Schema Theory Revisited

Author(s): Mary B. McVee, Kailonnie Dunsmore, James R. Gavelek

Source: Review of Educational Research, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Winter, 2005), pp. 531-566
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 Reviewof EducationalResearch
Winter2005, Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 531-566

Schema Theory Revisited

Mary B. McVee
University at Buffalo/SUNY
Kailonnie Dunsmore
Calvin College
James R. Gavelek
University of Illinois at Chicago

During the 1970s, schema theory gained prominence as reading researchers

took up early workby cognitive scientists to explore the role ofschemas in read-
ing. In the 1980s and '90s, the field shifted as researchers increasingly used
sociocultural theories, particularly the work of L. S. Vygotsky,toframe inves-
tigations of literacy. This article provides a brief review of schema theory as
situated in literacy studies. The authors review various conceptions of schema
theory to consider how recent social and cultural perspectives might prompt
reconsideration of schemas as transactional and embodied constructs. Con-
comitantly, they explore how earlier conceptions of schema theory may assist
researchers in their articulation of concepts such as ideal and material tools
and the role of activity in Vygotsky'swork. The article concludes with consid-
erations of implicationsfor future work.

KEYWORDS:cognitive science, embodied,literacy,mediation,sociocultural.

The influenceof thecognitiverevolutionon literacyresearchandpracticeoverthe

pastquarterof a centuryhasbeenbothprofoundandpervasive.Thisinfluenceis, per-
haps,seen most readilyin relationto the developmentof schematheoryandthe role
it has playedin exploringandconceptualizingreadingandwriting(e.g., Anderson&
Pearson,1984;Tierey & Shanahan,1991). Recently,however,we have witnessed
the growinginfluenceof varioussocial conceptionsof mind with theircorrespond-
ing implicationsfor understandingliteracyprocesses.These have includedVygot-
sky's socioculturaltheory(e.g., Cole, 1996;Gavelek& Raphael,1996;Moll, 1990;
Wertsch,1991, 1998),variousrenderingsof socialconstructivism(Au, 1998;Greene
& Ackerman,1995; Spivey, 1997), and discursivepsychology (Gergen& Gergen,
1983; Harre& Gillett, 1994). Centralto this recognitionof the social is the impor-
tantrole of discourseprocessesin the developmentof mind and literacy(e.g., Gee,
1997a,2000; SantaBarbaraDiscourseGroup,1994). As is often the case in pendu-
lum sweepsthatcharacterizeeducationalinquiry,thereis a dangerof overcorrection.
Eitherthe social comes to be emphasizedto the relativeexclusionof the individual,
or vice versa.
With this in mind, we examine recent contributionsof social and culturalper-
spectives andhow these might contributeto and changeour currentconceptionsof
schematheory.Withits emphasison individual,cognitiveprocesses,schematheory
and researchconductedthroughthat lens have helped researchersand teachersto
531
McVee et al.
understandhow knowledgeis organizedandhas helpedshed light on the individual
cognitive routinesthat childrenemploy duringthe readingprocess. We examine
schematheorybecauseof its resiliencein the field andbecauseof its utilityin help-
ing teachersandresearchersunderstandthe role of an individual'spriorknowledge
in comprehension.Whereasschematheoryforegroundsthe role of individualcog-
nitive processes, socioculturaltheories,particularlythe work of Vygotsky (1978,
1986) and scholarswho use Vygotsky's work (e.g., Au, 1998;Cole, 1996; Gavelek
& Raphael, 1996; Gee, 1992; Holland& Cole, 1995; Kozulin, Gindis, Ageyev, &
Miller,2003; Moll, 1990;Rogoff, 1993;Wells, 1999) have also providedsignificant
insightsinto individuals'meaning-makingprocessesby highlightingthe role of lan-
guage as mediationaltool, the importanceof social interactions,andthe situatedness
of languageandsocial interactionswithinculturalandhistoricalsystems.We exam-
ine socioculturalperspectivesbecauseof theircontinuinginfluenceandimportance
in the field and their ability to contributeto our understandingof the interplay
betweenliterateprocessesandthe social andculturallives of childrenas they carry
out meaning-makingactivities. In undertakingsuch exploration,we seek to blur
the boundariesthathave traditionallyseparatedschematheoreticperspectivesand
researchfromsocioculturalperspectivesandresearch,withthe aim of rethinkingthe
constructof schema.
As teachersandteachereducators,we believe thatschematheoryhasbeen a pow-
erfultool in helpingus andin helpingpre-serviceandin-serviceteachersunderstand
readingcomprehension.But the growinginfluenceof socioculturalperspectiveshas
also led to an additionaltension.We have noted thatresearchersand authorsof lit-
eracy and languageartstextbookscontinueto talk aboutschematheoryas a useful
model of reading comprehension,as distinct from currentsocioculturallines of
inquiryinto literacydevelopmentandpractice,becausesuchinquiriesemergedfrom
differentviews of knowledgeandknowledgeconstruction.Althoughdiscussionsof
schema theory inevitablyraise discussions of culturalknowledge, little work has
beenundertakento bridgethegapbetweenversionsof schemaas anin-the-headphe-
nomenonandmorerecentsocioculturalperspectivesthattreatschemaas something
thatexists beyondthe individualandwithinan individual'ssocial andculturalcom-
munities.For example,how might we rethinkschemain light of perspectivesthat
arguethatmind"extendsbeyondthe skin"(Wertsch,1991,p. 14), in thatmindis dis-
cursivelyproduced(e.g., Harre& Gillett, 1994;Harre& Steams, 1995) andsocially
distributed(Gee, 1992, 1997b;Lave & Wenger,1991;Rogoff & Lave, 1984)?In par-
ticular,what might we learnfrom socioculturalperspectivesaboutthe origins and
developmentof schemas?
To begin exploringsuchquestions,we firstbrieflyconsiderwhy it is importantat
thisjunctureto revisit schematheory.Second, we identifywhat we believe are the
salientfeaturesof schematheory,and we tracethe originsof schemaas a construct
and as relatedto researchin the literacyfield. We arguethatschematheoristshave
inadequatelyexploredthe issue of schemaorigination.The genetic questionfocus-
ing on the origins anddevelopmentof knowledge is a fundamentalquestionessen-
tial to socioculturalexaminationsof learning(Wertsch,1991), and a questionthat
must be considered in reconciling social and individual perspectives. Third, we
examinesocioculturalperspectivesto considerwhattheycancontributeto ourunder-
standingsof schema. By "sociocultural"we referto the belief thatthoughthas its
genesis in social interaction (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). Both externally focused,
532
 Schema TheoryRevisited
interpsychologicaltools, such as language and other sign systems, and internally
focused,intrapsychologicaltools, suchas thought,arecreated,shaped,andsustained
in social and culturalcontexts.Thus cognitiondoes not exist as an isolatedprocess
withinthe individualbutas a "bio-social-culturalprocess"thatis bothpublicandpri-
vate (Cole, 1996, p. 136). Socioculturalperspectivesexplore the role of ideal and
materialtools and activities,notingthatboth are ensconcedin culturalsystems and
thusaredevoidof meaningoutsideparticularcontextsandactivities.We believe that
by more explicitly linking the constructof schema with explorationsof ideal and
materialtools and activity,we can enrichourunderstandingsof schematheory.We
posit that such a linkage may also have the addedbenefit of enrichingour under-
standingsof socioculturalperspectives.To illustratethe ways thatschematheoryhas
helpedus understandcomprehensionandlearning,andto illustratesome of ourcon-
cerns about schema theory as traditionallyconceived, we provide an example of
classroompractice.Throughoutthis article,we advancethe notion of schemas' as
transactionaland embodied constructsto addressthe subject-objectdualism that
underliestraditionalcognitive science approaches.

Why Revisit Schema Theory?

Building on WhatWeHave Learned
Recently, there have been calls to accept what we have learnedaboutliteracy
practices and instructionand to acknowledge how our past knowledge helps to
inform our present endeavors. Raphael (2001) remindedliteracy educatorsand
researchersthatthereis a collective body of knowledgethathas been identifiedand
developed related to literacy practices. In identifying various phases of literacy
research, Raphael urged literacy scholars to look across these practices and
acknowledgethe impressivebody of knowledge and areasof consensus thatexist
in the field, in orderto avoid a mistake that has often been made in educational
research.She arguedthat, "insteadof recognizing that with each passing decade,
our field has learnedmore abouthow to teach literacy,aboutthe complexityof the
literacyprocesses, and aboutthe ways in which literacyis instantiatedand valued
acrosstime andcultures;we [have]essentially[fallen]into the trapof assumingthat
new knowledge somehow replacedor overshadowedpreviouspractice"(Raphael,
2001, p. 9).
Othershave also attemptedto move the field towardconsensusby pointingout
somecommonlyacceptedbeliefs aboutliteracyandliteracyinstruction(e.g., Dudley-
Marling& Murphy, 1998; Pearson, 1996). Most of those who have identifiedan
areafor consensushave done so in relationto instructionalpractice.However,it is
also importantto revisit the particulartheoriesand theoreticalconstructson which
such practicesarepredicated.Obviously,thereare substantivelydifferentissues to
drawupon when we foregroundtheory.The epistemologicalviews tied to theory,
for example,may not allow for consensusor agreementin the samemanneras when
we discuss methodsof literacylearningandpractice.Yet we believe therearesome
areasthatarecomplementarybut which areoften seen as disparateandincommen-
surable,as was recentlynoted by Purcell-Gates,Jacobson,and Degener (2004) in
theirreview of social and cognitive theories of literacydevelopment.In addition,
althoughscholars, notably Smagorinsky(2001), have begun articulatingcultural
theoriesof reading,we believe thatadditionalexplorationsare needed.
533
McVeeet al.
As we were preparingthis article,some of ourcolleaguesaskedus why we felt it
was importantto revisit schema theory. Some skeptics cite numerous studies
couchedin socioculturalperspectivesand numerousreviews of researchthatseem
to establishsocioculturalperspectivesas "thewinner"in the clash of cognitive ver-
sus social paradigms.A review of the thirdvolume of the Handbookof Reading
Research (Kamil,Mosenthal,Pearson,& Barr,2000) bears out the importanceof
social andculturalperspectivesandtheirrole in readingresearch(see, for example,
Bean, 2000; Florio-Ruane& McVee, 2000; Gaffney& Anderson,2000; Gee, 2000).
Despitethe fact thatsocioculturalperspectiveshavebecome increasinglyprominent
in conceptualizingeducationalresearchandpractice(Hruby,2001), we also believe
thatthe conceptof schemais a useful and powerfultool for understandingreading
processes.
Schemaas a Constructfor UnderstandingReading Processes
The extentto which the literacyfield still relies on andvalues schematheorycan
be seen fromthe resultsof an analysisof currentreadingand languageartstexts for
pre-serviceand in-service teachers.In a review of 25 reading/languagearts texts
publishedbetween 1989 and2004, we foundthatall of the texts introducedschema
theory to help explain the readingprocess, especially comprehension.The wide-
spreadrelianceon schematheoryindicatesthateducatorsstill believe schemathe-
ory is a valuable tool in helping pre-service and in-service teachers understand
cognitive and individualaspectsof reading.At the same time, most of these same
readingandlanguageartstexts introducetheirreadersto socioculturaltheories,par-
ticularlythe workof Vygotsky.Despitethe heavyrelianceoverallon social perspec-
tives, none of the texts thatwe reviewedforegroundedsocial and culturalfactorsin
theirdiscussionof schema.A few notedthatschematheoryimpliesa networkof social
andculturalrelationshipsbut did not developthatidea with referenceto social theo-
ries of readingandlanguageuse (e.g., Graves,Juel,& Graves,2004). Onlytwo of the
texts (Lipson& Wixson, 1997/2003;Weaver, 1994/2002) soughtto explicitlycon-
join the discussionof cognitiveperspectiveswith social perspectiveson learning.
It is possiblethatthis compartmentalization exists, in part,becausetextbooksare
createdto presentinformationin an efficient and fairly straightforward manner;or
the compartmentalization may be due to the lag thatoften exists when theory and
researcharetranslatedinto practice.Thatschematheoryis still widely cited in read-
ing and languageartstexts is more intriguingwhen we considerthatin a review of
articleson researchandpractice,GaffneyandAnderson(2000) foundthatthe terms
"schema"or "schematheory"havefallenintodisusein describingresearchandprac-
tice in publishedjournals.Although the terms "schema"or "schemata"appeared
frequentlyin researchand practitionerjournalsin the 1980s, researchersin recent
years have opted to use terms such as existing knowledge,topic knowledge,prior
knowledge,andpreviousknowledge.GaffneyandAndersontook this shift in terms
as an indicationthatschematheoryis used in generalways, andthey expressedsur-
prise at the limited referencesto schema theory in research,given the impact of
schematheoryon readingresearchin theearlyto middle1980s.Othershaveobserved
thatusingtermssuch as backgroundknowledgeorprior knowledgeinterchangeably
with schema implies a consensus that does not exist (Sadoski, Paivio, & Goetz,
1991). This concernaside, the continuedrelianceon schematheoryin textbooksas
a means of describingcognitive reading processes to pre-service and in-service
534
 Schema TheoryRevisited
teacherssupportsGaffneyandAnderson'sassertionthatschematheoryis still influ-
encing ourperceptionsof readingandis believed to be a viable andvaluableexpla-
nationfor teachers.The point here is thatthe constructof schemais morethanjust
a usefulmetaphor.Themetaphoritself says somethingabouthow literacyresearchers
and educatorshave come to see readingprocesses, because "structuralmetaphors
guide our thinking (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and, when incorporatedinto our
models of cognition, stake out the parametersof our epistemologies" (Hruby,
2001, p. 48).
At the same time, the dearthof articlesthatdirectlyexploresimilaritiesbetween
schema and socioculturalperspectivesleads us to believe that literacyresearchers
andeducatorshave not yet thoughtthroughthe relationshipbetweenschematheory
and morerecentlyadoptedsocioculturalperspectives.Althoughwe conjecturethat
manyof ourcolleaguesin literacywill agreethatschematheoreticperspectivesand
socioculturalperspectivesare not as dichotomousas once believed (see Frawley,
1997), we know of no publishedworkto datethatexploreswhetherandhow schema
theoreticperspectivesmaybe reconciledwiththe social perspectivesof mindandlit-
eracyespousedby socioculturalresearchers.
Historical Review of Schema Theories
Early Use of "Schema":The Workof Kant,Bartlett,and Piaget
The conceptof the schemacan be tracedto PlatoandAristotle(Marshall,1995),
but Kant(1929) is generallyconsideredto be the firstto talkaboutschemasas orga-
nizing structuresthatmediatehow we see andinterpretthe world (Johnson,1987).
Schemasare"asortof bias inherentin the mind"(Campbell,1989, p. 90). For Kant
a schema stood between or mediatedthe externalworld and internalmentalstruc-
tures;a schema was a lens thatboth shapedand was shapedby experience.
Bartlett(1932/1995)used the termschemaandconductedexperimentsto explore
schemas as culturalconstructsin memory,and this is the work most widely cited
by schematheoristsworkingin the cognitive era (Saito, 1996). Bartlett'sresearch
and writingpoint to schemas as more than in-the-headphenomenaand provide a
basis for thinkingof them as patternsthatextendbeyondthe knowerinto the social
and culturalworld (Saito, 1996, 2000). In looking at Bartlett'swork, it becomes
clear that schema theory, at its inception, was not about in-the-headphenomena
only. Middletonand Crook(1996) wroteof Bartlett(citing a 1961 republicationof
the same 1932/1995 book thatwe reference):

