Do traditional Chinese values act as impediments to modernization and internationalization in education?
Why are Confucianism and Confucian educational tenets being revived in China today?
What are the implications for the rest of the world of China's rising nationalism and its pride in its intellectual heritage?
What can China and the rest of the world learn from each other and how can this be a mutual enterprise based on reciprocal
respect and joint endeavour?
Although some, such as Vickers and Zeng (2017), caution against adopting ‘exceptionalist’ approaches to China which point to its
uniqueness compared with other systems of educational practice, arguing that such approaches militate against criticism of China, there
are areas where China can be considered exceptional and are worthy of study. These include the quest, even obsession, to be ‘world
class’ in education and to regain its former intellectual glory, its valuing of education throughout its long history, and the symbolic role
that educational attainment plays in its society.
Generalizations about Chinese education and Chinese students can of course belie the complexity and immense differences within
China's borders. There is a vast diversity of people within China (and among Chinese populations outside China), with great variety
even within the dominant Han ethnic group, as well as in the 55 ethnic minorities. This creates dilemmas in describing either ‘Chinese
culture’ or ‘Chinese-ness’ (as indeed it can with ‘Western’ culture). In addition to this is the diversity of religions and belief systems
comprising dominant Confucian beliefs, but also Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Islam, which have historically intermingled and can
even harmoniously co-exist within individuals (in contrast to the fiercely contested boundaries of Western Abrahamic religions). Added
to this are individual, spatial and generational differences, to name but a few. Although this diversity must be kept in mind in any
descriptions of China, there are some general patterns and historical trends that point to how education and educational beliefs in China
have developed and influenced contemporary thinking and practice.
Definitions of ‘culture’ are contested and attempts to define it can essentialize phenomena that are fluid, dynamic and occupy vast
temporal and geographical spaces. The way that the term Chinese ‘culture’ is used in this volume is in the sense of referring to
traditions and belief systems in mainland China that, with the focus of this book, can be seen to influence beliefs and practices in
classrooms and educational institutions. ‘Chinese students’ refers to those in, or from, the People's Republic of China, but does not
include the Hong Kong or Macau Special Administrative Regions, which for historical reasons have very different educational systems
and conditions and are beyond the scope of this book. It should be noted, however, that with the return to Chinese sovereignty of Hong
Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, education systems there are increasingly coming within the purview of CCP educational policies and
regulations and are adapting to these new regimes (see Cheng 2017 and Lee & Cheng 2017 respectively for discussion of these two
systems).
It is also recognized that ‘large culture’ explanations of systems of cultural and social practice risk essentializing or dehistoricizing them
and ignoring important distinctions and features as well as the fact that individuals within a culture can have vastly differing ideas and
perspectives about that culture. A focus on culture can also downplay the impact of other forces such as political or ideological ones as
well as philosophical and psychological factors, which are all inter-related and on their own provide only limited explanatory power.
Kipnis (2011) articulates the dilemma in describing attributes of Chinese education as they are ‘usually dismissed as an exercise in
orientalism’ (p. 4) illustrating the difficulties and tensions in work such as the present one even though it looks through multiple lenses
and over a long time period. But this book offers an overview of education in China from my own perspective and through my personal
experiences as a student, researcher and teacher in China as well as my field work and academic work in China over a forty-year
period. It offers a snapshot at the current point in time, recognizing that China is a rapidly changing society with a dramatically changing
educational landscape and growing global political profile.
It is difficult to capture and do justice in a single volume to such a rich and diverse subject as education in China both temporally and
spatially and it has been necessary to truncate and perhaps at times over-simplify many important topics and events. The intention of
this book, however, is to identify some major trends and features as a basis for analysis of the most significant factors and influences on
education in China today.
In this book, how tertiary education institutions are referred to follows the British and Australian model rather than the American one.
Higher education institutions are referred to as ‘universities’ rather than the American term ‘college’, and vocational and technical
institutions (those devoted specifically to this type of education rather than vocational programmes in schools) are referred to as
‘colleges’ (though ‘colleges’ can also be used in universities to describe faculties). Schools after the primary school level are referred to
as ‘junior high’ schools, although in China they are sometimes referred to as middle schools, to show their relationship to senior high
schools.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the historical, philosophical and political roots of education in China today to explain the roles of both
tradition and innovation – of continuity and change – in China's education system. It describes the history of China's education from the
time of Confucius and how his thought has been used over the centuries by different dynastic periods to train the scholar class and instil
a moral civic code. The link between education and what became the official State orthodoxy of Confucianism is explored to contribute
to an understanding of the development of educational thought and philosophy historically and in the contemporary context. It
demonstrates that many ancient ideologies and philosophies are alive and well in China and continue to have an enduring influence in
ideas about education and society.
China's contemporary educational policies, governance and funding mechanisms, and formal education systems at preschool, school,
vocational, and higher education levels, and the development of educational infrastructure and capacity, are explained in Chapter 2. The
role of the CCP party-state is examined to show how governments at various levels determine and implement educational policies and
influence educational practices. A discussion is also provided of the role of adult and lifelong learning in China and other, more informal,
systems of learning such as extra-curricular activities and the ‘shadow’ education system of extra private fee-paying tuition in
academic subjects. The chapter documents government efforts to build capacity in a nation with ambitious goals for its educational
achievements and the place of schools and teachers in this system within a culture of intense competition and aspiration, and high-
stakes testing. These developments provide a backdrop to the broader and sweeping curriculum reforms taking place at all levels of
education, which are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 explains efforts by government and educators over the past two decades to reform all levels of the education system to
improve its quality. China's aim, like that of most other countries, is to have among the best educational institutions in the world
(although China is probably exceptional in its ambition) and provide the knowledge and skills to continue to drive economic growth and
increase its global influence. This chapter also examines the major challenges and tensions limiting reform, including: resistance by
teachers and parents; incompatibility of indigenous and foreign educational theories and philosophies; gaps between policies and their
implementation; and the endurance of the guanxi (关系) network of personal connections, which can inhibit experimentation and
innovation and potentially lead to further stratification in Chinese society.
Chapter 4 considers the growing inequalities between different sectors of Chinese education, mirroring and driving those in society, and
examines how these might operate as threats to the nation's cohesion. Although the education reform programme has achieved some
success, there remain significant inequalities in the provision of education and educational resources in different parts of the country,
particularly in the western and central provinces where conditions may have changed very little. In addition to this, a rise in private
and international education means that wealth-based disparities are increasing even further.
The tensions between a traditional view of education and neoliberal ideology (extremely important now, even in a Communist Party-
run state), and their underpinning values and beliefs, are examined in Chapter 5. This chapter further discusses the role of the CCP in
education and how it seeks to instil moral and civic attitudes and values and enlist the hearts and minds of its citizens to the national
(CCP) cause through various forms of political and ideological curriculum in public education. The reintroduction and ‘reinvention’ of
Confucian ideas of education as part of the central government's national and international agendas is also examined. The reintroduction
of traditional moral values in the curriculum also arises from attempts to re-set the nation's ‘moral compass’ as a counter to widespread
corruption and materialism, through subjects such as moral education, patriotic education, citizenship education, and political and
ideological education.
As China becomes more confident about its own power, traditions and abilities, the Chinese government does not want merely to learn
from other countries but to surpass them. Chapter 6 charts the course of educational interchanges between China and the West over
the past two decades and argues that China and the rest of the world can work together more effectively to develop mutual
understanding, a more pluralistic knowledge base and less hegemonic relationships. It identifies some continuing challenges facing China
in the development and reform of its education system and in its collaboration with Western and other systems of educational practice.
1
The Genesis of Chinese Education: From Confucius to the Twenty-First Century
For millennia, education and learning have played central roles in Chinese government and society, as well as in the development of
state-sponsored ideologies in which a range of ‘desirable’ moral and ethical behaviours are considered necessary for the proper
governance and wellbeing of the people. Apart from a few brief periods such as the Cultural Revolution when education and educators
were targeted as representing ‘feudal’ ideas, these close connections have endured to the present day.
This chapter looks at the history of China's education system to show how the past has had a deep and enduring influence. It starts
from the time of Confucius and considers how Confucius's moral teachings were invoked over the centuries by different dynasties to
train the scholar class and instil a moral and civic code, and to legitimize and enhance their power and hegemony. It considers how
Confucianism has been both valourized and vilified in the modern period and now once again is being eulogized in contemporary
educational settings and discourses. The inextricable link of education to politics, economics and culture in China is again becoming
apparent as, although the formal education system suffered neglect in some recent times, it has been designated by the Chinese
government as a top priority for reform and improvement to ensure the nation's continued progress and prosperity and as a key site
for ideological education to ensure the allegiance of the citizenry to the national cause.
This chapter maps the role that education has played in supplying the nation's officials and thus ruling class over the past two millennia
and in the development of the state bureaucracy. It discusses China's claim to be the first ‘meritocracy’, as the imperial examination
system, rather than merely wealth or birth, became the avenue for social and political mobility. According to Li (Forthcoming):
Throughout China's practice of political meritocracy, there [has] existed a close relationship between education and politics, as
education has always been deemed not only to promote personal development but, more importantly, to fulfill its social function to
nurture qualified talents for governmental appointments.
(p. 1)
This points to the unique link between governance, culture and education that has existed in China. The discussion below provides a
framework for understanding the influence of education in the affairs of the nation and also the more recent resurgence of popularity in
Confucian educational ideas. There has been a ‘re-traditionalizing’ of cultural values via the re-introduction of Confucianism in moral
education programmes and the promotion of Confucian educational tenets (explored further in Chapter 5).
China is a country in a hurry; it has been racing to catch up with the Western world as quickly as possible so that it can surpass it, and it
has already made major gains. The Chinese government is determined to reclaim the nation's former glory and the leading position it
once held in the world. An examination of past fluctuations in Chinese fortunes helps to explain current attitudes to education and the
role it plays in the national psyche and in contemporary educational beliefs and practices.
People in China pride themselves on what they often cite as China's ‘5,000-year civilization’ and the fact that learning and education
have been valued throughout this history. China is proudly portrayed as ‘the first meritocracy’ and Confucius is venerated as ‘the first
teacher’; ‘perhaps the first teacher who taught all capable students what had been to that time reserved to the children of nobles’ (Bai
2011, pp. 617–18). In Chinese society, education has been seen as the primary vehicle for social mobility, position and status, and
economic and political power and wealth. This is evidenced by the significant percentage of their income that parents (and
grandparents) are prepared to spend on their children's or grandchildren's education.
The following sections charting the history of education in China are, for the sake of brevity, divided into four periods: the imperial
Confucian era from the second century BCE to the mid nineteenth century; the late imperial period from the 1860s to the
establishment of the People's Republic in 1949; the socialist era from 1949 to 1978; and the reform era from 1978 to the twenty-first
century. Although there were immense changes and developments from the second century BCE to the nineteenth century, for
example, all that can be included here are the most significant events and factors which can be seen to have shaped aspects of
contemporary education over the past century and the last twenty years in particular.

The imperial Confucian period

To understand education in China and its historical antecedents, it is necessary to go back two and a half thousand years to the time of
Confucius (551–479 BCE). Although education in the sense that we know it today didn't start with Confucius, what we now recognize as
the educational values and ideologies of China today most certainly did.
The reasons for the primacy of education in contemporary China can be found in China's distant past, at a time when there was no
‘China’ and widespread political and civil turmoil continued until the central regions of China were unified in the third century BCE
under the Qin Dynasty, the name of which (pronounced ‘chin’ in English), is thought to be the origin of the name ‘China’. The Chinese
name for the country – the ‘Middle [or central] Kingdom’ (zhongguo 中国) – provides a clue to the central position that China saw and
still sees itself having in the world.
Confucius lived during this period of instability with continuing warfare between rival warlords and kingdoms. This turmoil prompted
him to hark back to an earlier ‘more refined’ golden era when poetry, dancing and music were revered as desirable intellectual pursuits
and were demonstrated through cultural rituals. Confucius believed in the importance of the morality of the individual and of the State
as essential elements for a stable, civic and well-governed society and thus a path to peace and harmony. Confucius was said to have
had over 3,000 disciples and travelled through China advising kings and state officials seeking political influence, but it was his disciples
and subsequent followers who later promulgated and proselytized his thoughts and philosophy (much like other sages such as Christ
and the Buddha) through the ‘classic texts’ or scriptures. Confucianism was adopted, or co-opted, by successive dynasties, becoming the
official State orthodoxy over following centuries and later introduced to other countries in the region such as Vietnam, Korea and Japan.
It became the political and ideological tool by which Chinese rulers trained and selected the ruling class and its discourses of ‘morality’
were used to establish social norms and hierarchies. According to Pepper (1996):
Confucian learning, imperial power, and bureaucratic authority were thus bound together in a mutually sustaining relationship that
would dominate Chinese intellectual life until the [imperial] examinations were abolished in 1905 and the imperial system was
overthrown in the 1911 revolution.
(p. 47)
Confucius was not the only influential philosopher during this early period, however. Scholarly and philosophical debate flourished in the
era of a ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’, from the sixth century BCE to the Qin Dynasty. Other notable philosophers of the period
included Laozi (Lao-tzu), Mozi (Mo-tzu), Mengzi (Mencius) and Zhuangzi (Chuang-tzu). Mencius inherited the Confucian tradition and
emphasized the innate goodness of human nature and the need for this to be nurtured through education, self-cultivation and discipline.
Daoism, another branch of Chinese philosophy purportedly founded by Laozi, was concerned with understanding the universe and all
things in it and finding the true ‘dao’ (道) or ‘way’ through a simple life. Daoism also had its roots in the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’,
as did other schools of thought such as Legalism and Mohism. Many of these philosophical traditions have influenced Chinese thought
and have intermingled but Confucianism has had the most significant and enduring influence on educational thought and society more
generally. Yao (2008) argues that Confucianism ‘is more a tradition generally rooted in Chinese culture and nurtured by Confucius and
Confucians rather than a new religion created, or a new value system initiated, by Confucius himself alone’ (p. 17).
The scriptures extolling the virtues and practices that Confucius personified and advocated were the subject of intense disagreements
and interpretations by scholars throughout following centuries. Thus, ‘Confucianism’ has evolved over a long period of frequent debates
about the fidelity and interpretation of Confucius's ideas and the ancient texts. According to Spence (1999), some of the ‘ancient’ texts
were actually later forgeries. In truth, what is known as Confucianism, or ‘ruxue’ (儒学), has changed and been re-interpreted or
appropriated over the centuries and used to legitimize or give force to various State political and social agendas.
The popularity of Confucianism has waxed and waned according to the political and social conditions of the day. It has been selectively
used by the State in radically different ways to justify or promote often contradictory worldviews (much like other ‘religions’). More
recent attempts to instil moral values among young people have seen the resurrection of the ‘true teachings’ of Confucius and even
their portrayal as being compatible with liberal and student-centred views of pedagogy (see Chapter 5). Law (2017), conversely, argues
that Confucianism has been used over time to promote obedience to the State:
The imperial state further used education and imperial civil examination (keju) to foster obedient citizenry by teaching, spreading
and perpetuating those Confucian ideas in favour of the state leadership, such as loyalty to the emperor and filial piety to the father
(p. 258) … for centuries Chinese education has tilted more toward creating obedient citizenry than liberating individuality.
(p. 260)
Confucianism is not a religion but rather an ideology; it is not concerned with the supernatural but focuses on what happens on earth.
Its most common representation is as a philosophy or code of ethics with morality, virtue and the perfectibility of the self at its heart
and offering the promise of a harmonious and ethical society governed by an educated class of scholar-officials. The ruling hierarchy was
thus built not on military prowess but on philosophical beliefs with the Emperor portrayed as a ‘Philosopher King’ and the ruling elite or
gentry as the scholar-officials (shidafu 士大夫). The Confucian ‘curriculum’ was a liberal one with an emphasis on philosophy, literature
and history, and graduate officials were meant to embody the highest ideals, perfecting themselves through life-long learning.
Confucianism was essentially concerned with personal ethics, good governance and social order, or a ‘good society’. The Confucian ‘five
relationships’ of society were patriarchal and included those between ruler and minister, elder brother and younger brother, husband
and wife, father and son, and between friend and friend. This encompassed a hierarchy of authority and duty so that officials obeyed the
Emperor, citizens obeyed officials, students obeyed their teacher, wives obeyed their husbands and children obeyed their parents.
There was ‘a sharp demarcation in rights and obligations between the ruling and the ruled’ (He 1964, p. 255), justified by the claim that
being a member of the ruling-class, from Emperor to officials, was based on individual merit.
The relationships between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’ were not meant to be merely about power but also were meant to incorporate the concept
of ‘benevolence’; a ruler had a moral duty to act in the best interests of his subjects, and a dynasty was seen to have lost the ‘Mandate
of Heaven’ during times of major political turmoil or periods of natural disasters and could be legitimately overthrown. Yang (2011)
argues that these human relationships and their associated duties are essential elements of Chinese culture and are embodied in the
‘five constant virtues’ – benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity (p. 397).
This system of hierarchy and respect for authority has influenced views of teachers and students. Teachers were highly respected and
viewed as a strict but benevolent parent; a ‘good’ student was one who listens to the teacher. Li and Bray (2007) argue that this
hierarchy continues to the present day although their argument undermines claims that merit determined examination success and
therefore social standing rather than position at birth (see further on this later):
China's 4,000-year-old Confucian ideology emphasizes social hierarchy, where every individual and group is embedded in a social
network determined by status at birth and performance … These values remain significant today, allowing an individual's successes
to affect the family or the collective unit.
(Li & Bray 2007, p. 410)
Scholar officials were appointed on the basis of their knowledge of the Confucian texts through the imperial examination system. This
system enabled rulers to shape the nation through selection of those deemed to have the ‘correct’ knowledge and values and thus
worthy to serve the Emperor and the nation. Imperial examinations existed in some form from the Han Dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE)
but were formalized and institutionalized in the Sui period (581 to 618 CE) and became widely used in the Tang period (618 to 907 CE).
Examinations have been ‘a significant governing technology in China for well over a millennium’ (Kipnis 2011, p. 7) and functioned as a
conjunction between education, government and social development. They were not abolished until 1905.
A formal education structure has existed in China since the second century with the establishment of the Imperial College (taixue 太学),
later replaced by the National Academy (guozijian 国子监), which administered the education system and oversaw higher learning. A
nationwide schooling system was established in the third century. Emerging during the Tang Dynasty and then flourishing in Song
times (960–1279 CE) were shuyuan (书院) (numbering 4,000 by the end of the nineteenth century, Pepper 1996), private Confucian
academies where scholarly ‘masters’ debated the Confucian texts with their disciples. Buddhism, imported from India, and Daoism
flourished and strongly influenced Chinese educational thought and practice in this period due to their concern for the spiritual and
transcendental worlds rather than what was seen at that time as the merely human and mundane world of Confucianism (Hayhoe
2006). The Tang and Ming dynasties are considered China's ‘golden age’, with a proliferation of fine art, literary works, and a highly
educated scholar class. By the time of the Ming empire (1368–1644), China had a rudimentary but nationwide state school and
scholarship system (He 1964). Chinese society was rich in philosophical debate supported by a wealth of publishers, printers, bookshops
and professional teachers, with huge libraries at the disposal of scholars, often supported by wealthy merchants (Spence 1999).
In the eighteenth century, schooling was almost uniformly private and ‘sishu’ (私塾) (private schools) were run by private tutors. Many
wealthy families ran their own schools and their homes were lavishly decorated with elaborate scholars' desks and luxurious paper, ink
and calligraphy brushes. These private schools and academies were gradually replaced by modern schools in the reforms of the late
Qing period in the early twentieth century.
At the heart of this whole system were the triennial imperial examinations based on knowledge and analysis of the Confucian classics
including the Analects (lunyu 论语), a collection of dialogues between Confucius and his disciples. The Analects were often annotated
with later commentaries which drew from other philosophical traditions such as Buddhism and Daoism, and students were expected to
learn from these as well. Other subjects included legal knowledge, calligraphy and mathematics (Li 2017a).
The examinations changed very little over the hundreds of years of their existence. At their core was the notorious ‘eight-legged essay’
on morality and politics which required intensive knowledge and memorization of the classic texts. In China today this emphasis on
acquiring knowledge through memorization and repeated reading endures, and even young children are expected to know a large
number of classical poems by the end of primary school. Some young Chinese students proudly claim that they can recite hundreds and
sometimes even thousands of poems and can be shocked to learn that this type of learning is not respected in other countries as a sign
of advanced learning.
A successful candidate in the imperial examination became a member of the intellectual aristocracy, rising in rank through the various
district, provincial and palace examinations, each level conferring more entitlements, honours and government positions. The final level
was obtained by only a very small number of men, usually after decades of study, and those with essays judged best by the Emperor
himself were chosen as his highest ministers and advisors. The imperial examination system was even retained by non-Han dynasties
(such as those of the Mongols and Manchus) as it was seen as ensuring a stable system of government.
Families or extended familial clans often chose the boy considered to have the most potential to study long hours over many years, a life
often referred to as ‘shinian hanchuang’ (十年寒窗) – ten years by the cold window – due to the long hours in school or with a private
tutor and the considerable hardship involved (the character han 寒 can also mean ‘poor’ so it can also mean many years spent in
poverty). This long period of preparation would have required extraordinary perseverance and diligence. This early dedication to
education permeates the psyche of the Chinese people and persists in contemporary China. It helps to explain the considerable hours
and hardship considered necessary for success and the pervasive belief that anything can be accomplished through hard work rather
than innate ability or talent.
Although women were never allowed to sit for the imperial examinations, a small number of private schools admitted women and
upper-class women received education often alongside their male siblings until the age of ten when their education focused on more
‘womanly’ skills such as needlework (Bailey 2007, p. 7). Many of these women were famed for their poetry and literary writings.
‘Aristocratic women at court, as well as imperial consorts and dowagers, were famed for their patronage of scholarship and literature;
some of them also contributed significantly in their own right to historical scholarship or other forms of literature’ (Bailey 2007, p. 4).
Women clearly did not have the same opportunities are their male counterparts but Bailey (2007) argues that this did not mean that
they were seen as being intellectually inferior to men. Recent evidence, he argues, reveals that ‘representations of women in early
China (in historical annals, discourse and life-story narratives) frequently praised women for their sagacity, expertise, political acumen
and rhetorical skill’ (p. 4). Women's education, at least among the upper classes, was seen as important in instilling the ‘correct’
(Confucian) moral values and passing these on to the next generation.
Some claim that the imperial examination system influenced the introduction of examinations in the West as ‘Britain learnt it from
China’ (Liu 2006, p. 302) as well as the development of the British civil service tradition (Bodde 1948; Li 2017b). Appointment to
government positions was claimed to be determined not by one's family or social background, but through ‘socio academic mobility’ (He
1964, p. xi) via the imperial examinations. Yet few families could afford for a member to be engaged in long study for many years, and
although theoretically open to any qualified candidate and offering the promise of ‘equal opportunity for all’ through education (He
1964, p. 255), this system still worked to advance the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Some poorer candidates did manage to
succeed in passing the exams against the odds but many who failed were left frustrated and resentful and this resentment in part
helped to fuel the uprisings against the imperial system in the late Qing period. The ‘merit-based’ system only applied to merit within
the gentry class; examinations, wealth and birth were intimately linked. The number of peasants (the majority of the population) who
were literate was very small so the number who sat the imperial examinations was probably zero. The meritocracy myth promoted an
ideology that prevented change and enabled the continuation of privilege for the gentry and its rule.
Many lives were blighted by the long years of study, especially if the candidates’ hopes were dashed. There was also much bribery and
corruption including, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the selling of degrees and titles (He 1964; Spence 1999), and bribery and
corruption are practices that continue to be found to this day in examinations and in education more broadly in China due to, once again,
the vast benefits available to only a very small number of people. In one of the many examples of the continuity through Chinese
history of educational beliefs and practices, the national university entrance gaokao (高考) examination also requires huge effort and
memorization and plays the same high-stakes ‘winner takes all’ role in determining further educational and career opportunities, social
status and glory.
For much of China's history a national examination system has determined a student's entry into higher education and consequent
economic and social privilege. The current gaokao university entrance examination is, as in ancient times, intensely competitive and
this competitiveness is embedded in the psyche of Chinese people. When I ask my university students in China what most defines their
education, they universally answer ‘the gaokao!’, the ‘three days of hell’. Despite efforts to reform this system, the tyranny of the
gaokao and intense competitiveness are significant factors that have hampered efforts at more recent reform. Such a system creates
few ‘winners’ and few options for those who don't ‘succeed’.
The imperial examination lay at the core of Chinese society, culture and governance, influencing the development of its education
system over several centuries. He (1964) points to the exceptional nature of China's education system during this time:
the institutionalization of a competitive examination system as the main avenue of socio-bureaucratic mobility and the existence of
a large number of state and private schools are probably without parallel in major societies prior to the coming of the Industrial
Revolution and national compulsory education.
(p. 256)
The imperial examination system was both the nation's strength as well as ultimately its weakness due to it rigidity and inherent
resistance to change, especially in the face of Western encroachment and the superior military and technological power made possible
by the Industrial Revolution.

The late imperial period to the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949
The late imperial period saw the beginnings of major change in education with social and political pressure by intellectuals and students
as its catalyst. Intellectuals and students have been at the forefront of most of the political movements and events in China's history,
due to the long links between the educated and the State. Students and intellectuals played a major role in Chinese politics and society
from the mid to late nineteenth century through to the establishment of the People's Republic. Those decades saw a push for the
modernization of Chinese politics, society and education and intellectuals and students spearheaded demands for sweeping changes in
society in the face of humiliation by outside, mainly Western, powers and what was viewed as the decay of the imperial system. In this
sense, education could be seen as both a ‘mirror’ and a ‘motor’ of social and political changes in Chinese society throughout this period.
The reforms to education mirrored a changing society but educators also played a major role as a ‘motor’ or generator of social and
educational change. Educators were prominent in movements demanding political changes in Chinese society as well as changes to its
education system.
The previous relatively stable imperial system in China was shattered by events from the 1850s onwards which began what is known in
China as ‘a century of humiliation’. Foreign incursions from the mid nineteenth century exposed China to the superior military power
and technology of the West and Japan, and the ensuing foreign economic and cultural influences challenged the previous central tenets
of Chinese society. Disastrous military defeats at the hands of Japan and Western powers, and incursions by not just Britain but also
France, Germany, Belgium, Russia and the United States, and the consequent concessions and indemnities paid, weakened imperial rule
and caused widespread turmoil resulting in a national crisis and calls for major reform to modernize the Chinese state. Resentment of
the imperial examination system, exposure of the weaknesses of imperial rule, and the humiliations experienced at the hands of foreign
powers following the Opium Wars in the mid 1840s and 1860s helped to fuel the bloody Taiping Rebellion against the Qing Dynasty
from 1850 to 1864. According to Spence (1999, p. 271), in 1912 ‘there were at least seven predatory foreign powers with special
interests in China, not just one [Japan], and China was already heavily in debt to them’. People felt doubly oppressed by the imperial
system and by Western powers, even though there was also admiration for the achievements of the West. A nationalist tide began
which called for reform of education and society.
The foreign encroachments especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century when Western powers (primarily Britain) forced China
to engage in trade, and the subsequent forced opening up of treaty ports along its coastline, made the Chinese State aware of the
superior technological abilities of foreign powers and hence the need to update its own. Many of those calling for reform questioned
whether traditional Confucian culture was the root cause of China's apparent backwardness and viewed the imperial system as
moribund and in need of reform. From the late 1800s a new education system began to be established and the Confucian academies
were slowly dismantled. There was a disdain for foreigners and foreign cultures and a continuing belief in the moral superiority of
‘Chinese ways’ but a recognition that China needed to ‘learn from the Barbarian in order to conquer the Barbarian’ (Yang 2011, p. 38),
expressed in the late Qing period as ‘Chinese knowledge for norms, Western knowledge for use’ (zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong 中学为
体， 西学为用). These developments led to the ‘self-strengthening’ movement in the latter half of the century, an attempt to retain
some dignity and feelings of self-worth in the face of foreign incursions and influences, and a quest to learn from the West by adopting
its technologies while retaining Chinese cultural values. Particularly during the period from 1927 to 1949, education was geared towards
Western ideas of science and technology although the higher education system was modelled on the Japanese system.
This established the uneasy relationship that China has with the outside ‘foreign’ world, especially the West and Japan; it seeks to learn
from the West and Japan even though they are emblematic of its former humiliation. Western learning ‘came with the baggage train of
the foreign invader’ and represented an unprecedented challenge to ‘Chinese civilization's ancient claim to superiority’, threatening the
position and power of China's ruling class (Pepper 1996, p. 56).
The tensions between traditional Chinese educational values and the need to accommodate ‘modern’ ideas from outside, particularly
the West, have made for uneasy relationships to the present day. Chinese educators seek to learn from other countries while retaining
traditional Chinese educational values and moral standards. The influence of all things modern or Western has especially concerned
those who grew up during the socialist period, although the younger generation in China today mostly appears to have no such qualms.
Contact with the outside, and particularly the West, has been a major catalyst for educational change in China, both historically and in
more recent times, but it has been viewed with ambivalence, a source of both tensions and reverence.
The quest to learn from the outside started a flow of Chinese students travelling to study in Europe, the United States and Japan.
Schools were established in Beijing in the 1860s to teach foreign languages and later offered a broader curriculum. In 1866, the Fuzhou
Naval College was established as part of the ‘self-strengthening movement’ and sent the first group of students to study in the United
Kingdom in 1877. This trend continues to this day but these early experiences and ambivalence still overshadow the uneasy
relationship felt in China between Chinese and ‘foreign’ education. According to Liu (2017):
From 1866 to 1949, international education in China experienced considerable growth, although the debates always centred on the
tensions between new (Western) and old (Chinese) knowledge systems … the tension between Chinese and Western based
curriculum is still a contentious issue despite international education increasingly becoming the choice of middle class and affluent
families.
Alongside foreign trade came Western Christian missionaries, many American but also others from a range of countries, who developed
their own schools and universities which were also open to poorer students, and pioneered schooling for women and girls. They taught
Western science and technology and spread Western and Christian texts and ideas which had a strong influence on Chinese society;
many officials of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been educated at missionary schools and colleges. These
missionaries introduced ‘American-style’ liberal arts education and played a significant role in the establishment of China's first
universities. Chinese scholars returning from study in Europe, the United States and Japan also played major roles in the development
of universities and drew on higher education models from these countries. Patriotic individuals in China and philanthropists also helped
to establish private universities such as Fudan University in Shanghai and Xiamen University in Fujian Province.
Government universities were established alongside the private foreign universities, often with the aid of foreign investment such as
from the American Rockefeller Foundation, and many of these would become China's leading universities. Tsinghua University, for
example, was created using surplus monies following the reduction by the United States of its indemnities from the Boxer Rebellion.
These colleges became centres for political debate and activism and many of their staff and students became prominent in national
affairs. These colleges were dismantled in 1949 following the Communist takeover and the reorganization of higher education in 1952,
but many key universities in China today including Peking University in Beijing and Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou have links to
former Christian colleges.
The fall of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912 saw intense intellectual and political debates about
the needs of a modern state and education was seen as a key driver of political, cultural and social change. Education became a crucible
of political unrest and activism. The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed an interest in more progressive and ‘modern’
education and a focus on society and social life, practicality, broader educational access, an interest in foreign educational ideas and
fascination with Western literature and art. It led in part to the flowering of modern Chinese literature and political thought.
Disillusionment with the failure by the new Republic to solve China's social and political problems led to criticism of Confucian ideas as
holding back real reform and to calls for the development of a new ‘modern’ Chinese culture based on more ‘global’ or Western ideas
such as democracy and science.
This period also saw vigorous debates about the role of women in society and advances in women's education. Official and unofficial
schooling for girls had begun in the late Qing period and the first public schools for girls were opened in 1907. In 1912 secondary schools
for girls and coeducational primary schools were established, and in 1919 women were finally permitted to enter higher education.
Although enrolments rose steadily, they were still relatively small compared with rates for males.
The most influential of all the political movements of the 1910s and 1920s was the New Culture Movement led by prominent
intellectuals which began in 1917. Regarded by some as China's ‘Renaissance’ or ‘Enlightenment’ (Hayhoe 2006; Li 2017a), its aim was
to modernize Chinese culture through overthrowing its cultural and political traditions. This was followed by the May Fourth
Movement when student demonstrations broke out on 4 May 1919 protesting against the government's weaknesses. Although China
had sent troops to help the Allies in the First World War, the allied powers secretly gave surrendered German concession territory in
Shandong to Japan following the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the war, rather than returning it to China. This added to the
feelings of humiliation by foreign powers and unleashed a public backlash in response to the perceived weakness of the government and
rising nationalism. Many intellectuals were politically prominent during this period. University students and others gathered in Beijing
to protest on 4 May against this decision, and the movement that followed became known as the May Fourth Movement.
The May Fourth Movement was an important period for the ‘modernization’ of Chinese education and society. The slogans of ‘science’
and ‘democracy’ were promoted as antidotes to feudal beliefs, which were seen as moribund, oppressive and creating weak government
rule. Chinese students returning from universities overseas imported new pedagogical models into the education system. Many of those
associated with the New Culture and May Fourth Movements had studied overseas (mainly in America and Japan), and on their return,
took up high positions in educational institutions. Cai Yuanpei, who was educated in Germany, was the first Minister of Education in the
Republic and later the President of Peking University. He brought young intellectuals together at Peking University and they became
highly influential in the movement to modernize education.
Although the reformers had studied in a number of different countries, Naftali (2016) argues that ‘It was the “West” though, with its
strong conceptualization of “the self”, an ethic of rebellion, and a paradigm of critical thought’ (citing Schwarcz 1968), that most
attracted the attention of these early educational reformers’ (p. 28). The May Fourth Movement played an important role in calls for
reform and, according to de Kloet and Fung (2017), ‘Mao Zedong himself also claimed that the May Fourth Movement spearheaded
communist formation in China’ (pp. 4–5). The ensuing period saw the genesis of the nationalist KMT (Guomindang) and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). This period saw a flowering of intellectual, literary and social ideas and debates, an explosion of literature
criticizing Confucianism, increasing Western influence and urban ‘Westernization’ especially in Shanghai.
Despite the resentment towards foreign powers, interest in Western ideas continued. Many Western thinkers were invited to China
during this period and had significant impact, such as Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and the noted American educationalist John
Dewey.
John Dewey's ideas on progressive and liberal education and his philosophies of democracy had a significant impact on political and
educational thinking in China. Dewey arrived at the beginning of the May Fourth Movement and lived in Beijing from 1919 to 1920,
teaching courses and lecturing widely. Dewey proposed a ‘meeting of minds between East and West’ (Zhang 2007) and, while
acknowledging the importance of Western learning, urged the Chinese people to find their own solutions to resolving China's problems.
His ideas on liberal education and critical inquiry became hugely influential. Two of the respondents to Dewey's lectures were Hu Shi
and Chen Duxiu, two of the May Fourth leaders. Chen and Hu shared ideas on the importance of democracy and science for social and
political reform but differed in their views on how this should be achieved. Zhang (2007) argues that Hu used Dewey's talks for his own
agenda of social change through reform and Westernization of education in China and ignored his philosophy of democracy through
education. Hu was a leading light of Chinese liberalism, became president of Peking University and in 1939 was nominated for a Nobel
Prize in literature. Chen was more interested in Dewey's ideas on democracy but was not a proponent of Dewey's pragmatic approach,
instead advocating radical political and economic change. The May Fourth Movement split into two groups, one advocating a liberalist
approach to social change (and some becoming ultra-conservative) and the other more radical political change and social equality. Chen
Duxiu later became a co-founder of the Chinese Communist Party.
Through all these influences, the 1920s and 1930s saw improvements in education, including some increases in literacy, and the
development of a modern school curriculum and girls’ education. The Nationalist government embarked on a plan for universal basic
education for all children to receive one year of compulsory education by 1940 and two years by 1944. The massive political instability
and social unrest which continued alongside this tide of intellectual debate, however, meant that educational development was
scuppered by huge upheavals which engulfed China. Civil war between the Nationalist KMT and the Communist Party from 1927, and
the invasion by Japan in 1937 and its subsequent occupation of China during the Second World War until 1945 had devastating effects
on China and on its population.

