Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Tourism Management
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tourman

Heritage protection and tourism development priorities in Hangzhou, China:

A political economy and governance perspective
Yi Wang a, Bill Bramwell b, *
a
Nottingham Business School Ningbo, University of Nottingham Ningbo, 199 Taikang East Road, Ningbo, China
b
Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield Business School, Howard Street, Sheffield S1 1WB, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Government interventions can be important for determining priorities between heritage protection and
Received 11 July 2011 tourism-related development at heritage sites. This paper uses a political economy approach to examine
Accepted 23 October 2011 the government’s role in determining these priorities in China, for two heritage schemes at West Lake in
the city of Hangzhou. The study considers policy making for heritage protection and tourism develop-
Keywords: ment in the context of broad economic and political circumstances, the power and influence of different
Heritage protection
actors in the schemes’ governance, strategic selectivity in the policy choices, and whether views about
Tourism development
the policies exhibited a uniform hegemony among powerful and less influential groups. Consideration is
Political economy
Governance
given to how the relative priority for heritage protection and tourism development in policies reflected
Policy community the state’s regulation of the economy and maintenance of its political legitimacy. A powerful policy
China community was found that was beginning to consider other actors’ views, but tourism development
remained a prominent driver.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction economic justification, conservation policies and practices in many

places would not be established or justified in the minds of
The governance of heritage can be fraught with tensions community members and leaders”. Thus, the use of heritage for
between the requirements of protection and conservation and the tourism and related commercial activities can involve mutual
opportunities for commercial and economic development. On the benefits, but it may also entail trade-offs and the loss of irreplaceable
one hand, historic resources can be valorised to facilitate revenue features of our past.
generation and economic growth through tourism, real estate There are numerous studies illustrating specific places where
development and place marketing. The commercial use of historic either heritage conservation or tourism growth has taken prece-
assets thus can promote local socio-economic development. Heri- dence (McKercher & du Cros, 2002; McKercher, Ho, & du Cros,
tage resources and their conservation sometimes have acted as, or 2005), and it is important to provide sound explanations of the
been part of, urban regeneration or rural revitalisation schemes in processes behind those outcomes. This paper examines governance
that they have become integral with neoliberal strategies to improve processes that affect relations between heritage protection and
the competitiveness of places in the global capitalist economy tourism-related economic growth. It considers the relative priority
(Harvey, 2005). On the other hand, commercial activities may given to heritage and to tourism, and the potential tensions and
damage historic resources, through physical damage caused by mutual benefits between them. It is set in the context of China, with
tourist use or through commoditization, trivialisation and stand- its distinctive and rapidly evolving socio-economic and political
ardisation (Ho & McKercher, 2004). Yet, attempts to preserve local system. It is, therefore, of both global relevance and of special
historic resources that deny socio-economic development can relevance to China (Sofield & Li, 2011).
condemn places to economic impoverishment (Yang, Wall, & Smith, The concept of governance concerns how societies are governed,
2008). The commercial use of heritage may also be considered ruled or “steered”, and thus it involves the processes for regulating
necessary in order to generate the funding required to protect it and mobilising social action and for producing social order
(Chhabra, 2009). As Timothy (2007, p. xvi) notes: “Without an (Bramwell & Lane, 2011). Such regulation and mobilisation usually
involves collective action and coordination, with heritage protec-
tion often depending on such collective responses. Governance is
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 (0)114 2255555; fax: þ44 (0)114 2255036.
considered to be broader than government, in recognition that
E-mail address: [email protected] (B. Bramwell). often it is not just the formal agencies of government that are

0261-5177/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2011.10.010
 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998 989

involved in the coordinating tasks of governance: business, economic development at West Lake. Second, it explores Hang-
community and other actors potentially can also be involved. In zhou’s economic and political circumstances that helped shape
recent years increasingly complex multi-agency governance policy priorities for heritage and tourism in the two West Lake
patterns have emerged in many developed economies, including in schemes under scrutiny. It considers, third, the actors involved in
relation to heritage (Jessop, 2008; Wu, 2002). Governance can be the schemes’ governance, their power relations and their influence
characterised by more diffuse policy networks and markets, as on policy making. Fourth, it details whether and how the schemes’
found in many advanced capitalist nations, or by a comparatively policy makers privileged heritage protection or economic devel-
dominant hierarchical state, as occurs in China (Bevir, 2009). opment. There is consideration, finally, of whether views about
This paper explores how governance can affect the relative using heritage and tourism in the schemes were shared by
priorities at heritage sites given to heritage protection or conser- powerful and less influential groups.
vation and to tourism-related economic development. It uses the
theoretical lens of political economy, drawing on ideas developed 2. Political economy, governance and heritage-tourism
by Karl Marx (1818e1883), political economist Antonio Gramsci relations
(1891e1937), and more recently by sociologist Bob Jessop (1946-).
In political economy, the social system is considered to constitute The political economy approach provides distinctive perspec-
a whole, so society’s varied aspects are parts of the whole tives on the objectives of government policies for heritage protec-
(Bramwell, 2011; Mosedale, 2011). The driving forces of change in tion and tourism development.
the social system relate to oppositions and conflicts within and Marx famously argued that market forces are inherently unstable.
between the elements of this whole. This approach suggests that This was because they lead to capital over-accumulation and thus to
the political sphere associated with governance is strongly related periodic crises, and also because they encourage unstable social
to the economic, social and cultural spheres. Political economy relations and conflicts. In political economy the governance institu-
emphasises how economic relations can influence other social, tions, and notably the state, are considered to be important in regu-
cultural and political relationships, including governance. lating the economic and political system in order to mitigate the
Political economy is used in this paper to examine the gover- contradictions and crises created by market forces, and to promote
nance of heritage and tourism in the West Lake historic district on the system’s reproduction (Bevir, 2009; Cornelissen, 2011; Peet,
the east edge of Hangzhou’s city centre, in east China. Hangzhou is 2007). A key role for the state is intervention to encourage the
a major city located only 150 km from Shanghai, with a population conditions for capital accumulation and economic expansion (Bevir,
of over six million people. A large lake dominates West Lake historic 2009). At the same time, the state seeks to ensure it maintains its
district, but it also includes numerous religious, cultural and ability adequately to reflect the popular will (Goodwin & Painter,
historical sites. The landscape of lake, hills and historical sites has 1996; Peck & Tickell, 1992). If the state lacks legitimacy, then sus-
evolved over many centuries and it conforms to traditional Chinese tained economic activity is hampered. Purcell and Nevins (2005, pp.
aesthetics as highly harmonised (Sofield & Li, 2011; UNESCO, 2008). 212e13) suggest that “In order to maintain political legitimacy and
This complex landscape is well known in China, but it is increasingly effective authority over its people, the state must reproduce a politi-
threatened by tourism and other commercial pressures. Hangzhou cally stable relationship between the state and citizen”.
is a major tourism centre in China, and West Lake has been its iconic Political economy suggests that the state can tend to give priority
draw card. There is growing recognition of the importance of pro- to the economy as this produces the wealth which provides income
tecting West Lake’s heritage, but there is also much emphasis on its for the state and also for the population that provides the state’s
tourism value and its positive image for Hangzhou as an economic political support (Jessop, 2008). Thus, the state may often intervene
centre. The study focuses on two specific heritage schemes at West in favour of economic over heritage conservation priorities (Harvey,
Lake: Mei Jia Wu Tea Area and Leifeng Pagoda. 2010). When priority is given to economic growth through tourism
The case assessed here, therefore, is in a socialist country with then heritage protection may be neglected or traded-off.
a Communist Party-led state and a socio-economic system that Political economy also indicates why the state may intervene to
combines capitalism and socialism (White, 2002). The continuity of promote heritage conservation and to protect heritage from
the Chinese Communist Party’s rule and of socialist principles and damaging tourism development. One explanation is that the state
political institutions is a striking feature of contemporary China may decide to protect heritage resources from tourism activities if it
(Sun, 2008). Authority in China is “derived ultimately from a single, is considered that their loss or deterioration may reduce the
exceedingly centralised source on high” (Shue, 2008, p. 141), so that potential for present and future rounds of capital accumulation
the central state and Communist Party are highly influential. But (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010). Market forces can make actors focus
even here local government and other actors have scope to influ- on short-term economic returns to the detriment of heritage
ence governance processes (Yan & Bramwell, 2008). This dispersal conservation, even if the heritage resources are required to sustain
of governance was encouraged by reforms begun by Deng Xiaop- future economic returns, and thus this can prompt government
ing’s 1978 “Open Door” policies, which retained the Communist intervention (although the state may also focus on securing
Party and the state’s dominance, but led to capitalism’s dramatic immediate economic returns). Another explanation for state-
growth and increasing decentralisation in policy making. The study sponsored heritage protection is that there is usually an expecta-
focuses in this political system on how and why governance deci- tion that government will intervene to avert major damage to
sions were made associated with the relative priority given to society’s historical and cultural assets, not least to promote the
heritage protection and tourism-related economic growth at state’s political and cultural legitimacy and to maintain its authority
Hangzhou’s West Lake. It is important to understand how China’s (Harvey, 1996). In practice the state will usually intervene to secure
distinctive socio-economic and political system affects governance some sort of balance between economic development and heritage
decisions concerning heritage-tourism relations. These decisions protection because this is likely to gain quite wide support,
are of major significance as China has rapidly become the fourth although this intervention will impinge on the interests of some
most visited international destination in the world, while its groups and thus it may result in conflict.
domestic tourism industry is perhaps unrivalled (Sofield & Li, 2011). Political economy, secondly, provides distinctive perspectives on
The study explains, first, the political economy approach used to the policy processes affecting heritage-tourism relations. It suggests,
analyse the governance of heritage protection and tourism-related for example, that often there are several agents seeking to influence
990 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