Bartlettdiscussedschemaas an "organizedsetting"andnot as someuniform

featureof the mind (Bartlett,1932/1961,p. 200). Schematain such a view
(i.e., Bartlett's)arenot knowledgestructuresstoredin the brainsor mindsof
individuals fortheinterpretation butfunctional
of experience, of adap-
properties
tationsbetweenpersonsandtheirphysicalandsocialenvironments. (p. 202)
For Bartlett,schemashighlightedthe reciprocitybetween cultureand memory.
Schemaswerenecessaryto explaintheconstitutiverole of culturallyorganizedexpe-
rience in individualsense making.This early use of the term suggesteda transac-
tionalrelationshipbetweenindividualknowledgeandculturalpractice.
Contemporaries of Bartlett(e.g., Dewey, Bentley,andRosenblatt)developedpsy-
chological andliterarytheoriesthatexplicitlyused the conceptof transactionalism.
It is clearfromRosenblatt's(1989) definitionof transaction,below, thatthe spiritof
535
McVee et al.
transactionalismwas reflectedin Bartlett'sinitial constructionof the concept of
schemas:
Insteadof separate,alreadydefinedentitiesactingon one another(an inter-
action),Dewey andBentley(1949, p. 69) suggestedthatthe termtransaction
in whicheachelementconditionsandis con-
be usedto designaterelationships
ditionedby the otherin a mutuallyconstitutedsituation.This view requires
a break with entrenchedhabits of thinking.The old stimulus-response,
subject-object,individual-socialdualismsgive way to a recognitionthatsuch
takeplacein a contextthatalsoentersintotheevent.Humanactiv-
relationships
ities and relationships are seen as transactions in which the individual and the
social, cultural, and natural elements interfuse. (italics added; Rosenblatt,
1989,p. 154)
Schemawas also the centralmediationalconstructin JeanPiaget's (1952) struc-
turaltheoryof the origins and developmentof cognition.For Piaget, development
was interpretedas an ongoing dialectic in which the individualeither assimilates
new experienceconsistentwith existing schemasor changes (i.e., accommodates)
schemasto fit his or her experience.Whatis more,Piagetemphasizedthe embodied
natureof schemaformationby calling attentionto the importanceof sensory-motor
schemata in an individual's early development. But we find it interestingthat,
althoughPiagetsharedthe individualisticbias of cognitivescientists,the latterseem
to have been little influencedby eitherthe developmentalor the embodieddimen-
sions of Piaget's conceptionsof schemas.
Centralto our discussionin this articleis the recognitionthatthe early develop-
ment and use of the schema constructhad its origin in efforts to understandindi-
vidual thought processes as inextricably embedded in cultural life. Individual
knowledgeschemaswere transactionallylinkedto culturallyorganizedexperience.2
In the analysisthatfollows, we arguethatthis connectionwas lost in laterapplica-
tions of schemato the readingprocess.In fact, aftera close examinationof Bartlett's
work and some of his experiments,Beals (1998) wrote:
Unfortunately, thisviewof schemaas shapedby cultureis notincludedin some
currentversionsof schematheory.AlthoughBartlettis widely cited as the
sourceof thetermschemaas a modelfortheorganization of memory,theappli-
cationof the conceptto muchcognitivescienceandpsychologicaltheoryand
researchwashesout the "essentiallysocial character" (p. 225) of schemato
whichBartlett(1932)pointed.(p. 10)
We now turn toward explorationof moder conceptions and applicationsof
schemain cognitivepsychology,includingsome of the limitationsof schematheo-
reticperspectives.