The socialist era from 1949 to 1978

The provision of education improved dramatically after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the
ideologies underpinning education underwent a paradigm shift. Traditional Chinese culture and Confucian views of education were seen
as hindering modernization and education was marshalled to the cause of building a new socialist society, with socialist ideology
replacing Confucianism as the State orthodoxy. Students were encouraged to engage in ‘class struggle’, criticize ‘feudal ways’ as
impediments to the creation of a classless society, and study socialism and the political ideology of Chairman Mao Zedong.
The early PRC period saw massive expansion of basic education and vast improvements in school and university enrolments,
educational attainment, literacy rates and educational infrastructure. In 1949, over 80 percent of the population were illiterate or semi-
literate and only around 40 percent of children attended school. By 2017 attendance rates were above 99 percent (China Education
Center 2017) and literacy is now almost universal. Education was enlisted to destroy old power structures and privileges, develop a
more egalitarian society, and reduce gaps between the urban ruling elites and the masses in the countryside.
Advances were made in girls' and women's education, following Mao Zedong's dictum that ‘women hold up half the sky’. According to
Naftali (2016), ‘Many Chinese women recall these campaigns as enabling the transgression of gender boundaries and regard them as a
positive legacy of their childhood under Mao’ (pp. 34–5). In 1950, private schools and colleges were nationalized and modern schooling
began to extend across China including into rural and remote communities.
Chinese higher education was reorganized in 1952 following the Soviet model, focusing on scientific and technological subjects.
Universities were reorganized to form new technical universities specializing in areas such as engineering, mining, petroleum,
telecommunications, agriculture and medicine, as well as ‘normal’ (shifan 师范) universities which trained teachers, with only a few
comprehensive universities remaining. In 1957, an ideological split between China and the Soviet Union led to a break in ties including
in educational cooperation.
The educational achievements of these early years, however, were again overtaken by political events. The darker periods in the
following decades had devastating consequences for the expansion of education and for people's educational opportunities. The mid
1950s onwards were particularly hard for intellectuals as they were subject to public vilification. In 1956, Mao launched the Hundred
Flowers Movement aimed at encouraging people to openly express their opinions about the new regime. But in 1957 Mao responded to
the unexpectedly virulent criticisms expressed by intellectuals with the establishment of the Anti-Rightist Movement and many
intellectuals were arrested for their criticisms and sent into exile or to labour camps. The subsequent Great Leap Forward launched by
Mao in 1958, a plan to transform China through rapid industrialization and collectivization, directed workers to concentrate on
industrialization at the expense of grain and food production, and, combined with severe weather conditions, resulted in ‘the most
disastrous famine in history’ with up to 30 million deaths (Treiman 2013). The damaging consequences of the Great Leap Forward
were far-reaching for the education of the generation of youth during this period and into the 1960s and 1970s.
The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, launched by Mao as an effort to consolidate his power and diminish the power of his
opponents, was a major setback to the development of China and a particular disaster for education as it fell heavily on teachers and
intellectuals. Ostensibly its aim was to ‘promote a radical socialist agenda of eradicating social differences’ (Hannum & Park 2007, p. 4)
but, in reality, Mao was trying to reassert his authority after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and mounting opposition to him
within the Party. Universities and especially teacher education universities were seen as promoting traditional education and values
and were most severely affected. Many educators describe this period of education as a ‘blank’ as almost all schools and universities
were closed for most or some of this period.
During the ten tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution education became entirely an instrument of the State. Entry to and
progress through education were determined by a recommendation from the CCP based on class background, with students with
‘correct’ or more ‘revolutionary’ backgrounds given preference, including children of peasants, workers, soldiers or Party officials, with
the stated aim of reducing disparities between rural and urban dwellers. Students in the cities were sent to the countryside for ‘re-
education’ through manual labour. Higher education in particular suffered with the national university entry examinations suspended
and undergraduate admissions halted for six years and graduate admissions for 12. Vocational and technical schools were closed as well
as secondary teacher training colleges and schools that remained open adopted a highly ideological curriculum. During this period,
minban or locally community run and financed schools operated by communes, production brigades and neighbourhood revolutionary
committees increased significantly. One upshot was that the number of schools in rural areas increased during this period and gender
gaps in primary and secondary education narrowed markedly (Hannum & Park 2007).
Teachers and intellectuals were portrayed as representing the ‘old order’ and persecuted as ‘bad elements’, ‘counter-revolutionaries’ or
‘reactionary rightists’. Mao encouraged attacks against anything ‘old’, ‘feudal’ or ‘bourgeois’, including Confucianism and Confucian
education which were deemed ‘old thinking’. By using emotive terms such as ‘old’ and ‘feudal’ Mao was able to appeal to young people,
and children were encouraged to spy on and attack their teachers and even their parents, as part of Mao's general aim to root out
anyone likely to oppose him or argue against his ideas. Schools and universities were attacked; anything considered ‘old’ was smashed;
teachers were publicly humiliated and paraded wearing dunce's hats and signs around their necks stating their ‘crimes’, and were often
beaten, sometimes to death; others committed suicide. There were pitched battles on some university campuses between rival groups
of Red Guards, the young students whom Mao mobilized in support of his cause. Some university campuses were maintained by old
former teachers who acted as unpaid caretakers and faithfully tried to preserve what they could, but universities took years to rebuild
and to retrain staff.
Children of those persecuted were often sent away for their own safety. Some whose parents had been imprisoned or sent to labour
camps were forced to look after themselves and their younger siblings, and the older students who had been sent to the countryside
were often treated harshly by villagers. A whole generation missed out on education and this in part explains why today's parents and
grandparents are so keen for their children or grandchildren to have the educational opportunities that they were denied.
The Cultural Revolution did enormous damage not just to education, but also to educational infrastructure and educators themselves.
Schools and universities were left seriously depleted of suitably qualified staff as they had either not been trained or had died during the
Cultural Revolution or never recovered from their ordeals.
Especially in its later stages, the Cultural Revolution undoubtedly caused very damaging consequences for many but, although it is
commonplace for education during this time to be wholeheartedly attacked, it is interesting to consider why many elements of
education during this period did attract so many people. Many intellectuals and students genuinely found Mao's ideas on education,
such as open-door schooling, questioning of authorities, and learning from the masses, progressive and revolutionary. Many benefited
from education in this period who would previously have had no such opportunities, reducing gender gaps and improving access for
rural students and workers. The old absolute reverence for teachers and formal education was fundamentally shaken (though much
traditional thinking and practice has been revived). Although the teaching profession is still seen as a worthy and respectable
profession, and teachers are shown considerable respect in the classroom, teaching has never regained the lofty status it occupied
throughout most of China's history. One teacher I spoke to at a highly respected primary school in Haidian district in Beijing (the
‘university’ district sometimes referred to as China's Silicon Valley) told me that he enjoyed teaching but that it wasn't really ‘a man's
job’; he would have preferred to be in the Army.
Despite the devastating impacts on Chinese society, the view of China and Chinese education portrayed to the outside world at the time
was a rosy one. The post-PISA era is not the first time there have been calls to emulate China's education. Even during the Cultural
Revolution, it was heralded as a model of educational development by leftist commentators and visiting educators with its plans for
universal ten years of schooling and access for the poor, and education models that did not seek to simply emulate the West (see Pepper
1996). Communism held considerable appeal in other parts of the world at this time as offering an antidote to the perceived injustices of
capitalism. The leftist idealists who visited China at the time could be forgiven for the rose-coloured views they developed since what
they saw was tightly controlled and choreographed by the Chinese government (in a similar fashion to the ‘model’ classes visiting
foreign educators are shown today). When I arrived to study in Beijing in 1980, my images of China as a socialist utopia were quickly
disabused as I learnt first-hand the damage inflicted on students newly returned from the countryside and saw a nation mired in
poverty.
Following the end of the Cultural Revolution with Mao's death, and the fall of the ‘Gang of Four’ (the group led by Mao's former wife
Jiang Qing), in 1977 Deng Xiaoping gained power and set in motion a series of economic reforms that would transform the nation and,
over the next three decades, trigger massive changes to the nature and spread of education across the country. Economic reform began
first, with major reform of education coming later, but this has been equally transformative.

The reform era from 1978 to the twenty-first century

The current and fourth period, beginning in 1978, has seen massive change in Chinese society more generally and also in education as
the country has moved from a socialist planned economy to a socialist-led market economy. The 'Opening Up’ policy launched by Deng
Xiaoping in 1978 heralded a move towards marketization, decentralization and privatization of education. The political and ideological
arena was characterized by Deng's ‘pragmatic’ approach in contrast to the ‘idealism’ of the Maoist period and has entailed a transition in
education from egalitarianism to antithetical market-driven ideologies in the decades since, accelerating in recent decades. The
educational policies pursued by the CCP after 1949 that banned for-profit education and sought to mitigate the role of education in
social stratification were dismantled and previous ideologies turned on their head.
The early years of the Deng era offered educational opportunities to the ‘lost generation’ (Naftali 2016) of students returning from exile
in the countryside who had not attended school or university during the Cultural Revolution and a few lucky ones gained a university
place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They threw themselves into study as a means to improve or redeem their family's, and their
own, social standing but many were deeply scarred by their experiences and some developed a desperation to escape China by studying
overseas as this became increasingly possible.
The national gaokao examination was re-introduced in 1977 on a pilot basis and adopted nationwide in 1978. In those two years the
gaokao was uniform across the country, and those who successfully gained university places in these years consider themselves to be a
special group who had the opportunity to attend university regardless of background or status (though this is not entirely true as the
children of party leaders were not required to sit the gaokao). Many of the students of these two years (President Xi Jinping among
them) obtained leading positions in their fields and are still influential. Those I have interviewed regard their university years with
great fondness as they believe they gained admission during the time of a power-vacuum between the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976
and the battle for supremacy between different factions within the Party. Students during that short period feel that they earned their
places on merit, not through political patronage or wealth. From 1979 onwards, the gaokao was set by different provinces, with the
problems flowing from that as discussed in the next chapter. Gao recounts the story of his own mother who remembered this time as a
positive one:
My mother, who attended Peking University in the late 1970s, remembered being surrounded by classmates of all walks of life –
from the heirs of party officials and the scions of intellectuals, to workers fresh out of factories and peasants hailing from far-flung
provinces. (Gao 2014)
The reform period saw the expansion of education starting with primary and secondary education in the 1980s and higher education in
the 1990s. Government controls over education began to relax in the 1980s with the decentralization of financing and management of
schools and universities gradually moving to provincial and local governments. Education costs have soared since and institutions have
been increasingly encouraged to find alternative sources of funding, leading to huge disparities between the wealthier, mainly eastern
coast provinces and major cities, and the generally poorer and less developed central and western provinces. Educational inequality has
widened and disparities among different groups are increasing (discussed more fully in Chapter 4).
In 1986, the Compulsory Education Law established nine compulsory years of schooling and mandated equal access in education
regardless of sex, ethnicity, race, property or religion. Since the 1990s, financing of education has moved from complete dependence on
government funding to multiple sources of funding including from national and provincial governments, industry (for research),
enterprises or non-government bodies and alumni, and through tuition fees (introduced in 1997).
Since the late 1990s, a range of policies have been directed at reforming all aspects of education to improve the ‘quality’ (suzhi 素质) of
education provision and produce ‘quality’ citizens (detailed in the following two chapters). Discourses of ‘quality’ can be found
throughout educational policy and practice but the concept is a nebulous one and is often linked to more elitist goals as young people are
encouraged to develop (ill-defined) ‘leadership’ skills and universities are encouraged to be ‘world class’ (usually simply in numeric
rankings); such discourses are inextricably linked to inequality, as will be seen later, but also, Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue, embody
‘neo-Darwinist’ attitudes (p. 145). The ‘quantity–quality conundrum’, Pepper (1996, p. 481) argues, goes back to the first decades of
the PRC and debates then about the use of limited resources, where the education of peasants was seen as being wasteful, and the later
egalitarian expansionist policies during the Cultural Revolution. Competing ideologies such as these have continued to shape education
policy and cause continued tensions.
The move from the egalitarian ideologies of the early PRC period to the market-driven neoliberal ideologies of the reform era have
produced paradigm shifts in educational policy, provision, opportunities, attainment, expectations and thinking. Although there have
been wide-ranging attempts by the central and local governments to improve educational quality and access, egalitarian discourses are
essentially dead, and contradictory government policies combined with social forces and increasing prosperity mean that parental
aspirations and expectations, prompted by changing government ideologies and policies, have led to the warping of the social fabric in
education. Intense competition as well as personal status and connections play a key role in determining educational opportunities, and
educational inequalities have widened, with the select few leaving behind larger numbers of those without such opportunities in their
wake. Government discourses of ‘quality’ in education act to further widen this gap since, as Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue, they
‘denigrate the less educated or less fortunate’ (p. 343). It is natural for governments to seek to improve the knowledge and skills of its
citizenry and workforce and for individuals to want the best educational opportunities, but in a socialist country it is ironic that
neoliberal, market-driven models that underpin much educational policy have resulted in increasing inequality of educational
opportunities and attainment, as following chapters will show.
Personal ‘ideologies’ of education in China today are primarily concerned with how it is a vehicle for achieving social and economic
success rather than as an end in itself, reflecting an instrumentalist ideology towards education, an enduring legacy of the past. Bai
(2011) draws parallels between what eventually became the instrumentalism of those sitting the imperial civil service examination ‘not
to gain insight into life’ but rather to gain positions of power and influence, and with the gaokao examination which acts as a similar
mechanism to gain status and opportunities, to ‘get a good life by doing well in the examinations’ (p. 618).
The legacies of all these periods in Chinese history are apparent today in educational philosophies, government policies, and individuals’
social mores and cultural values. These inheritances can be seen in the enduring influence of Confucian educational ideology from the
imperial period, efforts since the early socialist period to improve educational provision, and the determination of today's parents and
grandparents in the market reform era to ensure a better future for their children than they had. These two generations are
determined to provide their children and grandchildren with the best education they can afford as they recognize the importance of
education in the current market economy for social mobility, status and security, and in the context of educational beliefs and practices
arising from China's distant and more recent past.

Conclusions
The educational legacy of China's past has provided strengths but also tensions and challenges. An examination of its past reveals that
China is an intellectual and highly sophisticated society and sees itself in this image, with continuing high value attributed to education
and intellectual thought. As Confucius did in the fifth century BCE, many in China still hark back to its glorious and romanticized past
and this nostalgia is manifest in many ways in education in China today. As in former times, the value of traditional educational ideas
and practices and the power of education in producing moral citizens are still extolled in official policies and statements (further
explored in Chapter 5). These policies draw on traditional educational values and beliefs to legitimize the government's contemporary
moral and patriotic ideals for its citizenry and make education a powerful tool in the central government's political and economic
agendas. Nostalgia also feeds into the current rise in nationalism encouraged by the CCP party-state and enacted through various
curriculum measures and is also driving endeavours by Chinese parents to rediscover traditional Chinese philosophical teachings (see
Chapter 4).
China was the dominant and most advanced nation in its region of the world throughout most periods in its long history, from the time
of the ancient Silk Roads to the zenith of its power in the Ming period, when ‘the empire of China was the largest and most sophisticated
of all the united realms on earth’ (Spence 1999, p. 7). This former glory and the legacy of the past hang heavily in contemporary China
and in the psyche of its citizens, meaning that modernity and tradition, or change and continuity, continue to vie for influence.
This chapter has shown that China has a rich educational and philosophical tradition but that education is fraught with tensions arising
from political and social conditions and contemporary agendas for which it has been commandeered over time. The meritocracy myth
that anyone can achieve high political appointment or social status through examination success ignores the fact that such opportunities
were usually only available to the few and birth, background and wealth all played a role in positioning individuals to be able to take
advantage of these opportunities, and this is once again the case today.
This chapter has also demonstrated the crucial role that education and the educated have played throughout China's history in shaping
the political and social affairs of the nation not only in the selection of its ruling class and the conferring of privilege but later in
destroying these privileges and the old feudal order. Many of the tensions and contradictions from the past continue in education today
including competing ideologies and also divided views over influences from other countries. This harks back to the fact that the despised
forced opening up to aggressive foreign powers and ensuing foreign sway over China for many years also precipitated social and
educational change and calls to emulate Western culture and brought China into the modern world.
This chapter has situated contemporary education in China within an historical and philosophical context to explain the genesis of
today's education ideas and practices. The following chapters discuss the contemporary education system and recent curriculum
reforms as well as the wide range of existing and future issues and challenges Chinese education faces.
2
Formal and Informal Education: Policies, Structures, Governance and Contexts
The CCP has control over all levels and aspects of public education in China. China has the largest education system in the world with, in
2015–16, 260 million students and over 15 million teachers in over half a million schools (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 2016).
China needs to increase its educational capacity and quality to achieve the central government's political and economic goal to move
from a manufacturing to an innovative, high-tech knowledge economy, with the subsequent need for a highly skilled workforce. It
particularly lacks capacity and expertise in the areas of early childhood, vocational and higher education. At the same time, it is
challenged by a growing urban–rural divide as well as growing inequalities between wealthier and poorer areas and different
socioeconomic groups (discussed more fully in Chapter 4), all of which can jeopardize the future social stability and economic growth of
the nation. These provide a backdrop to the broad and sweeping curriculum reforms taking place at all levels of education. This chapter
describes efforts by governments to build capacity in this context, in a nation with ambitious goals for its educational attainments.
The following also provides an overview of China's educational policies, governance and funding mechanisms, all of which exist within a
culture of intense competition and individual aspirations, and high stakes testing. It describes China's formal education systems at
preschool, school, vocational, and higher education levels, and the place of schools and teachers in this system. It also considers the role
of adult and lifelong learning in China and other, more informal, systems of learning such as extra-curricular activities and private
tutoring. The role of the CCP party-state is also examined to show how governments at various levels determine and implement
educational policies.
This chapter is mainly concerned with policies, structure and organization, while curriculum and pedagogy, especially in the context of
the curriculum reform programme, are discussed in Chapter 3. Public education is the primary focus of this chapter; private education
and educational disparities are discussed in Chapter 4. How the CCP implements its various political agendas in a number of curriculum
areas to influence educational ideological beliefs and practices is more fully discussed in Chapter 5.

National goals
China has generally centralized government control but has devolved much of the management of education funding and policy
implementation to provinces and local governments, with Tan and Reyes (2016) describing this as ‘decentrized centralization’ (p. 19).
The CCP retains strong control over education policy formulation and the setting of curriculum and national educational priorities and
uses this to implement the goals and imperatives of the central leadership of the time.
The central government has stated four top national goals for education: (1) improving education provision for rural, remote, poor and
minority students; (2) improving access and quality of primary education in rural areas, and in vocational education and preschool
education; (3) increasing subsidies for students from poorer families; and (4) developing high quality teachers (OECD 2016).
The crucial link of education to the development of the nation was emphasized in the Outline of National Medium and Long-Term
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020), and a number of policies has since been put in place, which the government
says will improve and reform education. The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016–2020) (State Council
2017b) included wide-reaching plans and targets were set for all sectors of education including improving the distribution of educational
resources and financial support for economically disadvantaged students especially in rural, remote and minority areas and for students
with special needs. Targets were decreed for enrolment rates in the three years of pre-school education to increase to 85 percent (from
77.4 percent in 2016, Xinhua 2017d) including access for children in urban areas born after the introduction of the two-child policy;
compulsory education completion rates to 95 percent (primary and junior high school completion rates in 2016 were 98.7 and 93.7
respectively), and senior high school enrolment rates to over 90 percent.
Further imperatives in the Plan were to improve mobility between vocational education and regular education and to waive fees at
secondary schools offering vocational education. Higher education was encouraged to be more innovative, and the Plan re-iterated the
government's goal to develop world-class universities and stated that enrolments of students in higher education from the less well-
developed western and central provinces would be increased. Further statements of intent covered improvements to senior citizen
learning, the additional development of online learning with a focus on vocational and applied higher education, and the establishment of
‘personal learning accounts’ for lifelong learning and continuing education. Teachers’ salaries and benefits were also to be increased and
educational IT infrastructure and support for schools improved.
At the 2018 ‘Two Sessions’ meeting (the People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) further
measures were announced to improve education provision in early childhood and basic education. These include standardizing teacher
education courses, improving the quality of teachers, and enhancing the teaching of physical education (following China's disappointing
results in the 2018 Winter Olympics).
These are aims set by the central government to tackle many of the shortcomings in the education system and to begin to even out the
worryingly increasing disparities between rural and urban areas. However, given the nature of devolution of funding and administration
to local governments, how these targets are achieved will depend on the priorities, and sometimes idiosyncrasies of educational officials,
and available resources in different areas.
While these particular reforms will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is important to understand the political and
administrative structures in China through which they are decided and implemented. General education policy directions and specific
priorities such as those documented above are set by the CCP and the State apparatus, the State Council. The State Council formulates
legislation and regulations to govern the overall direction of educational policies, which are put into effect by the central Ministry of
Education (MOE). The central MOE coordinates with other departments as necessary, such as the Ministry of Finance, especially if
government education initiatives have broader implications. These policies and strategies are implemented by a labyrinth of local
departments of education at the provincial level and bureaus of education at the county level and through complex systems of
oversight. These levels interpret the general central government policies and produce corresponding policy documents and practical
guidance for schools and universities, although national-level universities report directly to the central MOE.

Structure and funding of public education

Although considerable autonomy has been devolved to school principals and university leaders, they still need to work closely with local
MOE and CCP officials. Local bureaus and departments of education also provide regional consultants to advise schools on specific areas
of curriculum and pedagogical practice. Different policies and conditions exist in cities and economically developed (especially coastal)
areas and economically under-developed areas. Governments in minority autonomous regions formally have more autonomy and
education is designed and regulated at the local government level within the overall central framework.
Central government spending on education has increased and in 2016 was CNY3.8 trillion (USD560 billion), comprising 5.2 percent of
GDP, an increase of 7.6 percent over the previous year, and this is projected to rise further (China Daily 2017e). The central
government has increased investment in education by an average 19 percent per year over the past ten years (OECD 2016) but much
of this has been for reforms as outlined above or, for example, funding for special initiatives such as programmes to support rural
students or students with disabilities (see Chapter 4). The funding of general education has largely been devolved to provincial and
county levels and has also moved in recent years from a reliance on public funding to a greater proportion paid by students and their
families.
Formal education includes up to three years of preschool education and nine years of compulsory or ‘basic’ education. Basic education
comprises six years of primary education usually starting at the age of six, and three years of junior high schooling until the age of
fifteen. An additional three years of schooling is provided by senior high schools (or schools providing both junior and senior high school
education) or senior vocational schools. In the past, those who did not pass the junior high or ‘middle’ school exam (zhongkao 中考)
usually went to a vocational (purely technical) college, but due to the increased focus on the need for vocational education arising from
national economic policies, the number of vocational high schools and specialized vocational schools or vocational programmes offered by
secondary schools is growing. At the higher education level, higher vocational colleges offer two, three or four-year diplomas. Generally,
higher education institutions offer four or five-year undergraduate degrees, as well as three-year master's programmes and three to
four-year doctorates.
Tuition at primary and junior high schools has been free since 2006 (removing a small charge), although there can be extra hidden
costs. Parents from outside the local district can pay a fee to get their children into a well-resourced junior high school. Fees at senior
high school can be high and, according to Murphy (2014), each year of senior high school can cost more than a rural worker's annual
income, and the full cost of supporting a student through higher education is even more onerous.
In the late 1980s, the Quality Education Programme aimed to move away from a focus on a small number of ‘key schools’ to require
the provision of ‘quality education’ (suzhi jiaoyu 素质教育) by all schools with the guiding principles of ‘holistic education’ and ‘education
for all’ (Yu 2014). The previous system was introduced in 1953 and distinguished ‘regular’ schools from a small number of ‘key’ schools,
the latter defined as those whose students had high success rates of transition to ‘good’ schools at the next level of education.
Previously, limited resources were concentrated in these ‘key’ schools, which generally had better resources and teachers and whose
students were also more successful in gaining university places, especially the more prestigious ones. ‘Elite’ schools and classes still
exist, however, ‘though they take subtler forms than in the past’ (Yu 2014, p. 3). Some public schools have selective or specialized
programmes and take high-achieving students from outside the district. So, although new imperatives aim to provide more equitable
educational outcomes, in reality other mechanisms used by schools and social forces work against this and parents and schools can find
their way around the system, as will be seen below.
Public schools exist in an informal hierarchy. There are top ‘elite’ schools (ranked through reputation and results), those that take a
more ‘experimental’ approach to teaching and learning, and ‘regular’ schools. Many public schools have a number, such as No.1 Primary
School, usually denoting which schools were established first in the area (and with the lowest numbers also usually indicating the most
elite), or are named according to the factory or enterprise in which they are located. Many schools (and kindergartens) are attached to
universities and cater for the children of university staff and are located within their grounds or nearby and hold considerable prestige.
A complex system of oversight depends on the institution to which schools are affiliated, reflecting the diversity and complexity of
educational institutions at all levels. The growing number of ‘experimental’ schools appeal to parents who are unsatisfied with the
sometimes rigid and overly competitive environments of many public schools and their narrow curriculum and are usually run by more
creative principals and teaching staff.
Public schools are regularly evaluated by local education authorities which send audit teams to measure the quality of teaching,
teachers’ qualifications, student achievement, infrastructure, and resources and equipment such as computers and sporting facilities, as
well as, in the case of secondary schools, how many students proceed to which universities. More points are awarded if students
proceed to elite universities or if former students achieve distinctions such as sporting honours or Olympic medals.
There has been a rapid increase in investment by all levels of government in educational infrastructure. Unfortunately, however,
sometimes reform can be superficial and improvements may be limited, even at the physical level. Some universities and senior high
schools have impressive new buildings but they may have poor workmanship or facilities. In the present milieu of intense competition
between schools and universities, especially ones considered elite, in order to project positive images schools and universities can be
festooned with colourful banners and posters with photos and quotes from successful senior high school or university students around
their campuses. These do indicate a real sense of enthusiasm and pride in the school or university's achievements as well as those of
their students, but they are a distinct feature of educational institutions in China that is not usually seen elsewhere. These displays
occur especially when guests are visiting, during conferences, at the start of the academic year to welcome new students, or even during
government quality assurance inspections. One university lecturer recounted how she was surprised to discover for the first time
handwash and towels in the newly painted bathrooms just before the quality assurance inspection. At the more substantial level, there
can be serious cases of fraudulent activity by universities during quality assurance inspections including instances of documents being
faked or students’ examination papers being re-graded without the knowledge of the student in order to create more favourable
impressions (Huang 2016). Concerns with more superficial aspects or activities designed ‘for show’ can mask more pressing problems.
Likewise, reforms to curriculum and pedagogy, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, especially those arising from ‘policy
borrowing’ from other countries, can also be superficial, without a deep understanding of the educational principles and philosophies
underpinning them. This is not always the case, of course, but it does show that in the rush to improve and reform, some important
fundamentals may be missing. Linked to this is a performance culture where there are regular public displays by children and students
of their talents and achievements, such as concerts, competitions and exhibitions, as is the examination-orientation of the education
system and an obsession with grades and rankings.

‘Elite’ education and hyper-competitiveness

Education in contemporary China is characterized by a heady mix of aspiration and competitiveness. As outlined in the previous
chapter, education is highly valued and is a major determinant of one's life chances. Students and their parents are often obsessed with
rankings of schools and universities, both those within the country and overseas, as symbolic capital in the form of accreditation, but
also in terms of the social and cultural cachet that education brings.
Parents often aspire to send their children to the ‘highest’ school possible in the hierarchy (generally the better resourced former ‘key
schools’) and may do whatever is necessary to achieve this, such as using their connections or moving house. Although parents in most
countries aspire to sending their children to the ‘best’ possible schools, what is notable in China is the extent and lengths to which
parents are prepared to go and use whatever strategies are available in pursuing this goal. This includes paying substantial ‘school
choice’ fees, attending ‘interviews’ of the parents by the school, and seeking influence through their personal, social or political
connections. Wu's (2011) study of 360 parents in three public junior high schools in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region found that
although entrance examinations for public primary and junior high schools have been abolished, in practice entrance examinations were
conducted under the name of an ‘interview’, including sometimes also of parents especially at more popular schools and private junior
high schools which are offshoots of public secondary schools. Senior high schools can have selective admission policies since they are not
part of the compulsory years of education. For admission into top primary and junior high schools, the lower the academic ability of the
student, the higher the ‘choice fee’ paid by parents (Wu 2011). Public schools are required to first take children in their catchment area
before they can accept these ‘choice students’ but many top schools have very high proportions of such students. As Wu (2011) argues,
such practices exemplify Bourdieu's cultural reproduction theory:
The widespread practice of such actions by middle class families clearly illustrates how cultural capital can be used to maintain
social stratification by perpetuating educational inequalities that lead to unequal life opportunities for differently schooled people.
(p. 275)
Many parents use their social, cultural and economic capital to ensure their child not only attends the ‘best’ school, but also engages in a
wide range of extra-curricular activities and receives favourable treatment from teachers. Parents can spend vast sums on extra tuition
or extra-curricular activities for their child in addition to their formal education and these can take up almost all of children's time
outside of school. Not all parents agree with such ‘hothousing’ techniques but many feel that they have no choice but to keep up with
the competition or their children will miss out on important opportunities. One parent interviewed in Wu's (2011) study said that:
We are caught in this tide of competition for good school places. No one dares to take the risk of not sending his child to
extracurricular classes when everyone else does. If one does [not send his child to these classes], he will regret and pay for it later
when his child fails to enter a desired school.
(p. 281)
The ‘dream run’ for a student in China is to attend a No.1 or elite kindergarten, primary school, junior and senior high school, then a top
Chinese university for undergraduate study, and finally postgraduate studies at a leading Anglophone university (or sometimes in
Germany), preferably in the United States. In the past, there was stronger aspiration for students to ‘go out’, that is, to go to
universities overseas for undergraduate education and often for the later years of secondary school to better prepare for overseas
university admission examinations. Although rates of Chinese students engaging in such overseas study are still high, this is beginning
to change. This is due to the volume of returning graduates flooding the employment market and therefore having fewer job prospects,
concerns by employers about the quality of overseas degrees, and improved educational opportunities within China.
The obsession with educational attainment means that children often spend long hours at homework and extra-curricular activities
after school and on weekends. They can spend from 7am to 9pm at school, ‘cram school’, or in private tutoring. Most of the students I
have taught at universities in China report studying in one way or another until around 9pm or 10pm every night. Students may have
long journeys to and from school, and then have copious amounts of private study and homework to do when they get home. This puts
enormous pressure on children, and coupled with the frequent high expectations of parents, can produce intolerable pressures on
children especially in the lead up to the gaokao university entrance examination.
Pressure exists at all levels of education as there are often highly competitive regular tests and examinations in senior and junior high
schools, primary schools and sometimes even kindergartens. This can cause serious mental health problems for young people. Even
though there have been calls by the government for the academic pressure on children to be reduced and for limitations on the number
of hours of homework, parents are often keen to ensure that their children retain their competitive edge over others.
Schools and private companies run an array of after-school activities with options including chess, calligraphy, painting, literary writing,
music, dancing, martial arts, handcrafts and the performing arts, and encourage students to engage in concerts, competitions or
exhibitions of inventions or model aircraft, ship and motor vehicle making. Students are keen to gain a maximum number of
credentialing ‘certificates’ from these programmes as they believe that these will distinguish them from other students and help them
to be more competitive. These kinds of certificates are playing a greater role in how schools admit students but this discriminates
against families that may not be able to afford such courses. Many upper- and middle-class parents also arrange for extra tuition in
mathematics, Chinese or English for their children (discussed further below). Some have a foreign student billeted in their home over
the summer to help their child learn English through one of the many ‘cultural experience programmes’ for foreign students run by
private Chinese companies. In a relatively new phenomenon, some parents are even employing foreign au pairs, usually foreign
students on their ‘gap’ year before they begin university, to improve their child's English (Tang 2016).
An almost absolute belief exists in the power of education for attainment or advancement of social mobility and economic wealth. The
sons and daughters of the ultra-elite and wealthy, called the ‘second-generation rich kids’ (fu er dai 富二代), who have obtained places
in very prestigious national or international universities can see these opportunities more as status symbols and opportunities to show
off their wealth, just as they can be seen driving expensive cars around ‘glamourous’ areas of cities like Hangzhou or living ostentatious
lifestyles because of their parents’ wealth and connections. (Although major crackdowns on corruption since 2012 have led to such
families being more cautious in showing lavish lifestyles and conspicuous consumption.)
Even less wealthy families aspire to send their children to prestigious overseas universities like Oxford, Cambridge and those of the
American Ivy League due to these seemingly insatiable educational aspirations. Summer and winter programmes, which can include
expensive overseas trips with special classes and language training, can cost the equivalent of several months’ wages for an average
family but they have become very popular. Some parents spend vast sums to ensure that their primary and secondary school children
don't ‘lose at the starting line’ in the quest for good gaokao results and there have been reports of aspirant parents boasting about the
expense of the programmes to which they send their children and of parents even feeling ashamed if they don't send their children
abroad (Global Times 2017a). Cities such as Oxford and Cambridge are flooded with Chinese student groups over the summer period,
as are universities like Peking and Tsinghua in Beijing. These trips are intended to motivate children to aim high and work hard, and in
the case of foreign trips, to help children improve their English, their résumés and their connections.
Social connections, or ‘social capital’, are often used by parents in their efforts to obtain more benefits or support for their child, to
establish good relations and connections, or ‘guanxi’, with teachers. Parents may try to establish social relationships with teachers,
organize private tutoring by teachers for their children, give the teachers lavish gifts for their birthdays and even host banquets for
them. Gifts given by wealthier parents on the annual Teachers’ Day, when children give presents to their teacher, can be extravagant.
According to Xie & Postiglione (2016), however, this is more prevalent among the ‘new economic elite families’ and cadre and
professional parents, as few rural families are able to afford these (p. 1026). One student told me that at her senior high school in
Beijing, another student's parents paid for the entire teaching staff at the school to tour Europe over the summer.
The insidious nature of these practices can have severe impacts on students at the personal level and in terms of their educational
outcomes. Students sometimes report that they feel that teachers abuse their authority, giving students whom they don't like or whose
parents haven't provided gifts to them lower marks or ruling against them in student disputes. As one student told me, ‘power and
money [in education] mean everything, but power trumps money’. Money alone is not sufficient; power (that is, status and connections)
carries greater influence.
Such perverse practices and attempts to increase grades and teacher favour heavily tip the scales in favour of children from wealthy
families regardless of their academic ability and deepen inequalities between students. The often considerable costs involved in sending
children on these programmes or to these schools are seen by more affluent parents as an investment in their child's future and, by
extension, in their own. Even at university level, there is a ‘grade consciousness’ where students are listed according to their grades in
the whole year cohort. This can be seen as a continuation of the ancient ‘ranking’ system by intellectual achievement and attests to the
continuing perceived value and prestige, both culturally and economically, of education and hence its role in social mobility.
As education in China determines one's status, career prospects and connections, and even marriage prospects, it has become big
business. Those who can afford to send their children to top private schools, arrange extra tuition, and send them on overseas trips for
education give their children a competitive edge over their more socially and economically disadvantaged peers. Urban areas in
particular are dominated by an obsession with obtaining the most ‘elite’ educational opportunities and is the reason why parents are
prepared to spend so much on their children's education, and why so many children are put under enormous pressure to succeed
educationally. It is this desire that has fuelled the explosion of private schooling and after-school and weekend educational classes and
activities; the nation is obsessed with education and a large part of national expenditure accounts for educational services of one kind or
another.
Another notable feature of this hyper-competitiveness is the proliferation of public (as well as private) schools and programmes offering
British A-levels or the International Baccalaureate, and preparation for foreign examination accreditation programmes such as the
American APT or SATs. Parents choose these schools for status, to improve their children's English and to give them an edge in
applying to prestigious universities in the United States and United Kingdom.
Gaining entry to one of China's top universities is a pinnacle of educational attainment. In southwestern Guangxi Province in September
2017 four students from the province who had been accepted to the top two universities (Peking and Tsinghua) were paraded around
the streets of the county in open-top cars in a motorcade including lion dancers and drummers, a ‘testament to the importance Chinese
people place on gaining admission into the country's top universities’ (Zhou 2017) and reminiscent of the celebrations held for successful
candidates after the imperial examinations.
This fevered competition has spawned rampant corruption with, according to Gao (2014), parents paying tens of thousands of dollars in
‘voluntary donations’ to secure admission for their children to elite schools and paying exorbitant amounts for properties near
prestigious public schools. Parents may spare no expense in obtaining the best educational opportunities for their children:
Chang Qing, a friend and mother of a 16-year-old girl, has been preparing her daughter, Xiaoshuang, for America since the girl was
a toddler. She played her tapes of English lessons made from Disney movies, and later hosted a steady stream of exchange
students from America to hone her child's accent. Now, her daughter speaks impeccable English and attends a private academy in
Beijing where annual tuition is around $24,000. Ms Chang believes that nothing short of an Ivy League education will suffice. (Gao
2014)
This obsession with elitism also exists within higher education, seen most clearly in the government's political agenda to improve its
global university rankings. This is being pursued through ‘talent cultivation’ programmes to attract high-calibre academics, to increase
human resource capacity and improve research outputs. Under the ‘1,000 talents’ programme, ‘famous’ Chinese and foreign professors
are lured to China with massive salaries, preference is given to new academic recruits from ‘famous’ international universities, and
universities pursue connections with the most prestigious overseas universities, often with no real goals in mind or regard for the
suitability of the connection. The China Scholarship Council, in awarding postgraduate scholarships to Chinese students studying
overseas, demonstrates a bias towards undergraduate applicants from prestigious Chinese universities and, more importantly, potential
supervisors at international universities who are ‘famous professors’, often regardless of the student's topic or the appropriateness of
the chosen supervisor. In March 2018, one Chinese (not that highly ranked) university advertised for a position with the title ‘Great
Master in Mathematics’ saying applicants should be highly recognized scholars ‘including Nobel Prize winners, Fields Prize winners, or
other international award winners’. Chinese university rankings are also skewed towards prizes and awards. In the Academic Ranking
of World Universities (formerly the Shanghai Jiaotong rankings), 30 percent of the ranking score was for prizes and awards and 70
percent for high-level journal citations. This is in contrast to the other international university ranking systems which include quality of
teaching, staff–student ratios, numbers of international staff and students, and international research collaborations.
The fixation on world rankings reflects the Chinese government's desire to be seen as a world leader in fields such as education. Such
endeavours, however, can in fact damage the quality and integrity of academic research. China is not alone in a move to more market-
driven competitive approaches in higher education, in other countries usually in the context of declining public funding of higher
education and the subsequent need for universities to attract funding from industry. Zha (2016) uses the concept of ‘academic
capitalism’ to describe this phenomenon where academic research is increasingly less ‘curiosity-driven’ than ‘market-driven’. In China's
case and given the massive levels of funding being injected by the central and local governments into the more ‘elite’ universities to
achieve higher global rankings, this manifests as academic research and funding being more image driven.
The discussion above shows how political, social and cultural forces have produced in China's educational policies tensions that are also
often seen in other areas of public policy, with attempts to improve education and redress social inequalities in education often
conflicting with policies and ideologies that promote competition and the marketization of education (see Chapter 5).
The section below describes the nature of provision at the various levels of education and examines some of the major issues and
challenges in each of these areas. The final sections discuss informal types of education and the role of teachers.

Early childhood education

Early childhood education in China, sometimes referred to as pre-school education or kindergarten, is provided for children aged three
to six. Unlike compulsory education, kindergarten is not free and a new phenomenon is the significant increase in the number of private
kindergartens. In 2016, there were approximately 239,800 kindergartens, an increase of 16,100 compared with 2015 (MOE 2018c),
with most of this growth occurring in the private sector. According to Feng (2018), private kindergartens and preschools are booming in
China, with a near-tripling in the number of private kindergartens from 2003 to 2015 from 55,000 to 143,000.
Since the 1990s, responsibility for funding and managing early childhood education has been increasingly shifted to the private sector or
non-government organizations (Li & Wang 2014) and the sector is largely market driven. The abolition of central government funding
for early childhood education in 2005 caused a decline in accessibility, affordability and accountability and led to falling enrolment rates
and numbers of kindergartens and an increasing divide between urban and rural areas (Li & Wang 2014). Zhou, Sun and Lee (2017)
claim that almost half of preschool children across China have no access to early childhood education (although the official figures state
that 77.4 percent have access, Xinhua 2017d), and many parents complain that it is expensive and poorly regulated.
Private kindergartens in rural areas may be of poor quality but those in cities are often better resourced and more expensive. Parents
there often prefer private kindergartens as they have ‘better environments’, may have foreign teachers to teach English and,
importantly for working parents, include bus pick-up services. Some ‘high end’ private kindergartens, especially in larger cities, offer
non-traditional or Westernized approaches to childhood education. One private kindergarten in Shanghai, part of a national chain, has
over its entrance the motto ‘Hug First, Learn Later’, pointing to its non-traditional approach (for China). Many such chains have
cropped up across the country, some comprising several hundred or even thousands of establishments, and can charge high fees. In
very recent years, however, several reported cases of serious maltreatment of children in private kindergartens, even very expensive
ones, have prompted public outrage on social media.
Calls to expand free public kindergarten access to encourage parents to have a second child followed the introduction of the second-child
policy in 2016 (China Daily 2017e). The one-child policy was introduced in 1979 to stem the growing population which was straining the
nation's resources. The second-child policy was introduced due to China's ageing population and the need to ensure a robust workforce.
But the cost of raising children, especially rising educational costs, is a major concern for parents, and few have expressed interest in
having a second child (Kuo 2018). A survey by the All China Women's Federation and Beijing Normal University (2017) of over 10,000
respondents found that 53.3 percent of parents do not want a second child, 26.2 percent are hesitant about expanding their family and
only 20.5 percent express the desire to have a second child. Couples in economically developed regions and cities are less willing to have
more than one child compared with those in rural areas, with 62.3 percent of couples in Beijing not wanting a second child compared
with 44.6 percent and 44.7 percent of couples respectively in central and western China. The most common reason for this reluctance is
the quality and cost of kindergarten and school education, expressed by 83.7 percent. The central government is considering
introducing financial incentives for couples to have a second child due to the heavy costs of raising children (Guardian 2017a) and even
lifting limits altogether (Kuo 2018).
The importance of early childhood education for later development was emphasized in the National Development Plan (2010–20)
which included the aim of providing one free and three universal years of early childhood education by 2020 (Zhou, Sun & Lee 2017).
Public (local and regional) expenditure on early childhood education, including special initiatives and local government subsidies,
increased from 1.7 percent of the total education budget in 2010 to 3.4 percent by 2012. But fees and associated costs have skyrocketed
and there is uneven access across different geographical areas and socioeconomic groups. In 2014 the Three-Year Action Plan for
Early Childhood Education proposed the regulation of tuition fees, and increased funding for disadvantaged groups. However, there
continues to be a dearth of quality provision and a severe lack of qualified staff especially in rural areas and high student to teacher
ratios persist. According to Liu and Pan (2013), it is not uncommon for one teacher to supervise a class of 35 children.
Progress has been made since the launch of the national plan in 2010, although developments are patchy. Shanghai has achieved
universal three years early childhood education provision and offers subsidized teacher training and annual professional development.
By 2014, 99 percent of early childhood education teachers in Shanghai had post-secondary qualifications. The Shanghai government
provides funding for research in childcare and actively promotes curriculum development and organizes partnerships between city and
rural kindergartens and mentoring for rural principals and teachers. There have also been some improvements in rural areas. In the
poorer southwest province of Guizhou, funding by the central, provincial and county governments since 2011 for the construction of
kindergartens increased kindergarten attendance from 55 percent in 2009 to 80 percent in 2015 (Zhou, Sun & Lee 2017).
Demand for children's education even earlier than kindergarten has increased rapidly in the past decade, another indication of parents’
determination for their child to gain a competitive edge in the hyper-competitive world of education in China. Demand for childcare has
grown by 55 percent since 2009 but 60 percent of these services are privately run, have few qualified staff or poor-quality
programmes, and parents can be ‘mis-sold courses which are ruthlessly commercial at the expense of quality education’ (Marketing to
China 2018).