policy making, and that the associated policy networks involve Some studies of heritage tourism evaluate the priorities for
interests and power relations (Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997, p. 1). heritage protection and tourism development, with a much smaller
According to Long (2004, p. 30), power in such networks is “the number discussing these priorities in relation to different actors
outcome of complex struggles and negotiations over authority, and social forces, and to their influence on governance (Hampton,
status, reputation and resources”. Within policy networks there 2005; Johnson, 1999). Harrison (2004, p. 285) suggests that the
may be a “policy community”, which Rhodes (1999) depicts as governance of heritage tourism involves “a process in which
characterised by the most powerful policy decision-makers and by numerous groups and agencies jockey for influence and power”.
a relatively restrictive membership. There may be other actors that Such influences on the governance of heritage and tourism are
cooperate with “policy community” members, but less regularly and considered by Warren (1998) in a study of the politics of tourism
they are less influential in policy decisions, and these are identified in development near a temple in Bali, and by Henderson (2000) in an
this study as “contributing actors”. For political economy, therefore, examination of cultural heritage and tourism policies for Singa-
power is a key element of policy making processes. pore’s Chinatown. In these studies the state often emerges as
Gramsci (1971) examined more particularly how powerful a significant influence on heritage and tourism development.
groups may promote ideological “hegemony” for their own interests, Sofield and Li (1998, 2011), for instance, describe the increasing
including through the state’s activities. Hegemony is considered to enthusiasm for tourism of central and local government in China
involve sets of values and attitudes which many people endorse and after 1978 and its implications for the uses of heritage and for
that support the interests of influential groups. These values and heritage protection. There is scope for more research, however, that
attitudes are made to appear as the natural way of thinking and critically examines the influences on the priorities in heritage
believing, and powerful groups may seek to promote this (Peet, tourism relations. More specifically, more research on heritage
2007). Yet, Gramsci considers there are often conflicts around tourism might usefully employ ideas from political economy, one
hegemony (Avdikos 2011). He explains that “the fact of hegemony reason being that this encourages consideration of the potential
undoubtedly presupposes that the interests and tendencies of the interconnections between heritage, tourism, power, values and
groups over which hegemony is to be exercised are taken into attitudes, the state and the economy.
account.that is, the ruling group makes sacrifices of an economic The political economy perspective outlined here is used in the
corporate kind, but it is also indubitable that such sacrifices and such study to evaluate why and how governance affected the relative
compromises cannot affect what is essential” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 161). priorities given to heritage protection and tourism-related
He also suggests that struggles over interests and values mean that economic development in two schemes at Hangzhou’s West Lake.
less powerful groups can hold oppositional beliefs (Peet, 2007).
Political economy highlights the significance of economic and
power relations, but political economists such as Jessop (2008) also 3. The case of West Lake
contend that policy interventions do not result from a deterministic
logic. Instead, they suggest that, while economic and power rela- Because of its scenic West Lake, Hangzhou enjoys a reputation as
tions are important, policy decisions also involve personal a “paradise on the earth” in Chinese poetry, and West Lake historic
perceptions and attitudes, and decisions in response to specific district is widely recognised in China for its harmonious cultural
circumstances found at particular conjunctures. This transforms landscape and rich historical relics (Zhang, 2004). One of many
the perspective into a way of “analyzing a determinable but open legends enhancing West Lake’s tourist appeal depicts the lake as
historical process” (Peet, 1998, p. 79), and it stresses agency as well a “pearl from heaven” that was carved and polished by a dragon and
as structure (Bramwell, 2006; Long, 2001, 2004). Jessop (2008) a phoenix, and when the pearl fell to earth it changed into the West
argues that actors involved in governance are capable of taking Lake, and the dragon and phoenix become its adjacent hills (Yan,
a strategic view of structural constraints and of developing their 2003). West Lake is Hangzhou’s primary tourist draw card, and in
views and selecting their actions within those constraints, doing so 2008 the city attracted 43.4 million domestic and 2.2 million inter-
in the context of specific circumstances at particular conjunctures. national tourists (Hangzhou Statistics Bureau, 2009; Hangzhou
Through this “strategic selectivity” actors can transform social Tourism Committee, 2009; Li, 2007).
structures (Bramwell, 2011). For Jessop (1990, p. 221), governance is West Lake fringes Hangzhou’s city centre so it is affected by the
regarded ‘‘as a system of strategic selectivity and the nature of city’s growth and real estate development, and it attracts
political struggle as a field of competing strategies for hegemony’’. substantial tourist numbers. In the late 1990s the city government
Political economy is not widely used in research on tourism realised that these pressures could damage West Lake’s environ-
governance. Tourism policy-making research has often focused on ment and tourist appeal so it established West Lake Scenic District
describing the networks of policy-related interactions, including Management Committee (shortened here to West Lake Manage-
the interactions between actors related to the policy process (Pforr, ment Committee) to plan the district and to manage its tourism,
2006; Scott, Baggio, & Cooper, 2008; Scott, Cooper, & Baggio, 2008). along with Hangzhou Tourism Committee (Hangzhou Municipal
While many studies of tourism governance recognise the influence Government, 2006). In 2002 West Lake Management Committee
of power and contests over resources, relatively few of them and Hangzhou Tourism Committee established the West Lake
consistently apply social theory to explain those relations (Hall, Protection Project. One important stimulus behind this Project was
2005). Social theory consists of groupings of ideas that provide the desire for West Lake district to be a UNESCO World Heritage
broad explanations of society. In particular, only a modest amount Site: “it is vital for West Lake to gain UNESCO designation as it is
of work on tourism governance uses political economy, an such a precious historical and cultural site” (WLMC, 2000, p. 2;
approach that deals simultaneously with broad social, political and Ryan, Chaozhi, & Zeng, 2011). UNESCO had previously declined its
economic processes, and that considers the influence of economic designation due to the “dramatic reduction in the lake surface by
pressures on tourism policies. Political economy ideas are used, for human activities, damage to historical relics, and the negative
example, by Hall (1994, 2006) to examine the local state’s roles in influences from urban modernity” (UNESCO, 1999, 2003, p. 14). The
developing sport mega-events, by Bianchi (2004) to evaluate the study examines two schemes in the West Lake Protection Project
politics of tourism planning in the Spanish Canary Islands, and by that combine heritage protection and commercial tourism devel-
Bramwell and Meyer (2007) to explore policies for tourism and the opment: the Mei Jia Wu Tea Area and Leifeng Pagoda schemes. The
environment in former East Germany. background to each of these schemes is explained subsequently.
 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998 991