Schema Theoretic Perspectives in the 1970s and '80s

Contemporaryconceptionsof schemaderive primarilyfrom work conductedin
cognitive science duringthe 1970s. As we begin our explorationof schematheory
within cognitive psychology, several definitionsmay be helpful. Rumelhartand
Ortony(1977) definedschemasas "datastructuresfor representingthe genericcon-
cepts storedin memory.They exist for generalizedconceptsunderlyingobjects,sit-
uations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions"(p. 101).
BrewerandNakamura(1984), in an attemptto addresstherole of schemain remem-
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 Schema TheoryRevisited
beringknowledgeandconstructingnew knowledge,wrote:"Inbrief, [schemas]are
higher-ordercognitive structuresthat have been hypothesizedto underlie many
aspects of humanknowledge and skill. They serve a crucial role in providingan
account of how old knowledge interactswith new knowledge in perception,lan-
guage,thought,andmemory"(p. 120).These definitionshighlightseveralimportant
featuresof schemasas notedby Rumelhart(1984):
* Schemashave variables.
* Schemas can be embedded,one within another.
* Schemasrepresentknowledge at all levels of abstraction.
* Schemasrepresentknowledgeratherthandefinitions[italics in the original].
* Schemas are active processes.
* Schemasare recognitiondevices whose processingis aimed at the evaluation
of theirgoodnessof fit to the databeing process.(Rumelhart,1984, p. 169)
Althoughmuch of the early work on schematheoryin the 1970s was published
by cognitive scientists exploring knowledge construction through computer
metaphors(e.g., Minsky, 1975; Schank& Abelson, 1975; Winograd,1975), such
theorieswere readilyappliedto the studyof reading.Cognitive scientistsstudying
storyschemasprovideda clearlink betweenschematheoryandreadingresearchin
comprehensionby exploring story structureand recall (e.g., Mandler& Johnson,
1977; Rumelhart,1975). Otherscholars(e.g., Anderson,1977, 1978; Anderson&
Pearson, 1984; Bransford& Johnson, 1972, 1973), workingprimarilyon investi-
gationsof readingcomprehension,contributedsignificantlyto the workon schemas
andhelped bringschemaresearchinto mainstreamreadingresearch.
Perhapsthe best summaryof schematheoryand its importancefor the reading
field comes from Pearson(1992), who observed:"Andersonand Pearson's(1984)
schema-theoreticaccountof readingcomprehensiontypifiesthe cognitivelyoriented
version of this [reading]model, with its twin emphases on priorknowledge (as a
resource) and inference (as a process) in directing the constructionof meaning"
(p. 1075). Pearson'ssummaryemphasizesthe cognitive processesthatareto some
degree made visible by schematheory.Elsewhere,Andersonand Pearsonexplain
thatschematheoryis "amodel for representinghow knowledgeis storedin human
memory"(1984, p. 259); andlater,"thereader'sschemais a structurethatfacilitates
planfulretrievalof text informationfrommemoryandpermitsreconstructionof ele-
mentsthatwere not learnedor have been forgotten"(p. 285).
Schematheorywas a majorforce in the developmentof readingmodels andhad
an importantinfluenceon research,particularlyin relationto readingcomprehension
and learning.It providedresearchersand teacherswith a model for representing
knowledgeandorganizingexperience.It also provideda window into how individ-
uals might transferand generate knowledge, for example, by explaining how a
schema for a cup would help an individualunderstandothercontainers.Through-
out the 1970s and early 1980s, scholars (e.g., Anderson, 1977, 1978; Pitchert&
Anderson,1977) conductedgroundbreaking researchin the role of schemain stories
andthereadingprocess.Scholarsalso wrotearticlesfor teachers(e.g., Hacker,1980;
Pearson, 1982). By the mid-1980s, schema theory exerted enough influence that
Andersonand Pearsonnoted, in theirreview in the second Handbookof Reading
Research,that"schema-theoreticnotions became the drivingforce behindempiri-
cal investigationsof basic processes in reading"(p. 259). A review of researchand
537
McVeeet al.
practitionerjournalsgives credenceto theirclaim. Researchusing schema theory
was prevalentin literacyjournals for the decade from 1978 to 1988 (Gaffney &
Anderson,2000).
Limitationsof Schema Theoryand Studiesof Schema
Although schema theory obviously had an impact on the study of reading
processes,the constructof schemaandthe theoriesdescribingschemaactivationand
use hadlimitationsthatwere notedby bothproponentsandcritics.Earlydefinitions
of schematheory,for example,presentedschemasas fixed,rigid structures(Schank
& Abelson, 1977), but, as Kintsch(1998) noted,such rigiddefinitionswere quickly
revised to include more loosely defined structures.Despite this change, studies of
schematendedto be limitedin a numberof ways. We providea briefreviewof some
of the criticismsof schematheory,using a studyby Anderson,Reynolds,Schallert,
and Goetz (1977) thathas often been cited by readingresearchers.
In this study, Andersonet al. presentedmusic studentsand weightlifterswith
ambiguouspassagesandfoundthatthe students'experiencesandknowledgeinflu-
encedtheirinterpretations of the passages.Thatis, the music studentstypicallyread
the ambiguouspassage (AppendixA) as a story aboutfourfriendsgettingtogether
on the weekend to play music. Weightliftersreadingthe same passage tended to
read it as a passage aboutplaying cards. Concomitantly,the music studentsread
anotherambiguouspassageas referringto a prisonbreak,whereasthe weight-lifters
read it as referringto wrestling (Appendix B). One of the strengths of schema
theory in this study and in others is thatit provideda way of thinkingaboutprior
knowledge in text interpretationand how an individual's experience (e.g., as a
weight-lifteror a flutist) would shape their interpretationof text. Most critics of
schema theory accept and acknowledgethe importanceof schema in providinga
means of describingand thinkingaboutpriorknowledgein text interpretationand
how an individual'sexperience would shape his or her interpretationof text (see
Carver,1992, for an alternativeviewpoint),butdetractorsraisenumerousothercrit-
icisms, summarizedbelow.
Many schema-relatedstudies, including the one above, have relied on what
Sadoskiet al. (1991) referto as "bizarretexts"(p. 469). Bizarretexts areambiguous,
containingfew or no concretereferents.Such texts are useful in activatingparticu-
lar schemas as they relate to a person's experienceor priorknowledge, but these
ambiguoustexts differfrom naturallyoccurringtexts, which containspecific refer-
ents even when they arechallengingbecauseof theircontent,specializeddiscourse,
or reading level. Responses to bizarretexts tend to activate pre-existingdefault
schemas and thus do not accountfor the more rich, complex, diversifiedtypes of
knowledgethatare storedwhen a personreadsothertexts or encountersotherless
constrainedcircumstances(Alba & Hasher, 1983; Nasajii, 2002). Because the
ambiguoustexts are specialized and involve particularcomprehensionprocesses,
schematheorydoes little, arguesCarver(1992), to explainthe "normal,typical,or
ordinaryreading-called rauding"(p. 165). Studiessuch as the one with the musi-
ciansandwrestlersmakeclearthe importanceof a reader'spersonalbackgroundand
surroundingcontexts,but arefurtherlimitedbecausetheyraisequestionsabouthow
relevantandgeneralizablefindingsarefor "thereadingof naturallyoccurringtexts"
(Sadoski et al., p. 470; see also Alba & Hasher, 1983). Moreover,despite some
notableexceptions,which we will addressmomentarily,most studiesof schemaare
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limitedbecauseof relyingon experimentalproceduresratherthancommunity-based
or classroom-basedsettingsandtasks.
To address a number of limitations of schema theoretic perspectives, some
researchershave proposedalternativetheories,often from an associationistor con-
nectionistperspective.Sadoski and Paivio (2001) proposedDual Coding Theory
(DCT) as an alternativeto schema theoreticperspectives.DCT focuses on areas
relatedto verbaland nonverbalencodingand to the role of imageryin readingand
writing.This attentionto imageryis somethingthatotherresearchershave not taken
into account.SadoskiandPaivio eschew the use of the termschemaas they contrast
DCT with a numberof perspectiveson readingandwritingthatmakeuse of the term
schema.Kintsch(1998), on the otherhand,continuesto use the term,while noting
its limitations as he proposes a "construction-integration(CI) model" (p. 94).
Kintschobservesthatschemas,as traditionallyconceivedof in connectionwithcom-
prehension,havebeen seen largelyas top-downprocessesthataretightlycontrolled,
whereasa substantialamountof researchindicates"theneed for conceivingof com-
prehensionas a more bottom-up,loosely structuredprocess"(p. 94). Kintschcon-
trastsschemas,whichhe calls "fixedcontrolstructures" (p. 94), withcomprehension,
which he describesas "incrediblyflexible andcontext-sensitive"(p. 94). His model
incorporatesschemabutis broaderandmorecomplexthantraditionalschematheo-
reticperspectives.
Ourreview of the limitationsof schematheoryandalternativeviews is not meant
to be exhaustive.Rather,we wish to point out some of the limitationsand to note
two, in particular,thataremost relevantto the workwe have takenup in this article.
In additionto the rigidityof schemasas traditionallyconceived,scholarshave noted
that issues of schema constructionand activationare problematic.For example,
research,suchas thatwith the musiciansandwrestlersdescribedearlier,has focused
on schemaactivation,not creation.This poses the problemof needingto "fillslots in
schemataad infinitum"(Nassaji,2002, p. 445). In this articlewe do not addressthe
issue of schemasendlesslydeferredbutaremoreinterestedin the questionof the ori-
gins anddevelopmentof schemas.In whatdo schemashavetheirorigins?Traditional
schemastudieshave done little to addressthis question.
In addressingthis question,we areinterestedin the role of social andculturalfac-
tors.Althoughvariousdefinitionsof schemaand the numerouscritiquesof schema
suggest attentionto both individualand social contexts, culturaland social factors
typicallyareacknowledgedby schematheorists,andby manyof theircritics,as just
anotherset of variables(Middelton& Crook, 1996).
We do not mean to suggest that researchershave not investigatedschema and
its relationshipto culture.For example, in an international,cross-culturalstudy,
Pritchard(1990) examined how culturalschemas influenced 1 th-gradereaders
from the United States and from the Pacific island nation of Palau. Steffenson,
Joag-Dev, and Anderson (1979) examined Indian and American university stu-
dents' understandingsas they read culturally familiar and unfamiliarpassages
aboutweddings.Yet few studiesusing schematheoryhave examinedhow various
culturalgroupswithinthe United Statesinterprettexts. A notableexception is pre-
liminaryresearchreportedby Anderson (1994) that investigatedhow Black and
White teenagers perceived passages involving "sounding," the good-natured
exchange of insults in the Black community (see Reynolds, Taylor, Steffensen,
Shirey, & Anderson, 1981, 1982; see also Lee, 1995). It is noteworthythat this
539
McVee et al.
particularinvestigationexploreda community-basedpracticeratherthana school
text, and as Anderson notes, "It remains to be seen how much school reading
materialis culturallyloaded"(p. 478). Anderson'scomments alertus to the need
to explore culturaland social factors not as backgroundvariablesbut as integral
componentsof schema in theirown right.
The Influence of Sociocultural Perspectives:
Reading as Social, Contextualized Practice
Althoughschematheoryhelpedresearchersandtheoriststo thinkaboutthe inner
workingsof the mindandhow knowledgeis storedin memory,changes,andis used
in comprehendingtexts,thetheoryas takenup duringthecognitiverevolutionlargely
marginalizedthe role of the individual'ssocial andculturallife. Experiencefigured
prominentlyin schematheory,butthe versionof cultureimpliedby schematheoretic
models, and by some alternativemodels, is vastly oversimplifiedwhen compared
with the increasinglycomplex, and contested,views of culturethatwere emerging
from anthropologists(e.g., Clifford, 1988;Clifford& Marcus,1986), from cultural
psychologists (Scribner& Cole, 1981), and from the work of educationalanthro-
pologists (e.g., Au, 1980; Heath, 1983; Watson-Gegeo& Boggs, 1977) who were
exploringliteracyprocessesduringthe 1970s and '80s.
A numberof theoretical,methodological,and contextualfactorsconvergeddur-
ing the 1970s and '80s to facilitatea greaterconsiderationof social factorsin liter-
acy development. There were increasing concerns about issues of culture and
languagein educationalsettingsandin relationto populationsthathadnot achieved
school success. These concernsemergedwhile Vygotsky's works were becoming
morewidely availablein English(Moll, 2001). In addition,to exploreissues of lan-
guage andculturein teachingandlearning,some researchersturnedto ethnographic
methodologies,creatinga moreinterdisciplinary studyof literacy.Writingaboutthis
shift in readingresearch,Florio-Ruaneand McVee (2000) observed,"Researchers
froma hybridof traditionsincludinganthropologyandpsychologyhaveprobedhow
literacyas both culturaltool and culturalpracticeis influencedby social andhistor-
ical factorsas well as the micro-politicsof face to face interaction(e.g., Scribner&
Cole, 1981; Moll, 1992)"(p. 158). Increasingly,researchersturnedtowardexplor-
ing the tools andsigns relatedto literacypracticessituatedwithinparticularcontexts
and activities.Withinthe UnitedStates,researchersalso turnedto the workof other
Russian activity theoristsand psychologists, particularlyas their work was inter-
pretedby Americanscholars(e.g., Cole, 1996; Moll, 1990; Scribner& Cole, 1981;
Wertsch,1985, 1991).3
Althoughresearchexplicitlybasedon schematheorycontinuedintothelate 1980s
and 1990s, it was from the mid-1970s throughthe early 1980s thatthe most theory
and researchwere generatedfrom schema theoreticperspectivesand the findings
most often actively applied to the study of reading processes. Pearson (1992)
observedthatalthoughmoreresearchon basic readingprocesseswas actuallycon-
ductedin the 1980s, this workdid not dominatethen as it had in the 1970s. Among
othercauses,Pearsonattributesthis developmentto the increasingattentionfocused
on the social and culturalfactorsrelatedto literacy(e.g., Au, 1980; Au & Mason,
1981;Cazden,1988;Heath,1983;Moll & Diaz, 1987). As a result,researchfocused
on models and theoriesof readingprocessesbecame "old news." Finally, and per-
hapsas an outgrowthof the focus on social andculturalfactors,researchon thebasic
540
 Schema TheoryRevisited
readingprocess"wasrecapturedby the cognitivepsychologycommunityandtended
to be reportedinjournalsandeditedvolumeswithmoreof a cognitivesciencefocus"
(Pearson,1992, p. 1077). In fact, althoughmany cognitive scientistshave contin-
ued extendingandelaboratingtheirwork,particularlythroughconnectionisttheory
(e.g., Rumelhart,1990, 1994; Ramsey, Stich, & Rumelhart,1991), this laterwork
has not yet had the same amountof influenceon the literacyfield as the mainbody
of work developedearlierby cognitive scientists.Even theoriesthatare specific in
addressingthe limitationsof schema theory (e.g., Carver, 1992; Kintsch, 1998;
Sadoski& Paivio, 2001), have met with limiteduptakein relationto recentliteracy
researchandpracticein the broaderliteracycommunity.
As Pearsonsuggested,becausecognitive accountsof readingprocessesfailed to
addressthe socioculturaldimensionsof literacythatanthropologistsandsociologists
wereuncovering,parallellines of researchemerged.It maybe thattheseparallellines
simplymirroredthe dualismbetweenindividualandsocial perspectivesthatcharac-
terized cognitive psychology. In his criticism of the cognitive revolutionand the
metaphorof mind as computer,Bruner(1990) wrote:"Therecould be no place for
'mind' in such a system-'mind' in the sense of intentionalstates like believing,
desiring,intending,graspinga meaning"(p. 8). Computationalmodels of mind, as
presentedby cognitivescientists,have representedindividualknowledgeas existing
distinctfrom,andthus portableacross,socioculturalcontexts.Absentis the consti-
tutive force of the social-that schemas are culturalhistoricalconstructionsthat
emergeonly withinthe individualthroughtransactionswith others.
Although many cite Bartlettor Kant as early proponentsof the term schema,
AndersonandPearson(1984) wrotethat"thefull developmentof schematheoryas
a model for representinghow knowledgeis storedin humanmemoryhad to await
the revolutionin ourconceptionof how humansprocessinformationspurredby the
thinkingof computerscientistsdoing simulationsof humancognition(e.g., Minsky,
1975;Winograd,1975)"(p. 259). The modelof the mindas machine,as information
processor,is largelyacceptedto be at odds with socioculturalperspectives,although
there are several scholarswho have writtenpersuasivelyabout what they learned
from both perspectives (cf. Beals, 1998; Frawley, 1997). Clearly, there are some
major differences between these paradigms. A view of mind predicated on an
information-processingmodel is criticallyat odds with socioculturalperspectives
thatassertthatthe genesis of thought,language,and,therefore,developmentlies in
social andculturalactivity.4Social andculturalconsiderationsarethereforethe most
criticalandessentialfactorsin schemaacquisition.It is not enoughto acknowledge
the role of the social and culturalat the marginsof cognition. Rather,as Wertsch
(1991) has noted,we must explorehow social and culturaltools and activitymedi-
ate learningand development.Thus the genesis of individualliteracyknowledgeis
situatedin the socioculturalmilieu and is inextricablytied to the milieu's discourse
practices,mediationaltools, andculturalartifacts,whichhave botha materialandan
ideationalcharacter.Both ideal and materialtools are always value-ladenbecause
they are shapedby relationshipswithin and among people. People position these
tools accordingto socioculturalnormsgoverningthe activityin the moment.
In the next section we discuss contributionsthat socioculturalperspectivescan
maketo ourunderstandingsof schema,andwe also suggest some ways thatschema
theory might help us to think about socioculturalperspectives. We raise issues
related to the origins and development of schemas as mediated by materialand
541
McVeeet al.
ideationaltools andby embodiment,and as culturalprocessesof social-individual
origin thathave both public and privatedimensions.