Basic education
In 1986, the Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China made nine years of basic education compulsory. ‘Basic
education’ comprises six years of primary education and three years of junior high school. As discussed earlier, parents put a great deal
of effort into trying to select and gain entry for their child into the ‘best’ school and, as elsewhere, movement into often expensive school
catchment areas is not uncommon.
Private schools, especially elite ones in major cities, have both written and oral entry examinations and offer extra classes and tuition in
Chinese, mathematics and English. These schools appeal to many parents as they are considered stricter or push children harder to
achieve better academic results and many have long waiting lists. But not all want their children to attend private schools even if they
can afford the fees. Many whom I have interviewed in recent years want to avoid this pressure on their children and prefer to send
their children to good public schools. Sometimes wealthier families send their children overseas for schooling especially if they want to
avoid the stresses of China's examination-focused education or wish them to later attend universities overseas. Few poorer families
have such choices available to them.
The past decade has seen rapid expansion of alternative education, again due in part to parents’ dissatisfaction with the perceived rigid
examination-orientation of public education. Some Western approaches have become popular such as Montessori and Steiner schools.
Steiner schools are viewed as fostering children's imaginations and curiosity, educating not just the ‘head’ but also the ‘heart’ (Sun
2018). ‘Steiner fever’ has seen the opening of forty new Steiner schools and 500 new kindergartens in the past ten years with many set
up by parents and with long waiting lists for many schools, sometimes up to five years, but are largely a middle-class phenomenon (Sun
2018). According to Sun (2018), the figure may be as high as 1,000 schools as many schools are unlicensed. Although they draw on the
western Steiner philosophy, their nature-based approach is seen as compatible with traditional Chinese philosophy such as Daoism and
Confucianism and the curriculum has been ‘indigenized’ by combining elements of the Steiner curriculum with the teaching of subjects
such as Chinese calligraphy and Chinese musical instruments.
At the vast majority of schools, children spend long hours in class or after-school study. They usually arrive between 6.30am and
7.30am, have breakfast and then do reading (often from Chinese classics such as The Monkey King), then quizzes. Classes start around
8.15am and finish around 3.30pm or 4pm and many children do extra-curricular activities organized either by the school or privately
run programmes, or go to private ‘cram school’ classes, sometimes until 9pm or 10pm, particularly for older children. Children are
expected to be very polite to their teachers and commonly bow to them at the start of lessons each morning. Manners are considered
very important and are portrayed as an essential aspect of Confucian traditions, and children are often expected to undertake
community service such as cleaning the streets.
At primary level, students study subjects such as Chinese, mathematics, science, art, music, physical education, foreign languages, and
have classes such as ‘morality and life’. There can also be much emphasis on learning poetry and practising character writing. The
curriculum reform programme (discussed further in the following chapter) has meant that pedagogy and curriculum in primary schools
now has considerable flexibility and there is much more experimentation by some schools at this level than at the later levels. Many
schools use thematic approaches and are often very creative and innovative.
Urban primary schools, especially in larger ‘tier one’ cities like Beijing and Shanghai, are often remarkably well resourced and would be
the envy of many schools in Western countries. They frequently have impressive libraries and sophisticated computer equipment, and
bright and colourful displays of children's work in classrooms and corridors. Schools in ‘tier two’ cities such as Wuhan, Chengdu and
Xi'an and in more economically advanced rural areas can also have very good resources but schools in poor or remote areas are
generally far less well resourced (see Chapter 4). As part of the government's efforts to improve rural education, it has established long-
distance learning programmes providing access to digital teaching materials. Many schools have good information technology facilities
and use this in innovative ways such as linking students to peers in other countries to work on collaborative projects and to increase
students’ cross-cultural skills.
At middle school level, a much broader range of subjects is provided. This includes Chinese, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology,
history, politics, geography, information technology, foreign languages, physical education, health education, fine arts, music, community
service and moral education. Elective subjects are also offered, and sometimes new subjects are added to the curriculum such as design
and technology, as well as vocational subjects. However, from this level, teaching starts to become more focused on more ‘serious’
subjects in preparation for the high school examination, and a substantial part of the timetable is spent on Chinese and mathematics.
Relationships between teachers and students also become more formalized.

Examination system
China is often described as having an ‘examination culture’. Despite the aims of the curriculum reform programme (discussed in the
next chapter) to move from examination- to quality-oriented education, tests and examinations are ubiquitous. Although many
countries have examinations at different levels of schooling, in China they are especially ‘high stakes’ in determining future life paths.
This is due to the large population and as yet insufficient capacity, meaning that there is fierce competition for places at the next level of
education and examinations are a simple but blunt instrument for assessing such large numbers of students. Students take exams and
tests at the end of each semester, each school year, and before graduation. The most important of these is the university (or college)
entrance examination, the gaokao (高考).
At the end of junior high school, depending on their results in the zhongkao or ‘middle’ or junior high school examination, students
wishing to pursue higher education go to senior high schools, while others proceed to vocational colleges. The zhongkao tests students in
Chinese, mathematics, English, physics, chemistry, political science and physical education. Fierce competition exists for places at top
schools and students who have just missed the required score can sometimes elect to pay significantly increased fees to gain entry.
Although there are tests and examinations at earlier levels, it is the gaokao examination that concentrates and culminates previous
study into one high-stakes chance at further educational opportunities and future life chances. This is discussed in the next section.

Senior high schools

Different types of senior secondary schools include general secondary, specialized and technical schools, and vocational secondary
schools which include adult, vocational, technical and crafts schools. Teaching in senior secondary schools is mainly devoted to
compulsory science and mathematics but a range of elective subjects is also offered. All schools must teach English and some offer
additional foreign languages. Some schools are affiliated to German schools or universities and also teach German.
Senior high schools are often well resourced, including sophisticated science laboratories and teaching areas, especially those with better
reputations and higher ‘ratings’ in towns and cities. These schools often proudly display their students’ scores and achievements
including annual lists of which students have been successful in gaining admission to elite universities.
The focus in senior high school is very much on achieving high scores in the gaokao, meaning ‘higher test’. A student's gaokao score
determines whether they achieve their choice of university and subject; a good score provides a passport to bright career prospects and
social and economic success. The final year is usually totally devoted to revision and almost the whole three years of senior school can
be spent memorizing material for the gaokao.
Each province sets its own gaokao examinations and cut-off scores. Only around 40 percent of students are successful in gaining a place
at university and higher scores are needed for students who live outside the province in which a university is located (see below). The
gaokao consists of nine hours of examinations and usually takes place over two or three days in June. It comprises compulsory papers
in Chinese, mathematics and a foreign language (usually English), as well as three optional subjects including physics, chemistry,
biology, history, politics, geography and technology. The Chinese language and literature paper can contain up to sixty pieces of ancient
texts and essay prompts on sometimes esoteric topics such as ‘Write an essay about “circle” ’ (Fang 2018).
The gaokao system is particularly complex and the subject of much criticism, one being regional discrimination in that higher scores are
required by students from some areas. Locally set university admission quotas create significant inequalities between regions. Each
university is able to set very generous admission quotas for local students and (necessarily) much smaller quotas for students from
other provinces (with some exceptions for minority students). This advantages students in areas with a large number of universities,
particularly if this includes a range of ‘elite’ institutions (such as in Beijing), and massively increases the scores required to gain one of
the non-local places in that university. According to Xiong, Cao and Zhang (2016), this is illustrated by ‘the disparities between ratios of
a province's enrollment of students to the total number of candidate students of the province’ (p. 58). They reported that in 2010, the
acceptance rates for students from Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong and Henan (the last two being less developed areas) who applied for
universities of the first-ranking category were respectively 20.1 percent, 18 percent, 7.1 percent and 3.5 percent. These differences
cannot be explained by differences in the quality of students from these regions but are largely a result of the quota system.
The major criticism of the gaokao is its intensely gruelling nature and the enormous psychological pressures it places on students.
According to Naftali (2016), ‘Preparing for the gaokao is a rite of passage so normalized that it is considered the central experience of
the Chinese teenager’ (p. 530). Parents and students go to extraordinary lengths to do well. Streets around test centres (often
universities) are cordoned off, workers nearby are not allowed to make any noise, and parents wait anxiously at the gates to ferry their
children to and from the test centres. Many parents rent hotel rooms nearby so that their children can rest between exams. There are
even reports of students receiving blood transfusions and performance enhancing drugs before the tests to boost their performance.
Even though there is intense security surrounding the testing, and cheating carries a penalty of up to seven years in gaol, it is still rife.
According to Zuo (2018) cheating schemes abound and use ever more sophisticated techniques such as fake fingerprints to trick the
biometric measures which are deployed alongside such measures as metal detectors to prevent electronic devices being smuggled into
test centres.
The importance of the gaokao may finally be beginning to diminish, however, as young Chinese seek alternatives and envision different
futures as broader opportunities open up. The South China Morning Post (Zhuang 2018) reported that in a survey of 20,000 gaokao
candidates in 2018, half of these ‘Generation Z’ respondents, the first students born in the twenty-first century to sit the test, reported
that the gaokao isn't their only chance for a good career and better life and they are less likely than students in the past to rely on their
parents’ advice or wishes for their choice of career or major. Many aim to study overseas and concentrate on receiving a good IELTS
score (of English language proficiency) or intend to enrol in alternative Arts majors or at universities where required gaokao scores are
lower. One in four said that their ‘affection for an idol’ rather than advancement prospects would influence their choice of university or
career, especially if that person had attended that particular university. However, this was a relatively small sample and it is clear that
the influence of the gaokao system is not going to end any time soon. Despite recent and proposed changes to the system (described in
the following chapter), it is unlikely that the pressure on students to achieve highly in the gaokao will greatly diminish. Simply as the
population gets richer, more families aspire to higher education for their children and more are able to afford it.
Vocational and technical education
Vocational education has been identified by the central government as an important part of its strategy to move to a technologically
advanced economy. Vocational education and training is run by a complex mixture of independent vocational and technical colleges,
adult colleges, vocational and technical schools or programmes run by universities, regular junior colleges and independent four-year
colleges. Many previous vocational colleges have been upgraded to vocational universities as part of the government's plan to improve
the quality of tertiary education. Vocational and technical education has traditionally focused on applied skills such as practical trades
but the curriculum is beginning to broaden. At the college and university level, it is increasingly focusing on advanced skills such as
computer-aided design, information and communication technology, robotics and especially ‘smart home technology’ or the ‘Internet of
Things’. The government has recently called for a ‘renewal of the “Spirit of Craftmanship”’ (Ho & Li 2017, p. 6) and made vocational
and technical education a national priority.
The vocational education sector has been expanding significantly in recent years with 12,300 vocational schools with over 26.8 million
students in 2017 (Xinhua 2017b) but the sector is beset with problems of capacity and quality with high student drop-out rates, high
tuition costs and narrow curricula (Xiong 2011). A lack of funding, of suitably qualified teaching staff and of ‘quality students’ means
that the quality of programmes can vary, and the status of vocational and technical qualifications continues to be lower than higher
education. Stigma is still attached to vocational and technical education, which is often seen by parents as less desirable and a last resort
if their child fails to gain entry to higher education. But this is beginning to change due to the transformation of the needs of the
economy.
China aspires to become a high-tech knowledge economy with a consequential need for a highly skilled and trained workforce, but it is
facing a skills shortage. Its aspiration is reflected in the ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy, introduced in 2015 and modelled on Germany's
Industry 4.0 initiative. In this plan to re-balance production in the country away from low-level manufacturing, the Chinese
government is taking a lead in the development of areas such as intelligent manufacturing, robotics and artificial intelligence (AI),
aiming for China to become a global powerhouse in these domains.
In 2017, the State Council launched a project on high-tech learning based on AI which encourages the teaching of computer
programming to children as young as seven or eight. More than 80 private companies offer classes in schools or outside of school but
Jing (2018) argues that these are ‘overwhelmingly the preserve of middle class kids’ and that they and similar extracurricular classes,
such as those for the hugely popular Math Olympiad, offer ‘conveyor-belt’ training that kills the joy of learning.
Such moves are seen as crucial to China's future development in the ‘age of technology’. The government has recognized the need for
improved access and quality in technical and vocational education, indicating the close link in China between education and economic
and political imperatives. China aims to become a world leader in these areas and significant funding is being invested not only by the
central and local governments but also industry. Many academics, especially those with engineering or mathematics expertise, are
encouraged to be entrepreneurial and work part-time with industry on top of their regular teaching positions, often in commercial
centres located close to university campuses. This can be quite lucrative for them and is considered beneficial to industry.
In 2014, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang both emphasized the need to prioritize vocational education to realize the ‘China
Dream’ of national rejuvenation. Xi Jinping has a keen sense of China's history and his ‘dream’ encompasses (re)making China a
prosperous nation and the revival of its leading position in the world. At China's Communist Party's 19th National Congress on 18
October 2017, President Xi stated:
We will build an educated, skilled and innovative workforce, foster respect for model workers, promote quality workmanship and
ensure that taking pride in labor becomes the norm.
(Hou & Li 2017, p. 6)
The reference to ‘model workers’ and ‘workmanship’ appears to be an attempt to redress the de-valuing of the working class, which has
seen it status, job security and economic benefits decline (especially since the 1960s and 70s when workers were often eulogized as
national heroes). They have felt left behind in the race towards individual private wealth. The expansion of vocational and technical
education may also be seen as an antidote to the large numbers of university graduates struggling to find employment following the
expansion of higher education in the 1990s, in a labour market where degrees, including from overseas, have been devalued by their
ever-increasing numbers. The greater number of graduates has led to higher competition for jobs, as well as a view common among
employers that graduates aren't ‘job ready’. This has led to employers requiring vocational skills certificates on top of university
degrees.
At the school level, there has been an introduction of design and technology subjects, as well as new subjects or optional activities such
as Maker Education. Maker Education encourages students to design solutions to address complex problems using creative and
innovative ideas. Some schools offer these subjects to all students and some universities also run Maker Education classes for school
children on the weekends.
These developments, as well as students trying to distinguish themselves from other candidates for jobs, have led to what is known as
‘certification craze’ where university students, and increasingly teenagers, seek large numbers of certificates through short courses or
programmes offered by universities, vocational and technical institutions, or private providers. This craze is also an indication of
students’ anxiety about their future social mobility. But some believe that this phenomenon leads students to neglect their university
studies and is also an unfortunate product of more utilitarian views of education.
Certificates are also becoming an important part of gaining admission to junior high schools, especially more prestigious or selective ones
(Wu 2011). Junior high schools are not allowed to set entrance examinations so schools look for other forms of accreditation or evidence
of merit. Many over-subscribed schools require certificates from students for winning competitions, such as the Chinese Mathematical
Olympiad (China's annual and most influential national mathematics competition) or the Public English Testing System (organized by
the MOE).

Higher education
There are over 2,000 higher education institutions in China, including an increasing number of private universities. Universities have
different management and funding systems, depending on whether they are designated national, provincial or local institutions. Control
of universities has been decentralized and they now have more autonomy, but they still work closely with local, provincial or national
governments and Party organs.
The huge expansion of higher education from the 1990s has moved it from an elite to a mass education system; the proportion of
students in higher education in 2017 was 20 percent compared with 1.4 percent in 1978 (China Education Center 2017). It is the largest
system of higher education in the world with over 26 million students. Although China has achieved its goal of bringing higher education
to a much greater proportion of its population, the cost, as elsewhere, has been in the quality of its programmes. The rapid expansion
has stretched resources and the increase in the student population has not been matched by a proportional increase in teaching faculty.
Higher education institutions offer undergraduate and graduate education as well as non-degree education certificates and short
courses. In 2016, 793 institutions offered graduate education, including 576 colleges and universities and 217 research institutions. The
total number of graduate students was 2.5 million, including over half a million part-time students. Student fees for tertiary education
were introduced in 1997 on a cost-recovery basis and there has since been a dramatic increase in tuition fees, leading to an increase in
demand for private higher education (Li & Bray 2007).
Universities which are administered at the national level work with the central MOE in deciding enrolment numbers and subject
quotas. For provincial-level universities, these are set at that level. Enrolment numbers and quotas are more flexible for private
institutions and joint foreign programmes. A notable trend over the past 15 years has been the establishment of links and collaborations
with universities overseas as part of the government's internationalization imperatives (discussed below).
Despite these efforts to expand and improve higher education, several problems remain. Houxiong Wang (2011) argues that although
there have been significant gains for women and ethnic minority students, access for students of lower socioeconomic backgrounds or
from less well-developed geographical areas remains a problem, resulting in ‘social class polarization’ and the ‘accumulation and
continuation of a gap in opportunities to access higher education’. Children of urban parents tend to gain entry into more prestigious
universities and courses than those from rural and poorer areas and can take advantage of a range of special mechanisms such as entry
‘by recommendation’, through ‘independent enrolment’ or extra gaokao credit, or the acceptance of students with lower qualifications
(pp. 227–8).

Online and distance learning

Online learning is becoming increasingly popular with growing numbers of providers and is seen by the central government as one way
to address regional inequalities in higher education as well as increase the skills of university faculty. In April 2018, the MOE announced
the development of a national plan, regulations and standards with the aim of China becoming a world leader in online learning through
MOOCs (massive open online courses) with a target of increasing the number of credit-bearing ‘quality’ national-level courses from 490
in 2018 to 3,000 by 2020 (Li, Lei 2018). Universities such as Peking, Tsinghua, Fudan and Shanghai Jiaotong offer MOOCs and online
courses, and a number of online schools and distance education colleges have been established, with China now having more than ten
million distance education learners (Li, Wang & Hu 2017). Online and blended (face-to-face and online) distance education courses are
also offered through the national Open University (modelled on the UK Open University and previously called the China Central Radio
and TV University) which operates through a network of hundreds of provincial, prefecture and county level centres.

Adult, continuing and lifelong education

Along with the expansion of higher education, adult education has been growing significantly, although it receives little attention. The
central government has introduced policies to encourage lifelong learning through adult education and in the 2017 13th Five-Year Plan
(State Council 2017b), it announced that continuing lifelong education would be further developed to provide education and training to
farmers, workers, and retired veterans and announced the development of a national qualifications framework.
Adult education and training is designed for rural workers to improve literacy rates and for people in the workforce to upgrade their
skills, and many higher education institutions offer adult education programmes, short courses and certificate programmes. Courses are
also provided by secondary vocational schools, vocational and technical colleges, private providers and industry bodies such as factories
or State enterprises.
Adult education forms a significant part of higher education and is for those who are between the ages of 18 and 45 and who have had
an educational gap of at least one year prior to enrolment (Lai 2014). It includes those who have never had any tertiary education as
well as those who are returning to further their education. Adult education has a long history in China and, along with regular higher
education, has been expanding in recent times with 10.4 million students enrolled in adult higher education in 2011. According to Lai
(2014), 35 percent of the 9.3 million undergraduate diplomas conferred in 2011 were for adult education programmes. Lai's (2014)
longitudinal analysis of the General Social Survey data from 1949 to 2003 found that this sector accounted for half of the
undergraduate credential output over that period.
The central government has recently designated adult and continuing professional education a top priority and introduced new mech-
anisms to encourage its growth. This includes the establishment of a national voucher scheme which workers can use at the provider of
their choice; the provider receives the government subsidy when the person has completed the training. A large number of courses has
been established in recent years, but there is concern over the quality of these programmes, poor resources and equipment and a lack
of qualified staff to teach them (Li, Zhongjian 2017). Adult higher education courses are generally offered part-time and consist of online
or correspondence education, night classes, and by broadcast and television universities and is often employer or state-sponsored.
Another form of adult learning but an informal one is the laonian daxue (老年大学) or ‘Old People's University’ (equivalent perhaps to
the University of the Third Age). Because many people in China retire at 50 (for manual labourers) or 55 (for professionals), they often
look for lifelong learning opportunities and recreational activities to keep their minds active. Programmes and courses include painting,
dancing, singing, music and so on, and participants are encouraged to put on performances of their new skills which can often be seen in
public places. Most of these programmes are government-run, sometimes at colleges, but there are also private providers since these
programmes are so popular and are relatively cheap. In the 13th Five-Year Plan, the government announced that, due to the ageing of
the population, the official retirement age will be raised as part of social security reform, so this will have a significant impact on these
types of programmes.

Non-formal education and extra-curricular learning

Other forms of learning that could be considered non-formal, as they are usually non-credentialled, include non-credit bearing
undergraduate and postgraduate classes, university entry preparatory classes (including yuke 预科 foundation courses for minority
students), in-service vocational or professional development courses, and certificate courses.
A major form of informal learning is public or private extra-curricular after-school activities or summer and winter schools, as discussed
above. These kinds of programmes have proliferated in recent years.
Private tutoring, or ‘shadow education’, is usually provided by school teachers ‘moonlighting’. The MOE formally banned teachers from
working in private tutoring companies in 2015, and in 2018 banned teachers from engaging in any forms of money-making tutoring, but
the ban is not enforced and the practice continues. Kong, Yu and Zhao (2017) argue that these practices blur the lines between the
public and private space of teachers and families and, according to Naftali (2016), ‘After-class academic activities and extra-curricular
tutoring has now become almost a prerequisite for school entry’ (p. 104). There are certainly cases where teachers deliberately omit
key examination curriculum content so students are forced to pay for private tutoring offered by the teachers themselves since this is
such a lucrative form of income for them. In an indication of the scale of this problem, in 2018 the MOE (2018a) announced additional
controls on extra-curricular training to reduce dependence on ‘off campus’ training which encourages intensive ‘test-taking’ behaviours
which ‘affect the normal education and teaching order’. Zhang and Xie (2016) in their empirical analysis of national China Family Panel
Studies data from 2010 examined the relationship between private tutoring and academic success. They found a strong relationship
between the socioeconomic status of the family and the likelihood of the child receiving tutoring. Superficially it seems private tutoring
has a positive impact on academic achievement and a correlation with higher verbal and mathematics performance. However, when
family background characteristics are controlled for, they found that there is very little difference between performance in mathematics
for those receiving and those not receiving private tutoring.
But parents see such types of expenditure as an investment in their own future prosperity and status. Naftali (2016) describes this as
an ‘accumulation strategy’; ‘parents and grandparents invest in educating a child who will, ideally, generate dividends in the future’ (p.
104). Manifestations of this preoccupation with improving children's education are evident across the nation. Even major shopping
centres are often full of activities for children aimed at encouraging their learning, especially for very young children; however, these
are generally found in more affluent cities and areas within cities.

The role of teachers

Teachers in China are traditionally well respected and the teaching profession has a high status. It is seen as being an attractive
profession because of good job security and benefits. Teachers are ranked by professional grades including Professional Senior Teacher,
Senior Teacher and First, Second and Third-Level Teacher. These are judged by the county education bureaus and sometimes by
schools. Rankings depend on the teacher's qualifications; years of experience; mastery of curriculum and pedagogical theories,
principles and methods; and innovations and publications. An honorary title of Special-Grade Teacher is bestowed upon those who are
judged as being outstanding and they are expected to be experts in education and role models or mentors for other teachers.
Teachers are generally not well paid and a portion of their salary is performance based, according to workload, appraisal or bonuses for
their students’ results. However, a new dimension was added in 2017 in guidelines issued by the central government that ‘moral
performance’ (whose meaning is unclear) would be the primary criterion for teachers’ evaluation, promotion and awards (Xinhua
2017c). Teachers in urban schools are paid substantially more than those in rural schools, often three times as much.
Primary and junior high-school teachers specialize in subject areas more than in other countries, so children will often be taught by a
range of teachers; and teachers tend to have fewer teaching contact hours than, for example, in most Western countries. Many public
schools employ foreign deputy head teachers to advise teachers on Western teaching and learning to prepare students for international
study. Head teachers in primary schools frequently teach some classes and are often active in organizing teacher development
activities. Teachers and principals at this level can have quite close, parent-like relationships with children.
Head teachers can even become cult-like ‘hero’ figures who are admired and valorized by teachers and parents. Many take a very
active role in their school, personally greeting students as they arrive and leave each day, visiting classrooms and encouraging teachers
and students. Some publish their ideas in academic and professional journals and can develop strong personal followings within the
profession. They are strong authority figures within schools and often take a keen interest in their teachers’ professional and personal
development, with some even prescribing essential personal reading and viewing of movies to enrich them, especially for early career or
recently appointed teachers. This aligns with the traditional positions of high-level respect and authority that teachers have occupied
since ancient times, although not now to the same degree as previously. Leading head teachers are often appointed as regional
consultants at the provincial or district Department or Bureau of Education level or can be appointed to national education policy
committees.
Teachers are often very conscientious in their work in classrooms and in their professional development. Many work long hours
preparing and marking and can spend considerable time on professional development during their holidays. I have witnessed many
examples of such dedication among teachers in both urban and rural schools, though this is not universal and depends on the ethos and
location of the school and make-up of its parent body. Although most teachers are committed to their profession and are dedicated to
supporting their students, some teachers can abuse their positions, and as described earlier, significant corruption exists in some
aspects of the system.
In terms of pedagogy in schools, although it is common to find schools taking a fairly traditional, often strict (sometimes draconian)
approach to teaching and learning, there are also many examples of schools in China introducing creative and innovative strategies. In
some schools, there is still undoubtedly a predominance of textbook learning, listening to the teacher and providing the ‘correct’
answers, with little student engagement in learning or critical thinking skills. This is changing, however, as a result of the curriculum
reform programme, especially at the primary level, and also at later levels although these will take longer to have real impact. This
varies considerably according to the individual school, reflecting the diversity of educational philosophies and contexts in China today.
It is certainly easy to find schools that are taking more creative approaches to pedagogy. One school in Beijing I have visited over
several years has as its mission to stimulate children's curiosity and independent learning skills. It introduced a sweeping range of
innovative pedagogies including children themselves sometimes taking the class and much ‘hands on’ and peer learning. Another school
I visited in Hangzhou was equally creative and innovative and saw as its mission the nurturing and development of children's natural
curiosity. It provided a range of highly creative interactive learning displays throughout the school based on the theme of the Yangzi
River alongside which it was located to provide an integrated curriculum approach to the teaching of literature, mathematics, science
and the environment.

Conclusions
Although public education comes under the control of the CCP party-state, China's complex system of educational governance and
funding described above means that broader national policy is having mixed results and can be subject to and even thwarted by local
conditions and priorities – to what Luke (2016) describes as ‘persistent unresolved tension between centrally generated policy and local
uptake’ (p. 282). Bureaucratization means that national policies filter through several layers of provincial and local government leading
to vast differences in policy and practice in different areas.
There are many stereotypes about teaching and learning in China, but in reality, as in any country, there is a broad and diverse range of
teaching and of teachers. Outdated or ill-informed views that either portray teaching in China as something so rosy that it should be
emulated or as being entirely rigid and characterized by rote-learning are both wrong. I have observed both good and bad teaching in
top-ranked schools in China in both urban and rural settings, as well as examples of both traditional and innovative teaching and
learning. Much of this is to do with local curriculum and pedagogical policies and is mediated by expectations and pressure from parents
and local communities. But there is increasing disquiet about the heavy educational burdens placed on young people and this has led to
extensive curriculum and pedagogical reform which is discussed in the following chapter.
3
Reform and Resistance
Although China's education system shares many features with other systems, one thing that is remarkable about China's is the pace and
extent of change, especially since the late 1990s. This chapter charts efforts to improve the quality of education over the past two
decades. These have had the aim of having among the best educational institutions in the world, developing the knowledge and skills
necessary to drive economic growth, and increasing China's global influence. But these reforms, particularly at a school level, have not
been easy to implement and have met resistance, and many worry that they have caused their own problems.
This chapter examines major challenges and enduring tensions limiting reform, including: entrenched cultural beliefs and pedagogical
resistance to the reforms; anxieties about the import of foreign ideas and loss of indigenous theories and philosophies; gaps between
policy intention and implementation; the primacy of the gaokao; the endurance of the guanxi system of personal connections which can
inhibit experimentation and innovation; and the impact of changing government political agendas on the nature and longevity of
reforms.
Although change began in the 1990s with the launch of the Twenty-First Century Education Rejuvenation Action Plan following
widespread and unprecedented public consultations, it was not until 2001 that wholesale reform was formally announced with the
release of the Guidelines on Basic Education Curriculum Reform (MOE 2001). This, and several other reform policies over the next
decade, envisaged paradigm change across all sectors of education, putting the onus on educational institutions to change and improve
and also giving them the autonomy to do so. The devolution of education finances and policies, at the school level, allowed for more
independence and freedom of management, employment and curriculum, and county and district governments provided a greater
curriculum support role for local schools and colleges.
In 2011 ‘fine-tuned’ reform policies sought to extend change but at the same time specifically began to provide more central direction
on the level of political content to be included in the curriculum. In more recent years central political control has been re-asserted over
the curriculum, particularly following the inclusion in 2017 of the ‘Thoughts of Xi Jinping’ into the Constitution (see Chapter 5) and with
the announcement of the revision of the entire curriculum to include more patriotic content and the re-writing of all textbooks by 2020.
The earlier reforms focused on more ‘progressive’ curriculum and pedagogy while the later reforms are more driven by political and
economic agendas, but still particularly to ultimately give China a competitive technological edge globally.
Although the early reform saw impressive change in many areas, especially in pedagogy, outcomes have been patchy and had mixed
success. ‘Traditional’ teaching and learning is still prevalent but there is no doubt that there has been significant change by schools,
parents and teachers. But cultural beliefs run deep and broader social expectations and pressures can run counter to the aims of any
reform programme.
The curriculum reform programme was launched in response to concerns about the quality of education in China compared with other
countries. Although China did well in the 2009 and 2012 PISA results, it looked to outside models of teaching and learning to develop
more creative and innovative pedagogy (ironically as other nations looked to China for successful ideas). Such new approaches have
been seen as essential for the development of the skills the nation needs for an innovative, knowledge-based economy. The reform
programmes arose out of economic and political imperatives to make China more competitive and innovative in the global market place
but were also partly driven by public concern about students’ heavy workloads and pressures on students arising from the gaokao.
The reform programme saw the questioning of accepted models of curriculum and pedagogy which began to be seen as a weakness
threatening China's future development. Traditional methods were criticized as too examination-focused and resulting in students
having a great store of knowledge but less capacity to put this knowledge into practice. This is, according to Lee and Pang (2011), ‘a
widely recognized problem of Chinese education, gaofen di'neng [高分低能] (high scores but low ability)’ and is an acute issue for
Chinese educators wanting to close the ‘creativity gap’ between East and West (p. 337).
Tensions and challenges to reform have arisen at all levels of education, however, arising from competing ideologies as well as pressure
from different stakeholders. This chapter shows a nation grappling with issues such as how to modernize and internationalize its
education system and engage with education systems worldwide while also retaining what are viewed as China's intellectual traditions
and values; its essential ‘Chinese characteristics’ (zhongguo tese 中国特色). How the reforms are both succeeding and being challenged
in different areas is discussed below, and questions are raised about whether the way in which educational reform is being approached
is appropriate for China, and if that is in itself causing confusion and resistance.

School education reform

The basic education (kindergarten to Year 9) curriculum reform was launched with the release of the 2001 guidelines and extended in
the 2011 national plan. In 2011 new curriculum standards for all subject areas in primary and junior high schools were disseminated by
the MOE. The reforms aim to move from a transmission-based to an inquiry-based, or constructivist, teaching and learning approach –
from the previous ‘two basics’ (shuangji 双基) acquisition of knowledge and skills, and an examination-oriented education (yingshi
jiaoyu 应试教育), to a ‘quality-oriented education’ (suzhi jiaoyu 素质教育) involving more flexible, school-based curriculum and less
didactic pedagogy.
The reforms aim to develop ‘autonomous’ and ‘all-round’ learners and encourage independence, creativity, critical thinking and
problem-solving skills and collaborative learning. But pedagogies such as inquiry-based learning have been difficult for many teachers
to implement and many are concerned about losing the traditional strengths of Chinese education or compromising standards.
The reforms not only embody the central government's aim to develop the skills necessary for national development but also its
ideological intentions for a citizenry with specific ‘ideal’ characteristics in the Chinese context. The goal is to produce ‘quality’
autonomous learners who are not only academically strong but well-rounded; ‘a child who is developing morally (deyu [德育]),
intellectually (zhiyu [智育]), physically (tiyu [体育]) and aesthetically (meiyu [美育])’ (Naftali 2016, p. 45). The qualities of morality,
knowledge and sporting ability are also the criteria for entry into the Young Pioneers and resonate with Confucian notions of self-
cultivation and self-perfection but, as Naftali (2016) argues, also fit Marxist ideals of the importance of the physical, intellectual and
moral training of children. Moral and physical education remains a significant part of the curriculum at all levels and is incorporated into
several subjects (see Chapter 5). The 2011 reforms introduced more topics related to China and Chinese culture as part of the CCP's
internal agenda to develop national pride and its external agenda to use Chinese culture and educational achievements for building ‘soft
power’ globally (see Chapter 6).
The continuing examination-orientation of the education system is one of the most pressing challenges to reform. Although parents are
questioning traditional methods of teaching and learning, parents’ and students’ concerns about getting good results in the gaokao are
an enduring restraint to broader and deeper reform. The gaokao continues to dominate education and ‘seeps into every aspect of the
business of education’ (Walker, Qian & Zhang 2011, p. 393).
There are moves towards more formative and innovative forms of assessment and evaluation of learning, including at secondary school
level, although their implementation is often limited. Many schools and districts across China have been experimenting with different
methods of teaching and learning and different forms of assessment such as through portfolios of students’ work.
Curriculum reform in early childhood education is aimed at moving towards ‘Western-style, progressive’ education including child-
centred methods and play-based learning. Li, Wang and Wong's (2011) study of five kindergartens in Shenzhen, however, found that
traditional teacher-directed approaches were still predominant. They argued that this was due in part to the ‘top-down’ approach to
curriculum reform in the sector, with a failure to consider the needs of teachers and students in local social and cultural contexts, but
also due to inadequate resourcing and teacher training and high child to teacher ratios. They contend that there has been little change in
curriculum and pedagogy and changes are often only superficial. There are other examples, however, particularly in larger cities, of
more creative or ‘progressive’ approaches to early childhood education often driven by parental pressure and choices, particularly in
the private sector.
At the primary education level, however, things have changed considerably, with much more creativity and innovation in many schools,
‘hands on’ learning and experimentation, as well as learning through games and thematic approaches to the curriculum.
But this kind of inventiveness tends to come to a halt at senior high school, due to anxiety about the looming gaokao. The reform of
senior high schooling came later than that of primary and junior high schooling, so it is natural that there has been less progress, but this
is beginning to change. Some parents are making wider choices of schools that offer special programmes, more holistic approaches, or
are just more prestigious (especially those with programmes in English with Western curricula) to give their children a better chance at
being accepted in a leading university overseas, especially in the United Kingdom or the United States. This ‘moving with one's feet’ has
created further pressures for reform at the senior secondary level.
There have been innovations in pedagogy such as field work and self-directed research, and the introduction of innovative subjects such
as design and technology. Shanghai, often at the forefront of reform and the piloting of new programmes, completely revised its biology
curriculum in the mid 2000s to include a wider range of topics to encourage more student engagement with learning, and students can
engage in research into DNA and field work on water quality and salinity of local rivers and water supplies. Despite all this, however, it
must be said that such moves have been limited due to the continued dominance of the gaokao, acting as a bottleneck putting
downward pressure on the curriculum in the years leading up to it, as more conventional modes of teaching through memorization and
repetition can produce better examination results.
Although some of the best-resourced schools are found in the larger cities, especially Beijing and Shanghai, curriculum and pedagogy in
many individual schools even there are still not necessarily the most engaging or innovative. I visited one senior high school in Pudong
in Shanghai in 2008, the year before Shanghai students topped the 2009 PISA rankings. The school had state-of-the-art buildings,
facilities and resources and its halls were festooned with sayings from famous Western scientists and philosophers and posters
reminding students to work hard, dedicate themselves to their studies and always speak English. Yet the Chinese literature class I
observed was one of the most unengaging lessons I have ever seen. The ‘model’ teacher stood at the front, barking questions at
students who sat in long rows and dutifully raised their hands and, when called, stood to give a short, seemingly ‘correct’ answer. This
was a demonstration class for outsiders and I was aware that, although all the students raised their hands, they knew which hand to
raise depending on whether they knew the answer or not and could then be called upon to answer. In the break, I saw the students
slumped exhausted with their heads on their desks, probably from long hours of studying the night before.
The gaokao is beginning to change due to the enormous pressure it puts on students, teachers and parents and concerns that it inhibits
the development of students’ higher-order thinking skills. In 2014, the central government announced reforms to reduce reliance on
standardized testing, make examinations more ‘well-rounded’ and give greater subject choice to students. The new gaokao includes a
unified national examination on the compulsory subjects, Chinese, mathematics and English, but students can also now choose three
elective subjects (the 3 + 3 model).
Different provinces and cities trialled different approaches in 2016 and 2017, including the choice of additional subjects, longer periods
to take examinations, and the end of streaming into either science- or liberal arts-based disciplines. Students who sat these pilot
examinations, however, complained that the system is still examination-focused and merely puts pressure on students over a longer
period. Overall changes to the gaokao give students more choice including more foreign language subjects in addition to English, and
Japanese, Russian, Spanish, French and German have been included, as well as a greater emphasis in the curriculum on traditional
Chinese culture and the Chinese Communist Party.
More recently, reform has entailed a broadening of the curriculum to incorporate fewer purely academic-oriented subjects and
encourage more innovative curriculum. In the 13th Five-Year Plan, the government announced the diversification of the curriculum
and inclusion of more social and personal learning to increase students’ sense of social responsibility and awareness of the rule of law,
and the strengthening of sports, physical health, mental health, the arts and aesthetics, and students’ scientific literacy.
As part of the broadening of the curriculum and to relieve academic pressure on students the MOE issued policies in 2017 requiring all
schools to integrate social activities into their formal curriculum. These mandate at least one hour of such activities for first and second-
year primary students and students in the following three years to have at least two. Activities (which can be decided locally) should be
‘interdisciplinary and closely related with students’ lives and personal development’ and students ‘should be allowed to do research on
their own and gain firsthand knowledge and experience’ (Zhao 2017). The changes aim to improve students’ problem-solving skills,
awareness of their social responsibilities, foster innovation and promote the value of vocational experience to improve students’
practical skills.
Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue that much curriculum is state mandated, and this is certainly the case in areas such as patriotic
education, but in reality, policy ‘guidelines’ issued by the MOE are generally vague, meaning that their implementation at local levels
can vary enormously. Public schools must follow national curriculum guidelines but a proportion of the curriculum can be designed
locally, and often schools introduce more imaginative and innovative content into children's learning. Even rural primary and junior high
schools are offering innovative curricula. In one programme, a non-government organization is working with 2,500 disadvantaged rural
schools offering programmes that boost students’ creativity and confidence ‘to put pupils on an equal footing with their peers in the
country's coastal areas’ (Sixth Tone 2017).
Other non-traditional or less purely ‘academic’ subjects have been introduced, frequently in ‘experimental schools’ or ‘demonstration
schools’ or as pilot projects, especially in areas that relate to national development priorities, or changing social, individual and
environmental issues. China has been working with UNESCO to introduce social responsibility education through Global Citizenship
Education and Education for Sustainable Development. In the reforms to science education, schools are collaborating with museums,
and museum education has become increasingly prevalent. Some art museums have established education departments offering
student workshops and teacher resource packs and training for teachers.
The essential social conservatism of the school curriculum is also beginning to change with some schools beginning to offer limited safe
sex education (Aresu 2009). The national sex education programme in schools began thirty years ago but took an ‘abstinence’ stance
and safe sex education is still not compulsory. Safe sex education is mainly taught in schools by non-government organizations but there
have been recent calls for it to become compulsory in all schools and in 2016 the MOE called on universities to develop courses for
students on reproductive and sexual health (Yang 2017).
In an interesting development and aligned to more neoliberal imperatives, investment and financial planning education is being
introduced into primary, junior high and vocational schools and universities. In 2015, the China Securities and Regulatory Commission
launched pilot projects in more than twenty regions and has provided training for 10,000 teachers (Global Times 2017b).
Subjects focusing on design innovation and creativity are also being introduced. Several schools, especially experimental schools,
international schools and schools in larger cities, have for example introduced Maker Education. The ‘Maker Movement’ originated in
Silicon Valley in the United States (Green 2017) and involves working creatively to solve real life problems. Many schools have
developed design studios or ‘maker spaces’ to encourage creativity and entrepreneurship and learn about electronics and programming.
These initiatives are part of the government policy to move from ‘Made in China’ to ‘Created in China’ and the consequent need to
develop the skills required in the design and creative industries. In its move from a manufacturing to a hi-tech economy, China is keen
to improve its design capabilities and is taking bold steps to secure its ambition by partnering with prestigious overseas bodies. In its
first international collaboration, the Victoria and Albert (V&A) Museum in the United Kingdom partnered with the China Merchants
Group, a large State-owned corporation, and in December 2017 opened a state-of-the-art design museum in Shekou, Shenzhen, in
southern China to be a ‘lightning rod for cutting-edge design in China’ (Wainwright 2017). As part of its remit, the museum will work
with universities and schools to provide design space and design education and many schools in Shenzhen, China's original economically
autonomous zone, have introduced Maker Education classes.
As China moves from being the ‘world's factory’ to a more highly skilled creative and innovative economy, it needs to build knowledge
and skills, particularly in design and technology. There has been a proliferation of art and design courses in universities and many
examples of astonishing architecture and design can be seen across China, not just in cities like Beijing and Shanghai, that are far more
exciting and innovative than in many other international cities.
The central government's aim of innovating in education to fuel China's global economic competitiveness and hence its political strength
on the world stage is set alongside its ideological imperative to instil national identity as well as pride among its citizens in China's
historical and contemporary educational and cultural achievements. This was apparent in the 2011 reform with the introduction of
topics such as Chinese calligraphy, Chinese opera and Chinese music and folk songs. The government is utilizing China's intellectual
achievements and cultural identity in its quest to carve out a distinctive role in its drive to establish a new world geopolitical order. Law
(2017) cautions, however, about the dangers of attempting to both traditionalize and globalize as this may produce tensions due to
China's ‘dilemma between cultural preservation and development [which] is likely to become more intense in education and in society
at large’ (p. 253).