4. Study methods including society’s governance. In this context, China’s expanding

market economy has been accompanied by a decentralisation of
Research on the two schemes covered the period 2002e2007. governance away from Beijing, and local initiatives have helped to
Information was obtained from interviews, government documents pioneer the way to a new social order (Harvey, 2005; Jin & Zou,
(including minutes of West Lake Protection Project meetings), four 2003; Zhang, 2006). Fiscal decentralisation has been important,
local newspapers, promotional materials, blog websites, and site with local government allowed to control a larger proportion of tax
observations. Purposive sampling for the interviews included actors revenue, and cities have gained powers to fund projects by selling
who were “information rich” and participants in key policy processes the rights to develop real estate, while still retaining public land
or actors directly affected by them. Several respondents were identi- ownership (Wu, 2002; Wu & Zhang, 2007). As a result, “local
fied from interviewee responses about other actors involved in, or governments have transformed from passive regulators in the
affected by, the West Lake Protection Project and the two schemes. previous planned economy to entrepreneurial agents that initiate
Questions in the in-depth, semi-structured interviews were used local developments” (Oi, 1995, p. 1145; Shin, 2010). According to
flexibly according to the respondents’ roles and experience, and Zhang (2002a, p. 303), “In the field of urban development, it is now
probing explored the ideas that emerged. Each interview lasted the municipalities rather than central government that are shaping
between one hour and one and a half hours and all were recorded. China’s urban landscape”.
Themes and issues in the interview transcripts were explored using N- The changes mean that Hangzhou’s city government has gained
Vivo software and Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) framework approach far greater funding and also economic, administrative and planning
for qualitative data analysis. The same themes were considered when powers to make key decisions affecting West Lake’s heritage and
consulting the documents and reflecting on the site visits. tourism development (Lewis & Xue, 2003; White, 2002). Further,
During the first intensive fieldwork phase in 2005, 37 interviews the West Lake Protection Project did not require approval from the
were conducted with 22 government officials, nine private sector provincial government, although in practice it did endorse it. Yet
actors, three tourism experts, and three community members Hangzhou is not completely free to make its own decisions. One
(including a villager and village committee member from Mei Jia top-down influence is that many of the city’s politicians are
Wu). The government officials included two from the National Communist Party cadres who seek to carry out the Party’s national
Tourism Administration, two from the Zhejiang Provincial Tourism policies (F. Qian, 2007, Z. Qian, 2007). Central government has
Administration and Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress, and 18 substantial influence on key municipal appointments, with party
from the city government (including Hangzhou Legislation Office, secretaries and mayors being career administrators who are in the
Hangzhou Tourism Committee, West Lake Management Committee, city for only three to five years before moving on (Zacharias & Tang,
Hangzhou City Planning Bureau and Hangzhou Environment 2010). Nevertheless, Hangzhou’s local state and mayor were
Protection Bureau). The interviews focused on decision-making for powerful actors in relation to West Lake, particularly when civil
West Lake Protection Project and for the two schemes in this project. society organisations remain weak in China.
They included questions on actors that were involved or affected and The growing autonomy of city government has encouraged
their objectives, the actors’ interactions around this policy making, intense competition between China’s cities to attract capital invest-
and their views about these issues. During the second intensive ment and businesses. Many have ambitious growth strategies and
fieldwork phase in 2006, an additional 22 interviews were con- have engaged in major infrastructural schemes and place marketing.
ducted with six government officials, three private sector actors, This city competition echoes the trend in the West in the 1990s to
three tourism experts, and 10 community members (five villagers entrepreneurial city governance (Bramwell & Rawding, 1996),
from Mei Jia Wu, three residents living near Leifeng Pagoda, and two although in China city government has greater economic and political
residents living near another West Lake scheme). The interviews power (Zacharias & Tang, 2010). Hangzhou has been active in this city
were with people also included in the first fieldwork period, but for competition and in regulating economic development, as reflected in
community members only three of the 10 had been interviewed the 2001 Hangzhou Urban Development Strategic Plan (Wu & Zhang,
before. These interviews concentrated in more depth on certain 2007). This plan identified the city’s competitive advantages to be its
issues about the West Lake Protection Project, notably on the human resources, high quality environment (notably the West Lake
decentralisation of governance and on power relations, and the Mei district), and potential for high-tech development. Tourism is seen as
Jia Wu and Leifeng Pagoda schemes were explored in more detail. a key growth sector for the city’s economic growth and competitive
positioning, with West Lake depicted as a major tourism focus. West
5. Results and discussion Lake’s historical and scenic areas are also depicted as highly valuable
for the city’s imaging, notably to attract investors (Hangzhou
5.1. Economic and political context Municipal Government 2002).
Thus, political economy highlights the influence of economic
The structural context of China’s recent economic and political pressures in Hangzhou on the city’s overall governance. More
development influenced the approach taken to heritage protection generally, the policies for West Lake can be better understood in the
and tourism development at West Lake. As explained earlier, within context of the general preoccupation with economic growth in China
a political economy approach all aspects of society are viewed as as a whole. According to Harris (1996, p. 319), a “quest for economic
inter-connected with the broad economic and political environ- improvement currently pervades all aspects of Chinese life”. Despite
ment (Jessop, 2008). Thus, West Lake must be considered in rela- China’s traditional philosophies emphasising the harmony of
tion to wider economic and political trends. A key feature of these humans and nature, the country’s long history of shortages means
trends has been China’s transition to a more market-oriented that material or economic concerns often prevail. Zhu (1999)
economy within a socialist society, with this prompted by Deng suggests that some of China’s leaders consider that economic
Xiaoping’s economic reforms announced in 1978. Since then the growth is the goal most capable of uniting the nation’s citizens after
Communist Party has emphasised the construction of a capitalist decades of political upheavals and difficulties. In the context of
market economy that incorporates neoliberal elements together China’s tourism development, Sofield and Li (1998, p. 386) argue that
with authoritarian centralised control (Harvey, 2005). “Environmental issues are only now being considered: addressing
Political economy suggests that changes in the economic foun- ecologically sustainable development in a serious and nationally
dation eventually are likely to affect the realm of superstructure, comprehensive way is still in a distant future”. Yet the policies for the
992 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