Sociocultural Perspectives on Schema

Addressingthe Genetic Question: The Origins and Developmentof Schemas
The cognitivism of most cognitive science approaches has generally been
premisedon a rationalistworldviewthatis inherentlydualistic.In such a view, the
active individual-as-knoweris generallyassumedto standseparateand apartfrom
the world-as-known,suchthatthe formeris ableto representthe latterthroughhis or
thatis, an
her schematicrepresentations.In such a view, mindis hyper-rationalized,
overemphasisis placed on cognitive structuresandprocesseswithinthe individual.
In contrast,transactionalistperspectives-such as thoseheld by Dewey andBentley
(1949), Gee (1992, 1997a, 1997b, 2000,2004), Smagorinsky(2001), andVygotsky
(1978, 1986)-generally assumethatthe knowerandthe known,the personandthe
environment,includingotherindividuals,are mutuallyconstitutiveof each other.
This perspectivecarriesprofoundimplicationsfor how we conceptualizethe origins
and developmentof representationalconstructssuch as schema. Ratherthan per-
ceiving schemaor cognitive structuresas in-the-headrepresentationsof something
out therein the world, thus separatingknowerand known, the transactionalnature
of knowingacknowledgesthatthe dualisticseparationof subjectand objectis "not
given andready-made;[dualism]is an ideathatbelongsto thehumanhistoryof mind
andnature"(Varela,Thompson,& Rosh, 1991, p. 141).
In contrastto a transactionalview, schematheoryas developedin the 1970s and
'80s positedthatmeaningwas storedin mentalstructures,which in turnwere acti-
vatedandorganizedduringthe readingprocess.Readingbecametheuniquearrange-
ment of mental structuresas elicited by any particulartext, as opposed to being
inextricablysituatedin the process of the interactionbetween texts and schema.
Meanings in the head, though shapedby experience,were nonethelessviewed as
having an existence independentof any particularembodiedactivity.Althoughthis
explainsthe relationshipbetweenpastandpresentexperienceandthe conventional-
izationof experienceinto scripts,frames,androles thatrepresentourunderstanding
of whatis andcould be, it does not accountfor the originsanddevelopmentof these
mentalstructures.
Indeed,the genetic questionis not one thatwas identifiedas a primaryconcern
to schematheorists.The primarychallenge for schematheorists,as Andersonand
Pearson(1984) describedit, was to give specificityto "theform and substanceof
schema"andto specifythe processesthatallowedfor schemause (p. 259). Anderson
and Pearsonand othersemphasizethe applicationof schemasto readingprocesses
with scantattentionto the originsanddevelopmentof schemas.In addition,schema
developmenthas been describedas reorganizationof existing mental structures;
new schemas are createdonly by analogy or reconfigurationof old ones. Yet the
origin of these schemas is not accountedfor. As stated by Rochelle and Clancy
(1992), "Researchersmay ask, 'Whatis the rawmaterialof reasoning?'(Koedinger
& Anderson,1990), but they tend to give one choice-varieties of representations.
Schemamodels of learninginvolve perceptiblefeaturesbut deal only with a priori
representations of experience(Schank& Abelson, 1977)"(p. 448). Thusthey do not
addressthe originsandprocessesby which schemadevelop.
542
 Cognitionand the Role of Ideal and Material CulturalArtifacts
Hatano(1993) has arguedthatas researchershave begun to study teachingand
learningfrom a constructiviststance,as opposedto a transmission-oriented stance,
they need to furtherrefinetheirunderstandingof Vygotsky's theoryto more fully
"explainthe sociogenesis of individualcognition from the constructivistpoint of
view" (p. 164). One of the ways to do this is by investigatingand describingthe
"materialupon which constructive mental processes work" (Resnick, 1987, in
Hatano,p. 164). Hatanourges scholarsto specify in greaterdetailthe "natureof the
materialandhow it is workedon by an active mind"(italicsadded;p. 164). In other
words, if researchersthink about schemas from a socioculturalperspective,this
involves rethinkingboththe natureof schemas(i.e., Whatarethe salientfeaturesof
schemasfrom a socioculturalperspective?)and theiruse (i.e., Whatare the media-
tionalfeaturesof schemas?How do schemasfunctionas mediationaltools?).To fur-
ther explore the culturaland environmentalmaterialsand their role in cognition
implies exploringlearningand cognitionnot as containedwithin an individualbut
as createdin the interactionbetweenmaterialand activity.
Holland and Cole (1995) suggest that schemas represent the ideal-that is,
conceptual-aspects of cognition,whereasdiscourserepresentsthe materialaspects.
Both serve as artifacts-collective tools with historiesandfunctionsthatarecontin-
ually modifiedwithinsocial practices-to mediatehumancognition.Understanding
thatcognitive activityin any single instanceis mediatedby the ideal as well as the
materialaspects of culturalartifactsaffordsopportunitiesto attendto the ways in
which individualmotivationsand intentionsand the rules governing social activ-
ity reflect the essentially dialogic natureof meaning making. Holland and Cole
suggest that although schemas attend to the habitual forms of behavior, they
"alwaysmustbe woven to the particularsof a situation"(p. 480). Elsewhere,Cole
(1996) explains that,
definedin thismanner,theproperties of artifactsapplywithequalforcewhether
oneis consideringlanguagesormoremundaneformsof artifactssuchas tables
and knives which constitutematerialculture.Whatdifferentiatesthe word
"table"fromanactualtableis therelativeprominence of theirmaterialandideal
aspectsandthe kindsof coordinations theyafford.No wordexists apartfrom
its materialinstantiation,
whereaseverytableembodiesan orderimposedby
thinkinghumanbeings.(p. 117).
Vygotsky also recognizedthatwords are imbuedwith psychologicalsense and
notjust meaningas linguisticallydefined."Thesense of a word ... is the sum of all
the psychologicalevents arousedin ourconsciousnessby the word.It is a dynamic,
fluid,complexwhole, which has severalzones of unequalstability.Meaningis only
one of the zones of sense,themost stableandprecisezone"(Vygotsky,1986,p. 146).
No single definitioncan ever capturethe full sense of a word. Wordmeaningsare
indeterminate.It is only withinthe rules of the languagegame thatmeaningsarise
(Wittgenstein,1961).This shiftsthe focus of ourinvestigationsandthe unitof analy-
sis awayfromthe mentalprocessesalonetowardexaminationof activitiesor events.
Of this shiftRogoff (1993) writes,"Animportantperspectivethatresultsfromusing
the dynamicevent/activityas unit of analysis is a shift from consideringcognition
as a collectionof mentalpossessions (suchas thoughts,schemas,memories,scripts,
andplans) to regardingcognition as the active process of solving mentaland other
543
McVeeet al.
problems (e.g., by thinking,recounting,remembering,organizing,planning,and
contemplating),generallyin the serviceof intelligentaction"(p. 124).
It is only by attending to the materialityof artifacts that we can explore the
way cognitive processes are dependenton the social and physical practices that
both enable and constrainthe meaning potential.Many investigations of literacy
(e.g., Heath,1983;Moll, 1994;Purcell-Gates,1995;Watson-Gegeo& Boggs, 1977)
have demonstratedthe ways thatvariousspeech communitiesoffer studentsdiffer-
ent (not less) ideationaland materialartifactsto mediate their understandingand
experienceof any text activity. These examples of work relatedto the discursive
aspects of meaning making furtherproblematizepsychological explanations of
schemasthattreatcultureas a variablewithin,ratherthana constituentof, mental
representations. Theyarealso importantbecausetheydrawourattentionto thepower
containedin such tools, as particulartools can eitherfacilitateor constrainour par-
ticipationin particularactivities.This is particularlyrelevantin educationalarenas
where the use of particulartools can lead to the labeling of some studentsas suc-
cessful, even gifted, while othersarelabeledas at riskor struggling.
One example of the need to focus on both the materialand ideal comes from
Wertsch's(1998) interpretation of researchconductedby Beck andcolleagues(Beck
& McKeown, 1994;Beck, McKeown,& Gromoll,1989;Beck, McKeown,Sinatra,
& Loxterman,1991). These researchersarguethatstudentscould not makeconnec-
tionsbetweeneventspresentedin the textsin a coherentway becausethe textsthem-
selves were inadequate;thatis, the historytexts did not have textualcoherence.The
researchersalso arguedthat teacherstry to cover too much material.This in turn
thwartsstudents'attemptsto makeconnections.Wertschinterpretsthese studiesby
using narrativeas a culturaltool thatmediatesstudents'understandingsof the text
andof history.He writes:
In termsof mediatedaction,thepointis thatstudentshadnotmasteredthecul-
turaltool-namely, a historicalnarrative-andfor this reasontheycouldnot
takeadvantageof the affordancesthis culturaltool offeredas they soughtto
carryouttheformof mediatedactioninvolvedin reproducing accountsof the
AmericanRevolution.Thesestudentsknewtoo littlein thesensethattheyhad
not masteredthe narrativeformthatconsistsof an ensembleof interrelation-
shipsorganizedintoa singlewhole.(Wertsch,1998,p.87)
Wertschacknowledgesthat the studentshave masteredother narrativeforms and
understandthem.Whatis differenthere is thatthe specific form, a historicalnarra-
tive, has not been mastered.
This is similarto the problemcited by Bransford(1983): that packetsof infor-
mationin texts may appearunrelatedto students.The greatdifficultylies not in pre-
senting students with more informationbut in providing for them a means to
recognizeandconstructthe relationshipsbetweenvariousbits of information-that
is, weavingthe strandsof informationintoa coherentschemathatfacilitatesstudents'
understandingsof content. Wertsch makes a similar point when he writes that,
"unlessit is integratedinto a coherentschema(i.e., a narrative,in the cases thatI am
considering),informationis very hardto comprehendandretain"(1998, p. 86).
Schemasas Embodied
The effort to construct knowledge relationships is affected not only by the
materialand ideal tools that a learnerhas access to but also by the characterof
544
 SchemaTheoryRevisited
embodied learning and embodied interaction.In the following extended quota-
tion, Johnson (cited in Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) explains:
Meaningincludespatternsof embodiedexperienceandpreconceptual struc-
turesof oursensibility(i.e.,ourmodeof perception,ororientingourselves,and
of interactingwithotherobjects,events,orpersons).Theseembodiedpatterns
do notremainprivateorpeculiarto thepersonwhoexperiencesthem.Ourcom-
munityhelpsus interpretandcodifymanyof ourfelt patterns.Theybecome
sharedculturalmodesof experienceandhelp to determinethe natureof our
meaningful,coherentunderstanding of our"world."(p. 150)
Johnson(1987) proposesa meaningfor schemasthatdiffersin an importantway
fromthatofferedby cognitivescientists.In contrastto the symbolicor propositional
natureof schemas conceptualizedby cognitive scientists, Johnsonmaintainsthat
embodied schemas are "constantlyoperatingin our perception,bodily movement
throughspace,andphysicalmanipulationof objects"(p. 23). Thisperspectiveon the
role of embodimentis furtherelaboratedin Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) ground-
breakingbook Philosophyin the Flesh: The EmbodiedMind and Its Challengeto
WesternThought.
Such a view foregroundsthe ways in which meaningis shapednotjust by expe-
rience as recollected,by reifiedevent structures,or by materialand ideal artifacts,
but also by embodiedexperienceandthe ways in which thatembodiedexperienceis
shapedby othersin our social community.In such a view, "culturalmodes of expe-
rience"act as one meansof mediatingourperceptionsof the world.In turn,cultural
modesshape,andareshapedby, boththe idealandthe materialartifactsthatwe make
use of.
Thereis growing attentionto the embodimentof humancognition (e.g., Clark,
1997; Johnson, 1987), although attention to issues of embodiment is not new.
William James (1890) wrote that "we sense our bodily selves as the seat of our
thinking"(cited in Rosenblatt, 1989, p. 245), and thus he suggests that when we
look at a tree stump and think of it as a chair, we reveal the relationshipbetween
our inner world and the externalworkingsof it througha bodily form. Similarly,
consider Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) assertion that not only is all language
metaphorical,but our metaphorsemergethroughourphysicalactivityin the world.
They note that
metaphorsaregroundedby virtueof systematiccorrelateswithexperience....
We arenot claimingthatphysicalexperienceis in any way morebasicthan
otherkindsof experience,whetheremotional,mental,culturalorwhatever....
Ratherwhatwe areclaimingaboutgroundingis thatwe typicallyconceptual-
ize thenonphysicalin termsof thephysical-that is, we conceptualizetheless
clearlydelineatedin termsof themoreclearlydelineated." (italicsin theorigi-
nal;p. 58)
A shortcomingof schematheoryas traditionallyconceivedby cognitive science
is thatit implies an understandingof literacyas unconnectedto embodiedmaterial
experience.Recently,Gee (2004) madethis pointin writingabouttraditionalviews
of cognitionandlearning,particularlylearningto read:
Learningdoes not workwell whenlearnersareforcedto checktheirbod-
ies at the schoolroomdoorlike gunsin the old West.Schoollearningis often
about disembodiedminds learningoutside any context of decisions and
actions.Whenpeoplelearnsomethingas a culturalprocesstheirbodies are
545
McVeeet al.
involvedbecauseculturallearningalwaysinvolves havingspecificexperi-
ences thatfacilitatelearning,notjust memorizingwords.
Traditionaliststreatlearningto readas if "read"was an intransitiveverb.
Peoplejust"read."Butno onejustreads;rathertheyreadsomething.(italicsin
theoriginal;Gee, 2004, p. 39)
Ratherthanthe embodied,situatedapproachdescribedby Gee, cognitive versions
of schema theory privilege literacy, and to some extent language, as if it were
divorcedfrom use and practice.
Consider,for example,the way in whichmanyexperimentson schemahavebeen
carriedout. Most have been conductedin laboratorysettingswith adultswho have
been askedto readone or perhapsseveralnarrativepassagesrelatedto alreadyexist-
ing, or default,schemas(Nassaji,2002). Althoughsuch investigationswere neces-
saryto defineandexploreschemasas constructsandto determinehow schemasare
activatedandapplied,theyhave also putforwarda relativelynarrowview of schema
activationand constructionthatemphasizesthe individual.In this sense, we might
say that schema theoreticviews have hyper-rationalizedliteracy processes, fore-
groundingthecognitiveat theexpenseof the material.Yet languageis a way of doing
thingsin the world.The determinationthata child is havingdifficultycomprehend-
ing some particulartext well involvesjudgmentsaboutthe values,norms,roles, and
goals thatpositionthe child in a particularway with respectto a text. The discourse
processesrequiredin the momentareembeddedin culturalhistoriesnotjust of indi-
vidualsbutof kinshipgroups,social classes, andpoliticalideologies.It is not merely
wordsbut social and culturalpractices,opportunities,and interactionsthatmustbe
provided.In addition,these experiences,opportunities,and interactionsmust allow
for a child to engage with a rangeof mediationalartifacts,both materialand ideal,
thustyinglanguageto authenticmaterialandcognitivepracticesandembodiedactiv-
ity. Schemas,as traditionallyconceivedof in relationto reading,were limitedto in-
the-headcategories,in part,becausethey were removedfrommaterialityconnected
to culturalcontextandprocesses.