Challenges to implementation
A major area of concern about curriculum reforms and a source of resistance to them is perceived threats to traditional teaching and
learning. Concerns have been raised that while the aims of the reform programme are laudable, its very success may threaten
conventional values and standards especially in the areas in which China has traditionally excelled and has been seen as a leader, such
as in mathematics.
A further criticism is that reform has not addressed education inequality but widened the rural–urban achievement gap (discussed in
the next chapter) with significant inequalities in education provision and resources in different parts of China, especially in the western
and central provinces where conditions in schools may have changed very little as reform has proven particularly difficult to implement
in the countryside. According to Wang (2011), in rural areas reform has resulted in an overloaded curriculum, and factors such as
differences in family support have added to the persistence of the rural–urban achievement gap between students. The slow pace of
reform and its unevenness across different areas has also been attributed to deep-seated and enduring cultural norms (Dai, Gerbino &
Daley 2011; Walker, Qian & Zhang 2011) as well as the continued influence of the examination system.
The reforms have included changes to curriculum as discussed above, but also to pedagogy, and this is where China has been learning
from other countries. In its quest to develop quality education and autonomous learners it has been ‘borrowing’ ideas from Western and
other countries in its quest to move from an examination-oriented to a quality-oriented system due to concerns about the continuing
lack of creativity and innovation in its education system. It is acutely aware, for example, that, at least until very recently, it has had
few Nobel Prize winners especially in the ‘hard’ sciences such as physics and chemistry.
Concerns have been raised, however, about the appropriateness of ‘borrowing’ pedagogical ideas from different cultural contexts.
Difficulties in implementation can be caused by the fact that educational practices in other systems are underpinned by different
ideologies and historical and contemporary circumstances. The problem with ‘policy borrowing’ of ideas from other countries is that
these ideas can be ‘lost in translation’. Policies and ensuing practices may be introduced only at a superficial level, without an
understanding of the underlying fundamental philosophical principles and ideologies, and the historical genesis of these ideas. In the
area of critical thinking, for example, which Chinese educators have seen as a crucial learning strategy to improve the thinking skills of
its students, sometimes only very narrow aspects of critical thinking are taught in Chinese institutions. In her study of the teaching of
critical thinking courses at a top university in Beijing, Ruijing Li (2017) found that it is almost exclusively taught as a mechanical process
that emphasizes the logical and semantic features of critical thinking rather than its broader principles and dispositions. What is often
missing, she argues, are the more philosophical aspects of critical thinking such as how to deal with uncertainty and doubt, and the
possibility of there being no ‘correct’ answer. More subjective or interpretive, qualitative, or challenging, approaches are more often
neglected as well as there being a lack of understanding that critical thinking is only one part of a whole repertoire of higher order
thinking skills such as synthesis, evaluation and ethical judgement.
Examples of the problems of borrowing apparently innovative approaches can also be found at the primary level. One school I visited in
Shanghai was experimenting with intercultural learning using a thematic approach and had introduced a collaborative learning
programme with a school in Germany. The teachers had put much work into making this programme a very interesting and engaging
one, but when asked about the learning objectives of the programme, they were less clear about what they were. At another school in
Inner Mongolia, the teachers had used the ‘good learning behaviours’ model of encouraging inquiry-based learning, one of which was
that children should be independent learners. The school had proudly displayed these ‘good learning behaviours’ on posters around the
school, but the one on independent learning explained this as ‘Children should sit quietly and should not disturb others’. Here, the
meaning of ‘independent’ was interpreted in a different way and demonstrated the inherent difficulties in importing educational ideas
that may or may not transfer into different cultural contexts. It must be said, however, that the teachers in both these contexts were
experimenting with a whole range of teaching and learning ideas with much enthusiasm and their classrooms and classes were highly
engaging and imaginative.
In Yin's (2013) study of teachers’ responses to the curriculum reforms in senior secondary education, teachers reported that although
they may not agree with some reforms or have difficulty implementing them, they are unlikely to overtly challenge them. He argues
that teachers use ‘facework’ (or pretence) in following the reforms in order to avoid conflict and preserve harmonious relations,
indicating outward compliance but internal resistance. He concludes that in order to achieve their successful implementation, those
behind the reforms need to work more closely with teachers and use more ‘bottom up’ approaches to curriculum reform.
Despite often apparently opposing views of curriculum, in reality both constructivist and traditional views of education can co-exist in
teachers (Tan 2017); the work and ideas of teachers reflect overall tensions within contemporary Chinese society and are situated
within a complex mixture of often contradictory ideologies (see Chapter 5). In a study comprising 733 questionnaire responses and nine
in-depth interviews with junior high school English teachers in ten provinces and municipalities, Zhang and Liu (2014) examined
teachers’ beliefs about curriculum, pedagogy, assessment, resources, and the roles of teachers and students. They found that teachers
held seemingly contradictory beliefs and use a combination of these in their teaching. They suggest that teachers ‘seem to be able to
blend the Western-based theories of language teaching and learning with traditional Chinese cultural and educational values without
much internal conflict’ (p. 201). They argue that in a context where ‘curriculum innovation is confronting deep-rooted cultural
traditions and complex teaching realities’ teachers’ own beliefs can play an important mediating role in curriculum implementation (p.
187).
Similarly, Tan (2017) argues that constructivism is not necessarily incompatible with transmission approaches and that many principles
of constructivism are compatible with many of the tenets of Confucianism. Tan (2017) advocates that teachers make ‘a judicious
adaptation and synthesis of constructivist and other approaches’ (p. 244) according to what works for them in their contexts and for
their students.
But other studies have highlighted the constraints that can inhibit the implementation of reform. In their study of 582 teachers from
nine provinces and 16 cities across China on teachers’ views about inquiry-based learning, Dai, Gerbino and Daley (2011) found that
teachers are receptive to constructivist inquiry-based methods but that there are practical constraints in fully implementing them due
to the continuing predominance of the high-stakes testing regime. They argue that teachers play a pivotal role in initiating reform in the
classroom but are under pressure from administrators and parents to raise the test scores of their students. Equally important,
however, was the teachers’ ambivalence and confusion about the underpinning philosophies and conflicting cultural ideas about the
nature and purposes of education.
Likewise, there has been debate about whether the education reforms are being constrained or resisted by school principals; whether
they are ‘victims or accomplices’ to the reform process (Walker, Qian & Zhang 2011, p. 390). School principals in Walker et al.'s (2011)
survey of secondary school principals in Shanghai reported that they receive mixed messages about implementing reform due to a
contradictory focus in the evaluation of their work. Their work is mainly assessed on the basis of their students’ academic performance
in tests and examinations, encouraging concentration on traditional methods. Walker et al. (2011) conclude that it is ‘enduring cultural
norms which continue to underpin societal expectations and accountability, rather than a lack of curriculum leadership on the part of
school principals’ (pp. 388–9).
The results of all these studies reflect the apparent clash of ideologies between constructivist theories of learning underpinning the
reforms and traditional beliefs about teaching and learning. Naftali (2016) argues that teachers and parents are caught between
conflicting imperatives and ideas, ‘between the promotion of collectivism and individualism, obedience and independence, forceful
control and self-governance, contemporary childrearing and educational agendas’. These, she continues, reflect the moral and
ideological question of ‘how to link the next generation with the nation's past, yet prepare them for the future?’ (p. 68).
It is clear that the ambitious goals set in the original 2001 guidelines for reform have not, or have only partially, been successfully
implemented and one of the enduring challenges has been pedagogical and ideological resistance by teachers and principals. This has led
to a gap between policy intention and policy ‘enactment’; the policy-practice gap. New ideas may challenge teachers’ deep-seated
beliefs; they may find them confronting or just difficult to implement. The contradictions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, or foreign
and Chinese educational ideologies, have caused some confusion and resistance among teachers. For example, the importance of
thinking skills versus foundational knowledge continues to be debated among educators. Teachers have different views about
constructivist versus transmission theories of education and these are mediated by the social and cultural contexts within which these
are situated (see Chapter 5).
A final key problem may be the self-contradictory nature of many of the curriculum reforms. The reforms have sought to encourage
creativity, innovation, critical thinking and more ‘scientific’ methods. But this may be inconsistent especially with the more recent
reforms that have introduced more politicized and nationalistic curriculum content through the political and ideological subjects in the
curriculum, including moral and patriotic education and political and ideological education, which students are expected to essentially
accept without question. The curriculum reforms have arisen from often competing neoliberal and traditional ideologies and
government agendas and are employed to fulfil multiple political, economic and social purposes (discussed in Chapter 5). The resulting
difficulties can cause confusion and resistance not just from teachers but also from students and may ultimately thwart the ambitions of
the reform programme.

Teacher education and professional development

The need for change in teacher education and professional development has been seen as one of the most pressing issues for the success
of the reform programme.
Most comprehensive universities now have dedicated faculties offering programmes in Education (including master's and doctoral
programmes), but teacher pre-service education is provided by five national, ‘normal’ universities as well as many provincial and local
universities. Several problems have been identified, however, with the quality of these programmes. These include a lack of suitably
qualified teacher educators arising from universities’ preferences for recruiting academic researchers rather than teacher educators
with experience in schools, few official requirements regarding school practicum field experience and poor practicum supervision in
schools, and the marginalization of teacher educators as teacher training programmes are located in discipline areas (such as
mathematics) rather than in Education faculties, meaning that ‘teacher educators are marginalized due to their hybrid roles’ (Zhao,
Zhou & Li 2017).
Following initial problems with implementation of the reforms, more emphasis was placed on school-based professional development
communities to work in a more ‘bottom up’ fashion to find local solutions to fulfil the aims of the reforms. These groups and
communities have played a vital role, especially at the primary and junior high school levels, in preparing teachers for new roles and
relationships between teachers and students.
The central government has put much investment into the pre- and in-service training of teachers and principals. This training is
designed to meet the requirements of the reform programme and to improve teachers’ professional education and expertise, especially
those in rural schools in the central and western provinces. New teachers are required to undertake 120 class hours of in-service
training before commencing teaching, and all teachers are required to undertake 360 class hours of in-service training every five years
although many teachers are sceptical about the quality of this training. New principals must take 300 class hours of training and all
principals must undertake 360 class hours of training every five years (OECD 2016).
Every school has a system of continuing professional development through local teacher research groups (jiaoyanzu 教研组) as well as
lesson planning groups. These professional development groups are utilized at very local levels in schools as well as through district and
national networks to drive teacher research and professional development (Sargent & Hannum 2008; Ryan et al. 2009). In these
groups, teachers research their own practice, discuss their ideas or problems with other teachers and the principal, or receive feedback
on their teaching from other teachers. Many schools also participate in larger networks of teacher research groups (see Ryan et al.
2009).
Teachers are also required to open their classrooms for observation two or three times a month. Sometimes parents are also invited to
observe and may be invited to attend a question and answer session out of school hours to discuss the teaching of their child. Parents
observing teaching would be considered quite intimidating in other contexts and parents can certainly be very demanding, asking the
teacher questions such as why they didn't ask more questions of their child. New teachers are required to undergo an induction
programme and work with other teachers on continuing professional development. This can include working with more experienced
teachers on lesson plans and plans for improvement of their teaching.
Teacher research groups and schools often publish teachers’ and principals’ accounts of research into their own practices and share
these among the group or more widely in learning development communities. These can be a valuable source of professional learning
for other teachers and schools and is a feature of teacher research not often found in other countries.

Vocational and higher education reform

The reforms in vocational and higher education in recent years have mainly been structural but they have had the same aim of
developing more relevant knowledge and skills necessary to drive the nation's economic growth and increase its global influence.
Although there is scant literature available on reforms in the vocational education sector compared with the large body of scholarship in
the higher education arena, it is clear that recent reforms have focused on expansion and diversification (in terms of promoting the
number and type of public and private vocational and technical institutions). Much of the focus of reforms has also been on graduate
employability, demonstrating the importance attached to this form of education to drive economic growth.
Reforms have included the encouragement by the central government for some universities to convert to vocational education colleges
to meet the demand for highly skilled workers. The central government is encouraging 600 higher education institutions to convert into
polytechnics to improve vocational and professional education training but also to diversify the higher education sector (Yang 2015). In
2007, improvements in financial support for students in vocational education courses were introduced. Other reforms have included the
shortening of many vocational education courses from three years to two (Xiong 2011) but this has raised concerns about the quality of
these programmes and how well they can prepare students for employment in this sector. Since 1999, students completing vocational
education courses have been able to upgrade their qualifications by continuing on to higher education although quotas are placed on
this.
The demands of the economy for workers with advanced knowledge and skills has promoted the development of a vast system of
colleges of technical and further education, and some of the tensions and challenges facing schools and universities are also applicable to
this sector. Xiong (2011) argues that, as in other areas of education, the opportunities for real reform of vocational education are being
constrained by competing traditional and neoliberal views of vocational education. Neoliberal ideologies surrounding contemporary
vocational education include economic efficiency, individual freedom and self-interest whereas traditional Confucianism is seen as
focusing on moral accountability, social responsibility, and the common good. Xiong (2011) argues that these competing ideologies cause
tensions in enacting reform as the benefits of vocational education for the individual vis-à-vis the State can be quite different.
Higher education has experienced whole scale reform as well as expansion. The move from an elite to a mass higher education system
from the 1990s has seen massive changes in this sector. There has been significant growth in the number and types of higher education
institutions, student enrolments, and outputs of research publications.
Reform of higher education has occurred at the policy, structural and systemic levels but also at the level of individual university
programmes and pedagogies. This has included the overhaul of management, administration, quality assurance and methods of
evaluation of teaching and learning, as well as academic programmes, curriculum, teaching, learning and assessment.
A series of structural reforms and amalgamations of universities in the past few decades has led to a differentiation of types and levels
of universities and a more pronounced hierarchy of universities. The different tiers of higher education institutions reflect research-
versus teaching-intensive universities, the geographical location of the university, and the locus of control. They include national
research universities, provincial public universities and regional colleges.
The central government and provinces have invested very large sums in the development of high-quality universities and programmes.
In 1994, the Reform Plan of Teaching Contents and Curriculum of Higher Education Facing the 21st Century established several
projects covering teaching ideology, teaching content, curriculum structure and teaching methodologies. In 1999, the MOE released the
Facing the 21st Century Education Development Action Plan which outlined plans for the improvement of higher education.
One of the most important imperatives of the higher education reform is the desire to develop world-class higher education institutions
with the aim that China will have a number among the best universities in the world by 2020. The 211 Higher Education Institute
Project in 1995 was designed to foster 100 world-class universities for the twenty-first century and concentrated investment in leading
universities such as Peking and Tsinghua Universities and in major discipline areas. To encourage even greater investment in the very
top universities and to develop policies and strategies to further this aim, the 985 World Class University Project was announced in
1998 and encompassed institutions
In 2015 China moved from the 985 and 211 projects to the Double World Class Project (world-class universities and world-class dis-
ciplines). The current government goal of creating ‘world-class’ institutions aims at investing a greater proportion of expenditure in
higher education and in particular towards advancing scientific research capacity, infrastructure and facilities. Its longer-term purpose
is to have not just some, but a significant number, of world-class universities by 2050.
The Double World Class scheme is open to any university but the central government has targeted 42 universities and 465 discipline
areas from 140 universities for extra, often substantial, financial support. Universities are required to improve in a number of areas
such as ‘talent cultivation’ (improving staff capacity and quality), scientific research, social service, cultural heritage and international
exchange. They are also required to improve innovation across a number of dimensions including technological, values and institutional
innovations. The scheme has seen massive funding for the 42 universities to improve their international rankings. But unlike its
predecessors, it enables any universities to apply for government financial support if they have ‘first-class’ disciplines. Regional
governments have also allocated very substantial sums to improve universities in their regions. These measures aim to improve the
quality of teaching as well as the standard and rigour of research, in order to produce world-class researchers and world-class research
publications.
The Double World Class ‘talent cultivation’ policy requires universities to recruit top-class academics (although it also refers to
undergraduate training). Several programmes are aimed at attracting the most talented foreign-trained Chinese scientists and
academics to return to China. The ‘1,000 talents’ (originally established in 2008) aims to attract ‘leading talents’, the ‘10,000 talents’ to
attract ‘high-calibre’ individuals, and the ‘1,000 Young Talents’ aims to attract high-potential early career Chinese academics and
graduates to return to China. Such incentive schemes can offer enormously high salaries, promotions and very generous benefits
especially to those with very good publication records (these schemes also recruit foreign academics with sometimes even greater
incentives and rewards).
One unintended consequence perhaps of this policy is that the race by universities to attract the ‘best brains’ is causing a drain of
talented academics from poorer provinces. As universities have become more autonomous, faculty mobility has increased and given rise
to phenomena familiar in Western universities such as poaching staff and offering rewards and incentives to ‘famous’ and highly prized
faculty or younger academics seen as having potential. According to Yan, Yue and Niu (2015) ‘universities cannot but try to acquire
more competitive resources and promote their own prestige and status under the framework of unbalanced development increasingly
favored by the Chinese government’ (p. 528).
Although academic mobility in China is still lower than in other countries, Yan et al. (2015) found that academics’ decisions to either
leave a university or to remain depended in large part on the university's status, prestige and atmosphere, as well as the city in which
the university is located. These all operate as either ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors, indicating a focus on factors such as status and prestige
found more widely in education in China. Such practices not only mirror what is happening in other higher education systems but lead
to the concentration of resources in a small number of elite universities while the remainder continue to struggle to improve their
quality. This hampers reform efforts to improve higher education more broadly.
There is no doubt though that China has made astonishing progress in research outputs, especially in the sciences and engineering. In
2016, China made a remarkable achievement when it achieved its goal of having universities among the top 100 in the world by 2020.
In the 2018 ARWU (the Shanghai Rating Consultancy Academic Ranking of World Universities) rankings (formerly the Shanghai
Jiaotong rankings), Tsinghua, Peking and Zhejiang Universities were ranked 45th, 57th and 67th respectively in the world (ARWU
2018).
It should be noted, however, that the components included in the ARWU rankings differ significantly from the two other major world
university rankings, the Times Higher Education World University Rankings and the QS World University Rankings. The ARWU is
weighted heavily towards prizes, awards and high-level citations (comprising 30 percent for awards and prizes and 70 percent for high-
level citations) which are weighted towards STEM subjects. The two other international measures give more weighting to quality of
teaching and learning, staff–student ratios, student satisfaction, and academic reputation as measured by leading scholars worldwide.
There are criticisms that a focus on such kinds of ‘performativity’ measures may in fact run counter to good academic scholarship. In
the Stern report (2016) commissioned by the United Kingdom Government on the Research Excellence Framework (REF), several
criticisms of these kinds of systems and rubrics were made. These were that they take time and energy away from teaching and
research due to the increases in staff required to administer these systems, are costly (in 2014 the preparation for the United Kingdom
REF was estimated to have cost GBP246 million), and encourage selfish behaviour, competitiveness and obsession with image. The
Stern report also concluded that there was evidence that people manipulate the system and little evidence that they make any real
difference, resulting in only superficial rather than fundamental change. Stern (2016) argued that these systems provide ‘perverse
incentives’ for academics to publish research too soon, produce ‘burdens and distortions’ as people become obsessed with image and
reputation rather than focusing on the quality of research and scholarship, and put too much focus on ‘high flyers’ rather than
improving the quality of research and teaching across the system. That is, these types of performance measures tend to benefit a small
number of individuals and institutions but don't change the fundamentals of the system or its overall quality. An obsession in China on
rankings based upon such measures has its dangers.
Nonetheless, China's increase in peer-reviewed research publications has been impressive. According to figures produced by Elsevier
(2017), China overtook the United Kingdom in 2014 to have the second largest number of peer-reviewed article citations worldwide.
But although there has been a tremendous increase in the volume of research publications by Chinese academics, this has not yet been
matched in terms of citation rates per article. For the period 1996 to 2016, the citation rate per publication from the United States was
23.58 (for 9,165,271 publications), for Chinese publications it was 7.16 (for 4,525,851 publications), and for publications from the United
Kingdom it was 21.04 (for 2,499,445 publications) (Scimago Journal and Country Rank 2017) (citation rates for Chinese articles have
increased more recently though). Questions have been raised also about the integrity of some journal articles from China given evidence
of academic fraud following investigations by the journal Science and the Chinese government itself (broader issues of academic
integrity are discussed in the final chapter).
The programmes described above have clearly resulted in much success in improving research capacity and the international
reputations of these universities. But criticisms include that they concentrate resources in a small number of more elite universities and
this has caused inequality in the system more broadly as well as sometimes corruption due to the intense pressure on academics in
these universities to publish.
Apart from these targeted programmes, an important part of the higher education reform programme more generally has been
improving the quality of the higher education workforce. China has used a two-pronged strategy to reform and internationalize higher
education over the past three decades using both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ strategies to accomplish this.
Internal strategies to improve the quality of higher education include the reform and internationalization of universities as well as
investment in them. The internationalization of higher education has been seen as a crucial component of the reform of higher
education. This includes a broad array of policies such as internationalization of the curriculum and major efforts have gone into the
establishment of collaborative agreements with universities internationally, involving collaborative research, joint programmes and
teacher and student exchanges. Universities across China have developed relationships with overseas universities which sometimes
involve joint programmes or the establishment of branch campuses within China of British and American universities. These are all
aimed at learning from other systems of higher education but also at capacity building in teaching and research.
Many universities have broadened and internationalized their curriculum to include multidisciplinary courses, creative writing, and
programmes that involve community service, and teaching methods such as inquiry-based learning, team teaching and student group
presentations. Some universities have introduced liberal arts programmes and general education studies courses, modelled on the
American system, with many establishing special colleges for these, especially in the more elite universities. These broader courses
include political, moral and physical education, military training, foreign languages, social sciences, literature, history, arts and
philosophy.
China has also employed external means to reform higher education and improve the quality and capabilities of its workforce. This form
of capacity building has mainly been in the form of sending academics and students to study or research overseas and this has seen
large numbers of students and faculty travelling to countries all over the world to study, research, or as visiting scholars (these
strategies and their implications are discussed further in Chapter 6).
Despite these reforms there are continuing tensions around the adoption of foreign models and ideas. Development and reform of
higher education has mainly been modelled on the American system (and to a lesser extent, on the British system, especially in regard
to quality assurance mechanisms). Yang (2011) argues that despite this, higher education continues to lack important fundamental
cultural and ideological principles that underpin academic cultures in other countries, such as academic freedom and autonomy. ‘China's
import of the Western university model has been centred mostly on the material level, with some touching on social institutions, while
the core of the Western university model such as academic and intellectual freedom and institutional autonomy has rarely been
understood, let alone implemented’ (Yang 2011, p. 41). This is further discussed in Chapter 6. As Yang argues, cultural beliefs and
norms continue to influence contemporary educational practices despite much outward or superficial reform. He cautions that
‘[p]umping resources into universities will only lead to diminishing returns as Chinese culture and practices will act as a brake to the
pursuit of academic excellence’ (2011, p. 527).

Conclusions
The diversity of educational institutions and parent and student motivations described in the previous chapter, and varying teacher
responses, mean that the reforms have, not surprisingly, seen major changes in some areas but not in others as the effectiveness and
longevity of reforms have been influenced by social, cultural and political factors.
At the pedagogical level there remain concerns about the quality of teaching and, at the philosophical level, about the incompatibility of
instrumentalist versus liberal views of education arising from different views about the purposes of education and between the needs of
the nation and of individuals within it. The success of the reforms is mediated by local contexts and teacher beliefs but also depends on
the political dimension. The loosening and tightening of central government political control, seen in the recent re-writing of the
curriculum (see Chapter 5), also causes uncertainty inhibiting experimentation and the longevity and effectiveness of reforms.
The tensions experienced and contradictory messages received by educators are evidence of a nation struggling with its past history
and future desires as China rises in the world. These tensions are generated by ideological and cultural beliefs of Chinese society more
generally but also may clash with China's more nationalistic goal to once again become a world leader, albeit without losing its ‘Chinese-
ness’. Countries such as Singapore, Japan and South Korea which all achieve considerable educational success have shown, however,
that it is possible to retain traditional values and modernize at the same time. What China needs to be mindful of are the tensions of
introducing educational ideas from other cultural contexts that may have different philosophical and cultural underpinnings and may
only result in superficial change.
Curriculum and pedagogy are sites for ideological struggles between traditional beliefs, neoliberalist views and national globalization im-
peratives. As this book has shown, the liberalization of education has led to runaway private education ventures creating chaos, skewing
the social fabric and increasing social inequalities. These inequalities are discussed in the following chapter.
4
Inequalities and Disparities
China's market reforms from the late 1970s have markedly improved its economy, enabling vast increases in educational provision and
resources, but they have changed the education system from a redistributive to a market-driven one leading to increased and growing
inequalities in educational access and attainment across the country. Inequality exists right through the education system, with
widening gaps between urban and rural areas, rich and poor, and between ‘mainstream’ and disadvantaged groups of students including
ethnic minority students, migrant students, and students with disabilities. These gaps are particularly evident at the senior high school
and higher education levels and occur across several dimensions.
This chapter discusses why, despite measures by governments and the educational improvements for many not just since 1980 but
since 1949, China's recent vast economic and social development has not led to equal improvements in education for all and has led to
disadvantage for some.
Although public education expenditure has been increasing in recent years – by an average of 19 percent per year from 2006 to 2016
(OECD 2016) – this is occurring within the context of the decentralization of educational management and resource allocation, which
has resulted in the burden of dramatically increased educational costs shifting to provincial and local governments and individuals, who
have differing capacities to pay. According to Li and Yang (2013), the average yearly cost of attending university and living on campus
was greater than the average Chinese family income, and this is made worse by the fact that:
Students from better-off urban families are well prepared to enter high-quality public universities which are also the cheapest,
while much disadvantaged rural students are more likely to attend poor-quality second-tier or private institutions which charge
high fees.
(p. 317)
Since the late 1990s, substantial sums have been allocated to the ‘elite’ research universities in an effort to make them among the top-
ranking universities worldwide. All governments want their higher education institutions to be among the best in the world, and the
goal of providing extra funding to ‘top tier’ universities is not equality but improving quality and international prominence. However,
such policies have consequences for individuals and run counter to other public policies such as poverty alleviation and improving
educational access.
The reform of education is occurring against a backdrop of increasing social and economic divides as a consequence of the economic
reform policies of the 1990s which have led to significant inequalities in educational provision and resourcing in different parts of the
country. The massive rise in private and international education providers also means that inequalities even within the wealthiest and
largest urban areas are increasing and, although the population is becoming better educated and wealthier, the rural–urban and rich–
poor gaps are widening and divisions between ‘the increasingly cosmopolitan elite and the rest’ are rising (Vickers & Zeng 2017, p. 143).
In the education sphere, this divide is stark. In 2007 Hannum and Park noted that ‘parents with money can increasingly buy their way
into schools with better climates, more resources, and a more qualified teaching staff’ regardless of the child's academic ability (Hannum
& Park 2007, p. 15) and this is even more the case today. At the other end of the spectrum are the children of migrant workers in urban
centres and those left behind in villages when their parents migrate to cities to find work, who fall ‘under the radar’ and may receive
among the least education and fewest resources of any group.
It is difficult to get a full and accurate picture of educational inequality in China. Rong and Shi (2010) state that government data
‘usually lacks reliability, validity, and consistency, a function of unsophisticated data collection techniques, ambiguities in definition,
misconceptions, and political manipulation of data collection and the publication process’ (pp. 111–12). But much evidence is available
about the continuing and growing comparative educational disadvantages being faced by many groups which have consequences for the
continued strength and cohesion of Chinese society, occurring as they are in the midst of a general rise in resentment about burgeoning
inequalities between rich and poor. China's Gini coefficient measuring income inequality was 0.467 in 2017, above the warning level set
by the United Nations of 0.4, indicating severe income inequality, which, according to the Nikkei Asian Review (2018) ‘imperils China's
push for “quality” growth’. One percent of the population owns a third of the country's wealth (Leng 2017). Although there was some
slight improvement in income inequality in the previous decade (Milanovic 2018), particularly between 2008 and 2015 (Nikkei Asian
Review 2018), it is now on the rise again.
As we have seen, education has historically been the primary vehicle in China for economic mobility and social prestige. But in China's
fast developing modern market economy, where resources and rewards are unevenly distributed, although education is now not the
only means to power and wealth, it has nonetheless taken on an even greater role in the creation or reproduction of social and economic
status and the opportunities afforded to young people. In 2007, Hannum and Park warned that ‘economic advancement is increasingly
tied to education in China’ and market reforms have ‘created a labor market that increasingly rewarded the highly educated’ (p. 1).
These trends have become even sharper in the decade since and unfair access to education is set to become an even greater source of
resentment.
Although the CCP party-state espouses socialist values, and after the successes in expanding educational access in the socialist era, in
recent decades educational access and achievement by different socioeconomic groups has become more unequal and is accelerating.
The rise of a middle class has seen the multiplying of ‘elite’ education programmes in schools, massive expansion of international and
private schools, and huge investment by parents in their children's education, putting pressure on access to the most prestigious schools
and universities and intense pressure on children to perform and achieve. This has led to a pervasive ethos of competition feeding
‘rampant credentialism’ (Vickers & Zeng 2017, p. 35).
China still has areas of real poverty, especially in rural and remote areas. As part of its poverty alleviation programme, in the 13th Five-
Year Plan, the central government pledged to improve educational funding, resourcing and infrastructure especially in the central and
western regions. Yet as educational governance has become more decentralized over the past two decades, this has led to significant
differentials in expenditure in provinces and even within local counties. The Plan includes measures aimed at evening out these
discrepancies to some extent, but other factors also play a part in determining the life chances of China's young people, including the
system of ‘guanxi’ (关系) or social connections.
China is a country whose social fabric is strongly influenced by individuals’ connections; business, family or personal. This is also the
case in other countries but in China it is much more pronounced. Even in poorer areas, the well-connected can access better schools and
afford to send their children to privately run services such as cram schools and after-school or weekend educational programmes and
activities. ‘Guanxi’, in Bourdieusian terms the social and cultural capital of parents, are important in accessing better schools and classes
within a school and even to curry favour among teachers for their child (Xie & Postiglione 2016).
Educators, parents and students readily admit that educational access and success in China can be bought; those with money and
influence can access the best schools, gain more teacher attention and better support for their children and even better grades.
Measures taken by parents to gain the best opportunities for their children can be extreme. According to Yu (2014), ‘Children of the
rich routinely get into good public schools by donation, though schools conceal the practice by leaving these children's names off the
roster’ (p. 4). Parent donations to obtain admission for their children at top schools and universities are not unknown in other countries
but in China, as Yu (2014) says, such current circumstances have led to the rise of a ‘parentocracy’, meaning that educational
opportunities depend not so much on a child's abilities or efforts but on the wealth and desires of their parents.

Urban and rural education

Since 1978 education, like almost everything else in China, has moved from central planning and control to marketization,
commercialization and decentralization. This has been a key element in explaining why the overall increased wealth of the country has
not led to equal outcomes in education, even though governments have made efforts in recent years to address this.
Some of the most severe inequalities exist between rural and urban areas. Gaps in educational attainment between rural students and
their urban counterparts arise from a range of factors including family support, quality of infrastructure and facilities, and teacher skills
and attitudes. Rural children are concentrated in the lower levels of basic education and their university admission rates are a fraction
of those for urban students, at one percent compared with 14 percent (Wang, Dan 2011). Rural students have fewer years of schooling,
lower levels of literacy and numeracy, lower examination results, and their learning may be monitored less frequently by teachers. In
impoverished regions, girls often have fewer years of education and lower test scores than boys, especially in mathematics, which
according to Sun, Liu and Sun (2015) ‘very likely reflect the degree to which the family emphasis on boys’ education surpasses that for
girls’ (p. 473). The preference in Chinese society for boys over girls is still marked and not just in rural areas. Selective abortion has led
to an imbalance of males over females, and girls are less likely to receive the same levels of educational support as their male siblings in
families where there is more than one child (Zhang 2016).
In addition, the government has been closing rural schools with fewer than 100 students. This means that even very young children
have to travel long distances to get to school or have to board in schools often with poor facilities. It has also led to over-crowding of
rural schools with reports of a stampede for places at one primary school in central Henan which killed one child and left 22 others
injured (Wang & Li 2017).
Conditions and facilities at remote schools can be seriously lacking. In 2016 a story emerged of children from the Yi minority in a small
impoverished community living in a mountainside hamlet in Sichuan Province who had to climb ninety minutes down and back up a cliff
face on rickety wooden and vine ladders to get to and back home from school each day (Khomami 2016). A steel ladder was eventually
installed by the government which considerably cut their travel time, but this story of a literal and metaphorical educational ladder was
just one graphic example of some of the considerable hardships facing many rural students and the many continuing challenges for
governments and communities in providing good educational provision especially in remote areas.
Another disadvantage for rural children is that the reformed curriculum is often designed for advanced urban students and curriculum
and textbooks contain content unfamiliar to rural students. According to Wang (2011), they are also culturally biased, portraying rural
ways of life as ‘backward’ compared with the ‘modern’ cities. Ethnic minority students can internalize these deficit messages of minority
culture leading them to see their own cultures as backward.
Since 2007, the central government has introduced measures to improve rural education including free basic education tuition and
textbooks, professional development funding for rural teachers, increased investment in school infrastructure, technologies and
resources, preferential policies for higher education, and free tuition for teacher education students at six of the ‘normal’ (originally
established for education/teacher training) universities and for teaching graduates who teach in rural areas. Other measures include
financial incentives to increase student attendance and linking teacher salaries and promotion to students’ attendance and test scores.
Initiatives such as Teach for China, run by a non-government organization and modelled on the Teach for America programme, also
encourage teaching graduates to teach in remote villages to address increasing shortages of qualified teachers in these communities.
The results of all this can be seen in many rural areas. However, rural schools still have difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified
teachers and improvements are patchy across different regions.
Although central and provincial governments have increased investment in early childhood education in recent years, significant
differences remain in funding and investment between different areas. Large cities such as Shanghai now have a universal three years
of early childhood education but poorer rural and remote provinces often have almost none. Under the National Development Plan
(2010 to 2020) and the 2014 Three-Year Action Plan for Early Childhood Education the central government announced substantially
increased investment in early childhood education in rural, remote and ethnic minority areas. But it is clear that broader social and
economic developments mean that investment in this area of education, as in others, may be less effective than hoped in reducing
inequalities.
The rural–urban education gap can be seen most clearly at the higher education level, with Li and Yang (2013) arguing that the
disparities between higher education institutions in urban and rural areas are a fundamental source of China's educational inequalities.
Research by the Rural Education Action Program, a collaboration between the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and several
American universities, found that almost two-thirds of rural students drop out of school by Year 12 and only half of rural junior high
school students proceed to senior high school (Stanford Rural Education Action Program 2016). Lower-performing rural students are
‘eliminated’ through the junior high examination, meaning that they cannot attend high school. Those who do continue to high school
have to compete for university admission with urban students who have better access and opportunities.
The central government provides grants and subsidies to poorer provinces to improve educational access and quality, but since the
1980s responsibility for funding and delivering basic education has been devolved to the provincial or other local levels. Thus, education
can depend on geographical location. Some provinces are poorer than others because of lower tax revenues, governments in different
areas have different priorities and levels of effectiveness and efficiency, and some have elements of corruption. The vast majority of
‘top-tier’ schools and universities are located in cities in the developed east such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.
But geographical location, or proximity to the main centres of power and capital in the east of the country, is not necessarily an indicator
of wealth or poverty. Remote areas and borderlands often have rich natural resources. Vast deposits of minerals have been discovered
in parts of Inner Mongolia, for example. The case of a city I visited in that region shows how governmental structures and policies can
lead to idiosyncratic use of resources according to local priorities. In Ordos in Inner Mongolia, a huge city grew up out of the Mongolian
sands almost overnight after the discovery of coal and rare earth minerals used in mobile phones, and the local government invested
large sums in developing educational resources. At the time, the local mayor was a former teacher and prioritized expenditure on
education from the new wealth coming into the area from the mineral boom. The spending on infrastructure was further encouraged by
a huge growth in new housing, built with private speculative investment, for the millions of residents it was thought the city would
attract. The schools I visited there had beautiful playing fields made of artificial grass and state-of-the-art buildings and resources, on a
par with top public schools in Beijing and Shanghai. The schools in Ordos were experiencing much success in creating innovative and
effective teaching and learning approaches for their students through intensive teacher development. These facilities were built because
one local government leader was interested in education, and in the context of speculative investment pouring into the city aiming to
profit from the mining boom. The new schools showed how the decentralization of decision-making and funding often determine how
educational resources are now distributed in China. Ordos has since been labelled a ‘ghost town’ due to the lack of people who came to
populate the city and has become a sad symbol of the country's uneven development. It is also emblematic of the fact that educational
opportunities can depend on the vagaries of local conditions and individuals’ priorities.
Uneven conditions also exist in eastern ‘developed’ areas. Schools I have visited in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai boast
facilities that would be the envy of schools anywhere around the world and can also be among the most innovative in terms of
curriculum and pedagogy. But not all schools in the eastern coastal regions are wealthy. One school that research colleagues visited in
Shandong province several years ago, on the coast between Shanghai and Beijing, and ironically the birth place of Confucius, was so poor
that the children had to bring in tables and chairs from home each year and take them home again at the end of year. There are fewer
examples of such poor conditions in recent years due to increased investment by central and local governments, but there still exist
impoverished schools in remote areas and China remains a country of uneven and patchy development. As we have seen in Chapter 3,
poor infrastructure and resources do not necessarily reflect teaching pedagogies and these also differ markedly depending on school
leadership and teacher professional development programmes. However, there are certain groups of students who are clearly facing
multiple disadvantages, most of which do relate to geographical location.
In spite of improvements in access to schooling in rural areas since 1978, and significant public investment in rural education, as well as
assistance from international agencies (such as the World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO, the Asian Development Bank and the United
Kingdom Department for International Development), and other overseas donors, inequality between rural and urban education is
widening. Education in capital cities in rural provinces has improved vastly but remains limited in remote areas. But the urban–rural
educational divide is also increasing as a result of China's rapid economic development and the unprecedented movement of rural
workers to cities for work. The consequences of this for children and their education are examined in the following two sections.