West Lake schemes may still have been affected by rising interest in Management Committee will tell us what they want and plan to
China in environmental issues and in heritage protection (Tseng, do first. According to their aims, we help set the objectives and
1999). actions. Also, when we finish the plan, we need to show the
results and explain them to [those two organisations]. It is their
decision to say whether the plan will be implemented or not”.
5.2. Governance of the Mei Jia Wu Tea scheme
At the same time, city government is taking some risk as the
The Mei Jia Wu Tea Area scheme is located in the West Lake consultants might criticise their activities or proposals, although
heritage district but in hills about six km. from the lake (Han, 2006; the consultants might then lose future contracts (Peet, 2007). These
WLMC, 2004). It is a scheme within the West Lake Protection experts in the Mei Jia Wu scheme were also invited for their
Project, a project prompted in part by ambitions for the district’s technical expertise rather than wider socio-economic or political
designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Tea has been grown recommendations, but it was at least a small step to widening
here since the Dongjin Dynasty (317e420 A.D.) The scheme sought participation in decision-making. Further, in this scheme their
to celebrate the tea-producing traditions in Mei Jia Wu village and proposals were adopted.
thus to enhance Hangzhou’s reputation as a traditional tea- There were also several “contributing actors” who had fairly
producing centre and for the heritage of tea consumption (Shu, limited and indirect power and influence in relation to the scheme.
2005; WLMC, 2002). It also promoted this tea-producing village They had much more restricted interactions with “policy commu-
to tourists, with economic benefits for villagers and the develop- nity” members, through occasional information exchange and
ment of a new destination for tourists (WLMC, 2004). The scheme meeting attendance. They included staff of some city government
included creating a tea museum, refurbishing village buildings in departments: the Environment Protection Bureau, Construction
a traditional style and upgrading the teahouses where tea is drunk Committee, Forestry and Water Conservancy Bureau, Trans-
(both the latter funded by government), increasing tourist car portation Bureau and Security Bureau. They also included members
parking in the village, and creating a new bus route for tourists of the Mei Jia Wu Tea Village Committee and staff of a few private
from the lake to the village (WLMC, 2002). sector companies providing specialist services, notably a landscape
As a theoretical perspective, political economy directs attention design company, public bus company and construction company.
to the influence of power in policy-making processes. Thus, this Overall, however, there was only modest evidence of private sector
analysis of the Mei Jia Wu scheme identifies actors involved in its and community involvement in the scheme’s policy making.
governance, their power within Hangzhou’s wider policy networks, The villagers, teahouse investors and tour operators bringing
and their relative influence on policy making. tourists to the village, who were much affected by the scheme, had
Analysis revealed a relatively restricted and powerful “policy almost no direct influence on its governance, so their political power
community” of influential actors, comprising of members of West was very limited. Thus, there was very modest community
Lake Management Committee and of Hangzhou Tourism engagement. This is perhaps unsurprising because, as noted by
Committee, the city’s Mayor, staff in Hangzhou’s Legislative Office, Zhang (2002b, p. 479), in China “Civil society is still in its early stage
and several consultants. The West Lake Management Committee in terms of public participation and involvement in local affairs”.
and Hangzhou Tourism Committee had most power, partly due to Further, with no real election power to leverage government offi-
their overall management responsibilities for West Lake district. All cials, these community and business groups were not politically well
the scheme’s substantial policies were considered by Hangzhou’s placed to influence the development policies. Hangzhou’s decen-
Legislative Office, with the city’s Mayor giving final approval. tralised governance also meant that national and regional govern-
Relevant policies thus were produced and enforced by a small ment tiers were excluded from direct governance of the scheme.
number of political institutions in the centre of power in Hang-
zhou’s government. Decisions did not need to be considered by 5.3. Heritage protection and tourism development at Mei Jia Wu
higher government tiers or by Hangzhou’s or Zhejiang’s Commu-
nist Party Congresses because authority had been devolved to the The assessment next explores connections between political
city’s government. There were no private sector businesses or power and policy priorities from a political economy position for
community representatives in this concentrated and powerful heritage protection and tourism development at Mei Jia Wu. It also
“policy community”, which very largely comprised state actors. considers whether there was hegemony in views among policy
A group of consultants were the only non-government actors makers and other actors, whether there were signs of dominant
working closely with Hangzhou Tourism Committee and West Lake groups taking on board some views of subordinate groups
Management Committee. They had specialist tourism and heritage (Gramsci, 1971), and whether policy makers displayed “strategic
knowledge and were university academics who regularly advised selectivity” based on contingent practical experience and lessons
local government due to its limited tourism expertise. A government (Bramwell, 2011; Jessop 2008).
official suggested: “The government officials lack professional Respondents from the two politically powerful “policy
knowledge about tourism. So they rely a lot on tourism experts’ community” organisations, the West Lake Management Committee
opinions. Although the government makes the final decision, the and Hangzhou Tourism Committee, regularly commented in the
experts’ suggestions are taken very seriously”. According to Zhang interviews on the twin aims of protecting the village’s heritage and
(2002a), municipal government in China often uses consultants environment and of promoting tourism. There was a desire to
because it provides borrowed expertise, the “experts’” recommen- conserve the tea traditions and to contribute to the West Lake
dations can secure greater political legitimacy, and it exposes Protection Project in order to secure UNESCO World Heritage Site
government to less risk on decisions that follow consultants’ recom- status. At the same time, the intention was to establish a new
mendations. He depicts their use as potentially a “useful strategy used tourist destination to boost Hangzhou’s tourism and to enhance the
by the municipal government to maintain control” (p. 319) because villagers’ economic returns (WLMC, 2004). A West Lake Manage-
government appoints them, they report back to government, and they ment Committee official commented:
often follow government preferences. One consultant described how:
“We considered the teahouse businesses as an approach to
“What we have done is follow the instructions of the govern- promoting and protecting the local tea culture. Meanwhile, the
ment. Usually the Hangzhou Tourism Committee or West Lake revenue from the teahouse businesses could benefit the local
 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998 993

villagers. . In tourism development, it is important to think on the scheme’s implementation and results. There are also
about both economic growth and culture protection. This plan suggestions here that both consultants and “contributing actors”
was based on that aim”. were taking on board at least some of the views of subordinate
groups, views that are discussed next (Gramsci, 1971).
These respondents only occasionally mentioned tensions
The five local villagers differed in their responses, with some
between heritage protection and economic goals.
supporting the scheme and others opposing or having mixed
When tensions were discussed by the politically dominant
feelings. This was despite all five being directly or indirectly
“policy community” respondents it was often implied that they
involved in tourism, as was the case with most villagers, with three
could be overcome through effective planning. In relation to
of them running teahouses, one renting their house for teahouse
increasing car parking in the village, Hangzhou Tourism Commit-
use, and one providing tea products to the village’s tourist shops.
tee’s Deputy Head argued that: “these public facilities are necessary
Thus, the views of the villagers and other actors involved did not
in order to develop tourism in Mei Jia Wu. We also considered some
exhibit a very clearly uniform “hegemony”, with at least some
environmental problems that might result from them. Thus, loca-
oppositional views emerging.
tions of the car parks were all carefully selected”. Nevertheless,
On the one hand, some of the five villagers stressed the scheme’s
some argued that economic benefits outweighed negative conse-
perceived benefits, including increased tourist expenditure in
quences, recognising that trade-offs had occurred. Thus, a Hang-
teahouses, refurbished old buildings, and financial compensation
zhou Tourism Committee official contended that “some sacrifices
paid to people relocated to make way for new tourist-related
were inevitable in the process of tourism development, but such
facilities, notably the car parks. A villager said: “I feel a little bit
developments would finally bring more advantages”.
uncomfortable about the changes in the village. The refurbish-
In practice, while heritage protection was a very significant aim,
ments completely changed the village’s look. But I can see the
actors in the powerful West Lake Management Committee and
benefits from the project, of course. The teahouse businesses now
Hangzhou Tourism Committee regularly highlighted how
bring a lot of customers to us”. Another commented how: “I
improvements to village teahouse businesses would boost tourism
personally am quite satisfied with the project. Our houses have
receipts and how new car parks would benefit tourists. A West Lake
been refurbished; they look very nice now. We rent two of our
Management Committee official stated that: “I think the plan was
houses to people from the city for teahouse businesses. We receive
successful. Local people have not only had economic benefits, but
these rents very regularly”. Another resident remarked how “we
their living standards have also benefitted from the new public
are willing to move and give way to facility construction. Why not?!
facilities”. This respondent also argued that “The car parks actually
The government gives us very good financial compensation.
solve the capacity problem in the village resulting from the process
Moreover, we can do nothing about the government’s decision”.
of tourism development. This, as I can see, brings a lot of benefits.”
The last comment reflected a sense that there was little point
The consultants in the “policy community” similarly emphas-
complaining when city government had determined its course of
ised the economic benefits, but they also gave some prominence to
action. There was evidence of passive acceptance, given the limited
social and environmental problems resulting from the scheme.
extent to which villagers considered they could “voice” their views
They were critical of the car parks for adding to congestion and
or were consulted (Shin, 2010).
pollution. One consultant explained how:
On the other hand, some of the villagers also expressed concerns
“I advised the West Lake Management Committee that those car that the scheme had damaging their living environment. One
explained that “the quality of our living environment is not just
parks are unsuitable in the village. They would only encourage
more private cars to come, especially during the weekends or about how much we can earn, it is also about the natural envi-
ronment and the surrounding facilities in the village”. Another
holidays. The pollution for local villagers and the traffic
congestion are key issues”. complained:

Another stated that “Car parks are vital for tourism development “I feel that our living environment has been very much changed
in the area. However, their locations should have been considered or influenced by the project. The teahouse refurbishments have
more carefully”. Thus, the consultants could be more critical about totally changed the original look. We miss the old building style
as it told us a lot of stories about our history. We are also
the scheme, but in its planning stages they had endorsed the
unhappy about the new car parks because of the noise and
government’s official proposals.
Several of the less politically influential “contributing actors” pollution. It is also sad that some of our friends had to be relo-
also expressed concern about the Mei Jia Wu scheme’s environ- cated to further down the road in order to make way for facility
mental and heritage impacts (Li, 2005). The environmental focus of construction”.
some agencies meant they were concerned about environmental Four of the five villagers commented that some residents had
impacts. Representatives from the Environment Protection Bureau been reluctant to move out of their homes, noting that some had
and Transportation Bureau indicated that tourism had damaged the protested when they were relocated. Thus, there were some
village’s environment and traditional character. An Environment dissenting voices about the scheme among villagers (Gramsci,
Protection Bureau official stated that: “Tourism development 1971). As many as 17 of 22 respondents in the second interview
certainly is important. However, the overwhelming focus on the phase considered that villagers were likely to continue to complain
development of teahouse businesses has resulted in an excessive about the scheme.
number of tourists. These tourist activities have led to heritage and In the interviews the key “policy community” members gave
local culture being damaged”. This official also said: “We disagreed prominence to economic development through the Mei Jia Wu
with the plan for car parks in the village. We warned staff in the scheme. Yet, they showed what Jessop (2008) calls “strategic
head office that these car parks would cause too much environ- selectivity” by modifying this economic focus in their policies after
mental impact”. Similarly, the Land Use Management Bureau’s the scheme faced practical difficulties, indicating they had learnt
Deputy Director commented: “I thought the tourists should use car lessons and perhaps had taken some account of critical views.
parks outside the village, and then walk in. It would be nicer both Contingent difficulties seem to have encouraged these actors to
for the environment and locals”. Thus, some criticisms of the Mei Jia reflect and modify their views and policy priorities. Problems
Wu scheme were voiced by the “contributing actors”, partly based especially arose from the scheme’s emphasis on village teahouses
994 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

being more commercial and attracting more tourists. This led some decisions made by state actors with their accumulated political
local people to rent their teahouses to operators from outside the power in city government.
village who knew less about traditional tea culture and local dishes. As with the Mei Jia Wu scheme, this scheme’s less powerful
Also, some teahouses changed their type of business, teahouse staff “contributing actors” mainly comprised of government depart-
stood in the road encouraging people to visit their teahouse, and ments only involved with specific elements of the scheme. They
some outlets left rubbish by the road (Wang, 2005). According to often only joined in meetings at the scheme’s final decision-making
Chen (2004), the village had been “modernized” and “commer- stage, and normally they agreed with proposals already developed
cialised”, and the changes were “ruining the tea culture”. An Envi- by the “policy community” actors. The “contributing actors”
ronment Protection Bureau official stated that “The biggest problem included one commercial organisation: the Xizi Hotel, a commer-
for the village at the moment is that it is being modernised”, while cial hotel located near the pagoda. This hotel managed land used for
a villager argued that “I don’t think this helps in promoting the tea the area’s development as a tourist destination, and it also partly
culture. But surely it is good for the growth of business”. funded the scheme. Hotel representatives attended some meetings
These difficulties led the powerful West Lake Management about the scheme led by the “policy community”, although
Committee and Hangzhou Tourism Committee members to revise a Hangzhou Tourism Committee official noted that “they seldom
their “strategic selectivity”, and a second plan was developed for went to the government meetings and rarely contributed to the
the village based on new recommendations from the consultants. plan. Because they had invested money, they cared more about the
This new plan began to pay more attention to cultural heritage numbers of tourists and tourist receipts after the pagoda had been
protection issues. It included encouragements for local villagers to rebuilt”. This hotel, together with other investors in the scheme,
operate the teahouses, discouragements to external investors, became involved in the Leifeng Pagoda Tourism Management
provision of training courses for teahouse managers about tradi- Company (Xizi Hotel, 2005), which organises the area’s manage-
tional tea culture, assessments of the operational quality of each ment as a tourist destination. This commercial sector involvement
business, and teahouse grading by quality so that tourists could in the scheme has features of a corporatist public-private sector
recognise the best establishments (WLMC, 2004). “pro-growth coalition”, although the hotel had only recently been
The consultants, who were within the “policy community” but privatised, having previously been a government hotel for impor-
less powerful than the two main organisations, led work on the tant officials and international tourists (F. Qian, 2007, Z. Qian, 2007;
revised policies and they were able to soften the scheme’s original Zhang, 2002b).
focus on economic returns so that it paid more attention to Hangzhou’s residents were asked to comment on the various
traditional tea culture. This non-government group, therefore, pagoda proposals (Wang, 2000; Xin, 2000). This was an unusual
was able to tilt the scheme’s priorities more toward heritage use of public consultation in China, indicating growing awareness
protection, helping the “policy community” in its seat of power to in Hangzhou government circles of the value of being seen to
adjust its policies and perhaps respond to wider criticisms. It consider public opinion, and this helps to maintain political legit-
suggests that the “policy community” was perhaps beginning to imacy. In this case the residents were asked to decide on which
take on board the views of subordinate groups (Gramsci, 1971). pagoda model they favoured among models of rival proposals
Thus, the policy makers were responding to threats to traditional viewed at an exhibition. In practice, however, the “policy commu-
tea culture, to future capital accumulation and economic devel- nity” members used their “strategic selectivity” to choose the
opment based on that culture, and to the political credibility and scheme not favoured by most city residents who voted. This re-
standing of the state. In this way the state organisations appear to flected the “policy community’s” consolidated political power, civil
have sought to secure the future economic potential of the heri- society’s limited direct political influence, and the policy makers’
tage resources and to maintain their own political legitimacy and unwillingness to respond more fully to this challenge to their
authority. preferences. It suggests the political leaders wanted to be seen to
consult about the scheme’s heritage features, perhaps in order to
5.4. Governance of the Leifeng Pagoda scheme consolidate their authority, but they did not consider it politically
essential for their legitimacy that they should respond to public
The second scheme involved rebuilding West Lake’s Leifeng preferences that did not coincide with their own.
Pagoda, an ancient cultural symbol and tourist attraction located
near the lake shore and city centre. The original pagoda of 975 had 5.5. Heritage protection and tourism development at Leifeng
collapsed in 1924. Its ruins have long attracted tourists as they are
associated with the “Lady White Snake” legend (Zheng, 2001), Based on political economy, the assessment of the Leifeng
concerning a white snake which took the female form of Lady Pagoda scheme examines connections between policy makers’
White to attract a lover. Their love was forbidden by a Buddhist power and the policy objectives and priorities for heritage protec-
monk, however, who caught the snake and kept it captive under the tion and tourism development. It considers whether the policies
pagoda (Yan, 2003). Most Chinese people are aware of this legend, reflected “strategic selectivity” by policy makers (Jessop, 2008), and
and Leifeng Pagoda has become Hangzhou’s iconic symbol (Lin, whether policy makers and other actors held a single hegemonic
1999). Again based on political economy, the assessment estab- view about the policies (Gramsci, 1971).
lishes the actors involved in the scheme’s governance, their relative Important aims for the dominant lead organisations were to
political power, and their influence on policy making. protect and carefully to display the site’s historical relics, to
The scheme’s most influential “policy community” actors were construct a new pagoda above the relicts as a replacement feature
the same as for the Mei Jia Wu scheme: members of West Lake of the historic cultural landscape, to contribute to West Lake’s
Management Committee and Hangzhou Tourism Committee, the World Heritage Site designation bid, and to educate people about
city’s Mayor, Hangzhou Legislative Office, and a few heritage and the site (WLMC, 2005). In the interviews the “policy community”
tourism consultants. Thus, they were limited in number, in the actors often discussed three aims, which were regularly depicted as
same politically powerful positions in the city’s policy-making mutually beneficial: heritage protection, tourism development, and
circles and, apart from the consultants, all were within government. tourism as an economic catalyst for the city. A West Lake
The consultants were from a different university to those involved Management Committee official argued that “The tourism devel-
in Mei Jia Wu, but again they acted as advisors, with final policy opment benefits our heritage protection work because it brings
 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998 995