The Originsand Developmentof Schemasas a CulturalProcess

Cognitionas culturalprocess implies a social conceptionof mind.Gee (1997b)
characterizedthe social mind and its ability to interpretthe world as a pattern
recognizer:
Becausetheworldis infinitelyfull of potentiallymeaningfulpatternsandsub-
patternsin anydomain,somethingmustguidethe learnerin selectingthepat-
ternsandsubpatterns to focuson.Thissomethingresidesin theculturalmodels
of thelearner'ssocioculturalgroupsandthepracticesandsettingsin whichthey
arerooted.Becausethemindis a patternrecognizerandthereareinfiniteways
to patternfeaturesof the world,of necessity,althoughperhapsironically,the
practiceandset-
mindis social(really,cultural)in the sensethatsociocultural
the
tingsguide patterns in termsof which the learner
thinksacts,talksvalues,
andinteracts.(p. 240)
Acting as a "patternrecognizer,"the mind guides learnersin accordancewith per-
ceived culturalpatterns,not just in the head but in the world. Mind, in Gee's por-
trayal, reflects the embodied nature of knowing socially and culturally as one
interactswith the world. Meaningis not just in the head or in the body, but in the
546
 Schema TheoryRevisited
world. That is, meaning does not exist in the form of words or even images, but
withinourrelationshipsamongandacrossexperiences,actions,talk,people, andall
sortsof culturallysituatedknowledge(Gee, 2004). As GavelekandRaphael(1996)
have observed, "throughour interactionswith more knowledgeable others, we
acquirethe culturallyvariableandhistoricallychanginghigherpsychologicalfunc-
tions thatmake possible the intelligenceuniqueto humankind.The higherpsycho-
logical processes that define us as culturalbeings thus emerge from, but are not
reducibleto, the elementarypsychologicalprocessesthatcharacterizeus as biolog-
ical beings"(p. 184).
Socioculturaltheoristsarguethat schemas emerge from the social interactions
betweenan individualandhis environment.This is the same principlethatoperates
in Vygotsky's generallaw of culturaldevelopment.Vygotsky (1978) wrote:"Every
functionin the child's culturaldevelopmentappearstwice: first,on the social level,
andlater,on the individuallevel; firstbetweenpeople (interpsychological),andthen
insidethe child(intrapsychological).... All higherfunctionsoriginateas actualrela-
tions betweenhumanindividuals"(italicsin the original;p. 57). Vygotsky's general
law of culturaldevelopmentunderscorestheimportanceof therolesof boththe social
and the individual.The Vygotsky Space (see Figure 1), adaptedfrom Harre(1984)
by GavelekandRaphael(1996), aidsvisualizationof the myriadways thatthe social
andthe individualcome into play as knowledgeis constructedandinternalized.The
model draws our attention to one of the basic principles of internalizationas
describedby Robbins(2003): "Thekey aspectof interalization is the rootingor the
process of ingrowth that leads to personal transformation.Internalizationis not
understoodas a reflectionof the external,butrathera transformation of the external"
(p. 31). The VygotskySpace model providesopportunities thinkingaboutknowl-
for
edge constructionas an evolutionof both internalizedand externalizedknowledge
processesthatincludeindividualand social considerations.
The four quadrantsof the Vygotsky space (Figure la) are formedby the inter-
sectionof two orthogonaldimensions,one public<--- privatedimensionanda sec-
ond social ----> individual dimension (arrows indicate two-way interaction).
Togetherthese two dimensionscreatefour "spaces":(1) public-social,(2) private-
social, (3) private-individual,and (4) public-individual.The origins and develop-
ment of a person's cognitive processes and structuresproceediterativelythrough
QuadrantsI throughIV andarecharacterizedby fourcorrespondingtransitions:(1)
appropriation (Qr-Qi), in which an individualappropriatescertainways of thinking
acquireddiscursivelyin interactionwith others;(2) transformation(QII-QII),in
which an individualtransformsand takes ownershipof these previouslyappropri-
atedways of thinking;(3) publication(QII-QIv),in which an individualgoes public
or makesobservablethroughtalkor actions,or both,his orherthinkingthatwas pre-
viously private;and (4) conventionalization(Qiv-Qi), the process whereby these
public ways of thinkingbecome conventionalizedas partof the individual'sown
thinking and that of others. The origins, development, and transformationof
schematicways of thinkingcan be understoodas the iterativemovementthrough
these quadrantsthat define the Vygotsky space. Throughthis movement,an indi-
vidual's cognitive structures(i.e., schemas)andprocessesemergefrom,but arenot
reducibleto, his or her interactionswith others.
Consider,for example,fifth-gradestudentsengagingin book clubs to learnnew
contentrelatedto literacyand social studies(e.g., how to discuss a book, historical
fictionas a genre,developmentsleadingto the U.S. Civil War,the meaningof "Con-
547
 Figure la Public

Conventionalization

~, >
0
/ IV I \
0
Individual o = Social
:3 '] :::::
::'

o at I

Private

? : . ' * -4..Figure lb
*' : .
? .'
-.;...

Past. . !

?,:.:.;.;. ,.'