‘Left-behind’ children
Over the space of a few decades, 250 million workers have moved from rural to urban China, making it the largest migration in human
history and five times the size of the great migrations from Europe to the Americas in the nineteenth century. These migrants often do
not take their children with them due to a number of systemic barriers arising from the hukou (户口) household registration system.
This system, Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue, effectively enforces ‘rural–urban apartheid’ (p. 34).
The phenomenon of these ‘left-behind’ children (liushuo ertong 留守儿童) is a significant problem in rural areas. An estimated 58 to 60
million children are left behind in villages, with nearly a quarter of all rural children being raised by grandparents, relatives, neighbours
or friends. These figures are based on a report by the All China Women's Federation in 2013 but a survey by the Ministry of Civil
Affairs in 2016 put the total figure at eight million (due to differences in definition). There is agreement however, that whatever the
true figure, this is a pressing problem due to the short- and long-term deleterious effects on the health and wellbeing of these children.
Children tend to be left behind if they are younger, with parents of boys migrating for shorter periods. Although there is some evidence
that rural workers are beginning to return home to set up businesses in provinces where economic conditions are improving (Sixth
Tone 2018), millions of children still only see their parents during the annual Spring Festival holidays and Chinese media each year is
full of heart-breaking stories of the sad farewells when parents leave again.
Parents leave their children behind for several reasons. The hukou household registration system means that they are not eligible for
government benefits or services in the cities; parents work long hours in cities; and their children have been unable to sit senior high
school and university entrance examinations away from their home province (Zhou, Murphy & Tao 2014). In 2014, the hukou system
was slightly relaxed and some local governments have begun to allow migrant students to sit the gaokao in the province where they
reside. But there are restrictions on this. In Guangdong province, for example, at least one parent must have a ‘legal, stable residence
and job, and must have held a residence permit and bought social insurance in Guangdong for at least three consecutive years’ and the
student must have completed their three years of senior schooling in the province (Xu 2016).
Although there appear to be no significant disparities in educational attainment between rural children who are left behind and those
who move to cities with their parents, children left behind by migrating mothers (but not fathers) have lower levels of school
engagement and younger children are especially vulnerable to disruption. There can be effects on left-behind children's physical and
emotional wellbeing, including problems with self-esteem and social skills, and they are at greater risk of neglect, sexual assault, child
abduction, child trafficking and committing crimes (Zhou, Murphy & Tao 2014; Naftali 2016).
As so many rural parents have left the countryside to work in cities, and entrusted the care of their children to others, demand for rural
kindergarten places has soared, and there are severe shortages of teachers in this area. The care of young children was always a
communal responsibility between adults in a village but villages now often have few working-age adults and mainly older people and
large numbers of children remain. Even with increased investment from government, public provision is unlikely to keep up with
increasing demand, and it will be the children of better-off urban families who will increasingly receive kindergarten education, while
those in rural areas will struggle to do so. The movement away of working-age adults also means that less revenue is available for local
governments and educational provision in these areas is put under pressure. Private, low-quality, provision is sometimes the only
option – which has to be paid for by money sent back by absent parents.
According to the MOE, in 2015 only half of children in poorer areas had access to kindergarten with up to 16 million rural children
between the ages of three and six having no preschool education at all. Rural kindergartens are mostly privately owned and often have
inadequate resources or are poorly run. The deaths of four kindergarten children who had been left locked in school buses in severe
heat, in separate incidents in July 2017, caused an outcry about the poor quality and lack of oversight of rural kindergartens (Cai Xin
2017).
Several counties in the western provinces are providing free early childhood education in response to this problem. Four counties in
Shaanxi and Shanxi Provinces in central China provide three years of free early childhood education for children aged three to six in
public and private kindergartens and preschool programmes in primary schools, resulting in enrolment rates of 92.4 percent in 2013
(Rao & Sun 2017). However, Li and Wang (2014) argue that many costs in this programme still fall on parents and there are continuing
problems of accessibility, affordability, accountability and sustainability.
Parents often migrate to cities to have money to invest in their child's education. Many keep in contact though telephone calls or
WeChat (a Chinese social media platform). But long distances, the costs of travel and few holidays mean that parents may rarely see
their children. Lack of a parental presence can mean that children drop out of school early or may lack aspiration to go on to university
(although many do). Students in poorer western and central provinces remain under-represented in the later years of schooling and in
higher education (Naftali 2016). According to Gao (2014), the differences in educational opportunities for urban and rural students
remain stark:
While many of their urban peers attend schools equipped with state-of-the-art facilities and well-trained teachers, rural students
often huddle in decrepit school buildings and struggle to grasp advanced subjects such as English and chemistry amid a dearth of
qualified instructors.
Fewer rural students are admitted to elite universities such as Peking and Tsinghua and the figures are declining. Only 10 percent of
students attending Peking University in 2014 were from rural areas compared with 30 percent in the 1990s (Gao 2014). Gao (2014)
argues that despite increases in access to basic education and quadrupling of the number of university graduates in the previous
decade, China has ‘created a system that discriminates against its less wealthy and well-connected citizens, thwarting social mobility at
every step with bureaucratic and financial barriers’.

Migrant children
Joining left-behind children at the other end of the spectrum from privileged children in wealthy cities are migrant children in these
same cities who accompany their parents in their search for work. In 2010 there were 36 million migrant children in cities, with 80
percent holding a rural ‘hukou’ permit (Xu & Dronker 2016), representing a staggering estimated 30 percent of the child population in
cities (Hu & West 2015). Due to the insecure and often seasonal nature of work for migrants, they often have to move to different parts
of China (or are evicted), frequently at short notice, and their children's schooling can be seriously disrupted as, among other things,
curriculum and pedagogy differ in different parts of the country. It is difficult for migrant workers to enrol their children in local public
schools so children often have to either be sent home or receive no schooling at all.
Although government schools are required to admit them, there are often quotas, higher fees or they are simply refused admission.
Many public schools don't have the capacity to enrol more migrant children. As they lack local residency permits, they must return to
their home province to sit public junior high school and university examinations. Government reforms since 2012 aim to increase access
to public schools for non-local hukou holders but progress has been limited (Xu and Dronker 2016) and migrant children do not have
equal access to state education. A small number of ‘quality’ migrants are allowed to obtain local residency status, however, including
those with qualifications, higher socio-economic status or those running larger businesses. These moves arise not from concerns to
diminish disadvantages suffered by migrants but more from desires to take advantage of any benefits that they might bring to urban
areas and populations. Administrative and financial barriers as well as discrimination also inhibit rural children's enrolment in public
city schools and although not officially permitted, schools sometimes require them to have higher examination scores especially for
schools that are over-subscribed (Hu & West 2015). Many children are forced to enrol in the private migrant schools run by migrants
themselves or voluntary groups but these are often ‘under the radar’ and may not be legally registered, of poor quality, lack resources
and qualified teachers, or be prohibitively expensive.
Migrant children can also face prejudice and segregation into separate classes in state schools (Hu & West 2015) or even separate
playground areas. Teachers and other students can see them as ‘lower quality’ and may ostracize them for having ‘dark skin or
hometown accents and dialects’ (Naftali 2016, p. 174). Local parents in urban areas are reluctant to send their children to schools with
large numbers of migrant children, fearing that these children will have a negative impact on their own children. Migrant children can
also receive less attention and support from teachers particularly if they are experiencing difficulties due to previous poor education
quality (Hu & West 2015). Children at unlicensed migrant schools cannot join the Young Pioneers, which can be important for later
career and other opportunities, as these schools have no official Party connection. Many parents express satisfaction with these migrant
schools, however, and prefer their children to be among ‘their own kind’ (Naftali 2016, p. 164, citing Kwong, 2011).
Migrant workers are more likely to bring their sons with them to cities for a better education and to leave daughters behind due to
gender discrimination. The Annual Report on Left-Behind Girls in China's Rural Areas in 2016 reported that 78.9 percent of parents in
villages prefer to bring sons to larger cities for education, and if they can only afford to pay for one child's higher education, 97.5 percent
choose sons over daughters (China Daily 2017d).
Although Beijing and Shanghai now allow migrant children into local senior high schools and vocational colleges and to sit the gaokao
there, recent mass evictions of migrant workers in those cities mean that few can access that right. Populations in cities like Beijing have
mushroomed, with Beijing's more than doubling in fifteen years, going from 10.1 million in 2000 to 20.4 million in 2015, with, according
to Feng (2017), at least eight million people without a hukou. Hundreds of private schools for migrant children had been established on
the outskirts of the city, not all legally, some operating for twenty years, but these are being demolished with the Beijing municipal
authorities aiming to shut down all unlicensed migrant schools by 2020. The central government has announced plans to loosen the
hukou system in some cities and grant permanent residency to up to 100 million migrant workers by 2020 but this will not include the
over-populated ‘first-tier’ cities of Beijing and Shanghai.
These recent reforms to educational access for children of migrant workers, according to Gao (2014), are having ‘only a tangential
impact on levelling the playing field’ and are lessened in effect by the numerous other, often informal or discriminatory barriers facing
rural migrants trying to find education for their children:
In Beijing, home to eight million migrant workers, preconditions for admission [to schools] seem intended less to promote
educational equity than to exacerbate the discrimination. Some parents have switched jobs, sued the government and even
engineered divorces to get around onerous documentation requirements, which often vary from district to district. Many urban
migrants ultimately have no choice but to send their children back to their rural hometowns for inferior schooling.
(Gao 2014)
The children of migrant workers, either those left behind or those brought to cities, whose parents have underpinned China's economic
growth, are the collateral damage of decades of national development policies. With lower educational access and attainment rates they
continue to be innocent victims of the increasing prosperity and stratification of Chinese society. Despite some attempts to address their
problems, social forces and conflicting economic and social policies mean that they continue to suffer multiple layers of disadvantage and
discrimination.

Minority education
China is an ethnically diverse country with 55 recognized minority ethnic groups or ‘nationalities’ (minzu 民族) in addition to the
majority Han ethnic group, and with 70 ‘mother tongues’ (Wan & Jun 2008). Ethnic minority groups (shaoshu minzu 少数民族)
comprise nine percent of the population or around 105 million people (Zang 2015) and are scattered across China, mostly in the vast
western, southwestern and northern areas. These areas comprise over 60 percent of China's territory, and although they are generally
much poorer than the developed eastern coastal areas some are rich in natural resources. The five largest groups, each with populations
of over ten million, are the Zhuang in Guangxi Province (bordering Vietnam), the Uyghur (located mainly in Xinjiang Province in the
northwest), the Hui in Ningxia Province (in the central northeast), the Manchu (in the far northeast) and the Miao (in southern China).
There are also Tibetans (living mostly in the Tibetan Autonomous Region but also in adjoining areas such as Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan,
and Yunnan provinces) and Inner Mongolians. There are five ethnic minority autonomous regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Guangxi,
and Inner Mongolia, as well as ethnic minority autonomous prefectures within Han regions throughout the country. Minority
autonomous regions generally have more freedom in determining their own educational provision.
The concept attributed to Confucius of minzu ronghe (民族融合) or ‘ethnic fusion’ is used by the Chinese government to underpin and
legitimize its policies on ethnic minority education. This concept is meant to signify unity through diversity; or the ‘amalgamation or
fusion of the Han majority and the non-Han minorities in a process of Confucian cultural diffusion’ (Zang 2015, p. 19). Proponents of this
notion such as Zang (2015) claim that it ‘celebrates the idea of cultural, economic and political intermingling among ethnic and cultural
groups, in order to promote assimilation and unity into a harmonious community’ (p. 19). Notions of assimilation and integration recur
in the literature reflecting the essential subservience of ethnic minority rights to the national purpose and the apparent paradox of
promoting ethnic minority rights while privileging the unity of the nation both politically and socially. Many minority areas are in
strategic border areas or in areas where separatist movements are found such as in Tibet and Xinjiang which are regarded by the
party-state as a threat to national security and prosperity. Minority education, especially through citizenship education and ‘ethnic
solidarity education’, is used to control and diffuse these tensions, to enlist political and ideological loyalty to the State and to foster
‘ethnic plurality within national unity, but at the same time assimilating ethnic minorities into Han-dominated Chinese culture and
socialist national identity as prescribed by the CPC [Communist Party of China]’ (Law 2017, p. 253) and through the use of a ‘Han-
centric curriculum’ (Vickers & Zeng 2017, p.143).
The concept of minzu ronghe is taught in civic or moral education classes in primary schools across the country and the longevity and
comparative stability of Chinese civilization is attributed to this idea. The saying attributed to Confucius in the Analects of ‘he'er butong’
(和而不同), which is often used as a basis for this, is ‘harmony but not sameness’. This in fact referred to how ‘gentlemen’ behave, not
how people from different ethnic groups should intermingle, and is yet another example of the appropriation of Confucian aphorisms to
support contemporary agendas.
The central government has taken substantial measures to improve education for minorities, investing heavily in minority education
since the 1950s and introducing policies to improve educational access for minority students in their regions or for those living or
studying in other areas. Specific ‘compensatory’ measures since the 1980s include extra funding and resources from central and
provincial governments, subsidies for local governments, free or subsidized textbooks, funding for minority students to attend schools
in major cities, and classes for minority students in mainstream junior high schools. Extra funds have been provided for schools and
infrastructure, training of ethnic minority teachers, and the establishment of boarding schools in remote or mountainous areas.
Affirmative action policies for minority students include lower or no tuition fees, living expenses for students studying away from home,
reserved places and lower admission scores for universities, and the option of sitting the gaokao in one of the six designated minority
languages, including Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, Korean, Kazak and Kirgiz.
National policies are designed to ensure access to the compulsory nine years of basic education for minority students, and overall
attendance and literacy rates have risen markedly in recent decades, recorded at over 99 percent in 2012 (de Kloet & Fung 2017),
though they still remain at lower levels than for the majority Han population, especially among the smaller minority groups (Zang
2015). The central government has also supported the development of minority language education, trained teachers of minority
languages, and produced textbooks and other resources in minority languages. Some argue, however, that these policies are frequently
violated by teachers and others, their implementation is often patchy, and market forces are undermining these protections (Banks
2014; Leibold & Chen 2014).
Minzu schools and universities are located in minority areas or in larger towns and cities across the country but recent decades have
seen the centralization of minority education. Central schools have brought together teachers and resources from surrounding schools
previously scattered at various smaller sites. Boarding schools have been established for students whose families live in very remote
and isolated areas with no educational provision or who come from nomadic groups and are often located at large distances from
children's homes and families. In Muslim areas, girls-only boarding schools have been established. Many regular boarding schools
provide education in pastoral or agricultural subjects. Students in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region can attend an inland ‘neidi’ (内地) boarding school for secondary education also often far from students’ homelands.
Yang (2017) argues that the neidi schools have provided secondary education for thousands of students, especially those from rural or
nomadic families, providing pathways to tertiary study in inland cities, while some see them more as opportunities for aspirational
families to join the ‘minority elite’ (Vickers & Zeng 2017, p. 61).
Most ethnic minority students live in rural areas or are children of migrants working in cities, so the disadvantages generally associated
with being a rural or migrant student compound with additional layers of disadvantage experienced by ethnic minority groups to create
multi-layered handicaps. School enrolment, retention rates and examination results for minority students remain lower than for their
Han counterparts, enrolment rates are lower for girls among some ethnic groups (Wan & Jun 2008; Naftali 2016) and there are high
rates of truancy, failure, and dropouts at all levels (Leibold & Chen 2014). The Compulsory Education Act in 1986 mandated that nine
years of basic education be gradually introduced across the country but this has not yet been fully implemented in all minority areas.
Primary school attendance is a national priority but although official national dropout rates for primary school are only 0.2 percent, Lu
et al.'s (2016) analysis of a dataset of 14,761 primary school children in northwest China found an estimated cumulative dropout rate of
8.2 percent.
Dropout rates among different minority groups may be influenced by a range of factors. Parents may not see the value of mainstream
education or may see schooling as a threat to traditional values and ways of life (Wan & Jun 2008; Postiglione, Jiao & Goldstein 2011).
Although out of pocket school expenses in rural education are now relatively low due to various funding schemes, opportunity costs for
some groups, especially those with nomadic traditions, may inhibit school enrolment. Tibetan children often care for livestock, and their
nomadic lifestyles and fear of erosion of cultural traditions can work against the perceived benefits of schooling (Postiglione, Jiao &
Goldstein 2011). Mainstream schools may not be as sensitive to minority cultures and students can feel a disconnect between their
school and family lives.
A dual education system (eryuan jiegou 二元結構 ) exists from pre-school through to higher education. Minority students can choose to
attend a mainstream Han (or putong) school, where instruction is in Mandarin (referred to as min-kao-han students), or a minority
(minzu) school, where instruction, textbooks and materials are in both Mandarin and the minority language or languages (where
students are referred to as min-kao-min), and teaching staff are mainly from the same ethnic group (Ma 2009; Wang, Lu 2017).
At the higher education level, ethnic minority students can choose to attend a mainstream university or one of 15 minzu universities
located across China. Gaokao entry scores are lower and tuition is free for min-kao-min students studying minority-language medium
(minshou) courses at some minzu universities. Minzu universities provide education for minority students; the study and preservation
of ethnic minority languages, history and culture; and conduct research to improve economic and social development in minority areas.
They were originally established to provide people from ethnic minorities with training as Party cadres to liaise between the central
government and local people. They were initially organized on the Soviet model and were highly ideological and political, and still are,
although they now have more autonomy. The central Minzu University of China in Beijing is considered the top minority university and
five other national-level, centrally regulated minzu universities are located in the capital cities of Hubei, Sichuan, Gansu, Ningxia and
Liaoning provinces. Nine local-government regulated minzu universities are located in Inner Mongolia (two), Guangxi, Yunnan, Hubei,
Guizhou, Qinghai, Shanxi and Sichuan Provinces.
The quality of minzu schools and universities varies depending on location and whether they are centrally or locally funded and
controlled. Schools in remote areas or poorer provinces may have only very rudimentary resources and parents provide basic items
such as textbooks and equipment. Some minzu universities, especially in large cities such as Beijing and Lanzhou, are designated key
national universities and receive more central funding and have higher admission scores than other minzu universities. Although there
have been significant improvements in recent decades development is uneven across the country and many minority schools complain
about having fewer, lower quality or outdated resources, and often struggle to recruit teachers (Ma 2009), especially those who speak
minority languages and dialects. According to Ma (2007), one of the major challenges has been the mammoth task of translating texts
across discipline areas into dozens of minority languages.
The dual education system provides benefits such as improved access for minority students and nurturing ethnic cultures but it can
create difficult choices. Students who attend min-kao-min schools and courses in universities can find that their lower fluency in
Mandarin can affect their later careers. Tang, Hu and Jin (2016) examined the relationship between educational attainment, Mandarin
language proficiency and socioeconomic attainment of Muslim Uyghurs and their Han counterparts in Xinjiang Province. They found
that although Uyghurs have the same number of years of education as the Han, their lesser fluency in Mandarin negatively impacts
their employment opportunities and income: ‘The Uyghurs are likely to be just as educated as the Hans, but they spend most of their
time being educated in their own language’ (p. 354).
Parents want their children to learn about and appreciate their own culture but they also want them to have the best opportunities in
the future. Parents make strategic choices about which pathway to choose for their children, putong versus minzu. Children attending
minzu schools can find that this limits their later educational and career choices, as minzu schools teach very little English; children
attending putong schools may have difficulty learning in Mandarin and adjusting to different cultural practices and values. Families
often weigh up the benefits and disadvantages of each system and those with more than one child (the one-child policy did not apply to
minority groups) sometimes send one child to a minority school and one to a Han school. This way the family can maintain its cultural
identity and heritage while also ensuring economic benefits and status for the family. Parents can feel torn, however, between wanting
their children to understand and retain their cultural heritage and also wanting them to be successful in the context of a highly
competitive education system where employers may not be interested in students only qualified in minority languages and cultures.
Large numbers of Han people have migrated or been sent to minority areas which means that minzu major students have to compete
with them for employment opportunities and minzu majors and subjects may not seem as useful to employers.
The dual education system can thus be a two-edged sword where policies designed to ‘help’ minority students can limit their broader
social integration and later career opportunities (Ma 2009; Wang, Lu 2017) and they can suffer alienation no matter which track they
take. Binaries of minority versus mainstream Han can also create artificial barriers among people as they define people through a single
characteristic rather than other facets of their lives and there are growing debates within China about the usefulness of ethnic minority
categories and their implications for individuals as well as the nation (Leibold & Chen 2014).
These tensions mean that minzu schools have become less attractive, with enrolments falling in recent years. Enrolments of Inner
Mongolian students in minzu schools have dropped from 73.3 percent and 66.8 percent for primary and secondary schools in the 1980s,
to 28 percent and 27 percent respectively in 2014 (Wang, Lu 2017). The number of minority students choosing a minzu major at
minority universities rather than a putong major is also declining (Wang, Lu 2017).
The declining attractiveness of minzu education means these students are increasingly competing for places in mainstream schools or
universities for which they are less academically prepared than their Han competitors and they do not benefit there from the subsidies
available in minzu education.
No matter what choice they make, minority students at mainstream schools and universities sometimes report discrimination as they
are seen as being ‘backward’ or of a ‘lower class’, especially when they are minority-language speaking (Banks 2014, Wang, Lu 2017).
Many have learnt Mandarin at the expense of their own language (Yang & Nima 2015; Zang 2015) and also may feel ‘dislocated’ from
their homelands and cultures (Wang & Zhou 2003). In the neidi schools, only one subject is taught in the minority language at junior
secondary school and usually none at senior secondary level, with more attention given to other subjects (Yang 2017). Ethnic minority
students report feelings of mixed or confused identity, wanting to learn about and retain their cultural heritage but worried about
discrimination or later disadvantage. Ethnic identity is fluid and subject to the internal factors described above but also to global
imperatives so minority students also face the need to consider futures and workplaces beyond the national sphere.
Advances since the 1950s have created greater autonomy and access for minority education, but tensions between segregation versus
cultural preservation cause several problems, especially for students studying far from their homelands. Despite decades of special
policies, minority enrolments during the expansion of higher education have not increased at the same rate as for other students, and
inequalities between ethnic minority groups and the majority Han population are growing, regardless of whether they live in Han or
minority regions (Zang 2015). Minority students suffer greater disadvantage, generally achieve lower levels of education and are also
less likely to attend the more ‘elite’ universities. However, higher education in the border regions may benefit from the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) with the development of education links and exchanges and economic investment in neighbouring countries, which
often share cross-border ethnic populations with these regions.
Despite the advances, it is evident that minority education policy and practice is fraught with tensions. Since many preferential policies
are ‘based on ethnicity rather than on individual characteristics, those who have benefited from the policies are not necessarily from a
lower social background’ (Yang 2017, p. 328), and resentment of perceived preferential treatment has led to further discrimination and
prejudice by the Han majority and intensified conflict between the two groups (Law 2017). Such tensions resonate with the situations
regarding ethnic minority groups in other countries such as the Māori in New Zealand and indigenous peoples in Australia and illustrate
the difficulties of managing the balance between cultural preservation while also ensuring mainstream opportunities for ethnic
minorities. The introduction of ethnic solidarity education (ESE) for the whole school population has as its stated aims to reduce ethnic
tensions and foster ethnic tolerance and social cohesion (see Chapter 5) but deeper tensions remain. These relate to the assimilationist
nature of China's minority policy which is seen as providing not just a ‘legitimized space’ for the preservation and development of ethnic
cultural heritage but as a ‘civilizing project’ (Yang 2017, p. 330) reflecting more colonialist intentions. The introduction of putonghua as
the official language of instruction across the nation, even in Han areas with local languages, has resulted in commentators such as
Vickers and Zeng (2017) viewing this as ‘linguistic imperialism’ (p. 143). They argue that although the strategy behind this policy since
1949 has been one of nation building and the easing of ethnic tensions in the far west, this has not been successful, and the party-state's
response has instead been ‘ramping up patriotic education, intensifying policies of sinification and further restricting religious
expression’ (p. 143).

Students with disabilities

Probably the most disadvantaged group of all in China is that of students with disabilities and learning difficulties. Although
improvements in the provision of education to children with disabilities have begun in very recent years, due to previous neglect and
stigma attached to disability, there is a severe shortage of specialist schools and qualified staff, particularly in rural areas, as well as
resources and qualified staff for students with disabilities in mainstream schools.
Special needs education in China is in its infancy with only an estimated 72 percent of students with special needs enrolled in school
(Marketing to China 2018). A report for the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2011 (Zheng et al. 2011) estimated that there were
85 million people in China with a disability, although China has a much narrower definition of disability than other countries so this
figure may be ‘the tip of the iceberg’. Definitions of disability include visual, hearing, speech, intellectual, physical, psychiatric (autism is
included in this category) and multiple disabilities but not others such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and learning
disabilities (Kritzer 2011). The WHO report (Zheng et al. 2011) found that the number of people with disabilities is increasing due to
workplace accidents and environmental factors such as pollution, with physical and mental disabilities increasing markedly over the
past two decades, while visual, hearing, speech and intellectual disabilities decreased significantly.
In 2015, China had 2,080 specialist schools employing 50,334 teachers and enrolments of 491,740 (China Statistical Yearbook 2016b).
The 1986 Compulsory Education Law made basic education compulsory for all children and the 1995 Education Law stipulated that
people with disabilities should be offered opportunities in education. China endorsed the International Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and other international statements on this issue, and in the 1980s adopted policies that promote inclusive
learning in regular classrooms via the Learning in Regular Classrooms (LRC) programme.
Students with moderate or severe disabilities are generally educated in specialist schools but the number of children with disabilities
learning in regular classrooms has increased under the LRC programme although provision varies across different provinces and
districts. Qu and Cowan (2016) claim that the percentage of children with disabilities in mainstream LRC classrooms has actually been
decreasing since 2001 due to lack of clear and consistent policy guidance. Dauncey (2017) argues that historically, there has been
greater emphasis on students with mild physical disabilities and sensory disabilities meaning that students with intellectual or
behavioural disabilities ‘are left somewhat out in the cold’ and access to education depends not just on the type and severity of a
student's disability but also their geographical location and ‘the attitudes and support of those around them’ (p. 310)
Although 55 percent of students with disabilities attend regular schools, Wang, Mu and Zhang (2017) contend that resources and
support for teachers in these schools is ‘shaky’ (p. 116). In their survey of 2,549 primary and junior secondary teachers who work with
students with diverse disabilities across 272 regular schools in Beijing and Harbin, only 21.4 percent had received in-service training.
Most teachers developed their expertise ‘on the job’ and used their own ‘agency’ to develop their professional skills. Wang et al. (2017)
concluded that teachers in regular classrooms experience challenges in accommodating children with disabilities due to not only a lack of
professional development but also a paucity of support services and resources.
Yang and Yang (2015) found a similar picture for teachers in specialist schools. Their study of 3,485 full-time teachers (8.8 percent of
the total) in specialist schools identified a number of difficulties they encounter. These teachers work in schools for children with hearing
impairments, schools for children with visual impairments, schools for students with intellectual disabilities, and generalist specialist
schools, in nine provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. The most commonly stated difficulties were the diversity of students
(55.9%), heavy workloads (34%), difficulties gaining promotion (33.5%) and lack of instructional support (30.2%).
As part of their Chinese Students’ Resilience and Wellbeing survey of 2,600 Grade 4 to 9 students across multiple provinces, Mu, Hu
and Wang (2017) randomly selected 112 children with disabilities and 112 without disabilities to examine their perceptions of support
from teachers. The children with disabilities were ‘plagued by multiple stressors across individual and social domains’ (p. 129),
reporting lower levels of wellbeing, higher risk of poverty, bullying and discrimination, and less support from teachers. As with the
Wang, Mu and Zhang (2017) survey of teachers in regular classrooms with students with disabilities, Mu and his colleagues comment
that individual teachers are not necessarily to blame, but that they work in an increasingly competitive, neoliberal environment that
judges teachers (and their salaries) according to their students’ results:
[I]t may be unfair to put the full blame on teachers for providing insufficient support to these students. As neoliberalism
increasingly deprofessionalizes teachers, it is understandable that teachers sometimes have to submit to the neoliberal logic.
(p. 132)
Although previous laws were vague and provision of education to people with disabilities was patchy, of poor quality or non-existent,
China is now moving fast to try to catch up with best practice elsewhere. In 2017, the Regulation on Education for Persons with
Disabilities (State Council 2017a) was promulgated coming into force in May and was followed in July by the National Policy on the
Second Phase of Special Education 2017.
The new regulations are far-reaching and ambitious, aiming to improve access, quality and provision of all levels of education. They
make refusal of enrolment unlawful and require local governments to organize assessments, rehabilitation services, facilities, resources
and support for education for children and adults with disabilities in both mainstream and specialist settings to ‘gradually advance the
establishment of barrier-free environments for all levels and all types of schools’. The regulations reiterate the right of children with
disabilities to receive compulsory education in their local neighbourhood school (or nearby school if they need specialist support) and
local upper secondary schools and prescribe further provision of vocational and higher education in either mainstream or specialist
institutions. Schools will receive CNY6,000 (USD1,000) a year per student to upgrade facilities (such as toilets and stairs) and for
specialist teachers (China Daily 2017k) and must offer ‘more open and flexible’ models of schooling including support for home- and
self-study. The regulations also establish an expert national committee and special education resource centres to carry out assessments
and provide guidance and training to schools, parents and guardians, and free tuition and support for children with disabilities educated
at home. Specialist schools are required to develop individualized learning plans and to listen to the views of students, parents and
guardians. Government education departments at all levels must establish specialist departments and services and schools, colleges and
universities are required to develop or improve special education training courses and to provide pre-service and in-service teacher
training.
These eagerly awaited regulations were swiftly followed by the national policy indicating that education of students with disabilities has
finally been placed firmly on the national education policy agenda. How quickly and effectively these policies and regulations are
implemented across different areas remains to be seen, given different conditions across provinces and counties, but there is no doubt
that they represent a major milestone in the rights of people with disabilities to education in China. Although the regulations and policy
are ambitious, they are silent about precisely how curriculum, pedagogy and assessment practices need to be customized to
accommodate the needs of students with disabilities, and significant staff development will be required for teachers at all levels.
Despite the new policy pronouncements, current provision is uneven, with examples of both good and bad practice as well as continued
discrimination against students, especially those with mental health conditions or more severe forms of disability. The new regulations
do not address systemic problems including compulsory physical examinations for students entering universities which still permit
those with ‘physiological defects’ or ‘mental disorders’ to be rejected.
This sector has historically been neglected and under-funded and long characterized by stigma, with children with disabilities viewed as
‘defective’ and largely hidden from view. Medicalized models of disability persist rather than social models which view the ‘handicap’
not so much as residing within the person with the disability but in the ways that they are handicapped by systems and structures.
Negative attitudes prevail in Chinese society towards people with disabilities and students with disabilities suffer much discrimination
(China Disabled Persons’ Federation 2016), so attitudinal change will take much longer to take effect.

Private education
Luke (2016) argues that the persistent and emerging patterns of inequality in education arise from China's cultural, spatial,
demographic and socioeconomic diversity and heterogeneity, and varying local practice. He argues that inequalities are less the result of
market-driven neoliberalist principles than the tensions between ‘centrally generated policy and local uptake, between official ideology
and local discourse practice, and ultimately between grand policy narrative and local educational stories, struggles and everyday
practice’ (p. 382), once again reflecting the policy-implementation gap. As Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue, this also allows the CCP to
attribute any failures of policy to local levels rather than to central or systemic shortcomings.
But market-driven neoliberalism has undoubtedly resulted in the massive re-emergence of private schooling in China (after it was shut
down in 1949) and it is increasingly playing a role in education provision especially for wealthier and socially aspirant families. Although
it is a relatively new phenomenon it is expanding at an astonishing rate, with Wang and Chan (2015) describing it as a ‘defining
characteristic of China's current transitional society’ from a State-run to a market economy (p. 89). The definition of ‘private’ or
‘minban’ education is complex and can involve many ‘hybrid’ models. The term minban originally applied to community-run schools in
rural areas for children with no access to education but has evolved to mean ‘for profit’.
The number of private schools has risen spectacularly in the 2010s. In 2008, private preschool, primary, secondary, higher and
vocational and technical education constituted 20 percent of all education and training institutes (Naftali 2016) and this figure has
increased significantly since. By the end of 2016, there were more than 171,000 private schools with nearly 50 million students, with
over 8,000 new private schools opening in the previous year alone (China Daily 2017a).
There are thousands of privately run child care or early learning centres as well as after-school and weekend educational programmes.
These informal educational centres are ubiquitous and can be seen across China especially in cities where parents can regularly be seen
taking their children to these centres after school and on weekends.
The expansion of private education ventures is largely due to the growing wealth of many families who seek opportunities for ‘elite’
education for their sons and daughters, or those who feel that their children need to ‘keep up’ in the educational race, as well as the
increase in the numbers of entrepreneurs seeking profit-making ventures. Education is often the largest single item of family
expenditure.
However, private schools cater for poor rural or migrant children as well as the wealthier. Private schools and kindergartens in rural
areas may have very basic facilities and difficulties in recruiting qualified staff, unlike private schools in more developed areas which can
have impressive facilities and offer a range of extra-curricular activities, preschool education, and English tuition.
Private universities have been established across China and are growing in type and number. Private higher education was abolished
after 1949, and existing private and religious institutions were converted to public ones, but they re-emerged from 1978 and grew
rapidly due to insufficient capacity in the public sector and rising demand. They originally tended to be founded and financed by
wealthy overseas Chinese, especially from Hong Kong. In 2005, 175 private universities had been approved to issue diplomas, enrolling
810,000 students. Many ‘have expanded from small colleges renting makeshift campuses to large operations owning spacious
campuses enrolling 10,000 to 40,000 students’ (Lin 2007, p. 45). By 2012 there were 630 non-government higher education
institutions and by 2015, 813 (China Statistical Yearbook 2016c), an increase of nearly 30 percent in three years. Private universities
can enrol students with lower entrance scores but charge much higher tuition fees.
Government policies since the 1990s have encouraged and facilitated the establishment and growth of private education, including the
conversion of public schools into private minban schools or publicly owned schools operated by the private sector. The intention is to
encourage the adoption of market principles in education so that schools can generate profits and be less reliant on government funding
(Wang & Chan 2015). In 2017 the State Council announced the complete lifting of restrictions on private investment in education and
the entitlement of private schools to preferential tax policies and the same access to student loans, scholarships and state aid as public
schools. However, the guidelines also state that the management and quality of private education needs to be improved and made clear
the political expectations for private education: ‘Private institutes should reinforce the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and
they should cover socialist core values throughout their curriculum’ (China Daily 2017a).
Private schooling comprises a complex, diverse and sometimes murky mix of different types of schools often involving a ‘hybrid’ of
public and private, blurring the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ education. Different types range from private schools
‘affiliated’ to (often prestigious) public schools, former public schools ‘converted’ into private schools, and community-run schools – all
subject to varying degrees of government control – through to international schools operated either by private Chinese or foreign
individuals or companies. Affiliated or ‘sister’ schools are often private–public partnerships that provide additional funding to public
schools and profits for investors. They may receive public funding but their finances must be run separately from the public school.
Converted schools are often an offshoot of a public school, funded by the public school and sometimes with shared facilities and
resources, but with greater autonomy in management and teacher recruitment. Some receive local government subsidies if they admit
public students and have good reputations and they can also hire publicly funded teachers from public schools; their affiliation with a
public school gives them higher status and credibility.
Universities often have affiliated schools that are run on an entrepreneurial basis to attract more revenue, provide education for the
children of university staff, add to the prestige of the university, or attract high-achieving students who can then be funnelled into the
university. Many private schools are also located within wealthier gated communities which have sprung up following real estate booms
and the locations of prestigious public and private schools can push up real estate prices markedly.
The level of autonomy enjoyed by private education providers depends on how they are owned, funded and controlled, with converted
schools having the least autonomy and international schools the most. Private schools generally have more autonomy than public
schools including local control over the curriculum and teaching, but they must comply with government regulations. According to Wang
and Chan (2015) only schools that are entirely privately funded can avoid direct control of their operations and international schools are
essentially exempt from government education regulations. This burgeoning industry has seen instances of mismanagement, and local
governments have introduced new policies requiring private schools to establish financial reserves and stricter financial oversight amid
continuing concerns about the quality, integrity and governance of many private education enterprises.
Some private schools have been set up by students returning from overseas, or by teachers or academics who want to establish more
innovative and creative, or more Western-oriented, schools. Foreign providers usually have to find a Chinese joint-venture partner but
the regulations around foreign educational collaborations have been easing in recent years.
Private education ranges from relatively modest local community-run schools, and even volunteer-run schools for migrant children in
large cities, to ‘elite’ private schools. These ‘elite’ schools are often run by entrepreneurs who may have received degrees at prestigious
overseas universities, or large corporations such as New Oriental. New Oriental is the largest private provider of education in China
which in 2017 had 77 schools and 850 learning centres and is the world's third largest international education provider. Some individual
entrepreneurs have also established hundreds of kindergartens and schools, often with names in their titles such as ‘Oxford’ or
‘Cambridge’ when in fact they have no connection to these. Staff at these schools often are required to engage in considerable marketing
and promotional work and also publish research, even if it has nothing to do with their teaching but is merely intended to project a
better image of the school. At many schools, the quality of teaching can be low and they may have few resources but parents are
desperate to gain an advantage for their children and are unable to judge the quality of the teaching and the programmes.
The high-end companies provide a range of top-level resources and promise the chance to mix with other ‘elites’ and hence gain entry
into the upper levels of Chinese and international society. They have become a status symbol for the ultra-wealthy, or in Bourdieusian
terms, a source of ‘symbolic capital’. Many produce glossy prospectuses with photos of foreign children in the classrooms. Many
overseas schools, including British ones such as Harrow and Wellington College, have established sister schools in China, which offer a
replication of the British school's curriculum as well as education in English. Students from these schools feature prominently in the
applications to prestigious overseas universities such as Oxford and Cambridge and the American Ivy League universities.
There are other reasons why parents choose private education for their children apart from prestige. This phenomenon is also due to
parents’ dissatisfaction with the examination-oriented curriculum and perceived poor quality of the public system. For similar reasons,
some parents take their children out of public school before they have finished compulsory education to home school their children even
though it is illegal. These children are not eligible to sit for the gaokao so they are often sent abroad for higher education. A similar
motivation underlies the revival and growth of ‘sishu’ schools which focus on traditional Chinese culture, an example of the desire by
some parents to return to traditional values. These schools are controversial due to practices such as students being required to read
classical texts from thousands of years ago in their entirety rather than just the excerpts which are read by children in mainstream
schools. A sishu was originally a private school established during the Qing Dynasty by wealthy families and there are now an estimated
2,000 sishu schools in China (Sixth Tone 2017). Modern sishu schools (xiandai sishu 现代私塾) have also become an instrument of
spreading Chinese government influence abroad, with their establishment overseas in countries like the United Kingdom in a similar
fashion to the Confucius Institutes at university level (see Chapter 6).
There has also been a burgeoning of private religious schools such as Muslim schools. Mosques have traditionally provided religious
instruction for adults and children to cater for China's 25 million Muslims (from ten different minority groups) and are now permitted to
run schools, except in Xinjiang due to a fear of separatism and strict controls over Muslim communities there (Jaschok & Chan 2009).
The expansion of private education and ‘hybrid’ public–private models illustrates the contradictions between national economic and
political policies. The retreat from the regulation of private education contrasts with the government's political directives that private
schools and universities must support the CCP and cover socialist core values in their curriculum. The lack of regulation of private
education has led to concerns about opaque management systems and lack of transparency around financial affairs and allocation of
resources (Liu 2018).
The ‘hybrid’ models have led to the blurring of boundaries between public and private education, the encouragement of
entrepreneurship in public schools and increased competition between them. Hyper-capitalism and desperation not to be left behind in
the race for educational success has meant that these neoliberal ventures have created opportunities for parents and students but
inevitably to higher costs and greater uncertainty in the choices that they make.