a lot of income, which is necessary for protecting the relics, other One consultant argued that: “it was essential to consider the
work, and educating people about the site”. Similarly, one of the functions in the surrounding tourist scenic district, and the long-
scheme’s consultants contended that “the economic profits from term benefits of this have been proved for tourists”. He also
the tourism development can further enhance the heritage argued that “the modern look could be more embedded into the
protection work”. Hangzhou’s Tourism Committee Deputy Director current Hangzhou city”, suggesting that a modern aesthetic was
stressed that preservation of the site’s relics meant it was possible more appropriate for Hangzhou’s image as a city. Similarly, the
to “share our cultural heritage with the tourists, and to raise their Deputy Chairman of Hangzhou’s Tourism Committee asserted that
awareness about the need to protect them”. the design was suitable for Hangzhou’s “modern and fashionable
The influential “policy community” actors also regularly city image”.
focused on the site as a tourist attraction, with many discussing There were expressions of unease, however, with the relative
the importance of planning for large tourist numbers. The Mayor priorities between heritage protection and tourism at the pagoda,
asserted that “Leifeng Pagoda should be rebuilt as the icon of indicating there were challenges to the “hegemonic” policy aims
Hangzhou’s traditional culture, and tourism definitely shows conceived at the political centre (Gramsci, 1971; Peet, 2007). A local
the way” (Xin, 2000). The site’s official plan also focused much academic complained that “The protection of cultural relics in
attention on developing the site as a major tourist attraction Leifeng Pagoda is actually destroyed by the tourism development”
(Chen, 2001; Lin, 1999; WLMC, 2000; Zheng, 2001). This involved (Morning Express, 2005, p. 6). A newspaper commentator argued
developing the pagoda surroundings as a landscaped tourist that “the modern infrastructure totally destroyed the pagoda’s
“scenic district”, and restoring the “beauty of the sunset at Lei- culture, and made the Leifeng Pagoda’s identity vague” (Chen, 2001,
feng Pagoda”, which is promoted to tourists as one of West Lake’s p.3). There were “counter-hegemonic” comments on blog websites,
ten most attractive views (WLMC, 2005). The site’s proximity to with one tourist describing how “The pagoda with the modern lifts
the city centre also means its development adds to the city was a real shock to us. We were looking for the remains of those
centre’s critical mass of attractions and property values legends, but we could only see a modern, artificial big toy” (Shuzai,
(Hangzhou Municipal Government, 2002). Because the pagoda is 2005). When local residents were asked to vote on their preferred
so widely recognised across China, the site also has much model of the pagoda’s design, most chose a traditional design,
significance for the imaging and promotion of Hangzhou as a city. unlike the one actually built. Criticisms of the final design were
As Hangzhou Tourism Committee’s Deputy Chairman explained: quite frequent in the interviews with ten Hangzhou residents. One
“the Leifeng Pagoda project is of interest to all people in Hang- commented that “The design is too modern and over-done”, and
zhou, and it is even influential for the whole nation. This is another noted that
because the legend of Leifeng Pagoda has become a key symbol of
“Most of our friends voted for a model in a traditional design. I
Hangzhou city.”
don’t like this new pagoda at all. It does not fit those romantic
Within this focus on tourism development, the “policy com-
legends about Leifeng Pagoda. It totally breaks the links between
munity’s” “strategic selectivity” favoured a replacement pagoda
the pagoda and the meaning of the ‘Leifeng Pagoda’”.
with a layout allowing easy access around the site by substantial
tourist numbers, resulting in a preference for construction with On several occasions, however, the “policy community” did
obviously modern infrastructure and materials. This led to the use review its own decisions about the Leifeng Pagoda scheme. But,
of external and internal lifts, external moving escalators, and ultimately, this powerful grouping’s own “strategic selectivity”
concrete and bronze in the new pagoda’s construction. The Hang- prevailed, favouring a more modern replacement pagoda and
zhou Tourism Committee’s Deputy Head explained that: a scheme arguably strongly focused on tourism-related economic
development, thus ignoring the views of others who were less
“We cannot just consider the look of the pagoda; we also need to
politically powerful and who favoured a more traditional design
think about the functional aspects. The pagoda is going to
(Zhang, Xu, Su, & Ryan, 2009).
receive a lot of tourists after the rebuilding. We need to make
sure it won’t crash down and that it can last for a long time even
6. Conclusions
under extreme weather conditions”.
Interventions by the state can be important for the relative
One of the scheme’s consultants admitted that:
priorities given to heritage protection and tourism-related
“Some people do not like the current pagoda because they think economic development at heritage sites. The study examined how
it is too modern. But we are more concerned about how long the governance affected these priorities for Mei Jia Wu and Leifeng
pagoda will survive, how to protect the cultural heritage prod- Pagoda schemes in Hangzhou’s West Lake Protection Project. A
ucts inside the pagoda, and also how to establish the tourist political economy approach was used, where the economic and
attraction here. For example, the lifts in the pagoda will easily political spheres are viewed as inter-connected. This approach
bring tourists to the top of the pagoda for the beautiful scenery.” involved examining the schemes in relation to the power and
influence of different actors in the schemes’ governance, the state’s
Another “policy community” official noted that: “The current
power and its roles in the economy and in responding to public
pagoda uses much.bronze, which can help the pagoda to resist
views and maintaining its legitimacy, and the extent of any “hege-
deterioration for a very long period, and it can bear the weight of
mony” in values and attitudes among powerful and less influential
large numbers of tourists at the same time” (Xin, 2000).
groups. The study is important as there is a need for more research
The “strategic selectivity” favouring large tourist numbers also
on how governance affects heritage-tourism relations, particularly
led to the site plan including a substantial area around the pagoda for
from a political economy perspective. It is also necessary to under-
tourist use. A Hangzhou Tourism Committee respondent explained:
stand these connections in China as this country has a distinctive
“We also need to think about the future of the pagoda. After its and evolving socio-economic and political system, and as it already
rebuilding, the pagoda would receive a lot of tourists. That’s why attracts huge volumes of domestic and international tourists.
we also needed to include in the plan the area surrounding the The relative priorities for heritage protection and tourism
pagoda and to make the whole area an attractive tourist development at West Lake were considered in the context of wide
destination”. economic and political trends. In particular, the growing autonomy
996 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