F-j

I J

Present
FIGURE 1. The VygotskySpace. The model provides a representation
of knowledge construction as an evolution of both internalized and
externalized knowledge processes that include individual and social
considerations. Adaptedfrom the work of Harre (1984); thefigure on
which this adaptation is based originally appeared in Gavelek &
Raphael (1996), p. 186. Copyright 1996 by the National Council of
Teachers of English. Reprinted with permission.

federate"and "Union").In this context a student,Jason,has the opportunityto use

public discourse,such as writtenbook logs and talk abouttext, to engage in social
knowledgeconstructionwith othersin the public sphere(QI)and, at the same time,
to use these tools (e.g., writing,discourse,reflection)to make connectionsthrough
548
 Schema TheoryRevisited
his thinking(Qi-Qiii). Partandparcelof thisprocessis the extentto whichhe is able
to transformand applywhathe has appropriated. In QIvand Qi again,interpsycho-
logical engagementhelps provideopportunitiesfor the ongoing,iterativemediation
andelaborationof Jason'sknowledge.Forexample,if Jasonis strugglingto under-
standwhathe has read,discussinga text with moreknowledgeablepeers in a book
club groupmay providescaffoldingto supportJason's comprehension.In this cir-
cumstancehis learningis mediatedby writtenlanguage(the printedtext), oral lan-
guage (discussion), and numerous other tools both ideal (e.g., word sense,
schemas)andmaterial(e.g., discourse,paper).Social interactionsfacilitateJason's
internalizationof various kinds of knowledge and provide the basis on which he
andotherstudentsinteractwith thatknowledgeat an individuallevel (Qli andQmll).
Forexample,throughwritingJasonmay takea constructacquiredin the public set-
ting (e.g., writingreadinglogs as responsesto text) and then transformit through
privatecognitive activity (i.e., by inventinga new readinglog focused on the titles
across varioustexts).
The point here is that it is not that the public interactionsare more important
than the cognitive processes, but rather that cognition is a culturally situated
processinvolving mentalproblemsolving in a particularcontext. Such a view con-
trastswith traditionalperspectivesof cognition, which portraycognition as a set
of independent,decontextualizedmental representations(Rogoff, 1993). This is
congruentwith what Gutierrez,Baquendano-Lopez,and Tuner (1997) label the
"thirdspace."In such a space, "learningtakes precedenceover teaching;instruc-
tion is consciously local, contingent, situated,and strategic"(p. 372). In Jason's
case, he is introducedto readinglogs as a conventionused by studentsand teach-
ers in book club discussions (Qi). Over time, he appropriatesthis particularcon-
vention,becomingfamiliarwith multipleformsandfunctionsof readinglogs (QI).
In introducinghis own formatfor a readinglog, he has transformedthe idea orig-
inally presentedto him (Qiii).Jason shares this new type of reading log with his
teacher and classmates as a means of knowledge sharing or publication (Qiv).
His learningis basedon a repertoireof socially situatedskills andbehaviorsas well
as on knowledge aboutlanguage.In this context, Jasonhas the opportunityto act
as both novice and expert.
The Vygotsky Space model representsthe recursivenatureof Jason's learning,
butreadersshouldnotethatthe modelis limitedby its two-dimensionalpresentation.
Figure lb representsa three-dimensionalmodel thathighlightsthe recursivenature
of knowledgeconstructionandinternalization.One of the limitsof this modelis that
it still appearsthateach axis andquadrantmustbe activatedin sequencewhile inter-
nalizinganyconcept.However,knowledgeconstructionis obviouslymorecomplex
thanas portrayedin Figurela. Forexample,we mightactuallyfindsituationswhere
particularknowledgeconventionsareappropriated butnot publicized(e.g., wherea
studentcan recognize and constructa mentalcharactermap but does not write the
charactermap down or publicize his knowledge), or appropriatedbut not trans-
formed(e.g., a studentwho alwaysfollows the modelof readinglogs suppliedby the
teacher).In addition,in Jason's case, the new knowledge that he has constructed
about the writing convention of reading logs can be representedone way in the
Vygotsky Space, whereashis understandingof othercontentknowledge(e.g., rea-
sons for the Civil War) might be representedanotherway by using the Vygotsky
Space model.
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McVee et al.
The Vygotsky Spaceportraysthe continuumof knowledgeconstructionthrough
public <--> private, social --> individual domains. In public cognitive activity, the
teachercan assist studentsin making visible what are typically invisible, private
processes.Forexample,Jason'steacherMrs.Pardocouldaskhimto do a thinkaloud
abouthis readinglog to describehow he came up with the idea for a new readinglog
formatand his purposein doing so. However, her access to the privatecognitive
domainis limited.As notedby GavelekandRaphael(1996), "Whencognitiveactiv-
ity is private,the thinkingcan only be inferred-for example,by readingsomething
a childhas written(i.e., inferring,basedon thatpublicperformance,whatmighthave
precededit" (pp. 186-187).
In thisregard,teachersdo not have access to the intramentalprocessesof concept
formationbut might inferthem from workmade publicby the student.The Vygot-
sky Space, in QuadrantsII and III, draws our attentionto where sociocognitive
processesgo underground,withinthe individual.Two considerationsareworthnot-
ing. The firstis thatthere is no schism thatexists between the public-privateand
external-internalrealms, a considerationthatVygotsky himself has noted (1986).
The second considerationis that Vygotsky describeda multifacetedprocess for
knowledgeconstructioninvolvingmultiplephasesand stages (1986, pp. 110-126).
As acknowledgedabove,we feel thatschematheorycan help literacyresearchers
attendto both the materialandideal in tool use. Hollandand Cole (1995) acknowl-
edged a similarcontributionwhen they wrote:
Takentogether,the ideasof culturalschemasandculturalmodelsappearto
offera congenialset of linkagesbetweencultureandmentalstructure. But,as
ordinarilyinterpreted, the ideas of culturalmodel, schema,and scriptdiffer
fromourcharacterization of artifactspresentedherein on a crucialrespect:they
arewidelyinterpreted as ideal,conceptual,"inthe head"phenomena,bothby
psychologists(e.g., Rumelhart,1978;Schank& Abelson,1977) andanthro-
pologists(D'Andrade,1984;Quinn& Holland,1987).We insistthatin prac-
tice culturalartifactsalwayshavea materialas well as anidealaspect.(p. 480)

We see a secondpotentialcontributionof schematheoryin helpingsociocultural

researchersto addressunfinishedexplorationsof scientificandspontaneousconcepts
(Vygotsky, 1986). Everydayconceptsarethose thatareformedthroughour experi-
ence with the world-again, our embodied experience.The relationshipbetween
everydayconceptsandscientificor systematicconcepts,associatedwithhigher-order
thinking,has notbeenclearlyestablished.Schematheorymaybe one meansof more
clearlyunderstanding theseconstructsandtheirrelationshipas it drawsourattention
to privatecognitiveprocesses.
If we thinkof schemaas embodiedandnotjust in the head,thenit becomesclear
thatpatternsof enactment,ways of engagingthe world,both shape our interpreta-
tion of culturalactivityandareshapedby culturalactivity.This requiresvery differ-
ent ways of thinkingaboutteachingand learning.Not only must teachersscaffold
and model for students,but they must also be cognizantof the role of schemas as
embodiedsocial andculturalconstructsthatmediatestudents'learning.Here,a dis-
tinctionneedsto be madebetweenschemaas an organizationalfeaturethatthe mind
imposeson experienceandschemaas a mentalrepresentation thatmediatesactivity.
Teachersmust provide meaningfulcontexts where studentsengage with cultural
activitiesand materials(e.g., writtenand spokenlanguage,texts, and questions)in
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 Schema TheoryRevisited
ways thathelp studentsto understandand internalizepatternsembodiedin the cul-
turalmaterialsandactivitiesthatfacilitatesuccess in U.S. schools. At the sametime,
it is criticalthat teachersrecognize the political natureof this reality. All cultural
activityis imbuedwith and linkedto power;therefore,schemascan assist a learner
in accessing relevantknowledge,or culturallysituatedschemas may cause confu-
sion or even precipitateresistance.Such is the politicalnatureof schemas.
We now turnto an examplefromclassroompracticeto explorethe varioustheo-
reticalpointsintroducedin the previoussections.