International schools and programmes

Enrolment in international schools by Chinese nationals is probably the most notable trend in the quest by Chinese parents for
education that carries social cachet and it is increasingly becoming the education of choice among middle-class and affluent families (Liu
2017). Originally established for the children of expatriates living and working overseas, in China international schools increasingly
cater for affluent national parents seeking a competitive edge for their children to improve their child's future prospects as well as their
own status; they function as a passport to study in prestigious universities overseas and as a vehicle for joining the ‘international elite’.
International schools offer curriculum and qualifications from countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and
Australia. They offer a curriculum in English (or sometimes German), the chance to mix with foreign or other ‘elite’ children, and
opportunities for direct admission to foreign universities as students can study British A-levels or the International Baccalaureate.
These schools also prepare students for foreign accreditation programmes such as the American APT or SATs, or Cambridge
Examinations.
Considerable kudos is attached to the success of students at these schools in gaining entry to prestigious universities internationally,
and each year their campuses are festooned with posters displaying photographs and stories of their most successful students and lists
of the foreign (usually American Ivy League) colleges to which they have been accepted. Statistics are prominent on their websites and
prospectuses showing students’ results in foreign final-year school examinations. Many public high schools, while not private, also
aspire to be considered ‘elite’ schools, and engage in similar practices.
Since legislation in 2003 permitted the establishment of Sino-foreign cooperative educational ventures, hundreds of joint school, college
and university programmes and campuses have been established. The University of Nottingham in Ningbo was the first joint university
venture in 2005 and others now include New York University in Shanghai, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University and Duke Kunshan
University, and the number of such campuses or joint ventures is growing.

Conclusions
Despite much government effort and rhetoric to reduce inequalities in education, equal educational opportunities remain a chimera for
many as conflicting policies and ideologies mean that, according to Li and Yang (2013), the education system is being transformed into
‘a triumph of middle-class ideology’ (p. 322).
Education can act as both an enabler as well as a disabler, either transforming opportunities (especially for the disadvantaged) or
reproducing privilege. As in ancient times, education in China continues to function as the primary determinant of individuals’ life
chances and career opportunities and therefore ensuing wealth or poverty. Although more educational choices are available than ever
before, how much ‘choice’ can be exercised depends on factors such as socioeconomic status, class, geographical location, ethnicity,
gender, disability and personal connections.
The upshot of these trends is that the ancient belief in education that anything can be achieved through hard work (though never
entirely true) is being replaced by the reality that anything can be achieved through power and money. Contradictory government
economic, educational and social policies and social forces are undermining attempts to reduce inequalities, leading to increased social
stratification and educational disparities which can seriously imperil the life chances of many. The persistent gaps between rich and
poor and urban and rural areas have implications not just for individuals but for the integrity, good governance and stability of the
nation.
5
Ideologies in Competition
Competing ideologies can be found in China in political, economic and social policies and at all levels within the education system.
Educational discourse and policy contain a complex mix of often contradictory ‘traditional’ Confucian, market-driven neoliberal, and
utilitarian ideologies of education all interwoven with the political needs of the party-state with its rhetoric of socialism ‘with Chinese
characteristics’.
Education in China is more overtly political than in most other countries, which has significant ramifications across the curriculum.
Governments of most countries seek to impose their ideological and political views and aspirations onto their education systems
through various policies and funding mechanisms but in China this is done in a much more explicit and direct manner and state
interventions permeate all aspects of public (and often private) education.
Education is at the core of the government's human capital development strategy to develop the workforce it needs to drive its current
and future national and international economic ambitions. But education also acts as the handmaiden of the CCP party-state to ensure a
‘harmonious’ society by enlisting the hearts and minds of citizens to the national cause through political, moral and patriotic education
from kindergarten through to higher education. Education performs political and social functions at every level from national to local
and serves the will and aspirations of the Party ‘in sustaining and reinforcing its political leadership and domination’ (Law 2017, p. 258).
For families and individuals, it serves as a way of attaining social status, economic wellbeing and self-esteem, all important to the overall
civil and political stability of the nation.
As we have seen, education has had an enduring influence on cultural and ideological mindsets at the aggregate national and individual
levels and the reform of education continues to be a site of struggle between conflicting beliefs, such as in how to modernize education
without losing traditional values. Aspects of both traditional and reformed educational values also sit uncomfortably with the growth of
neoliberal market ideology and more utilitarian desires for the acquisition of status and wealth.
Education in China is a story of continuity and change rooted in the broader political, economic, cultural and social affairs of the nation.
The impact of politics and culture on education (and vice versa) have been deep throughout China's history, including during periods of
major change and more recent upheavals and reform. Many educational philosophies or ‘traditions’ have endured or been jettisoned
only to re-emerge. Some traditions have been ‘re-invented’, most notably ‘Confucian’ educational ideas, through idealized or imagined
notions of China's past, in order to serve contemporary desires to reclaim China's cultural pride and global prominence. ‘Confucian’
educational values have been explicitly revived within the curriculum and classroom, in the yearning by some teachers and parents for
a more ‘authentic’ tradition which taps into new nationalism and notions of China's uniqueness.
Confucianism is a malleable ideology easily transportable across time, facilitating its usage to promote, vilify or reinvigorate various
contemporary agendas and debates. Ryan and Louie (2007) argue that:
in the last century interpretations of Confucianism, particularly of Confucian education, have undergone transformations that have
at times rendered any commonly accepted interpretation meaningless … Like other great figures such as Christ and the Buddha,
Confucius’ thinking can be twisted to suit just about all times and needs.
(pp. 409–10)
During the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was condemned as a feudal, reactionary system that perpetrated class and economic
injustice. In more recent years, it has been revived as a means to a more moral and ethical society and Confucian imagery is being used
to represent China's culture globally, seen in the establishment of Confucian Institutes at universities around the world. Louie (2011)
argues that ‘the name Confucius has been at the centre of some of the most savage intellectual and political controversies in modern
China’ (p. 78) but in the naming of the Confucian Institutes, Confucius has been ‘institutionalized’ for world consumption (p. 98).
However they are defined, and apart from during the Cultural Revolution when students at all levels had to read the Analects as
‘negative material’ (Louie 2011, p. 82), there is no doubt that Confucian ideology and its espoused values have had an enduring
influence on teaching and learning ideas and practices and are alive and well in Chinese classrooms today. Modern portrayals of
Confucian educational ideals centre around perfectibility of the self and educability of all through hard work and self-reflection. Various
moral virtues are extolled such as kindness, humility, selflessness, modesty, obedience and conformity, and respect for elders, teachers
and texts, and ethical behaviour. Daoism, which emphasizes self-control and harmony with others, has also influenced people's social
interactions and beliefs about the upbringing of children.
The recent promotion of Confucian ideology can be explained not just by nostalgia or attempts to promote China's ‘uniqueness’ and
contributions to world culture. In the present context, it can also be understood as a reaction to perceptions of a moral vacuum in
current Chinese society against a backdrop of consumerism and corruption; perceived lack of any ‘spirituality’; fears that Chinese
culture is being lost to foreign, particularly Western, corrupting influences; and desires by individuals beyond just making money.
Confucian ethics are seen as an antidote to greed and the superficiality of, especially, modern youth culture.
Education performs many functions; it is not only seen as the engine of national growth and prosperity but also as the nation's ‘moral
compass’. Proponents of Confucianism stress its moral and ethical dimensions (while ignoring its historic oppressive features), whereas
religion plays this role in other cultures and countries, and with its emphasis on the stability of the State and the duty of individuals to
the national purpose, Confucianism is seen to work well with communism. With widespread disillusionment existing about communism
following the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was an easy choice to fulfil the ‘moral compass’ role given its historical place in China
and its attraction as a source of national pride.
Concerns about the morality of youth, and society more generally, have seen the salvaging of Confucian educational ideas since the
beginning of the reform period but this has intensified in recent years with the inclusion of Confucian ideals of the ‘good society’ and the
‘moral person’ into moral education classes in schools. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, some educators worry that traditional beliefs
hinder reform and inhibit more innovative and creative pedagogy. But others believe that China should take pride in its intellectual
traditions and revive Confucian educational tenets that are compatible with modern educational ideas and practice, such as the idea of
perfectibility for all through education and the development of reflective thinking through dialogue between students and teachers.
The development of people's social values is tasked to the education system, as is the inculcation of desired political ideologies linked to
allegiance to the CCP party-state and promoting its legitimacy and continued rule. Education is used by the State not only to socialize
but also to politicize students and it uses the curriculum ‘as a significant device of citizen-making, socializing students into a set of state-
prescribed political and social values’ (Law 2017, p. 256). This is built in throughout the curriculum as well as via specific ideological
subjects including moral and patriotic education, citizenship education, ethnic solidarity education and political and ideological education.
This chapter first analyses the tensions between traditional and neoliberal ideologies of education, examining their underpinning values
and beliefs. It then examines the link between the reintroduction of Confucian ideologies of education and the broader cultural context
and beliefs. It then examines the link between the reintroduction of Confucian ideologies of education and the broader cultural context
of Chinese society and, finally, it looks at how specific areas of the curriculum are designed to promote national political and ideological
agendas.

Neoliberalism versus traditionalism

One of the major tensions in education reform and education more generally in China is the perceived conflict between neoliberalist
ideology and traditional views of education. Yang (2015) argues that in higher education:
Traditional ways of thinking have survived dramatic social and cultural changes in China's modern history and remained deeply
rooted among the Chinese people. Their impact on contemporary Chinese higher education is amazingly profound. The clash
between the two traditions forms the most fundamental cultural condition for China's contemporary higher education
development.
(p. 530)
This clash is apparent at all levels of education. In responding to globalization China has adopted a neoliberal ideology that conflicts with
traditional Confucian values (as well of course, it would seem, with communist ideology). But most commonly now as Lee and Pang
(2011) argue, educators are having to make choices between two contradictory values and message systems:
[P]eople involved in educational governance and management in the mainland of China are confronted with a choice between
traditional Confucian ethics and values, such as hierarchical relationships, collectivism, humanism, and self-cultivation, and the so-
called new values of competitive relationships, market, choice, efficiency, flexibility and accountability.
(p. 333)
It could be argued that competition was always fierce in education in China, given the benefits it bestowed particularly through the
ancient examination system, but this was never within the ‘market’ context such as exists now.
Traditional Confucianist humanist educational ideologies in fact run counter to the current utilitarian approaches to education. Jiang
(2013) argues that most students ‘view education primarily as a means of securing good jobs, a high salary, and mobility. The pursuit of
humanistic values and personal and academic integrity is superseded by utilitarianism’ (p. 108). This makes for tensions between
neoliberal and traditional ideologies about the nature of education, as well the purposes of education.
There is also tension in China between the ideology of globalization and a growing focus on the success and history of the nation; these
tensions are apparent in the increasing nationalistic content in the ideological curriculum. According to Law (2014), ‘China's new
curriculum reflects the increasing tension between globalization and nationalism; while preparing its students to compete globally, China
also urges them to identify with and take pride in the nation's achievements and culture’ (p. 332).
The question of how to deal with pressures arising from globalization while maintaining traditions and strengths has been a thorny one
for educators and policy makers concerned about the loss of national identity and allegiances in a globalized world often dominated by
American or Western cultural artefacts. Naftali (2016) argues, however, that despite Chinese youth being exposed to Western ideas
and values via the media, and a general fascination with America (and also Japan and South Korea), their consumption of American
television programmes has not led to them identifying with Western values. The feelings of humiliation by foreign aggressors still run
deep in China. According to Naftali (2016), young Chinese simultaneously distrust America and want to emulate it.
Policy makers have attempted to counter foreign influences with curriculum that embodies Chinese values and those of the party-state.
Law (2014) argues that:
the state selects global curriculum elements that will equip students to survive and compete globally; it also acts as gatekeeper,
infusing state-prescribed socialist and Chinese values into curricula to foster a socialist citizenry.
(p. 323)
These competing ideologies would appear to be incompatible but exist simultaneously and inform different aspects of education or can
reflect different educational motivations, even within individuals. Values such as self-cultivation and morality can be seen as intrinsic
forms of motivation in education, while competitiveness in examinations and the job market is driven by the lure of extrinsic rewards;
students may be driven by both forms of motivation.
The core government narrative of development and socialism with ‘Chinese characteristics’ (which is used to explain the central place of
market reform and hyper-capitalism within a communist system), is also essentially applied to education; the modernization of
education but with ‘Chinese characteristics’. An example of this is President Xi Jinping's call to teachers in February 2017 to emphasize
the teaching of traditional Chinese literature and the importance of retaining Chinese poems and classical texts in senior high school
curriculum (China Daily 2017b). But more significantly, as Naftali (2016) argues, even while young Chinese are being prepared for a
more active role in a modern and globalized world, and with the adoption of neoliberal ideologies in the marketization and privatization
of education in China:
State schools in contemporary China are also at pains to teach children the ‘traditional’ precepts of Confucianism, which now enjoys
a renewed importance in government discourse as a superior moral logic and as an embodiment of the ‘true essence’ of Chinese
national cultures.
( p. 183)

Resurrecting Confucius
Confucianism is being revived in China as a central narrative and Confucian ideologies of education are being resurrected by educators.
A general description of Confucianism was provided in Chapter 1 so its central tenets will not be repeated here, but it is necessary to
revisit some important aspects of Confucian education in order to understand why it is making a comeback.
Its resurgence is built upon a number of factors. These include: nostalgia, which exists alongside a fear of loss of traditional educational
strengths; uncertainty caused by changing social patterns and different generational experiences and expectations of education;
concerns about the morality of the society and youth; national political imperatives and rising nationalism; and the conflicting
educational philosophies and ideologies arising from geopolitical changes described earlier.
Confucian moral teachings have long permeated education and continue to do so. They are taught across the curriculum in subjects such
as moral education where ideals of self-cultivation, reflection and personal ethics are promoted. Although Confucian tenets on the need
for hierarchies of power and obedience to ensure social and civic order have been used through the centuries to oppress various classes
in society, most notably women and peasants, many of Confucius's ideas on education such as his dialogic approach to teaching and
learning and his philosophical ideas would be regarded today as good pedagogical practice anywhere in the world and continue to have
appeal. Bai (2011) draws parallels with Socrates; ‘both Confucius and Socrates tried to drive students beyond mere memorization of the
classics and the acceptance of the customs of the day by inducing them to discover, and to even renew, the meanings of traditions. What
they offered to their pupils or interlocutors is a philosophical education’ (p. 618).
The revival of traditional Chinese ‘wisdoms’ partly arises from the view that education has lost some of its indigenous features and may
lose its ‘time-honoured’ educational values and strengths and fears that the adoption of ‘foreign’ academic standards will lead to the loss
of indigenous scholarship and research. Some believe that traditional values were eclipsed by the introduction of Western educational
values from the late nineteenth century, when China began taking on more outside ideas. This view explains some of the caution in
contemporary China about ‘policy borrowing’ from other countries, and a nervousness about jettisoning Chinese educational ideas and
features as foreign theories of education are underpinned by ideologies that may not align with or may compete with philosophical
traditions and values in China (Wang, Yousheng 2017).
In one example of nostalgia for traditional educational achievements, Liu (2006) defends the imperial examination system and heralds
it as ‘a masterpiece of Chinese traditional culture’ (p. 303) as it appointed government officials based on merit rather than social or
political connections. But this view buys into the myth of meritocracy for all since it was only a pathway for merit within the ranks of the
gentry. Pepper (1996) recognizes the elitism inherent in the system but argues that at least within the imperial examination system
‘concerns about fair access and opportunity to compete had been integral to that tradition for at least a thousand years’ (p. 323).
Many scholars believe that Confucianist educational tenets are being selectively interpreted or mis-interpreted, repeating a pattern
from ancient times. Bai (2011) believes that ‘the so-called Confucian (or East Asian) pedagogy, vilified by some and celebrated by
others, is not really Confucian … the Confucian tradition itself is long and complicated, and the difference between one Confucian and
another might be far greater than a Confucian and a Western scholar’ (pp. 615–16). One university teacher in Beijing I interviewed
about her views of Confucian education believed that the essence of Confucius's philosophy of education has been lost in contemporary
teaching:
The key point of Confucian education philosophy is that differential teaching methods are required for different students. What
Confucius said is that if there are fifty students then you need to teach them using fifty different methods to cater for them. You
should not use one method to teach all 50 students. The metaphor is clear. This is Confucius's point. I think his view is very
insightful. However, the value has been lost in modern education; Chinese teachers have already forgotten Confucius's words. What
our teachers are doing is one method for fifty students, even for one hundred students.
Many of the more humanistic central tenets of Confucianism are at loggerheads with contemporary educational practice due to ever
more fierce competition and high aspirations in society and the education system as well as changes to the social and economic fabric in
China. An understanding of these tensions also helps to explain why some imported educational ideas succeed while others fail. But it is
worthwhile to first look at some traditional concepts to see how they are being used in classrooms today and assess their compatibility
with modern, often ‘Western’, educational theories.
Many ancient educational ideas being revived in classrooms derive from classical texts on education, the foremost being the Xueji (学记)
‘On teaching and learning’. This central Confucian text on education, written 2,500 years ago, was part of one of the ‘Five Classics’
which form the core of the Confucian texts. The ‘Five Classics’ comprise the Book of Songs (the Shijing 诗经), the Book of History (the
Shujing 书经), the Book of Changes (the Yijing 易经), the Book of Rites (the Liji 礼记) and the Spring and Autumn Annals (the Chunqiu
春秋). The Xueji explains the rituals of the Imperial Academy, the institution that trained scholars to become officials to govern the
Chinese empire.
The Xueji is often compared to the teachings of ancient Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. It is the world's oldest known
detailed text on education, preceding similar texts and doctrines by thousands of years, and the source of much pride for many
educators in China who believe that its messages resonate with pedagogical beliefs today. According to Xu and McEwan (2017), it is ‘one
of the earliest scholarly essays in ancient China to systematically discuss the system of teaching and learning, the philosophy, principles,
methods, roles of teachers and students, and actual education methods practiced during the Han dynasty’ (p. 1).
An example of a hotly contested area within China's curriculum reform is the Western concept of collaborative learning. Though
teachers in Western countries can also have difficulty with the concept, Yousheng Wang (2017) argues that many Chinese teachers
have struggled to implement it since some believe it does not sit well with some of the traditional educational philosophies noted above,
and they believe there may be acceptable, or better, Chinese alternatives. Educators have sought to adapt the concept of collaborative
learning by reviving traditional ideas such as peer-assisted learning, known as ‘xiaoxiansheng’ (小先生) meaning ‘little teacher’. This
involves students working in pairs or small groups with one student acting as the ‘teacher’ and sometimes even conducting whole class
learning with most of the class time organized around pair work followed by whole group discussion. The teacher observes the students’
learning and then gives evaluation and advice. Experiments with peer-assisted learning (rather than collaborative group work) in some
schools have led to reported improvements in academic performance, accelerated language development and improvements in
friendships among students (Wang, Yousheng 2017). This approach could be seen as a form of didactic teaching but as it is peer-to-peer
teaching rather than teacher-led it is seen as better aligned with traditional educational ideas such as self-improvement. This method is
more common in primary schools than secondary schools where pedagogy is often more conservative, especially in the later years of
upper secondary school when students are preparing for the gaokao.
Another example of traditional educational ideas is the concept of ‘jiaoxue xiangzhang’ (教学相长) described in the classical text the
‘shisanjing zhushu’(十三经注疏). This means that teachers and students both benefit from teaching and learning. The concept refers to
the dialectic relationship between the ‘student’ and ‘teacher’ but also to discursive and dialectical relations between the ‘learning’ and
the ‘learnt’ which can occur within an individual; the learner becomes their own teacher. The act of teaching is also a source of learning
for the teacher; the teacher needs to learn something first in order to teach it, making teaching a dynamic and dialectic process which
benefits the teacher as well as the students (Wang, Yousheng 2017). This approach is not seen as a technical or instrumental process
but as reciprocal learning between students and teachers and the co-construction of knowledge, both central tenets of constructivism.
The concept of ‘datong’ (大同) is another key case in point. ‘Datong’ refers to the common good or ‘great unity’, seen as an important
concept in Chinese philosophy and history originating in the Confucian classic the Datong Shu (the Book of Great Unity) which
advocates the idea of a harmonious society and communitarianism. This concept demonstrates how traditional Confucian ideas aligned
with later socialist ideas of communitarianism and it continues to have influence in contemporary society and government policy. The
concept of datong is also used to support curriculum such as Global Citizenship and Education for Sustainable Development (as well as
minority education). Global citizenship and sustainable development are popular worldwide but in China they are taught in conjunction
with these ancient beliefs to give them more ‘Chinese characteristics’ and thus legitimacy. This also may be to reclaim these subjects as
ancient Chinese wisdoms rather than as being solely derived from foreign sources.
This resurrection of ‘traditional wisdoms’ can be the source of much pride among educators seeking to draw on the strengths of Chinese
education and develop more ‘authentic’ indigenous approaches. China is proud, for example, of its traditional strengths in mathematics
which has roots going back thousands of years to developments in algebra and geometry from the first century to the fourteenth
century, at a time when China, India and the Arab world led the world in mathematics (Lim & Wagner 2017). Others advocate caution,
however, in adopting so-called Confucian educational tenets since contemporary contexts are far removed from those of Confucius's
time of 2,500 years ago. Law (2017) argues that the current enthusiasm to revive Confucianism de-historicizes and ignores larger
political and ideological forces impacting on education, particularly the appropriation of Confucianism to encourage pride in the
achievements of Chinese culture and therefore attachment to the national cause.
Although, as previously noted, some believe that indigenous educational ideas were lost with the historical encroachment of Western
powers and introduction of Western education, others argue that ‘Confucianism’ itself was in fact ‘interrupted’ and its key wisdoms lost
long ago with the advent of the imperial examination system. Cheng (2011) argues that when the Confucian classics were appropriated
by the State they became a tool not for philosophy, but for memorization of the official canon and thus credentialling. Cheng argues that
‘[t]he beauty that Confucius had started was buried long before the western invasion in the education arena at the beginning of the
twentieth century’ (2011, p. 591).
Teachers’ concerns may also be a reaction to difficulties faced in implementing foreign methods or due to fears of foreign standards;
they may be using Chinese ‘traditions’ to assuage these fears and ‘retrofitting’ them to support their own education practices. Yet again,
many teachers are genuinely interested in experimenting with both old and new ideas and there is much to be admired in traditional
ideas and current practice. But caution needs to be exercised in claiming these ideas as ‘Confucian’ or retrieving ideas from the past,
especially because, as we have seen, Confucianism can mean all things to anyone and be used for almost any purpose.
Concerns about the adoption of ‘foreign’ or international ‘benchmarks’ particularly in research and publications also exist in the higher
education arena, with some fearing that they may skew scholarship and research and lead to the diminution of indigenous academic
traditions. The pressure on academics to publish in international journals (described in Chapter 3) and in English has led to concerns
about ‘self-colonization’ as they are required to conform to Western modes of academic writing in their efforts to have their research
published internationally. Since many universities in China use publications in international journals (such as those measured by the
SCI and SSCI) as a criterion for appointment or promotion of academic staff, this privileges international journals over national ones.
Yuan (2011) argues that this has led to the depreciation of native language writing and neglect of Chinese academic traditions:
During their internationalization process, many institutions often place too much emphasis on Western standards … This negates
Chinese national academic traditions and belies a dependency mentality in the process of internationalizing higher education … [It]
has led to a serious loss of the local characteristics and traditions of Chinese research universities.
(pp. 93–4)
The process of change through learning from the outside has been facilitated by the large number of Chinese academics and students
who have been trained overseas and brought back different views on scholarship. Learning from the outside does not necessarily
involve a dependency mentality as Yuan claims and internationalization may have many benefits, but how to learn from the outside
while maintaining Chinese cultural values or ‘Chinese characteristics’ (however they are understood or portrayed) continues to be seen
as a challenge for education reform more broadly.
Another key factor in the tension between traditional and ‘modern’ education, and part of the drive to reintroduce Confucian moral
concepts, is China's changing social fabric and concerns about morality in society particularly among its youth. A prominent feature of
traditional education is its focus on the ‘proper’ relationships between children and their elders, and relationships between teachers and
students are expected to be hierarchical but harmonious. Students are expected to show great respect to their teachers and not to
challenge them. Naftali (2016) argues that these traditional relationships between teachers and students are beginning to break down
as children, especially urban ‘singletons’, now have ‘more power vis-à-vis their teachers, parents and grandparents’ (p. 2). She argues
that children are becoming more rebellious and resistant to pressure from teachers and parents. However, ‘traditional’ relationships
between teachers and students have also been fluid at other times, breaking down completely during Taiping times and the Cultural
Revolution, so a contrast between the past and the present is not so stark nor simple. But Naftali's observation does illustrate a recent
growing trend in attitudes, particularly as parents are able to spend more money on their children.
Economic and social policies have led to concerns about the ‘spoiling’ of children arising from growing prosperity and the one-child policy
meaning that parents’ and grandparents’ hopes and resources are poured into the one individual; it is certainly not uncommon to see
these little ‘emperors’ and ‘phoenixes’ being mollycoddled and pampered. The phenomenon of children simultaneously being pampered
but also overworked and under immense pressure as they move through the education system can cause serious mental health
problems for children.
Struggles between traditional views of the ‘good’ teacher and more neoliberal and instrumentalist views of education can be seen in
other changes occurring in teacher–student relationships. Although traditionally teachers took the role of a strict but ‘benevolent
parent’, the current increased pressure on children to achieve and the growing phenomenon of teachers being remunerated on the basis
of their students’ results have produced instances of teachers treating children more harshly. Although corporal punishment was made
illegal in 1986, it is still widely used, especially in schools employing untrained and poorly paid teachers. Severe mistreatment is rare
but abuse and other physical punishment continues and there have been reports of children with disabilities, who are not able to
perform to the teacher's standards, being treated callously.
For the most part, parents’ expectations for their children arise from their desire to see them do well, with many expecting that they
themselves will in turn do well. But there can be a darker side to parents’ high aspiration, especially if they feel shame at their child's
lack of achieving these ambitions, and there are occasional reports of parents treating their children severely and cruelly if they
perform badly. Public shaming of children with lower scores or ‘bad behaviour’ in schools still occurs and the ‘benevolent’ relationships
between parents and children embedded in Confucian ideologies can become twisted and subverted due to the tensions arising from
fierce competition and examinations.
There still appears, however, to be far less overt resistance by children to the demands by parents and teachers than you would expect
to find in other educational contexts. This is despite the greatly different ideologies and expectations of the three generations in China
who have had profoundly different life experiences over the past fifty or sixty years. This had led to a generation gap not just between
children and parents, but also between parents and grandparents, who are often also significantly contributing to their grandchildren's
educational costs.
The legacy of the socialist period and its values, which not only shaped the lives but also the thinking of those born during the Maoist
era and now in their fifties and sixties, has created tensions and confusion about education reforms among grandparents as well as the
educational leaders who grew up during this period. Naftali (2016) argues that some policy makers ‘resist these new strategies or
attempt to adapt them to pre-existing models of childcare [and education], which draw on socialist-collectivist morality on which they
themselves were raised’ (p. 183).
One major reason behind the current revival of Confucianism arises from the CCP party-state's agenda to maintain a ‘harmonious
society’ and to allay dissent and social and political upheaval, but it also aligns with the desires of those harking back to the fundamental
collectivism and egalitarianism of Maoist days. In the earliest years of the PRC many Confucian tenets were claimed to be compatible
with Marxism. Although very different from those days, the political imperatives of the CCP are still vital in understanding how
education is developing in China.
As we saw earlier, universities have developed along Western models both historically and in the contemporary context (though also
influenced by Russia and Japan) and have largely adopted American models of organization and structure. But adoption of foreign
structural models does not necessarily bring along with it their modes of thought and academic practice. These university systems have
structural models does not necessarily bring along with it their modes of thought and academic practice. These university systems have
developed in different cultural contexts and traditions of thought and may run counter to CCP policy in higher education. Yang (2015)
argues that this is especially the case when it comes to the ‘academic culture’ of universities, defined as the attitudes, beliefs and values
of academics in relation to their work, and to the general ‘milieu’ of open inquiry, originality and critical dispositions. The values that
Yang (2015) refers to have been challenged especially in recent years due to concerns by the CCP leadership about the ‘correct political
orientation’ of universities, and in the Xi Jinping era, there has been an increasing number of restrictions imposed on universities and
academics and a crackdown on academic freedom. For years the Party leadership has worried about the loss of the ideological loyalty of
the country's youth and in December 2016, President Xi explicitly directed universities to ‘adhere to the correct political orientation’
(Xinhua 2016).
In a context of some changing social and educational ideas and values ‘on the ground’, at the ‘top’ national political level the government
is using a number of curriculum measures to promote its ideologies and political agendas, counter ‘undesirable’ social trends, enhance
allegiance to the State and to develop its vision of a citizenry with moral and socialist values. The following sections examine how the
CCP is using Confucian ethics and imagery and encouraging patriotism to achieve these aims through subjects across the curriculum,
including moral, patriotic and citizenship education, and political and ideological education.

Moral education
Although moral education has had a long history in China, its resurgence demonstrates concerns about an ethical crisis among its
citizenry reflected in widespread corruption and fraudulent practices, including in education. The education system is seen as a key
means to ameliorate this.
Naftali (2016) reports concerns that children's growing independence and consumer power will lead to ‘moral chaos, social instability, or
the loss of a distinctive cultural and national identity among China's young’ (p. 4) and parents are anxious about their children's moral
development, wanting their child to be a ‘moral, caring person’. Naftali (2016) argues that concerns also arise from foreign influences
which are seen as:
a threat to Chinese national identity and as a challenge to the powerful role that the Party-state seeks to play in shaping young
people's attitudes and values … [there is also] widespread criticism of children's perceived materialism and excessive Internet and
computer game use. These are seen as detrimental both to children's moral and psychological health as well as to the fostering of
national loyalty.
(p. 184)
Although very similar concerns about the moral values of youth are seen in other countries, the CCP is worried about the moral values
of young people in China and the influence of Western values on them, and its more nationalistic stance is aimed in part at countering
these influences. After several decades of policies aimed at learning from the West, these have taken a more inward-looking turn away
from Western ideas as China becomes more powerful and more confident in asserting its national identity (see Chapter 6). Minzner
(2018) argues that China is moving, still within a Communist Party governing structure, not only to a hyper-capitalist system but in
favour of an ‘ethno-nationalist ideology’ rooted in history, tradition and Confucianism.
The perceived erosion of socialist values and the rise of consumerism and social inequalities have been major factors in the revival of
Confucianism in the moral education curriculum. Moral and patriotic education are also designed to inculcate the Party's political values
and foster students’ faith in the country's leadership and its championing of socialist ideology. Subjects such as moral education are seen
as a panacea for all that is ‘wrong’ in society. But such simplistic solutions are bound to falter when set in the midst of the contradictory
neoliberalist values promoted more broadly and throughout the education system. Expectations of ‘moral’ behaviour also now extend to
teachers; since 2017, they have been required to display ‘moral performance’ which is tied to their appraisal (Xinhua 2017c)
In 2017 new Guidelines for Moral Education in Primary and Middle Schools were issued with ‘more emphasis to core socialist values,
traditional Chinese culture and the CPC's revolutionary traditions’ (MOE 2018c). In the refined 2011 curriculum, socialist and moral
values were written into the entire basic education system with a more Sino-centric stance and an emphasis on reinforcing students’
‘identification with, and pride in, China's cultural traditions and contemporary achievements’ (Law 2014, p. 348). This more
nationalistic stance accords with China's rising global power both politically and economically. Moral education is listed in the 13th Five-
Year Plan as a high priority. The concept permeates the Plan, with the word ‘moral’ occurring 13 times. Associated areas listed for
strengthening are increasing students’ sense of social responsibility and their awareness of the rule of law with a new ‘Morality and the
Rule of Law’ curriculum introduced in 2016.
Moral education (deyu 德育) is usually taught once or twice a week using textbooks designed by the MOE. It includes the teaching of
‘proper’ moral behaviours such as respect for parents, helping others, behaving well towards parents and others, and desirable virtues
such as modesty. At primary school, it is mainly taught through stories about the difference between right and wrong and the values
that people should uphold such as honesty and thrift. In other countries, this type of education would be viewed as citizenship or values
education (or included in religious studies) although in China there are more political and ideological overtones. Most schools, college and
university campuses display posters with slogans about proper behaviour and attitudes (which are also often found in public places such
as along streets), such as patriotism (aiguo 爱国), equality (pingdeng 平等), democracy (minzhu 民主), and freedom (ziyou 自由),
although what exactly is meant by these slogans is debatable.
Most students are ambivalent about what they are taught in moral education classes, generally finding them tedious, while others are
cynical about the hypocrisy of what is taught and what they see in everyday life. One student I interviewed about her own experience
of moral education classes said that most students at primary school level just learn slogans and sayings without understanding what
they mean. Her experience was that there is no discussion and if students do ask questions, the teachers reply that they will
understand these concepts when they get older. Yet some students say that many of the values taught in these lessons underpin their
feelings of belonging and pride in their country and in being Chinese, demonstrating that diverse views can be found among different
respondents.
What is striking about government policy documents compared with those in other countries is how much they are imbued with
ideological and patriotic rhetoric and peppered with moralistic discourses using notions such as ‘virtue’, ‘honesty’ and ‘civic morality’.
This can be seen in the 13th Five-Year Plan:
The Chinese Dream and the core socialist values will gain a firmer place in people's hearts. We will broadly advocate patriotism,
collectivism, and socialism. People should work to improve themselves, cultivate a sense of virtue, act with honesty, and help each
other out. We will work toward a significant improvement in the intellectual, moral, scientific, cultural, and health standards of our
citizens. Awareness of the rule of law will continue to be strengthened throughout society … We will advance civic morality and
foster a sense of moral judgment and moral responsibility.
Such national policy documents rarely provide any level of detail but appear to be more a case of exhortation and rhetoric, leaving
implementation to local levels.
Citizenship and patriotic education
Another avenue for ideological and moral education is citizenship education. The 2001 curriculum standards spelt out the multi-
dimensions of global and local citizenship education, involving self, family, school, local community or home town, China and the world
(Law 2014), setting expectations for each level of schooling as to what should be learnt. Grade 1 to 2 students are expected to respect
the national flag and emblem, learn the national anthem and take pride in being Chinese. At Grades 3 to 6, the curriculum includes
Chinese geography, recent national developments and policies, and China's achievements and contributions to world civilization. A
deeper understanding of China is expected from Grades 7 to 9, including national social, economic and political systems, and the theory
of socialism with Chinese characteristics (Law 2014). Students also learn about personal and social values such as self-esteem, respect
for others, honesty and social and family responsibilities. The subject aims to fulfil a national purpose in understanding China's history
and its achievements and hence fostering a sense of national identity and pride among citizens.
According to Camicia and Zhu (2011), in most countries citizenship education incorporates areas such as languages, political science,
history and moral education. Their comparison of citizenship education policies in China and the United States showed that while
citizenship education in most countries has shifted from a national to a global focus, with a stress on cosmopolitanism, in China
nationalism plays a much more prominent role. In China it is aimed at building a ‘socialist harmonious society’ with values such as:
democracy and the rule of law; justice and fairness; sincerity and amity; vitality; stability and order; and harmonious co-existence
between man and nature (Camicia & Zhu 2011).
Concomitant with the 2001 curriculum standards was a national policy Implementation Guidelines to Establish Civic Virtues in Citizens
issued by the CCP Central Committee. This document stressed a communitarian view of citizens’ rights, stating that the interests of the
nation should be put before those of the individual: ‘He/she must always put the national and people's interests first while enjoying
personal legal rights’ (cited in Camicia & Zhu 2011, p. 610). Camicia and Zhu (2011) argue that curriculum documents in China in fields
such as citizenship education are imbued with a ‘collectivist nationalistic discourse’ and stress the importance of national stability and
unity. The evolution that Law (2016) sees in citizenship education in China is from previously equipping students for class struggle to
now preparing them for the market economy.
Alongside this, a significant part of the curriculum is also devoted to patriotic education as a means to enlist young people into the
national cause. Patriotism is on the rise in China and could be seen in the enormous pride about its staging of and success in the
Olympics in 2012 and, in education, responses to China's stellar performances in the 2009 and 2012 PISA results.
Patriotic education has its roots in a widespread public patriotic education campaign (aiguozhuyu jiaoyu 爱国主义教育) launched by the
CCP in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The campaign was designed to provide a counter narrative to the demands for
democracy that were threatening CCP rule and to harness the idealism of youth to national political imperatives and collective rather
than individual identities.
Schools are major sites for the patriotic education campaign and programmes focus on China's achievements under the leadership of the
CCP since 1949 and include activities such as flag-raising ceremonies, school assemblies and visits to army bases. These programmes
can be highly nationalistic and can seek to discredit Western values and ideas of democracy, emphasizing China's historical ‘humiliation’
at the hands of foreign aggressors (China File 2017). They portray China as embattled, with attempts by other countries to contain it as
it grows stronger and play on feelings of wounded national pride. De Kloet and Fung (2017) argue that ‘[e]ducational institutions in
China are the most immediate platforms designed to govern youth’ (p. 46) and one of their primary roles is to indoctrinate youth with
the ideology of the Party:
learning the Party's position, the leaders’ ideology, and the Marxist doctrines still remains in the curriculum as a legacy of control.
Patriotic education constitutes an important part of the curriculum, which feeds into the discourse of nationalism that currently
serves as an important ideological glue to hold the nation together.
(p. 46)

Ethnic solidarity education

Before the curriculum reforms of 2001 and 2011 government policies on ethnic integration and national unity (discussed in Chapter 4)
were implemented through citizenship education. Following heightened ethnic tensions and unrest in Tibet in 2008 and Xinjiang in
2009 a separate ethnic solidarity education (ESE) curriculum was developed (Zhang & Chen 2014). These uprisings were seen as a
national security threat and were attributed by the Chinese government to the influence of ‘foreign hostile forces orchestrating the
disorder’ (Law 2017, p. 254):
To ease ethnic conflicts and guard against foreign ideological infiltration, the CPC-led state raised the status of ESE to the level of
national security concerns and considered it as a ‘battle’ for Chinese children and young people with adversarial forces from abroad
or at home.
(p. 255)
The new ESE curriculum moves away from providing ‘minority education’ only to minority groups, to the provision of ‘ethnic solidarity
education’ to the whole population with the intention of fostering greater awareness of ethnic issues and social cohesion and tolerance
between the majority and minority populations (Zhang & Chen 2014). New textbooks were adopted for Grades 3 to 11 called The Big
Family of the Chinese Nation, Knowledge about Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Policies and Ethnic Theories. Students study the history and
customs of different ethnic groups as well as government policies on ethnic relations. Law's (2017) analysis of these textbooks reveals
that they are designed to facilitate cultural and political assimilation of ethnic minorities by emphasizing that the CCP leadership ‘is the
political foundation and core of ethnic solidarity’ (p. 255). Zhang and Chen (2014) maintain that ESE education generally takes only
tokenistic approaches focusing on ‘cultural artefacts’ rather than deeper issues of ethnic identity and majority–minority ethnic
relations.