of city government in China has encouraged intense competition the powerful “policy community” members also saw the value of
between cities to attract inward business investment and to being seen to consider public opinion about the heritage features of
promote capital accumulation, which is seen in neoliberal city the scheme, perhaps in order to enhance their political legitimacy.
growth strategies and city marketing. Hangzhou’s city plan reflects Nevertheless, they did not consider it politically essential for that
this trend, and it depicts West Lake as a strong attraction for legitimacy that they should respond to the public preferences when
investors in the city, and the tourism industry associated with West it was found that they did not coincide with their own political and
Lake is presented as a significant growth sector. Thus, there are economic project, with many members of the public favouring
ambitions for territorial competitiveness and economic growth a more traditional pagoda design. Instead, the key policy makers
behind how Hangzhou’s city government viewed West Lake, and displayed “strategic selectivity” by ignoring the dissenting voices
this may help to explain the prominence of tourism development and opting for a design much influenced by tourism needs and
and economic returns in the two schemes. preferences for a “modern” city image.
Heritage-tourism relations in the two schemes were also The study examined only two schemes in one heritage tourism
significantly affected by the character and objectives of the project in one city, but it may point to a wider convergence in urban
schemes’ policy makers. It was shown how key decisions on policy China between governance through highly powerful local “policy
priorities were made by a fairly restricted and powerful “policy communities” and capitalism. Local government in Hangzhou had
community” of city government actors, comprising of members of a strongly entrepreneurial and growth-oriented policy agenda. If
West Lake Management Committee and Hangzhou Tourism this policy convergence applies in other cities in China, then it
Committee, the city’s mayor, and staff of Hangzhou’s legislative entails potential dangers that heritage protection could be
office, and they were advised by consultants. The decentralisation neglected in the context of the growing focus on tourism devel-
of governance from Beijing meant that national and regional opment and promotion.
government was excluded from direct involvement in the schemes. A political economy approach was used to understand the
The “contributing actors” for the schemes had far less influence on governance of heritage protection and tourism development
policy making, and there were only modest beginnings of other priorities at Hangzhou’s West Lake. This approach is relational and
wider participation in decision-making. Probably the most influ- dialectical, and it encouraged assessment of the West Lake project’s
ential actors outside of government were the university academics governance in the context of society’s wider reciprocal relations
who were paid consultants for both schemes, although there were between heritage, tourism, the state, economy, society and societal
limits to their activities and influence. A private sector hotel was values. The local state’s activities affecting heritage and tourism
also involved in Leifeng Pagoda’s policy making, but its participa- thus were considered in relation to the broad operation of
tion was modest. Further, there was a public consultation process economic and political systems. The connections between the
for Leifeng Pagoda where residents were asked to select their fav- project’s governance and some of society’s wider relations were not
oured proposal for the scheme, but the “policy community” finally always immediately apparent, but using this approach it emerged
chose a scheme not favoured by the public. Taken overall, therefore, that some were very significant. The study’s political economy
the policy priorities in the schemes were largely directed by state perspective rejects ideas that policy interventions result from
actors with much accumulated power in city government. a deterministic logic. Thus, while economic and power relations
The powerful “policy community” actors in city government were considered potentially important, attention was also directed
clearly were concerned about heritage protection, but they were to the agency of actors in their beliefs and responses to specific
also strongly focused on promoting tourism-related economic circumstances at particular conjunctures. Individual actors and
development. They often saw mutual benefits between heritage their “strategic selectivity” in specific conjunctures were shown to
and tourism, such as through heritage resources enhancing the be highly relevant. More research might usefully examine the
city’s image and tourism growth, and in turn these economic gains governance of heritage and tourism by considering micro-scale
could justify costly heritage protection work. It was argued, agency, macro-scale structures and the dialectical relations
however, that these actors put a degree of emphasis on tourism at between them. Differing and competing discourses and represen-
the expense of heritage protection, despite the schemes being tations are also important (Bramwell, 2006). Thus, future studies in
within the West Lake Protection Project and partly intended to this field could also explore in more depth than was possible here
enhance West Lake’s potential to secure World Heritage Site how subjective meanings and discursive practices are implicated in
designation. This emphasis on tourism growth and associated these relationships.
economic development was seen in the focus on teahouse business
development and additional car parking in Mei Jia Wu village, and
in the layout and “modern” materials and infrastructure at Leifeng References
Pagoda. The policy elite appear to have stressed reshaping heritage
Avdikos, V. (2011). Local hegemonic blocs: the case of tourism in Rhodes. European
for enhanced economic returns and for political ends. Urban and Regional Studies, 18(1), 77e92.
Yet the views of the many actors with interests in the two Bevir, M. (2009). Key concepts in governance. London: Sage.
schemes did not exhibit a very clearly uniform “hegemony” in Bianchi, R. (2004). Tourism restructuring and the politics of sustainability: a critical
view from the European periphery (The Canary Islands). Journal of Sustainable
relation to the priorities for heritage protection and tourism-related Tourism, 12(6), 495e529.
economic development, with at least some oppositional opinions Bramwell, B. (2006). Actors, power, and discourses of growth limits. Annals of
emerging. In the case of the Mei Jia Wu scheme the “policy Tourism Research, 33(4), 957e978.
Bramwell, B. (2011). Governance, the state and sustainable tourism: a political
community” members do appear to have responded to practical economy approach. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 19(4/5), 459e477.
problems arising from the emphasis on expanding tea businesses, Bramwell, B., & Lane, B. (2011). Critical research on the governance of tourism and
and it is possible they were beginning to take on board dissenting sustainability. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 19(4/5), 411e421.
Bramwell, B., & Meyer, D. (2007). Power and tourism policy relations in transition.
voices among subordinate groups. The policy makers here appear
Annals of Tourism Research, 34(3), 766e788.
to have adjusted their priorities between heritage protection and Bramwell, B., & Rawding, L. (1996). Tourism marketing images of industrial cities.
tourism development in response to the threats to traditional tea Annals of Tourism Research, 23(1), 201e221.
culture, to future capital accumulation and economic development Chhabra, D. (2009). Proposing a sustainable marketing framework for heritage
tourism. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 17(3), 301e320.
based on that culture to the views of other actors, and to their own Chen, X. (2001, April 19). Protection of heritage relics under Leifeng Pagoda. Daily
political legitimacy and authority. With the Leifeng Pagoda scheme Business3, (In Chinese).
 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998 997