Using Schema Theory to Explore an Example of Classroom Practice

We haveadaptedthe followingdescriptionof a classroominteractionandone stu-
dent's response to it from Brock (1997) and Brock and Raphael(2005), with the
authors'permission.In the scene below, Brock (1997) describedhow Deng, a stu-
dentof Hmongdescent,respondedto an activityrelatedto the book ManiacMagee
thatMrs.Weberandher class had been reading.Mrs.Weberused the book to fore-
groundissues of racialprejudiceandhomelessnessas partof a unitthatexploredrace
andracismin America.Along with readingManiacMagee, studentslistenedto Dr.
MartinLutherKing Jr.'s "IHave a Dream"speech andengagedin teacher-directed
discussionrelatedto the speech and in otherdiscussionsand activitiesto help them
understandkey conceptspresentedin the unit. Duringthis unit studentsneeded to
draw on priorknowledge;studentsneeded to constructor apply schemas to com-
prehendtext and classroomactivities.In this way, the vignettetypifiesmany of the
literate activities involving schema use in classroom settings. In the following
excerpt,Mrs.Weberreadsfrom a sectionof ManiacMagee:
Maniaclovedthecolorsof theEastEnd,thepeoplecolors.Forthelife of him,
he couldn'tfigurewhytheseEastEnderscalledthemselvesblack.Hekeptlook-
ing andlooking,andthe colorshe foundweregingersnapandlightfudgeand
darkfudgeandacornandbutterrumandcinnamonandburntorange.Butnever
licorice,which,to him,wasrealblack.(Spinelli,1990,p. 51; quotedin Brock,
p. 128)
Brock describesthe classroominteractionand responseto the passage:
Mrs.Weberpausedshortlyafterreadingthe above segmentand said, "I
wantto stoptherefor a minuteandI wantto go backto the colors.Thatwas
a significantpassagein thatthe authorwantsyou to knowthatManiacdidn't
see the ultimateof contrasts-black and white. He couldn'tfigureout why
blackscalled themselvesblack.He looked at skin tones andhe said, "I see
cinnamon."What do you think about when you think aboutcinnamon?"
(Transcript, 5-22-95).TheclassdiscussedSpinelli'suse of descriptivewords
for colors andhow some of those words(e.g., cinnamon,acorn,etc.) made
themfeel. Thentheteachersaid,"Iwantyou to putyourhandsoutrighthere"
(Transcript, 5-22-95).
She told the childrenthatshe wantedto look at all the differentshadesof
theirhands.
Thechildrenandtheteachermovedoff of theirchairsintothecenterof the
circle and began to hold out theirhands.Because the class was ethnically
diversewithAfricanAmerican,Hispanic,Caucasian,andAsianchildren,there
was a stunningarrayof differentcoloredhandsin thecenterof thecircle.One
551
McVeeet al.
child,Bill, said,"Ohcool, it goes fromlightto dark."Thentheclassdiscussed
thecolorsof theirownhands.Theytalkedaboutbutterscotch, cinnamon,flan,
etc.Mrs.Webertalkedaboutthebeautyof variationsandclosedthisdiscussion
segmentby suggesting,"Ihavethe feelingthatthe authorwantsyou to know
thatManiacspendstime lookingat the personratherthanat the skin tone"
(Transcript, 5-22-95).(Brock,1997,p. 129)
BecauseBrockhadvideotapedthe session andlaterconducteda viewing session
with Deng, we have a window into how he interpretedthe above activity.Because
Deng hadbeen in the UnitedStatesfor only 2 years,Brockenlistedthe help of Vue,
a Hmongtranslator,to increasethe likelihoodthather questionsand inquirieswere
understoodandto ensurethatshe understoodDeng's responses.As bothBrockand
the translatorinteractedwith Deng in discussingthe episode above, it became clear
to themthatDeng hadnot fully understoodthe teacher'spurposefor the activity.He
interpretedthe teacher'srequestto look at the shadesof handsin the circle as a lit-
eral task, to simply observe the colors of the students'hands.It also became clear
thatDeng did not fully understandthe concept of racism.In contrast,Mrs. Weber,
Vue, and Brockunderstoodthe figurativenatureof Mrs. Weber'srequest.In addi-
tion, Brock noted thatVue, who had lived for 8 years in the United States,under-
stood the natureof racism in the United States because he had experiencedit in
school (Brock, 1999, personalcommunication).
Before the scene describedabove, the class had engagedin both small and large
groupactivitiesanddiscussionspertainingto racismover a periodof weeks, which,
accordingto cognitive perspectivesof schema, shouldhave assisted Deng in con-
structingor activatinga schema for racism. Yet, as the interactionwith Brock as
researcherand Vue as translatormade clear, Deng did not have a well-developed
schemafor racism.In fact, even afterdiscussingthe issue in Hmongwith Vue, there
was some doubtas to whetherhe fully understoodthe teacher's reasoningbehindthe
handactivityat all. This is a case where it is possible to concludethat,becausethe
teacherhadincludedmanyactivitiesandstrategiesfor engagingwith the conceptof
racism before the hand activity (opportunitiesfor activating or constructinga
schema), therewas something"wrongwith"or faulty in Deng's schema-a view
predicatedon a deficitmodel whereinthe difficultyin learningis seen as an internal
deficitof the studentor his culture(Sleeter& Grant,1988).
On the other hand, there are those who will legitimately point out that if the
teacherhadmoreknowledgeof racerelationsin the AsiancountrieswhereDeng had
lived, she mighthave been able to makemoredirectconnectionsto his priorknowl-
edge. However, we feel thatthis second alternativefails to adequatelyaddressthe
context and its participants.Such a perspectiveassumesthat"in-the-head"knowl-
edge thatcouldbe conveyedfromteacherto studentwill addressa problemthatorig-
inatesin a social milieu.Giventhe transactionalnatureof knowledge,Mrs.Weber's
schema of race and racismboth shapes and is shapedby her engagementwith the
worldandby the social andculturalpatternsthatshe perceives.Even if Mrs.Weber
had readaboutor was knowledgeableaboutracismin Asia, she would have under-
stood both the constructsof race and racismfrom an embodiedperspective-as a
Euro-Americanfemale in the context of U.S. society and culturalinteractions.
Althoughknowledgeof Deng's experiencesin otherculturescould have been help-
ful, such knowledgeis limitedby the context,the participants,and the culturaland
materialactivity encountered.That is to say, both Deng and his teacher's under-
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standingsare"distributed acrossotherpeopleandvarioussymbols,tools, objectsand
technologies"(Gee, 2000, p. 198) ratherthanbeing simply containedin the mind.
The example also drawsour attentionto the limitationsof an approachto literacy
instructionthatposits thatinformationabouta student'scultureor ethnicityis "the
answer"to assistingthatstudentin formingknowledgestructuressuch as schema.
Deng's situationserves to illustratethe complexity of supportingcomprehen-
sion for students,particularlythose who areEnglish languagelearners.In essence,
Mrs. Weberwas doing manyof the "rightthings."She drew from a varietyof texts
and discussedthem, albeitin teacher-directedfashion,with her students;and in the
examplecited here she called students'attentionto theirown skin colors.Yet, at the
same time, Deng's teacherenacteda set of activitiesthatreplicatedher own ideo-
logical relationshipwith the experiencesand ideas representedin Maniac Magee.
She presumedthatin engagingin theseactivities,the studentswouldrepositionthem-
selves with respectto the texts in ways thatallowed theirunderstandingsto mirror
herown-and theseinteractionswerelikely helpfulto some children.The pointhere
is thatthey were not sufficientfor Deng. In this context,Deng lackedopportunities
both for comprehensibleinputand opportunitiesfor output.Brock notes thatonly
in listening to Deng's own account and assisted by Vue as translatordid she
become aware that Deng was not understandingthe story;he did not understand
Mrs.Weber's earlierdiscussionof moralandethicalissues relatedto racism.Deng
did not have an opportunityto constructknowledge about the text in other ways
(e.g., small, dialogic, peer-led discussions) that might have provided alternative
opportunitiesand tools for learning.
The difficulty for both Deng and his teacher lies in how to help Deng con-
structnovel events and constructa new schema. "Manyschema theorists,"writes
Bransford (1983), "have very little to say about the processes by which novel
events are comprehendedandnew schemasareacquired"(p. 263). One of the prob-
lems, Bransfordargues,is thatrelativelysubtledifferencesin people's schemascan
have dramaticdifferenceson theirinterpretations. Moreimportant,Bransfordnotes
thatmuchof theresearchon schematheoryuses pre-existingschemasto demonstrate
schemachangeor adaptationratherthanaddressingthe issue of schemaconstruction
in relationto a totallynew topic.
Bransforduses the exampleof an airportschemaandhow to understandthe rela-
tionshipbetweenthe following two sentences:"Janedid not wearher silverjewelry
becauseshe was going somewhere.She was going to the airport."To fully compre-
hendthe sentences,a readermustpossess a complexunderstanding of airportsandof
airportsecurityand how it works.In a classroomfor studentswho may not possess
sucha schema,we mightsimplytell themthattherearemetaldetectorsor even show
thempictures.However,Bransfordasserts,thisis highlyproblematicbecausein con-
structinga new schema,childrenoften have difficultyin relatingpieces of informa-
tion to each other.He goes on to explainby using examplesof childrendealingwith
new informationregardingNativeAmericanIndians.Becausethe contentwas unfa-
miliarto the children,they had a greatdeal of difficultyunderstandingtheirtexts.
Furthermore, and moreimportanthere,the childrendid not understandhow to con-
nect the variousbits of informationthatwere in the text. Accordingto Bransford,a
monumentalproblemto be overcomeis how to assistlearnersin connectingpackets
of information-informationthatthey perceiveto be unconnected.We have argued
thatactivatingpriorknowledge,makingpersonalconnections,andthe like were not
553
McVee et al.
enoughto scaffoldDeng's learning.However,given his lack of understandingafter
all the activitiesthatoccurredin his classroom,it would not be far-fetchedfor us or
for Deng's teacherto conclude that the problemis Deng's lack of an appropriate
schemaandto place the responsibilityfor misunderstanding on Deng.
We are fully aware that proponentsof schema theory never intendedor used
schema theory to promotedeficit models of education.Indeed, Bransford(1983)
arguesagainstdeficit models when he writes, "Some childrenmay appearto have
poorcomprehensionandmemoryskills not becausethey have some inherentmem-
ory 'deficits,'but because they lack or fail to activate,the backgroundknowledge
thatwas presupposedby a messageor text"(p. 260). We wish to be equallyclearthat
ourpointhereis not to discountthe roleof the teacher,for teachersareclearlyimpor-
tantin assistingstudentsin theirlearning,particularlyin guidinglearnersto become
awareof patterns(Gee, 2000). Whatwe arepreparedto argueis that,althoughcon-
nections to priorknowledge are critical,schema theorymust also include specific
attentionto the role of culturalmaterialandactivity,andthatteachersmustattendto
both.
Such a reformulationrepositionsschemaas more thanpriorknowledgeor topic
knowledge.Forexample,althoughMrs.Weber,Deng's teacher,was anexperienced
teacherwho providedactivitiesto supportherstudents'learningin theuniton racism,
closer analysisof Deng's classroominteractionsrevealthathe hadlittle opportunity
for dialogic engagement.Brockexplainshow, althoughthe class engagedin group
discussionof the text, thesediscussionsalmostalwaysoccurredin a whole-classset-
ting and followed the typicalIRE pattern,in which the teacherinitiatesa question,
the childrenreply,andthenthe teacherevaluatestheirresponses(Brock,2005). Fur-
ther analysis revealedthat only a limited numberof studentsparticipatedin these
"discussions."These interactionsdifferedgreatlyfromthe dialogictype of engage-
mentthatoccurredbetweenBrock,Vue, andDeng as Deng viewed the class sessions
on videotape.Duringthe viewing sessions, it is clear that Deng's growing under-
standingof theclassroomeventswas mediatedby boththeidealandthe materialarti-
facts present-for example,by the presenceof the videotapes,by Deng's controlof
the remote in stoppingthe tape, by his use of the opportunityto ask questionsof
BrockandVue, andby the languageuse andopportunitiesaffordedby the presence
of BrockandVue, the Hmongtranslator.
In relationto Deng, we agreewith BrockthatDeng lackedopportunitiesto learn
within the classroom setting. The lack of opportunitiesto learn were related to
teacher-directedactivities and strategiesused in the classroom and to the lack of
opportunityfor Deng to publicizethe knowledgethathe was internalizing,or failing
to internalize.The lack of opportunityin the classroomwas also relatedto the pat-
ternsof languageandof culturalactivitythroughwhich Deng's learningwas medi-
ated. These patternswere not contained in Deng's mind in script-likeform but
existed in the patternsthatDeng saw in culturalactivitiesand materials(Holland&
Cole, 1995). Althoughschematheoreticperspectivesdrawour attentionto Deng's
priorexperienceor backgroundknowledgeand towardthe teacher'seffortsto sup-
port studentlearningby providingnumerousactivitiesor encounterswith various
texts involving racism,our perspectiveand understandingof Deng's experienceis
madefarricherandmorecomplexby closerconsiderationof socioculturalconcerns,
particularlythe role of materialand ideal artifacts.In addition,a socioculturalper-
spectivedrawsour attentionto how Deng was positionedby othersandthe political
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 Schema TheoryRevisited
implicationsof suchpositioning.By giving Deng access to tools thatwouldhelp him
to articulatehis understandingof class interactions(Vue as translator,a video, etc.),
BrockpositionedDeng as an active participantin constructingknowledgeabouthis
own learning.This shift changesthe contextandprovidesan opportunityfor him to
appropriate,transform,andmakehis knowledgepublic.This is, essentially,a polit-
ical act, as it shifts Deng from a passive receptorof knowledgeto an active partici-
pantin knowledgeconstruction.
In summary,therearethreeways thatsocioculturalperspectiveshelpus to rethink
Deng's classroomexperiencesor opportunitiesin ways thattraditionalschemathe-
ory, as conceivedof by cognitive scientists,cannot.First,socioculturalperspectives
drawour attentionto the issues of the origin and developmentof Deng's schemas.
This geneticquestionis essentialin social conceptionsof mind(Wertsch,1991) and
is an areaof fundamentaldifferencebetween social and individualperspectivesof
mind. This leads us to be mindfulthatMrs. Weberand Deng are both filteringthe
constructionof knowledgethroughculturallenses and identitiesin both the private
andpublicdomain.
Second,in consideringtheoriginationanddevelopmentof schemas,sociocultural
perspectivesdrawourattentionto the ways in whichknowerandknownarenot sep-
arateentities as premisedin informationprocessing models of mind. That is, in
Deng's example,it is not simplythe case thatMrs.Webermustassist in the transfer
of knowledge"outthere"in the worldandin the text to Deng's mind.Rather,Deng
as learnerandknowledgeof the text as knownaremutuallyconstitutive;knowingis
a culturalprocessembodiedwithinthe culturaland social systems. Only a transac-
tionalview of schemasenablesus to both acknowledgeandexplorethe interdepen-
dence betweenthe text, practices,and contextswithin which the cognitive process
occurs.
Third,a socioculturalperspectivehighlights the role of mediationaltools, for
example, activitiessuch as language(both Hmong and English),and texts such as
books, along with videotapesand conversations.These activitiesand tools involve
boththe materialandthe ideal artifactswith which Deng interacts.Thereis an inter-
dependenceof thoughtand language,and of speech and activity,in the immediate
contextswithinwhich any act of text comprehensionoccurs.Because thought,lan-
guage,speech,andactivityareinterrelatedandsymbiotic,we areencouragedto view
cognition as a culturalprocess ratherthanas only a collection of mentalprocesses
(Rogoff, 1993).Culturalprocessesof cognitionoccurin contextsthatarehistorically
and socially bound,andthusthey arepoliticalentities.Fromthis vantagepoint,the
role of the teachertakes on even more profounddimensions and responsibilities
becausethe teacheris more thanjust a more knowledgeableother.She becomes a
mediatingagent who facilitates, or who may fail to facilitate, the acquisitionof
knowledgeandthe use of particularcognitive tools withina culturallyboundactiv-
ity system,thusemphasizingteachingitself as a politicalact.
Implications for Future Inquiry
Throughoutthis article we have tried to articulatewhat it means to consider
schemas from a socioculturalperspective.In summary,we remindour readersof
threekey points:(1) Schemaandothercognitiveprocessesor structuresareembod-
ied-that is, who we are as biological beings determinesour sensorialinteractions
with the world and thus the natureof the representationswe construct;(2) knowl-
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McVee et al.
edge is situatedin the transactionbetweenworldandindividual;and(3) these trans-
actionsaremediatedby culturallyandsocially enactedpracticescarriedout through
materialandideal artifacts.
The implicationsfor futureinquiryturncriticallyon whatwe takeschemasto be,
how they areformed,andthe processesby whichthey develop andaretransformed.
We have seen thatmanyresearchersconsiderthe schemaconstructto be ill-defined.
Yet the constructhas been remarkablygenerativeof researchandeducationalprac-
tices. We have also seen thatthe conceptionof the schemaas offeredby Bartlettwas
based on the assumptionthatwe build our (schematic)understandingsof the world
on the basis of our embodied and socially mediatedtransactionswith the world.
These transactionswith othersare criticalin the formationand continueddevelop-
ment of mind. Ourindividualschematicunderstandingsthus emerge from, but are
not reducibleto, our socioculturaltransactionswith others.In contrast,conceptions
of schematheoryprofferedby cognitive science have assumedthatthereis a divide
betweentheknowerandthe known,thatschemasareformedwithinindividuals,and
thatschemaformationis a disembodied,in-the-headproposition.
Whatseems clearis thatindividualsengagein patternedways of interactingwith,
understanding,and rememberingtheir world. Whetherone conceptualizesthese
transformationsin individualthinkingin termsof schemas,cognitive structures,or
representations,the fact remainsthatschemas(or cognitive structuresor represen-
tations) are transformedas a result of these transactionswith the world through
materialandideationalmeans.Whatseems equallyclearis thatwe have littleunder-
standingof how the schemasoriginateand develop or whatrole social and cultural
factorsplay in these geneticprocesses.As notedabove, socioculturaltheoryhas the
potentialto elaborateand furtherenrichthese fundamentalinsightsconcerningthe
genesis anddevelopmentof schemas.Perhapsthe most importantconceptualques-
tion raisedby this treatiseconcernswhen a construct,or theorybuilt arounda con-
struct, ceases to be the theory (or construct) that it was. Does an embodied,
transactional,andculturallyinformedconceptionof the originsanddevelopmentof
schemasso radicallyalterthereceivedunderstanding of theconstructthatit no longer
resembleswhatwas originallyintendedby cognitive scientists?
We raise this last questionas more thana rhetoricalexercise. To acknowledge
the embodied,transactional,andculturalnatureof schemasalso requiresacknowl-
edging and addressingthe inherentlypolitical natureof knowledge-something
that we have alluded to but not fully explored. While traditionalversions of the
schema constructthat were developed by cognitive science present knowledge
constructionthrougha value-neutralmetaphor(e.g., schemasareknowledgeorga-
nizationstructureslike a file cabinet)otherversions (e.g., Bruner,1996; Ferdman,
1990; Gee, 2004; New LondonGroup,1996) suggest thatknowledgeconstruction,
particularlyin the form of literacyteaching, learning,and research,is political in
nature;thatis, it is imbuedwith beliefs, ideals, and values. New Literaciesschol-
arspoint to the need to acknowledgeand addressthe increasinglydiverse cultural
contexts and increasinglydiverse digital contexts encounteredby students(Gee,
2003, 2004; Lankshear& Knobel, 2003). Gee, for example, observes that those
who will have access to power and social goods undernew capitalismwill be the
"shape shifting portfolio people" (p. 105) who can rapidly adapt and use their
knowledge acquiredthroughthe right "sortsof experiences, skills, and achieve-
ments ... accrued... with the 'right'sortof people"(p. 106). In otherwords,those
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who have a broadrepertoireof ideal andmaterialtools anda greatcommandof that
repertoirewill be able to use this knowledge to their advantage.Gee and others
have notedthatthe increasinglymultimodalnatureof literaciesmakesit difficultto
ignore the embodiednatureof learning.At the same time thatever more complex
types of tools arerequired,many minoritychildrenand many childrenwho live in
poverty,startschool alreadyat a disadvantagebecausemanyhave not hadthe same
exposureto academicdiscourseas theirmoreaffluentpeers. Althoughall children
come to school with pre-existingknowledge structures,in many cases the knowl-
edge and learningprocesses thatthe childrenpossess is not the same as, and may
even conflict with, the types of knowledge and knowledge constructionempha-
sized in school (Heath, 1983). Many scholars advocate making use of children's
internalknowledge, promotingdifferenttypes of knowledge as a strengthrather
thana deficit (Gutierrezet al., 1997; Heath, 1983; Moll, 1994). In contrastto more
complex and contextualizedapproachesto addressissues of literacy and equity,
neoliberal philosophies of schooling address equity through standards,testing,
accountability,and a free market.Thus childrenwho are alreadyat a disadvantage
areoffered "thebasics"andonly the basics, when, in reality,they need much more
to acquirethe materialandideal tools to enablethemto succeed in a rapidlychang-
ing environment.
As noted earlier,Gaffney and Anderson(2000) have observedthat, in literacy
research,schema theory has fallen by the wayside and is seldom used directly in
explaining,exploring,or conceptualizingcontemporaryresearch.Whetherthe con-
structof schemacan itself be redefinedto factorin the politicalnatureof embodied,
transactionalknowledgeremainsto be seen. Whenreadingthe critiqueof neoliberal
agendasby New Literaciesscholars,we are less thansanguineaboutthis prospect,
especially when we note that some time ago scholars encouragedresearchersto
widen theirinvestigationsof cultureandcognition(e.g., Cole, 1996).
On the otherhand,therearea numberof literacyscholarswho have called atten-
tion to new and emergingdigitaltechnologies,in particular,nonlineartexts. Many
literacyscholarsarguethatsuch texts requirenew skills and strategiesfor reading
(Reinking,McKenna,Labbo,& Kieffer, 1998). If so, traditionalunderstandingsof
comprehensionpredicatedon schema theory and the explorationof linear, print-
basedtexts will likely be inadequateto explainthe cognitiveprocessesthata reader
mustengage when exploringtexts in hypermediaenvironmentssuch as the Internet.
Some scholarshave, in fact, notedthatschemas,as rigidknowledgestructures,are
inadequateto explain the processes and outcomesprefiguredby new technologies
such as hyptertexts(e.g., Mishra,Spiro, & Feltovich, 1996; Spiro & Jehng, 1990;
Spiro,Coulson,Feltovich,& Anderson,1988).It may well be thatthe workof Spiro
and his colleagues in cognitive flexibility theory is more applicableto new and
emergingtechnologiesthanversionsof schematheoryas developedby cognitivesci-
entists.Cognitiveflexibilitytheory,with its explorationof learningin "ill-structured
domains,"may also be more compatiblewith the perspectivesadvocatedby New
Literaciesscholars.
Throughoutthisessay, we haveengagedin whatFlorio-Ruane(2002) calls "epis-
temologicalstocktaking,"whereinwe evaluateresearchandtheoriesthatwe ascribe
to andthe practicesthatwe carryout in our field of study(p. 207). It is in this tradi-
tion that we present this revisitationof schema. We propose our explorationof
schemasas thebeginningof a dialogue,in the hope thatliteracyresearchersandedu-
557
McVee et al.
cators will further explore the valuable contribution that schema theoretic perspec-
tives have made to literacy research, practice, and theory. At the same time, we
acknowledge limitations of the schema construct as traditionally conceived. We pro-
pose, in addition, that literacy researchers and educators engage in productive dia-
logue exploring how a transactional notion of schema might assist us, as teachers and
researchers, as we continue to investigate language processes such as reading, writ-
ing, listening, and speaking in the increasingly diverse social and cultural settings of
U.S. society.