Political and ideological education

As in many other countries education in China is highly politicized but in China it is even more overt and more closely aligned with the
CCP's national political agendas. Education continues to be tightly controlled by the party-state, despite the growth of private education.
Education has not just been closely tied to historical, social and cultural phenomena and influences but also political ones. Since students
have always been at the forefront of political movements for change, such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, the Cultural
Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, the Democracy Wall movement from 1978 to 1979 and the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the
government sees education as a crucial site for marshalling students’ allegiances and maintaining control over the messages they
receive.
Although the central government has distanced itself from the direct management and financial functions of education, it has
maintained tight control over ideology and potential political movements through the ‘arms-length’ curriculum measures described
earlier. These measures place the onus of implementation of political policies on educators and educational institutions but Party
officials play powerful roles within all public education institutions.
Ideological education (sixiang jiaoyu 思想教育) is built into curricula at all levels of education and includes topics such as the Thoughts
of Marx and Deng Xiaoping. Since 2017, when they were written into the Constitution, the Thoughts of Xi Jinping have also been
included and there has been a revival of and re-emphasis upon Marxist–Leninist teachings. Under Xi, political control of education has
tightened considerably and has become far-reaching and profound. There have been moves to consolidate the Party's power and some
movement away from market-oriented liberalization and back to a strong and powerful role by the State.
In 2017, the central government re-asserted direct control over the curriculum and the MOE established an official bureau, the
National Textbook Commission (Guojia jiaocai weiyuanhui 国家教材委员会), to design and issue new school textbooks by 2020 to
revise the entire curriculum and add more patriotic content; prior to this, it provided curriculum guidelines with authorized publishing
companies able to undertake textbook design. In 2017 three new textbooks, Chinese, History, and Ethics and Rule of Law, were issued
emphasizing the ‘CCP's revolutionary traditions’ (MOE 2018c). In 2017, the CCP and State Council issued Opinions on Strengthening
and Improving Ideological and Political Work in Higher Education Institutions under New Circumstances outlining the intention to
‘reinforce ideopolitical work’ in higher education institutions stating that they must ‘firmly adhere to the correct political orientation and
carry out to the full all Party guidelines on education’ for ‘cultivating first class talent’ (MOE 2018c). The latter clause implies that the
‘correct’ political line should be applied to recruitment and promotion within universities, a much deeper intervention than has
previously been the case, diminishing the autonomy of universities and enforcing compliance with the ‘correct line’, determining who
gets to work there and who does well once there.
At the higher education level, in their first or second year, students are required to study four compulsory modules which take up about
10 percent of total hours of their programme. Compulsory subjects include political theory (such as Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought,
Theory of Socialism with ‘Chinese Characteristics’), military training, English language and sports. The focus of the political theory
module changes at different times and can be decided at the local level but must relate to the current government policy or priority and
reflect the prevailing political ideologies of the Party leadership. In the past, this has included modules such as ‘A Harmonious Society’
(hexie shehui 和谐社会) and more recently ‘The China Dream’ (zhonguomeng 中国梦), President Xi Jinping's plan for ‘the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ which is designed to appeal not only economically but also emotionally and intellectually. The rest of
the curriculum includes subjects in the student's discipline and ‘cultural quality education’. Subjects in the latter component are decided
at the local level and comprise options such as moral cultivation, Chinese civilization and the basics of law.
In the two weeks before semester starts, all beginning university students undertake military training on campus or in off-campus
training sites by an arm of the military, either the Army, Navy, Air Force or the Armed Police (depending on with which arm the
university has connections). This consists of physical education, marching, martial arts, and self-defence training for women (conducted
by female military trainers). Its stated aim is to develop good discipline, team working skills and a sense of belonging to the university
community. Although students dress in military camouflage uniforms and the programme includes rudimentary rifle shooting training,
it mainly consists of physical education. The training is also used as a recruiting tool for the military. It is not seen as promoting
aggressive values, however. According to one student I interviewed who later studied in the United States, even the shooting training
was a brief one-off activity and nothing like that where she later studied in America where there was a very pro-gun culture and guns
were ubiquitous.
In another move to tighten political control of education, in December 2016 the MOE declared that all schools must teach ‘core socialist
values’ (MOE 2017). Although the new textbooks introduced from 2017 include a wider range of available subjects, they also involve a
much greater emphasis on Chinese culture, the CCP and ‘socialist values’. According to The Diplomat (2017), this includes a focus on
traditional Chinese values; more traditional literature illustrating the ‘brilliant achievements’ of China's ancient history; more articles
about Mao Zedong and other historical Party leaders; and stresses China's foreign policy agenda such as asserting its historical claims to
areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea. This illustrates the government's increasing use of
education as not just an instrument of national policy but also of foreign policy.

The CCP embedded in education

The CCP has direct control over all levels of education and Party committees also monitor university students’ ideological and political
activities. A parallel Party system works with schools on governance issues, Party Secretaries and Party committees are in place at all
levels of higher education, and the powers of the Party Secretaries in universities are on par with university presidents. Party officials
oversee the affairs of the Party on campus and run departments jointly with academic staff. They are meant to share decision-making
authority and, depending on the individuals involved or policies at the time, this can have either positive or negative impacts. Several
Party Secretaries I have spoken with at different levels insist that their role is to support university management and work
collaboratively in making consensual decisions but Party Secretaries are undoubtedly more powerful than administrators. Differing
personalities and agendas, however, can of course lead to conflict and tensions but these are rarely visible to or discussed with
outsiders. With the recent tightening of political controls, administrators have become much less likely to question decisions made by
Party leaders.
In addition to the Party units in schools and universities, there are also Party organizations for students. These include the Young
Pioneers movement (shaoxiandui 少先队) at primary school level, and the Communist Youth League at secondary and tertiary levels
(gongqingtuan 共青团) for young people aged fourteen to twenty-eight. In the first year of primary school, teachers nominate children
to be in the first group inducted into the Young Pioneers and they are awarded the red scarf representing a corner of the Chinese flag.
Children are chosen on the basis of excellence in five domains: de 德, zhi 智, ti 体, mei 美, lao 劳 – morality, knowledge, sporting ability,
aesthetics and labour. All children are usually automatically recruited into the Young Pioneers by second or third grade, and awarded
the red scarf, which they wear every day, and children wearing red scarves tied around their necks can be seen in classrooms all over
China. Until relatively recently children also could be occasionally seen wearing green scarves signifying that the child had bad
behaviour or poor grades, although educational authorities have pressured schools to discontinue this practice following protests by
parents and social media campaigns that this is discriminatory and harms children's self-esteem.
Until recently, almost anyone could join the Communist Youth League at secondary level but in 2016 the organization was told to limit
its membership to a smaller number of ‘elite’ students, capped at 60 percent of all high school students and only 30 percent of final year
students, in an attempt to control its membership and influence (Zhuang 2016). At university level, students can apply for full Party
membership, and must be nominated by a sponsor such as a teacher. The ‘best’ students will be approached to join, but not all go
ahead, and some who do not wish to use the tactic of delaying their applications in order not to cause offence.
De Kloet and Fung (2017) claim that youth participation in Party organizations has fallen and that only a small percentage of young
people are active in the Communist Youth League. Many people join the Party for career advancement (especially in public
institutions), rather than an interest in communism. In fact, on being questioned what communism means to them, in my experience
most students can't define what communism is and usually simply say that it refers to the Party. In 2013, the Party introduced stricter
admissions criteria and usually only high ‘quality’ students are accepted or asked to join. Applicants’ political backgrounds are still
examined but there is now a greater emphasis on an applicant's education and career. Using data from the Beijing College Students
Panel survey from 2009 to 2012, Xie and Zhang (2017) reported that 75 percent of university students in Beijing apply for Party
membership and one third are accepted, with university students now making up 40 percent of all new Party members each year.
They found that applicants who express a desire to improve social equality are more likely to apply for membership but there are no
differences in the acceptance rates between these students and applicants expressing more pragmatic career motivations for applying.
Interestingly, students from working-class backgrounds are less likely to be successful than other groups in their application.
CCP oversight of students extends to Chinese students studying overseas. In the early days of students studying abroad, they were
almost exclusively government sponsored, and there were stringent controls including having to report regularly to local Chinese
government representatives, and some students reported that they were spied upon by other students. Chinese students overseas,
especially in relation to any student association activities, have been told that they are free to organize activities as long as they avoid
the ‘three Ts’; Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen (and in more recent years, other topics such as the Cultural Revolution). Recently in
countries such as Australia and America, due to concerns about foreign interference from China, Chinese university students have been
accused of being spies for the Chinese government and this has led to some toxic debates about the desirability of having Chinese
international students in these countries.
Political oversight within China is particularly noticeable in educational ventures with foreign providers and visiting academics. Party
members usually audit lectures and courses given by foreign teaching staff to ensure that the content does not embarrass or criticize
the Party or raise ‘taboo’ issues such as human rights or religious issues. One British university with a relationship with an agricultural
university in China reported that when they remarked that the janitor always seemed to be sweeping in the rooms where their
meetings in China were held they were told that he was the local Party Secretary. Controls over what foreign academics can say seem
to be tightening with one prominent American professor announcing in 2018 that he was leaving his position in China due to increasing
academic intolerance (Wong 2018) and tighter controls have been placed recently on academics travelling overseas.
In June 2017, the government also introduced stronger political controls over international students studying in China, announcing that
they will be required to study compulsory courses on China's laws and regulations and institutions as well as traditional Chinese culture
and customs, with oversight by political instructors. Those studying philosophy and politics will also be required to study Chinese
political theory (Gan 2017).
The toughening of political control, especially in higher education, is also designed to counter Western values and influences. As Feng
(2017) notes:
During Party meetings last year, Mr Xi called on Chinese universities to become ‘strongholds’ of the Party's leadership, and to
integrate ‘ideological work’ into the entire educational process. Education officials have pushed universities to stop using imported
textbooks imbued with ‘Western values’.
As a further indication of the growing extent of political control over all aspects of education under President Xi, in the 2018 gaokao
examination paper, although previously ‘politics have not been front and centre’, five of the nine essay topic choices related to the
philosophy of President Xi Jinping using quotes from his recent speeches (Huang 2018).

Conclusions
As we have seen, China today is a hybrid of current neoliberal ideologies, previous socialist values, and traditional beliefs. These can be
held simultaneously not just at the State level, but also within an individual. Individuals can hold competing and even contradictory
views as public discourses of socialism in the market-driven era mix with private, often materialistic, individual desires. In China such
contradictions are called ‘maodun’ (矛盾), a vague and catch-all term, often accompanied by a shrug of the shoulders, to describe a
conundrum. People are aware of contradictions in the society but may feel helpless to solve them.
These competing narratives and ideologies make for a mix of often contradictory aims. Current neoliberal ideologies mean that
contemporary views of children as ‘autonomous, entrepreneurial individuals’ co-exist with a ‘nationalistic ethos that subsumes
individual children to state projects of national rejuvenation’ alongside a ‘nostalgic harkening back to the socialist, more frugal morality
of the Maoist period, and … long-held folk beliefs concerning the proper way to care for and educate the young’ (Naftali 2016, p. 10).
The curriculum is employed to cultivate the development of ‘desirable’ moral values and ‘correct’ political views; counter social
problems and foreign influences; and to act as a vehicle for ‘the state-supported central value system which provides the ideological
mandate for its governance’ (Law 2017, p. 260) and various Party mechanisms act to ensure that the ‘correct’ line is followed.
It is understandable that countries seek to foster ethical behaviours and moral values (however defined) but patriotic and ideological
education in China contain no such nuances and are unashamedly aimed at instilling the views of the leadership at any given time into
the thinking of its citizenry. Both moral and political education are designed to cultivate moral citizens instilled with national pride and
faith in the CCP, and students are expected to take on these ideologies without question, but this runs counter to the ideals of creativity
and critical thinking identified in the curriculum reforms as necessary for a modern workforce to propel China's economy and global
political standing. The liberalization of education adds a further layer of contradictions to the ideological messages that students receive
since these exist in a social milieu where parents can resort to questionable means to advance their child's educational opportunities in
an educational ‘free-for-all’ environment illustrated by the ubiquitous shadow education system where even teachers engage in fee-
paying private tutoring of curriculum content that they should be teaching in schools.
The education system in China is a microcosm of these competing ideologies as well as the ‘petri dish’ for changing State ideologies. But
China is not just a passive adopter of neoliberalist ideologies in this field. It has actively fed into global performativity measures in
education through its pioneering in 2003 of world university league tables through the Shanghai-Jiaotong University Ranking (now the
Academic Ranking of World Universities).
Over time in China varying ‘isms’ have shaped educational beliefs and practices, from Confucianism, to modernism, to socialism, and
now hyper-capitalism through marketization, consumerism and globalization. The current pervasive ideology of competitiveness, for
example, prominent in education, is a defining feature of both ancient educational practices and contemporary global neoliberalist views
but can also be seen as the antithesis of communist theories and Confucian ideals. Current concerns about ethics and morality among
the young, and in society generally, are driven not just by a nostalgia for both imperial and socialist periods, but stem from a mixture of
past, present and future ideologies and desires all simultaneously exerting influence and fighting for supremacy causing deep ructions in
the structure of Chinese education and society. Vickers and Zeng (2017) argue that the combination of ‘neoliberalism and neo-
traditional authoritarianism has offered elites enormous opportunities to entrench and legitimate vested interests’ (p. 325).
The central dilemma for Chinese education is how can the best of both traditional and innovative education be accommodated to
achieve the nation's goals and the aspirations of its citizens. But these efforts are hampered by contradictory and ambiguous public
policy and narratives; on the one hand, these promote traditional, nationalist and socialist values, as we have seen in this chapter, but
on the other, encourage innovation and creativity in the curriculum, as was seen in Chapter 3. The recent toughening of political
controls on education, encompassing the curriculum, textbooks, the gaokao, party youth organizations, university recruitment and
promotion, private education providers and even foreign students, and the revival of Marxist–Leninist teachings alongside the
introduction of study of the ‘Thoughts of Xi Jinping’, and intensified directives to follow the ‘correct’ political line, show a CCP leadership
wanting it both ways; a liberalized economy but continuing controls over education. The previous decentralization and liberalization of
education is being subsumed under a more overtly political and nationalistic agenda and discourse. Shifts between loosening and
tightening of State control cause uncertainty for educators and leave them and their students subject to current political imperatives.
Education in China is at a crossroads in its history, torn between all these influences and pressures. The following chapter looks at
China's likely future trajectory, examining its educational relationships with the rest of the world and the implications for those outside
China of all these changes.
6
Changing Relationships with the World and Future Challenges
Education is at the forefront of China's engagement with the world. Over recent decades Chinese scholars and students have become
engaged with other international educational systems on an unprecedented scale and those in other systems have had increasing
contact with Chinese students and scholars. As has been seen, educational reform in China has drawn upon many ideas from overseas.
But the most significant form of international engagement has been through human movement; Chinese students studying at schools
and universities overseas, academics from China going to overseas universities as visiting scholars, and academic exchange programmes
of staff and students. More than 4.58 million Chinese students studied abroad between 1978 and 2016 (Xinhua 2018). This movement
has been predominantly one-way but foreign providers and programmes are now travelling in the opposite direction with increasing
movement into China of foreign school and university programmes and institutions. These transnational education initiatives include
joint ventures, branch campuses, and dual or articulation degree programmes (where students undertake part or all of their studies at
an overseas university and receive a degree from that or both universities).
The underlying aim of all these, until relatively recently, was for China to ‘learn from the West’. China has invested heavily in improving
its educational system and into ‘catching up’ with the rest of the world with the ultimate goal of having among the best educational
institutions in the world. This strategy could be regarded as a modern-day manifestation of the late nineteenth-century approach when
China sought to catch up with the West (and Japan), and adopted the motto, ‘in order to defeat the barbarians, one must copy the
barbarians’. But this view of China's needs is beginning to change, with growing confidence in its own power, achievements and
traditions. This chapter charts these changes and examines the impact they are having within China and among those with whom it is
most closely engaged.
This chapter also considers another aspect of international engagement between China and Western countries. Rather than focusing on
putative differences and ‘competition’ between Chinese and Western education, it envisages the possibilities for more effective
collaboration which can lead to transcultural and mutual learning. But it also discusses the many persistent challenges to the
improvement of education in China and to collaboration between it and the West. External and internal challenges arise from different
ideologies, the continued dominance of the examination system, spatial and socioeconomic disparities, and issues of academic integrity
and autonomy.

China's rise and impact on international relationships

The past hangs heavily in China and explains why it is seeking to regain the historical status and influence that existed prior to the
dominance of the Western empires. Pan and Lo (2017) argue that China is keen to join the ‘First World Club’ (p. 18) and China's foreign
policy, as can be seen in supranational ventures such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), derive from ‘the mentality and strategies
associated with imperial China's tributary system [which] are still manifested in China's contemporary diplomacy’ (p. 2). Unlike Russia
whose empire has been diminished with the break-up of the Soviet Union, China's ancient empire is still fundamentally intact. The
increasing isolationism of America with the ascent of President Trump and the ‘America First’ policy and increasing nationalism in
Europe demonstrated by the Brexit vote in Britain, are seen by the Chinese government as assisting in its pursuit to reassert its power
and take on a leading role globally. The Chinese government sees China as being the sole superpower that can ‘plug the economic,
political and cultural gaps that the anticipated departure of the US and parts of Europe portend’ (Wekesa 2017). The BRI project is
emblematic of this endeavour, along with China's massive investment and operations in Africa as well as in other parts of the world.
International education initiatives such as the BRI education project demonstrate that the Chinese government is using education as an
instrument of ‘soft power’ to increase its influence not just in developing countries but also in the West.
The idea of simply improving by learning from the West is being fundamentally questioned as China has indeed begun to ‘catch up’ to,
and even surpass, much of the world in many areas of economics and power. As we saw earlier, educational reform is occurring
alongside debates about how to learn from ‘cultural imports’ – educational ideas and philosophies from outside – and how much
traditional or ‘Chinese’ ideas should be retained or rejuvenated. In education, as in many fields, China is no longer content with drawing
level with the rest of the world. This can be seen in its aims to have among the best universities in the world by 2050, to increase the
international profile and dissemination of Chinese research, and in its huge investment in infrastructure and human resources in
cutting-edge research areas such as artificial intelligence and robotics. China no longer wants to merely import educational ideas; it is
now engaging in initiatives to export its own.

Changing flows of people, ideas and knowledge

One of the most prominent strategies to reform education and improve capacity has been through sending large numbers of students to
study overseas. Chinese students are the most educationally mobile with, in 2014, over 800,000 studying abroad, chiefly in the United
States but also in Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan and Canada (UNESCO 2017). This included 80,000 in primary and secondary
education, 400,000 to 500,000 in colleges and universities, 100,000 to 200,000 in postgraduate study, and between 50,000 and
100,000 in vocational schools (China Daily 2017f).
Travelling abroad for study has a long history in China as we saw in Chapter 1. From 1949, student numbers and destinations were
tightly controlled by the government and reflected political priorities and alliances of the period. In the 1950s, when education followed
the Soviet model, students were mainly sent to the Soviet Union or Soviet-led socialist countries. In the 1970s, China began sending
students to Japan and Western countries, but initially they were only government-sponsored students in a narrow range of disciplines.
Their numbers stayed relatively stable for a decade from 1980, but the number of privately funded students started rising in 1980 with
now 90 percent of international students self-funded. The number of students going abroad to study tripled in the decade from 2008 to
2018 (China Daily 2017f) and students are now also increasingly travelling abroad for secondary and vocational education. The
dramatic increases in the outflow of Chinese students was in part due to the lack of capacity within the Chinese higher education sector
despite its expansion in the early 1990s, as well as the loosening of restrictions around studying abroad.
Chinese students are now also choosing more diverse destinations across the globe and more diverse discipline areas than the previous
mainly Business and Engineering courses. They have broadened their motivations for overseas study and often see international
experience as a way of developing intercultural skills, improving their foreign language proficiency and enhancing their career
prospects. The education initiatives in the BRI (discussed below) are also predicted to increase the number of Chinese students in
countries along those routes.
The strategy of relying on foreign higher education in the development of human capital to drive education reform and economic
progress has enabled education abroad to become a source of ‘brain gain’ for China. For a long period, many more students did not
return than those who did. The problem of ‘brain drain’ was raised early in the Opening Up period, even though Deng Xiaoping was
reported to have stated that even if only 10 percent of students returned, the country would reap substantial benefits. However, in
recent years this trend has reversed as China's economy and career opportunities improve and as the Chinese government has been
offering significant financial incentives for experienced scholars to return.
One policy introduced in 2008 to prevent the loss of talented students and academics is the ‘1,000 talents’ programme (originally
aimed at attracting back Chinese academics from overseas but later expanded to include foreign academics). This offers substantial
incentives to leading scientists and academics to take up posts in China. The Chinese government's efforts to stem the loss of talented
academics to achieve its goal of becoming a powerhouse of higher education by 2050 seem to be paying off. Reporting on an interview
with Wei Yang, President of the National Natural Science Foundation of China, Pells (2018), writing in the Times Higher Education,
quoted Wei as claiming that ‘the brain drain is almost over’. In 2008, Wei said, about seven students left China for each one that came
back; ten years later the figure is six returnees out of seven.
Many more students now return to China especially if they have advanced degrees from leading, generally Anglophone, universities as
they can command higher salaries and even prestigious postings, especially if they have graduated from a ‘world-leading’ university.
The bar is constantly rising which explains Chinese students’ obsession with rankings and universities’ reputations. China has seen this
‘knowledge diaspora’ as a growing national asset and has introduced other generous programmes to induce top academics and scientists
to return.
However, foreign study does not have the same cachet it once did. In past years a foreign degree was a mark of high prestige and a path
to a stellar career. This is changing due to the large numbers of returning students, and perceptions by employers that because
overseas master's degrees in particular are often of only one year's duration, overseas qualifications are of lower quality than the three-
year Chinese master's. The previous ‘sea stars’ gloriously swimming home have become ‘seaweed’, particularly if those returnees
attended a lower-ranked university. Perceptions by students about the lack of quality of foreign courses, especially joint programmes
between Chinese and (usually) Western universities, have led to students feeling that they are ‘cash cows’ for financially strapped
Western universities. A survey by a group of British, German and Chinese academics found that Chinese students at British universities
suffer much higher levels of ‘severe distress’ and anxiety than their counterparts in China and believe their universities pay more
attention to marketing themselves than to student welfare (Clarke 2018). Many students are still keen to study overseas, however, and
increasing numbers do, even if this entails substantial financial investment by their families and considerable hardship and hard work
for themselves.
For several decades China has been the largest sending country of international students but both the type and direction of flows of
students in and out of China to study have changed. Significant numbers of students now travel to China to study, due to generous
scholarships, career opportunities and the growth of programmes taught in English.
In 2016, more than 440,000 students from 205 countries were studying in China, 11.4 percent more than the previous year.
Significantly, over 200,000 of them came from 64 BRI countries, up 13.6 percent from 2016 and showing a faster rate of growth than
for overall international student numbers (China Daily 2017c).
The Chinese government sees this increase in international students as an indicator of its growing influence. An editorial in the China
Daily in November 2017 conceded that this trend owes more to its increasing power and influence than to improvements in its
education. Only 47 percent of international students were studying for degrees (the rest on short Chinese language courses or cultural
programmes) compared with 70 percent of the Chinese students studying degree programmes abroad. Over 90 percent of Chinese
international students go to developed countries while 75.3 percent of those in China come from developing countries, leading the China
Daily to conclude that there is ‘considerable potential’ for the higher education sector to improve its competitiveness (China Daily
2017j).
The changing direction of student flows is a developing global pattern as the previous dominance of Anglophone universities is being
challenged by other countries entering the international education market. Universities in European countries are increasingly offering
programmes in English, and countries in Asia are attracting international students within their own regions through the establishment
of education ‘hubs’. By 2012, Russia, Japan and Malaysia had joined the top 10 receiving countries for international students (Slethaug
2015). The predominantly ‘one way’ direction of travel of students and programmes is changing from a ‘core-periphery’ one to multiple
movements across the world (Institute of International Education 2014). As universities worldwide pursue internationalization
agendas, universities in non-Anglophone countries are also engaging with Chinese scholars and developing joint programmes with
Chinese institutions.
The increase in international students in China is part of the government's plan to extend the influence of Chinese culture around the
world outlined in the 2016 13th Five-Year Plan for Education. One objective is enhancing its internationalization strategy through
Sino-foreign education collaborations and joint ventures with priority given to new joint ventures in the natural sciences and
engineering, with universities, colleges and schools being encouraged to collaborate with ‘world-class’ international counterparts.
Despite these initiatives, fundamental problems remain due to the differing ideologies of education discussed in the previous chapter
which can pose difficulties for staff and students travelling along these flows. For Chinese students studying overseas, the nature of
Chinese educational traditions and practices can make this problematic. Students who have been successful within their own system can
encounter difficulties when they move to an educational system with unfamiliar norms and expectations, causing challenges for both
students and teachers.
Many Chinese students I have taught or interviewed over the past twenty years, in Australia and the United Kingdom, say they feel
misunderstood. They may be unaware that many of their educational approaches, a result of their previous education and upbringing,
stem from Confucian educational tenets, but the connection is very clear. Although not universal, many say that they like to think more
than talk (demonstrating self-reflection), don't like to show off (showing modesty or a preference for harmony), and keep problems to
themselves and try to work them out later using a textbook (displaying self-cultivation and perseverance). These traits are usually
interpreted in Western classrooms as passiveness or lack of academic skills and their teachers may focus on what they seemingly ‘lack’
rather than the qualities that they bring. These students may have good foundational and factual knowledge but may lack the specific
analytical and argumentation skills that are prized in their new learning environments. For these students, conflicting ideologies of
education clash at the very personal level.
Of course, not all Chinese students are the same, and students come from a variety of backgrounds or have grown up in different
periods, but their previous educational experiences do impact on their subsequent expectations of teaching and learning. However, the
‘gap’ between teaching and learning in these different systems is narrowing due to the reform of education in China and as Chinese
students have more international experiences.
As well as pursuing external strategies of internationalization through outflows of students and staff for foreign training, China has been
internationalizing its course provision internally. Many universities now offer joint programmes with international universities, courses
in English, and liberal arts or general education programmes. Structural and institutional reform has facilitated the establishment of
branch campuses of international universities offering foreign programmes in collaboration with Chinese providers and several foreign
universities are now operating within China. These complex and changing flows are fundamentally altering the nature of relationships
between Chinese and international education systems. These new sites of cultural and academic contact and new conditions offer both
the impetus and opportunities for new and more reciprocal relationships between these systems.

From importing to exporting education and culture

China is seeking to become an exporter rather than merely an importer of cultural and educational ideas and knowledge and this is
driven by China's new position in the world order. Its more muscular and outward-focused foreign policy reflects its desire to move
away from a ‘catch up’ mentality and beyond Western models of education.
The new multi-directional educational flows have been driven by China's changing geopolitical and economic relationships with the
world but also by its strategy of using education to soften its foreign and economic policy. The Chinese government sees education as a
source of ‘soft power’ and has been engaging in a range of strategies to further its geopolitical goals by ‘exporting’ Chinese education to
the world, thus reversing a trend of the last 150 years and representing a remarkable shift in its international education strategy.
These ‘export’ initiatives include: the establishment of Confucian Institutes in universities around the world; the development of branch
campuses of Chinese universities in other countries; the sending of Chinese mathematics teachers overseas to teach their foreign
counterparts; the establishment of Chinese schools and higher and vocational educational institutions internationally; and the BRI
educational programme.
Since 2004, China has promoted Chinese language and culture by establishing Confucius Institutes overseas with, by 2017, over 500 in
142 countries (China Daily 2017i). While these are jointly operated by Chinese universities and a foreign partner university, the
Chinese State Council has ultimate authority over them. In addition to teaching Chinese language, they promote China's culture, way of
life and foreign policies, and are seen as a major strategy to promote Chinese interests. Unlike similar initiatives such as Alliance
Franҫaise Institutes, Confucius Institutes not only represent ‘brand China’ (Louie 2011, p. 78) to the world but also give China a
massive presence in higher education internationally. The Confucius nomenclature is important, Louie (2011) argues, as it gives
credibility to such initiatives, positioning Confucius as a ‘twenty-first-century diplomat’ to facilitate PRC soft power ‘in a world where
national identity is marketed for political spin’ (p. 78).
A very recent development has been the establishment overseas of Chinese university campuses. Xiamen University established a
campus in Malaysia in 2016, and in 2018, Peking University opened a Business School on a campus in Oxford to attract students from
both China and Europe. In 2016, The New Beacon Group, a consortium of Chinese education groups and investors, purchased a former
campus of Staffordshire University in the United Kingdom for a new Chinese international school, university and centre for innovation.
Its aim is to offer ‘premium teaching methods [which will] combine the best of East and West’. Its higher education courses will be
offered through the University of Wolverhampton (New Beacon Group 2017). In China's first vocational education venture abroad,
Bohai Vocational College has established a training institute in Thailand using the ‘luoban’ (craftmanship) workshop approach, with
plans to extend this to Indonesia and India and then worldwide.
China's 2009 and 2012 PISA results triggered interest in Chinese education, especially in the teaching of mathematics. PISA is a
comparison survey conducted triennially by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which assesses the
reading, mathematics, and science competencies of fifteen-year-olds worldwide. As noted earlier, students in Shanghai topped these
results in all three subjects in 2009 and 2012 resulting in calls in other countries to learn from China's success. But China's results in
these years caused controversy about the credibility and representativeness of the data. Xu and Dronker's (2016) analysis of the 2009
and 2012 PISA data showed that, even though increasing numbers of low socioeconomic status students were enrolled in Shanghai
schools, those participating in the PISA tests were selectively chosen in terms of family background leading to ‘upwardly biased test
performance’ (p. 271).
The PISA results led to initiatives overseas to learn from China's teaching of mathematics. Several programmes were initiated in the
United Kingdom and Australia to bring mathematics teachers from China to demonstrate their teaching methods. In the 2015 PISA
round, when Beijing, Jiangsu and Guangdong were included, China dropped to twelfth place even though these areas are also relatively
wealthy, with Singapore topping the ratings. But this has not tempered interest in Chinese education abroad or the calls to emulate its
apparent success.
Students in China certainly spend a greater proportion of school hours learning mathematics and the gaokao emphasizes mathematics.
It is also true that Chinese students studying mathematics in British universities are generally initially ahead of their peers but can be
overtaken in later years when conceptual understanding and independent learning skills become more important. They may have
learnt how to do calculations quickly but don't necessarily understand the underlying concepts or have the skills necessary to undertake
independent work. Universities such as Oxford and Cambridge have found that although mathematics students from China enter with
good results, they tend to not do as well as other students in their course overall.
Increased interest in Chinese education and recognition of China's rise have led to the establishment of and increasing popularity of
Chinese bilingual or Mandarin immersion schools in countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States and in Europe with the
blend of Chinese and Western education holding some appeal. These initiatives are seen by investors as opportunities to fulfil the
desires of parents overseas, both ethnic and non-Chinese, who see the advantages of a Chinese bilingual and bicultural education for
their children's future. According to the Chairman of Kensington Wade School, a dual lingual and cultural school established in London in
2016, these developments are due to:
The growing influence of China on the economies, politics and culture of many countries [which] means that more and more people
will want their children to have the facility to mix with Chinese company and do business with China … Both Chinese and English
education have their limitations, and both have benefits. In order to take advantage of the best of both worlds, dual language and
culture schools are being set up in the USA and, finally, Europe.
(de Burgh 2017)
The revival of sishu ‘traditional’ private schools in China (see Chapter 4) is spreading the influence of traditional Chinese educational
values. Modern sishu schools focus on traditional skills and children wear traditional costumes and read classical literature. The sishu
nomenclature has been given to schools being established overseas, in a similar fashion to the Confucius Institutes set up at universities,
with its connotations of conservative and traditional education. These schools cater for younger children and offer tuition in Mandarin
and mathematics as well as in traditional Chinese arts. One school established in London and sponsored by University College London
offers after-school courses for children aged one to twelve and their parents (Sishu Chinese London 2017).
The most significant and ambitious example of China's desire to increase its political, economic and cultural influence globally is the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced in 2013 it involves massive infrastructure projects to ‘revive the ancient land and sea routes of
the Silk Road’ (China Daily 2017g) and to rejuvenate and restore China to its historic prominence. Invocation of the ‘Silk Road’ is no
accident; the project is clearly at the vanguard of China's efforts to regain its historical global prominence and power. It involves 100
countries with 65 trade cooperation zones along land and sea routes and encompasses major engineering, manufacturing, technology
and cultural projects, political and trade collaborations, and educational initiatives. Its focus is economic development and ties between
China and the mineral-rich central Asian republics and east and central Europe, though it extends right across Europe to western
Europe and Scandinavia, and via the sea route, to southeast Asia, the Indian sub-continent and through to the Middle East and Africa,
as well as North and South America. The BRI is probably the most prominent demonstration internationally of the current Chinese
‘psyche’ and rising nationalism as well as the most obvious manifestation of President Xi's ‘China Dream’ and his desire to establish a
new world order with China at its centre.
In 2015 the government established the University Alliance of the Belt & Road (UAB&R) which currently has 132-member universities
from 32 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa, North America and Australia. BRI educational initiatives include collaboration and exchanges
of students and staff between universities in China and ones along the various routes, with universities in one province in China given
responsibility for a region. Gansu Province, for example, has responsibility for the central Asian Republics due to its geographical
proximity and long ethnic and cultural ties, with Lanzhou University, as the leading university in the province, taking the lead role in
building collaborations with universities in central Asian countries.
Some argue that the BRI provides opportunities for international cooperation ‘to a degree unprecedented’ and that its ‘hard’ power
aspects include trade and infrastructure financing while it's ‘soft’ power potential lies in creating or re-creating cultural traditions and
heritages and promoting understanding among people of different cultures and histories (Galligan 2016). Others claim that the BRI is a
global ‘game changer’ and will be the key growth driver for many regions in the world creating a global ‘pivot to China’ (Yeoh 2016).
Some countries, however, most notably India, are wary of China's foreign policy ambitions and there are concerns elsewhere about
potential longer-term debt distress in developing countries which have borrowed from China for infrastructure projects along the
routes.
While the economic and political aspects of the BRI are now well known, the educational initiatives have received less attention but also
have potential to create significantly different transnational education relationships, in the growth, and patterns of international flows of
people, knowledge and ideas. Rather than the previous seeking of bilateral partnerships with foreign universities, the BRI supranational
initiatives represent a new form of international education involving multilateral ties across international higher education sectors not
driven by individual universities but by the Chinese government's economic and foreign policy imperatives. China is seeking to reverse
the flow and nature of academic mobility and take a more active role in international higher education. This ‘pivot’ to China will have
significant impacts in education especially in the movement of students from the central and western Asian republics to China.
The recent valorization of China's education and its export to the world has enabled its leaders to present China's culture and education
to its citizens as engendering respect globally and having high international status. New initiatives such as Chinese schools and univer-
sities overseas partly take advantage of the economic opportunities that such endeavours present, but others such as the Confucian
Institutes and the BRI education projects are charm offensives by the Chinese government to extend its ‘soft power’. China now seeks
more than wealth; it wants power and influence. Epitomizing this sentiment, Jiang Shigong, a Professor of Law at Peking University,
extolled the ‘era of Xi Jinping’ and argued that China stood up under Mao, got rich under Deng Xiaoping, and is now getting powerful
under Xi Jinping (The China Story 2018).