Chen, X. (2004, October 10). New scenic district: Mei Jia Wu tea village in Hang- Qian, Z. (2007). Institutions and local growth coalitions in China’s urban land
zhou. Daily Business6, (In Chinese). reform: the case of Hangzhou high-technology zone. Asia Pacific Viewpoint,
Cornelissen, S. (2011). Regulation theory and its evolution and limitations in 48(2), 219e233.
tourism studies. In J. Mosedale (Ed.), Political economy of tourism. A critical Rhodes, R. (1999). Control and power in central-local government relations (2nd ed.).
perspective (pp. 39e54). London: Routledge. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Goodwin, M., & Painter, J. (1996). Local governance, the crisis of Fordism and the Ritchie, J., & Spencer, L. (1994). Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research.
changing geography of regulation. Transactions Institute of British Geographers, In A. Bryman, & R. Burgess (Eds.), Analysing qualitative data (pp. 173e194).
21(4), 635e648. London: Routledge.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks. London: Lawrence and Ryan, C., Chaozhi, Z., & Zeng, D. (2011). The impacts of tourism at a UNESCO heritage
Wishart. site in China e a need for a meta-narrative? The case of the Kaiping Diaolou.
Hall, M. (1994). Tourism and politics. Policy, power and place. Chichester: Wiley. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 19(6), 747e765.
Hall, M. (2005). Tourism: Rethinking the social science of mobility. Harlow: Pearson. Scott, N., Baggio, R., & Cooper, C. (2008). Quantitative approaches to tourism
Hall, M. (2006). Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports mega- network analysis. In N. Scott, R. Baggio, & C. Cooper (Eds.), Network analysis and
events: the thin policies of competitiveness within the hard outcomes of tourism. From theory to practice (pp. 145e223). Clevedon: Channel View.
neoliberalism. The Sociological Review, 54(Suppl. S2), 59e70. Scott, N., Cooper, C., & Baggio, R. (2008). Destination networks. Four Australian
Hampton, M. (2005). Heritage, local communities and economic development. cases. Annals of Tourism Research, 35(1), 169e188.
Annals of Tourism Research, 32(3), 735e759. Shin, H. (2010). Urban conservation and revalorisation of dilapidated historic
Han, Q. (2006, September 10). New image of Hangzhou. City Express5, (In Chinese). quarters: the case of Nanluoguxiang in Beijing. Cities, 27, 543e554.
Hangzhou Municipal Government. (2002). Marching toward the Qiantang River Shu, Y. (2005, September 27). Image of Mei Jia Wu. Xinhua News2, (In Chinese).
era: Hangzhou urban strategic plan. Shanghai: Tongji University Press. (In Shue, V. (2008). Rule as repertory and the compound essence of authority. Modern
Chinese). China, 34(1), 141e151.
Hangzhou Municipal Government. (2006). Introduction to government departments Shuzai. (2005). Views on Leifeng Pagoda. Retrieved 21.05.06, from. http://shuzhai.
in Hangzhou. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government. (In Chinese). net/view/Article.asp?id¼602.
Hangzhou Statistics Bureau. (2009). Annual population statistics 2008e2009. Sofield, T., & Li, S. (1998). Tourism development and cultural policies in China.
Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government. (In Chinese). Annals of Tourism Research, 25(2), 362e392.
Hangzhou Tourism Committee. (2009). 2009 tourism statistics and future trends. Sofield, T., & Li, S. (2011). Tourism governance and sustainable national develop-
Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government. (In Chinese). ment in China: a macro-level synthesis. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 19(4/5),
Harris, R. (1996). Approaches to conserving vulnerable wildlife in China: does the 501e534.
colour of cat matter e if it catches mice? Environmental Values, 5(4), 303e334. Sun, L. (2008). Societal transition: new issues in the field of the sociology of
Harrison, D. (2004). Introduction. Contested narratives in the domain of world development. Modern China, 34(1), 88e113.
heritage. Current Issues in Tourism, 7(4/5), 281e290. Timothy, D. (2007). Introduction. In D. Timothy (Ed.), Managing heritage and cultural
Harvey, D. (1996). Justice, nature and the geography of difference. Oxford: Blackwell. tourism resources. Critical essays, Vol. one (pp. xiexxv). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tseng, E. (1999). The environment and the people’s republic of China. In D. Soden, &
Harvey, D. (2010). The enigma of capital. And the crises of capitalism. London: Profile. B. Steel (Eds.), Handbook of global environmental policy and administration (pp.
Henderson, J. (2000). Attracting tourists to Singapore’s Chinatown: a case study in 381e392). Basel: Marcel Dekker.
conservation and promotion. Tourism Management, 21(5), 525e534. UNESCO. (1999). West Lake’s evaluation report on the application to be a world
Ho, P., & McKercher, B. (2004). Managing heritage resources as tourism products. cultural heritage site. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Government Internal Document. (In
Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research, 9(3), 255e266. Chinese).
Jessop, B. (1990). State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place. Cambridge: UNESCO. (2003). Re-evaluation report on West Lake’s resources. Hangzhou: Hang-
Polity. zhou Government internal document. (In Chinese).
Jessop, B. (2008). State power. A strategic-relational approach. Cambridge: Polity. UNESCO. (2008). Hangzhou West Lake e traditional longjing tea garden landscape.
Jin, J., & Zou, H.-F. (2003). Soft budget constraints and local government in China. In UNESCO submission 28/3/2008. Retrieved from. http://whc.unesco.org.
J. Rodden, G. Eskeland, & J. Litvak (Eds.), Fiscal decentralization and the challenge Wang, P. (2000, November 17). Leifeng pagoda rebuilding scheme in Hangzhou. City
of hard budget constraints (pp. 289e324). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Express4, (In Chinese).
Johnson, N. (1999). Framing the past: time, space and the politics of heritage Wang, S. (2005, October 15). Profitability of tea houses in Hangzhou. Daily Busi-
tourism in Ireland. Political Geography, 18(2), 187e207. ness6, (In Chinese).
Kickert, W., Klijn, E., & Koppenjan, J. (1997). Introduction: a management Warren, C. (1998). Tanah Lot: the cultural and environmental politics of resort
perspective on policy networks. In W. Kickert, E. Klijn, & J. Koppenjan (Eds.), development in Bali. In P. Hirsch, & C. Warren (Eds.), The politics of envi-
Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector (pp. 1e13). London: ronment in southeast Asia: Resource and resistance (pp. 229e261). London:
Sage. Routledge.
Lewis, J., & Xue, L. (2003). Social change and political reform in China: meeting the West Lake Scenic District Management Committee (WLMC). (2000). Start from Xi Hu
challenge of success. The China Quarterly, 176, 926e942. Xi Jin. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government. (In Chinese).
Li, J. (2007). Economic growth and tourism development in Hangzhou. Speech at West Lake Scenic District Management Committee (WLMC). (2002). West Lake
second world leisure congress in Hangzhou. Hangzhou: World Leisure Congress. Water Area management regulations. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Govern-
Li, M. (2005, October 18). Business in Mei Jia Wu. Hangzhou News12, (In Chinese). ment. (In Chinese).
Lin, Z. (1999). Research on Hangzhou’s history and culture. Hangzhou: Hangzhou West Lake Scenic District Management Committee (WLMC). (2004). Mei Jia Wu Tea
Publications. Area project background. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government. (In
Long, N. (2001). Development sociology. London: Routledge. Chinese).
Long, N. (2004). Actors, interfaces and development intervention: meanings, West Lake Scenic District Management Committee (WLMC). (2005). West Lake
purposes and powers. In T. Kontinen (Ed.), Development intervention. Actor and Protection Project introduction. Hangzhou: Hangzhou Municipal Government.
activity perspectives (pp. 14e36). Finland: University of Helsinki, Institute for (In Chinese).
Development Studies. While, A., Jonas, A., & Gibbs, D. (2010). From sustainable development to carbon
McKercher, B., & du Cros, H. (2002). Cultural tourism: The partnership between control: eco-state restructuring and the politics of urban and regional devel-
tourism and cultural heritage management. New York: The Haworth Press. opment. Transactions Institute of British Geographers, 35, 76e93.
McKercher, B., Ho, P., & du Cros, H. (2005). Relationship between tourism and White, G. (2002). Riding the tiger: The politics of economic reform in post-Mao China.
cultural heritage management: evidence from Hong Kong. Tourism Manage- Chicago: Stanford University Press.
ment, 26(4), 539e548. Wu, F. (2002). China’s changing urban governance in the transition towards a more
Morning Express. (2005, December 12). Heritage relics protection around Leifeng market-oriented economy. Urban Studies, 39(7), 1071e1093.
Pagoda, p. 6. (In Chinese). Wu, F., & Zhang, J. (2007). Planning the competitive city-region: the emergence of
Mosedale, J. (Ed.). (2011). Political economy of tourism. A critical perspective. London: strategic development plan in China. Urban Affairs Review, 42(5), 714e740.
Routledge. Xin, Y. (2000, December 5). Political concerns on the Leifeng Pagoda rebuilding
Oi, J. (1995). The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy. China scheme. Hangzhou Daily2, (In Chinese).
Quarterly, 144, 1132e1149. Xizi Hotel. (2005). Introduction to Xizi Hotel. Retrieved 25.12.07, from Xizi Hotel
Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (1992). Local modes of regulation? Regulation theory, Web site. http://www.xizihotel.com/wangzhuang.htm.
Thatcherism and uneven development. Geoforum, 23(3), 347e363. Yan, W. (2003). Myths and fairy stories of Hangzhou. Zhejiang: Huadong Publications.
Peet, R. (1998). Modern geographical thought. Oxford: Blackwell. (In Chinese).
Peet, R. (2007). Geography of power. The making of global economic policy. London: Yan, H., & Bramwell, B. (2008). Cultural tourism, ceremony and the state in China.
Zed Books. Annals of Tourism Research, 35(4), 969e989.
Pforr, C. (2006). Tourism policy in the making. An Australian network study. Annals Yang, L., Wall, G., & Smith, S. (2008). Ethnic tourism development: chinese
of Tourism Research, 33(1), 87e108. government perspectives. Annals of Tourism Research, 35(3), 751e771.
Purcell, M., & Nevins, J. (2005). Pushing the boundary: state restructuring, state Zacharias, J., & Tang, Y. (2010). Restructuring and repositioning Shenzhen, China’s
theory, and the case of US e Mexico border enforcement in the 1990s. Political new mega city. Progress in Planning, 73(4), 209e249.
Geography, 24, 211e235. Zhang, C., Xu, H., Su, B., & Ryan, C. (2009). Visitors’ perceptions of the use of cable
Qian, F. (2007). China’s burra charter: the formation and implementation of the cars and lifts in Wulingyuan World Heritage Site, China. Journal of Sustainable
China principles. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 13(3), 255e264. Tourism, 17(5), 551e566.
998 Y. Wang, B. Bramwell / Tourism Management 33 (2012) 988e998

Zhang, I. (2004). History of Hangzhou. Retrieved 10.2.07, from Imperial Tours Web Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China:
site. http://www.imperialtours.net/hangzhou_history.htm (In Chinese). implications for growth and inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4),
Zhang, T. (2002a). Decentralization, localization, and the emergence of a quasi- 713e726.
participatory decision-making structure in urban development in Shanghai. Zheng, Y. (2001). The ruins of Leifeng Pagoda. Nanjing: Jinling Publication. (In Chinese).
International Planning Studies, 7(4), 303e323. Zhu, J. (1999). Local growth coalition: the context and implications of China’s
Zhang, T. (2002). Urban development and a socialist pro-growth coalition in gradualist urban land reforms. International Journal of Urban and Regional
Shanghai. Urban Affairs Review, 37(4), 475e499. Research, 23(3), 534e548.