Notes
The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and Diane Barone,
Fenice Boyd, Cynthia Brock, and Mary Rozendal for their feedback on numerous ver-
sions of this manuscript.
'In keeping with the recommendationsof the Publication Manual of theAmericanPsy-
chological Association (5th ed.), we use the plural term "schemas"instead of the tradi-
tional term "schemata"throughoutthis article.
2Readersinterested in the notion of transactionand cultural theories of reading may
wish to consult Smagorinsky(2001). Smagorinskydoes not revisit schema theoreticper-
spectives in his article,but his explorationof text generationand the role of tools and signs
in the constructionof meaning throughwhat he calls the "transactionalzone" (p. 140) is
highly relevant to issues that we discuss in this article.
3Forreadersinterestedin the origins of socioculturalperspectives and activity theory,
including interestingsociohistoricalcontexts, we suggest Blanck (1990); Robbins (2003);
Rosa & Montero (1990); and Van der Veer & Valsiner (1991).
4Severalpublishedresearchershave also writtenabout this tension. Beals (1998) notes
that, on first being introducedto a definition of schema while taking a graduatecourse,
she found it relevant in explaining her own learning. However, as she continued reading
about schema theory, she quickly became "disenchantedwith its applicationto informa-
tion processing theories and methods of teachingreading."Yet she also notes thatschema
is "a crucial idea in the study of development" (p. 11). Beals calls upon Bakhtin's work
to draw "society into the individual mind, and the individual mind into society" (p. 11)
and advocates a conception of schema that is closer to Bartlett's original version than to
the later version articulatedby cognitive scientists.
Another example comes from William Frawley, who describes, in Vygotskyand Cog-
nitive Science (1997), how as a graduatestudenthe studied both socioculturaland infor-
mation-processingtheories of language. In reflecting on that experience he notes: "The
two views of the human-as device and a person-never seemed at odds to me. Thanks
to the integrityof my teachers,they were never put at odds. That was reservedfor the par-
tisan and often dangerous world of the profession, where suggestions that the computa-
tional and the socio-culturalmind not only went togetherbut belonged togethermet with
a few worried looks" (p. 1).

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Authors
MARY B. McVEE is an Assistant Professorat the University at Buffalo/SUNY, Depart-
ment of Learningand Instruction,Buffalo, NY 14260-1000; e-mail [email protected].
Her researchinterestsinclude the use of narrativeas a mediationaltool in teacherlearn-
ing about culture and the use of emerging technologies as mediationaltools in literacy
teaching and learning.
KAILONNIEDUNSMOREis an AssistantProfessorat CalvinCollege, EducationDepart-
ment,3201 BurtonStreet,S.E., GrandRapids,MI 49546-4388; e-mail [email protected].
Her researchinterestsinclude literacy interventionsto supportstrugglingreaders,espe-
cially learningdisabledpopulations.
JAMES R. GAVELEKis an Associate Professorat the University of Illinois at Chicago,
College of Education(MC147), 1040 W. Harrison(EPASW:1412), Chicago, IL 60607-
7133; e-mail [email protected] researchinterestsinclude the social origins of mind,
focusing specificallyon the role playedby languageandothersemioticprocessesin medi-
ating intellectualand affective development,and on social epistemologies as they relate
to the integrationof instruction.

APPENDIX A
Prison/Wrestling Passage
Rocky slowly got up from the mat, planning his escape. He hesitated a moment
and thought. Things were not going well. What bothered him most was being held,
especially since the charge against him had been weak. He considered his present
situation. The lock that held him was strong, but he thought he could break it. He
knew, however, that his timing would have to be perfect. Rocky was aware that it
was because of his early roughness that he had been penalized so severely-much
too severely from his point of view. The situation was becoming frustrating; the
pressure had been grinding on him for too long. He was being ridden unmercifully.
Rocky was getting angry now. He felt he was ready to make his move. He knew
that his success or failure would depend on what he did in the next few seconds
(Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1977, p. 372).

APPENDIX B
Card/Music Passage
Every Saturday night, four good friends get together. When Jerry, Mike, and
Pat arrived, Karen was sitting in her living room writing some notes. She quickly
gathered the cards and stood up to greet her friends at the door. They followed her
into the living room but as usual they couldn't agree on exactly what to play. Jerry
eventually took a stand and set things up. Finally, they began to play. Karen's
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recorderfilled the room with soft and pleasantmusic. Early in the evening, Mike
noticed Pat's hand and the many diamonds.As the night progressedthe tempo of
play increased.Finally, a lull in the activities occurred.Taking advantageof this,
Jerryponderedthe arrangementin front of him. Mike interruptedJerry'sreverie
and said, "Let's hear the score."They listened carefully and commentedon their
performance.When the comments were all heard,exhaustedbut happy, Karen's
friendswent home (Anderson,Reynolds, Schallert,& Goetz, 1977, p. 372).

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