Opportunities for mutual learning and understanding

The increasing links between China and countries around the world have opened up greater opportunities for mutual learning between
their systems of educational practice rather than simply competition, capacity building or revenue raising. There are new developments
in the ‘export’ of Chinese education; however, it is still the case that although engagement of Chinese scholars and students with other
educational systems has led to much learning for them, this learning tends to be one-way. Chinese students overseas, for example, feel
that they have to adopt Western academic discourses in order for their work to be accepted, and the dominance of the English language
and Western academic values and discourses also causes dilemmas for Chinese academics wishing to publish internationally. They have
to not just write in another language but also conform to unfamiliar academic modes and discourses. Klitgård (2011) argues that this
‘tyranny of the Anglosphere’ acts to supress indigenous and diverse academic thought.
There is no doubt that, with its intellectual heritage going back thousands of years, much can be learnt from China. The accelerated
movement of people and ideas globally has opened up possibilities for reciprocal learning across education systems. The transnational
initiatives described above provide opportunities for cross cultural learning between China and its partners, and changing geopolitical
relations make the argument for more multi- rather than uni-directional learning compelling.
Educational contacts between Western countries and China have to date been based on the assumption that China has much to learn
from the West and that Chinese and Western academic systems are fundamentally different, even polar opposites. However, an
investigation of the putative differences between Chinese and Western ideas about scholarship and learning, to explore possibilities for
reciprocal learning, found no clear China–Western dichotomy (Ryan 2012). Comparisons across such vast spatial and diverse areas run
the risk of stereotyping individuals both within and between these systems but such studies can illustrate certain patterns. The study
compared the views on scholarship and learning of 26 senior academics at nine Western universities (in the US, UK and Australia) and
nine in China. Participants were asked how they define ‘good’ scholarship and ‘effective’ learning; their views on differences and
commonalities in paradigms of learning between Western and Chinese systems; and whether these paradigms are changing or should
change.
A good deal of similarity was found in participants’ definitions with academics in both systems identifying the importance of originality
and innovation in scholarship, and shared ideas about effective learning defining it as the understanding and application of knowledge,
development of skills such as independent thinking, and learning through building on what is known to generate new knowledge and
understanding. There were interesting differences by individuals within each system, demonstrating that there can be more diversity
within cultural academic systems than between them. The study showed that there are sufficient commonalities between these
systems to be the basis for mutual understanding but also sufficient differences to be the source of mutual learning.
The increased intercultural contact across knowledge systems provides a persuasive argument for educators to move beyond
complacency about their own systems and instead work creatively to secure the benefits of the global movement of people and ideas
through transcultural and transformative learning. Transcultural learning envisages that contact between cultures, as dynamic and
fluid systems of human practice, enables individuals to critique, reflect on and transform their own cultures leading to the formation of
new cultures through the combining of elements of these different cultural systems (Cuccioletta 2002). History has shown the value of
learning through cultures-in-contact, with the old Silk Road a pertinent example. Such learning, nonetheless, needs to be mindful of the
heterogeneity and dynamism of cultures and be informed by realistic and unromanticized understandings on both sides.
However, several impediments remain to the achievement of these lofty goals including entrenched attitudes and vested interests, and
any success will depend on willingness to embrace change. Additionally, rather than being genuine endeavours of transcultural learning,
intercultural contact between China and its, especially Western, counterparts is constrained by agendas and conceptualizations of
internationalization which are very far apart. Western universities see internationalization primarily as a revenue stream while China
sees it as a human capital development strategy. Similarly, neither ‘deficit’ views of the supposed lack of criticality in Chinese education
nor ‘surplus’ views that eulogize it are helpful in pursuing mutual understanding, based as they are on stereotyped, inaccurate or
romanticized assumptions. Mutual understanding by the West needs to be based on an understanding of contemporary realities that
recognizes the complex and often contradictory nature of education in China today.
Additionally, Western scholarship continues to be held up as the hallmark against which all others should be judged. This Eurocentric
nature of academic thought and practice has been challenged in recent times by theorists such as Said (in Orientalism) and more
recently by Connell (in Southern Theory) who call for new orientations towards scholarship and learning. Chen (2010) argues that a
new ‘point of reference’ is required for the examination of academic discourses in changing geopolitical conditions and that in
intercultural educational contact both sides need to move beyond entrenched cultural thinking and binary views of the other.
Others have called for intercultural dialogue and understanding and a move away from one-way, Western orientations. In 2006,
Hayhoe, commenting on Samuel Huntington's 1993 article ‘The clash of civilizations’, argued that the debate it ignited opened up
opportunities for ‘global appreciation of Eastern thought’ (p. 1). Many viewed Huntington's call as a warning, but Hayhoe (2006) points
out that Huntington called for dialogue among civilizations and intercultural understanding, and quoting Huntington, for ‘a more
profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people
in those civilizations see their interests’ (p. 3). China's growing power and importance in world affairs has made such intercultural
dialogue even more urgent.
In the internationalization of education, these more mutual approaches would seem to be even more important. Gu (2001) hints at the
undesirability of only one-way learning:
The internationalization of education can be expressed in the exchange of culture and values, mutual understanding and a respect
for difference … The internationalization of education does not simply mean the integration of different national cultures or the
suppression of one national culture by another culture.
(p. 105)
Without wanting to stereotype different education systems, there are distinctive features of the Chinese and the British systems, for
example (to take Britain here as a key illustration of traditional ‘Western’ education), that can provide for rich mutual learning. For
China, these can include academic freedom and integrity, criticality, learner-focus, creativity and innovation, and the value of
qualitative approaches to research. Britain can learn features of education in China such as respect for learning, the importance of hard
work, high aspirations for academic success, a willingness to learn from other countries, an eagerness to reform and invest in education,
and the importance of self-reflection.
This last feature derives from Confucian notions of the importance of self-reflection for learning, epitomized in the saying attributed to
Confucius that ‘in order to understand the other, one must first understand the self’. In Western contexts, the importance of a critical
stance is emphasized and students are encouraged to establish their own arguments through criticism of the work of others. In Chinese
contexts, the student is encouraged to take a modest stance and engage in learning through self-reflection. Western approaches thus
advocate critique of others while Chinese ones encourage critique of the self. Willingness to learn from others is demonstrated in the
apparent silence of Chinese students in Western classrooms usually interpreted as passiveness but more likely an indication that they
are listening to and reflecting upon the views of others. Likewise, the more holistic, less argumentatively structured, approaches to
research in China, rather than a focus on supporting one contention and taking it to its logical conclusion, can help to broaden methods of
inquiry. Chinese students can believe that the Western unidirectional approach to research and the presentation of results at the
beginning of a work is boring and a ‘give away’. These few examples show how intercultural learning and understanding can lead to a
more pluralistic knowledge base, more heterogeneous methods of expression, and more diverse views about the nature of knowledge
and scholarship.

Continuing challenges and tensions

Despite the achievements of the education reform programme, many challenges remain and as has been shown, these arise from the
nexus of social, cultural, economic and political conditions within which these problems are embedded. These include competing
ideologies of education, dominance of the examination system, disparities between different sectors of Chinese society, unevenness of
the reforms, and the implications of ‘education fever’. Many of these have been explored previously, but here some especially thorny
issues to do with academic integrity and autonomy are examined as these threaten to undo the efforts of educators and educational
institutions.
In seeking to become a world leader in scientific research, China has made impressive progress in its output of research publications in
international journals. It has invested heavily in infrastructure and facilities with now more laboratory scientists than anywhere else in
the world (Qin 2017). Yang (2015) argues that investment in hardware is not enough though, and what is lacking in China is high
quality ‘software’, including human resources; ‘Simply buying state-of-the-art laboratory equipment will not guarantee the kind of
intellectual atmosphere that has developed over centuries on European and American campuses’ (p. 533).
One significant problem is that of the quality and integrity of academic research. China has made remarkable gains in research output
and citation rates are increasing rapidly. In 2010, articles published in international journals by Chinese researchers accounted for 11
percent worldwide, but by 2014 this had jumped to 18.1, overtaking the United Kingdom and ranking it number two in the world
behind the United States (Elsevier 2017). This is partly due to the greatly increased volume of articles submitted to international
journals by Chinese authors, but even with this increase, as noted earlier, citation rates per article are still significantly lower than for
American and British researchers. According to The Economist (2013), ‘A hint of the relative weakness of these papers is found in the
fact that China ranks just 14th in average citations per SCI [Science Citation Index] paper, suggesting that many Chinese papers are
rarely quoted by other scholars’. One explanation of the lower citation of research outputs by academics in China may be the fact that
international citation indexes such as the SCI do not take into account articles published in Chinese (or in any other language). In
addition, most academics in China read English but very few non-Chinese scholars have the ability to read and therefore cite Chinese
language articles.
Other explanations may relate to issues regarding the reputation and integrity of research output. The Chinese government has
recognized that one of the major threats to the improvement of higher education is the level of dishonesty and fraud in the sector, and
despite recent successes in world university rankings and publications output, Chinese universities ‘still lag far behind the best in the
West’ (Yang 2015, p. 533). The integrity of some of China's research output has been called into question and the reputation of
publications coming out of China has been dogged by scandals.
Investigations by Nature (in 2010) and Science (in 2013) found evidence of widespread fraud and corruption in research publications
from China. The investigation by Science (Hvistendahl 2013) found evidence of an academic ‘black market’ including fraudulent
practices such as paying others, even online companies, to write articles, falsifying research results, plagiarism, self-plagiarizing by
translating a paper already published in Chinese and resubmitting it in English or hiring a ghostwriter to compose a paper from faked or
independently gathered data. The Economist (2013) reported a large number of instances of articles by Chinese academics being later
retracted from journals due to fraud, plagiarism or duplicate publications. This arises from a focus in China on quantity rather than
quality and is a product of an emphasis on targeting ‘numerical goalposts’ rather than the quality of research. As Professor Wei Ha of
Peking University argued in 2016, ‘quantity is not everything. If you measure quality [such as research citations] China is still lagging
behind’ (Wei 2016).
The Chinese government has recognized that the level of corruption and dishonesty within the higher education sector is a major threat
to its standing. In one government survey a third of more than 6,000 researchers at six leading institutions admitted to falsification,
fabrication or plagiarism (The Economist 2013). According to Qin (2017), China has had to retract more scientific papers than all other
countries put together because of fake reviews, and fraud and dishonesty have become a ‘festering problem of systemic fraud’. Yang
(2015) argues there has been a significant distortion and inefficiency in the operation of universities, and damage to morale and the
academic atmosphere within institutions, created by the fact that:
Since the 1990s, academic culture has fast become decadent and penetrated deeply into the higher education sector from regional
to national flagship institutions in almost every aspect of university operation. The problem has taken various forms including
falsifying and plagiarizing academic achievements of others, obtaining scientific research projects or rewards by bribery and other
illegal means, deliberately hiding academic scandal and covering up academic corruption by universities or research institutions.
Those involved include students, professors, institutional leaders and academicians.
(p. 532)
A further constraint on the quality and creativity of academic research arises from the tightening of government ideological controls and
subsequent self-censorship by some academics around sensitive topics. The recent emphasis on the correct ‘ideological orientation’ of
educational institutions has opened the system up to the vicissitudes of China's political leadership and has brought some instability into
education. Although President Xi's anti-corruption drives have been welcomed, it is clear that in the education sector, under his
leadership institutions must conform to a greater degree to ideological policies and practices. This can be seen in restrictions on access
to foreign journal articles, increased expectations for schools and universities to conform to the government's political imperatives, and
the introduction of units in schools and universities to monitor dissent or public criticism. Kuhn (2017), writing in the China Daily, notes
that the Party's leadership role is intensifying and the Party will be more deeply embedded within government agencies and in sectors
of society such as private companies, foreign businesses and educational institutions.
Although the government is intent on making China's universities among the best in the world, lack of access to online resources
severely hampers academics and students in gaining access to international research in foreign journals, conference websites and
foreign universities. The recent introduction of limits on academics travelling overseas will act as a further constraint. Access to
international journals and conference papers is provided in China via CNKI, an online educational database co-hosted by the Chinese
government and several Chinese universities, and Baidu Scholar (China's equivalent to Google Scholar). Both of these forms of access
can be easily censored. In July 2017 the government ordered China's telecommunication companies to block access to VPNs (Virtual
Private Networks) that allow users to circumvent China's online censorship system (the ‘Great Firewall’), as well as Google sites
including Google mail (Guardian 2017b).
The Chinese government is sensitive to outside criticisms of China from academics (and of course from those inside as well), viewing
such criticisms as ‘historical nihilism’. It has called on historians in China to ‘defend the history of the Chinese Communist Party’ (China
Daily 2017h). It is especially defensive towards academic articles on sensitive topics such as Tiananmen, the Cultural Revolution and
Xinjiang. In August 2017 the government directed Cambridge University Press (CUP) to block access in China to over 300 articles from
the renowned journal China Quarterly. Although CUP initially agreed, it subsequently reversed this decision in the face of an uproar
among academics outside China and a threatened boycott of CUP (Guardian 2017c), and amid reports that other academic publishers
have received similar requests (Zhou 2017a). In November 2017, the Financial Times reported that the academic publisher Springer
had also blocked access in China to 1,000 articles in two Springer journals, including the prestigious journal Nature, that contained
keywords deemed sensitive by Chinese officials, such as ‘Tibet’, ‘Tiananmen’, ‘Taiwan’, ‘Xinjiang’ and ‘Cultural Revolution’ (Bland
2017). Such measures limit academic freedom and autonomy and seriously hamper efforts by educationalists to improve the quality of
scholarship and learning in China and improve its standing and reputation globally.

Conclusions
Despite much progress in terms of increased educational access and curriculum reform, many challenges continue to face China's
education system. Continuing threats include rising inequalities, unevenness and lack of consensus about reform, the capacity-building
work still needed to achieve its ambitious plans to be a world leader in scientific research, and issues of academic integrity and
autonomy. These are all occurring against a background of competing ideologies and complex and rapidly changing social and cultural
conditions; culture is not static nor universal and China is a diverse and vast nation so such challenges are not easily resolved.
What is interesting to note is how the Chinese government is using education to increase Chinese influence internationally, such as
through the BRI and Confucius Institutes, and intensifying political and patriotic education, both playing into historic pride in China's
past achievements and the desire to regain former glory not just on the part of the Chinese government but its citizens as well. China is
no longer content to be the world's factory or be seen as second-rate so these initiatives have strong emotional and psychological appeal
in a nation desperate to (re)gain a leading role in the world. But the rise of China has been met with differing responses from outside; it
is sometimes revered, often feared, and largely misunderstood. China's national triumphalism in regaining economic and political power
and influence and its recent educational prominence means that education has become a flagship of national reform and a symbol of
China's past and future glory both nationally and internationally.
However, the educational benefits of China's success are not being shared. Despite attempts to reform and improve education the
government has not been able to address rising educational inequality and reduce pressures on students and families. Broader social,
cultural, economic and political factors are adding to growing inequalities which will have long-term implications not just for the
economic health and future development of China as a nation but also for the social cohesion of Chinese society. The Chinese
government is intent on shaping the minds of its citizens to secure allegiance to the State and secure political stability, social cohesion
and economic prosperity, but its efforts to improve educational quality and access are being thwarted by its economic and political
agendas. Overall, the educational free-for-all that is developing is leading to greater inequality and damage to the social fabric as well as
producing exhausted children who have missed out on a childhood and draining the resources of families desperate to get ahead.
Although educational reform in China is clearly an unfinished project, immense change is undoubtedly taking place and is probably
greater than in any other national educational system. The policies and goals that China has set for education will have tremendous
impact not just on the economic state of the nation but, more importantly, on the futures of its children and citizens. In many ways,
young Chinese people are already more internationalized than their Western counterparts given the number who travel overseas to
develop intercultural skills and knowledge and their exposure to Western and other foreign cultural influences. Their experiences and
perspectives will be the driving force behind Chinese culture and values in the future.
There is much to be learnt from China but much more work is needed before it can truly claim to have among the best education
systems in the world. Nonetheless, there are areas where it can be considered unique. The ‘secret’ to China's educational ‘success’ is not
China's education system, but the value placed on education in China, the high educational expectations and aspirations of students and
parents, and the efforts and investment of individual families and students. Although Vickers and Zeng (2017) rightly argue that
exceptionalist views of China tend to temper criticism of it, in these aspects China can be regarded as exceptional and these are what set
it apart.
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Index
13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016–20) 48, 77, 92, 115, 170, 171, 192
19th National Congress (2017) 73
211 Higher Education Institute Project (1995) 105
985 World Class University Project (1998) 105
1,000 Young Talents programme 106
10,000 talents programme 60–1, 106
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 61, 107, 184
adult/lifelong learning 47, 48, 77–9
Africa 198, 199
Alliance Française Institutes 195
America First policy 187–8
Analects 23, 129–30
Annual Report on Left-Behind Girls in China's Rural Areas (2016) 126
Anti-Rightist Movement 36
Aristotle 161
ARWU see Academic Ranking of World Universities
Asia 198, 199
Australia 3, 148, 181, 193, 196
Bai, Tongdong 43, 159, 160
Baidu Scholar 208
Bailey 24
basic education 50–1
alternative education 66
curriculum reform 87–95
examinations 65
long hours in 66
subjects studied 66–7
Beijing 33, 39, 58, 94, 96, 119, 120, 127, 133
Beijing College Students Panel survey (2009–13) 180
Belgium 27
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 3, 187, 188, 189, 195, 198–200
The Big Family of the Chinese Nation 175
Bohai Vocational College, Thailand 196
Bourdieu, P. 54
Boxer Rebellion 30
Bray, M. 21
Brexit 188
BRI see Belt and Road Initiative
Buddha, Buddhism 10, 18, 22, 23
Cai Yuanpei 32
Cambridge University 57, 58, 146, 197
Cambridge University Press (CUP) 209
Camicia, S. 172, 173
Canada 3, 148
Cao, Weixing 70
CCP see Chinese Communist Party
Central Asian Republics 199
certification craze 74–5
Chan, R. K. H. 142, 145
Chen Duxiu 33, 34
Chen, Lipeng 175
Cheng, Kai-ming 163–4
Chengdu 67
China 163
aspiration to become high-tech knowledge economy 72–4
catching up with Western world 16, 186–7
and century of humiliation 27–8
change from importing to exporting education/culture 194–200
changing flows of people, ideas, knowledge 188–94
civil war 34
as first meritocracy 16–17
foreign policy 3, 5
inequalities due to market reforms 112–16
move to creative/innovative economy 94
Opening Up period 190
opportunities for mutual learning/understanding 200–5
origins of 17–18
policy borrowing 53, 96, 159
poverty in 39
rich philosophical tradition 44–5
self-strengthening movement 28–9
uneasy relationship with outside/foreign world 29
China Central Radio and TV University 77
China Daily 192
‘China Dream’ 73, 177, 198
China Merchants Group 94
China Quarterly 209
China Scholarship Council 60–1
China Securities and Regulatory Commission 93
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 119
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2, 6, 10–11, 12, 33, 34, 36, 46, 49, 91, 115, 147, 151, 167, 168, 173, 175, 176, 178–82, 183, 184, 209
Chinese Mathematical Olympiad 73, 75
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 48
Chinese Students’ Resilience and Wellbeing survey 139
Christ, Christianity 10, 18
Christian missionary schools 30
citizenship education 172–4
CNKI (online database) 208
collaborative learning 67, 88, 97, 161–2
Communist Party of China (CPC) 129, 170
see also Chinese Communist Party
Communist Youth League 179–80
community-run schools 37, 142, 144, 146
Compulsory Education Law of the People's Republic of China (1986) 41, 65, 131, 138
Confucianism 10, 12, 15, 66
appropriation by the State 163–4
considered feudal/old 37
continuing influence of 43
disagreements/interpretations 19, 160
dismantling of academies 28
during Cultural Revolution 153
Five Classics 160–1
five constant virtues 21
five relationships of society 20–1
as malleable ideology 152–3
moral/ethical dimensions 20, 154, 158–9
philosophical/educational approach 20, 159–61
re-introduction/promotion of 16, 153–4, 158–68, 167, 169
selective use by State 19–20
self-cultivation/self-perfection 88
self-reflection 204
see also imperial Confucian period (2nd century BCE to mid 19th century)
Confucius 2, 15, 17, 18–23, 44, 120, 129, 153, 158–60, 163–4, 195, 204
Confucius Institutes 147, 195, 198, 210
Connell, R. 203
continuing (professional) education 77–9, 100–2
Cowan, S. 138
CPC see Chinese Communist Party
cram schools 56, 66
Cultural Revolution (1966–76) 36–42, 153, 154, 165, 175, 181, 209
CUP see Cambridge University Press
curriculum reform 85, 110–11
broadening of curriculum 92
challenges to implementation 95–100
child-centred/play-based methods 89
and collaborative learning 161–2
continued dominance of gaokao 90–1
design innovation/creativity introduced 93–4
examination-orientation as challenge to 89
field work/self-directed research 90
globalization/nationalism tension 156–7
goals of 88
instilling national identity/pride in citizens 94–5
introduction of social activities 92
reform plans/guidelines 85–6
professional development 100–2
programme for 86–7
‘quality’ autonomous learners 88
reform plans/guidelines 85–6
school education 87–95
self-contradictory nature of 100
teacher education 100–2
tensions/challenges to 87
vocational/higher education 102–10
Dai, D. Y. 98
Daily China 208
Daley, M. 98
Daoism 10, 19, 23, 66, 153
Datong Shu (Book of Great Unity) 162
Dauncey, S. 138
de Kleot, J. 32, 174, 180
Democracy Wall movement (1978–1979) 175
Deng Xiaoping 39, 176, 190, 200
Dewey, John 33
Diaoyu Islands 178
The Diplomat 178
disabilities/learning difficulties
attendance in regular schools 138–9
attendance in specialist schools 138, 139
as disadvantaged group 137
negative attitudes towards 141–2
plagued by multiple stressors 139
regulations concerning 140–1
special needs education 137–8
unevenness of provision 141
distance learning 76–7
Double World Class Project (2015) 105–6
Dronker, J. 196
early childhood education
access to/cost of 62, 123
ages of children 62
demand for 64–5
funding/management 62, 64–5
goal to improve access/quality of 47
importance of 64
popularity of Montessori and Steiner schools 66
private 63
quality provision of 64
and second-child policy 63–4
targets 48
see also preschool education
The Economist 206
education
attempts at reform 6–8, 15, 210–11
background 1–6
benefits of 38
and ’brain drain’ problem 190
classical texts on 160–1
continuing challenges/tensions 205–9
costs/funding 41
crucial role of 45, 186
culture of 4–5
definitions used 10–11
development of/investment in 1
Dewey's ideas/influence 33
educational ‘fever’ 205
effect of socialist ideology on 34–5
effects of Cultural Revolution 35–8
exported to other countries 3
formal structure 22–6
formal system 46–7, 50–1
generalizations concerning 10
generational loss of 37–8
global assessment rankings 1
holistic 51, 90, 204
importing/exporting 194–200
informal systems 47, 143
infrastructure 52–3
as instrument of soft power 4, 88
international exchange of people, ideas, knowledge 188–94
key role in Chinese society 2
legacies of the past 43–5
marketization, decentralization, privatization of 39–43
as mirror/motor of social/political change 27
multi-perspective approach 8–14
and national identity/historical purpose 3
need to increase capacity 46
obsession with grades/rankings 53
opportunities for ’lost generation’ 40
opportunities for mutual learning/understanding 200–5
outside worldview of 38–9
overseas demand for/recognition of 7
personal ideologies of 43
political/social function 3, 5–6, 15, 151–2, 154–5
policy borrowing 53, 96, 159
pressures/competitiveness in 56–62, 65, 92
‘quality’ discourse 41–3, 46
reform/expansion of 40–3, 53
school choice fees 54–5
size of 46
teaching of foreign languages 29, 91, 134, 143, 146, 148, 197
traditional wisdoms 159–63
Western theories 159, 160, 161–2, 163, 164–5
Education for Sustainable Development 93
Einstein, Albert 33
elite education 53–4
‘dream run’ 55–6
effect on status, career prospects, connections 59
entry into 59–60
obsession with elitism 60–1, 159
parental aspirations 54–5
pressures of 56–9
Elsevier 108
ESE see ethnic solidarity education
ethnic minorities 10, 76, 112, 118, 175
see also minority education
ethnic solidarity education (ESE) 136–7, 174–5
ethnicity, Confucian theory of 175
Europe 199
examination system 26, 36–7, 40–1, 68, 69–71, 89, 90–1, 182, 197
extra-curricular activities 12, 47, 55–6, 66, 79–80, 143
Facing the 21st Century Education Development Action Plan (1999) 104
Feng, E. 182
Feng, Jiayun 62
Financial Times 209
First World War 32
Five Classics
Book of Changes (Yijing) 161
Book of History (Shujing) 161
Book of Rites (Liji) 161
Book of Songs (Shijing) 161
Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu) 161
France 27
Fudan University 30, 77
funding
for education 47, 62, 64–5, 151
local government 49–53, 73
for special initiatives 50
lack of 72
Fung, A. 32, 174, 180
Fuzhou Naval College 29
Gang of Four 39, 40
Gansu Province 128, 199
Gao, H. 41, 60, 124, 127
gaokao (national university entrance examination) 26, 40–1, 68, 182, 197
alternatives to 71
changes in 91
cheating schemes 70–1
complexity of system 69–70
continuing importance of 89, 90–1
criticisms of 70–1
ethnic minorities 130, 132
focus on achieving high scores 69
importance of 71
preparing for 70
private schools 147
re-introduction of 40
set by different provinces 40–1, 69
suspension of 36–7
General Social Survey (1949–2003) 78
Generation Z 71
Gerbino, K. 98
Germany 27
Global citizenship education 93
globalization 156–7
government
national education goals 47–9
policies/plans 47–8
recognition of academic corruption/dishonesty 207
sensitive to outside criticisms 209
structure/funding of public education 49–53
tightening of controls/censorship 208
use of education to increase Chinese influence internationally 210
Great Leap Forward 36
Gu, Mingyuan 203
Guangdong Province 122, 196
Guangxi Province 59–60, 128
Guangzhou 119
Guidelines on Basic Education Curriculum Reform (2001) 85
Guidelines for Moral Education in Primary and Middle Schools (2017) 170
Guizhou 64
Guomindang (KMT) 33, 34
Ha, Wei 207
Han Dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE) 22, 161
Han ethnic group 128, 129, 135
Hangzhou 57
Hannum, E. 114
harmonious society/communitarianism (datong) 162–3
Harrow School 146
Hayhoe, R. 203
He, Bingde 26
higher education see universities
Hong Kong 10, 143
Houxiong Wang 76
Hu Shi 33
Hu, Yang 139
Hu, Yue 133
Hui ethnic group 128
hukou household registration system 121–2, 125, 127
Hundred Flowers Movement (1956) 35–6
Hundred Schools of Thought 19
Huntingdon, Samuel 203
hyper-competitiveness 53–62
after-school activities 56
celebration of educational attainment 59–60
and corruption 60
and educational admission 54–5
and elite education 53–62
extra tuition 57
fixation on world rankings 61
foreign examination accreditation programmes 59
grade consciousness/ranking system 59
hothousing techniques 55
long hours 56
overseas tuition 57–8
parental aspirations 54
pressures of 56
and second-generation rich kids 57
and social connections/social capital 58
and talent cultivation programmes 60–1
ideologies
CCP embedded in education 178–82
citizenship/patriotic education 172–4
competing narratives 151, 155–8, 182–5
Confucianism 152–4
during Cultural Revolution 153
and education 151–5
ethnic solidarity education 174–5
moral education 168–72
neoliberalism vs traditionalism 155–8
political/ideological education 175–8
resurrecting Confucianism 158–68
socialist 34–9, 115, 129, 144, 157, 163, 167, 169–70
Imperial College 22
imperial Confucian period (2nd century BCE to mid 19th century) 17–27
appointment of scholar officials 21–2
formal/nationwide education system 22
hierarchy/respect for authority 21
as ideology 20
imperial examination system 23–6
introduction of Confucianism 18–19
notable philosophers 19
personal ethics, good governance, social order 20
political/civil turmoil 17–18
popularity of Confucianism 19–20
private education 23
imperial examination system 4, 22–6, 159
considerable hardship involved 24
effect on bribery/corruption and selling of degrees/titles 25
eight-legged essay 23
influence in the West 25
memorization/repeated reading 23
successful candidates 23–4
women barred from 24
Implementation Guidelines to Establish Civic Virtues in Citizens (2001) 173
India 163, 198
inequalities/disparities 112–13, 149–50
international schools/programmes 148–9
migrant children 125–8
migrant workers/left-behind children 113–14, 121–5
minority education 128–37
parental wealth/connections 4, 54–5, 56–9, 113, 115–16
private education 142–8
social class polarization 76
students with disabilities 137–42
urban/rural 46, 49, 62–3, 65, 67, 76, 81, 113, 115, 116–21
Inner Mongolia 119, 128, 135
International Baccalaureate 59, 148
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 138
international schools 148–9
Islam 10
Ivy League universities 146
Japan 3, 7, 18, 27, 29, 167, 189, 192
Jiang, J. 156
Jiang Qing 39
Jiang Shigong 200
Jiangsu University 196
Jin, Shuai 133
Jing, Sun 73
junior high schools 12, 48, 51
Kensington Wade school 197
key schools 51
kindergarten see early childhood education
Kipnis, A. 11
Klitgård, I. 201
KMT (Kuomintang) see Guomindang
Knowledge about Ethnic Groups 175
Kong, P. 79
Korea 18
Kuhn, R. 208
Lai, Qing 78
Lanzhou University 133, 199
Laozi (Lao-tzu) 19
late imperial period (1860s-1949) 17, 27–34
cultural/political movements 31–2
debates concerning role of women 31
development of modern curriculum/girls’ education 34
effects of foreign incursions 27–9
establishment of universities 30–1
influx of missionaries 30
interest in progressive/modern education 31
major changes in education 27
movement of students abroad 29–30
tensions between traditional/'modern’ ideas 29
Western influences 31–3
Law, Wing-Wah 20, 95, 156, 157, 163, 173, 175
Learning in Regular Classrooms (LRC) 138
Lee, Chi Kin John 87, 155
Lee, Diana Pei Ling 62
left-behind children 113–14, 121–5
Legalism 19
Li, Hui 89, 124
Li Keqiang 73
Li, Lin 16
Li, Mei 21, 112, 119, 149
Li, Ruijing 96
Liu, Haifeng 159
Liu, Kai 29
Liu, X. 117
Liu, Yan 64
Liu, Yongbing 98
Lo, J. Tin-Yuan 187
Louie, K. 152, 153, 195
LRC see Learning in Regular Classrooms
Lu, Meichen 132
Luke, A. 83, 142
Macau 10
McEwan, H. 161
Maker Education 74, 93, 94
Maker Movement 93–4
Malaysia 7, 192, 195
Manchu ethnic group 128
Manchus 24
Mandarin 132, 133–4, 135, 197, 198
Mao Zedong 32–3, 34, 35–6, 37, 177, 178, 200
Māori 136
Marxism 88, 176, 177
May Fourth Movement (1919) 31–4, 175
Mengzi (Mencius) 19
Miao ethnic group 128
Middle East 198
migrant children 125–8
migrant workers 113–14
military training 177–8
minban schools 37, 142, 144
Ming period (1368–1644) 22, 44
Ministry of Education (MOE) 49, 76, 92, 123, 170, 176, 178
minority education
discrimination in 135–6
dual system 132–5
enrolment, retention, examination results 131–2, 136
ethnic fusion (minzu ronghe) concept 129–30
groups/autonomous regions 128
improvements in 130
national policies 130
parental choices 134
quality of 133
tensions in 136–7
Minzner, C. 169
missionaries 30
MOE see Ministry of Education
Mohism 19
Mongols 24
The Monkey King 66
Montessori schools 66
moral education 168–72
‘Morality and the Rule of Law’ curriculum 170
Mozi (Mo-tzu) 19
Mu, Guanglun 138, 139
Murphy, R. 51
Muslim communities 131, 134, 147
Naftali, O. 32, 70, 79, 80, 99, 156–7, 165, 167, 169
National Academy 22
National Development Plan (2010–20) 64, 118
national goals 47–9
developing high quality teachers 47
improving access/quality of primary, vocational, preschool education 47
improving provision for rural, remote, poor, minority students 47
subsidies for poorer students 47
National Natural Science Foundation of China 190
National Policy on the Second Phase of Special Education (2017) 140
National Textbook Commission 176
national university entrance examination see gaokao
Nationalist government 34
Nature 206, 209
neoliberalism 155–8, 182–3
New Beacon Group 195–6
New Culture Movement 31–2
New Oriental 146
New Silk Road 3
Nikkei Asian Review 114
Ningxia Province 128
Niu, Mengju 106
non-formal education 79–80
North America 198, 199
OECD see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Old People's University 78–9
Olympic Games 49, 53, 173
‘On teaching and learning’ (Xueji) 160–1
one-child policy 63
online learning 48, 76–7
Open University 77
Opinions on Strengthening and Improving Ideological and Political Work in Higher Education Institutions under New Circumstances
(2017) 176–7
Opium Wars 28
Ordos, Inner Mongolia 119–20
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 196
Outline of National Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development Plan (2010–2020) 6, 47
Oxford University 57, 58, 146, 197
Pan, Su-Yan 187
Pan, Yue-Juan 64
Pang, Nicholas Sun Keung 87, 155
parental aspirations 4, 54–5, 56–9, 113, 115–16, 166–7, 169
Paris Peace Conference (1919) 32
Park, A. 114
patriotic education 172–4
peer-assisted learning (xiaoxiansheng) 161–2
Peking University, Beijing 31, 32, 33, 59, 77, 105, 107, 124, 200
Peking University Business School, Oxford 195
Pells, R. 190
People's Congress 48
People's Republic of China (PRC) 10, 34, 195
Pepper, S. 18, 42, 159
PISA see Programme for International Student Assessment
Plato 161
political education 175–8
Postiglione, G. 1, 58
PRC see People's Republic of China
preschool education 47, 48, 62, 63–5, 66, 123
see also early childhood education
primary education
curriculum reform 89–90, 97
ethnic minorities 131–2
funding of 67
goal to improve access/quality of 47
tuition at 51
private education 23, 47, 65, 79–80
complexity and diversity of 144–5
expansion of 142–4
foreign providers of 145–6
government policies 144
hybrid models 144–5, 147–8
level of autonomy 145
overseas links 146
re-emergence of 142
reasons for choosing 147
in rural areas 143
types of 146
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 1, 5, 38–9, 90, 173, 196
public schools 51–2, 83–4, 92
Pudong 90–1
Qian, Haiyan 99
Qin, A. 207
Qin Dynasty 17–18, 19
Qing Dynasty 23, 28, 31, 147
Qinghai Province 128
QS World University Rankings 107
Qu, Xiao 138
Quality Education Programme 51
Red Guards 37
reform era (1978 onwards) 17
discourse on ’quality’ 41–2
educational opportunities 40
inequalities/disparities among different groups 41
move towards marketization 39–40, 42–3
re-introduction of gaokao examinations 40–1
Reform Plan of Teaching Contents and Curriculum of Higher Education Facing the 21st Century (1994) 104
Regulation on Education for Persons with Disabilities (2017) 140
Research Excellence Framework (UK, 2016) 107
Reyes, V. 47
Rockefeller Foundation 30
Rong, Xuelan 114
Rural Education Action Program 119
rural schools
curriculum reforms 92–3
during Cultural Revolution 36–7
improved access/support 38, 47, 48, 50, 76
improvements in 64–5
modern education extended into 35
urban-rural disparities 46, 49, 62–3, 67, 76, 81, 113, 115, 116–21
Russell, Bertrand 33
Russia 27, 167, 187, 192
Ryan, J. 152
Said, E. 203
Schools
access to 123, 124–5, 130
attached to universities 52
attendance at 35
closure during Cultural Revolution 36–7
core years 41
decentralization of financing/management of 41
effects of Cultural Revolution on 36–9
elite 4
evaluation of 52
examinations in 68
experimental 52
information technology in 48, 67
investment in 6, 52–3
long hours 24
modern curriculum in 34
nationwide system of 22
numbers of 46
pressures of 6
as private 23
support for 48
teaching of foreign languages in 29
terminology 11–12
women admitted to 24, 31
see also community-run schools; rural schools; secondary schools; senior high schools; sishu schools
SCI see Science Citation Index
Science 206
Science Citation Index (SCI) 206
Second World War 3, 34
secondary schools, curriculum reforms 48, 69–71, 89–90
self-strengthening movement 28–9
senior high schools 68–9, 90–1
Shaanxi Province 124
Shanghai 5, 33, 64, 90, 94, 119, 120, 127
Shanghai Jiaotong University 77, 196
Shanghai Rating Consultancy 107
Shanxi Province 124
Shekou, Shenzhen 94
Shenzhen 89
Shi, Tianjian 114
shuyuan (private Confucian academies) 22
Sichuan Province 128
Silk Road 198, 202
Singapore 196
sishu schools 147, 198
social cohesion 136
social stratification 4
socialist era (1949–78) 17
devastating consequences of political events 35–8
education as instrument of the State 36–8
expansion/improvement in education 34–5
persecution of teachers/intellectuals 37
Song period (960–1279 CE) 22
South America 198, 199
South China Morning Post 71
South China Sea 178
Soviet Union 35, 187
Special Administrative Regions 10
Spence, J. 19, 28
Springer Publishing 209
Staffordshire University 196
State Council 49, 176
Steiner schools 66
STEM subjects 107
Stern, N. 108
Stern Report (2016) 107–8
student/teacher dialectic relationship (jiaoxue xiangzhang) 162
Sui period (581 to 618 CE) 22
Sun, C.Q. 117
Sun, Jin 62
Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou 31
Sun, Yifan 66, 117
Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) 28
Taiwan 178, 181, 209
Tan, C. 47, 98
Tang period (618 to 907 CE) 22
Tang, Wenfang 133
Teach for America 118
Teach for China 118
teachers
concerns about foreign/international benchmarks 164–5
conscientiousness of 82
dialectic relationship with students 162
education 48, 100, 118
head teachers as cult-like figures 81–2
humiliation of 37
improving quality of 48–9
increase in salaries/benefits 48
numbers of 46
peer-assisted learning 161–2
private tutoring/moonlighting 79–80
professional development 121
quality of 83–4
relationship with students 67, 165–7
responses to curriculum reforms 96–100
role of 80–3
salaries 81
specialists 81
standardizing courses for 48
status of 38
traditional approaches 89
Teachers’ Day 58
technical education see vocational/technical education
Thailand 196
Three-Year Action Plan for Early Childhood Education (2014) 64, 118
Tiananmen Square protests (1989) 173, 175, 181, 209
Tibet 128, 129, 174, 178, 181, 209
Tibetan Autonomous Region 128, 131
Tibetans 128
Times Higher Education 190
Times Higher Education World University Rankings 107
Trump, Donald 187
Tsinghua University 59, 77, 105, 107, 124
Twenty-first Century Education Rejuvenation Action Plan 85
Two Sessions meeting (2018) 48–9
two-child policy 63–4
UNESCO 93
United Kingdom 3, 5, 7, 59, 90, 108, 148, 193, 196
United States 4, 7, 29, 30, 59, 90, 94, 108, 148, 181
universities
academic culture of 168
academic exchange programmes 186
academic research/publications 205–8
broadening of courses 109–10
corruption/dishonesty 205–7
critical thinking courses 96–7
criticisms of 108–9
curriculum reform 104–6
decentralization of control 75
development of world-class institutions 48, 107–9
encouraged to be innovative 48
establishment of 30–1
ethnic minorities 132–3
expansion of 75
faculty mobility 106–7
fraudulent activity by 53
gaining entry to 59–61
improving quality of workforce 109
international exchange of people, ideas, knowledge 188–94
investment in infrastructure 52–3
military training 177–8
national entry examinations 36–7, 40–1
national level administration 76
numbers of students 75–6
online resources 208
private 143–4
problems for 76
programmes 51, 100–1
reorganization of 35
student unrest in 37
ventures with foreign providers/visiting academics 181
Western systems 167–8
University Alliance of the Belt & Road (UAB&R) 199
University College London 198
University of Wolverhampton 196
Uyghur ethnic group 128
Vickers, E. 9, 42, 92, 122, 137, 142, 184, 211
Victoria and Albert (V&A) Museum, London 94
Vietnam 18
vocational/technical education 12, 67
as antidote to large numbers of university graduates 74
certification craze 74–5
closure of 37
curriculum reform 102–10
expansion of 50–1, 72, 74
foreign ventures 196
funding for 72
importance of 71, 72–3
improving access/quality of 47, 48
introduction of design/technology subjects 74
lack of capacity/expertise 46
management of 71–2
need to prioritize 73
neoliberal ideologies 103–4
upgrading to university status 72
Walker, A. 99
Wang, Dan 118, 124
Wang, Houxiong 95
Wang, Lu 134
Wang, X. Christine 89
Wang, Yan 138, 139
Wang, Ying 142, 145
Wang, Yousheng 161
Wei Yang 190
Wellington College 146
WHO see World Health Organization
women
debates concerning role of 31
education of 24–5, 31, 35
ethnic minorities 131
left-behind girls 126
Wong, Jessie Ming Sin 89
World Health Organization (WHO) 138
Wu, Xiaxin 54–5
Wuhan 67
Xi Jinping 3, 7, 40, 73, 157, 168, 176, 177, 182, 184, 198, 208
Xiamen University 30
Xiamen University, Malaysia 195
Xi'an 67
Xie, Ailei 58
Xie, Yu 80, 180
Xinhua 62
Xinjiang Province 128, 129, 174, 178
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 131, 209
Xiong, Huanhuan 70
Xiong, Jie 103, 104
Xu, Di 161
Xu, Duoduo 196
Yan, Guangcai 106
Yang, Fuyi 139
Yang, Guangxue 139
Yang, Rui 21, 110, 112, 119, 149, 155, 168, 205, 207
Yao, Xonzhong 19
Yin, Hongbiao 97
Young Pioneers 88, 179
Yu, Kai 116
Yu, Xiaoran 79
Yuan, Bentao 164
Yue, Ying 106
Yunnan Province 128
Zang, Xiaowei 129
Zeng, Xiaodong 9, 42, 92, 122, 137, 142, 184, 211
Zha, Qiang 61
Zhang, Donghui 175
Zhang, Fengjuan 98
Zhang, Hailiang 70
Zhang, Huajun 33
Zhang, Lili 138, 139
Zhang, Shuang 99
Zhang, Xiaobo 80, 180
Zhao, Xia 79
Zhejiang University 107
Zhou, Jinh 62
Zhu, Juanjuan 172, 173
Zhuang ethnic group 128
Zhuangzi (Chuang-tzu) 19
Zuo, M. 70
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